1 corrigendum to "sectoral growth and income inequality in asean-5 countries: case of low-middle income economies" dewa gede sidan raeskyesa school of business and economics, universitas prasetiya mulya bsd raya barat i, kavling edu i no.1, bsd city, serpong tangerang, 15339, indonesia author's e-mail dewa.sidan@pmbs.ac.id / raeskyesa@gmail.com corrigendum 1. in the article titled sectoral growth and income inequality in asean-5 countries: case of low-middle income economies, the last name of one of the authors whom i cite, "iván gonzález-górdon”, was missspelled in the text citation and the references as "górdon." therefore, the reference should be cited as follows: "gonzález-gordón, i., & resosudarmo, b. p. (2018). a sectoral growth‐income inequality nexus in indonesia. regional science policy & practice, 11(1), 123-139.". accordingly, the text citation should also be corrected and written as follows: (gonzález-gordón & resosudarmo, 2018). 2. still in the same article, part of the statement in the note under table a1 and table a2 was mistakenly written as "significance level ***p<0,001, **p<0,01, and *p<0,05." it should be written as "significance level ***p<0,1, **p<0,01, and *p<0,05.". this correction does not affect the main result at all. the author would like to express his gratitude to the journal of asean studies' editorial team from binus university for giving this correction opportunity and to ivan gonzález-gordón, who helped the correction. editorial: asean and taiwan relations finally, the second edition of journal of asean studies is published this december. in this second edition, jas covers fifth scholarly articles. first article entitled “relationship between military expenditure and economic growth in asean: evidence from indonesia”, written by tangguh chairil, dedy s. sinaga, and annisa i febrianti from indonesia defense university. in this article, writers investigate the relations between military expenditure and economic growth in southeast asia. they examine the relations by first reviewing literature on the relationship between military expenditure and economic growth, then by empirically testing the causal relationship between the two variables by using the augmented sollow growth model in the case of indonesia. the result shows that indonesia's military expenditure has positive effect on the country's economic growth, which is most possibly caused by development of human capital as effect of military expenditure. while chairil, sinaga, and febrianti’s article focuses on the relations between military and economic growth, the second article focuses on the relations between asean members with their non-asean neighbour. the second article entitled “india’s democratic identity and its policy towards myanmar from 1988 to 2010” written by htwe hteik tin lwin from myanmar ministry of foreign affairs focuses on the relations between myanmar and india. she argues that in the background of indo-myanmar development cooperation, india has made efforts to promote democratic value in myanmar differently from other western democratic countries. engagement policy has shaped indo-myanmar relations in the 1990s. india ‘engagement policy’, ‘non-isolation’ and ‘development cooperation’ with myanmar government has brought up contractions. the third, fourth, and the fifth articles still discuss the relations between asean countries with its east asia neighbor with particular emphasis on the relations between indonesia and taiwan. luh nyoman ratih wagiswari kabinawa from bina nusantara university, writes about economic and socio-cultural relations between indonesia and taiwan: an indonesian perspective, 1990-2012. her article analyzes the puzzle why did indonesia maintain durable economic and socio-cultural relations with taiwan? she argues that due to the indonesian people as promoter of ideas lead interactions with taiwan, indonesia is able to maintain its durable economic and socio-cultural relations with taiwan despite under the absence of diplomatic relations. people-to-people interaction builds three kinds of interactions between indonesia and taiwan on the issue of economic and socio-cultural: unofficial interaction, semi-official interaction, and official interaction. while the third article focuses on both economic and socio-cultural aspect, the fourth article entitled forging asean and east asia cooperation: the importance of counterparts in promoting people-topeople interaction between indonesia and taiwan, paramitaningrum from tamkang university, taiwan examines how students can actually become one of the significant actors to bridge indonesia taiwan relations despite the lack of diplomatic relations between both countries. the fifth article explores the condition of migrant workers from asean countries in taiwan. in their article entitled asean migrants: a boon for taiwan’s aging populace, hong-ming huang and jennjaw soong asked whether the taiwanese government policy that allows for southeast asian migrants to care for the elderly in taiwan a good one, or a bad one? in order to answer the question, they analyze the politicaleconomic aspects of this policy and offer certain recommendations and conclusions. one conclusion is the fact that southeast asian workers take better care of the elderly in taiwan when eldercare is provided through institutions, rather than if the care was provided by just one foreign caregiver engaged directly by families of the elderly. the positive effects of ‘institution-style’ workers are reflected in the work performance, life quality and management as well as labor rights protection. last but not least, editor-in-chief would like to express highest appreciation for authors who submitted their articles as response from our invitation. we also thank to indonesian association for international relations for supporting this joint publication with centre for business and diplomatic studies (cbds) department of international relations bina nusantara university. in order to become internationally renowned journal, we are very happy to receive comments, feedback and advice for quality improvement of the journal. we hope jas will bring an academic oasis that nurture new thoughts and encourage innovative practical application of asean studies in southeast asian region and the world. jakarta, 1 december 2013 tirta nugraha mursitama, phd editor-in-chief editorial continuing contribution on asean studies warm greetings from journal of asean studies (jas). this edition is an exceptional one. jas has been around for almost eight years in filling the gap in studies on asean-related issue. to freshen up, in our eighth volume, we change the layout of the journal so that it can be easy to read for our readers. the changes made are aimed at improving the quality of jas to contribute to the development of asean studies. these changes are also the first step in our ambition for jas to be indexed in internationally reputable databases such as scopus and the web of science (thomson reuters). there are also restructuring in our editorial boards. moch faisal karim phd is our current managing editor along with dr lili yulyadi. to create more effective communications, we have decided to rearrange the editorial board to be more focused on a particular area of expertise. we are thankful for scholars and practitioners who served in our previous editorial boards. they will keep helping us to develop the journal through their knowledge and guidance as our reviewers. currently, we are happy to announce jas will have eight scholars who serve as our international editorial board. prof. amitav acharya of the american university and assoc. prof. pierre van der eng of australian national university are still part of our editorial board since 2018. we would welcome prof. yahia h. zoubir of kedge business school, france, prof. jenn-jaw soong of national cheng keung university, taiwan, assoc. prof. nanthakumar loganathan of universiti teknologi malaysia, malaysia, assoc. prof. kuik cheng-chwee of national university of malaysia (ukm), assoc. prof. adam tyson of leeds university, united kingdom, and dr abbas mardani of the university of south florida as our new editorial boards. we are proudly presenting to all readers volume 8, no 1, 2020. in this volume, several issues related to economic diplomacy and terrorism as well as the development of asean in regards to economic diplomacy, terrorism, as well as its relations with other regions. this volume is comprised of five articles. the first article, written by dewa gede sidan raeskyesa explores the relationship between growth in economic sectors, especially manufacturing, service, and agriculture, towards income inequality in asean-5. in this article, raeskyesa shows that the agricultural sector has been more inclusive than others, including manufacturing and services. therefore, it is suggested that this sector can be enhanced and become the focus of the development agenda for the sample countries. the second article, written by defbry margiansyah examines how indonesia’s economic diplomacy engages with the potential of digital and new economic activities in facing the challenges of digital disruption. he argues that indonesia’s government has to pursue integrative strategies in its economic diplomacy by integrating new economy through the construction of “innovation diplomacy.” he further shows that the existing economic diplomacy is strongly directed to “conventional” commercial diplomacy. at the same time, it gives insufficient space for a new economy to develop significantly, due to the absence of concept supporting the operation off innovation-focused economic diplomacy. the third article, written by floranesia lantang and edwin m.b. tambunan examines the impact of the internationalization of papuan issue on indonesia’s policy on the south pacific region. they argue that the internationalization of “west papua” issue through social media has contributed to a shift of indonesia’s policy to the south pacific region from ignorance to initiative approach. however, they further argue that the initiative approach from indonesia is merely narrowing the gap of the issue instead of reducing the internationalization of the west papua issue. the fourth article, written by ali wibisono and aisha r. kusumasomantri, assess the cooperation between the european union (eu) and the association of southeast asian nations (asean) in the field of counterterrorism. in this article, wibisono and kusumasomantri argue that that the asean-eu counterterrorism (ct) cooperation is not about the targeting of specific terrorist individuals, cells, or organizations. instead, ct cooperation is about facilitating a more comprehensive security governance cooperation where european standards and experience are transferred to southeast asia for purposes of regional security and diplomatic relations. the last article, written by yunita permatasari provides an overall assessment of the role of indonesia’s in asean economic community. she argues that indonesia should see the potential of the aec and maximize it to benefit the strengthening of indonesia’s strength. finally, as the editor-in-chief, i would like to express my deepest gratitude to all authors who submitted their manuscripts to jas. i would also like to extend my highest appreciation to all reviewers who have contributed to the quality of the manuscripts published in jas. all parties that supported the journal from the indonesian association for international relations (aihii), the center for business and diplomatic studies (cbds) of the department of international relations, bina nusantara university, and research and technology transfer office (rtto) bina nusantara university are also very much appreciated. prof. dr. tirta n. mursitama, ph.d. editor-in-chief journal of asean studies editorial is asean still important? from macro to micro economic perspective warm greetings from the desk of editor in chief of journal of asean studies (jas). first of all, i would like to share good news on the acceptance of our journal, jas, to be indexed in scopus as indicated by the letter from the content selection & advisory board (csab) of the scopus dated on 26th november 2020. currently we are under the process of signing agreement. jas volume 8, no. 2, (2020) is presented to you when the world and especially, asean member countries face the extraordinary challenges to humanities posted by covid-19 pandemic. for almost 10 months, association of southeast asian nation (asean) as regional organization in southeast asia has been facing human security issues that disturb the stability and sustainability of the asean strategic regional goals and programs, and thus, might delay its achievements. it has been detected that the demise of several thousand people died because of the pandemic in the region has shifted the regional orientation to more domestic and inworld looking. in these circumstances, the editorial board has selected six papers that underline various issues from macroeconomics to microeconomics in the region, from policing cyberspace to conflict resolution in southeast asia, and from indonesia to china’s foreign policies towards asean, contributed by various researchers, academician and scholars from the region and beyond. first article is on macroeconomic determinants of auto sales in five asean countries, namely, indonesia, malaysia, singapore, thailand, and vietnam, contributed by suwinto johan from president university, indonesia. johan examines the determinants of car sales in these asean countries by looking at five macroeconomic variables i.e., consumer price index, gross domestic product per capita, changes in gross domestic product per capita, foreign exchange rate, and interest rate. by deploying the multilinear regression method with statistical package for the social sciences (spss) software to test the research model, johan argues that the growth of gdp per capita does not influence car sales. however, he asserts that the previous period for inflation, gross domestic product per capita, interest rate, and the foreign exchange rate significantly influenced on car sales in five asean countries. second article is on microeconomics contributed by myrtle faye laberinto solina from the philippines open university. the author highlights the current demographics, roles, and experiences of women involved in micro, small, and medium enterprises (msmes), and provides information on the current policies programs, and services. using available secondary data, she compares and contrasts these msmes among asean countries namely, the philippines, singapore, and myanmar. finally, she recommends measures to address the impeding factors in these countries. furthermore, technological advancement has triggered social networking sites become increasingly relevant in the study of democracy and culture in southeast asia. fernan talamayan from national chiao tung university taiwan, has contributed to understanding policing cyberspaces, especially on online repression that has been practiced in the philippine and thailand. talamayan examines the overt and covert policing of daily interactions in digital environments. using michel foucault’s notion of government and biopolitical power model, he discloses governmental technologies’ disciplinary mechanisms. in doing so, he sheds light on the practice of active and passive self-censorship in which the former was driven by the pursuit of a moral self-image and the latter by state-sponsored fear. the next article highlights issues on mediating civil conflicts in southeast asia. john lee candelaria from hiroshima university, japan pinpoints that aceh and mindanao conflict resolutions have given significant lessons. candelaria identifies the kinds of mediation and qualities of mediators that lead to achievement of peace agreements in these two cases. the author focuses on path dependence, critical junctures, and periodization approaches in the comparative analysis of aceh and mindanao third-party mediation through a qualitative examination that involved comparative process tracing (cpt), a two-step methodological approach that combines theory, chronology, and comparison. finally, he asserts that mediators as instrumental to the peace agreements of the aceh and mindanao conflicts are those who appease the commitment issues of the peace negotiation and ensure the trust and confidence of conflict parties. as such, according to him, mediators should be able to create relations of trusts among parties and a mediation environment where the commitment concerns are relieved through the promise of third-party monitoring. last two articles deal with indonesia’s and china’s foreign policies towards asean respectively. mohamad rosyidin and shary charlotte h. pattipeilohy from diponegoro university, indonesia highlight indonesia’s foreign policy under joko widodo’s (jokowi) administration. both argue that the diminished role of indonesia in asean, especially during the first term of jokowi’s presidency, is strongly influenced by causal beliefs held by indonesian political elites and presidential advisors. rosyidin and pattipeilohy pinpoint that although there are varying ideas from one individual to another, they have similar characteristics in projecting that indonesia should expand its concentric circle beyond asean. they argue that asean is intrinsically weak, and thus, can no longer accommodate indonesian aspirations. this idea acts as a road map that defines indonesia’s national interests amid the dynamics of international politics in the 21st century as the authors argued. last article on chinese military diplomacy to asean, contributed by lidya christin sinaga from indonesian institute of sciences (lipi), jakarta. sinaga examines the impacts of the military’s growing role in china’s foreign policy under xi jinping to its military diplomacy in asean. the author argues that xi jinping’s leadership and his vision of china dream, that is using military diplomacy as a pivotal tool for advancing its whole diplomatic goals, has been seen as a sign of growing assertiveness. as a result, while growing assertiveness has caused uneasy relationships between china and some asean countries, china’s military diplomacy which has different approach with asean, has resulted in “ongoing negotiation without progress” for south china sea dispute. finally, on behalf of managing editors, we are grateful to god the almighty, and our highest appreciation goes to the csab scopus, partners, paper contributors and reviewers for this inclusion of jas in scopus. we hope that by being indexed in scopus our quality of the manuscripts published in jas will be maintained and even better. all parties who supported the journal from the indonesian association for international relations (aihii) and the center for business and diplomatic studies (cbds) of the department of international relations, bina nusantara university deserve our highest appreciation. jakarta, 20 december 2020. prof. dr. tirta n. mursitama, ph.d. editor-in-chief journal of asean studies journal of asean studies (jas) editor in chief tirta n. mursitama managing editors bina nusantara university, indonesia lili yulyadi arnakim bina nusantara university, indonesia moch faisal karim layout editors vena meilissa wendsney arviany sadi associate editors bina nusantara university, indonesia donatus k. marut university of indonesia, indonesia kiki verico brawijaya university, indonesia m. faishal aminuddin university at albany, suny, united states mutti anggita vrije universiteit amsterdam, netherlands pamungkas a. dewanto bina nusantara university, indonesia paramitaningrum national planning agency, republic of indonesia sumedi a. mulyo bina nusantara university, indonesia wendy a. prajuli advisory international editorial board binus business school, indonesia ahmad syamil swinburne university of technology, australia alfons palangkaraya american university, united states amitav acharya university of indonesia, indonesia andi widjajanto sebelas maret university, indonesia andrik purwasito jana wyżykowskiego university, poland arkadiusz kotlinski airlangga university, indonesia baiq l. s. wardhani university of le havre, france darwis khudori paramadina university, indonesia dinna wisnu foreign policy community of indonesia, indonesia dino p. djalal university of hawai’i at manoa, united states ehito kimura jawaharal nehru university, india gautam k. jha bina nusantara university, indonesia harjanto prabowo ritsumeikan university, japan jun honna university of indonesia, indonesia juwono sudarsono dr. gr damodaran college of science, india k. k. ramachandran australian national university, australia lorraine elliott yunnan university, china lu guangsheng iseas-yusof ishak institute, singapore malcolm cook national university of singapore, singapore marleen dieleman ministry of foreign affairs, republic of indonesia marty natalegawa universiti teknologi malaysia, malaysia nanthakumar loganathan australian national university, australia pierre van der eng centre for strategic and international studies, indonesia rizal sukma kaohsiung seas, taiwan samuel c. y. ku budapest business school, hungary tamas novak cheng shiu university, taiwan wan-ping tai padjadjaran univeristy, indonesia yanyan m. yani journal of asean studies volume 7 number 1 2019 contents editorial tirta n. mursitama articles understanding sustainability-oriented innovation (soi) using network perspective in asia pacific and asean systematic review 1-17 budi harsanto, chrisna t. permana beyond brinkmanship: the implication of south china sea conflicts on china’s soft power in southeast asia 18-39 randy w. nandyatama a value chain approach to support southeast asian economic regionalism 40-57 craig a. m. jones repositioning indonesia – thoughts on the indo-pacific 58-72 anthony milner business and human rights in asean: lessons from the palm oil sector in malaysia 73-85 andika ab. wahab practice note what does asean economic community bring to older workers? examining inequality in old age in thailand’s fast-ageing society 86-97 wenqian xu, sikander islam journal.binus.ac.id/index.php/jas http://journal.binus.ac.id/index.php/jas aim and scope the journal of asean studies (jas) is an international peer-reviewed bi-annual journal that enriches understanding of the past, current, and future issues relevant to asean and its circle of issues. the article shall address any research on theoretical and empirical questions about asean. the topics addressed within the journal include: diplomacy, political economy, trade, national development, security, geopolitics, social change, transnational movement, environment, law, business and industry, and other various related sub-fields. journal of asean studies expects the articles encourage debate, controversy, new understanding, solid theory, and reflection on asean. the articles sent should have a sharp analysis and rigorous methodologies quantitative or qualitative as well as written in an engaging and analytical style. the jas does publish original research, reviewing research, book review, opinion pieces of current affairs. however jas does not publish journalistic or investigative style of article. the jas would not be responsible for any implied or written statements of articles published. each author would be responsible for their own writing. journal of asean studies is an international multidisciplinary journal, covering various fields of research on asean either as community, organization, process, and web of cooperation. journal of asean studies publishes the following types of manuscripts:  scholarly articles: the manuscripts should be approximately 5,000-8,000 words. the manuscripts must contain a review of the current state of knowledge on the research question(s) of interest, then share new information or new ideas that will impact the state of theory and/or practice in area of asean studies.  review article: the manuscripts should be approximately 1,500-3,500. the manuscripts must contain the current state of understanding on a particular topic about asean by analysing and discussing research previously published by others  practice notes: these are shorter manuscripts approximately 1,500-3,500 words that are of specific interest to practitioners. these manuscripts must present new development for the asean.  research notes: similar to practice notes, these are shorter manuscripts approximately 1,500-3,500 words that have specific implications for asean. the manuscripts should employ rigorous methodology either qualitative or quantitative.  book review: the manuscripts should be approximately 1,500-4,000. the manuscripts must contain a critical evaluation of book by making argument and commentary on the particular book discussed. centre for business and diplomatic studies centre for business and diplomatic studies (cbds) is established as part of the international relations department, bina nusantara (binus) university. our aims are to undertake and promote research and deliberation on diplomacy, business, international relations and developmental issues particularly in indonesia, southeast asia and asia pacific. we also commit to build, connect and share research and others kinds of knowledge generating activities for the betterment of life of the people and earth. our immediate constituency is international relations department, binus university and the larger constituency is the broader academic community of the binus university and other universities and institutions both national and international as well as policy community. cbds publishes scholarly journal, working papers, commentaries and provides training and consultancies services in the areas of diplomatic training, negotiations, commercial diplomacy, conflict resolutions for business, business and government relations, promoting competitive local government in attracting foreign investment, and understanding impact of regional economic integration on development specifically toward asean community 2015. cbds secretariat kijang campus, binus university jl. kemanggisan ilir iii no. 45, kemanggisan / palmerah jakarta barat 11480 +62.21 534 5830 ext. 2453 +62.21 534 0244 http://ir.binus.ac.id/cbds http://ir.binus.ac.id/cbds editorial contextual development in southeast asia greetings from journal of asean studies. we are pleased to present the latest volume on contextual development in southeast asia. in this volume 7 no. 1, 2019, several issues related to contextual regional development i.e. security, economic and social cultural aspects are discussed by various perspectives as the authors came from different countries with distinguish approaches, looking at recent development of southeast asia. this volume is comprised of five articles and one practice note. first article is written by budi harsanto and chrisna t. permana entitled, “understanding sustainability-oriented innovation (soi) using network perspective in the asia pacific and asean: systematic review”. both budi and chrisna explain how soi is mobilized and practiced throughout different social, institutional, and political contexts. with the most dynamic part of the global economy, asia pacific has become the prominent parts of the asean. the authors also explained that soi has been rapidly developing into practices in countries in the asia pacific, both in profit and nonprofit sectors. next article is on security in southeast asia as an implication from south china sea conflict discussed by randy w. nandyatama. his study shows the nature of china’s soft power, and the correlation amongst the increasing chinese assertive measures in the south china sea and the foundation of china’s soft power in the region. on the other issue, craig jones discusses in the next article on asean economic integration. his research aims at determining how southeast asian regionalism can circumvent vulnerabilities in north america and the european union on economic crisis. furthermore, anthony milner discusses in his paper about the changing regional and global environment which indonesia today confronts – stressing the faltering of globalization and the return of history. what are the strengths and weaknesses of this exercise of transformative leadership? there is a risk that indo-pacific aspirations could impact the centrality of asean and result in a higher leadership contest between the major states. asean-led institutions – which have emerged organically – reflect the current complexity of the region. in addition, the last article written by andika ab. wahab, provides lessons for asean member states to contemplate when developing their national action plan on business and human rights (napbhr), in particular under pillar 2 of the ungp-bhr. in this article, he argues that while some large palm oil companies have shown modest progress that emerge in many forms including the lack of leadership, collaboration and ambition to steer and scale up industry transformation on human rights across the supply chain. as such, the development of napbhr among the asean member states should reflect on this reality and challenges. finally, the practice note written by wenqian xu and sikander islam investigates the emergent inequality within and across age cohorts shaped by the aec structural forces, including academic publications, policy analysis, and scientific reports. wenqian and sikander are particularly concerned about the heterogeneity and poverty in old age. in conclusion, the authors suggest policy recommendations for mitigating inequality in old age and advocate a critical lens. finally, as the editor-in-chief, i would like to express my gratitude to all authors who submitted their manuscripts to the journal of asean studies (jas). i would also like to express my highest appreciation to all reviewers who have contributed to the quality of the manuscripts published in jas. all parties that supported the journal from the indonesian association for international relations (aihii) and the center for business and diplomatic studies (cbds) of the department of international relations, bina nusantara university are also very much appreciated. jakarta, 31 july 2019 prof. dr. tirta n. mursitama, ph.d. editor-in-chief journal of asean studies, vol. 1, no. 1 (2013), pp. 83–89 © 2013 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic practical note education for the asean community – the case of indonesia pingkan umboh bina nusantara university abstract education plays a significant role in all of the strategies made and initiatives taken to achieve various outcomes of asean. one of the core strategies which engage the higher education sector to meet the asean community in 2015 was “cross‐border mobility and internationalisation of education—to promote regional sharing, cultivate a regional perspective among member states and contribute to the spirit of regional unity and excellence.” the purpose of this practice note is to find and analyse initiatives taken by the government and higher education institutions focussing in indonesia, the largest population and largest economy country in asean and how the initiatives positioned the education in the region. this note is intended to contribute to the knowledge of asean community, especially on its education area. keywords: higher education, internationalisation, asean community introduction education plays a significant role in all of the strategies made and initiatives taken to achieve various outcomes of asean. the asean charter, the legal and institutional framework of asean also specifies an education specific related clause as one of the purposes of asean as “to develop human resources through closer cooperation in education and life‐long learning, and in science and technology, for the empowerment of the peoples of asean and for the strengthening of the asean community – a visioned of asean nations living in peace, stability and prosperity which is to be achieved by 2015” (article 1 paragraph 10). at the 2009 asean education ministers meeting, it was decided important to have a work plan that guides the education relationship in achieving asean community and the asean 5year work plan on education was established in 2011. one of the four strategic priorities agreed upon which engages the higher education sector was “cross‐border mobility and internationalisation of education—to promote regional sharing, cultivate a regional perspective among member states and contribute to the spirit of regional unity and excellence.” 84 education for the asean community this priority poses challenges to be achieved as each country has different education system and approaches in embracing internationalisation. yet, there are very few analysis made on country’s education strategies relates to achieving the asean community. thus, the major purpose of this practice note is to discover and analyse initiatives taken by the government and institutions in internationalising its higher education and the positioning its education in the region. this note is intended to contribute to the knowledge of asean community, especially on its education area. indonesia was chosen as the focus of this discussion because with over 3000 higher education institutions, indonesia which is also the largest population country and largest economy in the asean has huge shares and important roles in contributing to the success of the asean’s education work-plan. internationalisation of higher education internationalisation in higher education sector is considered as a process that has different meanings to many. to some, it may mean building an international, intercultural and global perspective to their stakeholders along with useful knowledge, skill and attitudes (elkin & devjee, 2003; knight, 2004) through the process of having internationalised activities as part of a heis’ academic strategies such as new international program, international mobility of students and lectures, international partnership and projects including international research initiatives (knight, 2004; chin & ching, 2009). to others, it could mean delivering courses to other countries through various partnership arrangement and new models of teaching delivery (knight, 2004; wildawsky, 2010). at the very general level, internationalisation of universities will teach people to have international knowledge and eyeshot (jinwei, 2005). internationalisation of higher education institutions (heis) also serves different purposes to the institutions. it may serve as a response to the global society, economy and mobility; to support investment and specialities in conducting strong research activities; or to gain income for the institutions and to support a nation’s economy (qiang, 2003; kapur & crowley, 2008). some higher education institutions (heis) are more advanced than others in progressing with the internationalisation of their universities (wildawsky, 2010). a study held by ayoubi and massoud (2007) defined stages of internationalisation of higher education institutions from being international losers (there is no intent nor having activities on becoming international) to become international speakers (has the intention described in their vision or mission statement but not so much in the strategies) then to enter the international actors stage (without any specific intentions but already took up activities related to internationalisation) and in the end become the international winners (have the intent described in their vision and mission statements along with a set of strategies and some activities related to internationalisation being successfully implemented). sullivan (2011) viewed the internationalisation activities taken at higher education institution are represented by stakeholders of the industry which include the administrator (planning and administration), students (student education), and faculty (faculty development). higher education institutions (heis) are unique and diverse of characters. according to bartell (2003), they have (1) goals which are fuzzy, differentiated, unclear and often journal of asean studies 85 hard to measure; (2) internal stakeholders from numerous disciplinary and culturally diverse and external stakeholders which are varied and requires managers to link them all together; (3) high labour intensive with staff from diverse background and profession, making achievement of organisational goals and objective complicated; (4) different values and system believed between the academics and administrator, which reduces efficiency and effectiveness in solving problems and issues; and (5) complex, rapidly changing and demanding environment. thus, it requires collegial process and executive authority in managing them. initiatives of the indonesian government the indonesian qualification framework (iqf) was signed by the president in 2011 and is currently in the process of being implemented. the iqf becomes the main benchmark in the classification of competencies of academic education, vocational education and professional education graduates (bill no 12 year 2012 on higher education, article 29). through the iqf and the descriptor of each level of qualification, quality of learning outcomes can be standardised across the country. iqf also allows qualifications to be made comparable and recognised by other countries and so supports mobility and cross border education. the national government also provides various scholarship programs for lecturers at heis to study and/or to conduct research overseas since 2009. 1000 full scholarships have been available every year. this initiative will not only enhance qualification of indonesian lecturers but also a mean to bring the international learning and living experience back home and build education networks internationally (rustad, 2011). in late 2011 the government announced schemes of international cooperation grants that assist heis to develop policy, regulation, guidelines and procedure documents for collaboration purposes. these documents were to support the heis to initiate and or to implement international collaboration, to define unit and operational costs in initiating or strengthening international collaboration, and to initiate non degree international collaboration. on the 13 july 2012 the indonesian parliament passed the bill of republic of indonesia no.12 year 2012 on higher education. the bill includes a new provision of relevance that supports internationalisation of higher education. this is the provision for foreign heis to deliver higher education in indonesia and for indonesian institutions to build collaboration with overseas heis. the new bill also has a provision on autonomy for heis in the conduct of: management; finance; student’s affairs; staffing; and infrastructure and facility (article 64). this will allow heis to be more integrated and support internationalisation and build creative partnership with overseas institutions. initiatives of higher education institutions at the institutional level, a number of higher education institutions (heis) have acted to embrace internationalisation which can be seen at their mission statements, english language website and new curriculum developed delivered in english (soejatminah, 2009). vice rectors of collaborations and heads of international offices of universities in indonesia regularly met and held workshops to share knowledge and raise capabilities (universitas sumatera utara, 2012; universitas airlangga, 2013). 86 education for the asean community heis are also active in building their own international collaborations. the 2010 data showed that there are over 2000 institutional collaborations involving 43 public heis in indonesia. these collaborations were mainly in the form of twinning, double degree, credit transfer, lecturer/ staff exchange, student exchange, and joint research. nine (9) universities recorded having more than 10 lecture exchanges, six (6) universities had more than 20 international student exchanges and nine (9) universities had more than 10 international joint research initiatives (jazzidie, 2011). the positioning of indonesian education regionally on student mobility, unesco data (2010) showed, indonesia hosted about 6500 overseas students whom mostly are from malaysia (about 40%) and timor leste (about 45%), while about 34,000 indonesians departed to study overseas. the same data also shows that in 2010, malaysia, thailand and singapore hosted about 57,000, 19,000 and 48,000 overseas students respectively (unesco, nd). indonesian position on international research can be seen from a study conducted by scientometrics (science analysis, n.d.) which compared total number of scientific publications of the world since 1996. from 1996 to 2010, indonesia was ranked as 64th, producing a total of 13,047 scientific documents while singapore, thailand and malaysia were ranked as 32nd, 42nd and 43rd producing 109,346, 59,332 and 55,211 documents. in 2010 alone, indonesia produced 2032 documents while malaysia, singapore and thailand produced 14,407, 13,913 and 9,129 respectively. world intellectual property organisation which is administered by patent cooperation treaty reported a new record of 181,900 international patent applications in 2011, a growth of 10.7% when compared from 2010. the top 5 countries filing for patent and the estimated number of patents in 2011 are the united states (48, 596), japan (38,888), germany (18,568), china (16,406) and republic of korea (10,447). from asean countries, contributions are led by singapore (671), malaysia (264), thailand (66) and then followed by philippines and vietnam (both 18), indonesia (13) and laos (5). this showed that indonesia’s capacity for innovation is still relatively low (world intellectual property organisation, n.d.). at the institutional level, three leading universities in indonesia were ranked at the 273rd, at the range of 450-500 and at the position of 601+ in the 2012 qs world university ranking (qs world university ranking, n.d). while ranking does not necessarily represent level of internationalization of an institution, it does represent an international respectable standing (baty, 2012). conclusion according to the association of indonesian private heis, only 10% of the private heis are ready to face the asean community (winarto, 2013). there are also less than 200 of the 3585 heis in indonesia have setup specific function or position managing internationalisation (purwanto, personal communication, 5 april 2012). in addition, there are also some controversies comments made against the embracing of globalisation focus, as there are concerns of the diminishing of local values (bani, 2012) and the questioning of how indonesia embracing internationalisation through its efforts in becoming world class universities (watson, 2011). journal of asean studies 87 discrepancies of education capacity of asean countries hinder the efforts to achieve the asean education plan which is to establish cross-border mobility and internationalisation. these education plans are highly relevant in the process to achieve asean community more specific at its economic factor as they play major roles in the establishment of free flow of skilled labour; provides knowledge to develop competitive regional economic policy and technologies to support regional integration; and acts as the mean to achieve equitable economies. internationalisation of heis will produce globally skilled labour; research and knowledge that assist the development of competitive regional economic policy; innovations and technologies that support regional integration. these are all contributing to support the road map of asean community, especially the economic pillar which aims to establish asean as a single market and production base, allowing the alliance to be highly dynamic and competitive, economically equitable and fully integrated as a region in the global economy. recent comment was made by vice president of indonesia on how globalisation such as efforts to achieve asean community in 2015 is unavoidable (kantor wakil presiden, 2013). rector of universitas gadjah mada also made statement on how indonesian heis need to be more exposed and be more proactive in embracing the globalisation (wibisono, 2012). those comments showed that indonesia views internationalisation process quite openly and positively and it is the nation’s expectation for their heis to be proactive and be the contributing players in embracing these changes. increasingly it is no longer a choice whether to internationalise, but a necessity if indonesia is to produce graduates with the necessary skills and research that contribute to a democratic, prosperous and sustainable world that benefit the health and wealth of all indonesians and be an economically equitable nation embracing the asean community by 2015. about author pingkan umboh is a student at binus university undertaking doctorate of research management study. her research is in the area of internationalisation and organisational performance focussing in higher education institutions in indonesia. she can be contacted at kasuang3@yahoo.com references ayoubi, r.m & massoud, h.k (2007). the strategy of 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(doctorate dissertation, university of south florida) unesco institute for statistics (n.d) global flow of tertiary-level students (2010). retrieved november 2, 2012 from http://www.uis.unesco.org/education/p ages/international-student-flow-viz.aspx universitas sumatera utara (2012). pertemuan wakil/pembantu rektor bidang pengembangan dan kerjasama se-indonesia hasilkan beberapa program. retrieved may 12, 2013 from http://www.usu.ac.id/pokokberita/1621-pertemuan-wakilpembanturektor-bidang-pengembangan-dankerjasama-se-indonesia.html universitas airlangga (2013). unair bahas internasionalisasi pendidikan. retrieved may 12, 2013 from http://pasca.unair.ac.id/?p=185 watson, c.w. (2012, 3 march), does indonesia needs world class universities? jakarta post. retrieved from http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/20 journal of asean studies 89 12/03/03/does-indonesia-need-worldclass-universities.html wibisono, b.k. (2013, 25 november). rektor ugm: pendidikan indonesia perlu wawasan internasional. antara news. retrieved from http://www.antaranews.com/berita/3452 64/rektor-ugm-pendidikan-indonesiaperlu-wawasan-internasional wildavsky, b. (2010). the great brain race, how global universities are reshaping the world. new jersey: princeton university press. winarto, y. (2013, 2 january). jelang 2015, hanya 10% pts yang siap bersaing. kontan online. retrieved from http://nasional.kontan.co.id/news/jelang -2015-hanya-10-pts-yang-siap-bersaing world intellectual property organisation. (n.d) international patent filings set new record in 2011. retrieved october 20, 2012 from http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/artic les/2012/article_0001.html editorial asean and its relevance amidst pandemic how to cite: mursitama, t. n., karim, m. f., & arnakim, l.y. (2021). asean and its relevance amidst pandemic. journal of asean studies, 9(1), https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v9i1.7648 keywords: covid-19; asean; cooperation; asean studies; us-china rivalry introduction the covid-19 pandemic has devastated the global economy, which brought many countries into recession. not only that, but the covid-19 pandemic has also made a fundamental change in the international system. the extent to which this covid-19 pandemic will fundamentally change the way we view globalization, democracy, and most importantly, the superiority of the united states’ power in the world. such a question indeed has been asked by many scholars of international relations. drezner (2020) argues that although the impact of covid 19 is enormous on the current global economy, it will only have a short-term impact. in a more macro and long-term context, covid-19 will not change the international system as we know it today. drezner even stated that covid-19 would only be a footnote in the study of international relations. at best, the impact of covid-19 on the international system is no greater than the impact of the influenza pandemic on international politics, which is, of course, very minimal. in contrast to drezner, mcnamara and newman (2020) instead, see that covid-19 is accelerating the process of major transformations taking place in the international system. for both of them, covid-19 shows how the distrust of globalization is getting bigger and the strengthening of identity and nationalism for the nation-state. despite the importance of international cooperation in resolving transnational issues such as the pandemic, the reality is that countries are increasingly nationalistic and seek to protect the goods they need. given such polarised debate, it is not surprising that the covid-19 pandemic led many scholars to analyze the extent to which domestic politics may link to international cooperation. pevehouse (2020) observes that despite the crisis requiring significant international cooperation, surprisingly, limited international cooperation had emerged. here, he argues the need for us to see the impact of domestic politics in understanding the impact of covid-19 towards the international system, especially the rise of populism and nationalist-inspired populism. surprisingly, there is a tendency of the rise of populism in light of the covid-19 pandemic. in this piece, we want to bring the debates into the context of asean and the study of asean. as one of the most dynamic and emerging regions, southeast asia and its robust regional organization can provide an interesting discussion on the study of international relations in general and area studies in particular. in this opportunity, we argue that it is undeniable that the covid-19 pandemic provides a clear picture of how the struggle of the two-axis of power in the international system, namely the us and china, compete in shaping the narrative and offering a vision of post-pandemic international cooperation. southeast asia has inevitably become the centre of competition for influence from these superpowers in the midst of the covid-19 pandemic. asean as a regional organization then needs to accommodate countries in the region to face various real challenges during the pandemic. moreover, we discuss three levels of challenges faced by asean in facing the pandemic, namely the international, regional and domestic levels. the deepening strategic rivalry between the us and china has become the major international challenge faced by asean at the international level. we argue that asean should increase its assertiveness in enhancing international cooperation amidst the rise of competition between the us and china. at the regional level, the major concern is the cohesiveness of asean in mitigating the impact of the covid-19 pandemic. we assert that asean should be able to stay relevant by making sure that all programmes and actions it created are delivered and implemented. last but not least, domestic aspects matter in international and regional cooperation. we show that each asean member state utilizes different approaches which ultimately result in different mitigation outputs. we argue that asean should provide a platform where each state can learn from other countries and even help each other in implementing best practices in the region. the international challenges the emergence of the covid-19 pandemic shows us how international cooperation is not something to be taken for granted. the literature related to the study of international cooperation has stated that international cooperation is more likely to occur when the cooperation is carried out in the context of low politics such as environmental and health issues than cooperation in the context of high politics such as security, nuclear, and also strategic (drezner, 2003; raustiala, 2002; vries et al., 2021). the notion of politicization of international cooperation is then important to understand why some cooperation is problematics while others do not. according to vries et al. (2021), two main aspects lead to public discontent about the existing international cooperation and the mobilization of this discontent by political entrepreneurs. public discontent might be caused by three factors; first, the economic consequences of international cooperation may negatively impact the domestic audience. second, growing concerns about identity and cultural value divide which make international cooperation difficult. finally, the contestation over international authority and their legitimacy. the mobilization of discontent by political entrepreneurs may result in strategic politicians’ effort to gain benefit from the grievances associated with international cooperation. in the case of covid-19 pandemic, arguably, these factors indeed play roles in making the international cooperation in mitigating covid-19 is getting harder. public discontent toward international cooperation can be seen from the public’s distrust of international authorities who manage cooperation to mitigate the covid-19 pandemic. we also see how politicians politicize covid-19 in both developed and developing countries. in the united states alone, we see how president donald trump sees covid-19 not as a threat but as a tool to slow down the us economy. the same is true in brazil and india, where leaders are politicizing covid19 for their domestic interests. we further show that the lack of international cooperation is also exacerbated by a growing rivalry between superpowers. in the case of the covid-19 pandemic, the united states and china are handling the spread of the devastating coronavirus pandemic in very different ways, and those differences are reshaping the global rivalry between the world’s two leading economies. in the case of asean, such rivalry seems to tilt toward china. for the past four years under the donald trump administration, the united states’ relations with the asean region have been deteriorated. president donald trump refused to attend the asean summit for the third year in a row, even in 2020 when the forum was conducted online. at the start of the covid-19 pandemic, the xi jinping regime was criticized for its slow response and indications to cover up the outbreak that allowed the coronavirus to spread rapidly worldwide. with an authoritarian approach in dealing with covid-19, china can control the spread of the virus and can successfully emerge from the crisis. with factories reviving, china is again exporting vital supplies and medical equipment to other countries. the initiatives and steps taken by china with this ‘mask diplomacy’ are interpreted as a means of re-branding the chinese government to maintain good relations with asean countries, especially in relation to economic cooperation. china seeks to change the face of covid-19 from a covid-19 outbreak to a symbol of its global leadership in overcoming the crisis. this effort is reinforced by propaganda that focuses on the chinese government’s response to the outbreak, which is part of a global campaign that observers call covid diplomacy. it is not surprising that according to a study conducted by singapore’s iseas-yusof ishak institute, 44.2 per cent of southeast asian respondents stated that china have provided the most help to the region for covid-19 while the us is trailing behind with only 9.6% of respondents. asean must be able to continue to be an international actor who plays a balancing role between these two superpowers. in this pandemic era, asean’s role is becoming increasingly important. asean must be able to keep the engagement of these two countries present in the region and at the same time not make one superpower country have a more significant influence than the other. the regional challenges asean’s challenges at the regional level are more about the ability of asean countries to be able to collaborate and synergize in efforts to mitigate the impact of covid-19 (djalante et al., 2020). many scholars view the role of asean sceptically in helping member countries to be able to mitigate the impact of covid-19 on the region. beeson (2020) for instance would argue that asean has so far been limited given that the organization is mainly ineffectual in overseeing a collective response to the crisis. despite the scepticism in seeing how asean responds to crisis, we show that asean is still relevant in nurturing cooperation among southeast asian states in mitigating pandemic covid-19. this stems from asean member states that see the pandemic would crash their economy. to that end, asean took action by proposing regional cooperation to overcome the covid-19 pandemic. asean leaders have made plans and discussed a number of policies that are part of asean regional cooperation. there are a number of policies that are mutually agreed upon by all asean members, and it is hoped that these policies can help fellow members fight the covid-19 virus. however, there are a number of criticisms and challenges for asean regional cooperation in dealing with the covid-19 pandemic. within asean itself, the ten members agreed on several essential points regarding the handling of covid-19, namely strengthening cooperation against covid-19 by exchanging information, best practice, research development, epidemiological development, and others. furthermore, providing protection for asean citizens in the midst of the covid-19 pandemic, strengthening public communication and efforts to combat stigmatization and discrimination, committing to take collective action and coordinated policies to mitigate economic and social impacts, the importance of a comprehensive approach involving multistakeholders and multi-sectoral, assigning asean economic ministers to ensure the continuity of supply chain connectivity so that trade can continue, and to support the reallocation of the asean trust fund to tackle the covid-19 virus pandemic. the leaders of asean countries have also decided to establish a regional fund to respond to the covid-19 pandemic. the establishment of the response fund is aimed at securing the availability of essential medical supplies and equipment in the asean region. the funds come from the reallocation of available funds and existing finances. support from asean partners, such as asean plus three, contributed to this funding. this funding is also accompanied by a commitment to refrain from spending unnecessary funds on the flow of goods, especially strategic goods to combat covid-19 such as medical, food and essential supplies (asean declaration 2020). we certainly see new initiatives from the apt summit and summit, such as the establishment of the asean covid-19response fund and the asean center for infectious diseases as an asean effort to become more relevant amid the covid-19 pandemic. however, learning from asean’s experience so far, initiatives to form new bodies like this often do not answer substantial problems at the member state level. its effectiveness will clearly depend on the matter of funds and the will of each member country. however, there are economic-political factors that shape state-society relations in member states that often pose challenges for multilateral agencies in managing non-traditional security threats in such a region (hameiri and jones, 2015). in the end, being able to demonstrate its important role in a crisis situation like this has indeed become a touchstone for asean. moreover, looking at the data, all asean countries are almost certain to be exposed to this global outbreak, although to varying degrees. but again, asean must be able to show its unity as a sharing and caring community. asean must prove that regional solidarity can be realized by giving priority to countries in the region to rise together. we need to stress the importance of asean to strengthen cooperation in accelerating asean’s economic recovery. president joko widodo, in his speech also reminded that in the economic situation that was quite down due to the pandemic, all asean countries must work harder to strengthen and grow the regional economy more quickly. the indonesian government sees connectivity as the key, whether the connectivity of goods, services and economic actors can be revived as soon as possible. asean is also considered in need to start arrangements regarding the asean travel corridor in a careful, measured and gradual manner. this is deemed to be important because it can show the strategic meaning of the asean community both in the region and in the eyes of the international community (presiden republik indonesia, 2020). the domestic challenges arguably, the domestic challenges have so far, the main hindrance for asean countries in responding to covid-19. in the context of asean, there are two debates regarding how southeast asian countries respond to the emergence of the pandemic. the first is the debate related to the implementation of neoliberalism and policy capacity in mitigating the impact of covid-19. the second is the issue of the securitization of health issues. in mitigating the economic impact caused by the pandemic, the governments of each country have also issued domestic policies, both monetary policy and fiscal stimulus. since early 2020, the majority of asean members have lowered interest rates and implemented other financial sector policies, according to the approach of each country. these efforts are taken to ensure liquidity and financial stability are maintained, as well as reduce borrowing costs to stimulate business production activities and public consumption the way each government in asean deals with this crisis is also very varied, including the amount of the budget specially prepared to reduce this pandemic. but overall, there are two broad approaches that the state has taken in its efforts to mitigate the covid-19, namely fragmented regulatory model and authoritative state-driven developmental model. jones and hameiri (2021) provide an interesting comparative analysis of solid state asian and neoliberal european states. this analysis fits with the context of asean. some countries choose to apply an authoritative approach, such as singapore, vietnam, and malaysia and countries that prefer a neoliberal approach such as indonesia. we also see how the differences between these two approaches have implications for the output of handling covid-19. in countries that use an authoritative approach, the state has managed to control the rate of spread of the virus. meanwhile, in a country that is fragmented and neoliberal-oriented, the handling of a pandemic seems slow and unprepared. another debate regarding domestic aspect of the handling of the covid-19 pandemic is to what extent the state has framed the crisis as a security issue. many studies suggest that the government elites may be best positioned to shape security attitudes and use their narratives to influence public attitudes during a crisis (karyotis et al., 2021). in his study, chairil (2021) asserts that state response toward the pandemic may be mainly driven by security rather than public health issues. this is particularly true for several asean countries, especially indonesia. he shows how indonesia’s response initially focus on the de-securitization of the issue but later turn into a securitization process limiting indonesia’s ability to restrict the spread of the pandemic. while countries such as singapore that treats covid-19 pandemic as a public health issue rather than security issue and then focus more on increasing states’ presence of fiscal, operational and policy capacities. the issues surrounding asean having discussed the challenges faced by asean, this volume reflects our concerns regarding the pandemic. as we have discussed above, the pandemic has further enhanced the rivalry between the us and china in the region. moreover, we see that challenges posed by the covid-19 pandemic have also directly impacted the economy of asean member states. in this volume, we collect interesting topics that relate to the growing concerns faced by asean both as regional organization and as region. we believe that understanding asean-china relations is essential to understand the trajectory of asean position in the post-covid-19 international system. in the previous volume, jas has published an article investigating china’s defence diplomacy toward asean (sinaga, 2020). in this edition, we further enhance the debate by bringing an article entitled “of benevolence and unity: unpacking china’s foreign policy discourses toward southeast asia”, written by enrico gloria. in this article, gloria shows that china has constructed a story of a ‘benevolent china’ in line with ‘developing southeast asia’ to positively represent itself in light of its ongoing rise to great power status. by doing so, china is benefitting from its overall pursuit of a positive identity within southeast asia. such positive sentiment can be seen in how china disburses chinese vaccines to combat the covid-19 pandemic in southeast asia. the second article, entitled “maritime security cooperation within the asean institutional framework: a gradual shift towards practical cooperation” also discuss one of the main challenges of asean particularly in the context of us-china rivalry that is how asean members cooperate with each other’s particularly in maritime security issue. i gusti bagus dharma agastia shows that there are various forms of cooperation between asean countries on maritime security issues. however, such maritime security cooperation among asean members continues to be largely dialogue-based, with few instances of practical cooperation. by comparing the three fora, he further shows that the organizational design of these forums tends to affect the forms of cooperation. the use of technology for small and medium enterprises (smes) is increasingly relevant to continue operating amid a pandemic, increase productivity, expand market access, and look for alternative financing. in fact, asean member states agree to enhance financial digitalization in order to create market resilience in facing pandemics. moreover, asean itself currently has the asean strategic action plan for sme development 2016-2025, in which one of its strategic goals is to promote productivity, technology and innovation. the third article, entitled “prerequisites and perceived information system qualities model for mobile banking adoption among the customers of private commercial banks in myanmar”, provides us with a glimpse of how mobile banking helps commercial banks in myanmar grow. phyo min tun shows that user interface design quality is a prerequisite of system quality and information quality. the following article deals with socioeconomic determinants of the infant mortality rate in asean. this article is relevant considering that studies related to health issues have not yet received an appropriate place in studies on asean. this article looks at how the infant mortality rate indicates the health status of a country. vita kartika sari shows that the size of the female workforce has a strong influence on increasing the infant mortality rate in asean. the last article, entitled “western centric research methods? exposing international practices”, is an exciting work for those who want to reflect on how should we approach asean without any western bias. catherine jones reminds us that in the study of international relations and particularly regarding institutions, area studies approaches should be more frequently adopted. the limited use of these approaches not only hampers new research but also hides a colonial hangover. this is the reason why the journal of asean studies tries to continue to understand asean not only as actors and processes in international relations but also to bring understanding and an area studies approach to understanding the southeast asian region. we hope that this regular issue vol 9. 1 2021 would invite further examination of the 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(2021). politicizing international cooperation: the mass public, political entrepreneurs, and political opportunity structures. international organization, 75(2), 306–332. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818320000491 journal of asean studies, vol. 4, no. 1 (2016), pp. 79-86 ©2016 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic mobilizations and movements of foreign fighters from southeast asia to syria and iraq tia m. kibtiah bina nusantara university, indonesia abstract this article examines foreign fighter movements, in particular, those who joined the islamic state and al-nusra front from southeast asia to syria and iraq. it will analyze the dynamics of the movements in southeast asia and syria and iraq, provide a discussion of the potential threats of the returnees and how state and civil society respond to the threats of the groups. it is based on interviews with afghan veterans in indonesia and analyses of primary and secondary sources of the syrian and iraq conflicts. it argues that it be urgent to strengthen unity and partnership between the state and civil society in coping the rise of the terrorist movements and to prevent violent attacks after the returns of southeast asian fighters from syria and iraq. keywords: foreign fighters, islamic state, jabhat al nusra, southeast asia, syria and iraq introduction the term ‘foreign fighters’ in this article refers to fighters who involved insurgencies outside their countries. it covers not only the people who join in combat but also those who migrate and travel to the conflict zone to participate in fighting or training with an insurgent group or provide some supports (zammit 2015). in 1980s-1990s, people traveled from southeast asia and other countries to join mujahidin in afghanistan to fight against the soviet union. they are considered as foreign fighters. it includes the people travel from all over the world to syria and iraq to fight against bashar al-asad’s regime in the last decade. this article will examine transnational terrorist movements, in particular, the islamic state (is) and jabhat al nusra (jn), which impact to the rise of terrorism recruitment, transnational movements, and nationalinternational threats. their involvement in the syrian conflict combines violent experience, international terrorism networks, and direct threats from returnees to their home countries. the number of foreign fighters in syria and iraq is varied from around 20,000 to 70,000 fighters from about 100 nationalities, including 4000 fighters from western europe (lister 2015). the fighters from southeast asia, especially from indonesia, malaysia, singapore, thailand and the philippines are main concerns on this article, how the fighters moved to 80 foreign fighters from southeast asia to syria and iraq syria and iraq and how state and civil society in southeast asia anticipate the returnees of the fighters. katibah nusantara, the group, founded by fighters from southeast asia in syria and iraq united fighters from indonesia, malaysia, singapore, thailand and the philippines with indonesians took leadership positions. overall southeast asian fighters are around a thousand and indonesia dominated the number and leadership. indonesia contributes about 500 to 700 fighters from both the islamic state and jabhat al-nusra, which created frictions among jihadists in indonesia and southeast asia. many of them previously became a strong part of jama’ah islamiyah leadership and members, however after the foundation of is by southeast asian jihadists the frictions begin. abu bakar ba’asyir, who used to be chairman of jama’ah islamiyah after the death of abdullah sungkar, now takes a crucial position in the is of indonesia along with aman abdurrahman. advisory board leadership of ba’asyir and aman is very influential to the growth of is in indonesia from about 500 in 2014 to 1,500 in 2015. bahrumsyah and m. fachry declared is in indonesia in july 2014. although the early meetings are discussing the support of islamic state of iraq and al-sham (isis) held in tangerang in february 2014. this article is based on the interviews with former foreign fighters involved in the afghan war in the 1980s. among them joined violent attacks in bali and jakarta. furthermore, it analyses primary and secondary sources from foreign fighter group websites, government and research center policy papers. it argues that mobilization and movements of foreign fighters have attracted more recruits and strengthened the capacity of individuals and groups after their involvements of fighting in syria and iraq. the returnees of syria and iraq potentially threatens security and stability in southeast asia and international regions where foreign fighters back to their home countries. foreign fighters up to a thousand of southeast asian jihadists are among foreign fighters from all over the world. it is surprisingly the percentage of foreign fighters from the west is much higher than the participants of fighters in the history of conflict and war involving jihadists such as afghan war. compared to afghan fighters, is (used to be isis) is ‚much better organized in that it has a military approach in spreading its influence with an over-arching set of strategies and a strong centralized leadership. al-qaida has more of the attack-and-run style, and the groups affiliated with it seem to be operating relatively independent‛ (nadaraj 2014). the majority of recruits to the islamic state going to syria intended of ‚acting there rather than training to become domestic terrorists‛ and ‚remains more personal than political‛ (the soufan group 2015: 7). however, the latest two decades domestic attack plots were organized by individual and groups closely related to foreign fighters experience. bali bombings in 2002 involved afghan veterans affiliated to jama’ah islamiyah. afghan returnees endangered their home countries threatening terror attacks and violent attack plans in the us, france, australia, southeast asia, europe, north africa and the middle east. syrian and iraq conflicts returnees will endanger and threaten more to their home countries. journal of asean studies 81 david malet defined foreign fighters as ‚non-citizens of conflict states who join insurgencies during civil conflicts,‛ playing critical roles in conflicts since ancient periods (lister 2015). the nearest equivalent was fighting in afghanistan against the soviet union, which attracted about 20,000 foreign fighters over a twelve years from 1980 to 1992. charles lister (2015) estimated foreign fighters involved in syria and iraq was growing dramatically from 700-1,400 in mid-2012 to over 22,000 in early 2015. it is predicted that the number of foreign fighters: tunisia (3,000), saudi arabia (2,500), morocco (2,000), jordan (1,500), france (1,550), russia (1,500), turkey (1,300), uk (700) – unnamed intelligence officials said 1,600, germany (700), indonesia (700), libya (600), bosnia (340), china (300), us (200), malaysia (100), the philippines (100) and singapore (2) (lister 2015: 1). the number of fighters is underestimated by analysts and intelligent. indonesian intelligent authority argued that indonesian fighters join the islamic state and al-nusra front are about 200-300. they do not consider the number of indonesian fighters from the middle east, pakistan and north africa where they are studying. wildan mukhollad (19), an indonesian student at al-azhar university and al islam school graduate, joined is in 2012 and became a suicide bomber for is in iraq in early 2014 (nuraniyah 2015). mukhollad wanted to show himself that he is among the best young fighters continued the agenda of bali trio and senior fighters in the early period of the al islam school of east java. he is among three martyrs in syria and iraq graduated from the school. ipac (2014) also stated other martyr zainul arifin recruited by the school graduate for is bombing attack operation in poso targeting police. table 1. foreign fighters in syria and iraq sources :lister 2015; the soufan group 2015 82 foreign fighters from southeast asia to syria and iraq lessons from southeast asia it is interesting to learn how southeast asian fighter organization founded and grew in syria and iraq, poses direct threats to government and the people in the region, and how state and civil society responded to the rise of radical jihadists and foreign fighters from southeast asian regions. their number, growth, and capacity are more efficient and deadly that fighters of the afghan war in the 1980s and 1990s. southeast asian fighters are divided at least into two factions: daesh (the islamic state) and al-nusra front (jn). the tensions between isis and al-nusra in late 2013 have forced southeast asian jihadists to choose their sides. in indonesia, aman abdurrahman sided with isis. the website almustaqbal.net, edited by m. fachry, also supported isis. on the other hand, al-nusra front had its supporters, commonly senior ji leaders and associates of al-qaidah. arrahmah.com, among the supporters, published statements from isis critics like al-maqdisi and aiman zawahiri. it published abu khalid as-suri, zawahiri’s associate, claimed isis of undermining jihad movement (ipac 2014). ali imron and other afghan veterans criticized that the islamic state do not conduct the ethics of jihad like how the prophet and his companions required rules and procedures of war. imron considered the way of is showing provocative video and pictures of slaughtering and other executions to public space is against the essence of jihad to disseminate good conduct and islamic ethics for a better community and the world.1 furthermore, abdul qohar, suhail and masykur, other afghan veterans 1 ali imron, interviews with author, polda metro prison jakarta, november 9, 2015. argued that the islamic state recruitments to any people without enough training preparations impact lower capacity and immature jihad operations. it will endanger their plan and counterproductive to the mission of jihad.2 kohar joined afghan academy training for three years and now keep himself into community education in jakarta. southeast asian is fighters from indonesia, malaysia, thailand, singapore and the philippines agreed to coordinate under the group of the katibah nusantara lid daulah islamiyah or the malay archipelago unit for the islamic state in which fighters share a common culture and language of bahasa indonesia and malay, and unite to recruit, train and mobilize fighters from southeast asia to syria and iraq. the katibah nusantara was headquartered in al-shadadi, in the syrian province of hasaka. it is headed by an amir identified as abu ibrahim alindunesiy. leaders of the katibah nusantara are mostly indonesians although some malaysians appeared among the leadership. it has some departments: ‚combat fighters, snipers, heavy weapons, tactics and strategy, and military management‛ (singh 2015: 2). it has also volunteer positions for cyber propaganda and communications supported by is members in syria, malaysia and indonesia. returnees: threats and challenge asean and international leaders warned the threats of returnees of syrian and iraq conflicts to stability and security. their ideological and violent experience can influence people in the region. the returnees will strengthen the capacity of potential violent attacks in southeast 2 abdul qohar, suhail and masykur, interviews with author, jakarta, june 6, 2015. journal of asean studies 83 asian regions. it is based on the experiences of afghan veterans who involved in serial attacks and plot plans targeting foreigners and government assets in indonesia, malaysia, singapore, the philippines, and thailand. indonesia is the most severe region affected by violent attack operations by afghan veterans. the is returnees can be ‚mobilized to undertake attacks in southeast asia. unlike ji which had members who were returnees from the afghan war, this time, the region would be confronted with a far stronger force regarding numbers, ideology and military training and combat experience.‛ (singh 2015: 1). however, institute for policy and analysis of conflict have a different opinion to potential threats of returnees. ipac (2014:11) stated that many southeast asian fighters are: "poorly educated, poorly vetted, poorly trained and poorly led. the result is the failure to do much damage. if the call to abandon the local effort and join the global jihad could weaken the movement still further, it is also true that mujahidin returning to indonesia from syria have the potential to provide everything today’s jihadist now lack especially experienced leaders." ipac underestimates the capacity of foreign fighters, including those from indonesia and southeast asia. although they do not require military training from anybody joined daesh/ is, their fighting and engagement experience with international fighters in syria and iraq, sharing common interests against asad’s regime and the west coalition countries are more than enough to consider the threats of the returnees. ali imron argues that isis more dangerous than al qaida. he said ‚we (al qaida) left the new order indonesia and never considered the government as unbeliever (kafir). it is very different from isis which disseminates takfiri ideology.‛ this ideology makes is members quickly targeting other people and groups for attack operations, including attacks on other muslim fighters. in late 2013, is killed leaders and individuals of jn, and other individuals and groups disagreed to support al baghdady. as of february 2015, among 90 australian fighters have ‚appeared in propaganda videos for jabhat al-nusra and is, three are believed to have carried out suicide bombings, and some australians are occupying leadership positions. some have also boasted of war crimes, and explicitly threatened australia‛ (zammit 2015: 10). the interactions and engagements experiences among foreign fighters in syria and iraq and their global networks enabled them to conduct transnational terrorism attacks. kira's (2014: 364-365) argues that ‚the technologies associated with globalization have enabled terrorist cells and groups to mount coordinated attacks in different countries. indeed, a hallmark of islamic militant groups is their ability to conduct multiple attacks in different locations.‛ cyber maniac among is supporters in indonesia had coordinated of robbery and attack operations in medan and poso in 2014 and 2015 using online chats and emails (ipac 2014). whatsapp, blackberry messenger, and other social media have become favorite tools of interactions and coordination among the islamic state members in the disseminating news, instruction, and meeting. they also used fundraising taking advantages of cyber technology. coordinating of returnees of southeast asia and global is, jn and other terrorist networks after the syrian and iraq conflict raised critical attentions among state leaders in southeast asia. lister stated 84 foreign fighters from southeast asia to syria and iraq that ‚some returnees retain the potential for reintegration into western society, with some requiring rehabilitation and psychological care. above all, not every foreign fighter should necessarily be treated as a lifelong extremist, but instead as a potentially valuable member of his or her home society‛ (lister 2015: 8). officials from southeast asian countries responded to the rise and threat of southeast asian fighters in syria and iraq. indonesia, malaysia and singapore government authority concerned to the threats. they agreed to the importance of unity and comprehensive partnership between the state and civil society in coping with the syrian and iraq conflict returnees. singapore’s defense minister ng eng hen argued that ‚the islamic state poses a ‘clear and present danger’ to southeast asia, with trained foreign fighters returning from syria and iraq potentially linking up and formalizing ties with local groups to execute attacks‛ (parameswaran 2015). rebellious and violent jihadist groups such as jama’ah ansharut tauhid commanded by abu bakar ba’asyir and abu sayyaf group of southern philippines are among groups already pledged allegiance to the islamic state since 2014. former activists of jama’ah islamiyah have declared to support the caliphate of abu bakar albaghdady. to the islamic state, ng said that ‚they have sympathizers, they have foreign fighters who are trained, who have the motivation, the means and who have a common vision‛ (parameswaran, 2015). in addition, malaysian defense force chief, general tan sri zulkifli mohd zin was ‚worried that when they (militants) return to malaysia, they will do something that can threaten the safety of the country, especially after they established a network in neighbouring countries from syria or iraq‛ (hanson 2015: 3). the threats of is to southeast asian countries also became a priority concern for singapore’s deputy prime minister teo chee hean. he said that is threats ‚not only to countries who are part of the us coalition but also to singapore. as with the threat from the al qaeda, even if singapore is not itself a target, foreign interest here may be targeted‛ (hanson 2015: 3). civil society organizations are strategic groups protecting the community from radicalization and preventing recruitments of is. in indonesia, nahdlatul ulama and muhammadiyah, the largest muslim organizations are the backbone for indonesian muslims preserving religious moderation and committed to supporting nationalism and nation-state building. they are strategic partners for national counter-terrorism agency (bnpt) to counter radicalism and terrorism. conclusion to conclude that mobilizations and movements of foreign fighters from southeast asia to syria and iraq conflicts raised the capacity of violent jihadis groups in the region and internationalized them with global jihad networks in syria and iraq were up to 100 different nationalities of around 70,000 foreign fighters involved in different groups. southeast asian is fighters coordinated quite effectively after the foundation of katibah nusantara which accommodates fighters from southeast asia. they successfully conducted operations in 2014 attacking kurds population. the foundation of the group was intended to accommodate indonesian, and malay speaking fighters and protected each other individuals and families from bashar aljournal of asean studies 85 assad and western coalition’s attacks. they also successfully launched propaganda and recruited people from southeast asian countries. they have taken a strategic position to represent caliphate leadership in southeast asia under abu bakar al-baghdady. syrian and iraq conflict returnees threaten stability and security in their home countries. they strengthen the capacity of local groups and need to anticipate of potential threats to attack operations targeting government and foreigners as revenge for the defeat and the death of leaders and community of the islamic state in syria and iraq conflicts and other regions. november 13, 2015, paris attacks were a continuation of battle as revenge against charlie hebdo and france’s coalition against the islamic state in syria and iraq (the economist, november 21, 2015). the is leaders continued to assure the importance of attacks against governments and people who are against the interests of is all over the world. state and civil society in southeast asia have to strengthen their partnership and cooperation to fight against terrorism and prevent violent attacks by is, jn and other individuals and groups sympathizing them. local insurgent and violent radical groups in southeast asia such as santoso’s mujahidin of eastern mujahidin and abu sayyaf group have directly threatened the government of indonesia and the philippines respectively of their support to the interests of is. indonesian counter-terrorism agency including detachment 88 has raised the importance of open coordination among government in southeast asia and australia to detect the flows of funds and people from the regions to syria and iraq. it includes prevention of cyber terrorism coordinated by global terrorist networks. about author a lecturer of department of international relations, binus university jakarta. she can be contacted at tiamariakibtia@gmail.com reference dershowitz, alan m. 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(2014). asean must get rid of isis in southeast asia. retrieved december 19, 2015, from http://www.establishmentpost.co m/asean-must-get-rid-isis southeast-asia/. nirmala, murugaian. (2015). old war, new methods the fight against terror. singapore: the strait times. nuraniyah, navhat. (2015). how isis charmed the new generation of i ndonesian millitants..middle east institute. retrieved 20 december 2015. http://www.mei.edu/content/map/ how-isis-charmed-new-generation indonesian-militants. parameswaran, prashanth. (2015. singapore warns of islamic state terror nexus in southeast asia. the diplomat. december 10. silverstein, ken. (2014). the secret world of oil. london/ new york: verso. singh, jasminder. (2015). katibah nusantara: islamic state’s malay archipelago combat unit. rsis commentaries no. 126may 26. the soufan group. (2015). an updated assessment of the flow of foreign fighters into syria and iraq. foreign fighters. the soufan group. weiss, michael & hassan, hassan. (2015). isis inside the army of terror. new york: regan arts. zammit, andrew. (2015). australian foreign fighters: risks and responses. sydney: lowy institute. journal of asean studies, vol. 7, no. 2 (2019), pp. 150-160 doi: https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v7i2.5751 ©2019 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic reinventing place-identity and embracing new economic opportunities: promoting creative economy of sanur through public participation i nyoman gede maha putra universitas warmadewa, bali ida bagus gede parama putra universitas warmadewa, bali abstract every place on the planet has unique characters that make it distinguishable from other sites. place-identity is the term widely accepted to explain this phenomenon. it is argued that the place-identity could not only strengthen the sense of belonging of the locals to a place and improve social cohesion but, in the age of global tourism, it could also increase the attractiveness of the place to visitors. therefore, it contains economic values if managed in a proper way. but places are transforming. the dynamics of contemporary activities where tradition is seen as outdated, new government system, new economic activities, and new actors and their roles challenge the stability of place-identity. unfortunately, the transformation of a place may benefit some actors but may trouble other groups. some places, however, maintain their place-identity for the social and economic values it holds. collaboration among different actors in managing the transformation of such place could maintain the place-identity of a place which ensures its attractiveness to visitors, sustains its economic values amidst rapid changes. the collaboration confirms no one is left behind. the case study research conducted in sanur showed that the sustained place-identity could economically benefit all actors. key words: place-identity, economic opportunities, tourism, role of local actors introduction the construction of place-identity involves many dimensions and is not a simple process. it is dynamic, consists of tangible components, such as the built and natural physical components of the place in which daily life takes place and its morphological transformation; and intangible components, such as the history of the place and the perceptions of the locals, as well as the visitors (watson & bentley, 2007). both tangible and intangible components are not static but in a state of constant change. nevertheless, each place has enduring quality upon which its place-identity is mostly associated with. it ensures the stability of place-identity amidst rapid changes in its components. however, stability is journal of asean studies 151 challenged when immediate and significant transformation occurs. this may happen when a new governance system takes over or dominate the management of a particular place formerly administered by traditional society members (bourdier & alsayyad, 1989). powerful stakeholders may control the decision-making process and lead the transformation to fulfil their needs. on the other hand, some people may feel powerless because they could not participate in the process (santos, 2004; madanipour, 2013). this may increase the feeling of insecure because their life is threatened. most importantly, large scale changes could also lessen the attractiveness of a place to potential visitors craving for authenticity. human identification with a place presupposes that a place has a character which consists of physical components, shapes and concrete things that create the atmosphere of the place (norberg-schulz, 1980). vernacular building processes of the traditional people in the pre-industrial era, where materials were gathered from surrounding areas and construction processes were locally developed, made the settlement familiar and blended in with the occupants. the locals created a deep process of identification with the physical components of their builtenvironment from which people could differentiate their village from another. the relationship between the people and a particular place builds place-identity that helps them define who they are as individuals and as members of a community (watson & bentley, 2007). therefore, place-identity is the understanding of humans with the place in which they are living in (proshansky & kaminoff, 1983). a deeper meaning of place-identity is about what a place means to people. meaningful places are often content with a sense of stability. this can be understood because the meaning of the place is important for the inhabitant’s life both as an individual or a member of the community. given that they convey a sense of stability, the place-identity of a particular place often associated with authenticity. by most standards, authenticity is considered to be the quality of a building or landscape developed with local materials and construction methods following local building traditions (watson & bentley, 2007). authentic places are often attracting visitors who bring economic benefits to the locals. tourism is nowadays considered as one among many businesses that dominate global economic development. it provides jobs, increases family earning and boosts local and national revenue. therefore, place-identity attracts investment, job seekers and is favored by the local and national government as part of their development strategy. a particular place, however, may be occupied by different people and different groups. each person or group may develop a different relationship with the place because the association to a place is largely influenced by experience and perception. different ways of experiencing and perceiving a place are, in turn, creating a distinctive human’s 152 reinventing place-identity association with a place. one place may be explained differently by different people because each person has personal feelings. moreover, the same person may also explain the same place in different ways in different timeframes as their experience with the place grows. different place’s narratives of different person or group of people may raise tensions of representation. this may occur if those whose representation is not included in the narration of the place. for example, when the government makes plans to advertise a city in order to attract tourists, the most attractive and visually appealing parts may dominate the narrative. in contrast, urban activists may expose the poorest parts of the city in order to gain sympathy and hide the more prosperous areas. this means that access to shared meanings is political (appleyard, 1976). the political problem of who tells the story and what purpose the story serves may cause disputes and conflict. those whose voices are not represented may feel a sense of powerlessness. this sense could be reduced by involving all community members in developing a consensus to construct place-identity (hague & jenkins, 2004). public participation mechanism, where different voices are accommodated, is believed as a means to reduce tensions of representation in place-identity construction. moreover, the inclusive process may strengthen the sense of communal control over the place in question (putra, 2017). the physical components of a particular place are in a state of constant transformation. the evolution may influence how it is experienced and perceived; therefore, bring impact to the place-identity of the place. because every place is in a state of constant change, its place-identity should be managed in order to avoid its negative impacts on social and economic potentials of the place (putra, 2017). this paper investigates the management of place-identity of a particular place rooted in tradition, based on agriculture, but in contemporary situation is ruled by the national government, who offers non-traditional economic activities, and rapidly change. it explores the roles of local inhabitants who consolidate their power in order to have significant roles in the transformation processes. methodology case study research is relevant to inquire about the place-identity because it is place-specific. in order to do so, sanur, in denpasar bali-indonesia, was selected as the case for this study. sanur is one of many settlements that construct the city of denpasar in bali. it is located in the easternmost part of the city, next to a beach. originally, the local people worked as farmers, but nowadays tourism sector dominates economic activities. the shift from traditional economic system to a creative-based economy of tourism has transformed the place-identity of the area. the investigation of the area was started by evaluating the components that construct the place-identity and how those journal of asean studies 153 components have transformed. in this case, urban morphology method was used. by employing urban morphology, the physical components of the case study are analyzed. firstly, the transformation of the overall layout of the village is investigated. to do so, development plans and their implementation in different timeframes which causes the place to transform are investigated. maps to carry out morphological analysis were derived from google earth. in order to understand how the case has been transforming, interview data were translated into spatial analysis. this spatial analysis was superimposed to see the pattern of physical transformation. from the document analysis, the physical transformation of the area is revealed. this will be presented in morphological maps and images. on the second stage, the roles of different institutions in the development of the area are also studied. this included analysis of different political systems and decision-making processes from which the logic of space planning in relation to socio-economic and culture could be understood. furthermore, since the place-identity is also constructed from people’s perception, it is also important to appreciate the voices of the people and to look at their creative ways of managing the place-identity. therefore, in-depth qualitative interview was also conducted. the morphological analysis is conducted to analyze different actors in different periods of development as well as local perception analysis were compared and related. the results are grouped into four dimensions of analysis: cosmological transformation, sociopolitical and economic transformations, spatial and physical transformation, and architectural transformation. results the evaluation on socio-political and physical transformation showed that sanur has gone through several morphological periods from pre-colonial to post-colonial. in each period, the governance structure has been shifted from one system to another. this has impacted the social, economic, and, in turn, the spatial and physical arrangement of the village which makes its placeidentity to transform. analysis on the four dimensions of transformation shows that the cosmology is the most resistance to change while architecture is the most vulnerable. paragraphs below show the analysis of transformation of the village. the pre-colonial period the majority of the villagers were work as farmers to support their family. wet rice was the most importance crop not only in sanur but bali in general. wetrice farming has formed the basic cosmology for the balinese including the people of sanur. water, the main element of the farming activities is important. therefore, water sources are protected and seen as the source of wealth. in order to protect the sources, the mountains and highlands were respected. these areas are also believed as the residences of the ancestor spirits. on the other hand, areas that are less fertile were less valuable 154 reinventing place-identity although are still respected because these locations are believed as the dwelling of impure spirits. with this duality, the people develop a sense of location where they live between the two distinctive locations of highland and sea. in sanur, rice fields and temples are located on the mountain-ward of the village and areas around the sea was avoided. the locals occupy area in the middle. this cosmological-based lay out was implemented since the pre-colonial until the colonial era when agriculture dominated the cultural landscape of sanur. the inhabitants defined and associated themselves as farmers and agriculture. a traditional village governance was responsible in managing the operational of the place. originally, the village was established by a priest family and their supporters. the supporters were, then, divided into five hamlets. at this level, democratically-elected leader led each hamlet. in higher level, the village, the leader was elected among the priest family members. although the village leader held the highest position in the local governance system, the hamlet leaders were also important because they were the ears of the top leader. this shows that in the traditional period, the local inhabitants had full control over the area. independently, they manage all village’s rituals, economic activities as well as daily life. access to natural resources was also in the hand of local people. this enable them to build the village using local materials such as local wood, stone derived from the beach. moreover, local builders also developed regional construction methods. as a result, the village’s lay out and the physical components of the area fit with its environment and occupants. the traditional cosmology, agriculture, local governance system and the physical components formed the place-identity of the area. the colonial period in the colonial period, there was a shift in the governance system of sanur. in the first decade of the 20th century, the island of bali fell under the control of the dutch colonial government. the traditional way of managing the area of the island of bali was impacted by the new system. in order to consolidate the powers of many traditional governments all over the island, the new government formed a centralistic system. the island was managed under one residency led by a formal leader. the main motif of the new government was to get economic benefits from local resources to be sold to international market. two important features of the colonial city were area with rich natural resources and harbor from which the resources were sent to international market. in this period, sanur with relatively small agriculture lands offered little opportunity although it is located in close proximity with denpasar as the city centre. therefore, the colonial government paid little attention to this village. this situation, however, open another opportunity. its close proximity and its traditional life attracted foreigners journal of asean studies 155 to visit and stay. a belgian born artist, adrien le mayeur, preferred to stay in sanur than in the city center. furthermore, some other foreigners also came and stay. new government system brought little impact to sanur but economically it had become a tourist destination. people were started to invest in commercial bungalows and homestays. local people and some foreigners managed these facilities where buildings were designed in traditional architecture. because the colonial government had little interest, the traditional leaders maintained their domination over political landscape of the area. the post-colonial era after the independence of indonesia was declared, bali joined as one of its provinces. the intention of the newly born government was to introduce the country to international audiences. tourism was seen as an effective means to fulfil this aim. in order to do so, the central government evaluated the potential of sanur as it already known by the westerners. in addition to introducing the new country, the government of the republic of indonesia also would like to show the word that this country is not lagging behind. they believed that employing modern architecture would make indonesia known as part of the modern world. moreover, modern architecture was also used to raise the pride of the people of indonesia who were stigmatized during the colonial period. furthermore, this strategy was believed would diminish the feeling of powerlessness. with its political power, the central government constructed a new hotel in sanur in 1963 with the hope that it will host hundreds of guests. the guests were hoped to introduce indonesia to the world after staying in the hotel. international style of modern architecture was the norm at that time and the hotel was designed with it. it was built in a boxy building with white cladding ten floors above the ground. this would invite a massive number of tourists. the building was the tallest structure on the island and its form was strange in the eye of the locals. following the government strategy, to attract tourists, private investors also built similar facilities but with different styles. knowing that the markets were craving for authenticity, facilities that were built by these groups of developers employed traditional building styles. they believed that the place-identity of sanur is the main features that attract tourists and, therefore, should be strengthened instead of being replaced with the newer building styles. many hotels, which were designed and built in the early indonesian independence, were following the path of the early investors. along the coastline of sanur, hotels and homestays with traditional styles dominated the cultural landscape. the new style was the antithesis of the government intention to introduce modern building style to develop pride. this shows that the central government and the investors saw placeidentity from two different perspectives. 156 reinventing place-identity on one hand, the central government would like to employ it as a means of introducing the country as the new modern nation. on the other hand, the investors saw that place-identity could be employed as income generators. although the locals praised the new government strategy and the investor’s effort to provide new economic activities, they locals felt that both could impact their place-identity. new actors potentially outweighed the roles of local people in maintaining their area. manuel castells argues that when a group people under the domination of another, they may consolidate their power to build trenches and protect their identity (castells, 2009). in 1964, the people of sanur established a new foundation named ‘yayasan pembangunan sanur’ or the sanur development foundation. the locals would like to play important roles in the development of the areas so that they voice could be heard by both the government and the investors. moreover, the locals also would like to develop businesses so that they could enjoy the benefits of the attractiveness of their place-identity. supplying raw food materials for hotels and restaurants, providing laundry services, opening school specializing in tourism management, and establishing micro finance for the locals were among the early activities of the foundation. in addition, nowadays, the foundation also manages some hotels and villas. however, managing the overall landscape of the village, including physical component and activities accommodated by it, is the strongest role they played. therefore, the yayasan pembangunan sanur has anticipated the domination top down decision-making process that may impact their life. today, all planning schemes and building permits will only be getting approval after being reviewed by the yayasan pembangunan sanur. this does not mean that they hold full control over the development of the area. they role is to ensure that any new development and activity will not offend or obstruct the place-identity of the area. the role of yayasan pembangunan sanur is to coordinate the needs and intentions of different actors in the development of the area. contemporary period the success of sanur in maintaining their place-identity continues. areas on the beach keep attracting tourists and also investors. investments grow at a neck-wracking pace. one could not find any place along the beach without tourism activities. hotels, restaurants, villas and other leisure facilities occupied the coastline. working on tourism industry is also offering better income if it is compared with being a farmer. agriculture no longer attractive and, therefore, is declining. this has influencing job market where young generations are leaving agriculture to work on leisure industry. not only local people, tourism industry also attracts workers from other places, creates the phenomenon of urbanization. tourism industry necessitates large amount of land journal of asean studies 157 to build facilities as well as housing for their worker. this leads to spatial transformation. the beach is transforming from an avoided place with little economic values to the most attractive area. the government, investors, and the locals alike nowadays favor the beach. therefore, its value is increasing. therefore, the price of lands close to the beach is higher than the agricultural site. ruled by land market, the spatial arrangement of sanur shows a division between three different groups. the first group is the traditional people who occupied the traditional part of the area. the second group is the investors who control lands that offer economic value in relation to tourism business and the third group is the migrants who get the benefit from the declining attraction of agriculture. figure 1. morphological change of sanur in different development periods. black areas show the built-form while green and blue signify rice fields and sea respectively source: author this situation is different from the pre-colonial period when cosmology ruled division of land. however, the locals maintain them believe that cosmology is important and should still be used as a guidance in maintaining and managing the area. although the landscape has changed, the locals maintain the ritual that is based on cosmology. in physical arrangement, the locals maintain and sustain the traditional part of the area based on cosmology. traditional village arrangement is preserved where the temple is still seen as the most sacred and respected part of it. at smaller scale, the building height is limited not be higher than 15 meters. http://www.mapsofworld.com/ 158 reinventing place-identity traditional architecture implementation is encouraged. the spatial transformation of the area in different time-frame could be seen from figure 1. six images show how sanur has grown from a small traditional village based on agriculture into a large area containing many economic activities where tourism is the most important feature. the spatial transformation of sanur is shaped by the transformation of power struggles among different actors. table 1 shows the shift in the governance system of sanur and its socio-political impacts on the place. table 1. shift governance system governance systemeconomic means stakeholders/actors decision making process pre-colonial village republic-agriculture traditional society; traditional village’s governance semi-democratic led by village leaders colonial centralistic government focusing on trading colonial government; individual entrepreneur (small scale); traditional society; traditional village’s governance top down post-colonial centralistic government focusing on national political agenda tourism national government in national, provincial and municipal level; private entrepreneur; traditional society; traditional village’s governance, yayasan pembangunan sanur top down at national level contemporary de-centralistic government tourism national government in national, provincial and municipal level; private entrepreneur; international investors; traditional society; traditional village’s governance, yayasan pembangunan sanur top down at municipal level and bottom up by the democratic process at village level source: author conclusion and future works a place is both a product and a process. it is shaped by power struggles and as a product it also shapes the power struggles that construct the place. given that the interaction between people and place contains evaluative instruments, cities have changed and will continue to change. immediate and large-scale change imposed from outside may heighten fear and anxiety because the society has limited power to manage and control it. lack of access to the decision-making process might also lead to a feeling of being socially excluded because the goal of contributing to managing change is not always being accommodated. in this situation, willingness to participate in developing the city may decline (madanipour, 2013), leading to a weakening sense of attachment and sense of belonging, two essential features of place-identity. journal of asean studies 159 nowadays, economic themes have transformed many places in the world. sanur is also experiencing similar trend where focus on financial benefits have influenced the place-identity of the area that is rooted in tradition that an active process of transmission, interpretation, negotiation and adaptation of vernacular skills, knowledge and experiences and, to be' socially accepted, it is often commented on and even criticized. thus, it is continuously renegotiated. the negotiation is often becoming they key to tradition to survive. this paper shows that the local people of sanur is also renegotiated their tradition in order to maintain the place-identity of the area and embrace new opportunity brought by tourism. the place-identity dynamics of sanur shows that the involvement of local actors is significant. the local actors succeed in consolidating their power in order to have significant role to participate in development. thus, they neither feel insecure nor powerless. furthermore, they roles also maintain the place-identity of the area and sustain the sense of authenticity that attracts tourists and investors. therefore, the place-identity of the area continues inviting visitors and investors, ensures its economic values. this research is based on multi actor involvement in the construction of place-identity dynamics. it revealed that the participation of the locals is important. however, this paper has some limitation. the first limitation is its sample that is only one area and this area. it needs to be tested in other areas with different sociocultural background to see if the actor involvement framework could be generalized. furthermore, in local level, the role of the locals in maintaining agricultural lands should also be studied. this is important because agriculture is acknowledged as the original raison d'être of the area. this will reinforce the sense of rootedness that support the strength of the place-identity of the area. about the author i nyoman gede maha putra and ida bagus gede parama putra are the lecturer and the researcher from universitas warmadewa in bali, indonesia focusing on architecture and urbanism. references appleyard, d. (1976). planning a pluralist city: conflicting realities in ciudad guyana. cambridge: mit press. bourdier, j., & alsayyad, n. (1989). dwellings, settlements and traditions: cross-cultural perspectives. lanham: university of minnesota press. castells, m. (2009). the power of identity second edition with a new preface. west sussex: wiley blackwell. hague., & jenkins. (2004). place-identity, participation and planning. london: routledge. madanipour, a. (2013). the identity of the city. in city project and public space, 160 reinventing place-identity urban and landscape perspective 14 (pp. 49-64). dordrecht: springer. norberg-schulz, c. (1980). genius loci: towards a phenomenology of architecture. new york: rizzoli. putra, n. g. (2017, september). defining and sustaining the place-identity of a traditional yet rapidly developing city. doctoral thesis. oxford. proshansky, f, a., & kaminoff, r. (1983). place-identity: physical world socialization of the self. journal of environmental phycology, 2 (31), 5783. santos, s. j. (2004). cultural politics and contested place-identity. annuals of tourism research, 640-656. watson, g. b., & bentley, i. (2007). identity by design. london: architectural press. journal of asean studies, vol. 3, no. 1 (2015), pp. 22-31 ©2015 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic the proposal for an indo-pacific treaty of friendship and cooperation: a critical reassessment vignesh ram manipal university, india abstract the emergence of the indopacific construct brings about interesting avenues for cooperation among states in the region. characterised by the intertwining geographies of the indian and the pacific oceans, the indopacific region is home to some of the most diverse peoples and economies in the world. in a speech delivered at the csis, washington in 2013, the former indonesian foreign minister marty natalegwa outlined the need for an “indopacific treaty of friendship and cooperation”. in efforts to continue to address the prospects and challenges for a treaty among the major powers in the indopacific region, the article argues that a treaty would be necessary step and but should be concluded when sufficient groundwork for it is concluded. the article also argues that, the indo – pacific concept would be best addressed if there is increased institutionalization of the concept and increased cooperation among middle powers such as india, indonesia and australia. keywords: indo-pacific, cooperation, regional security introduction the development of the indo pacific concept has led to widespread discussion among the members of the academic and the strategic community about the growing importance of the concept’s usage in international affairs. though nascent, the potential for it to alter the regional discourse is immense. geographical conceptualizations always have the ability to alter and provide more flexible manoeuvring for policy making and strategy. the strategic move to place the indo – pacific concept as an alternative paradigm has opened up the debate over this new concept. the region is a wide canvas of diverse states with different systems, identities and traditions. they have different strategies regarding security and various intertwined interests with different major powers. hence the challenge for the success of the indo pacific conceptualization would largely depend on the way in which the behaviour of states concerned can be moulded on the basis of norms and institutions that can be developed. for starters, in may 2013, indonesia’s foreign minister, marty natalegwa suggested an indopacific treaty of friendship and cooperation to be floated and signed by all the states concerned. the growing convergence seems to be taking shape regardless of the changing domestic political environment in the countries of the region. the change in administration in indonesia however has not commented on pushing forward 23 journal of asean studies the proposal but continues to propose initiatives which show its receptiveness towards maritime neighbourhood and the historical identification as a maritime gateway between both of the oceans. similarly, india’s act east policy that seeks to embrace southeast and northeast asia, adds more to the growing debate over why the concept could be more successful. apart from the american acceptance of the term and widespread usage, the japanese receptivity is also seen in the various policies that have fallen through. hence, there is growing relevance of such a treaty to be concluded. however, a number of challenges also confront the region. the attempt at revising the existing status quo position by china and the assertiveness of states in pushing forward their agenda unilaterally will affect the security situation in the region. therefore, by developing a new understanding about regions would provide opportunities for developing cooperative mechanisms among states. hence not discounting any intentions behind the proposed idea, an indopacific treaty will only be acceptable and realized if its clauses are acceptable to the smallest and the biggest player alike. hence the challenge would be to formulate a treaty that is centred on principles acceptable to all powers but at the same time is accommodative to interests, which is only possible if the treaty would promote common area of convergence and would not overpower the ambitions and interests of major powers in the region and play a more facilitating role. therefore, the paper argues that given the growing challenges from the emerging geopolitical power play in the region, a treaty in the indopacific needs to be a gradual process and should be developed over a period of time. it suggests that at the current juncture confidence building measures should be employed and the trust deficit should be bridged. the paper recommends that institutionalization of the concept is important so that there is a solid foundation to bring about a consensus for building any future cooperation in the region. the geopolitics of the indo pacific: different terminologies and security interests geopolitical definitions have often found their inspiration in concepts of geography. the term indopacific similar to the other concepts finds its origin in the bio geographic regional concept of the earth's seas, used mostly in fields such as marine biology. though the fields are different the concept forging two oceans has caught the imagination of geopolitical analysts and policy makers in countries in the region to come up with the concept, which like the bio geographic concept embraces the two oceans i.e. the indian and the pacific oceans (briggs, 1995). the indopacific has been used by various government functionaries of the united states but first picked up traction with its mention in the australian defence white paper which specified the importance of the arc running from india to japan via indonesia for australia (department of defence , 2013). similarly, it has also been conceptualized as an emerging asian strategic system that encompasses both the pacific and indian oceans, defined in part by the geographically expanding interests and reach of china and india, and the continued strategic role and presence of the united states in both (medcalf, 2012). the indopacific’s predecessor, the asia pacific which has been widely used in the realm of strategic studies has conflicting definitions. for instance, the unescap defines the asia pacific as a 24 the proposal for an indo-pacific treaty of friendship and cooperation region is made up of 53 member states and 9 associate members, with a geographical scope that stretches from turkey in the west to the pacific island nation of kiribati in the east, and from the russian federation in the north to new zealand in the south (unescap). moreover the asia pacific economic cooperation (apec) which again was a brainchild of australia in the 1980’s comprises of almost all of the pacific rim countries but excludes india. india had been kept away from apec due to its prevailing economic situation. a ten year moratorium which was put in place also expired but india was still denied a membership in apec. the newly evolving trade pacts such as the tpp, which was criticised by a number of scholars and policy practitioners including at the hearing before the subcommittee on trade of the committee on ways and means u.s. house of representatives in march 2013 for the lack of considering the inclusion of india (the committee of ways and means , 2013). even though, the us department of state perceives the regions of east asia and the pacific and south asia as different realms of its operations and provides the asia pacific strategy to the east asia and the pacific bureau (us department of state), the united states pacific commands’ area of operation stretches from about half the earth's surface, from the waters off the west coast of the u.s. to the western border of india, and from antarctica to the north pole (us navy pacific command). despite the overlapping definitions, the usage of the terminologies describes the intent, perceptions and calculations of different states in the region. the shift from the asia pacific to the usage of the term indo pacific has great significance. it signals the changing dynamics of regional power calculations. hence, it must be seen whether the indopacific region, can combine the total resources and balance the power relations in the region. the australian vision was also supported by the japanese assertion of the ‚confluence of two seas‛ (abe, 2007). the two seas’s which shinzo abe explained in his speech at the indian parliament were the indian and the pacific ocean’s, metaphorically highlighting the growing convergence between india and key states such as japan in the pacific. though there is a wide gamut of support, there has also been a widespread criticism of the indopacific construct. while it has been argued from and australian perspective that there isn’t a sufficient concentration of risks or of contested interests for the indopacific to be a useful inclusion into australia’s strategic construct (white, 2013), the indian arguments have been more concentrated in and around preserving the country’s strategic autonomy including its ability to manoeuvre between china and the united states (scott, 2012) (gupta, 2011).1 though there might not be tacit usage of the terminology, there is acceptance of the terminology at the highest echelons of power in the respective capitals. in india, the term has been used even by former pm manmohan singh at the indiaasean summit in 2012 (ministry of external affairs , 2012). the term has been widely used by japan 1 while one set of arguments that are critical cite the issues of the indo – pacific construct driving india too close to the us ambit, the other set argues about the relations with china could be disturbed if this term become the operational framework. it has also been argued that the change in foreign policy priorities of the us should not dictate india’s approach and the emphasis on the word ‚indo‛ need not necessarily denote that india has the paramount importance in the indo pacific construct. 25 journal of asean studies as well, where former foreign minister fumio kishida used the indopacific framework to describe relations with india. while jakarta, initiated and idea of an indo pacific treaty of friendship and cooperation, china has opposed the idea calling it and american plot to contain china and it urged india to join it’s indo – pacific geo economic plan including the maritime silk route and chart its own course. it can understood that china might have a different conceptualization of the indopacific and it is more aligned to its planning (aneja, 2014). this instance is clearly showcasing the different opinions of major powers with regards to the issue and the emerging competition in the region. asean, regional consensus and indonesia: stability of the indo – pacific asean countries are strategically placed, centrally between the indopacific triangle which encompasses japan, india and australia. a number of years before the inception of asean, the region faced with major power rivalry and intra regional disputes. such a region in classical geopolitics has been explained as a ‘shatterbelt’ (hensel & diehl, 1994). the issues in part were overcome by the formation of asean in 1967. there have been a number of interpretations about the use of asean by regional states and one has been to collectively balance the interests of major powers in the region. the unspoken objective of asean’s formation, as indicated by lee kaun yew was to gain strength through solidarity ahead of a power vacuum that would come with an impending british, and later a possible u.s., withdrawal. moreover, more candidly, lee expresses that though asean declared its objectives to be placed in the economic, social and cultural realm the banding together of member states was for more political objectives, stability and security (yew, 2000). hence how could small and medium states in the region be able to avoid the likes of competing superpowers? how could the stability of the crucial sea lines of communication (slocs) be secured? for such reasons, asean had to be dynamic and without the involvement of indonesia, it was not possible to build a regional consensus. indonesia’s role has been crucial for the region in terms of controlling the security challenges as well as the political conditions in the region. hence, a brief understanding of the core foreign policy behaviour of indonesia and its relations vis – a – vis asean could give valuable insights into the role of indonesia in southeast asia and its importance for the larger indopacific framework. geography has been the definitive feature of indonesia’s strategic understanding of its role in regional and international affairs and indeed its role as an archipelagic state. the archipelagic sea doctrine which was also pushed for by indonesia during the unclos negotiations becomes important to understand because under this circumstance, the sea becomes in a sense a uniting factor among the various islands in the state (hong, 2012). all these elements form a part of the nation’s strategic culture. while analysing the elements of indonesia’s strategic culture it has been noted that an important consciousness that shaped indonesia’s strategic community and national elites was the idea of ‘wawasan nusantara/ archipelagic outlook’ (shekhar, 2014). hence being an archipelago stretching between indian and pacific oceans, indonesia’s focus has been largely related to the pacific and lesser towards the indian ocean region. the reasons for 26 the proposal for an indo-pacific treaty of friendship and cooperation this could be manifold. one could be the suharto era initiated foreign policy which was more low profile, pragmatic, west friendly and asean centric. this led to the weakening of ties with india, which was ideologically incompatible at that time. second could be the economic potential of the pacific region including the assistance and aid which the countries of the region. in the 1970’s indonesia was one of the largest recipients of japanese aid and investments in the region. in the larger security environment another factor was that a more likely threat to the region at that time was considered more of a possibility as emerging from mainland east asia/ china and less from the indian ocean region. the defacto us security cover in the region was another reason. in the post transition era there has been growing relevance of indonesia towards its western neighbourhood. it especially became important with the growing levels of piracy in the strait of malacca. the yudhoyono administration continued a region focused foreign policy and asean was still considered the corner stone of indonesian foreign policy. apart from the piracy being a growing concern, there was also improvement in ties with india. in the asean front indonesia’s chairmanship saw key developments including augmenting of the fact about why indonesia is important for asean. asean was able to successfully defuse tensions between thailand and cambodia and for the very first time mediate between two member states and in 2012, it was at the behest of indonesia and its foreign minister marty natagelwa that a face saving statement was issued after the failure at the asean summit. in the relations with india, president yudhoyono visited india as the chief guest of india’s republic day, one of the highest honours given in the country to any foreign head of state. apart from that there was also a defence cooperation framework agreement and deeper military to military linkages established. indonesia was also one of the countries which lobbied for the inclusion of india as a core member of the east asia summit in 2005. however analysts have argued that there has been a shift in the policy regarding asean with the administration of president joko widodo coming to power. while the focus on developing ties with india remains ongoing, the shift from asean being ‚the‛ cornerstone of indonesia’s foreign policy to ‚a‛ cornerstone remains significant (parameswaran, 2014). the ‚maritime axis doctrine‛ which was initiated by the jokowi administration is also significant to note. this policy was initiated during the east asia forum summit in naypyitaw clearly highlighted the maritime importance of indonesia as the fulcrum between the indian and the pacific ocean and also focus on building relations with maritime powers such as india (witular, 2014). the shifting priorities of indonesia and asean will have a key impact on the indo – pacific. the consensus within asean is also an important factor. the breakdown of the consensus in 2012 was a key reason why a strong leadership is an important factor for asean’s stability. moreover, a policy of acknowledging the centrality of indonesia to the indo – pacific architecture is important factor because of its strategic location. hence the asean region also been termed as the indo – pacific security connector (santikajaya, 2013). hence with the growing convergence of major power policies in the region, the security and the safety of the indopacific revolves around the focus on southeast asia. 27 journal of asean studies revisiting the prospects for an indo pacific treaty of friendship and cooperation the idea for a treaty of friendship and cooperation was suggested by the former indonesian foreign minister marty m. natelegwa at the csis in washington in 2013. the proposal called for an ‘indopacific treaty of friendship and cooperation’. it envisaged establishing a treaty much in line with the established norms and rules or engagement which has been taking place through asean and its affiliated entities (natalegawa, 2013). however, the responses for the same were mixed and the efficacy of the idea was questioned. the proposal has been questioned by a number of academics in indonesia who have asked about the merit of such treaty and raised suspicions on jakarta’s leaning closeness to the united states (sukma, 2013). similarly, it has been argued that without the most powerful states in the ‘indopacific system’ backing the treaty, states will continue to rely on traditional alliance partners for protection or to provide a balance to other aggressive actors (sambhi, 2013). while others argue that there is no guarantee that major powers will behave as indonesia expects, nor there is a capability through which indonesia can dictate their strategic direction. hence the probability of such an instrument being successful is debatable (bandoro, 2013). then the question that arises is that how existing mechanisms such as the ‘treaty of amity and cooperation’ (tac) does not aid in supplementing the same issue of security in the region. the tac was devised on the premise of building certain norms of interaction and build cohesion amongst asean members against divisive regional politics. therefore, though the norms of asean have faltered at times regardless of accession of major powers (such as china) to the tac, just extending the tac for signature may not suffice the requirements for stability in the larger indo-pacific region. second, there is a clear absence of china among the established architecture via the existing conceptualization of the indopacific framework. hence any calculations will get severely restricted. third there is also a contention about the dilution of forums such as the east asia summit (eas). on the cusp of the eas’ creation the debate ranged from including non ‘east asian powers’ (to some extent india and to a greater extent australia and new zealand) as core members to the inclusion of the united states and russia, thereby questioning the core nature of the new formulation. malaysia and especially china was worried about the eas composition fearing the dilution but at the same time possessing an inherent fear of geopolitical marginalization (muni, 2006). hence considering the prevailing conditions, it would be premature at the current juncture to go ahead with a treaty but it would be a worthwhile exercise to build incremental steps towards putting one in place in the near future. the first step would be to build trust and confidence among major powers. this proposition is a very important requisite for anything to succeed. the trust deficit which was also highlighted in the csis speech by marty natelegwa still continues to plague the region and has been a continuing phenomenon. the asean regional forum, one of the only few security dialogue forums has been able to bring together major powers in a dialogue but there has been widespread contention about the results which it has been able to 28 the proposal for an indo-pacific treaty of friendship and cooperation produce. hence, the first step would be to develop a broad based consensus on the rules of engagement in the region. a first step would be to put forth a ‘declaration of friendship and cooperation in the indopacific’; the declaration should espouse the various tenets of behaviour taking into account the diversity of the region. the next step would be to institutionalise the indopacific architecture. this would be a challenging task and would require factoring in the conflicting interests of major powers in the region. in the brewing rivalry between china and the us, it would be difficult to hold together an informal and loose forum of member states and it will continue to remain a ‘paper tiger’ in the face of growing tensions, or worse will develop into a forum which is used to target other member states and propagate a particular point of view. this will be specifically detrimental for small and medium states and middle powers. hence, the a new institution can only be at a consensus point of organisation which have considerable inclusion in the indian ocean and include the principles of asean and east asian countries such as the east asia summit. in international relations, the creation of a new region has been in relation to geopolitical aspirations and also ambitions. the indopacific concept can be argued in the same light. the conceptualization may require a more inclusive understanding if there is a need for a stable conduct of relations in the region. while great power calculations may have various characteristics that can limit conflict amongst themselves, small and medium powers will have to endure the rising vulnerabilities and the risk of escalation. therefore, it is a valid idea to think about conceptualization that would be supported by a treaty. conclusion the indopacific is still a nascent conceptualization that is being widely debated in the region. while the status quo in the region is on the path of being altered in favour of a more assertive power, the time might be right to float the idea and concretise the proposal to regulate and increase the prosperity of the region. apart from the requirement of a consensus among major powers there will be a need to create a common understanding amongst medium and rising powers such as indonesia, india and australia, which are vital and important considering the strategic location and the important sea lines of communication. the consideration for an ‘indo – pacific treaty’ should not be abandoned but as suggested should be pursued by building incremental steps towards such an endeavour. the key to sustaining the indo pacific idea is the prosperity of the region by developing a cooperative framework where each county is a stakeholder and that is not a possibility without the assistance of a grouping such as asean. the successes of asean’s ability to bring about major powers within its framework has mostly been due to the fact that major powers have found it comfortable to invest in the informal, consensus driven nature of interaction and asean states’ non threatening posture towards major powers. widening the framework will help to form a basis for the indopacific institutionalization. a number of other security and economic challenges need a consensus to be arrived on also before such a proposal is reached. at the current juncture the indo – pacific region is facing competing interests in both the economic and strategic realm in terms of emerging trade 29 journal of asean studies blocs and overlapping security manoeuvring; hence a harmonization of interests is a pre requisite if there is a possibility of such as treaty ever taking shape. this again would depend on the confidence building mechanisms that are put in place and the pace at which institutionalization of this concept can occur. overall, there is a clear understanding that a treaty is not possible nor is feasible at the current moment but with the increasing influence and the shifting of possibilities there needs to be important alignments that need to be put into place so that conflict can be averted and the dividends of positive influence can be built upon. any alignment based on ideology will be problematic unless it is intended to be that way. it would be advisable that states in the region follow a dynamic approach, as economic and security dividends will be equally beneficial for the region. the indo – pacific is a conceptualization which has arrived in the cusp of time, with more debates and deliberations, along with a treaty could be seen as a feasible way to regulate the affairs in the region in the longer term. laying foundation stones for a future treaty could be started with the declaring the intent by all stakeholders to move forward and accept the concept as a feasible option. hence for such an outcome there needs to be strong emphasis to solve disputes that plague the region, therefore a better equipped regional apparatus will be a good initiative to begin with. the time might be ripe to develop a mechanism that will smoothen relations among nation states in the time to come. the indopacific will develop as a major region in international affairs and no opportunity must be wasted to maintain a stable order in the region for time to come. about the author the author is a ph. d candidate at the department of geopolitics and international relations, manipal university, india. the ph. d. thesis is entitled ‘extra regional powers and the geopolitics of southeast asia: a case study of asean’ reference abe, s. (2007, august 22). ‚confluence of two seas‛. speech by h.e.mr. shinzo abe, prime minister of japan. new delhi , india : ministry of foreign affairs, japan. aneja, a. (2014). china invites india for an indopacific partnership. beijing: the hindu. retrieved from http://www.thehindu.com/news/in ternational/world/china-invitesindia-for-indopacificpartnership/article6664706.ece bandoro, b. (2013, october 3). will good intentions in indonesia’s blueprint for asia-pacific security collide with harsh realities? iseas prespectives. retrieved from http://www.iseas.edu.sg/documen ts/publication/iseas_perspective_2 013_54_will_good_intentions_in_i ndonesia_blueprint.pdf briggs, j. (1995). global biogeography the netherlands. the netherlands: elsevier science b.v. department of defence . (2013). defence white paper 2013. canberra : department of defence . retrieved from http://www.defence.gov.au/white paper/2013/ 30 the proposal for an indo-pacific treaty of friendship and cooperation gupta, r. (2011, december 5). on america’s pacific century. new delhi, india: centre for land warfare studies. retrieved from http://www.claws.in/733/onamericas-pacific-century-rukmanigupta.html hensel, p. r., & diehl, p. f. (1994). testing empirical propositions about shatterbelts, 1945-1976. political geography, 13(1), 33 51. hong, n. (2012). unclos and ocean dispute settlement: law and politics in the south china sea. new york: routledge. medcalf, r. (2012). pivoting the map: australia’s indo-pacific system. sydney: the lowy institute. retrieved from http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/sites/def ault/files/cog1_medcalf_indopacific.pdf ministry of external affairs . (2012, december 20). pm’s opening statement at plenary session of india-asean commemorative summit. new delhi , india . retrieved from http://pmindia.nic.in/speechdetails.php?nodeid=1259 muni, s. d. (2006, october 3). east asia summit and india. isas working paper series. singapore: isas. natalegawa, m. m. (2013, may 16). an indonesian perspective on the indo – pacific. keynote address at the csis conference on indonesia. washington, washington d.c., united states: csis. retrieved from http://csis.org/files/attachments/13 0516_martynatalegawa_speech.p df parameswaran, p. (2014, december 18). ‚is indonesia turning away from asean under jokowi? the diplomat. retrieved from http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/isindonesia-turning-away-fromasean-under-jokowi/ sambhi, n. (2013). do we need an indopacific treaty? braton, act: aspi. retrieved from http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/d o-we-need-an-indo-pacific-treaty/ santikajaya, a. (2013, june 29). challenges to asean as an indo-pacific security connector. east asia forum. retrieved from http://www.eastasiaforum.org/201 3/06/29/challenges-to-asean-as-anindo-pacific-security-connector/ scott, d. (2012). india and the allure of the ‘indo-pacific . international studies, 49(3), 1 24. shekhar, v. (2014). indonesia’s rise: seeking regional and global roles. new delhi: pentagon press. sukma, r. (2013, may 28). insight: friendship and cooperation the indo-pacific: will a treaty help? the jakarta post. retrieved from http://www.thejakartapost.com/ne ws/2013/05/28/insight-friendshipand-cooperation-indo-pacific-willa-treaty the committee of ways and means . (2013). hearing on u.s.-india trade relations: opportunities and challenges. testimony of dan twining before the subcommittee on trade of the committee on ways and means, u.s. house of representatives one hundred thirteenth congress first session. washington : the committee on ways and means. unescap. (n.d.). “about escap”. retrieved from unescap: http://www.unescap.org/about us department of state. (n.d.). bureau of east asian and pacific affairs. retrieved from us department of state : http://www.state.gov/p/eap/ 31 journal of asean studies us navy pacific command. (n.d.). “about the uspacom” . retrieved from http://www.pacom.mil/aboutusp acom.aspx white, h. (2013). indo-pacific: listing our interests not making strategy. braton, act: aspi . retrieved from http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/i ndo-pacific-listing-our-interestsnot-making-strategy/ witular, r. a. (2014, novermber 14). presenting maritime doctrine. the jakarta post. retrieved from http://www.thejakartapost.com/ne ws/2014/11/14/presentingmaritime-doctrine.html yew, l. k. (2000). from third world to first: singapore and the asian economic boom. new york: harper collins. editorial: indonesian industrialization and the changing of southeast asia geopolitics we are proudly present our recently published journal of asean studies. the vol.2 no. 1 issue is the third issue we have consistently published from december 2012. in this issue, the key topics examined by the writers focuses on the domestic politics of industrialization and the changing of east asia geopolitics. the current condition of east asia geopolitics cannot be separated from the dynamics of political and economic issues faced in the domestic level by each country in east asia particularly in asean. in this issue, we focus on three main countries in east asia and how they affect the dynamic of southeast asia geopolitics. in this third edition, jas covers four scholarly articles. first article entitled “an industry without industrialization: the political economy of the failure of indonesia’s auto industry” written by wang-pin tai. in this article, he examines the puzzle why indonesia could not create its own automotive industry. having the largest auto market in southeast asia, indonesia is supposed to have more favorable conditions than thailand and malaysia on the development of auto industry. unlike malaysia’s auto industry that has its own national brand, indonesia does not have a national auto brand, nor like thailand as the largest auto exporting country in southeast asia, a japanese scholar even contends that indonesia’s auto industry is “technologyless industrialization”. in order to answer the question, he argues that the failure of indonesia’s auto industry has to do with the structural factors in indonesia’s political economy. the last three articles analyze the implication of the changing domestic policy toward the geopolitics in east asia and in particularly southeast asia. in the second article entitled “the us rebalance policy and the management of power politics in asia pacific”, anak agung banyu perwita and denisa rizkiya examine how the us rebalance policy introduced by the u.s. president barack obama early in his first administration in 2010, marked specific changing to the u.s. foreign policy like never before. their article tries to analyze how the u.s. rebalance towards asia policy, a term used for the u.s.' foreign policy influenced the regional stability in asia-pacific region. they argue that the u.s. continuously views south and south east asia, including the indian ocean, as a crucial driver for america’s economic growth and prosperity throughout the 21st century. numerous numbers of cooperation and partnership have been done to enhance the ties between the u.s. and the regions. the u.s. presence and involvement in most essential regional meetings and summits can also be seen as an effort to seek opportunities, politically, economically, as well as security. the third article focuses on the changing leadership in china and how it impacts the perception of southeast asia. in the article entitled “challenges against xi jinping: an asean perspective”, written by abdullah dahana and kelly rosalin examine various challenges, including nationalism as the most serious issue faced by xi jinping as a leader elected through compromise. they argue that although factionalism still exists, it has been converted to collaboration among all factions within the chinese communist party (ccp). the election of xi jinping to the presidency of the people’s republic of china (prc) and to the position as general secretary of the chinese communist party (ccp) is therefore, as the result of cooperation among factions. the fourth article discusses the changing domestic politics in japan and how it affect japan’s relations with their neighbor especially asean countries. the article entitled “japan’s renaissance and its effect to asean” written by syafril hidayat describe how japan has developed a new security policy against china in east china sea, which has increased tension in that region. furthermore, the article analyzes how japan’s new leadership under shinzo abe, who has conservative political view, has unbeatable policy against china’s hegemony. by using bargaining model of war, this article argues that japan’s security policy will determine overall situation in south china sea or particularly in east china sea: whether it will remain of high threat or balance of threat rather than balance of power, or it will face possible conflict in the future. we believe that these four articles might contribute toward the discussion on current southeast asia’s international relations and comparative politics. we also like to announce several changes in our editorial board. our editorial board prof. zainuddin djafar has passed way in may 2014. the whole editorial team and board show our deepest condolences and sympathy to his family. we hope that his works and his tremendous contribution to this journal will always be source of inspiration for all of us. furthermore, we are delighted to welcome our new editorial board; assoc. prof. darwis khudori from university of le havre, france; assistant prof. gautam kumar jha from jawaharlal nehru university, india; dr. k.k. ramachandran from grd institute of management, coimbatore, india; and dr. baiq wardhani from airlangga university, indonesia. their participation in our editorial board has made our editorial board composition covers america, europe, south asia, and indonesia. it shows our strong commitment to enhance quality of this journal. besides academics, our editorial board has been strengthening by the presence of dr. marty natalegawa, minister of foreign affairs, republic of indonesia and dr. dino patti djalal, vice minister of foreign affairs, republic of indonesia. their practical expertise will for sure enhance the merit of our journal. jakarta, 25 july 2014 tirta nugraha mursitama, phd editor-in-chief journal of asean studies, vol. 3, no. 1 (2015), pp. 32-41 ©2015 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic jokowi’s maritime axis: change and continuity of indonesia’s role in indo-pacific i gusti bagus dharma agastia president university, indonesia a. a. banyu perwita president university, indonesia abstract indonesia is undergoing transition and soon, a new president will be inaugurated. the new president brings promises of new foreign and defence policy for indonesia, building upon indonesia’s prior principles and putting renewed consideration on indonesia’s geopolitical position in the indo-pacific. this paper examines the “maritime axis”, the concept coined by president joko widodo and the possible changes in indonesian foreign and defence policy required as to achieve the maritime axis. in foreign policy, indonesia is expected to contribute more to the indian ocean rim association while maintaining its asean centrality. in defence, there is a significant change in indonesia’s defence outlook from land-based to maritime-based. also, indonesia looks towards india as a security partner in securing the indian ocean. keywords: strategic environment, security community, maritime axis, foreign policy, defence policy. introduction during the third presidential debate on 22 june 2014, presidential candidate joko widodo, or commonly recognized as ‚jokowi‛, promoted the idea of indonesia being a ‚maritime axis‛ in southeast asia. being a ‚maritime axis‛, based on joko widodo’s policy platform on defence and foreign policy submitted to the general elections commission (kpu), would secure indonesia’s economic and security interests in the maritime sector while also boosting indonesia’s identity as a maritime power and archipelagic nation. following his inauguration in october 2014, jokowi now has the opportunity to fulfil his ambitions of indonesia being a global maritime axis. changes to indonesia’s foreign and defence policy to achieve jokowi’s ambitious ‚maritime axis‛ are inevitable. thus, this article aims to examine the possible changes and continuities to indonesian foreign and defence policy in relation to the addition of the ‚maritime axis‛. these include a change in multilateral engagement through the addition of the indian ocean rim as a location of interest and in indonesia’s defence outlook. however, while changes will be present, the sacrosanct principles of indonesia’s ‚free and active‛ foreign policy will remain the same. this article first provides a review on the strategic environment in the indo-pacific. it notes the changing strategic environment in the indo-pacific, with the involvement of great powers and the emergence of the indian ocean as a new geopolitical interest. then, we examine the ‚maritime axis‛ doctrine and the changes that it would bring to indonesia’s foreign and defence policy. 33 journal of asean studies the changing regional strategic environment of the indo-pacific the strategic environment of the indopacific is steadily becoming unpredictable. in the pacific, gindarsah (2014) notes that major powers in the region will prefer strategic competition over cooperation. china’s military growth, combined with its increased assertiveness and economic power, is steadily becoming a power that should be treated with caution. in the south china sea, the pla navy has made their advance into contested waters near malaysia and the philippines.1 on the other hand, the u.s. is increasing their presence in the region through their ‘asia pivot’, or rebalance strategy, which aims to maintain the u.s’ strategic and economic commitments. 2 mahadevan (2013) notes that once the ‘pivot’ has been fully completed, it is expected that almost 60 percent of the u.s. navy will be stationed in the pacific. on a regional level, asean has been an important cornerstone for indonesian foreign policy and ultimately, the advancement of indonesian national interest. however, asean remains incapable of resolving ongoing security conflicts amongst and within its members and other great powers in the region. the south china sea dispute continues to be a potentially disruptive issue within asean. with four asean members as claimants in the dispute and the presence of two major powers in the region, asean cohesion is being tested. the philippines’ relations with china remains tense and as a result, the philippines have turned to the u.s. and japan for support. the 1 east asian strategic review, p. 160 2 clinton, hillary. 11 october 2011. america’s pacific century. foreign policy. accessed on 2 september 2014 from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/ americas_pacific_century u.s. is expected to provide increased military assistance to the philippines in order to face china3, while japan and the philippines have signed a defence agreement. 4 vietnam is actively diversifying its security choices by engaging russia, the u.s., china, india, and japan in military diplomacy. 5 furthermore, asean and china have yet to conclude a legally binding code of conduct, hindering peaceful resolution in the south china sea.6 aside from multilateral disputes, asean members also have their respective security issues which, if remain unhandled, could affect the stability of the region. thailand faces a turbulent political situation due to continued rows with anti-government factions despite ongoing peace talks. 7 sectarian violence in myanmar has resurfaced, which will severely affect domestic politics, as well as foreign relations and economy. 8 persecution of minority muslims has influenced other acts in neighbouring countries, especially in indonesia, where there have been reports of rohingya activists seeking out help from radical groups in indonesia. it is feared that these oppressed minorities might be recruited by a southeast asia jihad movement, increasing the 3 east asian strategic review, p. 150-151 4 department of national defense philippines. 2015. philippines and japan ink defense cooperation agreement. accessed on 20 june 2015 from http://www.dndph.org/2015-updates/philippinesand-japan-ink-defense-cooperation-agreement 5 east asian strategic review, p. 153-157 6 the new york times. 12 july 2012. asian leaders at regional meeting fail to resolve disputes over south china sea. accessed on 15 september 2014 from http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/13/world/asia/as ian-leaders-fail-to-resolve-disputes-on-southchina-sea-during-asean-summit.html 7 east asian strategic review, p. 165-167 8 ibid, p. 170 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century http://www.dndph.org/2015-updates/philippines-and-japan-ink-defense-cooperation-agreement http://www.dndph.org/2015-updates/philippines-and-japan-ink-defense-cooperation-agreement http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/13/world/asia/asian-leaders-fail-to-resolve-disputes-on-south-china-sea-during-asean-summit.html http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/13/world/asia/asian-leaders-fail-to-resolve-disputes-on-south-china-sea-during-asean-summit.html http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/13/world/asia/asian-leaders-fail-to-resolve-disputes-on-south-china-sea-during-asean-summit.html 34 jokowi’s maritime axis: change and continuity of indonesia’s role probability of a terrorist threat in southeast asia.9 to address these security issues in southeast asia and to further facilitate regional integration in the face of regional uncertainties, asean is to launch the asean political-security community in 2015. however, whether asean could successfully achieve the apsc is still debatable. solidum (2003) argues that asean’s institutions and existing platforms, such as the asean way, the treaty of amity and cooperation, and the asean regional forum, have provided a way for asean to engage in track two diplomacy and maintain security in the region. acharya (2001) praises asean for being a nascent security community despite the many challenges that it faces, while khoo (2004) argues that asean’s negative norms hinder the formation of a full-fledged security community. according to solidum (2003), security in southeast asia was a result of ‚asean values of peace, economic, social, and cultural development, cooperation, political stability, and regional stability and progress‛. on the other hand, jones and smith (2001) argue that asean is ‚neither a security nor an economic community, either in being or in prospect.‛ jones and smith emphasize on the shallow substance of the organization, criticizing the organization for producing a ‚rhetorical and institutional shell‛. one interesting point of jokowi’s foreign policy platform is the inclusion of the indian ocean as an area of indonesian foreign policy interest. despite being in close proximity with the indian ocean, it has remained out of the indonesian foreign policy lenses for some time. being out of the spotlight for the majority of the 20th century, 9 chanda, nayan. 12 march 2014. rohingyas vs. buddhists? huffington post. accessed on 15 september 2014 from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nayanchanda/rohingyas-vs-buddhists_b_4950999.html the region, known as the indian ocean rim (ior), has lately become an ‚area of crucial geostrategic importance‛ and is also described as ‚…politically troubled and potentially combustible‛ (michel and sticklor, 2012). the indian ocean has become the world’s most important energy thoroughfare, fashionably described by kaplan (2009) as an ‚economic jugular‛, with 36 per cent of middle eastern oil passing through the indian ocean. developed countries, such as japan, china and the u.s., rely heavily on middle eastern oil imports. furthermore, the littoral states around the indian ocean also boasts abundant economic resources, such as gold, diamonds, oil and gas reserves. two-thirds of the world’s oil reserves and one-third of global gas reserves are located in littoral states of the indian ocean. the emergence of china and india further boost the importance of the region as they show interest in the sea lanes of communication (slocs) and the overall stability of the states near the ocean.10 both traditional and non-traditional maritime issues riddle the indian ocean region. in a traditional sense, the indian ocean is home to some of the world’s largest military spenders. with the increased attention from major powers, the region is prone to traditional security threats such as a potential security dilemma fuelled by suspicions between the u.s., china, and india. the three powers are the top five world military powers11 and all have interests in the region. the u.s. maintains strategic interests in the indian ocean as it is vital for the execution of u.s. foreign policy, which involves mobilization of troops for nato campaigns in the middle east. china is also seeking to increase its influence in the indian ocean in an attempt to balance the u.s. by 10rumley, dennis (ed.) 2013. the indian ocean region: security, stability, and sustainability in the 21st century. australia india institute. 11 the military balance 2014. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nayan-chanda/rohingyas-vs-buddhists_b_4950999.html http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nayan-chanda/rohingyas-vs-buddhists_b_4950999.html 35 journal of asean studies investing in ports along the indian ocean to form their ‚string of pearls‛. stuck in the middle is india, wary of two great powers showing seeking to expand their influence in the indian ocean. the region also faces a nuclear proliferation issue. tensions are still running high between iran and pakistan. there is a possibility that ongoing tensions might cause iran to adopt a more aggressive nuclear strategy to face pakistan. pakistani nukes are also prone to falling into the wrong hands, increasing the fear of nuclear proliferation.12 the indian ocean is becoming a ‚nuclear ocean‛ and may play a role in the regional uranium trade. 13 while in a nontraditional sense, unsecure sea routes along the indian ocean provide ample opportunities for pirates and maritime terrorism. in 2004, the al-baqra oil terminal came under attack by suicide bombers.14 in terms of maritime piracy, from 2001, attacks on energy vessels passing through the indian ocean occurred in the malacca strait. however, from 2008, more incidents of maritime piracy occurred near africa due to somali pirates gaining increased capacity to operate offshore. as a result, in august 2008, a ‚security corridor‛ was established in somali waters to grant safe passage to merchant vessels.15 attempts to bring order to the indian ocean began in 1997 with the formation of the indian ocean rim association (iora) as a multilateral platform to facilitate cooperation among the states in the indian ocean. iora 12 behravesh, maysam. 11 november 2014. the nuclear implications of iran-pakistan tensions. accessed on 20 june 2015 from http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/the-nuclearimplications-of-iran-pakistan-tensions/ 13 ibid. 14 the guardian. 25 april 2004. suicide bombers in boat attack on iraq oil terminal. accessed on 15 september 2014 from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/apr/25/ir aq2 15 rumley, 2013, pp. 62-63 adopts an ‚open regionalism‛ approach, similar to apec, which is centred on nonbinding commitments on a voluntary basis and agreement by consensus (kelegama, 2002). driven mostly by economic interests, iora seeks to provide sustainable growth for its members, mutual economic cooperation, and promote a liberal trade regime in the region. in 2011, during india’s term as chair, iora added six priorities as the institution’s agenda, namely (1) maritime safety and security; (2) trade and investment facilitation; (3) fisheries management and sustainable harvesting of marine food resources; (4) disaster risk reduction; (5) academic and s&t cooperation; and (6) tourism promotion and cultural exchanges. 16 thus, the iora agenda expanded from merely trade to include maritime and environmental security. though iora seeks to provide a regional platform for cooperation in the region, it faces several challenges. wagner (2013) notes iora having a ‚peculiar legitimacy problem‛. most iora members are littoral states. according to the un convention on the law of the sea (unclos), littoral states cannot exercise sovereignty beyond the 12-mile line and the exclusive economic zone (eez), as the high seas are a public good where states have no claim (res communis). thus, maritime issues occurring in the high seas would require cooperation from the international community. furthermore, there are concerns, such as from kelegama (2002), that deeper integration among members would be unachievable due to stark differences among members. members of the iora come from different political and economic backgrounds, such as the developed australia to the less developed bangladesh. in kelegama’s words, members of the iora are ‚…too diverse, geographically scattered with different levels of development in member 16 ministry of external affairs. 2012. annual report 2011-2012. new delhi: ministry of external affairs. http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/the-nuclear-implications-of-iran-pakistan-tensions/ http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/the-nuclear-implications-of-iran-pakistan-tensions/ http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/apr/25/iraq2 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/apr/25/iraq2 36 jokowi’s maritime axis: change and continuity of indonesia’s role countries for any meaningful integration to take place.‛ based on kelegama’s observations, the iora has yet to become an effective regional architecture for maritime security. the absence of a shared interest inhibits the development of definite cooperation among iora members. though there have been initiatives, such as the indian ocean naval symposium (ions) and limited joint naval exercises, security cooperation among members are more operational-based and less policy-based (santikajaya, 2014). on a domestic level, indonesia has long retained its inward-looking posture. the armed forces (tni) is more geared towards internal threats, such as separatism and domestic violence, and maintaining national stability. 17 power projection across the seas has been the least of indonesia’s priorities for the last decade. as of such, the armed forces emphasize more on land forces rather than maritime forces. according to the iiss (2014), in 2014, the indonesian navy only has 65 000 personnel amongst the total of 300 400 personnel. this condition is understandable, as indonesia wishes to maintain a peaceful profile rather than an assertive profile. however, considering the size of the indonesia’s territory, the size of indonesia’s military is not enough to meet the minimum essential force (mef), especially in maritime security. additionally, indonesia’s indigenous strategic industries, especially the shipbuilding industry represented by pt pal, have been slow to develop due to high production costs from taxes and insufficient facilities and equipment.18 17 ministry of defence. 2008. indonesia defence white paper 2008. 18 the jakarta post. 14 august 2013. ‚shipbuilders struggle to meet production targets‛. the jakarta post, accessed 15 may 2015 from http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/08/14/s hipbuilders-strugglemeet-production-targets.html jokowi’s maritime axis: what it means for foreign policy and defence jokowi’s ‚maritime axis‛ recognizes indonesia’s geopolitical position as an archipelagic state and puts emphasis on the maritime domain as a medium for indonesia’s foreign and defence policy. jokowi’s foreign policy outlook emphasizes on indonesia becoming a strong regional maritime power not only in strength but also in diplomacy. jokowi’s platform acknowledges the importance of maritime diplomacy in resolving territorial maritime disputes with neighbours, the need to safeguard indonesia’s maritime domain, and alleviating maritime tensions between great powers in the region. it also emphasizes the importance of the indopacific region for the implementation of indonesian foreign policy. jokowi puts forward five points for indonesia’s regional policy i.e. (1) consolidation of indonesian leadership in asean, (2) strengthening regional architecture to prevent great power hegemony, (3) development of strategic bilateral ties, (4) managing the impacts of regional economic integration and free trade on domestic economy, and (5) ‚comprehensive maritime cooperation‛ through the iora. 19 furthermore, in his speech at the east asia summit in november 2014, jokowi further elaborated on his ‚maritime axis‛ doctrine by listing the five pillars of the maritime axis, namely (1) revival of indonesian maritime culture and ultimately, archipelagic identity; (2) development of oceans and fisheries; (3) improving maritime economy; (4) maritime diplomacy to address illegal fishing and other security threats; and (5) boosting indonesia’s maritime defences (neary, 2014). 19 widodo, joko and kalla, jusuf. may 2014. jalan perubahan untuk indonesia yang berdaulat, mandiri dan berkepribadian – visi misi, dan program aksi http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/08/14/shipbuilders-strugglemeet-production-targets.html http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/08/14/shipbuilders-strugglemeet-production-targets.html 37 journal of asean studies asean has always been the cornerstone of indonesia’s foreign policy in the asia-pacific and it will likely remain as such. from its foundation, indonesia has been active in asean to pursue its regional interests. however, with jokowi’s emerging ‚maritime axis‛ and subsequent policies, there are indications that asean might be losing its centrality as indonesia’s main multilateral platform. as observed by syailendra (2015), indonesia’s ‚high profile‛ foreign policy approach shows signs of declining engagement in asean in favour of a more nationalistic approach. recent events, such as the sinking of illegal fishing ships and reluctance to participate in the asean economic community (aec), can be interpreted as signs of indonesia’s moving away from its asean centrality. however, developing a more nationalistic approach towards asean does not necessarily mean that indonesia will strike asean off its multilateral institutions list. asean has provided indonesia with a platform for settling disputes with major powers and connect existing regional organizations within the asia-pacific region. through asean, indonesia has managed to connect southeast asia with some of the larger players in the asia-pacific. for example, the asean regional forum has provided a means for discussion and cooperation on asia-pacific security issues between the u.s., china, and japan. jokowi’s approach to foreign policy can be considered as pragmatic rather than nationalistic. he aims to show that indonesia is willing to cooperate with other countries, but not to the extent of comprising national interest. this approach corresponds nicely with jokowi’s vision of consolidating indonesian leadership in asean. it implies indonesia’s intent on playing a bigger role in asean to further indonesian national interest through asean as an important foothold in establishing the ‚maritime axis‛. indonesian interest in the indian ocean is a new addition to indonesia’s foreign policy following jokowi’s ‚maritime axis‛. in particular, in october 2015, indonesia will chair the iora for two years, succeeding australia as the former chair. it is likely that jokowi’s ‚maritime axis‛ takes into account indonesia’s position in iora. since the addition of six priorities in 2011, iora’s agenda has a lot in common with indonesia’s interests in the indian ocean, particularly maritime security and economic interests according to jokowi’s pillars of the ‚maritime axis‛. for example, iora’s agenda on maritime safety and security coincides with jokowi’s interest of developing the indonesian navy to better provide regional security against illegal fishing and piracy. despite iora still being in a stage of development, indonesian foreign minister, retno marsudi insists that iora remains as a part of indonesian foreign policy in creating the ‚maritime axis‛. despite iora’s shortcomings, such as a lack of coherent security architecture, marsudi explains indonesia’s participation in iora as being based on what indonesia could contribute for the iora rather than what iora could provide for indonesia. 20 this stance can be considered related to the ‚active‛ part of indonesian foreign policy, where the foreign minister sees indonesia as playing a more active role in developing the regional organization to suit its national interests. jokowi’s ‚maritime axis‛ envisions indonesia’s navy as a regional maritime power in the indo-pacific. 21 this marks a 20 indonesia ministry of foreign affairs. 25 february 2015. menlu ri: melalui keketuaan iora, indonesia perkuat poros maritim. accessed 20 june 2015 from http://www.kemlu.go.id/pages/news.aspx?idp=72 55&l=id 21 widodo, joko and kalla, jusuf. may 2014. jalan perubahan untuk indonesia yang berdaulat, mandiri dan berkepribadian – visi misi, dan program aksi http://www.kemlu.go.id/pages/news.aspx?idp=7255&l=id http://www.kemlu.go.id/pages/news.aspx?idp=7255&l=id 38 jokowi’s maritime axis: change and continuity of indonesia’s role serious change in indonesia’s previously-held threat perceptions, which were mostly focused on a continental defence outlook. the previous defence white paper, published in 2008, puts much emphasis on internal security concerns, such as separatism and internal violence related to ethnicity, religion, race, and communities, and maintaining continental defence, while putting little regard for the numerous naval chokepoints, eezs, and outer islands in indonesia. furthermore, the lack of indonesian presence in its territorial waters has caused indonesia to suffer from a lack of deterrence, especially against illegal traders using indonesia’s waterways and island claims by neighbours.22 to that end, jokowi plans to gradually increase the defence budget by 1.5 percent over five years, which is to be channelled into defence equipment procurement, rejuvenating the indonesian strategic industry and developing maritime infrastructure. the increased defence budget is also expected to fund defensive measures in indonesian waters, such as a military base equipped with combat aircraft in natuna to protect the island against a potential flashpoint in the south china sea.23 but most importantly, the defence budget will be channelled to bolster indonesia’s naval capacity to reach the mef required to safeguard indonesian waters. there is a possibility of indonesia securing its relationship with india as a strategic partner to carry out the ‚maritime axis‛, as both countries share similar interests. the two countries have a long history of bilateral and multilateral ties, especially in the 22 jakarta post. 22 march 2007. ri lacks deterrence force: juwono. accessed 20 june 2015 from http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2007/03/22/ri -lacks-deterrence-force-juwono.html 23 tempo. 10 september 2014. indonesia to build military base in natuna. accessed 23 june 2015 from http://en.tempo.co/read/news/2014/09/10/05560576 7/indonesia-to-build-military-base-in-natuna realm of security and economy. since the 1990s, india has been expanding its ‚sphere of influence‛ in the indian ocean and to a larger extent, southeast asia, by promoting itself as ‚benign provider of maritime security‛ (brewster, 2011). in 2001, both countries signed a defence cooperation agreement and since then, have conducted numerous defence exchanges. under the defence cooperation agreement, indonesia-india security ties also expanded to defence industry cooperation; however, progress in the area seems to be slow. indonesia has yet to acquire india’s brahmos cruise missile technology. according to brewster (2011, p. 233), indonesia’s limited defence budget and india’s limitations are the key factors hindering further security relations. aside from defence industry cooperation, india and indonesia have also been active in maritime security in the andaman sea. since the 1990s, india and indonesia have conducted joint naval exercises and naval visits to bases in andaman and nicobar (brewster, 2011). in trade, bilateral trade between the two countries reached us$ 20.1 billion in 20122013 and indonesia has become india’s second-largest trading partner in asean (ministry of external affairs, 2014). importexport from the two countries ranges from palm oil to pharmaceuticals. these existing bilateral relations, added with shared interests in the indo-pacific and membership in iora, could become the basis of a fruitful relationship in the future. conclusion president joko widodo’s ambitions of a ‚pan-indo-pacific‛ indonesia is represented in his maritime axis doctrine of foreign and defence policy. the ‚maritime axis‛ doctrine shows a significant expansion in indonesia’s foreign policy and defence ambitions. not only will indonesia strive to maintain its asean centrality, it also seeks to expand the http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2007/03/22/ri-lacks-deterrence-force-juwono.html http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2007/03/22/ri-lacks-deterrence-force-juwono.html http://en.tempo.co/read/news/2014/09/10/055605767/indonesia-to-build-military-base-in-natuna http://en.tempo.co/read/news/2014/09/10/055605767/indonesia-to-build-military-base-in-natuna 39 journal of asean studies indonesian sphere of influence by ‚looking west‛ towards the indian ocean. to achieve those ends, jokowi has decided upon a number of measures, such as reforming the nation’s defence outlook to accommodate a more outward-looking and maritime posture, increasing the defence budget to procure defence equipment, using multilateral platforms to engage with great powers in the region, and actively contribute towards institution-building in the indo-pacific. these measures will likely be the highlights of the jokowi administration throughout his term. despite these changes, indonesia’s foreign policy principles of ‚free and active‛ will continue to be the foundation of future policies. jokowi’s maritime axis will see to an indonesia that plays a larger role in building the indo-pacific region. about the authors i gusti bagus dharma agastia is a research assistant for the school of international relations, president university. a.a. banyu perwita is a professor of international relations, president university, kota jababeka, bekasi-indonesia. references acharya, amitav. 2001. constructing a security community in southeast asia. london: routledge. behravesh, maysam. 11 november 2014. the nuclear implications of iran-pakistan tensions. accessed on 20 june 2015 from hyperlink 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(2020). macroeconomic determinants of auto sales in asean: an empirical study in five major asean countries. journal of asean studies, 8(2), 95-110, https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v8i2.6621 abstract this research examines the determinants of car sales in asean countries. the research concentrates on five macroeconomic variables (consumer price index, gross domestic product (gdp) per capita, changes in gross domestic product per capita, foreign exchange rate, and interest rate). the total sample is 12 years of automobile sales in five asean countries from 2005 – 2016. the five asean countries are indonesia, thailand, malaysia, singapore, and vietnam. this paper used the multilinear regression method with statistical package for the social sciences (spss) software to test the research model. for interest-rate variables, we used a lag of one year. the empirical results show that the previous period for inflation, gross domestic product per capita, interest rate, and the foreign exchange rate significantly influenced on car sales in five asean countries. the growth of gdp per capita does not influence car sales. keywords: automotive, exchange rate, gross domestic product, inflation, interest rate introduction the association of southeast asian nations (asean) is a territorial intergovernmental cooperation comprised of 10 countries in southeast asia that facilitates economic, security, political, educational, sociocultural, and military integration among its members and other asia nations. as per stated in asean official website (asean.org), the asean members are indonesia, thailand, malaysia, singapore, vietnam, the philippines, myanmar, cambodia, brunei, and laos. 96 macroeconomic determinants of auto sales in asean the total gross of all asean countries’ domestic products is usd 2,92 trillion, equal to 3,65% of the world’s gross domestic product (gdp). the total asean population of 647 billion people is equal to 8,4% of the world's population. based on imf estimates, asean will have a population of 688 million by 2024. asean's gdp will reach usd 4,37 trillion and become the fifth-largest gdp in the world. gdp per capita will reach usd 6.350 (asean secretariat and world bank, 2015). in line with gdp and population growth, the total number of vehicles sold in asean countries was 3,56 million in 2018. car sales are equal to 4,2% of total world automotive sales. all global brands have a presence in the asean market. according to asean automotive federation (aaf) report, asean vehicle sales had achieved a growth rate of 7% from 2017 to 2018. cars become the primary transportation tool for countries in asean, while public transportation is still limited in big cities. the community uses car as the main transportation between cities to deliver agricultural products from villages to cities. with a population of 260 million in 2020, indonesia does not have adequate connections between cities, similar to vietnam. meanwhile, singapore already has public transportation connecting the entire country. the automotive is the essential industries in enhancing the economic growth of a country. the industry contributes 10,16% to the total gdp in indonesia (“industri otomotif,” 2018), 10% of total gdp in thailand (maikaew, 2019), and 4,3% of total gdp in malaysia (bernama, 2019). hundreds support the automotive industry to thousands of small and medium enterprises in the value chain from spare parts to the seat leather producers. the automotive sector is linked to other major industries such as banking, insurance, consumer financing, infrastructure, and mining industries for steel. the automotive sector is the critical contributor to the country’s budget on the income side. however, the sales of automotive are unpredictable from year to year, which consequently affect the budget income of the country as well as the realization of the annual government budget (johan, 2019). therefore, the government needs to be able to predict the determinant of automotive sales in their country. figure 1. total car sales in asean countries source: (asean secretariat and world bank, 2015) journal of asean studies 97 car sales have trends that fluctuate in line with the economic climate. asean countries have experienced several crisis as significant as countries in other parts of the world, including the 1998 asian crisis, the 2008 global crisis, and several other crisis. these crisis have reduced economic growth and gdp, resulting in a decline in car sales. total vehicle sales exceeded 3,3 million units in 2013. on average, car sales in the asean region have exceeded 2,5 million units over the last ten years, as described in figure 1. given its market potential, many global automotive players have an urge to enter the asean market. banks and finance companies contribute to the provision of car sales, in which banks contribute less than consumer finance companies. this happens in major economies in asean, such as indonesia, vietnam, and thailand. consumer finance companies finance most car sales, in which the financing demands depend on the charged interest rate and the actual interest rate. whereas the interest rates charged by financing companies depend on the macro interest rate level and inflation. higher the inflation leads to higher the interest rate. moreover, car sales are related to the country's exchange rate versus the usd. most of the vehicles remains having low local content. an adjustment in the exchange rate impacts the price of the vehicle, where an increase on the prices may reduce the consumer purchase intention. figure 2. four-wheeler sales in five asean countries source: (asean secretariat and world bank, 2015) as shown in figure 2, indonesia and thailand contribute 68% of the total asean fourwheeler market. malaysia has the third-largest market among the asean countries since it contributes 23% of the total asean four-wheeler market. according to the macroeconomics theory, aggregate demand is influenced by macroeconomic variables and financial market instruments. macroeconomic variables include gross domestic product, inflation, and foreign exchange rates, whereas the financial market instrument is interest rates. 34% 23%3% 34% 6% indonesia malaysia singapore thailand vietnam 98 macroeconomic determinants of auto sales in asean this research contributes to the influence of macroeconomic variables on auto sales. by having the idea of macroeconomic variables, business owners will be able to prepare an appropriate work plan. besides, the government will be able to arrange the annual budget planning, especially in terms of tax revenue on vehicle sales. literature review a number of researches focusing on automotive sales determinants have been conducted in developing countries, including malaysia, south africa, turkey, china, india, mexico, pakistan, indonesia, and brazil. however, none of them has the same conclusions about the effect of macroeconomic variables on automotive sales. these research includes chifurira et al. (2014), lee and kang (2015), kemal et al. (2015), wen and noor (2015), günşen (2015), and others. pant and nidugala (2016) investigate and evaluate the impact of macroeconomic indicators on car for indian banks. they find that real gdp growth, inflation rate, interest rate, and exchange rate substantially impact the car of indian banking. gross domestic product has a constructive effect to many car sales in malaysia. the interest rate, unemployment rate, and inflation rate negatively affect many car sales in malaysia (islam et al., 2016). chifurira et al. (2014) examine the correlation between the consumer price index and new vehicle sales in south africa. this research collects monthly data from the years 1960 – 2013. it comes up with results that inflation significantly influences new vehicle sales in south africa, with a 5% significance rate. patra and rao (2017) find that gdp and car sales have a positive and long-term relationship, while the interest rate and fuel price have a negative relationship. yagi and managi (2016) show that a decrease in population and household size in japan accelerate car ownership. lee and kang (2015) conduct a research about the global crisis effect on auto sales in china. this research explores the key variables influencing motor auto sales in china, which are motor vehicle price, fuel price, interest rate, and individual income before the global crisis. while the global crisis occurs, automotive sales are influenced by motor vehicle sales, interest rates, and individual consumer income. moreover, consumer income influences automotive sales in china after the global crisis. meanwhile, kemal et al. (2015) conduct a determinant factor study, examining the factor that influences the light category commercial car-buying markets in developing countries. this research rely on a survey method. 408 respondents in turkey are surveyed based on gender, age, monthly income, family size, driving license type, and fuel type, determining their influence on light commercial car demand. journal of asean studies 99 johan (2019) studies the macroeconomic determinants of car and motorcycle sales in indonesia. it is found that the gross domestic product and changes in a gross domestic product have a significant influence on car and motorcycle sales in indonesia. next, zeng, schmitz, and madlener (2018) find that gdp and government incentives are individually stronger predictors on the macroeconomic level, while price and gasoline consumption affect automobile demand significantly on the microeconomic demand level. gusev et al. (2018) examine those factors that directly impact the russian automotive market’s development. macroeconomic climate, inflation, price of the car, and government support harm car sales. delayed demand due to crisis, reduction of loan rates, and reduction of financing rates are the decisive factors that influence sales of cars in russia. günşen (2015) studies the economic effects of foreign direct investments (fdis) on the turkish automotive industry between 1997 and 2010 regarding exports, productivity, and employment. the research revealed significant fdi contributions to the turkish motor industry in all three areas considered. the results show that foreign direct investment to turkish has significant positive effects on the economy. in addition, pilat (2016) analyses foreign exchange exposure determinants based on 21 companies in the automotive industry. the results do not provide a clear explanation of the economic risks in the long run. kaya, kaya and cebi (2019) focus on factors that affect automobile sales and estimate automobile sales in turkey by using an artificial neural network (ann), auto regressive integrated moving average (arima), and time-series decomposition techniques. the dollar exchange rate, households’ financial status, the industrial production index and the logarithmic form of automobile sales before one month are found to significantly affect automobile sales. altaf and hashim (2016) investigate the key factors that influence intentions to purchase passenger vehicles among pakistan consumers. policymakers in pakistan's auto sector would gain from this research insights when explaining the long-overdue auto policy. analysis of the research data has disclosed that the three critical parameters identified from studies in other asian nations are also relevant for pakistan car consumers. additionally, wen and noor (2015) find that functional value, emotional value, and novelty value failed to demonstrate a significant relationship with consumers’ intention to purchase hybrid cars. the research uses a 7-point likert-scale survey. besides, demiroglu & yunculer (2016) estimate the trend level of light-vehicle sales to be roughly 7% of the existing stock. a remarkable out-of-sample forecast performance is obtained for horizons up to nearly a decade by a regression equation using only a cyclical gap measure, the time trend, and obvious policy dummies. gaddam (2016) investigates the automobile industry’s export and output relationship, also focusing on the geographic concentration of the automobile industry exports from india to other countries. bach et al. (2017) examine the automotive retail industry’s result, taking into deliberation the monetary policy implemented by the brazilian government from 1994 to 2014. 100 macroeconomic determinants of auto sales in asean they find that the sector’s performance, represented by production and export levels, is connected to variables related to monetary policy. the critical success variables impact on sales forecasting is determined based on real-time primary data, and secondary data of the automobile firm situated at pithampur, individually where the commercial vehicle segment research is conducted (chouksey et al., 2017). meanwhile, albors-garrigos et al. (2017) explain the impact of national culture on after-sales service in the automotive sector. the research views that after-sales services have become of paramount importance in the auto industry. it shows a framework for how the entire process chain of after-sales services could be researched and successfully applied to schwartz’s the individual-level value theory. jayaraman et al. (2018) investigate the influencing variables in using of non-national cars in malaysia. based on the remarkable outcomes, non-national four wheelers are recognized as having certain salient quality, excellent fuel utilization, and commendable maintenance and after-sales repair services. the respondents state that manufacturers of nonnational cars conduct regular research and development activities and continuously acknowledge market flavors and tastes, thus enhancing customers' propensity to buy nonnational cars. chakraborty and chattopadhyay (2019) confirm the validity of the structure-conductperformance hypothesis. this finding emphasizes the debt-equity ratio, advertising intensity, and return on net worth as the key influencers of the concentrated market structure for the chosen automobile segment in india. this research examines five macro-economic variables: inflation, gross domestic product per capita, changes in gross domestic product per capita, the foreign exchange rate, and the interest rate. the research is based on a regional economy that consists of five countries and on 12 years of historical performance. these factors render this research unique. the five countries from asean members are indonesia, malaysia, thailand, singapore, and vietnam. these five asean countries have a gdp of usd 2,46 trillion, with a population of 462 billion. they contribute 83% of the total gdp asean. research method the structure of research can be seen in figure 3. this research tests the effects of macroeconomic variables on car sales in the asean region. the macroeconomic variables are inflation, gross domestic product per capita, changes in gross domestic product per capita, the foreign exchange rate, and the interest rate. the macroeconomic data is based on world bank publications. this research is performed using a regression statistics model, which is described as follows: 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖⁄ + 𝛽𝛽3 ∆𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖⁄ + 𝛽𝛽4 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (1) journal of asean studies 101 where: y = car sales 0 = constant β1 ... βi = regression coefficient infl it-1 = inflation rate gdp/c it = gross domestic product per capita ∆gdp/c it = change in gross domestic product per capita exch it = exchange rate to usd inte it-1 = interest rate ɛ = error term figure 3. research framework this research employs five macroeconomic variables: inflation, gross domestic product per capita, the growth rate of the gross domestic product per capita, the foreign exchange rate, and the interest rate. the explanation for each variable is delineated in table 1. car sales are the dependent variable that indicates the total car sales, including both passenger and commercial cars, in each country. higher consumer price index leads to a lower demand for car sales. this is in line with the increase in inflation and interest rates. car sales, through credit, will decrease in line with the increase in interest rates. inflation variable indicates the inflation rate in each country during the year of research, which the hypothesis are: h1 inflation rate influences car sales in the asean region. h2 the interest rate lag-1 influences car sales in the asean region. gross domestic product variable is the total value or market value of all the finished goods and services produced by the citizen within a country's borders in a specific time period. gdp per capita is the total gross domestic product of a country divided by the population’s number within a country. more gdp per capita may increase the purchase probability in a society. purchasing power depends on the gdp per capita. the demand of transportation will be evolved from two-wheeler to four-wheeler, in line with the gdp per capita rate. the hypothesis is developed as follows: 102 macroeconomic determinants of auto sales in asean h3 gross domestic product per capita influences car sales in the asean region. h4 changes in gross domestic product per capita influence car sales in the asean region. the foreign exchange rate variable is the currency exchange rate against the united stated of america dollar during a specific time. higher import content will have an impact on the price of the vehicle. currently, local content average is less than 50%, whereas the import content is more than 50%. hence the hypothesis is developed to be: h5 the foreign exchange rate influences car sales in the asean region. interest rate variable is the interest rate charged by the financial institution to the borrower in a specific country during a specific time. interest rate lag is the interest rate of the previous period. for instance, interest rate lag-1 is the interest rate of the previous year. additionally, regression method with the statistical package for social sciences software (spss) is used to test the research model. this research uses secondary data from the world bank’s website. the data are cross-sectional data from an observed period spanning the years 2005 – 2016. the independent variables are five economic variables studied from 2005 to 2016. dependent variables are car sales in a unit from 2005 to 2016. the samples are five asean countries: indonesia, malaysia, singapore, vietnam, and thailand. the data have been collected from several independent sources, one of which is the world bank website. table 1. research variables no variables symbols formulas references 1 car sales mob car sales in year t 2 inflation inf t inflation rate in year t nawi et al. (2013); chifurira et al. (2014); pant and nidugala (2016) 3 gross domestic product per capita gdp/c gdp t / total population t nawi et al. (2013); patra and rao (2017) 4 changes in gross domestic product per capita ∆gdp/c gdp/c t – gdp/c t-1 pant and nidugala (2016) 5 foreign exchange rate usd/idr exch t-1 exchange rate usd/ country currency in year t nawi et al. (2013); pant and nidugala (2016); kaya et al. (2019) 6 interest rate inte the lending rate in year t nawi et al. (2013); lee and kang (2015); pant and nidugala (2016); gusev et al. (2018); patra and rao (2017) 7 interest rate lag -1 inte t-1 the interest rate in year t-1 journal of asean studies 103 results and discussions the highest car sales, at 1,4 million units, occurs in indonesia, while the smallest vehicle sales occurs in singapore at 34.111 units. on average, vehicle sales of 500.000 units occurs in five countries during the period spanning 2005 2016. indonesia has a population of 260 million in 2020, and singapore has a population of 3,5 million. the total landmass in indonesia is 1,9 million km2, while the total landmass in singapore is 721 km2. the highest inflation rate, 22,675%, occurs in vietnam, and the lowest is a deflationary rate, at -5,99% in singapore. on average, asean countries experienced a 4,57% inflation rate over 11 years. although most asean countries had experienced the 1998 asian crisis, all asean countries have recovered from it. table 2. statistical description n minimum maximum mean std deviation car sales 70 34.111,0000 1.423.580,0000 502.254.9714 385.876,2824 inflation 70 -0,0599 0,2267 0,0457 0,0504 gdp per capita 70 687,4797 64.581,9440 13.663,5303 18.788,2216 gdp per capita growth 70 -0,1395 0,5942 0,0795 0,1022 foreign exchange rate 70 1,2497 22.602,0500 6.097,2191 8.098,2942 interest rate 70 0,0415 0,1695 0,0799 0,0393 interest rate lag (-1) 70 0,0433 0,1695 0,0810 0,0399 valid n (listwise) 70 sources: research data gdp per capita reached an average of usd 13.663, with the lowest gdp of usd 687 in vietnam, and the highest in singapore at usd 64.582. the most significant gdp growth ever reached is 59,42%. in 1998, gdp declined at -13,95% in indonesia due to the asian crisis, while gdp per capita has grown by 7,95% on average. the average interest rate is 7,99%, with the highest interest rate in asean countries at 16,95%, and the lowest interest rate at 4,15%. the interest rate is considered high in indonesia and vietnam due to the high inflation rate. regarding the exchange rate, the highest exchange rate is 22.602 for vietnam’s dong against the us dollar, and the lowest is 1,2 for the singapore dollar against the us dollar. all combined, the five primary currency exchange rates in asean countries is 6.097 against 1 us dollar. singapore is the wealthiest country in asean, with a population of around 6 million people. singapore is also the country with the lowest interest rates and the lowest inflation. the singapore dollar is the currency with the lowest exchange rate comparison compared to the united state dollar. 104 macroeconomic determinants of auto sales in asean indonesia is the nation with the largest population in asean, having more than 267 million people in 2017. this population represents 45% of the total population in asean. indonesia has the largest gdp in asean of usd 1,1 trillion in 2017. indonesia's gdp is 33% of asean's total gdp. indonesia has a gdp per capita of usd 4.163. thailand has a population of 68 million which makes it the second largest gdp in asean, with a total of usd 0,529 trillion. thailand's gdp per capita is usd 7.791. malaysia is the third-largest gdp in asean, with usd 0,365 trillion with a population of 32,8 million people. vietnam, with a total population of 95 million individuals, has a gdp per capita of usd 2.739 and a total gdp of 0,262 trillion. table 3. test results of determinants of car sales unstandardized coefficients standardized coefficients b std error beta t sig (constant) 770219,669 100388,844 7,672 0,000 inflation -1972791,742 867954,346 -0,258 -2,273 0,026 gdp per capita -15,227 2,051 -0,741 -7,425 0,000 gdp per capita growth -283174,454 361149,210 -0,075 -0,784 0,436 foreign exchange rate -28,935 6,160 -0,607 -4,697 0,000 interest rate lag (-1) 2827049,012 1265783,243 0,292 2,233 0,029 r 0,724 r square 0,524 sig. f change 0,000 sources: research data the hypothesis test results establish that of the five variables, four had a significant effect on automobile sales, especially car sales in five asean countries, namely, indonesia, thailand, malaysia, singapore, and vietnam. the total model shows that the inflation rate, gdp per capita, gdp growth rate, foreign exchange rate, and interest rate influence car sales at 72,4%. the inflation rate reached 0,000 in terms of statistical value, and below 0,05. this demonstrated that the inflation rate is significant. inflation shows a negative effect on car sales. higher consumer price index causes lower demand for car sales. this is in line with the increase in inflation and interest rates. car sales, through credit, will decrease in line with the increase in interest rates. this also affects the ability of consumers to allocate costs in line with rising inflation. under normal circumstances, high inflation will slow economic growth, which impacts the purchasing power of consumers. during 2005-2016, countries in asean have dealt with several crisis as big as in 1998, an asian crisis and in 2008, a global crisis. the results are in line with the 1998 and 2008 crisis, where the car sales dropped significantly during the years. indonesia's interest rate reaches 60% and the tight liquidity causes a drop in car sales. the asian crisis have caused a correction in macroeconomic factors in indonesia, thailand, malaysia, and singapore, while the global crisis have causes the correction of journal of asean studies 105 macroeconomic factors in singapore, malaysia, and thailand. the results are supported by nawi et al. (2013), chifurira et al. (2014), and pant and nidugala (2016). gdp per capita was 0,000 in terms of statistical value, below 0,05. the gdp per capita shows the effect on automotive sales since higher gdp per capita increases the society’s purchase intention and probability, while the opposite will happen if the gdp is lower. purchasing power depends on the gdp per capita. most of the global automobile producers will enter a market depending on the gdp of the country. the demand for transportation will be evolved from two-wheeler to four-wheeler, in line with the gdp per capita rate. this research result shows the same condition with the decline in motorcycle sales in indonesia and the growth of car sales in indonesia since 2015. gdp per capita in indonesia is growing, giving rise to the purchasing power of the population. the research results are in line with nawi et al. (2013), islam et al. (2016), and patra and rao (2017). the statistical results demonstrate that gdp per capita is 0,436, which is above 0,00. gdp per capita growth does not affect the probability to buy automotive goods, especially cars. this explains why higher gdp per capita growth does not affect purchasing power if gdp per capita has reached a certain level. it shows that there is no direct effect on the growth of gdp compared to purchasing power. the purchase probability becomes more significant, the value of growth does not. total gdp has no direct implications because total gdp does not reflect the individual population’s purchasing power. gdp per capita is more likely to reflect the probability of purchasing power. singapore has the largest gdp, but a small population and a small geographical area, and adequate public transportation, so singapore residents do not need a car as a means of transportation. this result differs from what pant and nidugala (2016) have pointed out. the exchange rate reached 0,00 in terms of statistical value. the results are below 0,05. exchange rates affect the selling price of vehicles sold. this is due to the high number of vehicles from abroad, rendering vehicles sold sensitive to foreign exchange rates. if local content is low, the vehicle’s selling price will not be sensitive to foreign exchange rates. currently, local content averages less than 50%. the higher import content will have an impact on the price of the vehicle. the government imposes a tax rate on importing spare parts to protect the local automotive value chain industry. the tax rate will have an indirect impact on the price of a vehicle, so higher price of a vehicle will, in turn, affect the demand for vehicle sales. certain types, such as low-cost green carriers (lcgcs), have reached more than 80% of local content. the government targets more local content to support the automotive value chain’s growth and increased exports over imports of spare parts. the government’s challenge is to improve the quality of local spare parts. thailand is the vehicle production hub for several japanese brands for distribution with asean countries such as indonesia, malaysia, and vietnam. moreover, asean forms the asean free trade area, so that with the production center in the asean country, vehicle prices become more competitive. producers are trying to minimize the exchange rate effect by making factories closer to asean countries. asean countries have not yet had sufficient production capacity to reach a break-even point for 106 macroeconomic determinants of auto sales in asean automotive factories, so that production is concentrated. these results are supported by pant and nidugala (2016) and pilat (2016). interest rates (lag-1) affect motor vehicle sales. higher the interest rate leads to fewer credit sales which is attributable to high-interest rates. it can be concluded that credit sales have a strong dominance in automotive sales. currently, the credit market consists of around 70% of vehicle sales in indonesia and thailand. for the lower-end segment, the credit market is higher; however, the credit market is lower than the cash market in the premium market segment. if sales are in cash, car sales are not influenced by interest rates. lower interest rate causes higher vehicle’s demand due to lower instalment amounts from the buyer. the resulting data is supported by the condition of most countries at the beginning of economic development. at the beginning of economic growth, most countries have a higher cost associated with the interest rate. the research results are in line with nawi et al. (2013); kaya (2019); lee and kang (2015); pant and nidugala (2016). automotive company management needs to consider interest rates, gdp, inflation, and foreign exchange rates in determining production and sales plans, including plant expansion or capacity expansion. the government also needs to control inflation, foreign exchange rates, and interest rates to spur economic growth. it is essential that global automotive companies and local governments improve the local value chain of automotive spare parts to negate the exchange rate impact on vehicle prices. the increase of local content is one of the solutions to reduce exposure to foreign exchange rates. this research also demonstrates the importance of controlling inflation, interest rates, and exchange rates in maintaining industrial growth. this research proposes that the interest rate, gross domestic product, inflation, and exchange rate has a significant influence on automotive sales. the interest rate is considered having an impact on automotive sales after one year lag. interest rates have a positive impact on automotive sales. the consumer price index, foreign currency exchange rate, and gross domestic product variables have negative influences in the same period. it suggested that industry players pay attention to interest rates, inflation, and exchange rates in determining automotive work plans for the next period. whereas, the government should pay attention to inflation, interest rates, exchange rates, and gross domestic product growth in determining the state budget. conclusions this research studies the determinants of car sales in five asean countries, which are indonesia, thailand, malaysia, singapore, and vietnam. the research focuses on five macroeconomic variables (inflation, gross domestic product per capita, changes in gross domestic product per capita, foreign exchange rate, and interest rate). the results show that inflation, gross domestic product per capita, foreign exchange rate, and interest rate from the journal of asean studies 107 previous period significantly influence car sales in five asean countries. local content is a critical issue relevant to the dependence of the foreign exchange rate. the effects of the interest rate are attributable to dependence on the credit market. the gdp growth per capita does not influence car sales; however, the interest rate and gross domestic product influence auto sales in asean +5. the automotive industry in asean can take the competitive advantage of each asean country in terms of interest rates, exchange rates and inflation. it is considered that these variables increase the competitiveness of asean automotive industry. indonesia has a large market, thailand has good infrastructure, and singapore has low interest rates and inflation for funding. limitations of this research includes economic cycle factors. during the research period, the asean counties have experienced two significant crises: the asian crisis in 1998, and the global crisis in 2008. singapore, thailand and malaysia have suffered from global recession pressure in 2008. however, indonesia went through with positive growth during the period. the limitations also include micro variables, such as new vehicle models and new technologies. it is suggested further research includes other micro variables, such as new technology, government deregulation, and others. about the author dr. suwinto johan earned his doctor’s degree in business management from ipb university, indonesia. he authored over 40 publications. his current research interests: merger acquisition and restructuring, commerce and business law, sustainable and development, and animal law. acknowledgements the author would like to thank bapak gunawan geniusahardja (director of astra group indonesia, 2001-2016,) and bapak darmawan widjaja (director of toyota astra motor, indonesia) for sharing their knowledge on the automotive industry in indonesia and asean. references albors-garrigos, j., frass, a., schoeneberg, k. p., and signes, a. p. 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(2018). an econometric analysis of the determinants https://doi.org/10.21512/bbr.v10i3.5712 https://doi.org/10.1515/mmcks-2015-0012 https://doi.org/10.5539/ijef.v7n9p226 https://doi.org/10.1353/jda.2017.0031 https://www.bangkokpost.com/auto/news/1606570/automotive-industry-at-a-turning-point%20dated%20october%2014 https://www.bangkokpost.com/auto/news/1606570/automotive-industry-at-a-turning-point%20dated%20october%2014 https://www.idosi.org/wasj/wasj23(eemcge)/13.pdf http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ass.v11n26p52 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tranpol.2016.05.011 110 macroeconomic determinants of auto sales in asean of passenger vehicle sales in germany. institute of future energy consumer needs and behavior (fcn) 6/2018, school of business and economics/e.on. journal of asean studies, vol. 7, no. 2 (2019), pp. 122-137 doi: https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v7i2.5780 ©2019 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic implementing sdg to village level by integrating social capital theory and value chain: (case of village tourism pentingsari in yogyakarta, indonesia) roseno aji affandi bina nusantara university, jakarta aditya permana bina nusantara university, jakarta yanyan mochamad yani padjadjaran university, jakarta tirta nugraha mursitama bina nusantara university, jakarta abstract since the publication of the 2030 blueprint, sustainable development goals (sdgs) have been promoted as a global project. many steps have been taken; however, until now, the achievement remains limited. this is due to the low understanding of sdgs from stakeholders at the local level, such as the village. this study examines how we can develop sdg awareness and implementation in the village level. this article argues that we need to look at two essential factors namely the notion of social capital and value chain management in order to fulfil sdgs at the local level. arguably, social capital can be mobilized by the local leaders to socialize the importance of sdgs at the village level. second, value chain management enables local leaders to manage sustainable economic activities at the village level. hence, these two concepts eventually enhance the implementation of sdgs at the village level. this argument will be illustrated in the case of three tourism village development areas in yogyakarta namely, pentingsari in sleman, mangunan in bantul, and bleberan in gunungkidul. keywords: sustainable development goals, social capital, value chain management, community based tourism. introduction sustainable development goals (sdg) has become part of the global indicator and standard used by un members in their national development strategy plan. at the national level, sdg indicators have been valued as important standards for the government of every state and its stakeholders, as well as industrial entrepreneurs, multinational corporation, small-medium enterprises, and community leaders to conduct their respective business. the biggest challenge, however, is how to make this agenda http://news.unpad.ac.id/?p=48219 journal of asean studies 123 accommodated and implemented within the local values. how can the leaders at the national level encourage the implementation of sdgs at the village level? this article shows that all resources and commitments to run development under sdg based plan programs can work with rapid and comprehensive acceleration under less than 10 years of remaining towards 2030. it is urgent to be accelerated by the state along with collaborative partnerships between government and stakeholders at all levels. (united nations, 2018) the government indeed must invite more public participation such as from industrial background, community leaders, and academics. the government has often functioned as an initiator as well as a regulator in the implementation of the 2030 sdg blueprint. however, the government function must begin to shift and place itself as a facilitator, as well as providing more space for community participation. participation from the formal and informal community will be the motor of accelerating the implementation of the sdg. the topdown approach will be slightly reduced in portion, and shift to the bottom-up approach. within this framework, it is noteworthy for us to elaborate on the concept of social capital as the core that linked the other capital, i.e. the cultural capital and environmental capital. we argue that these social capital, cultural capital and environmental are linked to the concept of three bottom line as known 3 p planet, people, profit for sdg implementation (wise, 2015). our arguments are also supported by dwyer that he noted “triple bottom line dimensions are the core pillars of sustainability” (dwyer, 2005). this capital strength is important to the formation of sustainable community development. however, this abstract concept needs to be translated into more practical and easy steps to implement by all stakeholders. this vacuity then fulfilled by the concept of the value chain. the concept can be mobilized as a method to embrace each member of the community, government, and industry. our argument is that agents are the main key as a liaison between the government and industry and society for the creation of an institution capable of forming a synergistic value chain and strengthening among its members. we termed this method as “sustainable supply chain management” (sscm). our research then aims to integrate social capital theory with strategic management especially value chain analysis to implement the community management with specific tools to reach as much as possible the value of sdg on rural areas. in this study, we focus on the tourism industry, especially the community-based tourism industry with desa wisata pentingsari sleman, desa mangunan bantul and bleberan gunung kidul (tourism village) of yogyakarta, indonesia, as our case. 124 implementing sdg to village level the framework in this section, we aim to develop theoretical framework on social capital and value chain method. this framework arguably captures theories, fieldwork, and experiences. the framework is for shaping the model. the model can be used to implement sdg pillars to all levels of governance. the framework and model have been implemented to specific fields on the village tourism pentingsari, mangunan and blebersari yogyakarta under their social, environmental and cultural potential and challenges. pentingsari is a good example of how social empowerment starts from the power of leadership. mangunan is a good example of how cultural capital is the key success to develop their tourism destination development. blebersari is a good case of how to use their environmental capital to create village tourism. all of them is in the same territory as yogyakarta. it takes only about 3-4 hours to reach all of them. the reason we are using those as our study case is that their process of implementing community-based economy is very interesting become a model for other sustainable community development (sudjatmiko, 2014). in addition, pentingsari “won the indonesian sustainable tourism award 2017 for the green bronze category” (the jakarta post, 2017). the research framework can be seen in figure no 1, and the model can be seen in figure no 2. research framework: figure 1. research framework source: authors as mentioned earlier, we are promoting three main variables for implementing sustainable development to the village level, social capital, cultural capital and environment capital. those three variables must comply with the basics of sdg, which are called three bottom lines: people, planet and profit. the strategy is to shape the sdg implementation. we use the value chain approach which is based on institutional development and business development. we argue that three steps from the triple bottom line, three basic capitals, and the value chain are the fundamental framework to implement the sdg. social capital is generally defined as efforts carried out by civil society on a voluntary basis, outside of their relations with the government or the market (kumar, 1993). the concept of social capital was popularized by james coleman (1988) and immediately attracted the attention of academics as a field of study that continued to evolve as well as the basis for the preparation of new policies in an atmosphere that was promarket economy from the 1990s. social capital conception gives economics an insight into the combination of individual, journal of asean studies 125 institutional, and other networks by incorporating (inter)-subjective, emotive, and affective elements, which are often excluded by the discipline of economy that view humans as rational individuals acting instrumental and driven by incentives (fafchamps, n.d). however, the biggest academic contribution of social capital is facilitating the exchange of ideas across disciplines. the general definition of social capital is centered on social relations, which include elements of social networking, civic engagement, norms of reciprocity, and especially important concepts of trust. in this light, social capital is founded on shared norms, values, beliefs, trusts, networks, social relations, and institutions that facilitate cooperation and collective action for mutual benefits (bhandari & yasunobu, 2009; fukuyama, 2001). however, every scholar has an emphasis on this general notion. for example, three major scholars of social capital whose works are often cited such as bourdieu emphasizes social capital to “the aggregate of actual resources that are linked to the possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition” (bourdieu, 1986), whereas coleman defines it functionalistically as “a variety of entities with two elements in common: they are composed of various social structures, and they facilitate certain actors within the structure” (coleman, 1988). meanwhile, putnam defines it as “a social network established by associational engagement such as voluntary organizations and generated reciprocal norms and trust between citizens by such engagement” (putnam, 2000). despite the emphasize in individuality of collective traits, it is clear that social capital is a phenomenon that arises in the context of free-market economic society, albeit their conceptual closeness and resemblance with traditional community traits (fukuyama, 2000; fukuyama, 2001). in this type of society, the economic function of social capital is to reduce transaction costs caused by formal coordination mechanisms such as contracts, hierarchies, and bureaucratic rules (fukuyama, 2000). given this discussion, social capital is very relevant as a solution to weberian functionalists’ predictions that modernization will replace traditional systems and institutions with a formal bureaucratic system. but recently, empirical research shows that informal norms are still very important and relevant in the present days, where modernization of technology sometimes makes a subordinate more aware of things that are technical in the field than their superiors/supervisors. this simple illustration gives us example on how social capital has a great opportunity to cut off long-term and convoluted bureaucratic decision-making inefficiency and has the potential to cut project costs, facilitate the process of approaching with partners, increasing sustainability, and strengthening civil society (fukuyama, 2001). 126 implementing sdg to village level however, social capital is also very closely related to the idea of development, even expanding the notion of development to things that are not solely economic. development is a complex multidimensional process involving major changes in social structures, behaviors, and national institutions, as well as the acceleration of economic growth, reduction of poverty, narrowing of equity, and improvement in the quality of life (todaro, 1999). economic variables are indeed a prominent driving force of development, but the frontier of development transcends beyond income per capita. socio-cultural value systems help shape the economic, social, and political behavior and affect development through multiple indirect channels (bhandari & yasunobu, 2009). in this context, development as a process involves government intervention within certain limits to create conditions that allow social capital to work. these conditions can be created through a combination of approaches that are bottom-up and top-down. the top-down approach, namely the government providing incentives to economic actors, intervening in creating media to open the door for community participation, building local community-based institutions, increasing budgets for capacity building for both institutions and individuals, providing assistance by inviting agents such as from ngos or universities. the government has a role in fostering and nurturing the growth of social capital (fafchamps, n.d). the interference of the government is significant as a facilitator of the creation of a collaborative economy and avoids the occurrence of potential competitions that kill each other. social capital links to civil engagement, which is an important element in the bottom-up approach. the importance stems from the ability of social capital to maintain the authenticity of local norms. the social capital thus could be mobilized to create new social forms. through this social capital-based model, the economic activities within the village can be integrated in order to increase the economic competitive advantage. to further enhance social capital, the local governments’ support through regulation is needed. this is because sometimes individual within societies lack of incentives to band together in their economic activities. the reason for this due to the lack of knowledge, experiences, financial capital that make the individuals in the villages little incentive to cooperate. hence, the government plays a role to form the model (higgins-desbiolles, 2011). this model then emphasizes the importance of relations between government and community. this is because, arguably civil engagement may grow in such a condition where government and civilians create the opportunity to synergize in order to build the model. in this model, after social capital being formed, the next stage is to utilize cultural capital. the importance of cultural capital as argued by fukuyama journal of asean studies 127 lies in the idea that “societies in which people are accustomed to cooperating and working together in large groups are likely to develop strong and efficient state institutions.” furthermore, culture is an essential element in the formation of trust and cooperation. to strengthen this cooperation, the emergence of an agency plays an important role as a medium for such a task. the above discussion focuses in understanding social capital in abstract way. in order to further implement the social capital model, this article utilizes value chain method. the term value chain is coined by michael porter (1985) in his book entitled “competitive advantage”. his elaboration of his theory explained by de mozota as follows, “every firm (institution) is a collection of activities that are performed to design, produce, market, deliver, and support its product. a reflection of its history, its strategy, its approach to implementing its strategy, and the underlying economics of the activities themselves.” (mozota, 1998) in principle, the value chain consists of two parts, namely supporting activities, and primary activities as illustrated in the image as figure 2: figure 2. value chain source: (porter, 1985) first part is support activities. the firm infrastructure is the umbrella for the institution. its function is to form the agreement among members. the concept, values and legal matters are the basic methods to transform from informal to formalize the communities. this part is structuring the mind map of the communities from every member such as how to manage the monetary flows, providing materials, cash management, how much investment, how the organization mechanism etc. this part we can illustrate as the head of the human body. transforming every interest of the member’s needs, wish and hope into the collective purpose. it requires high participation for each member. the second part of value chain is primary activities. the primary activities are processed to transform the raw material into production and deliver it to the customer until the customer makes the payment. including product design, services design, packaging and marketing design (porter, 1985). in context tourism, 128 implementing sdg to village level the activities on this part are starting from developing tourism products such as destination, homestay, attractions and tour guide persons. the first things first to be done after those job descriptions and basic infrastructure have been done are 1. inviting the visitors, 2. picking up, 3. service them with activities such as art, cultural and rural events, 4. service them with home stay, 5. selling the souvenir and the last send the customer back to the airport. this part is the place for the distribution economy based on the capabilities of every member and the potential demand from customers. the agent must be clever enough to distribute economic capabilities to every member. who will provide the raw material, who will provide homestay, who will act as tour guide and who will pick up visitors. the reason why value chain method is helpful in implementation of social capital model is due to several reasons. first, it enables to divide individuals within groups according to their competencies such as knowledge, experience, and financial capital. second, value chain method facilitates the coordination of each individuals to complement each other. the analysis of the case studies having established the theoretical framework above, this section aims to examine the implementation of the model within three case studies. before we went for a research fieldwork, we conducted a library review through various relevant academic journals, books, news and seminars. then we proceed with interviews with pioneers, local leaders, members of the pentingsari, mangunan and blebersari village tourism. this method is very helpful to identify the practices of forming their social capital, knowing their values, how to manage their groups and communities, as well as the positive impacts they get. our research analysis tool is linking the conception about three capitals (social, cultural and environmental), agency, and value chain analysis from michael porter and sustainable tourism approach coined by bob mckercher. our first case is pentingsari tourism village. the village was previously known as one of the poorest hamlets among the villages on the slopes of mount merapi with relatively low economic and community income. however, there was a local leader who initiated a program for tourists to stay at their native home with local family members. the leader is doto yogopratomo. doto was starting to develop social capital first instead of the tourism business. his approaches have proven this slightly backward village to be more radiant, both socially and economically, and in turn brought broader trickle-down effects among its community, as reported by the local newspaper "through our tourism villages, we are able to have a tremendous effect on the community, because with tourism villages we will be able to accommodate all the components and improve the economy of the community” (sudjatmiko, 2014). journal of asean studies 129 the progress and the uniqueness approach from the stakeholder in pentingsari called international attention, as reported in the jakarta post, “world tourism organization (unwto) has pointed to pentingsari tourist village as one of the pilot projects for communitybased tourism and sustainable tourism development program. the village also won the indonesian sustainable tourism award 2017 for the green bronze category” (the jakarta post, 2017). therefore, it will be an excellent example of how sscm can become a feasible combination of the top-down approach and the bottom-up approach to create a sustainable economy for community-based tourism programs in rural area. therefore, we chose the formation of the pentingsari yogyakarta tourism village community as the case for this research. this is because the village is a real example of how the development of social capital can create positive economic impact. the social capital grows stronger through the emergence of local pioneers who received support and facilities from the local government. these local pioneers become agents that strength the bond between members of communities in the village. with the growth of social capital, it also increases the income of its members in the community. the mangunan village tourism is an example of how javanese culture creates the chain among social and individuals in their tourism destination. during our visit to the mangunan village, we were accompanied by fahlul mukti as tour manager to meet with several village tourism pioneers. i met with pak hardi as the head of watu goyang. watu goyang is a rock that can sway located on the hill of the village of mangunan bantul, yogyakarta. according to local history and stories, this place was one of the five other sites before sultan agung (the greatest islamic mataram king) determined the burial place of the kings of islamic mataram, now known as imogiri. and all five places were scattered in several areas of mangunan village. during our fieldwork, one of the homestays is operated with the traditional master puppet families. the father is also the abdi dalem (traditional servant) of the yogyakarta kingdom, the mother is sinden (traditional singer). so, every visitor to the burial kings of imogiri, will get both a package of historical stories about sultan agung and the magical and spiritual culture and nature of java. another family focuses on providing craft for souvenirs and fahlul itself acting as village tourism tour guide. the social capital based on culture has formed the economic activities chain among tourism village players on mangunan village. however, the individualistic economic tendencies of this approach are still relatively high, especially from existing industries or individualists whose economic ego is eminent. thus, the selfinterested and individualistic side of classical capitalism (what schumpeter 130 implementing sdg to village level called “methodological individualism”) is still the biggest challenge in this model. in pentingsari village tourism, there are still domestic political problems about doto's hegemony itself. while doto is a local leader, at the same time, he acts as the system itself in the group. there is no system to prevent if doto cannot perform its function due to his age. some members still don't have enough alternatives to support the group when doto can't do it anymore. after significant socio-economic growth and development in the pentingsari tourism village, doto as a leader must begin to manage the village economic activities in a more structured manner. for the sake of the sustainability of the organization and business of the pentingsari tourism village, regeneration is needed. in modern organizations, one of the keys to success in creating sustainability is regeneration. doto's success will be an example of the next generation if doto can prepare his successor to guarantee the principles of community-based business by strengthening social, cultural and environmental capital as doto has done. in mangunan there are also cultural constraints. seniority tends to make organizations less creative and cannot accelerate the younger generation to express their ideas, especially in the context of commercial problems. senior people who cannot use digital instruments to adapt to the contemporary business environment, such as optimizing digital, to promote and coordinate business processes. the gap between the senior and young generation is one of the biggest challenges in mangunan village tourism. culturally in java, the younger generation is not comfortable speaking frankly with seniors. seniority behavior is one of the communication gaps in the organization. that caused some of the talents of the younger generation to work outside the community. then it became a new competition between them. then, it became a situation in the village-based village tourism far from the principle of the social capital chain. instead of complementing and synergistic, they create new competition. to avoid increasingly sharp competition and to strengthen groups, the main function of agents is to create synergies between existing industries and social capital groups, while strengthening social capital institutions to strengthen group members. thus, the demands of an agency are those that come from third parties outside the government and outside the community members. in its main competency, agents must be able to create bridges that connect each other so that a synergic work chain is created. as theorized by partszch (2017), “... for the non-state and non-collective agency... non-state and non-collective agency... i suggest three categories of individual agents, increasingly relevant to global governance: celebrities, philanthropists and social entrepreneurs' ' (partszch, 2017). here she emphasizes that one group of agent acts as “inventors of new ideas, norms, or products.” partszch sees it as the first phase of a life cycle, as journal of asean studies 131 theorized by sikkink & finnemore (1998). the next phase is norm cascading, which makes a new norm of entrepreneurship widely spread (finnemore & sikkink, 1998). followed by the next phase i.e. the institutionalization of entrepreneurship, norms are the role to reorganize and choose the best options for implementing the new norm. the last phase is the policy of entrepreneurs who play institutional arrangements and leverage to create new institutions that replace the old (partszch, 2017). “social capital research as it pertains to economic development and identify four distinct approaches the research has taken: communitarian, networks, institutional, and synergy” (woolcock, michael, narayan, & deepa, 2005. the best example of the paragraph explanation above is from the village of blebesari gunungkidul with mr. tri hajono as the leader. incidentally mr. tri is the leader of the yogyakarta tourism village communication forum. compared to the example from pentingsari and mangunan, blebesari is more modern in determining its social economic chain management. he used the village government apparatus to create his socioeconomic chain. pak tri is a former village head who has led for 18 years. while he was still in the lead, there was a major problem of the village which was the provision of clean water. assisted by the gajah mada university community empowerment agency, in 2003 received assistance from the ministry of public development in the form of water pipes. after the public water services became a village-owned enterprise running for about 8 years. the village's own enterprise creates some business units. one of them is village tourism. the experience as former village government leader, pak tri has more experience of networking with university and government without eliminating the bottom up approach. based on the three cases above, we can see that an approach that uses a combination of formal and informal, seniority and structural, bottom up and top down, state and cultural is a suitable formulation for the development of socioeconomic chains. the approach to the distribution of work functions, in a series of value chain systems is the key to the formation of synergistic, complementary cooperation and avoiding competition among members. this approach needs not be carried out separately. thus, we need to model it into a more operational framework while continuing previous study carried out by xavier font, richard tapper, karen schwartz and marianna kornilaki from leeds metropolitan university (wotu bank research observer, 2000, pp. 22549). using companies engaged in tour operator services as case studies, their study entitled “sustainable supply chain management in tourism”, focuses more on environmental issues within tourism business (font, 2000). as travel organizer services providers, they consider tourist destinations as vendors who are encouraged to provide environmentally 132 implementing sdg to village level friendly tourism, food and equipment. this approach indeed inspired our study, but we emphasize more on how to build community-based tourist destinations. we expand previous research by deepening and trying to build the possibility of synergy between travel and tourists corporations who already have an awareness of sustainable tourism with a village tourism which is based on community development. within this limitation, we argue that (1) if there is a synergistic relationship between industry and rural tourism communities, a sustainable tourism environment will be achieved; and (2) if sustainable tourism is created in one area, it will accelerate the process of implementing the sdg to reach rural areas. it is also important to note that monitoring the progress achieved and reports on the improved environmental performance by both companies and their suppliers by awards and recognition that acknowledge the supplier’s involvement in the environmental concerns. “environmental achievement is also crucial (neetf, 2001) national environmental education and training foundation (neetf). 2001. going green upstream ... the promise of supplier environmental management. neetf: washington, dc. additionally, companies may also organize supplier meetings, in which useful information can be exchanged and companies’ expectations can be communicated. following this pattern, integrate environmental concerns into all business processes (lippmann, 1999) lippmann s. 1999. supply chain environmental management: elements for success. environmental management 6(2): 175–182.” to facilitate community participation in the village tourism, the ministry of tourism is collecting the tourism activist called “pokdarwis”. pokdarwis is an acronym from “kelompok sadar wisata (tourism activist group). the government provides and facilitates the community with training and capacity building "efforts to strengthen and increase capacity, roles and community initiative as one of the stakeholder’s interests, to be able to participate and play an active role as a subject or actor or as a recipient benefits in developing tourism sustainable ". (directorate of strategic planning, 2019) the agent has to be well understood about the value chain and can be acting as moderator to motivate every member of the communities to involve to form the institutions. the agent has to be able design the institution development and also business plan. the circle to develop pokdarwis will be among government community-business. to enhance pokdarwis’ capacity in pentingsari village tourism, some business sector from certain industry such as asia central bank (bca) support them through their corporate social responsibility (csr) program. their programs mainly involve design training such communication skill, team building, service excellence and also journal of asean studies 133 donate 109 million rupiah (nugraha, 2015) the training aim also facilitate local community development more specific inhome stay management to reach international standard without eliminating the local values (cnn indonesia, 2017) doto as leader said that the trainings provided by the government and bca have indeed increase their member’s understanding on sustainability of their economic activities. this, in return, has an effect to their community financially. for instance, in 2008 the turnover of the economic activities in pentingsari village was 30 million rupiah. but after development and training by supporting from the government, the following year the turnover increased to 250 million rupiah. in 2011 to 2014 the turnover from pentingsari jumped sharply to rp. 1 billion per year or approximately rp. 100 million per month after having supervising and development from bca. bca continues to supervise pentingsari on 2015-2017 and the result turnover reaches rp 2.5 billion per year or around 200 million rupiah per month. those performances provide about 55 units or 150 rooms and consist of 1255 heads of households. the community development is really making a good impact on the people relations to their environment, culture and people to people relations. pentingsari tourism village was appointed as one of the pilot projects of the community based tourism and sustainable tourism development program by the world tourism organization unwto (aprilyani, 2017). in these three case studies of pentingsari, mangunan and bleberan village tourism, we also observe how the villages create a tourism product that incorporate farming activities along with its natural uniques. travelers who came to these villages will experience not only as a guest but also an active participant of the farmers who can feel the real life of the village community. given this arrangement, the village community were given different type of tasks. for instance, some members are responsible for the homestay, others are responsible to provide meals, while some are responsible to perform cultural activities ranging from entertainment to game playing in rice fields. so, each member of the community has a role in this type of tourism areas. during our fieldwork, doto, fahlul and tri told us that the above arrangement shows that indeed distribution of roles create individual incomes for the member of community. this in return enhance local trust and solidity. as leaders, they are willing to sacrifice their portion of roles as long as the community having bigger benefit from such arrangement. in his words, doto told us “in every arrangement, each member of the community who perform their roles will instantly get the income from their respective roles. for instance, if the member is the one 134 implementing sdg to village level who provide the homestay with the price of rp. 100,000 per night, he will get instantly rp. 90,000. the other rp. 10,000 will be put into community saving. this 10% contribution will be reinvested to cover operational cost for the community such as common infrastructure and maintenance in the village. if there is money left, it will be used as a bonus for every member of the community after deducted with all expenses at the end of period once a year.” conclusion based on the empirical analysis above, there are some insights that can be used by others in their pursuit of social capital. in order to create a sustainable development-based community, fundamentally, the stakeholders should maximize the local potentials from their culture and environment. in order to maximize these potentials, the stakeholders must create a social bond among the community members. in this stage, the social capital is needed in order to engage each member of communities to take part of the economic activities. while the social capital is indeed important. the next step is to translate this concept into practice. one way of doing this is by using value chain method. value chain method helps the community to distribute the roles within arrangement to each member of community. thus, in this community, the system will run as if the community is one single cooperation. as a result, the integration of social capital theory and value chain method will ensure the sustainability of the community. based on the above the analyses of the case studies, it turns out that the theory of social capital combined with a management strategy approach with value chain tools has been able to produce sustainable community development. so that the implementation of sdg as a global value was able to be implemented up to the village level. the sustainable development community is the basic understanding for each stakeholder to implement the sdg. thus, the sdg implementation for village level can be started from the integration among social capital theory and value chain method. supporting activities on value chain has proved that social capital, cultural capital and environment capital has been designed and agreed among members. they use those capitals as product differentiation, in the context of institution development. supporting activities deepening the members to agree that every transaction will be deducted 10% as community saving. the kind of arrangement is the most democratic, inclusive, transparent and flexible according to members aspirations. thus, supporting activities can be used to form the social capital of the key success of pentingsari, mangunan and bleberan village tourism. moreover, the primary activities proved that distribution activities from inviting visitors, entertain with local art, culture, farming event, journal of asean studies 135 home stay, culinary, selling the souvenir make them more synergize instead of competing with each other. at the end of the day, this model can only be successful with the existence of good cooperation between the government-business and the community that put the social, cultural and environmental capital as the principle. the government functions as a facilitator. the business is anchor or foster father. and the community is the executor. the academic sector provides research and community development center. those actors are the most important actors to implement the sdg to the micro level of village community about the author roseno aji affandi, humanity faculty international relations department, bina nusantara university. aditya permana, humanity faculty international relations department, bina nusantara university. yanyan mochamad yani, international relations department, padjadjaran university tirta nugraha mursitama, humanity faculty international relations department, bina nusantara university. references aprilyani, j. 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©2013 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn2338-1353 electronic a secure connection: finding the form of asean cyber security cooperation khanisa centre for political studies, indonesia institute of sciences (lipi) abstract internet security is somehow being understated in asean’s strategy facing 2015. asean connectivity as the blue print of asean’s development strategy to strengthen the regional bond has not put proper attention in building security for guiding the connectivity plan among asean member countries. this paper will discuss the future of cyber security cooperation particularly as asean is planning to connect the region through ict. this paper will try to analyse what kind of framework asean will need on preparation to widen its security agenda to cyber world in the future to complete its preparation of being connected. keywords: internet security, cooperation, asean introduction as the wave of technology and modernity changes the way of our daily life, it has changed the world’s perception some of its values as well. one of the icons of this technological development is the internet which at first serves as the communication network in the cold war (ryan, 2010, p. 14). the internet nowadays also has created a new realm, cyberspace, and in the era of high-speed connection, many people labelled the cyberspace as a lawless and borderless world of which freedom is the main issue. anyone supposed to be free to be connected, search for anything they need from every source they find and transform their creation in digital form. some people even go beyond and use the internet to get what they need in illegal ways. this can be a general description of what will be later categorized as cybercrime. although there are still many discussions about the interpretation of cyber-crime due to its vast scope of infringement, it is important to have a basic understanding about what cybercrime really is. using computer as a tool to commit a crime is not necessarily called a cybercrime. there is a difference of cybercrime and computer crime. cybercrime is not only a crime committed with digital instrument, but it also connected to the network of digital communication (gerkce, 2011, p. 26). the connectivity issue makes cybercrime more complex to deal with. as a measure to avert the future damage caused by cybercrime, laws and regulations governing the cyberspace are created to prevent them to 42 a secure connection happen. some of the first emerged in the 1990s, like britain’s computer misuse act (1990), ireland’s the criminal damage act (1991), malaysia’s computer crimes act (1997) (singh, 2007, p. 79) and until now the growth of such laws and legislations continues as cybercrime expands. but the volume of cybercrime threats also goes parallel with the counter measures formulated by the government. nevertheless, cybercrime developed and extended its complexity and the actors also getting well-organized. the international community has acknowledged that this new threat can be global level security issues as many of the high scale businesses and administrations are run on digitalized systems which are fragile enough to be ruined by viruses created by hackers. due to that reason, the internet nowadays is treated more than a communication channel; as it has now included on a country “territorial” space. the awareness to treat cyber security more seriously can be seen as some countries started to build cyber security cooperation. the first convention arranging such cooperation is the 2001 convention on cybercrime held in budapest by the council of europe; with 39 countries have ratified the convention (council of europe treaty office, 2013). unfortunately, an arrangement like the council of europe’s convention on cybercrime is commonly preferred by democratic and developed countries. for developing region especially in southeast asia, this kind of cooperation will have to wait to be prioritized. in southeast asia, some of the countries may have developed in cyber technology and at the same time have cybercrime prevention unit. others may have not gone that far. countries in southeast asia seem to be unprepared to design cyber security cooperation as a consequence of gaps in development of information and communications technology (ict). despite these gaps and differences, asean has planned three regional blueprints; in one of them is in the politicalsecurity field which includes the asean regional forum, an establishment to promote peace and security in the wider east-asia region which also deals with the unconventional security issue like cybercrime. asean also put ict development as integral part of the asean connectivity. the development of ict should not only address on strengthening of the network but also the prevention from threats or attacks on that network. like many asean cooperation, asean have to struggle to synchronize the point of view of its members on the importance of such cooperation. since each member countries is in different phase of their ict development and their dealings with cybercrime. in this paper, the author argues that asean have to be prepared for dynamic changes in the security field which makes cyber domain as one of its source of new threat and regional security framework has to be designed to cope with such issue as it is a transnational type of disturbance that inter-state cooperation is nedeed. based on that argument, this paper firstly will discuss about the aspect of the growth of ict in the region of southeast asia to know how far ict impacting asean member states, and the later part of this paper will assess how asean, as a regional organization, build its cyber security agenda. the question is “what kind of cyber security cooperation should be implemented in region?” for answering the question, the author examines several formal documents such as convention of cybercrime, nato’s policy on cyber defence, apcert framework and also asean’s charter and documentation from asean’s meetings and forums. this approach is substantial to know whether journal of asean studies 43 the existed framework will be suitable to be taken building foundation for asean’s future cyber security cooperation. some reports and news also used to recognize the current trends and situation in the issue of cyber security and cybercrime. although not specifically discuss theoretical topic of security in later segments, this paper is built on the author perspective of dynamic changes in international relations especially in the field of security. in the author’s opinion, the need of cyber security is caused by the enlargement domain of dwelling and interaction of the internet user which as not only consist by individuals but also governmental bodies and private corporations, with all the affairs running on the virtual world, rules and guidance are needed to ensure all the parties will not harmed or be harmed by each other. ict and cyber security in asean the growth of ict in southeast asia is actually not too far behind the us, europe and countries in northeast-asia like japan and republic of korea. according to asean e-commerce database project released in 2010, asean represent 6 percent of the internet world users and the sum of global penetration level of asean members countries are 20 percent, with brunei darussalam, singapore and malaysia having the biggest share of internet penetration, and indonesia, philippines, and vietnam having the greatest numbers of internet user. although compared to global number of internet users, 6 percent seems small and insignificant, one cannot forget that asean is holding almost one-tenth (9 percent to be precise) of the world population, far above the population of 28 member countries european union combined. with this percentage, asean is in a good position to build an advanced ict region with internet businesses run on it or quoting the report released in the asean e-commerce database project, “...undoubtedly a good environment for the e-commerce” (asean e-commerce database project, 2010, p. 68). moreover, asean has made a considerable progress in ict development. asean incorporates ict development as one of the connectivity aspect in its recent master plan on building of asean community 2015. the master plan on asean connectivity encompasses physical, institutional and people-to-people connectivity with ict as integral part of physical connectivity. the most recent asean master plan released in 2011 is the asean ict master plan which gives more detailed information on how asean wants to develop its ict sector. asean’s vision to build the ict sector is to create a technologically advance and well-connected region. but asean’s development on ict is lacking in incorporating the security aspect. knowing the important yet fragile system of ict, asean needs to be ready to face cyber threat that might occur. so far, nine out of ten asean member countries have computer emergency response team (cert), the only country remained is laos who has not establish their cert. certs of the nine countries also are members of asia pacific computer emergency response team (apcert), a regional organization consist of 29 teams of cert (21 teams are full member and 8 teams are general member) from 22 asia pacific countries (apcert, n.d.). the existence of cert team is vital to be “cyber police” to secure the national cyberspace, and the cooperation among them is needed to build a network to fight cybercrime. with proper instruments available in most of asean member countries, the question remains whether the instruments are compatible enough to deal with the 44 a secure connection reality of cyber threat. table 1. asean internet penetration n o. country internet penetration internet users population brunei darussalam 81% (1) 318.900 395.027 singapore 78% (2) 3.658.400 4.701.069 malaysia 65% (3) 16.902.600 26.160.256 philippines 30% (2) 29.700.000 99.900.177 vietnam 27% (3) 24.269.083 89.571.130 thailand 26% 17.486.400 66.404.688 indonesia 12% (1) 30.000.000 242.968. 342 lao pdr 8% 527.400 6.993.767 cambodia 1,3% 13.800.000 173.675 myanmar 0,2% 53.414.374 110.000 asean 20% 604.308.830 123.146.458 (table from asean e-commerce database project, 2010, p. 14) evolution of the new threats before discussing about the evolution of cybercrime, knowing types of that new threat is useful to know. the author will refer to the typology of council of europe’s convention of cyber crime held in budapest on 2001. the convention divides four basic types of offences, they are: (1) “offences against the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of computer data and systems” (including illegal access, illegal interception, data interference, system interference, misuse of device), (2) “computer related offences” (computer related forgery, computer related fraud), (3) “content related offences” (including child pornography), and (4) “offences related to infringements of copyright and related rights”. these offences are the formal typology for popular terms like hacking, phishing, spreading worm, trojan, malware, or spyware, and illegal downloading. “a good decade for cybercrime”, a report released by mcafee in 2010, covering the growth of trends of cybercrime all over the world shows dynamic changes on cyber-crime that occurred. ten years turns out to be a sufficient time to see how cybercrime motives are adapting to current situation that time. divided by four time periods, the years from 2000 to 2010 captured some specific advancements of the use of internet follows by the cybercrime grew along the way. the first period (20002003) featured crimes like distributed denial of service (ddos), macro viruses, identity theft through unsecured wi-fi and harmful mp3 downloads. these kinds of disturbances are still minor compared to what second period caused. the second period (2004-2005) was the time when cybercrime actors tend not only to show off their skill to manipulate digital world but the goal is to make profit from their crime. the spread of adware, spyware, rootkit, and botnets started to threaten personal users and companies for their capability in stealing important financial information, as journal of asean studies 45 well as damaging their system. the third period (2006-2008) was when the actors started to assemble and act as an organized group. in this period the transnational nature of cyber became increasingly clear, since the group can spread beyond a country border and only connected through cyber space. the last period (2009-2010) captured the recent phenomenal trend of internet product, the social network sites (sns) that can cause a serious problem through personal information theft, the spread of fraud post or massage, and harmful links (mcafee, 2010, p. 4-6). in line with the mcafee 2010 report that predicts cybercrime will go mobile in the near future, some other reports also show the cybercrime threat is escalated beyond pc. norton cybercrime report released in 2012 stating this issue, giving the number of two-third adults use mobile gadget to access the internet, and two-third of that amount do not provide their gadget with security tools, the report also wrote that the mobile vulnerability is growing twice as big from 2010 to 2011 (symantec, 2012). these reports show that cybercrime threats have escalated in many level, and the complexity rises when it grew strong enough to threat national security. some cases of cybercrimes are addressed to attack the government institution, and as the trend of cybercrime evolves to a bigger scheme the term “cyber war” becomes popular. however, there is still a debate about the validity to call the “cyber war” as “war”. an article by professor sean lawson written in forbes on 2011 pictured one of the debates between the supporter and the opponent in the issue (lawson, 2011). dr. thomas rid, who is not agreeing on the term “cyber war”, stated his disbelieve clearly from his essay’s title “cyber war will not take place.” the base of his stand point is clausewitz’s theory of war. according to rid, cyber war doesn’t meet the main element of war, that are violent, instrumental, and political (rid, 2011, p. 10). meanwhile, jeffrey carr, countering this argument in his blog post titled “clausewitz and cyber war”, assert the approach of using a conventional war theory to analyse cyber war is not suitable since changes happen in the world. in his book written before this debate, “inside cyber warfare” (2010) carr also explains thoroughly about this trends and the implication to global community. despite the debate on the validity of the term cyber war, the effect of cybercrime in small scheme as well as enormous scheme is devastating, caused a major economic lost, even endanger diplomatic relation. a report released by kmpg in 2011, features economic lost in some countries, showing staggering numbers, range from eur 17 million (us$ 22 million) in germany phishing activity in 2010, us$ 560 million in us information lost calculation in 2009 to gbp 27 billion (us$ 43) from uk annual cost (kpmg, 2011, p. 8). in the issue of cybercrime is endangering diplomatic relation, cyber war in eastern part of europe, middle east conflict which is “going-cyber” or hostility between united states and china that is also spread to cyberspace are the evidences of political motives that might drive the attack. two latest notable examples of eastern europe cyber war are cyber conflict between russia-estonia (2007) and russiageorgia (2008). the first case was evoked by estonian government that moved a memorial of soviet war from tallin in 27 april 2007 that provoke kremlin’s rage (the guardian: russia accused of unleashing cyber war to disable estonia, 2007), later the estonian e-government system and commercial websites included banking system were heavily attacked. according to estonian ministry of defence some of the attacks, although denied by the russia, are hosted by russian state servers. (bbc: 46 a secure connection estonia hit by 'moscow cyber war', 2007). the latter case between russia and georgia is a part of two countries conflict concerning the two area south ossetia and abkhazia (the guardian: south ossetia: georgia preparing for war, russia claims, 2008), as well as launched real military attack, russia also delivered cyber disturbance to several georgia’s state server and commercial websites (the telegraph: georgia: russia 'conducting cyber war', 2008). in middle east conflict, one of the case that successfully stole the international headlines was the stuxnet attack addressed to iran nuclear facility in 2010, the attack was suspected to be an act from another country (the guardian: stuxnet worm is the 'work of a national government agency', 2010). last but not least is the us-china cyber warfare. as heat of competitiveness from both countries rises, the cases of cyberattack coming from the us and china also escalate. the latest news about the attack came from white house, confirming an attack had been launched to their network system (reuters: white house targeted in cyber-attack, 2012). although the source was not pointed to china by white house authority, but freebeacon, a washington conservative group, report that the hackers was linked to chinese government (bbc: white house confirms cyber-attack on 'unclassified' system, 2012). the cases above shows that cyber-crime trends are going global and the intensity of the attack are increased with lost calculation that not only threatens economically but also politically. considering the risk, if a region, in this case southeast asia, wants to connect its member ict infrastructures, a security plan must be built to avoid future cybercrime threat. countries in southeast asia themselves are not save from cybercrime threat. as told above, with the cyber development in this region, the threat of cybercrime is parallel with the advancement. although most of the problems in southeast asia countries that related to internet are concerning on the issue of internet freedom that does not mean there is no threat of cybercrime in the region. recent internet security threat report released by symantec shows that indonesia ranked in 10th place on cyber-crime source, delivering 2,4 percent cyber treat globally (kompas: indonesia masuk 10 besar penyumbang "cyber crime" terbanyak, 2012). another report by trend micro incorporated also picturing the future of cybercrime threat in the region of asia pacific (okezone: penjahat cyber ancam keamanan di asia pasifik, 2012), the report stated that vietnam rank in the 3rd of source of spam in the region (networks asia: asia-pacific security landscape shows a mix of old and new threats, 2012). cyber security cooperation models as cyber security become a global problem, the need to arrange a cooperation to overcome cybercrime threat is inevitable. many countries started to realize the importance of having cooperation to tackle the growth of cybercrime. this argument also implied in a statement by eun-ju kim, the itu (international communication union) regional director for asia and the pacific, “the best way to counter this crime is through close partnerships and cooperation in an interdependent information society” (unodc, cybercrime in asia and the pacific: countering a twenty-first-century security threat) dr. hamadoun touré in his itu publication “quest for cyber peace” (2011) enlists some cooperation addressed to this issue. some of them are council of europe with convention on cybercrime 2001, north atlantic treaty organization (nato) journal of asean studies 47 with cyber defence management authority, and united nation which implement cybercrime prevention on some of its branch like the un economic and social council and united nations office on drugs and crime. from all written above, council of europe’s convention on cybercrime (2001) is the earliest international formal cooperation who set the definition, typology, and measures to be taken to cope with cyber-crime. it has signed by 49 countries, four are from outside the europe, and they are japan, south africa, canada and united states. the numbers who have ratified is 39 countries, as the belgium as the newest one, who ratified it in 2012, and two countries in latest accession status, australia in 2012 and dominican in 2013 republic (council of europe treaty office, 2013). this comprehensively written agreement can be a good source to look at what asean needs to prepare and socialize among each member before working on the actual framework of cyber security cooperation. the most important part to be examine for the future framework is chapter iii of the convention which includes article on extradition (article 24), vast scope of mutual assistance in cyber space (article 25-35) and active communication (article 35). regulation regarding extradition is important in cybercrime is a transnational-based crime whose offender can launch their attack from anywhere outside the country. for the later matters on mutual assistance and active communication, these arrangements can answer the fulfilment of gaps between asean countries that more advance parties have the obligation to encourage the region to stand on the same standard before enforcing the cooperation framework. another example of cyber security cooperation is offered by nato with their cyber defence framework. in their document released in 2011, the alliance draft their cyber defence agendas not only in regard of securing the region in defensive mode trough nato cyber defence management board and nato computer incident response capability, but also integrating it into the national policy of the alliance members and encouraging education in cyber defence sector with nato cooperative cyber defence centre of excellence (nato 2011). nato’s cooperation might seem very organized and can be strongly recommended for asean to build such cooperation, but it has to be realized that nato and asean have a different platform of cooperation. asean is not security alliance and in asean, where noninterference and sovereignty are two of some basic principles, defence policy is a very crucial aspect to be interrupted. each country has their own view and asean cannot dictate members’ domestic area. the framework of asean future cooperation has to be emphasized on security of the region as a whole without disturbing its member sovereign. another example of cooperation, asia pacific computer emergency response team (apcert), took the form of regional cooperation. apcert members are cert and computer security and incident response team (csirt) of each country, the main legal body in combating cybercrime. its missions are enhancing cooperation, developing measures to overcome cases, facilitating in information sharing, promoting research and development, assisting conduct on cert, and providing recommendation on legal issues (apcert: missions statement). moreover since the members are team of experts, apcert will be able to focus on the technicalities to overcome cyber threat, event like drill exercise is the one of the main program held annually (apcert: operational framework, p 8). 48 a secure connection this model might be the one asean is aiming for, since almost all asean member countries are also joining apcert it is probably easier to use apcert model and configure asean’s cyber security framework based on that model. however, apcert is less legitimate than the other two previous examples. as mentioned, apcert members are only technical bodies of the member states that lacking of political power to make significant policy change. if asean take apcert format cooperation as a whole, it will only make a cooperation that will overlap with apcert agenda and will not be powerful enough to make any changes in governmental level. asean cyber security cooperation in the future the first purpose of asean as written in asean charter “to maintain and enhance peace, security and stability and further strengthen peace-oriented values in the region” (asean charter, p. 3) was actually the basic duty of asean. this point imply that asean is actually a security community which establishment driven by political motive (luhulima et al, 2008, p. 71). asean must be prepared for any security threats that challenge the region as the security issues evolve from time to time. but with conventional security conflict like border dispute is still on the headline, asean readiness to enter contemporary security issue is questionable. yet, asean has planned blueprints and master plans for the realization of asean community to ensure its path in the beyond 2015 will embrace the needs of future generation. in the case of cyber security, unfortunately the designed documents that supposed to be related to issue like asean political security blueprint, master plan on asean connectivity and asean ict master plan 2015 have not point out significance idea on how asean cyber security will be defined and maintained. in former documents of asean regional forum (arf), asean has noted the significance of cyberspace issue. it can be found in arf discussion since 2004 when arf seminar on cyber terrorism held in south korea. but not until the meeting in 2006 13th arf meeting, it released the statement on cooperation in fighting cyber attack and terrorist misuse of cyber space. although the statement is not as comprehensive as the council of europe’s convention on cybercrime, the statement already sent a strong message about the agreement among arf’s member states to combat the terrorism including types of terrorism using cyber space as its way for committing their act. arf also realize the enormous threat of the cybercrime or cyber misuse as stated below, “...terrorist misuse of cyber space is a destructive and devastating form and manifestation of global terrorism whose magnitude and rapid spread would be exacerbated by the increasing cyber interconnectivity of countries in the region; recognizing the serious ramifications of an attack via cyber space to critical infrastructure on the security of the people and on the economic and physical well-being of countries in the region” (arf, the statement on cooperation in fighting cyber attack and terrorist misuse of cyber space, 2006) but combining cybercrime with journal of asean studies 49 terrorism can cause confusion since both have different context. meanwhile many types of cyber misuse, from the small scale of cybercrime to cyber war, are not necessarily related to the act of terrorism. cyber fraud, phishing, piracy can be driven some other motives that are purely a crime act and not done by a terrorist group who is usually driven by political motive. by this reasoning, defining cybercrime apart from cyber terrorism is important to build basic understanding for cooperation on cyber security. asean is yet to have a formal agreement on cyber security beyond the arf statement in 2006. although the needs of having agreement on cyber security in asean is important, agreeing on an understanding about security in this region is never an easy task. the problem of digital divide or networking advancement gap, among countries of asean is causing different level of concern in each country. for example for an ict-advanced country like malaysia, the need of cyber security might be critical to be fulfilled. in his remarks for the shangri-la dialogue 2012, malaysia’s minister of defence, dato' seri dr. ahmad zahidhamidi stated the urgency of to build a more comprehensive cyber-defence as the cyber-attack is increasing (iiss: fourth plenary session). in the other hand, for countries with low number of internet users and internet penetration also not advanced in ict infrastructure building such cooperation and agreement might not become their priority. if asean is serious about realizing cyber security cooperation, asean has to know what kind of cooperation that would meet the need of the region. it has been discussed in previous section about three examples asean might want to consider. all formats can give beneficial input for making the framework of future cyber security cooperation; however asean must make some adjustment so the framework will be acceptable to the members of asean. there are three points worth to be taken from those formats. firstly, asean must stand on the same basic understanding on defining and treating the issue of cyber security and cyber threats. secondly, asean member countries must willing to put the issue of cyber security as of their priority area, by doing so, the policy made in the regional level will be easier to implement in national level. thirdly, cooperation in technical level must be taken seriously because networking security will need to run smoothly if every party have the same technical capability. for the format of cooperation, apcert actually is a good base for further development of stronger asean cyber cooperation in the future. but with the objective to secure asean’s ict network planned in the master plan on asean connectivity and asean ict master plan, cooperation framework like apcert must be strengthen. one of the ways for strengthening the format of apcert is by raising the cooperation into higher level, such approach will deliver stronger political power so it will have significant authority to push its agenda in national government level. a binding document like council of europe’s convention of cybercrime also can inspire asean’s cyber security cooperation framework, however basic understanding on the issue must be form in advance. the future cooperation also has to be designed carefully that it will respect asean’s principles of non-inference and sovereignty. conclusion picturing asean to be a connected region in ict infrastructure is a great vision it might need for realizing its goal in economic and socio-culture pillars. the 50 a secure connection vision, as stated in asean ict master plan 2015 is heading “towards an empowering and transformational ict: creating an inclusive, vibrant and integrated asean” (asean, asean ict master plan 2015, p. 12). but this vision came with complex arrangement to be prepared. the first one is to equalize the infrastructure, knowledge and competence on ict in asean member countries, and the second one is to prepare the safety procedure for running a connected region that lies on ict. the establishment of asean ict connectivity might be addressed for economic and social development of the region and placed below the pillar of economic with asean telecommunications and it ministers meeting (telmin) as the one in charge for drafting master plan, but this arrangement will be prone to security implication if it does not have a proper protection from cybercrime threats. for this reason, the agreement on how asean will secure its future ict connectivity is required. since most countries in asean already have their cert team, that can be imply the countries have realized the significance of securing their cyberspace. cooperation among those teams is also necessary because cybercrime is a contemporary threat to security which runs on a borderless cyberspace. but to enhance the level of cooperation, a more powerful form of formal agreement have to be conducted so asean member countries will have the same interpretation on defining cybercrime and ensuring their steps on overcoming the problem is orginized in the suitable framework. the agreement also have to cover the borderless nature of cybercrime, enables asean member countries to investigate cybercrime case in neighbouring countries in the region and processed the case according to regional agreement. building that agreement might not be an easy task, since cyber security is not yet considered as a priority and issues like state border disputes are considered to be more critical to solve. moreover, putting cyber security as an issue for convention like the council of europe did in budapest will require asean member states to adjust their national law once they ratified the convention. this adjustment usually initiates domestic debate for its relation to sensitive issues of national security and sovereignty. hence configuring an acceptable draft for this agreement is necessary to make sure asean member countries are willing to sign and ratify it. ***** about author khanisa, sip – graduated from bachelor degree in international relations department of faculty of social and political science, gadjah mada university in 2010, she is currently taking master degree in graduate studies in international affairs at college of asia and the pacific, australian national university. her work as a researcher started in 2011 as junior researcher in centre for political studies (pusat penelitian politik-p2p) at indonesian institute of sciences (lembaga ilmu pengetahuan indonesia). her research interests are the significance of and information and communications technology (ict) and social media in international relations and issues regarding the region of southeast asia and asean. acknowledgement the author would like to express her gratitude to dr c. p. f. luhulima for his input and suggestions in writing this paper. journal of asean studies 51 notes this paper was presented on 7 november 2012 at the first international conference on business, international relations, and diplomacy 2012, in binus university jakarta with the same title, later revision is added to meet current situation and updates. references asean regional forum 28 july 2006, statement on cooperation in fighting cyber attack and terrorist misuse of cyber space, arf chairman's statements and report, viewed 27 july 2013, <http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/files/li brary/arf%20chairman%27s%20statement s%20and%20reports/the%20thirteenth%20 asean%20regional%20forum,%2020052006/arf%20statement%20on%20cooperat ion%20in%20fighting%20cyber%20attack 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russia accused of unleashing cyberwar to disable estonia, the guardian online, (last update: 17 may 2007), viewed 27 july 2013, available at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/m ay/17/topstories3.russia> united nations office on drugs and crime 20 october 2011, cybercrime in asia and the pacific: countering a twenty-firstcentury security threat. united nations, viewed 27 july 2013, <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpag e/2011/october/cybercrime-in-asia-pacific_countering-a-21st-century-securitythreat.html> womack, h 2008, south ossetia: georgia preparing for war, russia claims, the guardian online, (last update: 8 august 2008), viewed 27 july 2013, available at : <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/au g/08/georgia.russia> editorial we are glad to reach the readers with the publication of this volume 4 issue 1, 2016. the journal of asean studies has now come into its fourth year and we are pleased to stay on track in contributing to the development of knowledge and debates pertaining to the political, social, economic and security issues in southeast asia. in this issue, we are making several updates, specifically related with our articles. there are at least six interesting manuscripts that consist of four article and two research notes. in this issue, we do not offer a specific line of theme as the topics brought into this issue greatly vary. first article with this issue reframes the discussion about the discourse of asean economic community (aec) amidst the rising trend of protectionism and nationalism in the asean countries. article that is written by alexander chandra offers a review on the debates over what constitute economic cooperation among asean countries. also, in his article entitled "regional economic community building amidst rising protectionism and economic nationalism in asean", chandra discovers how the economic turn into close cooperation in southeast asia is actually transforming the distribution of power and resources in the region. he contends that major crises become one of the intervening variables in overcoming the prectionist inclinations in the region. the second article attempts to discuss the prospect of china in challenging the united states as a global hegemon in the 21st century. in the article that is entitled "how does neo-liberalism explain the likelihood of china's threat towards united states' global hegemony in the 21st century", dennyza gabiella analyzes about the 'china threat theory' versus 'china peaceful rise'. using neo-liberalism as a framework, she argues that china will not potentially evolve as a threat with its economic growth rise significantly. she implied that despite assertive foreign policy under the xi jinping administration, china will rise peacefully. third article explores the development of automobile industry in southeast asian countries. by focusing on four countries, namely thailand, indonesia, malaysia, and the philippines, wanping tai assesses the political economy, as well as the state policy management in directing its industries. in his article entitled "the political economy of the automobile industry in asean: a cross-country comparison" he argues that despite each country employs different economic policies, the four receive great influence from the historical experience, whereby embedded liberalism is located at the center of policy preference. the fourth article describes about the cybersecurity policy in indonesia. in an article entitled "cybersecurity policy and its implementation in indonesia", muhamad rizal and yanyan m. yani first review the threats posed in the era of cyberspace. they contend that the threat in this sector is definitely prevalent, as the use of information, communication and technology is also escalating significantly. rizal and yani formulate few suggestions for the government of indonesia by identifying the types of threats and the scale of the necessary counter-measures. the last two articles are situated within the research notes as both strongly demonstrate an indepth research and policy-updates in the respective issues. the fifth article, written by tia mariatul kibtiah, was her paper at the 4th international conference on business, international relations and diplomacy (icobird), hosted by cbds bina nusantara university. in her article entitled "mobilizations and movements of foreign fighters from southeast asia to syria and iraq", kibtiah has conducted a direct survey to the former afghan veterans in indonesia and drew an interesting linkage between the state and the civil society in coping with the terrorist movements. lastly, article by risa bhinekawati talks about the comparative policy on the small and medium enterprises in indonesia and australia. in her article entitled "government initiatives to empower small and medium enterprise: comparing one stop shop for licensing in indonesia and australia", risa highlights the important lessons from the australian system that may be applicable to indonesia. the journal of asean studies is glad that our articles are now accessible through wide range of online repositories. moreover, each article with our journal is now assigned with a unique digital object identifier (doi), which will broaden our sphere of readership and ensure the accessibility and the qualification of the articles. this shows our commitment to maintain the credibility and the quality of our journal to have an international standing and high-quality standard. together with the publication of this issue, we would also like to congratulate dr. rizal sukma, our advisory international editorial board, with his new post as the indonesian ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the united kingdom. jakarta, 5 august 2016 prof. tirta n. mursitama, ph.d editor-in-chief increasing economic interdependence between china and asean and its implications1 wai ting hong kong baptist university, hong kong abstract this paper aims to study the problems and issues of china's relations with asean, which has achieved the establishment of asean economic community by 2015. taking into consideration the institutional framework constituted by the multiple agreements signed between china and asean, how will the development of china-asean relations be influenced by increasing economic interdependence between the two? what will be the difficulties ahead in enhancing trade and investments? does promoting economic cooperation lead to more mutual trust in the political-strategic arena? china's recent policy in developing "one belt, one road," and chinese relations with the u.s.-led trans-pacific partnership and their implications to asean will also be examined in this paper. key words: asean economic community, asymmetric interdependence, one belt one road, trans-pacific partnership, regional comprehensive economic partnership, new security outlook, intellectual property rights, regional public goods 1 this is a revised version of a paper originally presented to the international seminar on strengthening asean economic community resilience in facing the global economic crises at the national resilience institute of republic of indonesia (lemhannas ri) in jakarta, 18 november 2015. journal of asean studies, vol. 4, no. 2 (2016), pp. 127-141 doi: 10.21512/jas.v4i2.1524.g1745 ©2016 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic 128 increasing economic interdependence between china and asean and its implications introduction the establishment of asean economic community (aec) by 2015, as decided by asean leaders in 2007, was expected to pave the way for a more indepth integration of the economies of the ten member states. this paper aims to study the prospects of aec in the context of china-asean relations. not only the chinese perspective regarding the aec will be studied, but also the problems and issues of china’s relations with asean will be examined. the downturn of global economy, the economic slowdown of china that used to be one of the motors that drove the whole world, the difficult recovery of the developed world, and the sudden loss of momentum of brazil, russia, india, china, and south africa (brics) in becoming another engine for boosting the world economy are all major problems that contribute to the global recession. they pose significant impact to the future of aec. china’s economy is in slowdown, and xi jinping has asked for a minimum annual growth rate of 6.5 per cent until 2020. although in such circumstances china could still offer opportunities to southeast asian countries, one should not underestimate the challenges and problems that asean has to face resulting from china’s economic downturn. the political and economic relations between asean and china have been circumscribed by a series of treaties and agreements that constitute the institutional framework within which their future relations develop. asean in the past always wanted to construct multilateral frameworks in managing the relations with its northern powerful neighbor, so that the margin of maneuver of china could be restrained. this is what a scholar called asean’s ‘omnienmeshment’ strategy towards china and other major powers (goh, 2007-08, pp. 113-157). before the mid-90s, beijing refused to be ‘bounded’ by the international norms or the rules of the games internalized by these multilateral frameworks, so they chose not to join them. beijing did not wish to be ‘locked’ by those multinational frameworks. however, after the end of cold war, china aspired to ‘join the world’ and integrated into the global capitalist system. since the mid-1990s, china changed its policies from refusing to join those multilateral frameworks to actively participate in them. the pragmatic chinese leaders have then realized that from a realist perspective china could try to maximize its influence within the multilateral institutions. moreover, if beijing is not satisfied with the frameworks or international institutions, it could only seek transformation from within after it becomes a participating member. from a liberalist-institutionalist perspective, china could forge ahead the development of these international institutions basing on the spirit of consensus and cooperation, thus demonstrating its goodwill. in this spirit, china joined the asean regional forum (arf) as a dialogue partner in 1994. the series of multilateral institutional frameworks that china participates in include the declaration of conduct of parties in the south china sea signed in 2002; the framework agreement on comprehensive economic cooperation signed in november 2002 for the establishment of free-trade area (fta) by 2010, followed by the protocol to amend the framework agreement 2003 signed in bali; the treaty of amity and cooperation in southeast asia signed in october 2003; the framework agreement journal of asean studies 129 on asean-china fta (acfta) that came into force in july 2005; the trade in goods agreement signed in november 2004; the trade in services agreement signed in january 2007; the investment agreement signed in august 2007; and the second agreement of trade in goods within the framework agreement on comprehensive economic cooperation signed on 29 october 2010. additionally, there are some new institutional agreements in the pipeline, including the code of conduct of parties in the south china sea, which is now under discussion; the action plan to implement the declaration on chinaasean strategic partnership for peace and prosperity (2016-2020); the china asean treaty on good neighborliness, amity and cooperation; and the treaty on southeast asian nuclear weapon free zone. the chinese principles in dealing with its relationship with asean can be summarized by the followings: good neighborliness, mutual trusts, as well as bringing harmony, security and prosperity to neighbors, as proposed by the former premier wen jiabao, and the ‘new security outlook.’ taking into consideration the institutional framework constituted by these multiple agreements and the principles of chinese diplomacy, how do we see the development of asean when the extent of interdependence between china and asean has been enlarged in the past years? does enhancing economic cooperation lead to more mutual trust in the political-strategic arena? are the numerous institutional frameworks conducive to a more institutionalized relationship between china and asean? we refer to the concept of complex interdependence by keohane and nye, which is conducive to a better understanding among nation-states due to their increasing interactions in the economic and trade areas as well in social and cultural exchanges. according to the two authors, interdependence means mutual dependence (keohane and nye, 2001, p. 7). although both actors have to measure their benefits against the costs incurred during the interactions, asymmetry in dependence between the two entities is inevitable. asymmetrical interdependence can become a source of power for the less dependent actor (keohane and nye, 2001, pp. 5-17). the issue of asymmetrical interdependence between asean and china has become a serious concern of all ten asean members. it is the aim of this paper to study whether the chinese government’s perspectives and its policies regarding asean have taken into consideration this phenomenon of complex interdependence. this paper will not elaborate on the political aspect of china-asean relations, which has long been overshadowed by the south china sea problem. beijing seems to separate politics from economics, hoping that yangli (yielding benefits) to others would alleviate political discordance. asean-china trading relationship: changing pattern in the aec blueprint issued in 2007, it is stipulated that by 2015 when aec is established, the construction of a single market and production base will be accomplished. there should be free flow of goods, services, investments, capital, and skilled labor (asean economic community blueprint, 2007). it seems that the idea and implementation of a regional economic community demonstrate a key point raised by researchers regarding the 130 increasing economic interdependence between china and asean and its implications implications of globalization. current researches have shown that regionalization has been enhanced as a result of globalization. intra-regional trade, investments, and labor flow in various regions are further promoted as a result of economic globalization. china as a neighboring great power in phenomenal growth definitely plays a role in the further regionalization of the asia-pacific region, by linking east and southeast asia. what kinds of economic and political implications would be effectuated especially after the acfta has come into force? premier li keqiang proposed the upgrade of acfta during the tenth china-asean expo and the chinaasean business and investment summit in 2013, ‚… on further lowering tariff rates, cutting non-tariff-related measures, launching dialogues for a new round of service trade pledge, and pushing forward the actual opening-up for investment through policies concerning access and personnel travels, so as to boost the liberalization and facilitation of trade and investment.‛(li keqiang, 2013) in october 2013, during the asean-china summit, li proposed a ‘2+7 cooperation framework,’ which includes a two-point political consensus on good neighborliness and mutual trust, as well as deepening cooperation for mutual benefits. for the seven point proposal, it includes: 1. discussing the signing of the treaty of good neighborliness and friendly cooperation, 2. creating an upgraded version of the acfta, 3. boosting mutual connectivity infrastructure and establishing the asian infrastructure investment bank (aiib), 4. boosting financial cooperation, 5. carrying out maritime cooperation, 6. strengthening exchanges in the security field, and 7. promoting people-to-people and cultural exchanges (asean-china center). chinese scholars consistently indicate that china always tries to ‚give more than take‛ so as to benefit the developing countries especially its asian neighbors. a beijing professor stresses that, ‚the principle of ‘give and take’ on equal footing defines most of the fta negotiations. however, to show its generous spirit to its neighboring countries, especially the less developed countries, china adheres to the strategic principle of ‘giving more while taking less,’ or at times only ‘giving without any taking,’ and equality and mutual benefit all the time.‛ (ying fan, 2012, p. 109) as a result of this ‘principle,’ china continued to have trade deficits with asean countries, importing more than exporting, for a relatively long period in the past in 2000-2011 (jiang and cai, 2013, p. 16). during this period, exports from asean to china have increased much more than the imports from china to asean countries (hatakeyama, 2012, p. 105). however, during the period of 2012-2014, the growth rate of china’s imports from asean increased only nominally, from 24.7 per cent in 2011 to only 1.6 per cent in 2012, 1.8 per cent in 2013, and 4.4 per cent in 2014. but china’s exports to asean increased in a significant way, from 23.1 per cent in 2011, to 20.1 per cent in 2012, 19.5 per cent in 2013, and 11.3 per cent in journal of asean studies 131 2014.2 in 2011, the exports of china to asean was valued at us$170 billion, but only three years later, in 2014, the value of total exports increased to us$271.7 billion. on the contrary, in 2011 the imports of china from asean were valued at us$192.8 billion, but thereafter the value of imports remained stagnant and reached only us$208.1 billion in 2014. so, starting from 2012, asean suffers from having trade deficits with china. in 2012, the deficit was us$8.5 billion, but this increased to us$44.7 billion in 2013, according to the statistics of chinese ministry of commerce (salidjanova et al., 2015, p. 5). the trade deficit was further increased to $63.6 billion in 2014 (asean external trade statistics 2014 and direction of trade statistics, imf, 2015). is this a result of acfta, which largely facilitates the exports of china, especially its mechanical, electrical, and manufactured products? the party-state in china still plays a prominent role in guiding and monitoring its national economy. the downturn of chinese economy since 2014 to a certain extent is related to the diminishing market demand in europe and the united states (u.s.), which results in the significant reduction of chinese exports to the developed world. with the encouragement and assistance provided by the state, chinese enterprises have strenuously searched for the expansion of external markets for their products. asean has been in moderate and steady growth, attaining an average annual gdp growth of 5.5 per cent recently. this is considered to be a steadily expanding market especially for 2 author’s own calculations based on the statistics of chinese ministry of commerce. the industrial goods. it is obvious that china continues to expand its exports of machinery and manufactured goods to asean, benefitting from the coming into force of acfta which has reduced the tariff to zero for 93 per cent of all the products from asean by 1 january 2010. however, it should be noted that a large number of sensitive products is not included in the list of zero tariff. so, in the ‘upgraded’ version of acfta, the number of sensitive and highly sensitive products should be reduced (wei min, 2015, p. 130). on the other hand, has china significantly reduced the import of raw materials, minerals, fuels, and even agricultural products on which asean countries largely depend as exports? as the prices of these products are relatively low in comparison to industrial products, even if there might be growth in exports, the total value cannot be significantly enlarged. what is worse is that the prices of these primary materials are still suffering from downward trend. according to the agreement on trade in goods, the tariff-reduced products are divided into three categories: normal, sensitive, and highly sensitive products. the highly sensitive ones, including rice, sugar, plant oil, automobiles, and certain petro-chemical products, are still under tariff protection until 2015. we have to wait and see whether abolishing all the tariffs and non-tariff barriers to those products would boost up the two-way trade, or benefit more to one counterpart or another. asean should enhance its competitiveness in such traditional products such as food, fisheries, agricultural, and forestry commodities. asean and china used to be competitors in exporting to third countries, as their 132 increasing economic interdependence between china and asean and its implications exports of manufactured goods are quite similar. they are also competitors in attracting investments. but it seems that at least in the production chain they could be complementary to each other, as enterprises in china are looking to export their labor-intensive manufacturing industries to southeast asia, giving the increasingly high cost of labor in china. apart from the structural problems in trade as mentioned above, a chinese scholar highlights several major insufficiencies of acfta. first, the favorable policy has not been fully utilized by the enterprises, as some of the measures to facilitate trading are not yet applicable and the transaction costs are still high. second, the degree of openness of trade in services is relatively low. the openness of sectors like intellectual property rights (ipr), government procurement, technological, and environmental problems has not yet been treated. third, there are still severe legal restrictions to financial services and economic connectivity, which hamper the conditions for economic development (wei min, 2015, 130). it is obvious that asean countries have serious concerns regarding the opening up of the market of these significant sectors. however, opening up the service sectors and financial sector, as well as giving emphasis on ipr and environment concern, are key issues that should be considered in the development of the next stage of the fta. investments opportunities in asean from 2012 to 2014, the total foreign direct investments (fdi) in asean reached us$369 billion, out of which china’s amounted only to $21.4 billion, after the european union (eu), japan, and the u.s., and not much different from the value of hong kong’s investments (us$20.2 billion) (zhang, 2015, p. 28, and statistics of asean, 2015). however, investments on electricity and exploration of raw materials constitute 31.7 per cent of the total china’s investments, and investments in manufacturing industries only reach 13.4 per cent. the chinese invest significantly in infrastructure, real estate, financial services, and service industries. asean and china industrial structures are quite similar and at the same time competitive, as they continue to produce for the enterprises of the developed world. recently, some chinese analysts try to promote further interdependence of economic relations between asean and china through constructing an internationalized production network, or the so-called ‘vertical specialization.’ china aspires to become the source of technological invention, center of innovation, and research and development. if the chinese enterprises succeed in designing their own brands and designs, they can establish their own system of division of labor in the regional value chain through manufacturing the products in the neighboring developing countries. that is to say, the laborintensive production process is transferred to asean countries. the vertical specialization thus produced creates a ‘win-win’ situation in regional cooperation, and the products can be sold first in china, asean, and other developing countries with similar demand. this first step is considered to be important, because if the newly developed industrial powers rely significantly on overseas market, this will certainly arouse fierce competition from the more established industrial powers. it is only at the later stage that the chinese-designed successful products can enter the market of developed world through linkages to journal of asean studies 133 the multinational companies and international buyers. it is only at that time that the chinese enterprises are able to establish their own system of division of labor in the global production and value chain. on its road to become a global economic power, china is aspiring to be not only the major supplier of final products to the vast chinese and asean markets, but also the center of innovation and design of new industrial products. in order to achieve this objective, china needs to largely improve its ability to innovate. china can also assist other asian neighbors to be less reliant on european and u.s. markets, as the vast chinese market is growing, and the manufacture process in southeast asian countries of chinese-designed goods helps to promote their economic development. all these are instrumental in stabilizing and forging ahead the further development of east asian regional economy. constructing a vertical specialization is thus considered to be the foundation for china to become both the innovator and the recipient of final products. if china can design and the vast chinese market can absorb these newly designed products with the production process shifting to asean, it is considered as part of the upgraded version of acfta (zhang, 2015, p. 31). asean countries benefit from the moving of labor intensive industries from china to asean countries. in summer 2015, there was a remarkable decrease of foreign currencies reserve in china, from $3.99 trillion in june 2014 to $3.21trillion in june 2016 (figures from trading economics). this is due to a decrease in renminbi (rmb) savings in exchange for foreign currencies and relocation of investments from mainland china to southeast asia and other parts of asia by a large number of enterprises from taiwan, hong kong, and other countries. the labor-intensive manufacturers in southern china have been facing increase in wages and shortage of labor workers. many factories have been obliged to move to southeast asian countries like cambodia, vietnam, laos, and indonesia, and even india. china used to be the major recipient of these investments, which have their production process in the coastal areas of china. so, china was the competitor of asean countries for those export-oriented investments in the past. now, with the facility provided by investment promotion, shifting the production to asean will help to sustain the development in asean and increase employment. asean can benefit from the affluent middle class that has been growing significantly in china. it is expected that the middle class will ‚change consumer lifestyles, thus stimulating imports of quality and luxury products and services from asean countries‛ (chinvanno, 2015, p. 13). however, the slowdown of chinese economy since 2014 has started to pose a real challenge for asean exports. asean countries should be aware of a protracted slowdown in the chinese economy that results in a reduction of imports from asean. as a result, southeast asian countries aim to increase domestic demand as well as productivity. intra-asean trade has increased to 24.1 per cent of asean’s total trade in 2014 (asean external trade statistics, 2014) and this should be further promoted in the new ten-year strategic plan aiming for deeper integration beyond 2015. since the signing of the agreement on trade in services, the financial, tourism, information technology, education, and 134 increasing economic interdependence between china and asean and its implications logistics sectors have benefitted. however, even chinese scholars stress that the chinese investments should not focus on speculative profit-making activities like real estate development. they should learn from the japanese experience in investing in public transport, education, and technology skill training in order to assist the host country in establishing a solid foundation for further development. china and asean should cooperate to produce the so-called ‘regional public goods’ catering for the needs of asean countries. this is considered as crucial in order to 'earn the trust, improve china’s image and appeasing effects‛ among the neighboring countries. this demands not only financial and technical aid from beijing, but the latter should be more thoughtful in offering assistance in education, medicine, and social security (wang and zhang, 2015, p. 31). china has set up a ‚us$15 billion credit facility and a us$10 billion chinaasean investment cooperation fund with a focus on infrastructure and connectivity, thus helping to realize the asean community by 2015‛ (soerakoesoemah, 2012, p. 19). china is raising us$3 billion for the second stage of china-asean investment cooperation fund, but so far the usefulness of this fund has not been very clear (wei min, 2015, p. 139). china’s grand strategy of ‘one belt, one road’ during the visit of xi jinping to kazakhstan in september 2013, he proposed the idea of jointly constructing the ‘silk road economic belt.’ two months later when he visited indonesia in november 2013, he proposed the idea and policy of constructing the ‘maritime silk road.’ many scholars in china are actively engaging in justifying the necessity of this policy, searching for the essence of its meaning, and finding ways to implement it, whereas scholars outside china want to examine the geopolitical and geo-economic reasons behind the launching this policy and its implications. china has already committed us$100 billion in october 2014 for the aiib and contributed us$40 billion in november 2014 for the ‘silk road fund.’ beijing also committed to establish the ‘new development bank’ with the brics. the greater mekong sub-region is considered to be the first testing ground for the so-called economic integrative development. all these banks serve to finance those projects of infrastructural development, including railway, highway, sea transportation, aviation, electricity, water, as well as real estates, so as to facilitate the exchanges of personnel, trade, capital, technology, and agricultural products. china has already started the extension of its electricity grid to southeast asian countries, through the socalled ‘asean inter-connected power grid’ (report on the transfer of electricity from southern china to asean countries). now, the china southern power grid company has already supplied electricity to laos, myanmar, and vietnam.3 this is in reality a result of the over-capacity in the production of electricity in china, as well as the slow growth or even reduction of electricity consumption in various provinces as a result of the chinese economic downturn since 2014. there are two economic factors that play a part in the formulation of this 3 china has two electricity grids: the national power grid and the southern power grid. the latter supplies electricity to five provinces: guangdong, guangxi, yunnan, guizhou, and hainan. journal of asean studies 135 policy. first, the abundant foreign currency reserves of china, which amounted to a maximum of $3.99 trillion in june 2014 but dropped to $3.21 trillion in june 2016 due to the outflow of foreign capital, has always been a problem for the financial situation of china. in the past, it was constantly a source of pressure for the appreciation of rmb. now, beijing is suffering from the pressure for depreciation. how to make the best use of the foreign currencies is a difficult issue, as investments in wealthy developed world like europe and the u.s. are usually risky. so, buying u.s. bonds is the ultimate outcome, but lending money to the u.s. will curtail losses to china if the u.s. dollar is devalued. by the ‘one belt, one road’ policy, china can lend money through the aiib or silk road fund to southeast asian states, which will then make use of the loan to improve their infrastructural development. second, any infrastructural development will make use of cement, iron and steel, aluminium, chemicals, and heavy machinery. all these sectors in china are in a state of over-capacity. the prices of all these minerals and commodities have dropped significantly. the numerous factories that are set idle desperately need new markets as the chinese market is over-saturated. for every city of china, whether big or small, there must be several or over a dozen newly developed regions outside the cities. all these so-called ‘ghost cities’ are able to house millions of people, as proclaimed by an expert on urban development in a recent conference held in beijing. now, china wants to help the neighboring developing countries to build infrastructure. they obtain the loan from china then make use of the loan to buy chinese materials, expertise, and technology, that is to say, to keep the chinese factories that produce steel, cement, and even locomotive working. however, we need to consider whether these developing countries are able to pay back the capital investments that they borrow from china. the capital investment of billions of us dollars in building a railway depends on the loan, but is the country able to generate enough profits from the operation of the railway so that it could pay back the loan? this is a legitimate question that chinese decision-makers must clarify. if some countries are not able to pay within the designated period, will china exempt their debts, as it has done in the past in dissolving the debts of the poorest african countries? one recent example can be demonstrated by the laotian railway built by china. the two countries signed an agreement in 2015 in beijing on the construction and operation of a 418 km railway in laos. the total investment is rmb40 billion yuan. the proportion of china’s share is 70 per cent while laos’ is 30 per cent, which means laos has to contribute rmb12 billion yuan (ming pao, 2015, p. a23). since the railway will link up china’s domestic railway network with thailand’s and malaysia’s in the future, it can be regarded as a ‘political project,’ whereas the profitability of the railways seems to be doubtful but it is of secondary importance. if china is able to construct the high-speed railways4 that connect china 4 it should be specified that the relatively highspeed trains that run for 200 km per hour are called ‘dongche’ (dynamic trains) in chinese, while those extra high-speed trains that run for more than 350 km per hour are called ‘gaotie’ (high-speed trains). the former can use the ordinary conventional railway, while the 136 increasing economic interdependence between china and asean and its implications to europe via the numerous countries in central asia, western asia, and eastern europe, the whole railway system together with the communication, signal, and software system designed by china will be utilized by all the countries concerned. this is a significant achievement of china that brings remarkable political and economic implications. during the past 36 years of reform and open door period, china eyes on western assistance in providing capital, expertise, and technology. now, geopolitically speaking, china pays attention to the countries in its south and west and endeavors to modify the landscape of those countries through china’s economic power. the rcep and china’s reactions to the u.s.-dominated trans-pacific partnership apart from its grand initiative of one belt, one road, beijing seems to be eager to play a leading role in the asean initiative of regional comprehensive economic partnership (rcep), which was launched in 2012, that brings together the ten asean members states with the six states that have free trade agreements with asean, including china, japan, india, south korea, australia, and new zealand. fifteen rounds of negotiation have covered areas in trading in goods and services, investment, ipr, economic and technical cooperation, dispute resolution, and legal issues. key concerns include lowering tariffs especially in agricultural sector, an important issue for japan that is concerned with opening its latter are much more demanding technologically, requiring an isolated and specially constructed railway. however, in the chinese publicities regarding the exportation of train technology, the word ‘gaotie’ is always used. agricultural market. another concern is to push ahead investment opportunities that stronger powers such as japan and china are enthusiastic to achieve. the rcep is considered as another grand design for china in orchestrating the establishment of an upgraded fta in the asia-pacific region, in competition to the trans-pacific partnership (tpp) led by washington. since the new u.s. president donald trump has already mentioned his will to dismantle the tpp before his advent to power given his protectionist stance, asian countries including even japan are looking at rcep in considering their future in the regional cooperation efforts. the original proposal of four small states – singapore, brunei, new zealand, and chile – which largely rely on trade for their economic development, was baptized in 2005 as the ‘trans-pacific strategic and economic partnership.’ they aimed to promote free trade ‘at a higher level.’ they wished to draw attention to the necessity of ‘upgrading’ free trade. however, facing the difficulties in negotiations within world trade organization (wto) and the predominance of great powers, what they could do was rather limited. when the u.s. took over the proposal after the advent of president barack obama to power and changed its name to tpp in 2009, washington sought the approval of other countries in creating a ‘new’ fta that has to take into consideration some new conditions in relation to ipr, labor rights, transparency in decision-making, finance, e-commerce, private property, and environmental protection and conservation. even for the traditional areas like commodity trade and trade in services, the tpp set a higher standard. zero tariff will be enforced for all products, and for the market access in services trade, the tpp is very liberal, journal of asean studies 137 allowing the ‘pre-establishment national treatment,’ plus most-favored-nation and exception clause (wu and qu, 2014, p. 67). the tpp agreement, signed on 5 october 2015, marked a significant victory of the u.s. in determining the ‘rules of the games’ in international trade in the future. the tpp can be considered as the creation of new norms and regulations in international trade, led by the largest economy (the u.s.) and the third largest economy (japan) for the further development of regional economy (ta kung pao, 2015, p. a24). the ‘high standard’ in ipr, workers conditions, environmental control, and trade in services is a manifestation of the u.s. new fta. for instance, in ipr, the usual fta requests members to abide by the ‘traderelated aspects of intellectual property rights (trips) agreement’ as stipulated in the wto, but the tpp sets a higher standard. the u.s. has a very strong competitive edge in technological innovation and knowledge economy. the high standard in ipr would help the u.s. in maintaining its superiority in this area and safeguarding its interests in technological transfer and patents trade. however, this might inhibit the least developed countries in acquiring technology at a low cost. the regulations on labor rights as well as environmental conditions are seen by chinese analysts as a kind of pretexts used by the u.s. administration in imposing trade sanctions to least developed countries in the future. they would obstruct the exports of chinese products. the principle of non-discrimination is adopted by the tpp in the regulations on government procurement. this is also regarded by chinese analysts as a means to obstruct chinese government’s actions to buttress its state enterprises in order to support its crucial key industries (wu and qu, 2014, p. 71). though china would not suffer much from not joining the tpp in the short term, the tpp actually constrains the status and influence of china in fostering regional economic cooperation. chinese economists believe that the accession of japan to tpp while china is out of tpp would adversely affect the chinese economy, as trade would then shift towards the twelve member states of tpp with tariffs for all commodities reduced to zero. however, for the sake of upgrading chinese status and influence in east asian economic cooperation, beijing opts for ‘10+3’ in order to counter-balance the negative effects incurred upon china by the u.s.-dominated tpp, which is part of the american strategy of ‘rebalancing’ and ‘pivot to asia.’ beijing also thinks that the tpp complicates the great power relationship in the asia-pacific region, especially in china’s bilateral relationship with japan, asean, korea, and russia, since the tpp would further reinforce the relationship between the u.s. and its military allies in the region. it seems that china opts for an ‘east asian strategy’ rather than an ‘asiapacific strategy,’ as the former yields more ‘spillover’ effects on the member countries. among the strategic choices for china, the order for china’s choices is in the following sequence: 10+1 > chinajapan-korea > 10+3 > 10+6 (rcep) > asiapacific economic cooperation (apec) (free trade area of the asia-pacific [ftaap]) > tpp (wu and qu, 2014, p. 74). meanwhile, the most important task for china is to establish an upgraded version of acfta, which means reduction of tariffs and trade barriers for sensitive products; enhancing chinese investments in infrastructure, water and electricity, 138 increasing economic interdependence between china and asean and its implications telecommunication, and raw materials; as well as promoting trade in services such as financial services and cooperation (wei min, 2015, p. 131). the next major task is to accelerate the negotiation of fta for china-japan-korea, then 10+3, and the negotiation of bilateral fta with other regional powers such as korea, australia, brunei, malaysia, and vietnam. both japan and the u.s. have to sacrifice in order to demonstrate their goodwill for the establishment of tpp. the japanese government has to make sacrifice regarding opening up their agricultural market. the self-sufficiency rate of agricultural products in japan would be reduced from 40 per cent to 13 per cent, and, with the massive influx of foreign agricultural products, the agricultural population would probably be reduced by 3.5 million. the u.s. government has make sacrifice regarding its pharmaceutical industries, in which they have to shorten the length of their patents for new medicines from twelve years to eight years. china was not invited to the negotiation on tpp, and it will not be able to fulfill some of the requirements in the near future. one requirement is obviously targeted against the chinese state enterprises. the monopolization of key industries in china by the giant state enterprises, behind which is the state power, is against the ‘spirit’ of free trade according to the tpp. the regulations of tpp require that state enterprises should not enjoy any special privileges, so the key industries that are monopolized by the chinese state enterprises, such as chemical engineering, steel, petroleum, energy, minerals, banking and finance, logistics, and telecommunication, would ‘suffer’ in the eyes of chinese analysts. another condition set by tpp is also targeted at china, which are ‚new rules governing the free flow of data, privacy and cybersecurity … and bans a swath of practices used by china and other countries to protect her local technology companies‛ (donnan, 2015, p. 2). this is obviously set against the chinese hackers stealing commercial and technological secrets from the u.s. as a superpower, the u.s. still tries to safeguard its leadership position in deciding the so-called rules of the games (or international norms) in international trade and investments. if china wishes to enter the tpp, it has to make significant domestic reforms so as to abide by the new international norms. the tpp can thus be considered as a useful political instrument of washington to foster fundamental changes within china. nevertheless, it should be emphasized that higher standard on workers’ rights and protection, better protection of ipr, and environmental conservation should be regarded as the major trends in economic globalization, and it is also in the interest of china to gradually implement a higher standard in these regards. though it is clear that washington wants to make use of tpp to stimulate china for further domestic reforms in order to fulfill the conditions laid down by the u.s. – just like what the u.s. did in the past in fostering domestic legal, financial, and economic reforms in china in order to become a member of wto – it is imperative for china for its own sake to modify its economic structure and to upgrade its industries. so, the tpp setting a higher standard in many ways can be beneficial to china if the standard laid down will be conducive to further restructuring of chinese economy. interestingly, this argument is indeed echoed by chinese economists (wu and qu, 2014, p. 76). journal of asean studies 139 it seems that asean is interested in signing bilateral fta with regional powers by maximizing its own interests through the strategy of balancing in between the great powers. asean has four members in the tpp. how the tpp is related to rcep, ftaap, and other bilateral ftas and how they play a part in influencing regional economic integration remain to be studied. it is nevertheless certain that maneuvering in between the greatest powers in a skillful manner can render the maximum benefits for asean. establishing an fta with china enables all the members of asean to benefit from the vast chinese market and attract chinese investments, while the more prepared members are now opting for an upgraded fta – the tpp – with the u.s. and japan. this later can then help to counterbalance the possible over reliance on china from both the geopolitical and geo-economic perspectives. conclusion as a thai scholar has noted, ‚the problem for china … is that its relationship with asean lacks strategic trust due to lingering security concerns, while prospects for joint economic development are limited by asean’s fear of domination by its larger neighbor‛ (parameswaran, 2013, p. 12). asean ‚may worry that being overly dependent on china economically would allow beijing to use its dominance to undermine their foreign policy autonomy‛ (parameswaran, 2013, p. 11). however, in the cases of taiwan and hong kong, by ‘yangli,’ what the chinese authorities wish to achieve is that ‘rendered profits’ will succeed in winning the hearts of people, that is, economic integration will lead to political integration. in reality, the chinese practice, or malpractice, does not succeed in winning the hearts of the people in taiwan or hong kong; rather, the contrary is true. the massive inflow of chinese capital might modify the economic landscape and structure, fostering the dominating position of the chinese capital. if the chinese capital dominates, political domination is a natural corollary. this is the basic reason why the taiwan students fought against the cross-strait service trade agreement in the spring of 2014. it is true that between china and its neighbors, economic interdependence is the growing trend that is inevitable. however, if the interdependence is ‘asymmetric’ – meaning that one side benefits more than its counterpart, the partner country will be skeptical of the real intention of the bigger power, resulting in the loss of political trust. the reason why china is interested in dealing with its neighbors on a bilateral basis perhaps is due to the underlying logic of ‘asymmetry.’ so, beijing should be aware of the national sentiments of asean countries regarding their fear of domination and be cautious of any economic endeavors given the possible political and social implications. about the author ting wai is a professor at the department of government and international studies at hong kong baptist university. he graduated from the chinese university of hong kong and obtained his ph.d. in political science and international relations from the university of paris-x (nanterre), france. he was also former president of the hong kong association for european studies from 2006 to 2017. 140 increasing economic interdependence between 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(2015). the operational performance of the china-asean free trade area and its sustainable development path. xiandai guoji guanxi, (contemporary international relations), 7. journal of asean studies, vol. 7, no. 2 (2019), pp. 161-175 doi: https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v7i2.6163 ©2019 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic the predatory state and radical politics: the case of the philippines christopher ryan baquero maboloc ateneo de davao university, manila abstract this paper examines why the radical approach to politics of president rodrigo duterte, halfway into his term, has not overcome the predatory nature of the philippine state. the predatory nature of the state implies that politics in the country is still defined by vested interests. the struggle of the filipino is largely due to the structural nature of the injustices suffered by the country. duterte’s brand of politics is antagonistic. the president is a polarizing figure. despite the declaration that he will punish corrupt officials, traditional politicians and elite clans continue to rule the land with impunity. the country’s political ills are actually systemic. elitism is rooted in colonial history that is perpetuated by an inept bureaucracy. it will be argued that the strong resolve and charisma of a leader is inadequate to remedy the troubles in fledgling democracies such as the philippines. key words: predatory state, elite democracy, radical politics, president duterte introduction what is the fundamental task of every filipino president? there can only be one answer – to change the political landscape in philippine society. in order to do so, filipinos have to become mature in terms of their choices. yet, it is wrong to blame them for their situation. the problems of the philippine state are structural in character. political overlords control the lives of the people and manipulate political exercises to perpetuate themselves into power. as a result, millions have not escaped the poverty trap and continue to suffer from the discomfort of an inept bureaucracy. in 2016, rodrigo duterte was elected by an overwhelming majority of the electorate hoping that the radical approach of the tough-talking politician will alter the fortunes of the filipino people. in this new study, the author uses the interpretive method in textual analysis, using texts and materials culled from various sources, including books, recent newspaper articles, and scholarly works on the subject matter at hand. democratic paralysis in the predatory state john sidel’s capital, coercion, and crime: bossism in the philippines explains 162 the predatory states nd radical politics that bossism is the “interlocking and multitier directorate of bosses who use their control over the state apparatus to exploit the archipelago’s human and natural resources.” (sidel, 1999) the roots of bossism in the philippines can be traced to the american period. the western colonizers put the coercive and extractive power of the state into the hands of the traditional ruling class. elected officials, untrained in the sophistication of democratic governance, found at their absolute disposal the opportunity to manipulate the affairs of the state. the systemic exploitation of the filipino was entrenched in the politics practiced in the country. the landed class enforced the monopolization of enterprises. bureaucrats became tools of corrupt rule. this is apparent in provinces and cities that are dominated by political dynasties. the philippine state even after the people power revolt of 1986 is a paralyzed form of democracy that has been subordinated to the vested interests of traditional politicians and corporate masters. since the time of president manuel l. quezon, the traditional politician remains to be the boss in philippine society. bosses, sidel (1999) argues, “are predatory power brokers who achieve monopolistic control over both human and economic resources within given territorial jurisdictions or bailiwicks.” business interests and the politics of money mix up in the philippines. the businessman, who often monopolizes the trading of goods of a locality controlled by a few, finances the politician because the former expects the latter to protect his profit-making ventures. this scheme is mutually beneficial for both but is dangerous to the basic welfare of the people. nathan quimpo (2005) thinks that “bossism reflects a common conjuncture in state formation and capitalist development: the superimposition of the trappings of formal electoral democracy upon a state apparatus at an early stage of capital accumulation.” state formation in the philippines is the conspiracy between two evil masterminds: the traditional politician and the oligarchs who continue to subjugate, abuse and ultimately exploit the filipino to the hilt. predation in the philippine state is about the use of machinations to control the population. understanding the political consciousness of the poor matters in this regard. but one cannot blame the masses. the poor have been forced into circumstances that influence the way they think about and choose a candidate. this explains why the masses still elect corrupt politicians. the traditional politician has successfully portrayed that for the masa (people), it does not really matter who rules them. this fatalistic attitude is a consequence of latent as well as obvious forms of maneuvering from the barangay up to the provincial level. party bosses hire starlets and celebrities, transforming election campaigns into entertainment shows and public spectacles. at the root cause of it all is the politics of money. in sidel’s theory, the state is a mafia-like enterprise that exploits with impunity the natural and human resource of a political jurisdiction. the predatory journal of asean studies 163 state feeds on the weaknesses of the poor, many of whom lack formal education. having no decent means of living, the poor succumbs to dependency. political leaders organize the poor in urban centers as well as in rural areas into groups. leaders sell their votes wholesale. folks are made to attend fake seminars and mass rallies. even senior citizens are paid to distribute election materials. the poor see this as means to make money during elections. the electorate will ignore candidates who do not provide them with food packs or cash. in the end, the damage that a predatory state makes is irreparable. the people are used as means to perpetrate a systemic exploitation that is seemingly legitimized by dirty electoral exercises. the politics of money paralyzes democracy by influencing the outcomes of elections. quimpo (2009) explains that in a predatory regime, “clientelism and patronage give way to pervasive corruption, a systematic plunder of government resources and the rapid corrosion of public institutions into tools for predation.” public officials only approve business applications after they are bribed with shares of stocks. corrupt politicians also have a say on who must get the licenses in legal gambling like the small-town lottery. developers of subdivisions are forced to give padanlug (grease money) to have their land conversion requests approved. in addition, there are politicians who are engaged in smuggling and drug trafficking. the individuals who conspire in these evil schemes – businessmen, local police, and public officials – divide the loot. they do not only paralyze the bureaucracy; their wicked ways also destroy the future of the nation. culture and context will always matter. (paredes, 2002) for example, the value of “utang na loob” (debt of gratitude) is negative when applied in the political arena. according to oona thommes paredes (2002), “in the case of the philippines, it is clear that certain cultural factors configure social and political relations between bosses and their supporters, as well as within a given network of bosses.” people see their political overlords as their first resort when they need money during town celebrations, weddings, or baptism. in return, their sense of gratitude will translate into votes. paredes (2002) says that for sidel, “electoral democracy and bossism go hand-in-hand.” for this reason, the reality of bossism is inevitable in impoverished societies like the philippines. since the electorate is conditioned to think that they owe something to the traditional politician, the latter thinks that the people are no longer entitled to anything. the boss dictates not only the rules of the game but also the outcomes of the lives of the people. sidel’s analysis is important in understanding the type of leadership that usurps the state. the failure of any government to protect the welfare of its citizens may be due to the incompetence of technocrats but the root of the problem is dynastic rule. in the philippines, 169 or 84% of the 200 elected members of 164 the predatory states nd radical politics congress belong to pre-1972 ruling families. (tadem & tadem, 2016) senator manny pacquiao, a filipino boxing hero, thinks that “too much democracy is bad for the philippines” (elemia, 2019). pacquiao, who is also building his own dynastic rule in sarangani province, has the highest number of recorded absences in the senate (talabong, 2019). the effect of dynasties is apparent – persistent poverty. the monopoly of power means that people do not have the means to voice out concerns. as a result, the interest of the public is not attended to by their government officials. by limiting the field of candidates to a few, dominant family, national progress stagnates. but the bosses – mayors, governors, including the president – become richer. president duterte is a polarizing figure. his brand of politics is disruptive. but to put things into context, it is important to revisit the real reason why filipinos put duterte in malacañang. d. s. panarina presents a positive view on the philippine president. panarina (2017) observes that “duterte made a strategic decision to start his domestic policy with reestablishment of law and order using rather authoritarian and militaristic methods, but at the same time rapidly earned him the abovementioned trust of ordinary people.” duterte does not seem to mind the opinion of the west against him. a realist by heart, duterte’s pivot to china and russia presumably is for the sake of national interest, arguing that the us is meddling over his domestic policies, especially his war on drugs. panarina (2017) believes that despite the president’s “lack of diplomacy, duterte clearly comprehends the biggest dangers for his nation (potential or existing) and acts accordingly.” in fact, duterte’s timid yet realist position on the west philippine sea issue is simply misunderstood. while some accuse him of selling the country off to china, the president is clear in saying that he only wants to protect national interest by not instigating any potential military conflict against china. that duterte is an autocrat is debatable, but what seems clear is that he has the tendency to ignore public morals. to his critics, he sometimes speaks like a thug (wood, 2017). indeed, in his three years in office, critics and admirers alike would remember his rape joke, his cursing of pope francis and president barack obama, and above all else, his decision to allow the burial of the late strongman ferdinand marcos at the libingan ng mga bayani. the burial happened at early dawn. it was a strategy that caught his critics by surprise. but as of the moment, protests on duterte’s decision has since subsided. but while the president is projected negatively, he has also achieved unique accomplishments through his maverick ways. duterte solved the “laglag bala” racket at the ninoy aquino international airport, he made lucio tan’s philippine airlines pay its seven billion-peso debt, and the bangsamoro organic law (bol) was passed by both houses of congress and ratified in a referendum. journal of asean studies 165 the pejorative term “buang” senator ronald dela rosa, who led duterte’s “war on drugs” then as head of the philippine national police, was criticized for describing the death of kyla ulpina, a three-year old girl killed in a drug operation as “collateral damage” (aurelio, 2019). police operatives alleged that the girl was used by his father as a shield, although the report of human rights watch (hrw) indicates that the latter was actually unarmed. the human rights group said that the girl is a victim of duterte’s drug war (conde, 2019). the excessive use of force is the object of criticism. when duterte mentioned that he will protect law enforcers from legal suits emanating from anti-drug operations, critics said it gave the police a feeling of impunity. when the “right to due process” was raised by the catholic church and the country’s constitutionally independent human rights commission, duterte rebuffed his critics, saying that “your concern is human rights, mine is human lives” (villamor, 2018). critics were alarmed that murder has become a national policy. the problem of the president’s statement is that human rights and human life are not mutually exclusive. to protect human lives, one needs to value human rights. but one needs to ask, what is the reason for the huge support for duterte’s violent anti-drug war? arguably, it lies in the prejudice against drug pushers and drug users. drug addicts, in the mind of the philippine president, is “buang” (crazy). calling a person “buang” is reflective of the kind of bias that is still prevalent in philippine society. someone who is “buang” is not only an irrational man. the same is also considered as undesirable in society. this prejudice might have come from the fact that there are insane persons roaming the streets, the ones called “taong grasa”. they have been abandoned by their families and are left to scavenge for any leftover in garbage bins. this reminds us of the politics of exclusion, in which the bad elements of society are to be separated from the good ones. duterte characteristically portrayed the drug addict and drug dealer as vicious villains. for the president, both should be punished. steffen jensen and karl hapal (2018) in researching their paper, interviewed a law enforcement officer who put it this way: “the people we put down are not people anymore. they are demons that need to be removed from the face of the earth. we the police are like angels that battle those demons. we know what is right and we know that what those criminals do is not right.” according to hrw, the philippine drug enforcement agency (pdea) has recorded 4,948 deaths of suspected drug users and pushers in police operations since july 1, 2016 up to september 30, 2018. the same report indicates that 22,983 such deaths have been classified as homicides under investigation (human rights watch, 2019). some critics say that duterte only targets small drug dealers, although during the senatorial debate, then candidate dela rosa fired back at critics in defense of the president saying that police anti-drug operations have 166 the predatory states nd radical politics neutralized ‘big fishes’ like the parojinogs of ozamiz city and albuera mayor rolando espinosa, the father of the suspected drug lord kerwin espinosa. however, in a survey conducted by the social weather stations in december 2018, it was shown that 78% of the public are worried about extra-judicial killings. in the same survey, 50% of the victims of summary executions in the country belong to poor households. only 3% come from wealthy families (rappler, 2019). however, the filipino public has not shown any massive indignation against the president’s war on drugs. even the members of the clergy are divided. daniel franklin pilario (2017) says that it is because “the official political machine officially extols the success of the antidrug project.” beyond this observation, however, is the feeling that the war on drugs has made many communities safe from criminal elements. duterte’s mystique was reinforced when he met with the alleged drug kingpin peter lim of cebu city. the president has warned that he would kill the chinese businessman. so far, that has not happened. for some critics, duterte’s war on drugs is morally troubling. they argue that it is an extermination program (esmaquel, 2017). violence is at the heart of this anti-drug campaign. for three years, scores of drug suspects have been killed and then marked with a cardboard, “wag tularan” (do not follow). the context is clear. it warns the public to keep themselves away from illegal drugs. critics contend that duterte’s radical approach revolves around a world of crime and punishment. for historian vicente rafael (2016), the president’s violent ways are nothing but a manifestation of a principle of vengeance. he writes that “for duterte and the rest like him, justice means revenge.” rafael argues that the president is using his campaign against criminality as an excuse for his dictatorial infatuations. randy david (2016) says that such phenomenon of blind obedience and ultra-fanaticism is “pure theater – a sensual experience rather than the rational application of ideas to society’s problems.” david says that duterte is using the coercive power of the state against his dissenters. the sociologist thinks that duterte is the “incarnation of a style of governance enabled by the public’s faith in the capacity of a tough-talking, willful, and unorthodox leader to carry out drastic actions to solve the nation’s persistent problems” (david, 2017). he calls such phenomenon, “dutertismo”. benjiemen labastin (2018) explains that the idea “could be read as a prophetic warning to remind the people not to be trapped again with the sweet promises of authoritarianism as an easy path to solve the country’s woes.” david believes that duterte’s type of governance is nothing short of a demagoguery. labastin says that for david, the president is subverting the sovereignty of the filipino people (west philippine sea issue) and bastardizing its democratic processes (right to due process of drug suspects), suggesting that such an attitude is a characteristic of leaders who pay no respect to the rule of law. journal of asean studies 167 the paralysis of state and society in the philippines is manifest in the deaths of thousands in the war on drugs. it is no secret that the violent means employed by the state through law enforcers have resulted in the murder of innocent lives. the reason is simple. police operatives are human beings who make mistakes. they can also be abusive and so by giving them the absolute blanket of authority to kill every drug suspect, such an approach will have far reaching implications that can destroy filipino families. duterte, in this sense, is not only ruining philippine democracy, but is also obliterating the future of children whose parents have not been given the chance to reform. the death of thousands is a disturbing reality. in this regard, critics contend that the president is a danger to philippine society (panarina, 2017). politics as usual: the corrupt ways of post-colonial philippines according to michael cullinane (2003), “bureaucrats who were appointed to implement the new laws more often than not abused them.” the ilustrados aggrandized themselves. moreover, the same cabals impoverished the filipino people. the incompetent brand of service rendered to the people would be carried over decades thereafter. at the heart of the ilustrado rule is centralized governance. the spanish authorities instituted a system to administer the islands more effectively, although the main motive of the friars were land and the subjugation of the local population. when spain left the country, the americans maintained the system and distributed the resources in the country to the elites in manila. since the provincial elites were beholden to the national leadership and the oligarchs in the capital, the american imperialists knew that all they had to do was keep close ties with the ruling class in manila. paul hutchcroft and joel rocamora (2003) explains that “the logic of philippine politics became driven to a considerable extent by the politics of patronage and the division of the spoils among the elite and the expansion of the quantity of spoils available to the elite as a whole.” the edsa people power failed to emancipate the filipino from oligarchic rule. the elites used their status to influence policy. post-edsa ii governments promised to serve the filipino under the pretext of moral reform, but the predatory culture of corruption continued to stifle progress and governance. the elites in the provinces too wielded great power and influence. the philippine state had no real means to control them. instead, national leaders used local dynasts to perpetuate their positions. in return, the bosses in the poor provinces persisted in their greedy and corrupt ways. while relative economic growth was achieved during past administrations after edsa ii, this has not trickled down to poor households. the ascent of duterte to power can be attributed to the discontent of the filipino. duterte succeeded in projecting himself as the right candidate for the job by building that image of an alternative to a lousy leadership. but duterte is not 168 the predatory states nd radical politics someone who can be exempted from the predatory nature of the philippine state. while davao city can be showcased as a success story, this success is not about good governance, but the kind of discipline imposed on the people. it is the personality of duterte, more than his principle of governance, which charmed the filipino electorate. this makes manifest what patricio abinales and donna amoroso (2005) calls “the slide of philippine society from institutionalism into pure politics.” elite democracy only privileges the few. its rent-seeking ways only benefit those at the top. in such kind of politics, extraction and exclusion characterize the system. the filipino, as a result, finds himself serving two overlords – chinesefilipino tycoons and dynasts. chinese migrants effectively integrated themselves into philippine society. while they were unable to do so in malaysia or indonesia, it was a different case for the philippines (kusaka, 2017). filipinos of chinese descent control 60% of the non-land capital in the philippines. chinese tycoons own the biggest banks, manufacturing firms, and malls. they have shares in infrastructure, mining, and in utility firms. a rising oligarch, dennis uy is of chinesefilipino blood. injap sia, an emerging tycoon who at a very young age became a billionaire, is also of chinese descent. this is not to diminish the huge contribution of chinese filipinos to the development of the country. what we this claim intends to show is that opportunities have been scarce for the ordinary filipino but not for those who live in gated communities. the silencing of the voices from the margins, including the media, the perpetuation of a neo-colonial regime, and the presence of a semi-feudal socioeconomic order, reveal the predatory nature of the philippine state. the real problem of politics in the philippines is that it has been reduced into the pursuit of personal interests. president benigno aquino iii campaigned on the promise that he would reform philippine society by running after corrupt government officials. yet, as his administration started its mission, it has become clear that he was only interested in prosecuting president gloria macapagal arroyo. aquino’s government was also embroiled in many controversies, the most prominent of which was the development acceleration program (dap) where then budget secretary florencio abad was accused of re-aligning surplus funds from the national budget into discretionary projects without the proper authorization from congress as mandated by the philippine constitution. three years into the duterte presidency, it seems that it is “politics as usual” for corrupt politicians. duterte understands what power means. for this reason, he has to make alliances with dynasts and the traditional politicians in pursuit of all his agenda. the senatorial elections of 2019 proved that the president still has that charm, although some in the political opposition would like to insinuate that the exercise was rigged. clearly, the election of his special assistant christopher lawrence “bong” go is a testament of the high trust and journal of asean studies 169 confidence of the majority of the people on president duterte. the liberal party’s slate of senatorial candidates known as “otso diretso” that included the incumbent senator bam aquino and former department of the interior and local government secretary mar roxas, all lost in the election. the midterm election was simply a vote of confidence for duterte. the lp slate represented the elite. but the defeat of “otso diretso” does not also mean the defeat of the ilustrado class. in fact, many of the candidates who won in the 2019 midterm election are political butterflies or turncoats. the majority of the congressmen and senators who are now allied with duterte formerly belonged to the liberal party. for obvious reasons, politicians change loyalties for political expediency. so, despite the strong pronouncement of the president against corruption, it still widespread. indeed, traditional politicians have positioned themselves since time immemorial with the ruling party to secure their place in the hierarchy and the necessary funding for pet their projects. infrastructure projects are a potential source of kickbacks that range from 10 to 30 per cent. as a consequence, it is the people who suffer. in fact, it can be said that duterte has not dismantled elite rule in the country. the reason why the predatory nature of the philippine state remains is apparent. corruption in the country is systemic. unless the people mature in politics, there is no way to overhaul the elitist nature of philippine democracy. the cycle continues because no single man can reform this system. duterte himself knows that he has to play his cards well and dance with the wolves if he wants his agenda to push through. change does not happen overnight, not even after three years. the political machine has embedded itself and the traditional ways of politics have penetrated the deepest roots of philippine society like a cancer. while roads and bridges have been built in the countryside, poor houses occupy the landscape. without jobs, there is no way for the filipino to overcome his situation. politicians give people a reason to hope, but it is our choice of principles that would matter in the end. the traditional politician has none. moral politics and the radical president agonistic politics is grounded in the idea of struggle. society is not a homogenous set of identities. antonio gramsci’s constructivist view of the world tells us that human society has no intrinsic nature. what becomes of society is a product of hegemonic relations. this is the case for the philippines. for instance, the ownership of vast landholdings by the ruling class during the colonial period defined the economic as well as the social landscape of the country. there remains to be hierarchical differences that influence how citizens relate to each other politically. in fact, it is the case to this day. as such, after duterte won, big businessmen from manila came to see him at his temporary office in davao. they all wanted a big part of the action. but more than anything else, they simply needed 170 the predatory states nd radical politics assurance and security for their businesses. the thing that people call consensus is no more than an ordering of power. prior to duterte, those in the capital dictated what was to become of the country. the idea of dialogue is nothing but a disguise for the selfish motives of the powerful. the anti-establishment strategy that duterte employs is a type of antagonism. this type of conflict comes in various forms – manila versus mindanao, the educated versus the unschooled, the rich versus the masa (people) (kusaka, 2017). this is even clear in the reaction of mayor sara duterte, the president’s daughter, when she reacted against the use of the song “manila” during the opening ceremony of the 2019 seagames. yet. it can be said that duterte’s rule is not defined by class struggle. it is more of a disruptive type of politics that uses to the fullest extent the divisive situations of people in order to control the state and its political machinery. the daily life of the people cannot be separated from the dimension of their communitarian soul. nation-building as the slow unfolding of history in political movements is something that the atomism of most liberals has never paid attention to. radical democracy maintains that the political cannot be limited to rational discourse because doing so is to tie politics to the narrow limits of logic and explanation (mouffe, 1995). indeed, the notion of identity cannot be established without the reality of difference. any form of rational consensus ignores the value of passion in the political. indeed, the normal way of doing things will not work in a society like the philippines where the situation is abnormal. the clamor for someone who is strong, even this leader will bypass legal processes, becomes inevitable. thus, with his aggressive and adversarial style of leadership, duterte may have inaugurated radical democracy in the country. the moral vision of politics in the third world is that ideal of establishing an egalitarian society. there is a true concern for the equal rights of the poor and the disadvantaged who have been perpetually oppressed. the reason for every desire for radical reform is that social inequalities are unjustified. duterte has always considered himself a progressive. he has endured having embraced this principle, even with all the political divergences, many breaking points, and splits in the country after edsa i. but as a “contested democracy”, to use quimpo’s term, duterte’s style is of course subject to the judgment of history. it must not be forgotten that the kind of society filipinos have is not a matter of fate but a conscious act on the part of their bosses to exploit the powerless. in modern democracies, it is unexpected for a provincial politician to seize power from the ruling class of traditional political families. duterte is the product of a society that has failed on its democratic experiments, the latest of which was grounded on aquino’s moral recovery model of reform. even the journal of asean studies 171 development-oriented model of president arroyo did not work in the country. arroyo’s corruption plagued administration gave legitimacy to someone who represents change. president aquino became that person when his mother, the former president, died. the second aquino administration began with a great promise, only to suffer from the same malady the arroyo administration had. while president aquino may not be corrupt, he was not emulated by his fellow politicians as an example. aquino was a weak leader. but this weakness, it can be presumed, is not just a personality thing. it bespeaks of the lack of concern of the ruling elite beyond their own kind. it appears that most filipinos are not against shortcuts if the same can bring actual results and immediate benefits. the only problem is that the masses look up to their idols like some kind of a demi-god who will solve their problems. moral development, in this respect, is farthest from the mind of the electorate. what brings a poor man to city hall is not the desire to live the good life. rather, it is about his daily survival, the problem that he is embroiled in, and that hope that the politician-patron will be able to give him money to free him from his troubles. a poor man is not in search of virtue when it all comes to politics. he is looking for attention from the politician who is also a caring father figure, one who is expected to provide solutions to impossible problems. technical expertise may be crucial to the success of the state, but the most immediate concern of the poor filipino is really the way out of his desperate situation. the above attitude is ingrained in filipino political culture. politics has become some form of ritual for people wherein they worship their political idol. duterte is a political paradox. many of his critics say that he is no more than a dictator who use his colorful language to hide his true motives and ambitions of power. it is possible, for instance, that his daughter will run in the 2022 presidential elections given the weakness and lack of unity of his political opponents. but to his supporters, duterte’s maverick ways can help a society find the means and measures to achieve change. while the antagonistic nature of his politics will require people to go beyond the limits of rational discourse, duterte thinks that a politician must distinguish his politics from morality to realize the meaning of the common good. liberalism provides a straight path in achieving the ideals of democracy through discussion and dialogue. but the dynamics in philippine society, given the hegemonic relations rooted in an oppressive colonial past, leads one to think that duterte’s radical kind of leadership is necessary. limiting politics to the binaries of morality misses the important aspect of decision making which is crucial in realizing change. this should not mean that people must reject morality. it only means that citizens have to make the distinction when it comes to the political. for carl schmitt, politics refers to institutions designed to govern society. 172 the predatory states nd radical politics the political, on the other hand, is about relations of power. indeed, it is argued that the concept of a perfect consensus is an illusion. the same is utopian and unrealistic. despite the criticisms, duterte is using well the card of hegemony to his advantage. this is not to suggest that he has the wrong motives in doing so. but what is obvious is that he has been able to consolidate his powers to protect himself from any threat from those who may have plans to challenge his position, including the military. radical politics may characterize the situation of the filipino’s post-colonial struggle. but the ordinary filipino still finds himself voiceless in the affairs of the state. this colonial legacy appears to give some semblance of legitimacy to duterte’s radical leadership. but the death of elitism is temporary and the reason is often obvious. duterte has not implemented principle-based reforms to change the socio-political establishment. in fact, the president is aware that the same cabals in congress are still there. he has to depend on the normal state of things in order to pursue his agenda. the president also knows that he has to deal with the oligarchy and the traditional elites in philippine society. there’s the rub. conclusion the history of the filipino people is generally presented through the eyes of manila. such shatters the voices in the margins of philippine society. the radical approach of duterte is no less than his way of challenging the status quo. duterte as a father-figure knows how important it is for him to bring out the agenda of the masses. on the other hand, as the boss he also realizes the pragmatic reality of philippine politics. the only way forward, in this regard, is for the president to have the radical resolve to face the problems that bedevil the nation. the norm is for an elected leader to conform to tradition and protocol that befit the highest position of the land. but duterte shows that in his case, it is the other way around. the weakness of philippine institutions manifests the political and moral divide in society. institutional decisions are based on the choices made by people in authority in whom the electorate entrust political power. as such, it matters how people choose their leaders. people should play a part in the formulation of policies that are to affect their situation. it is beyond question that the development of modern nations draws from the principles of democratic governance because political maturity and economic progress must go together. the political will of duterte is a good thing, but the filipino people must also embrace the virtues of democratic governance and the rule of law if the country must escape from the ills of the past. the filipino people cannot just rely on outside help because in the first place, it is foreign rule that has bedeviled this society and cemented the latent and obvious moral and hegemonic divide among its people. filipinos must face their most pressing political problem – the absolute dismantling of a predatory state. the way forward is to overhaul a corrupt system and empower a people who have been deprived of their rights. nothing replaces institutional reforms journal of asean studies 173 that are truly grounded in democratic principles. about the author dr. christopher ryan maboloc, associate professor of philosophy at ateneo de davao university, finished his doctorate in philosophy at the university of san carlos, maxima cum laude. he graduated from the erasmus mundus master in applied ethics at linkoping university, sweden and ntnu, norway. he also has a master's in philosophy from ateneo de manila university. references abinales, p. n., & amoroso, d. j. 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(2017, may 2). the thug appeal of duterte. retrieved from the atlantic: https://www.theatlantic.com/inter national/archive/2017/05/rodrigoduterte-donald-trump/525072/ https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/05/rodrigo-duterte-donald-trump/525072/ https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/05/rodrigo-duterte-donald-trump/525072/ https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/05/rodrigo-duterte-donald-trump/525072/ journal of asean studies, vol. 8, no. 1 (2020), pp.41-59 doi: https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v8i1.6447 ©2020 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic the internationalization of “west papua” issue and its impact on indonesia’s policy to the south pacific region floranesia lantang1 and edwin m. b. tambunan2 1,2 department of international relations, faculty of social and political sciences, pelita harapan university mh thamrin boulevard 1100, kelapa dua, tangerang banten 15811, indonesia 1 floranesia.lantang@uph.edu, 2 edwin.tambunan@uph.edu received: 12th may 2020/ revised: 20th may 2020/ accepted: 01st june 2020 how to cite: lantang, f. and tambunan e. m. b. (2020). the internationalization of “west papua” issue and its impact on indonesia’s policy to the south pacific region. journal of asean studies, 8(1), 41-59, https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v8i1.6447 abstract this research argues that the internationalization of "west papua" issue through social media has contributed to a shift of indonesia's policy to the south pacific region from ignorance to initiative approach. underlying this argument is a growing concern of indonesia regarding the use of social media by papuan proindependence activists that resulted to the increasing awareness and support towards the independence of west papua from pacific countries as human rights problems become the highlight of west papua’s issue. the method used in this research was qualitative research method focusing on descriptive analysis of the internationalization of west papua issue on social media. this research results show that initiative approach from indonesia is merely narrowing the gap of the issue instead of reducing the internationalization of the west papua issue. keywords: west papua, indonesia, south pacific region, social media introduction papua or internationally known as "west papua" remains a long-standing sensitive issue of indonesia when dealing with the south pacific region. the issue lies in the intersection of sovereignty and humanitarian values. while there are at least four major agendas of the pacific countries to papua such as human rights, development, limited access to media, and poverty, human rights remain becoming the centre of attention among countries in the region. the concern on human rights is escalating due to the use of social media platform by the papuan https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v8i1.6447 42 the internationalization of “west papua” issue activist to mobilize their support and audiences towards west papua issue. on the other side, the indonesian government and public also use social media to disseminate positive progress in west papua without revealing the whole picture of west papua. social media, as part of online platforms, provide a space for individual and community to share their point of view through words, pictures, video, film, and graphic. according to kaplan (2010), social media is a group of internet-based application aims to exchange contents made by the user (encyclopedia of social network analysis and mining, 2014). social media consists of platforms such as facebook, youtube, instagram, wechat, tumblr, tiktok, weibo, google+, reddit, twitter, snapchat, and many more platforms available online. among these platforms, facebook, youtube, and instagram are at the top three of the most used platforms until 2019 (our world in data, 2019). as these platforms offer ease and speedway in disseminating information, it is inevitable that social interaction is now turning more to social media. for papuan activists, the use of social media is effective and efficient due to the tight media restriction in west papua. this research elaborates on the use of social media in internationalize the issue of west papua and how does it impact the indonesian government policy to the south pacific region. this research also provides the background of the problem in west papua and response from the indonesian government towards the problems. in addition, this research explains the use of social media platforms, mainly facebook, youtube, and twitter in disseminating west papua issues. eventually, a series of findings related to the shift of the indonesian government's policy from offline to online initiatives to the south pacific region is explained. analytical framework understanding the west papua’s problem the indonesia institute of science (lipi) in 2011 addressed that state’s human rights abuses is one of the four roots of the problem in papua together with the failure of development, discrimination and marginalization towards papuan people, and historical and political status of papua (widjojo, 2010). the concern on human rights is not without reason as many gross human rights violations remain unresolved in papua since papua was integrated into indonesia. this was exacerbated with the claim from the free west papua (fwp) organization that the indonesian government through the indonesian military (tni) handpicked just 1.026 'representative' people, out of population of one million, and threatened to kill them and their family if they do not vote for integration into indonesia. the fwp also added that the indonesian military has systematically murdered and tortured papuan. the violations of human rights in papua culminated when papua was under president soeharto's administration. during the new order era, papuan were oppressed and tortured by the state under a series of operation conducted by the indonesian national military (tni). these operations were an order from president soeharto in fighting the separatist groups, the journal of asean studies 43 free papua organization (opm) (international crisis group, 2006). the operations include operasi sadar (1965-1967), operasi barathayudha (1967-1969), operasi wibawa (1969), operation in the jayawijaya (1977), operasi sapu bersih i and ii (1981), operasi galang i and ii (1982), operasi tumpas (1983-1984), operasi sapu bersih (1985) (tebay, 2009). total of papuan killed during these operations is estimated at 2348 people. however, many of the victims remain unreported. additionally, around more than 10.000 papuans were fleeing to papua new guinea to escape from the indonesian military. nonetheless, only around 7.500 papuans succeeded to escape in png, particularly in the east awin and the western province of png (al rahab, 2016). even after the new order era, a series of human rights violations remain existing both in highlands and coastal of papua. biak numfor tragedy in 1998, abepura tragedy in 2000, wasior tragedy in 2001, wamena tragedy in 2003, uncen tragedy in 2006, violent altercations against yawan wayeni in 2009 and mako tabuni in 2012, paniai tragedy in 2014, and mapenduma tragedy in 2016 (erdianto, 2017) added the complexity of human rights violations in the region. setara institute reported that the human rights cases in papua increased from 16 cases in 2015 to 68 cases in 2016. the highest cases occurred on 16th of may, 10th of april, and 9th of december, when the peaceful demonstration was carried out in 7 places in and outside papua. these series of demonstration held as the support for papuan people for the united liberation movement for west papua (ulmwp) to be accepted as the full member of melanesian spearhead group (msg). the demonstration ended with a repressive response and the arrest of protesters. similarly, amnesty international in its report in 2018 “sudah, kasi tinggal dia mati” records 69 suspected killing cases by security forces in papua between january 2010february 2018. from 69 cases, 34 cases were involved police, 23 cases involved military, and 11 cases involved both police and military (amnesty international, 2018). in an effort to resolve a series of human rights violations in papua, the indonesian government has been working to formulate policy and conduct several actions. under the 2001 special autonomy for province papua chapter xii article 46, the province of papua has been given an authority to establish komisi kebenaran dan rekonsiliasi (truth and reconciliation commission). according to the law, the task of this commission is to clarify the history of papua, and to formulate reconciliation process in papua. the establishment of this special commission should be proposed by the governor and arranged under the presidential regulation (pemerintah provinsi papua, 2001). however, the truth and reconciliation commission law annulled in 2016 after enacted since 2014. furthermore, despite the draft for establishing the commission later proposed in 2015, there has been no effort in assessing this draft until recently. instead, the indonesian government, through the coordinating minister of political, legal, and security affairs established their own team called as an integrated team in addressing papuan human rights issues in 2016. luhut explained that the team will work together with the national commission on human rights (komnas ham), legal experts, and eight papuan representatives (sekretariat kabinet republik indonesia, 2016a). shortly after the commission was formed, series of demonstration held by papuan in indonesia and australia. the papuan rejected the establishment of luhut’s team as it was totally contradicted with the requirement in the 2001 44 the internationalization of “west papua” issue special autonomy that the team should only be proposed by governor and arranged by the president. on june 16th, 2019 in yogyakarta, 300 papuan students conducted a demonstration to reject luhut's team and demand that indonesian government give a right for selfdetermination (sucahyo, 2016). the protests against luhut's team were also coming from 2000 west papua national committee (knpb) in jayapura, and free west papua activists in canberra (rumagit, 2016; tabloid jubi, 2016). until recently, there has been no report from luhut's special team in addressing human rights problems in papua. while the progress on human rights remains a long-standing issue on the internationalization of west papua, other issues such as the failure of development, poverty, gender, good governance, the welfare of indigenous of papuan now emerge. these issues have become the concern of new actors, especially ngos, youth organizations, and tribal chiefs in papua and west papua provinces. concerns on these issues are certainly related to the fact of the low level of the human development index and prosperity in papua and west papua provinces. the latest statistical report from the provincial website reported that papua remains at the bottom sequence of the human development index in indonesia, despite a slight incline from 57,25 to 58,05 in 2016 (badan pusat statistik provinsi papua, 2019). papua is still known as the poorest province in indonesia with a percentage at 28,54, west papua province places the second last position with a percentage at 25,43. the poor people are concentrated in the rural area. the contribution of food commodity towards the poverty line is higher than noncommodity (housing, clothes, education, health) with comparison 75,36:24,64 (berita resmi statistik provinsi papua, 2016). in response to this economic challenges, former president susilo bambang yudhoyono and the current president jokowi has been implementing a series of acceleration program to support economic growth in papua. jokowi has made several policies such as the trans-papua road, one fuel price policy, infrastructure projects, and electricity projects. considering the geographical challenge as the main factor of economic inequality in papua, the trans-papua road is becoming the heart of jokowi's development policies in papua. this project is estimated to cost 12,5 trillion rupiah and targeted to be done by the end of 2019. the 4.325 kilometres of trans-papua road project will connect twelve main roads in papua and west papua provinces mainly from big cities such as merauke, wamena, jayapura, timika, nabire, manokwari, sorong (presiden ir. h. joko widodo, 2015). this project aims to accelerate the distribution of goods and movement of people from one area to another area to become more effective and efficient. another realization of economic progress by president jokowi to papua is through the 'one fuel price policy'. although jokowi realized that the implementation of this policy will cause indonesian state-owned energy company (pertamina) to suffer losses of idr 800 billion (sekretariat kabinet republik indonesia, 2016b), the matter of social justice is important to improve the welfare of the indigenous people of papua which for too long live with significant economic inequality. in october 2016, jokowi launched this policy with the aims of reducing the fuel price in papua that was previously ten times higher than the price in java. while the average price of premium is idr 6.450 per litre, the price in papua could reach idr 50.000 100.000 per litre (amindoni, 2016). this initiative was considered as the most significant contribution from jokowi, as for a long period of time, papuans have been burdened under the journal of asean studies 45 high cost of fuel. additionally, this was the first time for papuan to enjoy the equality of fuel price with other provinces in indonesia. following this, jokowi also launched five electrical infrastructures project in papua and west papua province in order to address the power supply shortage in these two provinces (budiman, 2016). these electrical projects will be conducted in waena, genyem, jayapura, holtekamp, and sentani. the estimated cost of this electricity project is 989 milyar rupiah (989 billion dollars) (“presiden resmikan 6 infrastruktur”, 2016). jokowi’s presence also ended up a thirteen-year struggle of mama-mama papua or papuan women in demand of a proper traditional market in jayapura. pasar mama-mama will accommodate more than 120 papuan women to sell their goods, mainly fruits and vegetables to make a living for their family. this market consists of five floors standing on a 2,400 square-meter plot of land formerly belonging to land transportation company pt damri (somba, 2016). while a series of economic policy implemented by president jokowi in papua and west papua provinces has contributed to reducing a little gap of poverty in the region, the security approach has to worsen papua's view on jakarta. jokowi's political-security approaches to papua is somehow contradictory to his goals in creating papua as the "land of peace" (atmanta, 2014). in jokowi's first two years, there were an increasing military deployment as well as the establishment of a new military base in papua. currently, papua still becomes the most heavily militarized regions in indonesia with a number of militaries estimated at 45,000 troops plus an additional 650 soldiers stationed near the png border (sebastian, 2015). in addition, according to the report from indonesian ministry of defence, the enforcement includes a new military command area in manokwari (kodam xviii kasuari), west papua province, naval base in biak and merauke, and border defence program empowerment (“coordinating minister luhut ensures”, 2016c). recently in august 2019, around 6000 personnel of tni and indonesian police were sent to papua and west papua to maintain security in the region due to a series of anarchist actions by demonstrators. the troops were deployed to areas such as jayapura, manokwari, sorong, paniai, deiyai, nabire, and fakfak. this massive deployment is a response towards a series of demonstrations that led to anarchist acts in the provinces. the demonstrators demand justice against act of racism towards papuan students in surabaya and criticize internet shutdown by the government in papua and west papua provinces (sebastian, 2015). for most non-papuans in west papua, the presence of the military is important as the activity of separatist groups is unpredictable and sometimes results in violence. there were many cases in the past where separatist group demonstrations in papua have caused death or injury of innocent peoples, particularly against non-papuan. however, for most of papuan, the increasing presence of military forces will more likely escalate tension in the region. not to mention a series of human rights violations towards papuan which involving military in the provinces. 46 the internationalization of “west papua” issue research method the method used in this research is qualitative research method focusing on descriptive analysis. sources of data used in this study were obtained from literature studies, especially on the analysis of the internationalization of west papua issue on social media. data analysis techniques in this study was carried out in three stages, namely data reduction, data display, and conclusion. analysis west papua issues in social media as the use of the internet becomes global, papuan pro-independence activists also gain benefit in disseminating their interests, especially in echoing human rights problems in papua. while previously their activities were hugely depending on offline activities such as demonstration and long march, the current trend is now also engaging social media, particularly since facebook, twitter, and youtube is popular. the increasing use of social media might also be related with the indonesian government’s regulations that prohibit any kind of selfdetermination activities and tight media restriction in papua. in august 2014, for instance, two french reporters were arrested for filming a documentary on west papua's independence movement in wamena for europe's arte tv (aljazeera, 2014). in such a situation, most of the activists deal with difficulties in disseminating their interest to the outside world. thus, social media platforms such as facebook, youtube, twitter, and website have been helpful in making their issue known. however, since social media depends on the internet connection, the shutdown of the internet might become an issue for the activists. indonesian government decision to restrict/cut off internet access in west papua in late august to early september 2019 has triggered anger among activist and papuan people in the provinces. following the strategic logic of the papuan pro-independence activists in social media, their ultimate goal is to gain support for the freedom of west papua. they begin by addressing human rights violations through pictures and videos in order to attract the heart and the mind of the reader, then building a case by explaining that papua is occupied by indonesia due to abundant of natural resources instead of humanizing the people. eventually, the activists invite the reader to take part in supporting free west papua. recently, there are many social media accounts used by the activists to disseminate information about west papua. as provided in table 1, some of the accounts are primary accounts-only broadcast information about west papua, and the rest are secondary accounts broadcast all information regarding self-determination around the world including west papua. table 1 list of primary accounts in social media in disseminating west papua issues (individual and groups) facebook twitter youtube website free west papua campaign australia @freewestpapua papua merdeka freewestpapua.org free west papua campaign @purepapua free west papua nl ulmwp.org west papua news @papuanv free west papua campaign ipwp.org west papua melbourne @wellipprai (personal account) west papua liberation organization voiceofwestpapua @hermanwaingagaiaaiai (personal account) lewis prai wellip (personal account) bennywenda.org (personal account) free west papua tv on youtube humanrightspapua.org west papua media alerts wpna2010 facebook has been used both to disseminate information and organize upcoming activities by using a feature of facebook group. the activists broadcast their messages through video, pictures, and description of particular issue about west papua. problems such as human rights, self-independence, discrimination, and the lobby of the msg for the independence of west papua at the un are still the centre of west papua's issue on facebook. support from the local and foreign community by raising the west papuan flag, body paintings, and mural art also often appears on facebook, as seen in figure 1. another important agenda of internationalizing west papua issue is to gain support from foreign countries, especially the pacific countries. this is not surprising as pacific countries have become a more secure place for the activists rather than staying in indonesia during soeharto's administration. the activists remain to stay in the pacific countries to have free travel access around the region. most importantly, because the activists also gain support from the official and leader of the pacific countries. 48 the internationalization of “west papua” issue figure 1 newest cover photo of free west papua account as per august 5th, 2019. source: (free west papua campaign, n.d) table 2 secondary accounts on social media in disseminating west papua issues twitter youtube website @youngsolwarapacific journeyman pictures redpepper (uk) @iawarenow survival international radio new zealand (rnz) international center on nonviolent conflict the calvary church of all nations minority rights group international ibuka beside the primary sources, other accounts which focusing on the advocacy of indigenous peoples and minority rights are now contribute in the internationalization of west papua issue (see table 2). these accounts are mainly found on youtube, organization websites, and twitter. "young solwara pacific" account on twitter claimed to be a platform for activists from pacific countries to share a common concern on issues impacting pacific people and islands (youngsolwara pacific, n.d). this account appears on the top list of “west papua” keywords on twitter even though this account was just recently joined twitter on august 2019. account "i aware now" reports a series of human rights atrocities by the indonesian government. this account also contributes to sharing issues of west papua on twitter (aware now, n.d). on youtube platform, most of the accounts spread the news of west papua and often repost some of the videos from the primary sources account. beside the primary and secondary sources, traditional media also plays a dominant role in raising the internationalization of west papua issue, as provided in table 3. medias such as https://www.facebook.com/freewestpapua/ journal of asean studies 49 aljazeera and sbs are now using social media platform, mainly youtube, to publish documentary and disseminate issues from west papua to the world. mostly, their contents about west papua seemingly only emphasizes on the unending violence in the region without providing progress from the indonesian government. table 3 list of media broadcasting papua’s issue media topic years aljazeera papua: indonesia's silent war 101 east-papua's aids crisis activist's death angers papuan new evidence of torture in west papua indonesian forces raid papuan independence gathering violence escalating in indonesia's papua province indonesian official defends policies in west papua goodbye indonesia people & power amnesty: indonesian forces behind unlawful killings in papua papua: neglect threatens remote indonesian tribes papuan indonesia admits slow response to papua's health crisis 2008 2008 2010 2011 2012 2012 2013 2013 2018 2018 2018 sbs indonesia’s brutal attack on west papuan rally freedom flotilla journey to west papua west papua's fight for independence 2011 2013 2014 while the information regarding west papua issues on social media remains unbalance in providing a comprehensive situation in the region, it still has an influence on the public, even government official. movements such as we bleed black and red movement, fiji solidarity movement for west papua's freedom, and walsolwara voice for west papua has been effective in gaining support from the public in the south pacific region. fiji solidarity movement, for example, managed to gather around 100 people in 2015. similarly, the wansolwara event in madang, papua new guinea also succeed in campaigning west papua issue for around 100 individuals representing the pacific islands (titifanue et al. 2016). social media even influence government official's perspective on the west papua issue. this is proved by the statement made by papua new guinea’s prime minister o’neill being quoted saying, “pictures of brutality against our people appear daily on the social media, and yet we take no notice". furthermore, o'neill also emphasizes that png, as a regional leader in the south pacific region, must take the lead to become vocal in raising this concern through mature discussion with indonesia (garrett, 2015). despite the concern on west papua triggered through social media, a sense of belonging due to melanesian origin become the major reason for supporting west papuan. 50 the internationalization of “west papua” issue the shift of indonesia’s policy to the south pacific region: from ignorance to initiative approach the increasing use of social media by the papuan pro-independence activists has contributed to the growing concern on west papua issue in the pacific islands. social media not only helps to disseminate content on ongoing problems in west papua but also impact to social activism in the region. nevertheless, it is important to note that support from the south pacific region towards west papua is not only triggered by social media, but also by the cultural similarity and historical relations even before west papua became part of indonesia. historically, the relations between west papua and the south pacific region has been shaped when west papua was still under dutch administration. during this time, the south pacific region has become an important arena for the pro-independence movement. in 1950 until 1960, papuan were involved in the establishment of the south pacific commission and pacific conference of churches represented by pastor kabol and maloali (imparsial, 2017). however, the relations between west papua and south pacific sharply declined shortly after indonesia took over the region from the dutch. limited access to travel and oppression towards west papuan under new order era depress the west papua-south pacific relations. this broken tie later reopened by kiribati, under president teburoro tito, who declared its support for west papuan self-determination together with nauru and vanuatu, and tuvalu, at the 2000 un millennium summit in new york. this support was the first step taken by the south pacific countries after nearly 30 years of silence as their activities are always constrained by australia and png, which reaffirm 'territorial integrity of indonesia'. uniquely, the support from president teburoro tito was made based on culture alone, despite a series of human rights violations in papua. this cultural-based support still becomes the most profound foundation of pacific countries in supporting papuan pro-independence activists due to the similarity of the race between west papua and south pacific islands as part of the melanesian race (maclellan, 2015). the west papua-south pacific relations gained a momentum in 2015 when united liberation movement for west papua was approved as a member of melanesian spearhead group (msg), and became an observer, under the support of solomon islands, vanuatu, and front de libération nationale kanake et socialiste (flnks) (lipi, 2017). the issue of human rights in papua also raised by countries such as vanuatu, solomon islands, tonga, nauru, marshall islands, and tuvalu to be investigated by the united nations (human rights and peace for papua, 2019). more recently, this issue also raised by papuan pro-independence activist, benny wenda, to be discussed in 2019 pacific islands forum in vanuatu (the guardian, 2019). in response to the internationalization of west papua issue, the indonesian government has just conducted a series of offline and online initiatives, especially to the south pacific region. previously, there is no significant effort made by the indonesian government to address the west papua issue. the indonesian government tends to ignore this issue by switching the concern on human rights to ongoing development progress in papua. however, since social journal of asean studies 51 media is widely used to spread the west papua issues, the indonesian government is now beginning to put a more serious concern towards west papua issues. offline initiatives such as economic, cultural, and educational cooperation have now become the focus of the government. additionally, social media is also used to counter the information from the papuan proindependence activists in social media. in the economic sector, the indonesian government initiated a multilateral forum to strengthen relations with south pacific countries. the indonesia south pacific forum (ispf) was held in march in jakarta and attended by 15 south pacific countries. this forum aims to facilitate indonesian entrepreneurs to exchange, expand, and strengthen their relationship and friendship with the south pacific countries. the main goal of this forum is to accelerate business growth by investing in the region (indonesia south pacific forum, 2019). it is explained that the ispf will provide a platform of dialogue between indonesia and south pacific region, especially to accelerate business cooperation and people to people contact between academics and civil society (marsudi, 2019). in the cultural sector, indonesia initiated the 2019 pacific exposition which was held in july 2019 in auckland, new zealand, with support from australia and new zealand. this event was attended by 20 member countries of the south pacific region, including indonesia, represented by various artists and high officials from papua, west papua, east nusa tenggara, maluku, and north maluku. range of activities such as tourism forum, business investment forum, pacific arts and cultural festival, and sound of pacific concert enliven this event (kementerian luar negeri republik indonesia, 2019c). in the education sector, indonesia also strengthens its cooperation with papua new guinea and at the same time encourage people to people relations between indonesia-south pacific countries by annual program journalist visit program (jvp). the participants are journalists which has a big influence and high rating of the subscriber in their own country. in jvp 2019, south pacific countries such as papua new guinea, fiji, kiribati, nauru, solomon islands, vanuatu, and tuvalu attended this program in three cities in indonesia namely jakarta, yogyakarta, and west papua. participants represent various media platform from electronic, online, and printed media. the topic discussed in this program is development, infrastructure, creative industry, and transportation. the output of this program is a publication made by the participants to be shared in their own country (kementerian luar negeri republik indonesia, 2019b). according to the report from the ministry of foreign affairs of indonesia, one of the participants from vanuatu has a different view of indonesia before joining the program. vanuatu's journalist claimed that the international media does not provide balance information about indonesia and tends to spread the negative content of indonesia. the jvp 2019 is a good initiative in showing the reality of indonesia instead of merely depends on online news. similarly, solomon islands' journalist argued that the output of this program would be shared to the government in each country as this program helps the journalist to have a better understanding about indonesia-pacific relations (kementerian luar negeri republik indonesia, 2019a). 52 the internationalization of “west papua” issue besides conducting offline initiatives, a series of websites are now used by the supporter of indonesia to counter information of west papua issues from the papuan proindependence activists. however, the information provided by the websites also framing an unbalance information of west papua issues. in contrast with the papuan pro-independence information, indonesia's online initiatives aim to convince the readers that human rights violations are no more an issue in the region. there are several websites used to disseminate positive progress in west papua without framing the reality of human rights violations in the region, which are: 1) kitorangpapua.news; 2) papuanews.id; 3) westpapuaupdate.com; 4) westpapuaterrace.com; 5) onwestpapua.com; 6) freewestpapua.co.nz; 7) westpapuaarchive.com; 8) cenderawasi-pos.com; 9) tabluidjubi.online; 10) harianpapua.com; 11) kabarpapua.net; 12) freewestpapua-indonesia.com; 13) papuatoday.id; detikpapua.online; 14) papuainframe.co.id; 15) papuamaju;com; and 16) kabarpapua.online, nevertheless, a collaboration report has revealed that these websites are fictitious as they have no clear addresses, sources, and contact person (“free west papua supporters”, 2016; zuhra, 2018). there are six agendas of these fictitious media which mainly to convince the reader about: zero human rights violations in papua; the indonesian government has done a lot of improvement in papua; foreign intervention is an effort to occupy papua; tni and police in papua are working better; papuans are now live in a peaceful condition; and the pro-selfdetermination groups in papua are criminals (zuhra, 2018). assessing the impact of indonesia’s initiative (offline and online) approach to the south pacific region series of offline initiatives by the indonesian government and online initiative were conducted by the supporter of indonesia mark a new chapter of indonesia-south pacific relations. in practice, the offline initiative not only encouraged the government to government relations but also people to people contact. most importantly, it also helps the public and government in the south pacific countries to obtain balanced information regarding the west papua issue. this is proven by the testimony given by the participant of the journalist visit program in 2019 from vanuatu and solomon islands who fulfilled indonesia's invitation to visit west papua. journalists from solomon island and vanuatu both agreed that the jvp 2019 journal of asean studies 53 provides a better understanding of indonesia-pacific relations since media mostly disseminate negative content about indonesia. similarly, the salomon islands is now reviewing its position on west papua issue after a visit to the region in 2018. the delegation of the solomon islands explained to the media that the visit helps the country to have a balanced picture of the condition in west papua. the delegation further addresses that there have been lots of improvements since the era of democracy in indonesia (dateline pacific, 2018). while there have been many initiatives made by the indonesian government to the south pacific countries, it is somehow merely narrowing the gap of information on the west papua issue. the initiatives have not yet cover and even resolve the underground issue and human rights problems in west papua, thus causing the internationalization of west papua issue remains a long-standing topic discussed in the south pacific countries. there are five factors underlying this argument: (1) the increasing awareness of bias information from public in social media; (2) the unresolved past human rights violations by the indonesian government; (3) the increasing use of military approach in papua despite the progress of development in the region; (4) the increasing number of social justice problems exacerbated by corruption, collusion, and nepotism in indonesia; (5) the emergence of new actors in supporting papuan independence complicate the effort in conducting diplomacy and peaceful resolution. as the number of internet users in the south pacific islands is increasing, online efforts must be taken seriously. this is important because the internet is more likely to become the first source of information for the public due to its access which is only limited by the availability of the network. all information shared on the internet could be easily accessed by the public and shared to other people. in fact, individuals and even government official in the pacific region has been influenced by online news and pictures shared on the internet. the use of social media even triggers the rise of social activism in supporting west papuan independence in countries such as fiji and papua new guinea. this shows that the power of social media has impacted the public in the png, although the government confirms their recognition of the territorial integrity of indonesia. on the other side, the use of social media by the supporter of indonesia seemingly not as effective as the public becoming aware of fictitious media. another factor that weakens indonesia's initiative approaches is the unresolved human rights in west papua. the violations against human rights in the region even continue to increase since west papua became part of indonesia. while there has been a series of policies made by the indonesian government to resolve this case, it is seemingly lack of willingness to implement this policy into action. following this, indonesia's response towards south pacific countries' concern on human rights in west papua in the international forum which tends to deny series of past human rights violations in the region will more likely show its weakness in strengthening human rights in the country. the other factor which is still related to human rights violations is the increasing use of the military approach in the provinces. while the deployment of troops to the provinces is expected to reduce the tension of conflict, it is somehow aggravating the trust issue between papuan and non-papuan in the provinces. on the other side, this military approach does not 54 the internationalization of “west papua” issue address the core of the problem, instead of exacerbating the problem. in the case of series demonstrations due to act of racism towards papuan students in surabaya, the government is supposed to arrest the perpetrators who accused the papuan students of throwing the indonesian flag, instead of unilaterally accusing and arresting them. in addition, impartial reported that military is not only involved in killing papuans but also in securing illegal logging business, supplying liquor in the provinces, even forcing the papuan to give their customary land rights (imparsial, 2011). these practices are no longer even public secret as papuan are becoming aware of military involvement in many sectors in the provinces. alongside the increasing use of military approach, social justice problems which exacerbated by corruption, collusion, and nepotism (kkn) in indonesia tend to escalate the issue of west papua overseas. the high number of kkn in indonesia by elites and officials in jakarta exacerbates public confidence in the accountability of the government sector. thus, it seems likely to build assumption that development progress in west papua will hugely depend on the leadership and good governance factors. this means that the change in leadership and governance could impact the progress in west papua. despite the fact that kkn also ranks high in the local level, especially in west papua, progress at the central level will be seen more as an indicator of good governance progress in indonesia. the last but the most important factor which is believed to hamper indonesia’s initiatives in declining south pacific countries support towards west papua issue is the emergence of new actors especially ngos and youth organizations. lipi map that opm is not the only actor fighting for independence. other actors such as tentara pembebasan nasional papua (tpnp), presidum dewan papua (pdp), dewan musyawarah masyarakat koteka (demmak), panel papua, satgas papua, dewan revolusioner opm, komite nasional papua barat (knpb), font nasional mahasiswa papua, gerakan mahasiswa pemuda dan rakyat papua (gempar), garda papua, asosiasi mahasiswa pegunungan tengah papua, gerakan rakyat demokratik papua (gardep), and forum independen mahasiswa have been actively voicing the independence of west papua in many sectors (lipi, 2017). these new actors have tendency to complicate indonesia’s initiative progress and peace process in the region. therefore, interests of these actors must be also taken into consideration especially in formulating policy to the west papua. conclusion the internationalization of the west papua issue has become the concern of indonesia in the south pacific region, especially since jokowi took power. this growing concern is not only because of the statement made by the south pacific countries in the international forum such as united nations general assembly but also caused by the circulation of news and photo regarding human rights violations in west papua. the use of social media has become the major tool for the papuan pro-independence activists and new actors such as ngos and youth organization in voicing the issue of west papua. as a result, public and government official in the south pacific countries such as png, journal of asean studies 55 fiji, and vanuatu are also influenced by the dissemination of information in social media. series of support from demonstration, mural arts, and statement from the government official has been shown by the pacific islanders to the papuan peoples. in response to this growing concern on west papua issue, the indonesian government, as well as the supporter of indonesia have been conducting offline and online initiatives especially in countering unbalance information regarding west papua issue. under the ministry of foreign affairs, the indonesian government initiated bilateral and multilateral forum and cooperation to strengthening indonesia ties with the region. cooperation in economic, business, and educational sector become the heart of these initiatives. besides these offline initiatives, social media is also used by the supporter of indonesia in framing indonesia's positive images to social media users. while indonesia’s offline initiatives have marked closer relations with the south pacific region, it is somehow merely narrowing the gap of information on the west papua issue. the concern on the west papua issue will always become a long-standing issue for the south pacific region due to five main factors. firstly, the use of social media as a counterpropaganda seemingly will not be effective as social media users are becoming aware of fictitious media. secondly, the unresolved past human rights violations will continue to bring down indonesia's position in the international forum, especially in the south pacific region. thirdly, the increasing use of military approach despite the progress of development in the region will impact on trust issue between papuan to indonesia. fourthly, the increasing number of social justices exacerbated by kkn adds the escalation of west papua issue as the proindependence activist are now fighting not only for independence but also for soft issues such as the failure of development and poverty. lastly, the emergence of new actors in supporting the independence of west papua, mainly ngos and youth organizations in papua tends to complicate the initiatives process of the indonesian government in the future. about the authors floranesia lantang is a lecturer of international relations at the pelita harapan university. she received her master of national security policy from the australian national university. her research interests include societal security, border management, papua, and indonesia-australia relations. edwin m.b tambunan is a lecturer of international relations at the pelita harapan university and a member of forum akademisi untuk papua damai. he received his doctoral degree at flinders university specializing in conflict resolution. 56 the internationalization of “west papua” issue references 2 tahun pemerintahan jokowi-jk, bangun perbatasan untuk antisipasi konflik antar negara. 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(2018, desember 6th). media siluman di papua: propaganda, hoaks, hingga narasumber fiktif. tirto.id. https://tirto.id/media-siluman-di-papua-propaganda-hoakshingga-narasumber-fiktif-da5b https://papua.antaranews.com/berita/455871/masyarakat-papua-gelar-demo-tolak-tim-pencari-fakta https://papua.antaranews.com/berita/455871/masyarakat-papua-gelar-demo-tolak-tim-pencari-fakta http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/jokowis-challenges-in-negotiating-peace-in-papua/ http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/jokowis-challenges-in-negotiating-peace-in-papua/ http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/12/07/papuas-pasar-mama-mama-ready-to-open-before-christmas.html http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/12/07/papuas-pasar-mama-mama-ready-to-open-before-christmas.html https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/programmes/datelinepacific/audio/2018646165/solomons-govt-approaches-new-position-on-west-papua https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/programmes/datelinepacific/audio/2018646165/solomons-govt-approaches-new-position-on-west-papua https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/mayarakat-papua-menolak-tim-bentukan-menko-polhukam/3379084.html https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/mayarakat-papua-menolak-tim-bentukan-menko-polhukam/3379084.html http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/droi/dv/508_nelestebay_/508_nelestebay_en.pdf http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/droi/dv/508_nelestebay_/508_nelestebay_en.pdf http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/9/22/west-papua-mediablackout.html https://twitter.com/youngsolwarap https://tirto.id/media-siluman-di-papua-propaganda-hoaks-hingga-narasumber-fiktif-da5b https://tirto.id/media-siluman-di-papua-propaganda-hoaks-hingga-narasumber-fiktif-da5b journal of asean studies, vol. 10, no. 1 (2022), pp. 61−79 issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic received: 27th april 2021/ revised: 23rd april 2022/ accepted: 10th may 2022 the effect of the internet on inflation: a research on asean-5 countries mustafa necati çoban department of economics, faculty of economics and administrative sciences, tokat gaziosmanpaşa university, turkey necati.coban@gop.edu.tr how to cite: çoban, m. n. (2022). the effect of the internet on inflation: a research on asean-5 countries. journal of asean studies, 10(1), 61−79. https:/doi.org/10.21512/jas.v10i1.7310 abstract information and communication technologies have become widespread with the onset of globalization, affecting almost every facet of human life. increasing internet usage has made accessing information swift and easy. the internet has also had a significant economic impact and provided financial benefits to nations all around the world to increase productivity and efficiency and reduce costs. customers had been able to access products at lower prices as a result of the reduction in market entry barriers and search costs, which led to an increase in competition in the markets. the research aimed to investigate the effect of the internet on inflation in asean-5 countries (indonesia, malaysia, philippines, singapore, and thailand). consumer prices (annual %) were used as an indicator of inflation, and individuals using the internet (% of population) were used as an indicator of internet usage. control variables such as unemployment rate, real interest rate, energy use and money growth were also included in the research. panel data analysis was performed using the data of asean-5 countries covering the period of 1994-2014. pooled least squares method (pooled ols) was applied to obtain an estimation of the model. as a result, it is found that as internet usage increases, inflation rates decrease in asean-5 countries. keywords: internet, inflation, panel data analysis, asean-5 countries mailto:necati.coban@gop.edu.tr 62 the effect of the internet introduction technological innovation has played a very important role in the advancement of humanity. education and health facilities have been developed as a result of new technologies and other innovations, and these improvements have spread all over the world with unquestioned efficiency. such advancements have had a positive effect on the quality of life of people across the globe. the world mortality rate decreased by approximately 50% between 1960-1990 through modernization in science technology, trade, agriculture, and similar fields (ejemeyovwi et al., 2019; hettiarachchi, 2006). in the last thirty years, there has been a significant increase in the use of information and communication technologies throughout the world (chavanne et al., 2015). the use of such technologies has made significant contributions to the increase of productivity, which has led to a new awareness of energy efficiency (salahuddin et al., 2016). the internet is a global system consisting of interconnected computer networks used by billions of users worldwide. it is defined as the network consisting of millions of private and public, academic, business, and local networks connected by fiber optic cables, copper wires, wireless connections, and other technologies (simsim, 2011). the various economic consequences of this growth in internet usage are currently being researched, although the overall effect of the internet on the economy should not be discussed in such a narrow field. it is seen that the internet has a direct impact on foreign investment, technological productivity, inflation, democracy, as well as the shadow economy (elgin, 2013; salahuddin & gow, 2016; sassi & goaied, 2013). the internet promotes economic growth by facilitating the spread of information (romer, 1986, 1990) to just about every aspect of life. employees can access information about their jobs via the internet. they can communicate with others, call potential customers, and use the internet for commercial transactions. on the other hand, researchers can also access data for their subjects online. consumers can purchase goods and services and access information about the product they want to purchase all through the convenience of the internet. consumers can also make payment transactions for invoices, etc. via the internet without physically leaving their homes or places of business. during this recent worldwide pandemic, online educational activities have gained momentum and countries have started to develop their distance education learning programs. most of these activities tend to increase productivity, increase private expenditure, reduce the cost of doing business, and increase the welfare level of people and the national output (hsing et al., 2020). the internet has been described as the eighth wonder of the world and is defined as one of the most important works of humanity (sathiaseelan et al., 2013). it has changed the way we work, socialize, create, and share information, which mediates the flow of ideas and communication between people all over the world. big businesses and national economies have gained significant benefits from the internet. if the internet were its own financial sector, journal of asean studies 63 it would likely have a greater share in gdp than either the agriculture or utility sectors (manyika & roxburgh, 2011). with the advancement of internet technology, shopping options allow for quick and easy online purchases, a major advancement from offline shopping methods, which require a potential customer to physically travel to the business to collect information and make decision. it allows for much more efficient use of time. for example, a consumer may access information about prices over the internet instead of physically visiting different stores to compare them. through the increase in internet usage and the development of internet technology, consumers can now use the internet for various purposes such as researching, communicating, online banking, and shopping (shanthi & desti, 2015). it is also well-known that the internet increases economic productivity. market entry costs end up reduced while an increase develops in competition in industries related to various products. it also helps to shorten the supply chain and significantly reduce internet search costs. prices fall with the lowering of internet-related search costs. lower search costs and fewer market entry barriers lead to more competition in product markets (wadhwani, 2000). there is a widespread belief that inflation rates will decrease as the rate of internet usage, which is one of the digital economy indicators, becomes widespread; and productivity will, therefore, see an increase. today, as the effects of globalization and digitalization are being clearly felt, it can be argued that studying the correlation between internet usage and inflation has become even more important. with the increasing use of the internet, the e-commerce industry has grown rapidly and provided an equally important opportunity to remove barriers to entry. as online competition is increasing, businesses are doing their best to offer low prices to consumers, which puts downward pressure on the price of goods. people can now showcase their products on giant e-commerce platforms such as alibaba and amazon, and they can access international markets as well (charbonneau et al., 2017; mentsiev et al., 2020). increasing use of the internet through technological advances has also contributed to the creation of a productive business environment in many different countries. as the level of ease of doing business locally or abroad has increased, bureaucratic obstacles and time costs have decreased. businesses are also able to file their taxes online, making it easier for people to find their way into the tax network (mentsiev et al., 2020; nuccio & guerzoni, 2019). the internet has disinflationary effects in the short and medium-term. transparency of prices subject to e-commerce paves the way for a more competitive environment than traditional retail trade. the internet, which supports international trade in goods and services, has a positive effect on the trend of globalization, resulting in disinflationary effects. higher productivity levels brought on by internet usage also lead to significant reductions in the costs of producers (coffinet & perillaud, 2017). over the past few decades, asean economies have undergone a significant transformation, with liberalization and fiscal deregulation. such initiatives have resulted in 64 the effect of the internet the expansion of the banking and financial services sectors in asean countries, significant growth in capital markets, and the emergence of private-sector financial institutions. the correlation between digitalization brought by globalization and its indicators and macroeconomic variables in these economies that have liberalized with globalization has mostly remained unexplored. asean-5 countries have made significant breakthroughs in information and communication technologies in recent years (jing & ab-rahim, 2020). the development in information and communication technologies has a significant role in the transformation of singapore from a third world country to a country with a high level of welfare. information and communication technology plays a crucial role in singapore's policy and development strategy. to stimulate economic growth, singapore started its strategy of embracing the ict revolution in the early 1980s, when the first generation of personal computers showed its potential. the effort is concentrated in two directions: 1) promoting ict adoption and 2) promoting ict production (vu, 2013). the importance of information and communication technologies in malaysia's fundamental transformation of society, politics, and economy has been expressed in malaysia's third outline perspective plan. ict in malaysia has been identified as one of the 12 new key economic areas (nkea) (salleh et al., 2020). thailand was the world's second-largest hard disk drive (hdd) country after china in 2015. the communication technology policy (2011-2020) adopted in thailand is the basis for developing information and communication technologies (charnsripinyo & inluksana, 2015). liberalisation and privatisation of the internet service provider (ips) in indonesia only started in the early 1990s. the situation has led to indonesia's telecommunications infrastructure being inadequate to other asean-5 countries (eick, 2007). although access to the wireless internet connection in indonesia is concentrated in big cities, it is stated that access to the internet is limited outside the big cities. in indonesia, electronic information and transaction act was introduced in 2008 and created the legal infrastructure of e-commerce (ruslijanto, 2012). it can be said that indonesia has made significant progress in the field of ict in recent years (jing & ab-rahim, 2020). although internet usage in the philippines was shallow between 2000 and 2009, it can be said that there was a severe increase, especially after 2009. it is stated that e-commerce will create enormous growth potential in the philippines, although the growth of ict has come later compared to other asean-5 countries (villegas, 2014). with the spread of information and communication technologies, the increase in internet usage, and the digital economy’s development, competition between online and traditional retailers is increasing, which puts downward pressure on prices. the situation is defined as the amazon effect in the literature (cavallo, 2018). asean-5 countries are increasing their level of integration into the digital economy day by day, and it also helps these countries achieve price stability. in the philippines, one of the asean-5 countries, the central bank of the republic of the philippines cooperates with the phillippine statistics authority to evaluate the impact of increasing e-commerce. it is also working with the ministry of commerce of thailand to add more online pricing to the bank of thailand consumer price index. central banks of asean-5 countries are putting forward policies to create downward pressure on prices by taking advantage of the increasing competition journal of asean studies 65 between online and traditional retailers, increasing internet usage, and the spread of information and communication technologies. in the research, the effects of internet usage on inflation in asean-5 countries were investigated. the research result has found that inflation rates decrease as internet usage increases. it can be stated that the increase in internet usage in asean-5 countries causes a rise in the level of productivity, which reduces the costs of producers. this, in turn, leads to a decrease in inflation rates. it has become clear that the level of competition in asean-5 countries has increased and inflation rates have decreased due to the role of the internet. the relationship between the internet and inflation is also an object of curiosity within the scope of the economic effects of the digital age. there are not many studies on the subject in the literature. the research aims to investigate the effect of the internet on inflation in asean-5 (indonesia, malaysia, philippines, singapore, and thailand) countries. in accordance with the specified purpose, the inflation rate (consumer prices annual %) was used as the dependent variable. as an indicator of internet usage, the ratio of people using the internet to the population is preferred. panel data analysis will be conducted using the data of the mentioned countries covering the years 1994-2014. the following section will constitute the literature review, and that will be followed by the research method. after the research method, there is an analysis section and a conclusion section to finalize. literature review when the literature is examined, it is seen that the relationship between the internet and inflation has not been the subject of many studies. however, a significant number of researchers have found that as internet use increases, inflation decreases (priyono, 2016, friesenbichler, 2018; koyuncu & unver, 2018; yi & choi, 2005). some researchers have accepted that while the internet has been able to lessen inflation in the short-term, the longterm effect of the internet on inflation is uncertain (coffinet & perillaud, 2017). it is possible that the internet could even lead to higher inflation in the long term (meijers, 2006). some of the researchers examine the correlation between e-commerce activities and inflation with the spread of the internet (calson-öhman, 2018; charbonneau et al., 2017; goolsbee & klenow, 2018; kulakov & vinogradov, 2020). regarding the studies on the subject, first, the arguments put forward in these studies will be discussed, and then the findings obtained in the literature will be discussed in detail. yi and choi (2005) have stated that increasing investments in internet infrastructure in a country may help reduce inflation. it has been also stated that the rapid development of the internet will affect the traditional correlation between money and inflation. likewise, it has been indicated that monetary authorities should act more cautiously in the transition to contractionary monetary policy when faced with increased employment and production. the development of the internet may cause downward pressure on inflation in the new economy as a result. meijers (2006) has stated that as more companies invest in the internet, competitive pressure will increase among both internet users and non-internet users, which will reduce 66 the effect of the internet the profit margin. this situation explains the low inflation rate in knowledge-based economies. it means that the prices in the output market decrease depending on the fixed factor prices. fixed wages and fixed energy prices are examples of this situation. if the spreading process of the internet stops, the markets will revert to a situation consisting of a fixed profit margin on the unit cost of production and fixed prices, even when some firms do not invest in the internet. this process implies that inflation falls during the spread of the internet. priyono (2016) argues that the use of the internet should be used not only for communication but also for research and development and cost-efficiency. it has been indicated that the use of the internet, which may have an impact on the productivity of commodity costs, will have an inflation-reducing effect. charbonneau et al. (2017) have shared findings from european countries regarding the inflation-reducing effects of digitalization, but believe they are an issue best left to policymakers. some have suggested that research should be conducted on whether the effects of digitalization on inflation are permanent or temporary. calson-öhman (2018) has suggested that increasing e-commerce with the increase in internet usage contributes to increased competition, which causes downward pressure on prices. eventually, the slowed rate of price increase and lower inflation rates will be encountered. friesenbichler (2018) believes that the widespread use of broadband internet supported by infrastructure and economic policies will reduce consumer price inflation rates. koyuncu and unver (2018) remarked that more investments should be made in information and communication technologies to spread the use of the internet in economies that aim to reduce inflation and that policies making internet access easier and cheaper should be supported in these economies. kulakov and vinogradov (2020) add that inflation has disinflationary effects on the internet. yi and choi (2005) investigate the effects of the internet on inflation. in the research examining 207 countries, the data of these countries covering the years 1991-2000 were used. the effects of the internet on inflation were analyzed with pooled least squares and randomeffects model. the result finds that the internet does, in fact, reduce the inflation rate. meijers (2006) has in-depth discussion on the relationship between internet diffusion and inflation in information economies. he makes an assessment on the discourses of high production, low unemployment, and low inflation of the supporters of the new economy. it is stated that the internet will reduce inflation in the short term, but the suppressive effect of internet use on inflation will end in the long term which will increase inflation. priyono (2016) analyzes the effects of the number of internet users on inflation. a panel data analysis is performed in the study in which china, india, japan, indonesia, and south korea are examined. it is determined that as internet usage increases in these countries, inflation decreases. charbonneau et al. (2017) study the disinflationary effects of digitalization in the canadian economy. they find that as e-commerce grows, the downward pressure on inflation may increase in the future with the effect of increasing competition. coffinet and perillaud (2017) make an assessment on the direction of the relationship between internet use and inflation in european countries. in the research, in which the journal of asean studies 67 statistical data of european countries are examined and put into tables, it is stated that the increased use of the internet has an effect on inflation in the short term, but it is claimed that it is still difficult to determine the effects of the internet on inflation in the long run. calson-öhman (2018) examines the effect of increasing e-commerce activities on inflation. a panel regression analysis is conducted on data from 28 european countries for the period 2016-2017. in the study, in which the model is estimated with the fixed effects model, it is found that increased e-commerce activities affect inflation negatively. cavallo (2018) analyzes the effects of internet transparency and online competition on the pricing behavior of large retailers and aggregate inflation dynamics. it is found that online competition increases the frequency of price changes, and is also stated that there has been a uniform pricing degree among locations in the usa in the last 10 years. together with the increase in e-commerce, goolsbee and klenow (2018) examine the effects of these increases on cpi inflation. the research uses data from online transactions between 2014 and 2017. it is concluded that inflation could be lower by 1,5% to 2,5% with the increase in e-commerce. additionally, the net increase in the number of new products has a significant effect on the decrease in inflation. fabo and slovenska (2018) analyze the potential implications of e-commerce for the national bank of slovakia. recent developments and available data in the economics literature are utilized in their research. they find that although the short-term effect of ecommerce is not noteworthy, there is a significant impact potential on price stability in the long run. therefore, central banks should follow the developments in e-commerce by collecting data and examining prices online. friesenbichler (2018) looks at the effects of broadband internet usage on inflation in oecd countries. the research is conducted by an unbalanced panel data analysis by using data of 30 oecd countries covering the years 1995-2014. yi and choi (2005) have proven the effect of the internet in reducing inflation. jo et al. (2019) examine the effects of e-commerce on inflation in japan. data challenges are overcome by utilizing datasets covering a wide period of time and past catalog sales. as a result, they find that the relative inflation rates for goods sold heavily online by e-commerce decrease. koyuncu and unver (2018) review the effects of internet use on inflation in oecd countries. in the research conducted by unbalanced panel data analysis, data of 22 oecd countries covering the period 1995-2015 are included. the results obtained after the analysis indicate a negative and statistically significant relationship between variables. as internet usage increases in oecd countries, the rate of inflation decreases. csonto et al. (2019) investigate the effects of digitalization on domestic inflation. in the research, panel data analysis is carried out using the data covering 2009-2014 in china. it appears to be no definitive evidence that digitalization affects inflation through inflation expectations. however, it is stated that as long as the digitalization process affects trend 68 the effect of the internet inflation and contributes to reducing inflation, central banks will have to readjust their policy responses to the reality of the new digital world. lv et al. (2019) investigate the relationship between technological development and inflation. the new keynesian philips curve (nkpc) model is used in the research, which looks at trends in the united states. the results find that technological development has more of an effect than globalization on low inflation in the us. kulakov and vinogradov (2020) study the effect of the development in e-commerce on inflation in the euro area. a panel data analysis is conducted within the scope of the study in which 19euro area countries are examined. it has been found in the model estimated with fixed effects that the development of e-commerce affects inflation negatively. lindgren et al. (2021) examine the effects of increasing use of the swedish price comparison website pricespy on prices. it is determined that the website led to a potential savings of 290 million sek in 2016 as a result of its increased use. manufacturers benefit even more, saving approximately 2,9 billion sek. it is emphasized that price comparison sites increase economic efficiency by creating downward pressure on prices. research methods in the research, panel regression analysis is performed using data of asean-5 countries (indonesia, malaysia, philippines, singapore, and thailand) covering the period 1994-2014. inflation rate is used as the dependent variable. the rate of individuals usage of the internet to the overall population is included as an indicator of internet usage among the independent variables. unemployment rate, broad money growth, real interest rate, and energy use are also included in the research as explanatory variables. the data of all variables are obtained from world development indicators, the database of the world bank. information about the variables in the research is shown in table 1. it contains variables, definitions of variables, and the expected sign of the coefficients expressing the effects of independent variables on the dependent variable. table 1. information on variables definition of variable variable expected effects on inflation individuals using the internet (% of population) internet unemployment, total (% of total labor force) unemployment broad money growth (annual %) moneygrowth + real interest rate (%) interestrate energy use (kg of oil equivalent) per $1,000 gdp (constant 2017 ppp) energyuse + consumer prices (annual %) inflation journal of asean studies 69 to briefly note the correlation between the unemployment rate and inflation, which are both control variables, the phillips curve is known to explain the correlation between these two variables. in simple terms, the phillips curve states that full employment causes inflation (piore, 1978). as it tries to reach full employment, increases are observed in the general level of prices. in terms of the correlation between monetary growth and inflation, it is well understood that increasing the money supply will raise aggregate demand, resulting in inflation (thoma, 1994). regarding the correlation between real interest rate and inflation, it can be claimed that lowering real interest rates will lead to higher real output and increase the inflation rate. if the inflation forecast is lower than the target inflation, the monetary policy committee lowers the policy rate. this leads to higher inflation (kose et al., 2012). it is stated for the correlation between energy use and inflation that energy use will increase the inflation rate of a country. the cost of energy resources is lowered when they are used optimally. it does not result in a significant rise in production costs. however, the non-optimal use of energy resources leads to more of them being consumed. this increases overall energy costs and costs per unit. careless and excessive use of energy resources, therefore, helps cause inflation (wasti & zaidi, 2020) a number of similar research in the literature are reviewed in determining which variables ought to be included in this research. descriptive statistics are stated first, and then the validity of the classical model is investigated. then, analysis is performed with the appropriate resistant estimator after heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation tests. the hypothesis is developed under the research: h0 = increases in internet usage have no effect on the decrease in inflation. h1 = increases in internet usage have an effect on the decrease in inflation. after the hypothesis is expressed, the model created under the research is given. inflationit = α0 + α1internetit + α2unemploymentit + α3moneygrowthit + α4interestrateit + α5energyuseit + αi + λt + εit description: inflationit : consumer prices (annual) internetit : ratio of internet usage to population internet unemploymentit : unemployment rate moneygrowthit : monetary expansion interestratei : real interest rate energyuseit : energy usage α0 : to constant parameter αi : unit effect 70 the effect of the internet λt : time effect εit : error the model is estimated with the panel ols method, and stata 14 package program is used in the analysis of the data. descriptive statistics of the variables are shown in table 2. it contains the number of observations, average values, standard errors, minimum and maximum values of the variables are expressed. table 2. summary statistics of the variables variable number of observations average standard error minimum maximum inflation 105 4,723 6,235 -0,845 58,451 internet 105 22,696 24,407 0,001 80,902 unemployment 105 3,682 1,677 0,21 8,06 money growth 105 12,091 8,179 -2,049 62,762 energy use 105 107,743 22,156 57,023 141,243 interest rate 105 4,050 4,512 -24,600 12,322 analysis the f-test is conducted first to test the existence of the classical model, and to test the existence of unit effect and time effect, respectively. after testing the existence of unit effect and time effect through the f-test, the likelihood ratio test is applied to test the classical model against the random-effects model. the heteroscedasticity in the model will be tested, and then the presence of autocorrelation will be studied. after all these tests are completed, the model will be estimated with the appropriate resistive estimator. table 3 shows the results of f-test to test the unit effect and the time effect. however, table 3 shows the results of likelihood ratio test to determine whether the random effect model or classical model is effective. table 3. f-test and likelihood test results testing the existence of unit effect f statistics 0,92 probability value 0,565 testing the existence of time effect f statistics 1,91 probability value 0,114 likelihood ratio test lr test statistics 0,00 probability value 1,000 journal of asean studies 71 in the f-test, the hypothesis that all units are equal to zero (h0: αi=0) and that all-time effects are equal to zero (h0: λt=0) are tested. the likelihood ratio test is used to test the classical model against the random-effects model. the h0 hypothesis is established as the classical model is true (tatoğlu, 2016). according to the results of f-test conducted to test the unit effect, it is found that there is no unit effect. h0 hypothesis is accepted. the classic model has been deemed suitable. according to the results of f-test conducted to test the time effect, it is seen that time effects are insignificant. h0 hypothesis is not rejected. when the likelihood test results are examined, it is found that h0 hypothesis, which states that the classical model is correct, is valid. after determining that the classical model, otherwise known as the pooled regression model, is valid, the next steps are to investigate the existence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the model. heteroscedasticity is frequently encountered in panel data models due to the presence of unit size. this causes the assumption that conditional covariance is zero between the error terms of different periods. in other words, there is no autocorrelation. in addition, if there are unit effects in the error term and the model is estimated by the pooled least squares method, the previous assumption is likewise invalid since the unit effect (αi) causes autocorrelation in the error term for each unit (tatoğlu, 2016). table 4 shows the results of breusch-pagan/cook-weisberg (breusch & pagan, 1979; cook & weisberg, 1983) test to examine the existence of variance. the basic hypothesis is established as “h0=no heteroscedasticity” in the breusch-pagan/cook-weisberg test. table 4. breusch-pagan/cook-weisberg heteroscedasticity test step 1 chi2(1) 144,62 prob>chi2 0,000 step 2 f(1,103) 45,12 prob>f 0,000 step 3 chi2(1) 31,98 prob>chi2 0,000 step 4 chi2(5) 157,35 prob>chi2 0,000 the chi2(1) (χ2) test statistics with 1 degree of freedom was calculated in tests 1 and 3, ftest statistics with (1,103) degree of freedom is calculated in test 2 and chi2 (1) (χ2) test statistics with 5 degrees of freedom is calculated in the final test. h0 hypothesis, which describes the constant variance, is rejected according to all test results. there is heteroskedasticity in the model. 72 the effect of the internet it is known that autocorrelation in panel data models occurs mostly due to the unit effect. if there is no unit effect in the model, the autocorrelation in the combined error will decrease, but the correlation in the error will no longer be affected. for this reason, it is important to test the autocorrelation in the residual error element (tatoğlu, 2016). wooldridge's test is used to investigate autocorrelation in the model, whose results is shown in table 5 (wooldridge, 2002). wooldridge proposed an autocorrelation test with the h0 hypothesis of "there is no first-order autocorrelation" to test autocorrelation in panel data models. drukker (2003) finds that the test is powerful even in small samples thanks to the simulation results he has concluded (tatoğlu, 2016). table 5. wooldridge autocorrelation test f value (1,4) probability value 14.330 0,019 table 5 shows f statistics with (1,4) degree of freedom and probability value. according to the results, h0 hypothesis stating that there is no first degree autocorrelation is rejected. the model includes first degree autocorrelation. after the relevant tests are conducted, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation findings are found in the model. the next step is to perform the regression analysis with the resistant estimator that takes into account heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. arellano, froot, and rogers’ resistive estimator can produce resistant standard errors in the existence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. in the research, the estimation of the model is made by the arellano, froot, and rogers (arellano, 1987; froot, 1989; rogers, 1994) resistant estimator. table 6 shows the results after the analysis made with arellano, froot, and rogers resistant estimators. table 6. estimation results independent variables coefficient standard error probability value internet -0,060 0,010 0,005*** unemployment 0,763 0,221 0,026** moneygrowth 0,330 0,123 0,055* energyuse -0,004 0,020 0,853 interestrate -0,545 0,061 0,001*** r2= 0.6173 ***: 1%significance level **: 5%significance level *: 10%significance level considering the coefficient of internet variable, it is seen that the direction of the coefficient is negative. it is observed that as internet usage increases in asean-5 countries, the rate of inflation decreases. although the direction of the coefficient is as expected, the result is statistically significant. journal of asean studies 73 the estimated coefficient of unemployment is positive and significant at the 5% level. unemployment has the unexpected sign. the estimated coefficient of the moneygrowth is positive and significant at the 10% level. moneygrowth have the expected sign. the estimated coefficient of energyuse is negative and insignificant. energyuse have the unexpected sign. the estimated coefficient of interestrate is negative and significant at the 5% level, and has the expected sign. it is seen that the results are compatible with a significant part of the results in similar studies (yi & choi, 2005; priyono, 2016; calson-öhman, 2018; cavallo, 2018; friesenbichler, 2018; goolsbee & klenow, 2018; koyuncu & unver, 2018; kulakov & vinogradov, 2020) the increase in internet usage in asean-5 countries has increased competition and led to a decrease in the general level of prices. conclusions within the scope of the research, the effect of internet usage on inflation in asean-5 countries (indonesia, malaysia, philippines, singapore, and thailand) between 1994-2014 is investigated. balanced panel data analysis is performed in this regard. consumer prices (annual %) are used as inflation indicator in the research where the pooled least squares method is applied. individuals using the internet (% of population) are used as an indicator of internet usage. unemployment rate, money growth, real interest rate, and energy use are also included as control variables in the research. regression analysis results on the relationship between internet use and inflation has shown that internet use in asean-5 countries leads to a decrease in the rate of inflation. the result is found statistically significant at the 1% significance level. these results are consistent with the results obtained in other studies in the literature (friesenbichler, 2018; koyuncu & unver, 2018; yi & choi, 2005). when the relationship between the unemployment rate (a control variable) and the inflation rate (the dependent variable) is analyzed, it is seen that the direction of the coefficient is positive. as unemployment increases in asean-5 countries, the rate of inflation also increases. the result is statistically significant at the 5% significance level. similar results are obtained in previous studies analyzing the relationship between relevant variables in asean countries (furuoka & munir, 2009; puzon, 2009). regarding the effect of money growth on inflation, it is found that increases in money supply increase inflation in asean-5 countries. the result also seems to be statistically significant at the 10% significance level. these results obtained are in the expected direction. it is observed that the direction of the coefficient is negative in the relationship between energy use and inflation. however, the results are statistically insignificant. the relationship between real interest rate and inflation is analyzed to finally find a negative relationship between these two variables, as expected. the result also indicates a statistically significant at 74 the effect of the internet the 1% significance level. in asean-5 countries, as real interest rates increase, inflation rates decrease. it is widely believed that information and communication technologies reduce costs by leading to high efficiency, in this case, reduces consumer prices by affecting inflation rates. it is stated that the increase in internet usage contributes to the decrease in inflation rates. the effects of internet use on inflation in asean-5 countries are investigated, and it is found that inflation rates decrease as internet usage increases. the results obtained within the research scope are consistent with the findings in similar studies (calson-öhman, 2018; cavallo, 2018; friesenbichler, 2018; goolsbee & klenow, 2018; koyuncu & unver, 2018; kulakov & vinogradov, 2020; priyono, 2016; yi & choi, 2005). digitization has varying effects on inflation. it can affect inflation directly through the prices of information and communication technology products, and through the sharing of these products in the household consumption basket. indirectly, it can affect inflation through firms' pricing behavior, market power and market concentration, productivity, and marginal costs (koester et al., 2021). technological developments and globalization have made the use of information and communication technologies widespread. digitization and the accompanying widespread use of the internet have increased efficiency and productivity, while significantly reducing costs. it has been stated that inflation rates will decrease significantly as the costs decrease (friesenbichler, 2018; litan & rivlin, 2001; salvatore, 2003; yi & choi, 2005). the use of the internet is increasing rapidly in the world, the digital economy is rapidly spreading, and its influence is increasing. this makes it more important for policy makers and economic agents to understand the effects of internet use and digital economy indicators on macroeconomic variables, including inflation (csonto et al., 2019). considering that the use of the internet reduces inflation through increased productivity or increased competition, it should not be forgotten that countries must give importance to information and communication technologies and the sector that hosts these technologies. with the increase in internet use, consumers become more conscious and knowledgeable. the formation of a more aware consumer profile, on the other hand, contributes to the increase in price competition. using smart phones, people can compare prices of products and services with a single click. companies that are aware of the situation enter into competition with other companies by applying lower prices and various discount campaigns to continuously attract customers. this can lead to a significant decrease in inflation rates (matolcsy et al., 2020). the research suggests that governments make productivity, competition, and ecommerce become widespread by ensuring there are no obstacles to internet usage. consumers, who are spared significant time cost and search cost by shopping online, will be able to buy products and services at lower prices with the increase of competition. central banks should follow the developments related to e-commerce and continue their activities since e-commerce is effective on price stability. it is seen that there are very few studies on the journal of asean studies 75 subject in the literature. it is believed that studies to be conducted to review the relationship between these two variables in different country groups will enrich the relevant literature. about the authors mustafa necati çoban is an associate professor in the department of economics at tokat gaziosmanpaşa university. his research interests are welfare economics, environmental economics, institutional economics, and digital economy. references arellano, m. 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(2005). the effect of the internet on inflation: panel data evidence. journal of policy modeling, 27(7), 885–889. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpolmod.2005.06.008 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016%2fj.jksues.2011.03.006 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016%2fj.jksues.2011.03.006 https://doi.org/10.2307/2077906 https://www.nomurafoundation.or.jp/en/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/2014/09/20010525_bernardo_villegas.pdf https://www.nomurafoundation.or.jp/en/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/2014/09/20010525_bernardo_villegas.pdf https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2013.08.002 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2013.08.002 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jobe.2019.101104 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpolmod.2005.06.008 journal of asean studies, vol. 11, no. 1 (2023), pp.25−44 issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic received: 3rd july 2021/ revised: 14th may 2022/ accepted: 10th january 2023 “local food” consumption: does locality matter? agustina multi purnomo1, gumilar rusliwa somantri2, ricardi s. adnan3 1faculty of social, political, and computer science, universitas djuanda, bogor, indonesia 2,3department of sociology, faculty of social and political science, depok, universitas indonesia agustina.m@unida.ac.id; gumilar.r09@ui.ac.id; ricardi.s@ui.ac.id how to cite: purnomo, a. m., somantri, g. r., & adnan, r. s. “local food” consumption: does locality matter? journal of asean studies, 11(1), 25−44. https:/doi.org/10.21512/jas.v11i1.7537 abstract the research examined the possibility of food being socialized as local food to replace local food’s role in food tourism. food was one of the major attractions during a vacancy in asean. the study of food in tourism rarely considered local food diversity in urban areas. the research addressed the other type of local food that is typical city food. in this case, there is no connection between the food and culture, traditions, history, or place, but the food is socialized as being indigenous. the local food consumption model was used to test whether the factors that affect tourists' local food consumption apply equally to foods socialized as local food. the research compared domestic tourist local food consumption factors in two food categories. 640 domestic tourists in a developed culinary tourism city in the jakarta metropolitan area participated in this online survey. the comparative test of tourist characteristics found gender, the purpose of visit, age, and status of visit tourist characteristics associated with the food choice. the physical environment, exiting experience, and authentic experience were the motivational factors that differed between two food categories. it is possible that socialized foods will replace local food. the food locality did not always a matter. the results provide an overview of the position of local food in urban tourism. this has been considered the main attraction of food tourism in asean countries. keywords: local food, food tourism, consumption, urban, indonesia introduction food was one of the major attractions for international tourists (himanshu, 2015) and positively impacted tourism demands in asean (nguyen & nguyen, 2021). a taste of the diversity and authenticity of the culture in asia and asean was experienced through food in p re ss mailto:agustina.m@unida.ac.id mailto:gumilar.r09@ui.ac.id mailto:ricardi.s@ui.ac.id 26 “local food” consumption: (lee et al., 2020; naruetharadhol & gebsombut, 2020; park, kim, & yeoman, 2019). the cuisine was featured in asean’s cultural education, awareness, and literacy initiatives (kheng-lian, 2014). the food was known as local food due to its heterogeneity and cultural authenticity. local food was an essential attraction in the food tourism study. tourists felt authenticity, a sense of place, cultural experiences, and satisfaction through local food experiences (björk & kauppinen-räisänen, 2019; hsu & scott, 2020; rousta & jamshidi, 2020; tsai, 2016; uehara & assarut, 2020; youn & kim, 2017). however, the research gave less attention to the diversity in local food. there was diversity in local food definitions (avieli, 2013). due to the urban context, various food producers compete for customers by selling each other food, known as “typical food of the city” (purnomo, 2022). the foods did not meet the local food definition as in previous studies. these foods have no culture or tradition tied to the area, and was relatively recent and can be found in other cities. however, they were particularly popular in the city as its typical food. the research called attention to the other “local food”, which has been socialized as local food. it differed from previous studies (avieli, 2013), which did not examine food consumption. food consumption while traveling denoted the tourist gaze and determined what foods tourists consider local food (adapted from korstanje & seraphin, 2017; urry, 1995). tourists’ consumption of local food while traveling determines which foods are considered authentic. the research examines the possibility of food being socialized as local food to replace local food’s role in food tourism. taking into consideration the importance of locality in the food that is socialized as local food, the research advances the conceptualization of local food. previous studies discussed local food attractions in food tourism as the locality of place, culture, tradition, and history (chang, kivela, and mak, 2010; choe & kim, 2019; zhang, chen, and hu, 2019). however, those studies largely neglect the possibility that tourists feel locality from the other "local food." this article proposes two types of locality in food, stemming from the history and tradition of place and socialization. the modification of the local food consumption model (kim, eves, & scarles, 2009) was used to test whether the factors that affect tourists’ local food consumption apply equally to food socialized as local food. the same impact indicates that food can be combined with local food in order to replace local food. the results provide an overview of the position of local food in tourism, which has been considered the main attraction of food tourism in asean countries. the research result contributes to the definition of local food by including food that is socialized as local food in the tourist perspective. the research challenges a single view of locality in urban food tourism that has dynamic inventions. literature review local food and food socialized as local food previous studies examined local food from three perspectives. first, local food was a specific geographical location (hsu & scott, 2020; knollenberg et al., 2021; rousta & jamshidi, in p re ss journal of asean studies 27 2020; zhang, chen, & hu, 2019). second, local food reflected cultural characteristics of a place. local food indicated a place’s identity (chang, kivela, & mak, 2010; chuang, 2009), native culture (zhang, chen, & hu, 2019), unique, original, traditional, special (avieli, 2013; choe & kim, 2019), indigenous herbs and food history from a particular place (sims, 2009; youn & kim, 2017). third, local food refers to people or producers of food from certain places (scheyvens & laeis, 2019; slocum, 2016; stoffelen & vanneste, 2016). local food in food tourism represents the culture, tradition, and history of a place. like the other asean countries, indonesia has a diverse food culture in each region. every region in indonesia has food that was linked to the region if it was sold anywhere in indonesia. it was known as java’s food, sundanese food, sumatra’s food, bogor food, or balinese food. indonesia also has food that did not indicate one particular region but denoted indonesian food. for example, indonesia’s government introduced fried rice as one of the 30 indonesian traditional culinary icons. fried rice was also known as the indonesian gastro brand (irwansyah & triputra, 2016). fried rice was a food found in almost all regions in indonesia. it did not indicate a specific region. both foods were local foods according to the definition of local food. how was the local food when the research took place in a particular city or region? the research proposes that the local food in a particular locality must fulfill the three local food indicators. the study of urban food tourism in asean should examine the famous foods introduced as the cuisine of the city. for example, bandung makuta cake was not a bandung cultural food but considered bandung’s souvenir food (chan, tresna, & suradipura, 2017). famous thai food poses a challenge to rice-based thai ethnic cuisine in urban tourism (berno, dentice, & wisansing, 2019), and vietnamese food is considered vietnamese even when it has been adapted from chinese food (avieli, 2013). food indicated a specific city but did not meet the three local food indicators recommended as socialized as local food. the study focuses on two categories of food that tourists perceive as local food. local food refers to culture, tradition, history, and food’s attachment to its place and maker. local food was part of the unique culture of a particular region or city. typical city food socialized as local food had no cultural, historical, or place attachment, but was considered typical city food. food that is socialized is mostly known as souvenir food, national food, or other foods. consumers may not distinguish between local and socialized food. tourists may consider any food they consume as local food, following their information about the food (avieli, 2013; lin, pearson, & cai, 2011; sims, 2009). food as a cultural characteristic may be replaced by the invention of regional communities, food providers, and tourists (avieli, 2013; cohen, 1988). the invention and socialization process opens up the possibility that tourists might consider the food to be local food. the tourist played a role in determining what food was considered local food through food consumption. food consumption in tourism was divided into four perspectives: tourists’ food consumption behavior or pattern; tourists’ special interests in various foods and related activities in destinations; food as a tourist product, and tourists’ special interests in various foods (mak, lumber, & eves, 2012). the research is closer to the first perspective. the first in p re ss 28 “local food” consumption: perspective discussed food consumption as a tourist’s food choice at tourist destination. it also discussed the factors that influence food consumption, and the perceived functional and symbolic nature of food choices. the tourists’ food choices denoted the perceived functional and symbolic food choices that influence food consumption. the claim implies that socialized foods can replace local foods when local food consumption factors produce the same level of effect as socialized foods. previous studies explaining the tourist’s perspective of food consumption behavior were conducted on international tourists. international tourists identify authentic indonesian foods from food authenticity, variety, and uniqueness (wijaya et al., 2017) or heritage, serving, food environment, variety, availability, sensory, and ingredients (hendijani, 2016; roozbeh, ng, & boo, 2013; wijaya, 2019). indonesian local food for international tourists was associated with flavor (rice-based, spicy, tasty, and sweet), herbs, spices, sauce, and halal as a significant characteristic (wijaya et al., 2016). therefore, both local food and food socialized as local food can be considered as local food by international tourists. meanwhile, domestic tourists can recognize local food better than international tourists (chen & huang, 2018, 2019; kim, park, & lamb, 2019). a study on domestic tourists illustrates the diversity of culinary tourism in asia (park, kim, & yeoman, 2019). research framework the research uses a model of local food consumption (kim, eves, & scarles, 2009) that conforms to the first perspective of food consumption. this model has been tested empirically (kim, eves, & scarles, 2013; kim & eves, 2012). according to this model, food consumption is determined by food choices. a model was proposed to test the influence of demographic, physiological, and motivational factors on local food consumption and the relationship between these factors. their model did not address the possibility of a diversity of local food in a place. the research used this framework to examine two forms of food choice (local food and socialized as local food). physiological factors were not tested because these factors were primarily studied in local food consumption by international tourists (hashemi et al., 2021; jeaheng & han, 2020; osmana & nazarib, 2020). domestic tourists have a similar food culture. thus, physiological factors as an impediment to local food would not occur (cohen & avieli, 2004). furthermore, the research did not examine the relationship between factors in order to examine the different impacts of the two factors on food choices. the demographic factors are age, gender, education level, occupation, and income level. additionally, two variables are similar to previous research, namely income rate (choe & kim, 2019; kim, park, & lamb, 2019; knollenberg et al., 2021; rousta & jamshidi, 2020), and occupation (björk & kauppinen-räisänen, 2019; choe & kim, 2019; rousta & jamshidi, 2020). in p re ss journal of asean studies 29 figure 1 local food consumption model (kim, eves, & scarles, 2009) tourist characteristics that influence consumption include more than demographic factors. travel objectives are added to differentiate tourists who come specifically for culinary tours and tourists who come for other reasons (andersson, mossberg, & therkelsen, 2017; chen & huang, 2019). the length of the visit is also examined, which finds that tourists can explore a variety of foods during longer visit times (avieli, 2013; choe & kim, 2019; tse & crotts, 2005). the visit status is added to determine the difference between tourists who came for the first time, many times, or had stayed at the study location (tse & crotts, 2005; wijaya et al., 2017). the tourist characteristic factors were a combination of demographic and socioeconomic factors. h1: tourist characteristics have an association with food choices. motivational factors include exciting experiences, escape from routines, health concerns, learning knowledge, authentic experience, togetherness, prestige, sensory appeal, and the physical environment (kim, eves, & scarles, 2009). previous studies have examined the same motivational factors (choe & kim, 2019; hendijani, 2016; kim, park & lamb, 2019; rousta & jamshidi, 2020; uehara & assarut, 2020; wijaya et al., 2016, 2017; zhang, chen & hu, 2019). learning knowledge and togetherness were not tested in this research. the togetherness variable was not asked about its origin in a greek study that included time together at mealtimes. this tradition was not found at the study site (purnomo, 2022). learning knowledge was also not asked. the preliminary research found there was no visitors’ interest in the process of making, the origin of food, and the socio-cultural context of food as an in p re ss 30 “local food” consumption: indicator of learning knowledge. the research suggests that local and socialized food choices are motivated differently. h2: motivational factors affect food choices differently. figure 2 research framework source: adapted from kim, eves, & scarles (2009) research method bogor is chosen as the research site because it has a variety of local foods well known in indonesia (purnomo, 2016). furthermore, one local bogor food is included in the list of the 30 indonesian traditional culinary icons. bogor had the highest regional income from culinary tourism (bps-statistics of bogor, bekasi, depok & tangerang municipality, 2020), and culinary was a significant tourism marker compared to other cities in the jakarta metropolitan area (purnomo, 2021). the research uses mixed methods, where the main data collection technique is a survey. the survey population is determined based on the population of domestic tourists to bogor city in 2018, 7.965.987 (bps-statistics of bogor municipality, 2019). the questionnaire is distributed online in march 2019 through social media. the samples are selected by a filter question, "have you visited bogor city?" of the 1414 questionnaires filled, only 640 are eligible for data processing. respondents from bogor city and regency are excluded because they refer to the definition of tourists as people who come from "outside their environment" (unwto, 2020) or, in this research, tourists who come from other cities. the 640 samples are more than 385 people, meeting the confidence level (α) 95% (adam, 2020). the qualitative data is used to explore the food categories in the preparation stage. the categorization of food is done by interviews with five bogor cultural participants. according in p re ss journal of asean studies 31 to the interviews, twelve kinds of food have historically been known as bogor local food. the foods are bogor style sticky rice, bogor style soup, bogor laksa, doclang, bogor style beer, bogor noodle soup, cungkring, nutmeg ice, ngohiang, nutmeg sweets, golosor noodle, and bogor pickle. next step is interviews with food traders or producers. interview with food producers found that one type of food is not available for sale (bogor style sticky rice). one type is non-halal food (ngohiang), three types of food are manufactured by the traditional factory (nutmeg sweets, golosor noodle, and bogor pickle), and seven types of food are sold by street food vendors (bogor style soup, bogor laksa, doclang, bogor style beer, bogor noodle soup, nutmeg ice, and cungkring). all food has been produced or sold for more than 50 years by the same producer or the second or third generation. food that is not produced is excluded because tourists may not find it in the market. in addition, non-halal food is excluded to reduce the risk of halal issues. therefore, the ten foods are defined as local food. the next step is structured interviews with 100 bogor city residents. they are asked two questions: 1) do you agree that these ten foods are included in bogor specialties? 2) mention other foods that you consider as typical bogor food. the ten local foods were chosen by 80100% of respondents. the second question reveals the respondents’ top ten favorite foods. the ten types of food are confirmed through observation, social media searching, and interviews with the food producers. the six types of foods were famous bogor souvenir foods (air mancur sweet pancake, unyil bread, taro layer cake, pia apple pie, grilled macaroni, and klappetart huiz), two types were a famous restaurant (lodaya durian soup and mang endang oxtail soup), and two types were sold by well-known indonesian artists (bogor princess cake/syahrini and bogor rain cake/shireen sungkar). the same type of food can easily be purchased anywhere in indonesia. food is sold in restaurants with modern environment, except for mang endang oxtail soup. five bogor cultural participants denied that these foods had any connection with the food history and culture of bogor. these ten foods are therefore considered to be locally socialized foods. the questionnaire regarding tourist characteristics is prepared based on indonesian statistics’ age, education, occupation, and income groupings. indicators of the purpose and length of the visit are compiled based on a preliminary study in 2014 (table 1). respondents fill in the motivational factors for the type of food that has been previously selected. the local food is identified as bogor’s traditional food and socialized as famous food. those questions are the most straightforward questions understood by respondents. responses to motivational variables are measured using a likert scale ranging from 1-5 points for the scale (1=strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree). it is recommended to use the midpoint of 1-5 points to measure the ordinal scale of statements that allows respondents to choose freely according to their opinion (chyung et al., 2017). questionnaire is designed for online use and easy completion. respondents cannot fill out the questionnaires more than once on one device. the process of filling out the questionnaire is shown in figure 3. in p re ss 32 “local food” consumption: figure 3 the questionnaire filling flow the validity test of 61 respondents is conducted using the pearson bivariate correlation techniques. the validity test results denote two indicators that measure the prestige variable that are omitted because they are considered invalid. the instrument reliability test uses the alpha cronbach formula because the research instrument is a multilevel scale. the reliability test results show an alpha value of 0,804. therefore, it is concluded that the questionnaire has reasonably high reliability. since tourist characteristics and type of food choice variables are categorical variables with nominal or ordinal measurement scales, the association between the two categorical variables’ level and type of food choice is measured by the chi-square test. the null hypothesis was rejected when the significance level was smaller than the specified error rate. an independent t-test is used to test the hypothesis since all the motivational factors are numerical variables and the type of food choice is a categorical variable. the null hypothesis should be rejected if the significance level is smaller than the specified error rate. logistic regression is carried out to determine factors that influence food choice. analysis tourist characteristics and food choices asean member states have obligations under treaties to which they are party and to agreements to which asean is a party. in the latter case, individual member states accede to the agreements following the completion of their internal approval processes. the agreements in p re ss journal of asean studies 33 usually have a threshold number of accessions before the agreement can enter into force. the other potential state parties can accede to the agreement at any time after it enters into force and is then bound to the terms of the agreement. table 1 tourist characteristics and food choices tourist characteristics food choices total socialized as local food local food amount percentage (%) gender male 156 162 318 49,69 female 185 137 322 50,31 age 17 25 years 69 50 117 18,59 26 35 years 95 72 167 26,09 36 45 years 139 131 270 42,19 46 55 years 37 39 76 11,88 upper 55 years 1 7 8 1,25 education junior high school 1 1 2 0,31 high school 56 55 111 17,34 undergraduate 199 162 361 56,41 graduate and post graduate 85 81 166 25,94 the income per month (in a million idr) less than 2,5 22 18 59 9,22 2,6 5 96 82 178 27,81 5 7,5 73 63 136 21,25 7,5 10 38 36 74 11,56 10 12,5 32 27 40 6,25 more than 12,5 80 73 153 23,91 occupation school 254 230 48 7,50 domestic worker 28 20 49 7,66 working 23 26 484 75,63 others 36 23 59 9,22 purposes of visit culinary tourist 61 27 88 13,75 others 48 36 139 21,72 weekend holiday 72 67 15 2,34 long holiday 12 3 116 18,13 visiting family 47 69 38 5,94 visiting friend 21 17 137 21,41 business purpose 71 66 23 3,59 transit 9 14 84 13,13 length of visit less than one day 3 10 278 43,44 2 4 days 199 160 206 32,19 more than four days 139 129 156 24,38 statuses of visit first time 3 10 13 2,03 more than one time 199 160 359 56,09 once lived in bogor 139 129 268 41,88 source: obtained from primary data by questionnaire, 2019 in p re ss 34 “local food” consumption: a pearson chi-square test is carried out on the association between tourist characteristics and food choice. table 2 indicates that tourist characteristics such as gender and purpose of visit significantly affect the choice of local foods over socialized local foods. this is at the 0,05 level of significance. age and status of visit significantly differed at a 0,1 level of significance. therefore, tourist characteristics such as gender, the purpose of visit, age, and visit status are associated with food choice. table 1 indicates that females are more inclined to select foods socialized as local foods than local foods. tourists who come for culinary reasons are more likely to choose foods socialized as local foods. visitors who visit just for transit are more inclined to try local foods. younger tourists are more likely to choose foods socialized as local foods than older tourists. therefore, the h1 criteria are accepted regarding gender, the purpose of the visit, age of the visitor, and status of the visitor. table 2 the influence of tourist characteristic factors on food choices characteristics value df asymptotic significance (2-sided) age 8,270a 4 0,082 gender 4,532a 1 0,033 education 1,146a 3 0,766 occupation 2,827a 3 0,419 income 0,279a 5 0,998 length of visit 0,112a 2 0,946 purposes of visit 23,639a 7 0,001 statuses of visit 5,647a 2 0,059 source: obtained from primary data by questionnaire, 2019 the difference of motivational factors on food choices motivational factors are measured on a likert scale. based on table 3, exciting experience, escape from routine, and authentic experience had a higher mean value than other motivational factors. the three factors are the most influential in tourists’ decisions about food. however, the mean value cannot yet show the differences in the choices of the two food categories. an independent t-test for equality of means is carried out to test whether each motivational factor could have a different impact on food choice. table 4 denotes a difference in motivational factors such as authentic experience, prestige, sensory appeal, and physical environment between purchasing local food and food socialized as local food. this difference is significant at a 0,05 level. therefore, escape from routine was significant at a 0,1 significant level. table 4 indicates the differences in the influence of motivational factors on food choices. in p re ss journal of asean studies 35 however, the results have been unable to demonstrate the degree of influence of one factor in comparison to other factors. table 3 average of motivational factors by food choice group statistics motivational factors food choice n mean std. deviation std. error mean exciting experience a 299 4,172 0,6236 0,0361 b 341 4,122 0,5770 0,0312 escape from routine a 299 4,207 0,5954 0,0344 b 341 4,125 0,5422 0,0294 authentic experience a 299 4,180 0,6730 0,0390 b 341 3,740 0,7850 0,0420 prestige a 299 3,982 0,6300 0,0364 b 341 3,787 0,6230 0,0337 sensory appeal a 299 3,767 0,5900 0,0341 b 341 3,642 0,5270 0,0285 physical environment a 299 3,840 0,6490 0,0380 b 341 3,990 0,5500 0,0300 health concern a 299 3,572 0,6600 0,0382 b 341 3,558 0,6160 0,0334 a = local food b = food socialized as local food source: obtained from primary data by questionnaire, 2019 table 4 independent t-test for equality of means on food choice motivational factors t-test for equality of means mean difference std. error difference t df sig. (2-tailed) exciting experience 0,0505 0,0475 1,065 638 0,287 escape from routine 0,0827 0,0450 1,839 638 0,066 authentic experience 0,4420 0,0580 7,596 638 0,000 prestige 0,1942 0,0496 3,916 638 0,000 sensory appeal 0,1252 0,0442 2,836 638 0,005 physical environment -0,1480 0,0470 -3,129 638 0,002 health concern 0,0137 0,0505 0,272 638 0,785 source: obtained from primary data by questionnaire, 2019 table 5 indicates a significant correlation among the motivational factors, but there is no high correlation. the results indicated that there is no multicollinearity among the factors. therefore, logistic regression is carried out without handling multicollinearity violations. in p re ss 36 “local food” consumption: table 5 pearson’s correlation coefficient among motivational factors correlations exciting experience escape from routine authentic experience prestige sensory appeal physical environment health concern exciting experience 1 0,603** 0,473** 0,428** 0,385** 0,244** 0,198** escape from routine 0,603** 1 0,465** 0,546** 0,511** 0,311** 0,259** authentic experience 0,473** 0,465** 1 0,540** 0,492** 0,205** 0,270** prestige 0,428** 0,546** 0,540** 1 0,790** 0,297** 0,288** sensory appeal 0,385** 0,511** 0,492** 0,790** 1 0,418** 0,443** physical environment 0,244** 0,311** 0,205** 0,297** 0,418** 1 0,550** health concern 0,198** 0,259** 0,270** 0,288** 0,443** 0,550** 1 **correlation is significant at the 0,01 level (2-tailed). source: obtained from primary data by questionnaire, 2019 table 6 indicates that motivational factors such as exciting experience, authentic experience, and the physical environment affect food choice. when motivated by exciting experiences or the physical environment, tourists are inclined to select socialized food over local food. an increased one-point average of exciting experience increases the likelihood of preferring socialized food over local food by 1.556 times. a one-point increase in the physical environment increases the likelihood of choosing socialized food over local food by 2.448 times. when motivated by authentic experience, tourists are inclined to prefer local food over socialized food. a one-point increase in authentic experience, 0,310 times more likely to choose socialized food than local food or 3.226 times more likely to choose local over socialized food. in terms of exciting experiences, physical environments, and authentic experiences h2 is accepted. table 6 logistic regression to determine effect of motivation factor to food choice variables in the equation b s.e. wald df sig. exp(b) step 1a exciting experience 0,442 0,199 4,938 1 0,026 1,556 esccape from routine 0,055 0,214 0,066 1 0,797 1,057 authentic experience -1,173 0,178 43,357 1 0,000 0,310 prestige -0,180 0,249 0,525 1 0,469 0,835 sensory appeal -0,114 0,280 0,167 1 0,682 0,892 physical environment 0,895 0,195 20,994 1 0,000 2,448 health concern -0,090 0,175 0,265 1 0,607 0,914 constant 0,681 0,804 0,717 1 0,397 1,976 a. variable(s) entered on step 1: excitingexperience, escapefromroutine, authenticexperience, prestige, sensoryappeal, physicalenvironment, healthconcern. source: obtained from primary data by questionnaire, 2019 in p re ss journal of asean studies 37 discussion researchers found that socialized foods have begun to replace local foods as the mainstays of food tourism. most respondents chose foods socialized as local foods (53,28%). this finding complements previous studies of tourists' preference for food other than local food (chang, kivela, & mak, 2010; lee, scott, & packer, 2014). the tourist characteristic factors associated with food choices include gender, the purpose of visit, age, and visit status. females were more likely to choose foods socialized as local foods than local foods, different from previous studies (chen & huang, 2018). tourists who came for the culinary experience are more inclined to select foods that are considered local than local food. it was a new sight to previous studies that found the exceptional attention to food tourists will more likely to choose local foods (andersson, mossberg, & therkelsen, 2017; chen & huang, 2019). in addition, tourists who have visited more than once or have lived in the city prefer food socialized as local food. it contradicts the previous studies that found that local food choice in asean is influenced by familiarity with local food (lee et al., 2020; mohiuddin & al azad, 2019; park, kim & yeoman, 2019). tourists who are familiar with the city usually choose food socialized as local food. the chance to explore food variety during visit times did not encourage tourists to choose local food as in previous studies (choe & kim, 2019; tse & crotts, 2005; wijaya et al., 2017). motivating factors that have an impact on food choice include exciting experience, physical environment, and authentic experience. tourists with more exciting experiences and physical environment are more likely to choose socialized food. the exciting experience variable was measured by the questions "the food that is different from where i come from makes me excited to try," and "enjoying food that is known as a specialty in the place where the food comes from makes me excited." the same question is asked in previous studies to find that it significantly influence local food consumption (choe & kim, 2019; kim, eves, & scarles, 2013). the physical environment variable is measured by the questions “the dining area arrangement is interesting” and “i had a memorable experience where i bought the food.” the physical environment variable is not used in testing the local food consumption model (kim, eves, & scarles, 2013; kim & eves, 2012) and is not used in previous studies (choe & kim, 2019; hendijani, 2016; kim, park & lamb, 2019; rousta & jamshidi, 2020; uehara & assarut, 2020; wijaya et al., 2016, 2017; zhang, chen, & hu, 2019). the local food consumption model is proposed to measure the physical environment variable to analyze how local food give tourists a different experience from their familiar environment (kim, eves, & scarles, 2009). the respondent’s preference is for a modern restaurant environment. modern restaurants sell food that has been socialized as local food. historical street food vendors and traditional factories sell local foods. the finding differs from the previous asean study revealing that the regional restaurant dining environment significantly influences locality experience (kim & lee, 2022; tan, goh, & lim, 2022; zhu et al., 2022). in p re ss 38 “local food” consumption: local food choices are significantly influenced by authentic experiences rather than foods socialized as local foods. the influence of authentic variables on local food choices was consistent with previous studies (chang, kivela, & mak, 2010; kim, eves, & scarles, 2013; kim & eves, 2012; sims, 2009). the authenticity variable is measured by the questions “the taste of the food is unique/original from bogor” and “the food makes me feel like i am in bogor city.” the finding indicates that authenticity as the primary food tourism attraction is in the local food realm (youn & kim, 2017; zhang, chen, & hu, 2019). variables in the local food consumption model represent factors that influence tourists’ consumption of local foods. the authentic experience contributes significantly to the authentic cuisine choice. however, tourists with more exciting experiences or the physical environment as a motivational factor were more likely to choose socialized food. moreover, the choice of tourists who came for culinary purposes, females, and younger tourists challenged the sustainability of the local food industry. conclusion food plays a crucial role in tourism in asean. it is found that local food gives visitors an authentic taste of the heterogeneity and authenticity of culture in asia and asean. food is the intangible cultural heritage in asean. however, the results indicate that the sense of asean’s heterogeneity and authenticity could be replaced by food socialized as local food. the research findings indicate that local food socialization has replaced local food in exciting experiences and physical environments. the urban context produces a food and dining scene that gives motivational experiences equal to local food consumption. unlike thailand or vietnam, the famous food does not take on regional characteristics. the tourists consider the foods socialized as local food is newer than local food. in addition, tourists familiar with the city tend to choose foods that are perceived as local. it is different from the previous studies that find that local food choice in asean is influenced by familiarity with local food. the tourist attracted by the modern restaurant environment. as a result, the traditionality of local food seller environments is challenged, which is different from the previous studies in asean. the research proposes that food locality only sometimes matters. local foods are being challenged by foods that do not relate to the region’s history and culture. the feeling of locality can be replaced by the invention of foods that are socialized as local food. the impact is on tourists who came for their culinary experience, females, and younger tourists. the group consumes a considerable amount of local food in the previous study. the research has made substantive contributions to the literature on food tourism in the urban context. the research challenges a single view of locality in defining local food with dynamic food inventions. its limitation was in determining which types of foods were surveyed. the process of developing foods socialized as local foods cannot be elaborated by this method. the process was essential to understand how a novel type of food became an in p re ss journal of asean studies 39 intangible cultural form. this limitation was because the study was focused on the tourist's consumption. the other limitation was that the study used a single case. further research in a city with a similar character in asean is recommended. this will enable us to develop a generalizable understanding of the role of socialized foods in asean's urban food tourism. acknowledgement many thank editors and reviewers for their comments and suggestions that improved and clarified the article. this research was funded by the directorate of research and community service universitas indonesia in indexed international publication grants for the final project of universitas indonesia students (pitta) grant. about the authors agustina multi purnomo is an active lecturer in the department of communication science at universitas djuanda, bogor. she has graduated from a ph.d program in sociology at university of indonesia and serves as a reviewer on several international journals indexed by scopus as well. she has published several articles in the fields of sociology of tourism and urban studies, indicating that she is interested in these fields. recent publications are urbanization and tourism development in bogor city (2021), attraction of culinary tourism destinations to promote sustainability development during the pandemic (2022), sociology of food tourism research opportunities: a bibliometric analysis (2022), social factors and social media usage activities on customer path 5a continuity due to e-marketing communication (2023). references adam, a. m. 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(2017). effects of ingredients, names and stories about food origins on perceived authenticity and purchase intentions. international journal of hospitality management, 63, 11–21. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhm.2017.01.002 zhang, t., chen, j., & hu, b. (2019). authenticity, quality, and loyalty: local food and sustainable tourism experience. sustainability, 11(12), 1-18. https://doi.org/10.3390/ su11123437 zhu, d., wang, j., wang, p., & xu, h. (2022). how to frame destination foodscapes? a perspective of mixed food experience. foods, 11(12), 1706. https://doi.org/10.3390/ foods11121706 in p re ss https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhm.2017.01.002 https://doi.org/10.3390/su11123437 https://doi.org/10.3390/su11123437 https://doi.org/10.3390/foods11121706 https://doi.org/10.3390/foods11121706 journal of asean studies, vol. 3, no. 2 (2015), pp. 133-149 ©2015 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic china’s assertive foreign policy in south china sea under xi jinping: its impact on united states and australian foreign policy lidya c. sinaga* indonesian institute of science (lipi), indonesia abstract this essay examines the impact of the assertiveness of china’s foreign policy in the south china sea under xi jinping on united states (us) and australian foreign policy. the essay focuses on the xi jinping period from 2013 because xi has a different approach in foreign policy making from that of his predecessors. his determination to defend and advance maritime claims and interests as well as the external developments, have made his foreign policy more assertive. this essay will argue that china’s assertive foreign policy in the south china sea under xi jinping has paved the way for a greater role for the us in southeast asia, and deepened the rivalry between china and the us. this rising tension in turn has put australia in a challenging situation, torn between its security alliance with the us, and its economic interests in china. however, australia does not have to choose one, but australia can play a constructive role in the development of some compromise between the two. key words: south china sea, foreign policy, china, united states, australia introduction the south china sea (scs) dispute is an unresolved territorial problem in the asia pacific region. the dispute has escalated in recent years, especially since 2009 when malaysia and vietnam jointly submitted information to the commission on the limits of the continental shelf (clcs) regarding the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles (nm).1 one day later, vietnam made a national submission regarding the outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nm from the baselines of vietnam. for china, these actions represented a violation of article 5 of the 2002 declaration of code of conduct (doc) regarding efforts to refrain from * author’s contact: lidya.bosua@gmail.com 1 w shicun, solving disputes for regional cooperation and development in south cina sea a chinese perspective, chandos publishing, uk, 2013, p. 152. mailto:lidya.bosua@gmail.com 134 china’s assertive foreign policy in south china sea doing activities that could escalate the conflict. the doc is an agreement between china and the association of south east asia nations (asean), which paved the way for a seven year period of peace between the scs claimants which include china, taiwan, vietnam, philippines, malaysia, and brunei darussalam. the 2002-2009 period after the signing of the doc was a period of peace in the scs, which was remarked by no significant incidents between conflicting parties during this period. however, after 2009, a few incidents (as discussed later) happened at sea, especially between china and vietnam, and china and the philippines, reigniting tensions. as a response to vietnam and malaysia submissions, china then responded by submitting a verbal note to the united nations, and attaching its ‚ushaped line‛.2 2 china also responded to vietnam’s declaration over the paracels and spratlys in its national law of sea by establishing a new city, sansha, in july 2012, a city that would have jurisdiction over the paracels, spratlys, and macclesfield bank. two months later, in november 2012, china issued a new version of its passport which contains a map of china that includes the u-shaped line. j zhang, ‘china’s growing assertiveness in the south china sea a strategic shift?’, national security college, retrieved 20 may 2015, <http://nsc.anu.edu.au/documents/occasional-5brief-4.pdf>. figure 1: china’s “u-shaped line” in the south china sea source: http://www.chinesedefence.com/forums/vie tnam-defence/5545-no-dispute-cinas-1948nine-dash-line-map-plus-article-15-unclosclear.html, accessed 12 may 2015. for china, sovereignty claims over the four island groups in the scs, the pratas islands, the paracel islands, the macclesfield bank and the spratly islands, derive from its historical rights as the first country that discovered, named, and continuously used these islands for more than two centuries.3 accordingly, for china, no other claimant states in the scs have sufficient evidence to support claims of sovereignty over the islands.4 after china declared its ‚ninedashed line‛5 in 1953, there was neither 3 ibid, p. 16. 4 ibid. 5 the chinese claim in the south china sea is called the ‚nine-dashed line‛ because as can be seen in map 1, it has a nine-dashed line (green lines). another source called it the ‚u-shaped line‛ because the lines http://www.chinesedefence.com/forums/vietnam-defence/5545-no-dispute-chinas-1948-nine-dash-line-map-plus-article-15-unclos-clear.html http://www.chinesedefence.com/forums/vietnam-defence/5545-no-dispute-chinas-1948-nine-dash-line-map-plus-article-15-unclos-clear.html http://www.chinesedefence.com/forums/vietnam-defence/5545-no-dispute-chinas-1948-nine-dash-line-map-plus-article-15-unclos-clear.html http://www.chinesedefence.com/forums/vietnam-defence/5545-no-dispute-chinas-1948-nine-dash-line-map-plus-article-15-unclos-clear.html journal of asean studies 135 opposition from the international community nor diplomatic protest against china from neighboring countries. therefore, in china’s view, the ‚ninedashed line‛ had been approved and recognized by the international community.6 2012 was the first time the map delineating china’s claims had been officially published since 1948. as argued by jian zhang, this action has been perceived by many as an indication of china’s growing assertiveness in regard to the scs dispute.7 indeed, since xi jinping came to power in 2013, he put ‚safeguarding the country’s sovereignty and security, and defending our territorial integrity‛8 as high priorities. subsequently, china’s foreign policy in the scs has become more assertive. furthermore, 2009 also marked the beginning of the involvement of external powers in the scs dispute, especially the us. by signing the treaty of amity and cooperation (tac), us indicated its strategic ‘pivot’ towards the asia pacific. the us intended to play a greater role in the region, particularly in the scs dispute, on behalf of its commitment to its allies in south east asia, especially the philippines. the us position raises questions regarding australia’s position, another us security ally in the asia pacific. created a u-shape, while others have called it the ‚nine-dotted line‛. 6 li jinming dan li dexia, ‚the dotted line on the chinese map of the south china sea: a note‛, ocean development and international law no. 34, 2003. 7 j zhang, op.cit. 8 council on foreign relations, ‘china’s maritime disputes’, retrieved 20 may 2015, <http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinasmaritime-disputes/p31345/#!/> in light of these arguments, this essay argues that china’s assertive foreign policy in the scs has had an impact on us and australian foreign policy. the rise of china, to some extent, places australia in a challenging situation, torn between its security alliance with the us and its economic interests in china, australia’s largest trading partner. however, the growing rivalry between china and the us does not mean australia must choose one. meanwhile, australia can play a constructive role in the development of some compromise between the two. china’s assertive foreign policy in the south china sea under xi jinping “while we pursue peaceful development, we will never relinquish our legitimate rights and interests, or allow china's core interests to be undermined. we should firmly uphold china's territorial sovereignty, maritime rights and interests and national unity, and properly handle territorial and island disputes.‛9 xi jinping, november 2014 xi jinping has led a transformation in china’s domestic and foreign policy. since xi jinping was appointed as the party’s general secretary in the 18th party congress of november 2012, xi has put himself at the centre of a new leadership, leaving behind the ‚collective leadership‛ style upheld 9 ministry of foreign affairs of the people’s republic of china, ‘the central conference on work relating to foreign affairs’, beijing, 29 november 2014, retrieved 9 may 2015, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t121 5680.shtml>. 136 china’s assertive foreign policy in south china sea since deng xiaoping. 10 he has put a hallmark on his new leadership by revealing ‚the chinese dream/zhongguo meng".11 a year later, after xi came into power in 2013, he spoke at the central conference on work relating to foreign affairs, announcing a new development in china’s foreign policy. at this high level meeting of the china communist party on foreign relations, xi officially laid out his new shift in foreign policy, marking a transformation from deng xiaoping’s dictum of ‚keeping a low profile‛ to ‚active and creative‛ strategy. for xi jinping, foreign policy should help realise the ‚two 100s‛12, which means ‚china becomes a "moderately well-off society" by 2020, the 100th anniversary of the communist party of china; and that modernizing china becomes a fully developed nation in the year 2049, the celebration of 100 years of the people's republic of china‛.13 according to medcalf, xi’s speech underlines ‚china's 10 ‘the power of xi jinping’, the economist, retrieved 10 may 2015, <http://www.economist.com/news/china/21618882cult-personality-growing-around-chinas-presidentwhat-will-he-do-his-political>. 11 the "chinese dream" includes four important things, namely strong china (economic, political, diplomatic, scientific, and military), civilized china (equality and fairness, rich culture, high morals), harmonious china (friendship between social classes), and beautiful china (healthy environment and less pollution). 12 t shi & d tweed, ‘xi jinping outlines ‘big country diplomacy for china’’, sydney morning herald, 2 december 2014, retrieved 19 may 2015, <http://www.smh.com.au/world/xi-jinping-outlinesbig-country-diplomacy-for-china-2014120211yaj5.html>. 13 kuhn r l, ‘xi jinping’s chinese dream’, new york times, 4 june 2013, retrieved 10 may 2015, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/opinion/global/ xi-jinpings-chinesedream.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>. determination to defend and advance its maritime claims and interests‛14 and clearly sends a message that china will protect its core interests.15 however, this is not a new policy because protection of maritime rights and interests was addressed in china’s twelfth five-year plan in march 2011.16 china’s core national interests have driven china’s foreign policy, with domestic political stability also related to foreign policy.17 these core national interests include sovereignty, territorial integrity, and sustainable socio-economic development. the report of the 18th ccp congress of 2012, a guide for the next five years, emphasized the importance of protecting these interests and sovereign rights of china, and of not surrendering to outside pressure. the 18th ccp congress also reclassified the south china sea as a ‚core national interest‛.18 xi jinping also put nationalism, patriotism and pride, at the centre of his leadership.19 as argued by huang, xi jinping realized that nationalism is a powerful notion in chinese society.20 china’s grand new strategy certainly attracted international attention, especially 14 r medcalf, ‘xi jinping speech: more diplomacy, less raw power’, 1 december 2014, retrieved 19 may 2015, <http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/12/01/xijinping-speech-more-diplomacy-less-rawpower.aspx?collcc=272644824&>. 15 f cameron, ‘china’s foreign policy under the new leadership-more continuity than change’, retrieved 10 may 2015, < http://www.euasiacentre.eu/pub_details.php?pub_id=124>. 16 j zhang, op.cit. 17 f cameron, op.cit. 18 ibid. 19 ibid. 20 c huang, ‘xi’s chinese dream’, in j sharp, the china renaissance the rise of xi jinping and the 18th communist party congress, world scientific publishing, singapore, 2013, p. 37. http://www.economist.com/news/china/21618882-cult-personality-growing-around-chinas-president-what-will-he-do-his-political http://www.economist.com/news/china/21618882-cult-personality-growing-around-chinas-president-what-will-he-do-his-political http://www.economist.com/news/china/21618882-cult-personality-growing-around-chinas-president-what-will-he-do-his-political http://www.eu-asiacentre.eu/pub_details.php?pub_id=124 http://www.eu-asiacentre.eu/pub_details.php?pub_id=124 journal of asean studies 137 on the scs territorial and island disputes, as illustrated by china’s 2009 sovereignty claim (the ‚nine-dashed line‛). there are several other indications of china’s growing assertiveness in the south china sea under xi jinping. first, china actively conducts military exercises in the scs in order to strengthen its claims. also, china regularly sends patrol boats to the area, and has even built military posts and airstrips on some islands. in december 2013, china sent its first aircraft carrier, the liaoning, to the scs. these moves heightened regional tensions, especially following china’s unilateral declaration of an air defense identification zone/adiz in the east china sea. some people worried that china would make a similar declaration regarding the scs.21 second, the 2014 placement of the haiyang shiyou-981 oil rig at a location within vietnam’s exclusive economic zone (eez) triggered massive anti-chinese protests in hanoi.22 after nearly two months, on july 16, 2014, the china national petroleum corp finally shut down the rig and moved it closer to hainan island in southern china. 21 a panda, ‘one year of adiz: what next for china?’, the diplomat, 27 november 2014, retrieved 20 may 2015, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/one-yearof-adiz-what-next-for-china/>. 22 at least 1000 people took to the street protests against the chinese actions. this unrest not only attacked the chinese passport workers, but also destroyed and looted chinese-owned companies and factories which were operating in vietnam. more than 3,000 chinese nationals were evacuated from some parts of vietnam after riots since mid-may 2014. the chinese foreign ministry immediately responded by evacuating its citizens and did not allow its citizens to travel to vietnam. third, china has carried out extensive land reclamation projects in the scs. however, article 121 of the 1982 un convention on the law of the sea (unclos) declares that submerged features (such as shoals) cannot be claimed by any party and that ‚rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf‛23. china is now building new islands on five different reefs and is creating conditions to sustain human habitation to bolster its claims.24 in january 2014, a massive land reclamation was done at johnson south reef.25 since 2014, additional land reclamation is also being done on woody island, duncan island, and drummon island, accompanied by infrastructure.26 according to tiezzi, johnson south reef will be the home to a new south china sea airbase.27 fourth, in june 2014, the hunan map publishing house issued a chinese map, which displayed a ten-dashed line of the south china sea that incorporated 23 united nations, ‘united nations convention on the law of the sea’, retrieved 20 may 2015, <http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreement s/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf>. 24 s tiezzi, ‘why is china building islands in the south china sea?’, the diplomat, 10 september 2014, retrieved 20 may 2015, <a>. 25 r wingfield-hayes, ‘china’s island factory’, 9 september 2014, retrieved 20 may 2015, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/special/2014/newsspec_ 8701/index.html>. 26 v r lee, ‘south china sea: china is building on the paracels as well’, the diplomat, 14 april 2015, retrieved 21 may 2015, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/south-china-seachina-is-building-on-the-paracels-as-well/>. 27 s tiezzi, op.cit. 138 china’s assertive foreign policy in south china sea taiwan into mainland china.28 and fifth, in march 2014, china blocked two civilian ships chartered by the philippines navy to send logistics to the philippines marine unit stationed on second thomas shoal. this disputed shoal in the spratly islands is located 200 km from kalayaan islandswestern philippines, and has been claimed as part of the philippines’ continental shelf. there are several factors contributing to xi jinping’s more assertive policies in the south china sea. first, recent external developments have driven china to adopt a more assertive position in the south china sea. as argued by zhang, these developments to be, in part, the result of beijing’s previously more moderate position, one that failed to effectively protect china's sovereignty and maritime interests against intensified disruption by other claimants.29 china believes that the doc has enabled a growing number of foreign oil companies to exploit scs energy resources, and enabled fishing by foreign ships leading to growing disputes, given that the scs is considered by china as its historical fishing ground.30 moreover, china’s historical claims over the scs are unlikely to be accepted in the modern international legal system.31 at the same time, asean’s insistence on the development of a multilateral code of 28 nguyen thi lan anh, ‘new ten-dashed line map revealed china’s ambition’, 19 july 2014, retrieved 30 may 2015, <www.thanhniennews.com/commentaries/newtendashed-line-map-revealed-chinas-ambition28816.html>. 29 j zhang, op.cit, p. 19. 30 ibid, p. 21. 31 international crisis group, stirring up the south china sea (i), asia report no. 223, 23 april 2012, in j zhang, op.cit. conduct (coc) in the scs has deepened china’s anxiety. second, xi jinping wants to define his leadership by reasserting china’s core interests and nationalism. xi has great influence in the foreign policy making process. as argued by huang, xi is a very different leader from his predecessor, hu jintao, as ‚xi’s style is more like a strongman leader‛.32 xi is the first member of the politburo,33 the elite group of the ccp which consists of seven people and which oversees china’s policy-making (primus inter pares). president xi leads a number of committees that deal with different aspects of foreign and security policy and he has a decisive voice.34 third, as a result of the increasing global influence of china, the number of domestic actors involved in the foreign policy making process has increased. besides the politburo and party organs, there are also financial and business groups, regional and city bosses, the media (conventional and modern), research institutes, the people liberation army (pla) and branches of the armed forces.35 these agencies certainly influence china’s foreign policies. sometimes their priorities and interests are not always in line with beijing. for example, in 2014 when the hunan map publishing house issued the ten-dashed line map mentioned above. this incident is similar to the one that occurred in 2012 when hainan province, without 32 c huang, ‘change agent or steady as she goes?’, in j sharp, op.cit, p. 28. 33 president xi jinping is a member of the politburo along with prime minister li keqiang, wang qishan, zhang dejiang, yu zhengsheng, liu yunshan, zhang gaoli. 34 f cameron, op.cit. 35 ibid. journal of asean studies 139 permission from beijing, issued passports with the u-shaped line map that depicted china’s scs claims. china’s recent moves have raised some doubts that china has become more assertive in south china sea. in turn, it has been reasons for the us to play a greater role in southeast asia. the united states’s interests in the south china sea ‚we do not have a position on the legal merits of the competing sovereignty claims to the islands, but we do have a position under the 1982 un convention on the law of the sea on the potential maritime claims.‛36 it has been argued that 2009 was not only a turning point regarding china’s assertiveness in the south china sea dispute, but also a turning point regarding the us position in this dispute. on 23 july 2009, hillary clinton, us secretary of state, signed tac at the sixteenth asean regional forum (arf). this was the us ‚pivot‛, the starting point for the ‚back to asia‛ policy. the obama administration wished to enhance us presence in southeast asia.37 the us policy on the scs was made clear one year later, when hillary clinton attended the seventeenth arf in hanoi, vietnam. clinton clearly declared that the 36 us department of state, ‘u.s. department of state daily press briefing’, 10 may 1995, retrieved 10 may 2015, <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/erc/briefing/daily_briefing s/1995/9505/950510db.html>. 37 manyin, me, garcia, mj, morrison wm, ‘u.s. accession to asean’s treaty of amity and cooperation (tac)’, crs report for congress, 5 may 2009, retrieved 21 may 2015, <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/124064. pdf>. united states has a national interest in the freedom of navigation in the south china sea.38 however, this was not the first time that the united states declared an interest in the scs. on 10 may 1995, the united states issued a us department of state daily press briefing, which stated that maintaining freedom of navigation in the region is a fundamental interest of the united states. the united states clarified its position by saying that: ‚the us takes no position on the legal merits of the competing claims to sovereignty over the various island, reefs, atolls, and cays in the south china sea‛. the united states would, however, view with serious concern any maritime claim or restriction on maritime activity in the south china sea that was not consistent with international law, including the 1982 unclos.39 the united states has consistently used the issue of freedom of navigation as its primary reason for showing interest in the south china sea. since the ‘pivot’ in 2009, the united states consistently has raised this issue at annual arf meetings. in 2011, at the first east asia summit (eas) attended by us president barack obama, the us restated its previous position that it 38 r emmers, ‘the us rebalancing strategy: impact on the south china sea’, national security college, retrieved 21 may 2015, <http://nsc.anu.edu.au/documents/occasional-5-brief8.pdf>. 39 us department of state, op.cit. 140 china’s assertive foreign policy in south china sea takes no position in the dispute, but that freedom of navigation is its core interest.40 however, according to fravel, the us has two principal interests in the south china sea. first is the freedom of navigation. here the us refers to articles 87 of the unclos, which declares that ‚the high seas are open to all states, whether coastal or land-locked. freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this convention and by other rules of international law. it comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and land-locked states: (a) freedom of navigation; ...‛.41 the us asserts it has legitimate economic and military interests in freedom of navigation in the scs. according to glaser, more than us 1 trillion dollars’ worth of the us trade comes through the scs every year.42 in addition, us naval vessels from the us west coast and japan pass through the south china sea on their way to the indian ocean and persian gulf. the second principal us interest is peace and stability in southeast asia region. this relates to trade and economic development – any disruption to the security of sea-lanes in the scs would affect cross-border trade and investment.43 the united states has raised these principal interests in the scs since it poses several security threats. according to fravel, since the 2001 incident in which a 40 r emmers, op.cit. 41 united nations convention on the law of the sea, <http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreement s/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf>. 42 b s glaser, ‘armed clashes in the south china sea’, new york, council on foreign relations, 2012, p. 4, <http://www.cfr.org/world/armed-clash-south-chinasea/p27883>. 43 m t fravel, ‘us policy towards the disputes in the south china sea since 1995’, policy report, march 2014, p. 2. us reconnaissance plane and a chinese jet fighter collided44, china has tried to restrict us military activities in this zone, especially regarding surveillance and reconnaissance. furthermore, the modernization of the pla navy poses a challenge to us naval vessels in the scs.45 accordingly, in light of these security threats in the scs, fravel also argued that the us has to maintain three interests: ‚its commitments to allies in the region, its stable and cooperative relations with china, and finally its neutrality regarding the sovereignty of land features‛.46 therefore, the us’s support to the philippines can be put in the context of the us commitment to its ally. the philippines, one of the claimant states in the south china sea dispute, is a us ally based on the 1951 mutual defense treaty. article vi provides the mechanism for the two countries to respond if there is an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the pacific, or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the pacific.47 although there is debate about whether the south china sea is a part of the us obligation under the treaty48, president 44 incident happened when a us ep-3 reconnaissance plane and a china’s f-8 fighter jet collided near hainan island. 45 m t fravel, op.cit. 46 ibid. 47 yale law school, ‘mutual defense treaty between the united states and the republic of the philippines’, 30 august 1951, retrieved 10 may 2015, <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/phil001.asp >. 48 some in the philippines refer to the 1999 diplomatic letter from the u.s. ambassador to the philippines, thomas hubbard, to the philipinnes’ foreign secretary domingo siazon, which affirmed william cohen’s statement that the south china sea is journal of asean studies 141 obama seemed to make it clear on his visit to the philippines in may 2014 when he stated that: "… our commitment to defend the philippines is ironclad and the united states will keep that commitment, because allies never stand alone."49 moreover, the us and the philippines signed the enhanced defense cooperation agreement (edca) in 2014 which updated and upgraded their defense commitments.50 since the us declared its renewed interest in the south east asian region, the scs dispute has been mentioned in other arf and eas participants’ statements. initially china did not expect the international exposure of the scs dispute, but since vietnam and indonesia chaired the asean in 2010 and 2011 respectively, ongoing exposure is inevitable. however, in 2012, when asean was chaired by cambodia, a close economic partner of china, asean failed to issue a joint communique regarding the scs dispute. this was because cambodia refused to incorporate the april 2012 scarborough shoal incident into the final document of considered as part of the pacific area, to ensure that it is part of the treaty. fonbuena, c, ‘old letter of us envoy details us pledge to defend west ph sea’, 14 may 2014, retrieved 21 may 2015, <http://www.rappler.com/nation/58048-edca-hearingcongress>. 49 fonbuena, c, ‘obama: u.s. commitment to ph 'ironclad'’, 29 april 2014, retrieved 21 may 2015, <http://www.rappler.com/nation/56690-obamaironclad-support-philippines>. 50 us support for the philippines is increasingly evident with the signing of the improved defense treaty, the ten-year agreement that allows the us military greater presence in the philippines signed on 28 april 2014 between the philippine defense secretary voltaire gazmin, and us ambassador to the philippines, philip goldberg , a few hours before obama's arrival in the philippines. asean ministerial meeting. at the asean summit of november 2012, asean and china also failed to negotiate a multilateral code of conduct (coc) for the scs. asean has not yet reached a consensus on a multilateral code as four of the six scs claimants were asean member states. indeed china insists on negotiating bilaterally with asean members. the disagreement between asean member countries is actually unfavorable for regional security, and as argued by emmers, has reduced the strategic benefits which are provided by us rebalancing strategy in southeast asia,51 something that is not desirable for the us from its greater involvement in the southeast asia region since regional peace and stability in southeast asia is one of the principal us interests in the scs. australia’s interests in the south china sea ‚it shows the united states can say a lot about regional prosperity but doesn’t do much. china only says some things, but does a lot.‛52 it has been argued that australia has no direct interests in the south china sea. but, since australia has a security alliance with the united states, has close economic relations with china, and is a member of both the arf and eas, the south china sea 51 r emmers, op.cit, p. 43. 52 j perlez, ‘asia’s ‘big guy’ spreads cash and seeks influence in pacific region’, 22 november 2014, retrieved 21 may 2015, <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/23/world/asia/asia s-big-guy-xi-jinping-spreads-cash-and-seeksinfluence-in-pacific-region.html>. 142 china’s assertive foreign policy in south china sea dispute does have an impact on australia’s strategic considerations and interests regarding regional stability. furthermore, australia’s 2013 defense white paper clearly stated that: ‚australia has interests in the peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes including in the south china sea in accordance with international law, the prevention of aggression within southeast asia, and freedom of navigation and maritime security in the region’s sea lanes‛.53 therefore, a peaceful scs is in australia’s interests, particularly as australia’s extensive shipping trade with east asia passes through this region.54 australia and the united states have a security treaty entitled the australia new zealand united states (anzus) treaty, signed on 1 september 1951. the focus of this treaty is the security guarantee provided to australia by the us, although this guarantee does not seem to be as explicit as the one relating to the north atlantic treaty organization (nato).55 the anzus treaty involves not only security guarantees for australia, but also provides australia access to us intelligence and military technologies that it could not 53 department of defence, defence white paper 2013, retrieved 22 may 2015, <http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/2013/docs/ wp_2013_web.pdf>. 54 northeast asia is the destination of 55 percent of australia’s merchandise export, based on australian government, department of foreign affairs and trade, country and region factsheets, in dupont, a dupont, ‘living with the dragon: why australia needs a china strategy’, lowy, sydney 2011, retrieved 25 may 2015, < http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/pubfiles/dupont% 2c_living_with_the_dragon_web.pdf>. 55 p edwards, ‘permanent friends? historical reflections on the australian-american alliance’, lowy institute paper, no. 8, 2005, pp. 16-17. produce itself.56 in addition, as kelton argues, the anzus alliance enhances the prospects of australian influence in the region which benefits australia’s long-term interests.57 however, as a consequence, the us almost certainly expects diplomatic and military support from australia in any major us maritime military measures in east or south east asia.58 australia has previously proved its commitment to the alliance by joining major us military actions in afghanistan and iraq. the us has clearly committed itself to a rebalance of power in the south east asian region, making commitments regarding the security of south east asian allies involved in the south china sea dispute. there are questions, however, about the extent to which australia would support the us in an east asian conflict. as mentioned, in the 2013 defense white paper, australia strongly supports the continued engagement and enhanced presence of the united states in south east asia. however, that does not necessarily mean that australia would militarily support the us in any south china sea dispute. australia may be confronted with a situation similar to when president bush declared china as a strategic competitor, but prime minister john howard and foreign minister alexander downer did not follow us’s china policies.59 australia chose to play its own strategy, choosing to actively support the us in 56 department of defence, op.cit 57 m kelton, ‘more than an ally? contemporary australia-us relations, ashgate, usa, 2008, p. 187. 58 a behm, in j lee, op.cit, p. 404. 59 c tubilewicz, ‘the 2009 defence white paper and the rudd governmet’s response to china’s rise’, australian journal of political science, vol. 45, no. 1, march 2010, pp. 149-157. journal of asean studies 143 afghanistan and iraq, while at the same time refraining from opposing china on issues related to china’s core strategic interests. further, in 2003, australia surprisingly rejected an invitation from the us to join in secret meetings on how to deal with the rise of china. uk, canada, new zealand, and japan, which are called as the halibut group, attended the meeting. concerned about offending china, australia preferred to talk bilaterally with the us. australia considered that it would gain more through individual talks with the us, and at the same time avoids offending china.60 australia’s pragmatic foreign policies have helped australia build a strategic economic partnership with china. china is now australia’s largest trading partner and second-biggest export market.61 according to griffiths and wesley, pragmatism in australia’s foreign policy is reinforced by several factors. first, as a status quo power with a strategic alliance with the us, australia tends to avoid risks that could reduce its privilege. second, australia culturally has national characters such as ‚suspicious of big‛, abstract thought and keen for immediate and visible results. third, bureaucratic problem in australian foreign policy-making is also evident since only a few executives with excessive load involves. finally, griffiths and wesley called this last factor as a ‚culture of serendipity‛ that australia 60 l sales, ‘australia declines invitation to us forum on china’, 28 june 2005, retrieved 22 may 2015, <http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2005/s1401925.ht m>. 61 m griffiths & m wesley, ‘taking asia seriously’, australian journal of political science, vol. 45, no. 1, march 2010, p. 20. ‚seems to be always saved‛ by the international occurrence. therefore, as they quoted from horne (1965), ‚a country that has never had to weather the full impact of an international challenge is not disposed to think hard about the future‛.62 nonetheless, relations between australia and china have fluctuated since 1972 when australia built diplomatic relations with china. significant progress in the relationship was made during kevin rudd’s prime leadership in 2008. china was his first overseas trip. however, in 2009 the partnership reached a low point63 when the 2009 defense white paper considered china to be a threat. the white paper argued that china's military build-up went beyond what it needed for a conflict with taiwan.64 for china, as stated in the beijing review, this white paper was just an excuse for australia to increase its military budget, and to assure the us that australia would not further its relations with china.65 in the 2013 defense white paper, four key australian strategic goals are identified: a secure australia, a secure south pacific and timor leste, a stable indopacific66, and a stable, rules-based global 62 ibid. 63 c tubilewicz, op.cit. 64 see point 4.26-27 in department of defense, defending australia in the asia pacific century: force 2030, australia, 2009, retrieved 29 may 2015, <http://www.defence.gov.au/cdg/documents/defenc e_white_paper_2009.pdf>. 65 c tubilewicz, op.cit. 66 the 2013 defence white paper defined the indopacific region as a wider concept of the asia-pacific region, extending from india though southeast asia to northeast asia, including the sea lanes of communication on which the region depends. department of defence, defence white paper 2013 op.cit, p.7. 144 china’s assertive foreign policy in south china sea order. the paper acknowledged that the security of south east asia is central to a stable indo-pacific region. australia has for some time engaged with south east asia for such security reasons. australia became asean's very first dialogue partner in 1974 and was a founding member of the arf in 1994. australia’s accession to the tac in december 2005 was primarily motivated by canberra’s desire to be a founding member of the eas.67 the asean-australia dialogue relations achieved a significant milestone in 2007 with the adoption of the joint declaration on asean-australia comprehensive partnership.68 clearly, south east asia is recognized as part of australia’s strategic interests. the 2009 defense white paper did mention that ‚a secure and stable southeast asia is in australia’s strategic interests‛.69 therefore, it is not surprising that australia chooses to support asean’s view regarding the proposal for a multilateral coc in the scs. the impacts of china’s assertiveness on the us and australian foreign policy china’s growing assertiveness in the south china sea has had an impact on us and australian foreign policy. first of all, it seems to have prompted a shift in us policy, one toward greater involvement in the southeast asia. at the same time, the south east asia countries have welcomed 67 manyin, me, garcia, mj, morrison wm, op.cit. 68 asean secretariat, ‘overview of australia-asean relations’, retrieved 22 may 2015, <http://www.asean.org/asean/externalrelations/australia/item/overview-of-asean-australiadialogue-relations>. 69 department of defense, defending australia in the asia pacific century: force 2030, op.cit. the us presence in region, especially vietnam and the philippines, both in dispute with china over scs claims. vietnam has increased its defence relations with the us by conducting joint naval activities and opening its commercial repair facilities at cam ranh bay to all navies.70 the philippines has also enhanced its defense arrangements with the us. the signing of the edca, april 28, 2014, has enabled the us to use philippine military facilities and deploy us troops on a rotational basis, while at the same time the us gives assistance to the philippines armed forces.71 in addition, the us government supports the efforts of the philippines in its scs sovereignty claim at the arbitral tribunal in the hague. interestingly, in december 2014, vietnam joined the philippines by submitting a position paper to the arbitral tribunal.72 second, china’s assertiveness has deepened the rivalry between the us and china. china views the us rebalancing strategy, its focus on the south china sea, and its strengthening of regional bilateral alliances as an attempt to contain china’s peaceful rise. for china, the us argument about freedom of navigation is only an excuse to justify greater us military 70 r emmers, op.cit. 71‘agreement between the government of the republic of the philippines and the government of the united states of america on enhanced defense cooperation’, retrieved 25 may 2015, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/220920869/enhanceddefense-cooperation-agreement>. 72 heydarian, r j, ‘south china sea legal battle hots up’, straits times, 18 december 2014, retrieved 25 may 2015, <http://www.straitstimes.com/news/opinion/moreopinion-stories/story/south-china-sea-legal-battlehots-20141218>. journal of asean studies 145 presence in the region.73 a sign of deepened rivalry can be traced to the divided asean response to the south china sea issue, especially the failure to issue a joint communique at the 2012 asean ministerial meeting. asean also faces difficulties in drafting a multilateral coc in the scs since china insists that this be done bilaterally. as a result of china’s insistence, asean cannot achieve consensus on how to address the scs sovereignty dispute. third, the more assertive china foreign policy in the south china sea has caused a dilemma for australia. since the risk of conflict between the us and china is rising, as argued by dupont, ‚australia could be drawn into the unresolved territorial dispute in the south china sea‛.74 although the potential for war is low, the deteriorating situation may in the future force australia to choose between its security ally and its major trading partner.75 finally, australia cannot avoid foreign policy ambiguity and pragmatism in regards to the increasing rivalry between the us and china. the ambiguity can be seen in the 2013 defence white paper which did not offer any clues regarding the extent to which australia might play a role, even a minor one, in reducing strategic tensions between the us and china.76 this position is based on the desire not to disrupt key relationships. australia is happy with the status quo. consequently, on the one hand, australia would like to maintain its alliance 73 r emmers, op.cit. 74 a dupont, op.cit. 75 ibid. 76 j lee, ‘australia’s 2015 defence white paper: seeking strategic opportunities in southeast asia to help manage china’s peaceful rise’, contemporary southeast asia, vol. 35, no. 3, 2013, pp. 395-422. commitment with the united states, while not explicitly offending china. on the other hand, australia would like to support the asean goal of a multilateral coc in the scs, thereby possibly offending china. this ambiguity and pragmatism, argues griffiths, seems to show that australia cannot have independent foreign policies.77 the best thing australia can do is avoiding collision, especially in its relations with the us and china, while at the same time play a constructive role in the development of some compromise between the us and china. in agreement with the idea of ‚a concert of asia‛, as proposed by white, which could engage asia’s great powers, such the us, china, japan, and india, australia can play a role in this framework. as white argues, this order ‚would maintain the greatest strategic role for america in asia while also maintaining peaceful us-china relations... [which] also best preserves australia’s alliance with america‛.78 conclusion the external dynamics of south china sea dispute and domestic consideration of xi jinping’s leadership to define the rules of its presidency has made xi’s policies seem to be more assertive. however, these developments have impacted on the us and australian foreign policy. first, it seems to have prompted a shift in us policy toward greater 77 m griffiths, ‘us-china relations: should australia be worried?’, professionals’ lecture series, flinders university, 26 may, 2015. 78 hugh white, ‘powershift: rethinking australia’s place in the asian century’, australian journal of international affairs, vol. 65, no. 1, 2011, pp. 81-93. 146 china’s assertive foreign policy in south china sea involvement in the southeast asia. second, it has deepened the rivalry between the us and china. third, it has caused a dilemma for australia between its security ally and its major trading partner. finally, the increasing rivalry between the us and china leads australia into foreign policy ambiguity and pragmatism. these impacts basically reveal that this dispute is not only about china and other claimant states. therefore, china only has at least two best options: achieve the win-win solution multilaterally by using asean mechanism and its economic leverage; or maintain the status quo without pushing the claim assertively. then, the us and australian foreign policy could lead china into this way. references ‘agreement between the government of the republic of the philippines and the government of the united states of america on enhanced defense cooperation’, retrieved 25 may 2015, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/220920 869/enhanced-defense-cooperationagreement>. anh, n t l, ‘new ten-dashed line map revealed china’s ambition’, 19 july 2014, retrieved 3o may 2015, <www.thanhniennews.com/commen taries/new-tendashed-line-maprevealed-chinas-ambition28816.html>. asean secretariat, ‘overview of australiaasean relations’, 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http://nsc.anu.edu.au/documents/occasional-5-brief-4.pdf journal of asean studies, vol. 9, no. 1 (2021), pp. 49-71 doi: https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v9i1.6899 issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic prerequisites and perceived information system qualities model for mobile banking adoption among the customers of private commercial banks in myanmar phyo min tun department of information technology, assumption university, bangkok, thailand phyomintun.sg@gmail.com received: 31st december 2020/ revised: 18th january 2021/ accepted: 08th april 2021 how to cite: tun, p. m. (2021). prerequisites and perceived information system qualities model for mobile banking adoption among the customers of private commercial banks in myanmar. journal of asean studies, 9(1), 49-71, https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v9i1.6899 abstract the research attempts to conjecture the prerequisites of perceived qualities of information system (is) such as mobile banking (mb). the quantitative research was conducted and a total of 577 mb users of private commercial banks in myanmar participated in the research. the results of the hypotheses were formulated by using partly exploratory factor analysis (efa), partly confirmatory factor analysis (cfa), and structural equation modeling (sem) techniques. the findings expose that device quality is an independent factor, and an antecedent of user interface design quality and system quality. the research also discloses that user interface design quality is a prerequisite of system quality and information quality. in the research, system quality and information quality are key factors affecting customers’ intention to adopt mb. further, the results confirm that system quality has a statistically significant effect on information quality. however, the effect of device quality on information quality is insignificant. it is expected that the research gives valuable insights for not only bank managers but also software engineers who are going to develop mb systems. keywords: mobile banking, information system, qualities, private banks, myanmar. introduction the inventions of advanced technology drive the retail banks to perform the rapid digital transformation of banking services and create a mobile environment that enables customers to perform financial transactions with minimum effort (tam & oliveira, 2017). therefore, the usage of mobile technology devices and innovative financial technologies (fin50 prerequisites and perceived information system tech) in financial institutions is inevitable. as a result of technological advancement, banks invent an information system (is) based on the mobile app to assist their customers to interact with their services (noh & lee, 2016). mobile banking (mb) provides customers with extensive benefits such as conducting their financial transactions at anytime and anywhere. moreover, mb supports the potential of increasing the effectiveness of payment methods and expanding the accessibility of traditional banking services by those who currently lack them. being originally independent of location and time, mb provides cost-effective banking services and can play a crucial role, particularly in emerging countries. mb has extra advantages compared to traditional banking which allow the banks for minimizing cost, maximizing revenue, more market shares, higher brand loyalty, greater customer retention, and better customer experience (jeong & yoon, 2013). thus, banks are investing in developing mb continuously. however, the adoption rate is still under the expectation of banks since their customers still hesitate to use this technology. the research attempts to disclose the underlying prerequisite qualities of the perceived is qualities from delone and mclean (1992) information system success (iss) model, which is one of the widely employed research models to verify the likelihood of the success of is in the mobile commercial application landscape (petter, delone, & mclean, 2013). this empirical research is a first-time endeavor to discover the prerequisites of perceived is qualities in mb context (sharma & sharma, 2019; damabi, firoozbakht, & ahmadyan, 2018; myo & hwang, 2017; deventer, klerk, & bevan-dye, 2017; tam & oliveira, 2017; lokman et al., 2017; zhou, 2012; zhou, 2011; lee & chung, 2009). therefore, the research focuses on a comprehensive set of potential is qualities that influence mb adoption. two factors adapted from the iss model of delone and mclean (1992), system quality and information quality, and two factors based on prior studies, device quality and user interface design quality, are employed to investigate the intention of users to adopt mb. furthermore, the major objective of the research is to contribute to both theoretical and managerial issues concerning the relationships among the different quality aspects and the influence on the individual intention in mb adoption. thus, the following research questions are needed to answer in this study: rq1: what are the underlying prerequisite is qualities? rq2: what are the relationships between prerequisite and perceived is qualities? rq3: which perceived is quality is more important than others in mb adoption? literature review myanmar, an asean country, had been mainly a cash-based economy due to the prolonged over controlling of financial policy by the central government since 1960. as a result of the financial institutions law in 1990, several private commercial banks emerged. nonetheless, the era of rising private commercial banks was short due to the banking crisis occurring in 2003, so the financial sector became fragile (tun, 2020a). as a consequence of reforming economic policy in 2011, financial inclusion enabled conditions for the endeavor of re-establishing private banks (turnell, 2011). there are currently 27 privately-owned domestic banks in myanmar which dominate 67% of total bank assets in myanmar (hofmann, 2018). journal of asean studies 51 among them, kanbawza bank (kbz) is the largest private commercial bank which represents 41% of the private bank market share. ayeyarwady bank (aya) is the second largest with 17% of the total, followed by co-operative bank (cb) with 11% of the total. furthermore, only 25% of the myanmar population has bank accounts according to the world bank report 2018. besides, there are about 68,24 million mobile phone users in myanmar and mobile network coverage is currently at 82%. the majority of mobile phone users (90%) are using the device with the android platform, while only 10% are using apple ios devices (kemp, 2020). therefore, the central bank of myanmar (cbm) has granted private banks to operate mobile banking services since 2013. although there are abundant facilitating conditions, mb adoption in myanmar is relatively low compared to mobile phone users (lwin, ameen, & nusari, 2019). the growth of m-commerce technologies transforms the way of banks and their customers conduct financial transactions, and mobile banking (mb) is one of them (albalawi & rehman, 2016). mb is a major mobile financial management service having similar functionality with internet banking (via computer) that is widely adopted by many customers to mainly check the account balance and process fund transfers (gu, lee, & suh, 2009). similarly, mahad et al. (2015) defined mb as the use of mobile smartphone devices to access banking tasks not only for transferring funds and monitoring account balances but also making bill payments and locating automated teller machines (atm). furthermore, mb can be assumed as a subset of electronic banking (e-banking) that refers to the transformation of accessing financial services from wired networks to wireless networks through a mobile device (clarke iii, 2001). according to yeo and fisher (2017), mb is a more advanced financial technology than online banking with unique features such as narrow costs for usage, mobility, customization, and a broader scope of utilities. moreover, mb has evolved from short message service (sms) based banking to mobile applications installed in users’ smartphone devices (deventer, klerk, & bevan-dye, 2017). mb offers private commercial banks' customers a variety of advantages of conducting financial services easily, effectively, quickly, and conveniently compared to accessing physical banks. in addition, mb is an application of m-commerce and an innovative method which facilitates business transactions via telecommunication channels by using mobile devices (kim, shin, & lee, 2009). theoretical background delone and mclean (1992) proposed a model to measure is success (figure 1) based on the theory of communication by shannon and weaver (1949). the is success model caught the concept of a communication system which is a mechanism of delivering and transferring information to the receivers. as a result, delone and mclean built a framework consisting of two major quality dimensions, system quality to measure technical success, and information quality to measure semantic success. later, seddon (1997) suggested modifying the d&m iss model for clarification since the original framework is confusing, and the use construct in the model is ambiguous. 52 prerequisites and perceived information system figure 1 information system success model (1992) consequently, delone and mclean modified their iss model in 2003 by adding service quality factor into major quality components, system quality, and information quality, to enhance the measurement capability on the success of is in e-commerce context (figure 2). however, service quality is an insignificant determinant of behavioral intention (brown & jayakody, 2008; kuo, wu, & deng, 2009). tun (2020) also proved that service quality is not critical for mobile financial service adoption in myanmar. furthermore, tam and oliveira (2017) postulated that system quality and information quality could be the most significant quality dimensions to measure the success of an is. therefore, prior premise and research findings lead to exclude service quality construct in the research model. figure 2 updated information system success model (2003) another significant modification in the updated d&m iss model (figure 2) is the separation of use and intention to use. venkatesh and davis (1996) argued that users show their intention to use the technology before they use it by modifying technology acceptance model (tam). fishbein and ajzen (1975) explained that certain behavior of users originated from the intention for engaging by developing theory of reasoned action (tra) which is the background theory of tam. subsequently, delone and mclean (2003) proposed to separate ‘intention to use’ and ‘use’, but they are stuck to each other and alternation. alam (2014) explicitly stated that behavioral intention is an unavoidable antecedent of actual adoption which is the ultimate business goal of banks. therefore, the intention to adopt can be referred to as the willingness and possibility of the user to adopt a specific information system. the research model is adapted from delone and mclean (1992) as it focuses on investigating potential is journal of asean studies 53 qualities that will lead to users’ intention to adopt an is, which does not predict its success. moreover, none of the previous studies, as shown in table 1, attempted to investigate the prerequisite of key is quality factors of delone and mclean (1992). table 1 summary of relevant previous studies researchers context country sampling size investigated is qualities sharma and sharma (2019) mb oman 227 sysq, infq lee and chung (2009) mb korea 276 sysq, infq myo and hwang (2017) mb myanmar 206 sysq, infq deventer, klerk, and bevan-dye (2017) mb south africa 334 sysq zhou (2011) mb china 210 sysq, infq zhou (2012) mb china 240 sysq, infq tam and oliveira (2017) mb southern european 354 sysq, infq damabi, firoozbakht, and ahmadyan (2018) mb iran 155 sysq, infq lokman et al. (2017) mb malaysia 146 sysq, infq chemingui and lallouna (2013) mobile financial services tunisia 300 sysq gao and waechter (2017) m-payment australia 851 sysq, infq routray et al. (2019) m-wallet india 200 sysq, infq koo, wati, and chung (2013) mb and internet banking indonesia 141 sysq, infq talukder, quazi, and sathye (2014) mobile phone banking australia 242 sysq wilson and mbamba (2017) mobile phone payment tanzania 260 sysq noh and lee (2016) mobile apps-based banking korea 520 sysq, infq yoo (2020) m-commerce korea 283 sysq, infq phuong and trang (2018) m-commerce vietnam 427 sysq, infq lee and chen (2014) m-commerce taiwan 406 sysq, infq yassierli, vinsensius, and mohamed (2018) m-commerce indonesia 230 infq hypotheses development device quality the advanced mobile services such as carrying out financial transactions, seeking information, playing games, and buying and selling products can be accessed by using modern mobile devices (roy, 2017). likewise, middleton (2010) stated that advanced technology has enabled mobile devices to have higher computing performance and network connectivity through wireless technologies such as 4g, wi-fi and bluetooth, which has led to the rise of mobile phone usage. liu, au and choi (2014) explained that users can utilize mobile apps to perform desired functions by installing and running them on handheld devices such as tablets and mobile phones. the mobile device has unique features to influence users' beliefs and support special services for various businesses and information systems. technically, the device quality could be investigated in three aspects: functionalities, compatibility, and 54 prerequisites and perceived information system performance. these aspects may have an impact on the perceptions of users, which in turn might outcome in the overall feeling of using the device (parveen & sulaiman, 2008). thus, previous literature leads to formulate the hypotheses: h1: device quality has a significant positive effect on user interface design quality. h2: device quality has a significant positive effect on system quality. h3: device quality has a significant positive effect on information quality. user interface design quality a higher quality of user interface design enables users to use desired functions on an information system in different approaches while being allowed to perceive the quality of the system (branscomb & thomas, 1984). according to jeong (2011), user interface design is referred as screen design, and yoo (2020) considered it as visual quality. user interface design encompasses the whole visual appearance of information systems such as the font style, color usage, icons and buttons placement, and content layout (graham, hannigan, & curran, 2005). on the other hand, bharati and chaudhury (2004) stated that user interface design quality is the manner of displaying and presenting the information. therefore, user interface design quality will be investigated as a discrete factor in the research although it is the sub-dimensions of system quality factor in d&m iss model (seddon, 1997). the users will learn further about the information system based on their initial experience in user interface design (everard & galletta, 2005). lee and chung (2009), damabi, firoozbakht, and ahmadyan (2018) also proved that user interface design is a critical factor in mobile banking context. therefore: h4: user interface design quality has a significant positive effect on system quality. h5: user interface design quality has a significant positive effect on information quality. system quality system quality is an instant impression through the using device that leads to use of the system since users do not directly access service in the case of mb (gao & waechter, 2017). the extensive scope of system quality is obvious in the various ways measured by ease of use, functionality, usability, and response time of the specific system (delone & mclean, 2003). system quality captures the concepts of the productivity model to evaluate the degree of is resource, which is crucial in the mobile environment (lee & chung, 2009). on the other hand, kuan, bock and vathanophas (2008) stated that system quality is the technical perspective of the e-commerce system that produces information. furthermore, talukder, quazi, and sathye (2014) define system quality as the technological quality of the mobile system that reflects the quality of the information provided to users. hariguna and berlilana (2017), sharkey, scott, and acton (2010), and lin (2007) asserted that higher system quality has the capability to boost the intention of users to adopt it and lead to the rise of market share in the e-commerce landscape. therefore, the hypotheses have been formulated: journal of asean studies 55 h6: system quality has a significant positive effect on information quality. h7: system quality has a significant positive effect on intention to adopt mb. information quality nelson, todd, and wixom (2005) defined information quality as a motivation factor, the information results or content of is processing. information quality is output of the system which represents how the information is organized on the limited user interface of a mobile device (lee & chung, 2009). on the other hand, the measurements of information quality in e-commerce and traditional is context are different because of their nature to reflect the objectivity, relevance, and reliability of the information (yoo, 2020). information quality can be considered as two dimensions: 1) intrinsic, where the information from the system represents the data of the real world, and 2) contextual, where the information is produced by the system after completing a specific process (mcknight et al., 2017). in addition, mcknight et al. (2017) stated that information qualities such as consistency, accuracy, and completeness can motivate the users to continue engaging the current services rather than the other services with inaccurate or incomplete information. therefore, the following hypothesis can be proposed: h8: information quality has a significant positive effect on intention to adopt mb. according to the prior research, theoretical background, and formulated hypotheses, the research model presented in figure 3 with eight hypotheses and five constructs is proposed to validate in the research. moreover, h2, h3, h4 and h5 are intended to answer rq1, h1 and h6 are intended for rq2, and rq3 will be answered by h7 and h8. figure 3: proposed research model research design neuman (2006) recommended that the survey is an appropriate technique to understand attitudes and is suitable for quantitative research. partly exploratory factor analysis (efa) and 56 prerequisites and perceived information system partly confirmatory factor analysis (cfa), and structural equation modeling (sem) analysis are employed and used to test the proposed hypotheses. the survey questionnaire (appendix a) is developed in the bilingual language (english-burmese) by using google form to collect data. the questionnaire is reviewed by five highly educated people with strong experience in using mb. the survey is conducted through social networking sites, facebook and linkedin. all the indicators of factors (table 2) in the questionnaire use a 5-point likert scale ranging from 5 (strongly agree) to 1 (strongly disagree), except demographic variables. in the questionnaire, there is a filter question to ensure target participants are mb users of private commercial banks in myanmar to reduce the rate of invalid dataset due to lack of knowledge regarding mb in general. according to sem analysis, the widely accepted typical minimum sample size is 200. on the other hand, kline (2011) suggested that sample size to the number of questionnaire items ratio (n:q) should be 20:1. furthermore, comrey and lee (1992) recommend that the scale of sample size 500 is very good. therefore, a minimum sampling size of 500 is required. table 2 questionnaire items of factors factors items (q = 15) reference device quality devq1, devq2, devq3 (lu & su, 2009) system quality sysq1, sysq2, sysq3 (ahn, ryu, & han, 2007) information quality infq1, infq2, infq3 (kim, xu, & koh, 2004) user interface design quality ui1, ui2, ui3 (lee & chung, 2009) intention to adopt ia1, ia2, ia3 (talukder, quazi, & sathye, 2014) analysis results and findings demographic profile of the respondents total of 620 people in myanmar responded to the questionnaire, 43 respondents (6.9%) answered that they do not have prior experience in using mb, thus only 577 respondents are available for further data analysis. after eliminating outliers (12%) from the remaining responses according to the value of standard deviation of each dataset, the valid dataset is down to 508. the final usable dataset consists of 41.3% male respondents and 58.7% female respondents, indicating that the result does not have gender bias. most of the respondents (71.1%) are the age group of 24-39 years (generation y), followed by 18.9% above 40 years (generation x), and 10% below 23 years old (generation z). in the survey, 66.3% respondents have higher than a bachelor degree and 31.1% respondents have a bachelor degree. only 2.6% of respondents have a diploma and lower education level. furthermore, half of the respondents (50.2%) are civil-servant, 28% of participants are employees, and 10.8% are self-employed. only 9.1% are students and 2.0% of respondents are unemployed. journal of asean studies 57 table 3 analysis result of demographic profile of respondents demographic freq (n = 508) percentage gender male 210 41.3% female 298 58.7% age <= 23 year 51 10.0% 24-39 year 361 71.1% >= 40 year 96 18.9% education status high school 5 1.0% diploma 8 1.6% bachelor degree 158 31.1% master degree 286 56.3% ph.d 51 10.0% occupation status employee 142 28.0% self-employed 55 10.8% civil servant 255 50.1% student 46 9.1% unemployed 10 2.0% preliminarily descriptive analysis first, preliminarily descriptive analysis is examined in spss software. all the questionnaire items of values of standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis are between 2 and -2 according to the analysis results (table 4). it indicates the normality of each questionnaire item and the contribution of respondents. therefore, the dataset is suitable for the use of maximum likelihood (ml) estimation in sem analysis (kline, 2011). table 4 shows that respondents strongly believe that their mobile phone has adequate features to perform well in conducting mb transactions and is compatible with mb (devq1, devq2, devq3). furthermore, respondents have a positive belief that mb is easy to use (sysq2) as it provides appropriate functionalities (sysq1) for prompt financial transactions (sysq3). besides, the willingness of respondents to increase using mb (ia2) and to use mb whenever opportunities arising (ia3) are high. table 4 preliminarily descriptive analysis results items mean std. deviation skewness kurtosis devq1 4.44 0.649 -0.744 -0.491 devq2 4.48 0.626 -0.796 -0.376 devq3 4.56 0.605 -1,018 0.017 sysq1 4.25 0.730 -0.617 -0.268 sysq2 4.31 0.707 -0.748 0.186 sysq3 4.07 0.707 -0.370 -0.118 ia1 3.90 0.979 -0.500 -0.666 ia2 4.14 0.827 -0.601 -0.444 ia3 4.21 0.794 -0.695 -0.203 infq1 3.82 0.773 -0.138 -0.495 58 prerequisites and perceived information system table 4 preliminarily descriptive analysis results (continued) items mean std. deviation skewness kurtosis infq2 3.75 0.783 -0.054 -0.55 infq3 3.85 0.780 -0.233 -0.406 uiq1 3.84 0.766 -0.068 -0.630 uiq2 3.97 0.760 -0.391 -0.173 uiq3 3.94 0.800 -0.438 -0.212 analysis results of factor loading and cronbach’s alpha exploratory factor analysis (efa) is conducted in spss software. principal components analysis (pca) method with a varimax rotation of factor analysis is used to confirm that all the correspondence indicators are associated with respective factors from the proposed research model (figure 3). all the indicators are with a loading coefficient greater than 0.5 (hair et al., 2010) and the factor analysis confirms five factors affiliated from 15 indicators (table 5). furthermore, the analysis results of cronbach's alpha of factors are greater than acceptable value 0.7. the results indicate that internal consistency reliability is adequate (table 5). table 5 analysis results of factor loading and cronbach’s alpha device quality information quality intention to adopt user interface design quality system quality cronbach’s alpha devq2 0.863 0.054 0.080 0.160 0.161 0.833 devq1 0.809 0.212 0.121 0.045 0.100 devq3 0.799 0.041 0.183 0.158 0.209 infq2 0.111 0.848 0.189 0.185 0.169 0.851 infq1 0.087 0.772 0.191 0.195 0.266 infq3 0.159 0.751 0.186 0.294 0.165 ia2 0.137 0.178 0.831 0.193 0.200 0.828 ia1 0.190 0.146 0.816 0.172 0.077 ia3 0.091 0.226 0.769 0.179 0.236 uiq1 0.206 0.252 0.163 0.775 0.040 0.813 uiq2 0.099 0.211 0.218 0.760 0.296 uiq3 0.101 0.204 0.202 0.747 0.273 sysq2 0.199 0.145 0.183 0.269 0.786 0.779 sysq3 0.117 0.352 0.171 0.212 0.710 sysq1 0.361 0.206 0.219 0.111 0.629 journal of asean studies 59 correlations among the factors the relationships between the factors are investigated by using the matrices of pearson correlation coefficients in spss software. the results confirmed that all the factors have significantly positive correlation with each other at a 0.01 level. further, correlation coefficient ranging from 0.344 (devq ↔ infq) to a maximum of 0.589 (sysq ↔ infq). the shaded cells in table 6 represent the eight causal relationships in the proposed research model (figure 3). however, the significant correlations do not confirm that there are significant causal effects between the factors (kline, 2011). table 6 analysis result of factor correlations factors devq sysq ia infq uiq device quality (devq) 1 system quality (sysq) 0.503** 1 intention to adopt (ia) 0.377** 0.524** 1 information quality (infq) 0.344** 0.589** 0.499** 1 user interface design quality (uiq) 0.381** 0.582** 0.512** 0.584** 1 note: **. correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). the results of convergent validity and composite reliability according to the procedures of cfa, reliability and convergent validity were examined by standardized regression weights, average variance extracted (ave) and composite reliability (cr) by using amos software. the value of standardized regression weights for all indicators were greater than 0.691 and all the indicators are significant according to the suggestion of hair et al. (2010). the acceptable threshold for cr value is > 0.7 and for ave is > 0.5. all the constructs of cr and ave values exceeded their respective minimum acceptable values. thus, the results indicate that the dataset has good internal consistency reliability and adequate convergent validity (table 7). table 7 analysis results of convergent validity, ave and cr factors items std. regression weights cr ave device quality devq1 0.732 0.837 0.632 devq2 0.848 devq3 0.800 system quality sysq1 0.691 0.783 0.547 sysq2 0.778 sysq3 0.747 information quality infq1 0.791 0.854 0.662 infq2 0.854 infq3 0.794 60 prerequisites and perceived information system table 7 analysis results of convergent validity, ave and cr (continued) user interface design quality uiq3 0.776 0.817 0.599 uiq2 0.837 uiq1 0.703 intention to adopt ia1 0.730 0.837 0.632 ia2 0.840 ia3 0.811 the result of discriminant validity discriminant validity for the evaluation of the amount of difference among correlated constructs as defined by hair et al. (2010) is always an important analysis to examine the validity of constructs. all the values of the square roots of the ave are larger than the correlation estimates of each construct which demonstrate discriminant validity. in table 8, all the values of the square root of ave are bolded. according to the analysis results (table 8), the proposed research model has satisfactory discriminant validity for further sem analysis. table 8 analysis results of discriminant validity factors devq sysq infq uiq ia device quality 0.795 system quality 0.601 0.740 information quality 0.385 0.704 0.814 user interface design quality 0.449 0.735 0.680 0.774 intention to adopt 0.433 0.645 0.585 0.616 0.795 model fit indices analysis verifying model fit indices is part of the cfa and the statistics for considered in this study are goodness of fit index (gfi), adjusted goodness of fit index (agfi), normed fit index (nfi), incremental fit index (ifi), and comparative fit index (cfi). the fit indices of the measurement model obtained are as following: x2/df = 2.055; gfi = 0.960; agfi = 0.939; nfi = 0.958; ifi = 0.978; cfi = 0.978 and rmsea = 0.046. the fit indices of structural model (research model) was further examined and the statistical results are: x2/df = 2.126; gfi = 0.957; agfi = 0.937; nfi = 0.955; ifi = 0.976; cfi = 0.976 and rmsea = 0.047. the values of gfi, agfi, nfi, ifi and cfi of both measurement model and structural model are greater than recommended value of 0.90 and rmsea is lower than 0.05 and hence these verification results (table 9) confirm that the research model of this research is good-fit with dataset. journal of asean studies 61 table 9 analysis result of model fit indices x2/df gfi agfi nfi ifi cfi rmsea good-fit < 3 > 0.9 > 0.9 > 0.9 > 0.9 > 0.9 < 0.05 measurement 2.055 0.960 0.939 0.958 0.978 0.978 0.046 structural 2.126 0.957 0.937 0.955 0.976 0.976 0.047 the analysis results of hypotheses testing the hypotheses were examined as proposed in figure 3. the results of hypothesis testing are presented in table 10. device quality positively affected user interface design quality (β=0.589, p<0.001) and system quality (β=0.364, p<0.001), which means that h1 and h2 are approved. user interface design quality positively affected system quality (β=0.487, p<0.001) and information quality (β=0.340, p<0.001). thus, h4 and h5 are accepted. furthermore, system quality (β=0.593, p<0.001) evidenced a positive effect on information quality. therefore, h6 is supported. system quality (β=0.731, p<0.001) and information quality (β=0.261, p<0.01) with regard to mb, showing a significant positive effect on the intention to adopt. thus, h7 and h8 are consistent with the proposed hypotheses. however, the analysis result showed that the device quality has no significant effect on information quality which leads to rejection of h3. all the analysis results of hypothesis testing are concluded in figure 4. figure 4 research model with hypothesis results table 10 analysis results of hypotheses hypothesis relationship path coefficient hypothesis results h1 devq → uiq 0.589 *** (0.449) approved h2 devq → sysq 0.364 *** (0.343) approved h3 devq → infq -0.089 ns (-0.069) rejected h4 uiq → sysq 0.487 *** (0.602) approved h5 uiq → infq 0.340 *** (0.346) approved h6 sysq → infq 0.593 *** (0.489) approved h7 sysq → ia 0.731 *** (0.518) approved h8 infq → ia 0.261 ** (0.224) approved note: ns means no significant, *** means p < 0.001, ** means p < 0.01 62 prerequisites and perceived information system the effects in the research model the shaded cells in table 11 are additional findings of the research. an exogenous variable, device quality, has a higher effect on user interface design quality than system quality. although device quality has no significant direct effect on information quality, it has a medium indirect effect through user interface design quality and system quality. user interface design quality has a medium effect on both system quality and information quality, and it is an intervening factor between device quality and information quality. also, system quality has a medium effect on information quality. system quality and information quality have a direct effect on the intention to adopt construct, an endogenous variable, and system quality has a larger effect than information quality. furthermore, both device quality and user interface design quality have medium indirect effects on intention to adopt through system quality. table 11 the effects in the research model variables endogenous intervening dependent uiq sysq infq ia e x o g e n o u s independent devq direct direct indirectly only devq → uiq → infq 0.200***(0.155) devq → sysq → infq 0.216***(0.168) indirect devq → sysq → ia 0.266***(0.178) intervening uiq nil direct direct indirect uiq → sysq → ia 0.356***(0.312) sysq nil nil direct direct infq nil nil nil direct theoretical contributions the investigation on device quality and user interface design quality as a prerequisite of d&m iss model (1992) in the mb context is one of the novelties of this study. this study confirmed that underlying prerequisite qualities are existing and they are vivid requirements of information system success. the absolute qualities of the mobile device such as performance, functionality, and compatibility will help the users to interact with the mb comfortably through a user-friendly interface and learn the system quality effectively. even experienced users are afraid that they will press the wrong buttons on complicated mobile applications during payment processes (jarvenpaa & lang, 2005). parveen and sulaiman (2008) also stated that the smaller the screen size of mobile devices, the less information displayed. they further stated that better interface design and higher mobile device ability will lead to a positive belief of an individual that specific technology has adequate functionalities, fast response, and also easiness. according to the findings of this study, device quality will not increase the accessibility of sufficient and accurate real-time information. however, higher quality mobile journal of asean studies 63 devices are capable of delivering quality information through system quality and user interface design quality. further, the better quality of the mobile device is able to support the users to perceive the system quality of mb which will lead to the use of mb intensively. the comprehensive good design perspectives such as font, color, style, and shapes on the screen will allow users to access the full capacity of the mb system and acquire desired information from mb. laukkanen (2007) also recommended larger screen size is required to display adequate financial information in the mb system. it can be implied that user interface design quality is a mediator between device quality and system quality. the appealing user interface design of mb will support users to have a good experience in system quality then it will encourage the users to keep using mb. the finding also indicates that system quality is able to deliver sufficient information whenever users need. in the banking industry, ali and ju (2019) advocated that a system with higher quality will provide more reliable and valid information for its users, in addition, if the system is easy to use and learn, the likelihood of users' adoption will high. subsequently, perceived system quality and information quality will enhance the willingness of users to use mb frequently. therefore, the findings are consistent with previous studies in mobile commerce and mobile banking context (bahaddad, 2017; noh & lee, 2016). managerial contributions bank managers should note that relying on existing is quality factors for formulating mb system improvement strategy is not adequate. according to the findings, the better mobile device quality can display better quality of the image and higher screen resolution. therefore, the users with the latest mobile device can enjoy the full capacity of the interface design of mb rather than the users with outdated mobile devices. mb is at a nascent phase most notably in myanmar, mb must be easy to access and compatible with widely used mobile devices in the current market. since user interface design quality has significant positive effects on both system quality and information quality, mb developers ought to ensure the interface of mb is simple, less complex and easy to interact with users by avoiding convoluted structures on the screen. particularly in myanmar, every text in mb is required to display in the native language properly and clearly, emphasize graphical user interface, and provide user guides to use of mb. therefore, users will get the best experience in system quality of mb and accessing the financial information through user interface design quality then mb adoption will follow. banks should learn first about their customers’ current performance of mobile phones before developing or releasing the new features for mb, and ensure the forthcoming feature is compatible with the mobile phone the customers are currently using. thus, it is imperative for software engineers to understand what improves system quality and information quality, how they are correlated, and how they drive the adoption of mb. software engineers also should duly develop mb systems by strictly following the standardization of technical aspects of mobile technology because higher quality of system is still a competitive advantage in mb context notably in myanmar. 64 prerequisites and perceived information system conclusions the research attempts to identify the underlying quality factors in information systems for the first time in mb context by utilizing d&m iss model (1992). the empirical findings suggest that is qualities model incorporating additional prerequisite qualities, device quality and user interface design quality, is a stronger predictor for mb adoption among the customers of the private banks, thereby answering rq1. also, the research findings highlight essential quality factors for mb system development, upgrading features of mb, and mb users' needs. in mb context, prerequisites of system quality are device quality and user interface design quality, system quality, and user interface design quality for information quality, thereby answering rq2. in addition, the research concludes that system quality has a higher effect than information quality on mb adoption among the customers of private commercial banks, thereby answering rq3. mb systems should be in harmony with mobile devices in the market and provide sufficient information as users require. limitations and future research the major limitation of the research focuses on mb users only, and the perception of all the customers of private commercial banks does not reflect. moreover, the opinion of generation y is dominant in this study and the results may not be the same in generations x and z who are with different experiences in the mobile technology landscape (lin & theingi, 2019). these research findings are limited to a cross-sectional study, and a longitudinal approach incorporated with qualitative research is therefore recommended for future studies because the technology landscape is rapidly advancing and transforming over time. according to the contributions of the present study, future research can include device quality as a prerequisite of system quality, and user interface design quality is for information quality. future researchers can extend the updated d&m iss model (2003) by supplementing the emerging factors of this study and should endeavor to investigate the underlying prerequisite of service quality. it is also recommended to validate the research model of this study in different contexts such as mobile learning, mobile commerce, and mobile services. moreover, this research model can be reasonably extended by adding the role of the major device platforms (android and ios) as moderating variables for a deeper understanding of is success in the mobile environment. journal of asean studies 65 acknowledgements first of all, i thank the editor, dr. moch faisal karim, and anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of the manuscript. i also thank ms. dior liu, ms. sandi myint tun, my family, and my friends for all the encouragement they gave to me during this research. special thanks to all the respondents for giving the answers to the questionnaires and those who gave extra support in making our work have a better quality. about the authors phyo min tun, b.a, m.i.s, and phd (assumption university of thailand), has professional experience of more than 5 years in university lecturing and more than 7 years in digital marketing. published 11 papers in international journals and conferences. his primary research interests are in the area of banking, mobile financial services, and commerce. references ahn, t., 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(2012). understanding users' initial trust in mobile banking: an elaboration likelihood perspective. computers in human behavior, 28(4), 1518-1525. journal of asean studies 71 appendix items statements devq1 my mobile phone has adequate features to support mb. devq2 my mobile phone performs well while conducting financial transactions with mb. devq3 my mobile phone is compatible with mb. sysq1 mb provides a fast response and transactions processing. sysq2 mb is easy to use. sysq3 mb offers appropriate functionalities. ia1 i plan to use mb frequently in my daily life. ia2 i intend to increase my use of mb. ia3 i intend to use mb when the opportunity arises. infq1 mb provides me with information relevant to my needs. infq2 mb provides me with sufficient information. infq3 mb provides me with accurate information. uiq1 the screen colors used for mb are appropriate. uiq2 the presentation style of mb is easy to understand. uiq3 mb is easy to navigate. journal of asean studies, vol. 9, no. 1 (2021), pp. 73-85 doi: https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v9i1.7280 issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic socioeconomic determinants of infant mortality rate in asean: a panel data analysis vita kartika sari1*, dwi prasetyani2 1,2department of economics development, faculty of economics and business, sebelas maret university, indonesia 1vitahanifanaira@gmail.com; 2nd_prasetyani@yahoo.com received: 03rd april 2021/ revised: 11th july 2021/ accepted: 12th july 2021 how to cite: sari, v. k. & prasetyani, d. (2021). socioeconomic determinants of infant mortality rate in asean: a panel data analysis. journal of asean studies, 9(1), 73-85, https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v9i1.7280 abstract the infant mortality rate indicates the health status of a country. previous studies have proven that socioeconomic factors have a significant influence on infant mortality rates in both developed and developing countries. further studies on infant mortality rates are useful for public service strategic policy in the health sector. the main purpose of this study was to analyze the socioeconomic factors influencing infant mortality rates in asean based on panel data estimates for 2000-2017. the dependent variable for this study was infant mortality rate, while the independent variables were health expenditure, female labor force, maternal fertility rate, and gdp per capita. the authors concluded that the main cause of infant mortality in asean is care during delivery. other influencing factors include family health status, maternal education level, and socio-economic inequality. this study found that the size of the female workforce has a strong influence on increasing the infant mortality rate in asean. the fertility rate also had a strong influence on increasing infant mortality rate in asean, while gdp per capita had a negative influence on infant mortality rate. health expenditure is proven to have no effect on the increase of infant mortality rates in asean. keywords: infant mortality rate, socioeconomic factors, asean introduction the infant mortality rate is one of the main health indicators (see: arik and arik, 2009; dallolio, et al., 2012; naveed, et al., 2011; rosicova, et al., 2011). the issue of infant mortality rate has long been a special topic of study by researchers, especially in developing countries (gomez, hanna, and oliva, 2012; hanmer, lensink, and white, 2003; oloo, 2005), because the infant mortality rate is related to other socioeconomic factors, as well as being an mailto:1vitahanifanaira@gmail.com mailto:nd_prasetyani@yahoo.com 74 socioeconomic determinants indicator of human welfare. bhatia, et al, (2018) also stated that efforts to reduce infant mortality rates are a top priority in developing countries. in addition, there is also an interesting discussion on whether prosperity level is related to health status. the infant mortality rate tends to be high in poor countries and low in developed countries (chaudhuri & mandal, 2020; klugman, et al, 2019; ullah, et al, 2011). developed countries focus on providing healthcare in the form of quality care, including access to quality maternal and child health services. sustainable development must consider the socioeconomic factors. economists agree that economic development is not only measured by gdp per capita growth or other macroeconomic indicators, but also supported by public health status (hanmer, lensink, and white, 2003). this is in line with the policies of the united nations development program (undp) and the world health organization (who) on the importance of human development in terms of health, education, poverty, and the environment as stated in the human development index to achieve the sustainable development goals (sdgs) (bhatia, et.al, 2018). according to who (2020), the infant mortality rate is defined as the death of a child before one year of age over a certain period of time. lamichhane, et al. (2017) emphasized the infant mortality rate as a primary human development indicator and a key part of the challenge to provide good quality health so as to realize social welfare. previous studies by dallolio, et al., (2012); erdogan, ener, and arica, (2013); genowska, et al. (2015); and iram and butt (2008) explained the influence of socioeconomic factors on infant mortality rates. the economic factors were national income, income per capita, health expenditure, unemployment rates, and income equalization, while the social factors were the education level of the mother, nutrition, environmental factors such as pollution, healthcare quality, and women’s welfare. iram and butt (2008) found the main influencing factors of infant mortality rates in pakistan were environmental factors, family income, and the education level of the mother. lamichhane, et al (2017) identified several influencing key factors of the infant mortality rate in nepal, including birth spacing, breastfeeding, parenting styles, and ecology. in line with this, sarkar, dhar, and rouhoma (2018) also found differences in the adequate number of health facilities in developed countries compared with the relative lack in developing countries, and identified several determining factors of infant mortality rates, namely delivery assistance, the education level of the mother, and total population. most asean countries are developing countries, and the infant mortality rate is still rarely studied in the asean region, so it is interesting to estimate the influence of socioeconomic factors on infant mortality rate in asean. journal of asean studies 75 figure 1 infant mortality rate in asean 2000-2017 source: world bank, 2020. based on the figure above, the infant mortality rate in asean, in general, has significantly decreased from 2000 to 2017. in aggregate, the highest infant mortality rate was found in laos, followed closely by myanmar, while the lowest infant mortality rate was found in singapore. asean countries are predominantly developing countries that are rapidly adapting to global changes. the amount of per capita health expenditure in asean shows an increasing trend from 2000–2017, which can be seen in the following figure. singapore and brunei darussalam had the highest health expenditure, followed by malaysia and thailand. figure 2 health expenditure per capita in asean (us dollar) source: world bank, 2020. 76 socioeconomic determinants the infant mortality rate is important for welfare, so the main purpose of this study was to analyze the socioeconomic factors influencing infant mortality rate in asean. studies analyzing infant mortality rates in asean are still rarely performed. hence, this study is expected to provide a literature reference related to the infant mortality rate in asean so as to encourage policies advancing the maternal and child health sector. literature review based on the literature, there are two methods for calculating the infant mortality rate: 1) calculation of mortality in newborns, infants, and children under 5 years per 1000 births in a certain time period, or 2) calculation of mortality in infants over 28 days of age, infants aged 1 year, and children 2-4 years old per 1000 living people (rutstein, 2000). according to santiago and tubayan (2016), the infant mortality rate is a key factor of a country’s public health status. improvement of human quality as the main development agent starts from the womb, delivery, childhood education, to adulthood. maternal health during pregnancy and childbirth can be used as evaluation material to reduce infant mortality. hanmer, lensink, and white (2013) stated that development is not only measured by per capita income but must also measure variables such as infant mortality rate, literacy rate, and other social indicators. ollo (2005) explained two causes of infant mortality: internally, infant mortality is caused by genetic factors, uterine disease, and birth defects, while externally it is caused by accidents. maternal fertility rates, nutritional status in pregnancy, smoking, and environmental pollution are thought to have a strong influence on infant mortality rates. the education level of mothers can in the long term affect the welfare of children, involving everything from breastfeeding to parenting style. women with low education levels (see: bhatia, et.al, 2018; dallolio et al., 2012; klugman, et al, 2019; ullah, et al, 2011) tend to marry early, have no knowledge of pregnancy and its care, low economic welfare, and have a higher risk of mortality during childbirth. gdp per capita also plays an important role because the better the standard of living, the better the healthcare (oloo, 2005). with increase in economic growth, the portion of health expenditure is increased, health programs are expanded, and access to healthcare is becomes easier. ullah, et al, (2011) pointed out that in developed countries, the government prioritizes maternal and child healthcare, but in poor countries, the government still needs to reduce the infant mortality rate. erdogan, ener, and arica (2013) described the important role of economic factors on infant mortality rates, with the main factors being equal income distribution and gdp per capita. gdp per capita can have a direct or indirect effect. high-income countries tend to have a higher quality of life in terms of the provision of food, education, and health. in addition, erdogan, ener, and arica (2013) also found empirically, infant mortality rates decreased alongside economic growth in oecd countries, meaning that quality and affordable healthcare is needed to accelerate economic and social development. journal of asean studies 77 socio-economic factors also play roles. rutstein (2000) explained the influence of socioeconomic factors: for example, increasing economic welfare positively improves child health, while social factors such as housing, maternal education, and electricity supply can also affect infant mortality rates. in line with this, zakir and wunnava (1999) explained the significant influence of socioeconomic factors, namely maternal fertility rate, female labor force, education level of the mother, and gdp per capita on infant mortality rate in several countries. shobande (2020) identified the negative influence of energy consumption and pollution on the infant mortality rate in africa. the infant mortality rate is thus useful for measuring the welfare of the total population over time and the basis for a strategy to improve maternal and child health policies. houweling and kunst (2009) found that the difference in socioeconomic conditions in developed and developing countries is a cause of infant mortality, in addition to health factors such as maternal health, nutrition, and disease. iram and butt (2008) identified social factors namely neighborhood, education level of the mother, exclusive breastfeeding, and income had a significant influence on the infant mortality rate in pakistan. rezaei, matin, and rad (2015) found that the infant mortality rate in iran was influenced by gdp per capita, the ratio of doctors per 1000 total population, female labor force participation, neighborhood, and education level. dhrif (2018) found that health expenditure significantly reduced the infant mortality rate in developed countries but was insignificant in poor countries. oloo (2005) conducted a study in developing countries and found that the health expenditure per capita and immunization programs had no significant influence on infant mortality rate, but per capita income and maternal fertility had a significant influence on infant mortality rate. bhatia, et.al (2018) in india found various programs reducing socioeconomic inequality also reduced infant mortality rates. shobande (2020) identified that energy consumption causing pollution has a negative and significant influence on the infant mortality rate in africa. rezaei, matin, & rad (2014) analyzed the influence of gdp per capita, the number of health workers, the female labor force, the total population in villages, maternal fertility rate, and education level on infant mortality rate in iran. the study found a positive relationship between infant mortality rate, fertility, and population domicile, while the female labor force and gdp per capita were insignificant. sarkar, dhar, and rouhoma (2018) studied the influencing socioeconomic factors of infant mortality rates in several asean countries and found that education level, delivery assistance by medical personnel, and the population had a significant influence on infant mortality rate. goldani, et.al (2001) found that social inequality had an influence on the infant mortality rate in brazil. hosseinpoor et al. (2005) showed that socioeconomic inequality had an influence on the infant mortality rate between provinces in iran; this is related to the importance of equitable development policies. naveed, et al., (2011) with the vector error correction model (vecm) method aimed to find out the influencing variables of infant mortality rate in pakistan and found that women’s empowerment and income had a negative influence, but the total population had a significant influence on infant mortality rate. dallolio et al. (2012) found that gini index and the unemployment rate had a positive 78 socioeconomic determinants influence on infant mortality rate, while the education level of the mother had a negative influence. asean member countries are faced with the triple challenge of reducing infant mortality, child maternal, and maternal mortality. high infant mortality rates indicate the low quality of maternal and child health services, especially during and after delivery. the government also needs community support to maintain preventive behavior for pregnant women, maintain a healthy living environment, and implement a healthy lifestyle. therefore, a comprehensive health policy is urgently needed to improve the quality standards of maternal and infant care services in the asean health system. methodology the main purpose of this study was to estimate the determining factors of infant mortality rate in asean (indonesia, malaysia, thailand, singapore, vietnam, laos, cambodia, brunei darussalam, the philippines, and myanmar). this study used secondary data published by the world bank, and undertook panel data analysis for the period 20002017 consisting of 10 cross-sections and covering an 18 years’ time span. the dependent variable was the infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births), while the independent variables were health expenditure per capita (us $), female labor force (% of the total labor force), maternal fertility rate (births per mother), and gdp per capita (constant lcu). according to gujarati (2003), panel data is suitable for studying the dynamics of change, makes it easier to understand complex behavior, is good for measuring impacts that simply cannot be seen on cross-section data or time-series data, has more information and variations, can minimize bias generated in the aggregation, and can overcome heterogeneity. the first step in data estimation is looking at the distribution of variables through descriptive statistics and checking the correlation of the independent variables with the infant mortality rate. the data testing panel has three approaches: least square (common effect), fixed effect, and random effect. the common effect method is the simplest method, combining time-series data and cross-section data regardless of the differences in time and individual dimensions. the fixed effect method improves the common effect method by using dummy variables to intercept differences. the random effect method has different parameters between regions and time to be included in the error term, and technically can eliminate heteroscedasticity in the study model. this study used a development model from previous studies by hanmer, lensink, & white (2003); oloo (2005); rezaei, matin, rad (2015); and ullah et al (2011). the study period was chosen based on the economic conditions of asean member countries which in 20002017, which were relatively strong. journal of asean studies 79 equation (1) is common effects model (cem) estimation, equation (2) is fixed effects model (fem) estimation, while equation (3) is random effects model (rem). the α0 is the intercept while 𝛽1, 𝛽2, 𝛽3, and 𝛽4, are the parameters/slope of the model, the ‘i’ is the cross-section of 10 countries in asean while ‘t’ is a time series of period 2000-2017. imr (infant mortality rate), he (health expenditure per capita), wl (female labor force), fr (maternal fertility rate), and gdp/cap (gdp per capita). furthermore, the model was tested with the common effect, fixed effect, and random effect. then, the chow test was carried out to test the best fit of the model between the common effect and the fixed effect. the hausman test was carried out to select the best model between the fixed effect method and the random effect method. the lagrange multiplier test was conducted to select the best model between the random effect model and the common effect model. results and discussion this study used panel data consisting of time series and cross-sections. according to gujarati (2003), panel data can analyze big data, have a greater degree of freedom, and analyze more efficiently. panel data analysis can be carried out through three approaches, namely the pooled least squared (pls)/common effect model (cem) with fixed coefficients between time and individuals; the fixed-effect model with a constant slope but different intercepts between individuals; and the random effects model with parameter differences between regions or between times are included in the error component. the testing stage was carried out by testing all these methods to find out the best model. in general, descriptive statistics can be seen in the following table below including the mean, median, minimum value, maximum value, standard deviation, and the number of observations. the data had subtle differences for all countries, except for singapore. singapore had the lowest infant mortality rate and highest health expenditure per capita in the asean region. however, in aggregate, there was a significant decrease in infant mortality rate in –between 2000 and 2017. 80 socioeconomic determinants table 1 descriptive statistics imr health expenditure female labor force maternal fertility rate gdp/cap mean 25.86 154.73 42.97 2.36 10299.40 median 22.65 31.25 41.78 2.30 2459.04 maximum 79.50 1262.33 51.83 4.31 57378.86 minimum 2.20 0.39 34.69 1.15 342.14 std. dev. 19.87 257.78 4.90 0.71 15459.39 correlation 1.00 -0.89 0.48 0.79 -0.89 observations 180 180 180 180 180 source: processed secondary data. with panel data estimates, common effect model and fixed effect model estimates were obtained. to select the best model from the two test models, the chow test was carried out and found out that the fixed effect model estimate was better and valid than the common effect model. this can be seen from the prob value. chi-square cross-section <0.05, thus, the fixed effect was chosen over the common effect. after that, the random effect model was tested. based on the hausman test to choose between the fixed-effect model and the random effect model, the best estimation model was the random effect model with h0 or p value> 0.05. then, the lagrange multiplier test was carried out to choose the random effect model or the common effect model. based on the lagrange multiplier test, the random effect model was the best model in estimating data. the p-value was 0,000 at a 0.05 significance level. thus, based on lagrange multiplier test, h1 was accepted meaning that the best estimation method was the random effect model. table 2 panel data estimation results variable common effect common effect fixed effects health expenditure -4.79 (0.00)*** -4.79 (0.00)*** -0.92 (0.36) female labor force 3.75 (0.00)*** 3.75 (0.00)*** 3.11 (0.00)*** fertility rate 11.00 (0.00)*** 11.00 (0.00)*** 3.06 (0.00)*** gdp/cap -3.92 (0.00)*** -3.92 (0.00)*** -5.30 (0.00)*** c 5.77 (0.00)*** 5.77 (0.00)*** 5.49 (0.00)*** adjr-square: 0.91 0.91 0.99 (f-statistics) 446.18 1455.06 139.12 chow test (0.00)*** hausman test (0.27) lm test (0.00)*** observations 180 180 180 source: author's estimation note: () denotes significance; ***, ** and * are 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. journal of asean studies 81 the results of data estimation with the common effect model showed that health expenditure had a significant and negative influence on infant mortality rates in asean, while female labor force had a significant and positive influence, maternal fertility rate had a significant and positive influence, and gdp per capita had a significant and negative influence. based on the random effects model analysis, health expenditure in asean had no influence on infant mortality rates. this occurs because of differences in health expenditure, with the better the welfare of a country, the higher the attention it pays to health, leading to an increase in health expenditure per capita. brunei darussalam had the highest health expenditure per capita in asean, singapore in second, malaysia in third, and thailand in fourth, while vietnam, the philippines, myanmar, laos, indonesia, and cambodia had the low health expenditures per capita. this data imbalance shows that the impact of health expenditure was insignificant. most asean countries have not focused on policies for accessible and affordable health care. this is in line with a study by dhrif (2018) showing the differences in health expenditure had no influence on infant mortality rates in poor countries but had a positive influence in rich countries. sarkar, dhar, and rouhoma (2018) identified significant differences in developed countries which pay close attention to health, with the provision of health facilities to prevent and reduce the infant mortality rate while developing countries do not have this policy. goldani, et al. (2001) found that economically weak regions had high infant mortality rates in brazil. maternal and child health cases in developing countries are more complex because of the more challenges faced, such as infant mortality, child and maternal malnutrition, stunting, and maternal mortality. health services are a priority that should be spread throughout all regions to remote areas. the female labor force has great potential in developing regions such as in asean, by contributing to family income, increasing family purchasing power, and increasing aggregate consumption. despite this, the female labor force had a significant influence on infant mortality rates. the coefficient of the female labor force was positive, indicating that the more mothers work, the higher the risk of infant mortality. the female labor force had a significant influence with a positive coefficient, meaning that every 1% increase in the female labor force causes an increase in the infant mortality rate of 0.03%. the maternal fertility rate also had a significant influence with a positive coefficient, meaning that every increase in fertility rate causes an increase in the infant mortality rate. poerwanto, et al. (2003) found that the infant mortality rate in indonesia was influenced by the prosperity level and education level of the mother. low prosperity families tend to have a higher risk, and other factors such as maternal fertility rate, contraception use, birth spacing, and prenatal care also had a significant influence on infant mortality rates. naveed, et al., (2011) also found that female labor participation and income per capita had a negative correlation on infant mortality rate in the short term. however, in the long run, the female labor force and maternal education had a greater influence than income per capita. this is in contrast to a study by rezaei, matin, and rad (2015), which found that the female labor force had no influence on the infant mortality rate in iran. meanwhile in poland, the work environment is not conducive and pollution from the industrial sector has an influence on the infant mortality rate (genowska et al, 2015). 82 socioeconomic determinants based on previous studies, a high infant mortality rate was usually found in economically weak countries. dhrif (2018) described that this condition is recognized as an important issue because it is closely related to the level of human productivity as a production factor to create economic development and welfare. productivity starts from infancy and childhood, with good nutrition, education, and environment to improve social and economic conditions. income is an important variable, a family with a high income can meet the needs of better quality, so as to improve the quality of life and welfare. based on estimates, gdp per capita had a negative influence on infant mortality rates in asean. gdp per capita had a significant influence on the infant mortality rate, where every 1% increase in gdp per capita reduces the infant mortality rate by 0.44%. this is in line with studies by erdogan, ener, and arica, (2013) and naveed, et al. (2011) showing the significant and negative influence of infant mortality rates and gdp per capita. thus, the increasing prosperity level will be followed by a decrease in the risk of the infant mortality rate. hosseinpoor, et al. (2005) found that socioeconomic inequality in iran was the cause of the increased infant mortality rate, where provinces with high economic potential tend to have low infant mortality rates. rezaei, matin, and rad (2015) also found that the insignificant influence of gdp per capita on infant mortality rate in iran. household income had no influence on the infant mortality rate in italy, while the education level of mother had no strong correlation with the infant mortality rate (dallolio et al, 2012). the risk of infant mortality must thus be viewed from a socioeconomic side in a balanced manner, in order to obtain a realistic policy direction and support weaker economic and social groups. modern health services today are more accessible for mothers and children, but this must also be balanced with income equalization so that services are easily accessible by all groups. continuing social and economic inequality causes high infant mortality rates to be concentrated on poor families. infant mortality rate censuses are needed for the formulation of development policies, especially in the health and social fields, forecasting population growth, and the possibility of a demographic bonus for sustainable development. additionally, empowering women has both direct and indirect impacts on awareness of maternal and child health. therefore, it is necessary to formulate effective health policies to reduce infant mortality rates, because maternal and child welfare determines the health of the next generation. conclusion this study analyzed the socio-economic determinants of infant mortality rates in asean member countries as an indicator of adequate human capital. socio-economic variables such as female labor force, health expenditure, maternal fertility rate, and gdp per capita have previously been analyzed in other studies and were found to have a significant influence on infant mortality rates in various countries. high gdp per capita was also found to reduce infant mortality due to higher health spending on maternal and child health. this study estimated the influence of socioeconomic factors on infant mortality rate in asean,. the social variable was the maternal fertility rate, while the economic variables journal of asean studies 83 were health expenditure, female labor force, and gdp per capita. data estimation used static panel data model with balanced panels. based on the estimation results, the best result was found in the random effect model. this study found that there was a significant influence of the female labor force and maternal fertility rate on infant mortality rates in asean countries. meanwhile, health expenditure per capita had no significant influence on infant mortality rate, but gdp per capita had a significant and negative influence. thus, the recommendations of this study are: 1) strategies are needed to provide accessible and affordable health facilities for all groups, 2) increase awareness of women’s empowerment through educational programs on maternal and child health, 3) improve social conditions in society, and income equalization to improve citizen welfare. this study was limited by excluding other socio-economic variables which may influence infant mortality rates in asean. about the authors this vita kartika sari is a lecturer at the department of economics development sebelas maret university. she graduated from bachelor of economics development, sebelas maret university in 2010, and graduated her master of science in economics, gadjah mada university in 2012. her research interests include institutional economics, public economics, and monetary economics. dr. dwi prasetyani, s.e., m.si. is a lecturer at the department of economics development, faculty of economics and business, sebelas maret university. she graduated from bachelor of economics and development studies, sebelas maret university in 1999, then continued her masters in development economics, gadjah mada university in 2001, and continued her doctoral program in economics, brawijaya university in 2018. her research interests include institutional economics and public policy, industrial economics, business society/environment, entrepreneurship, msmes, small and medium industries, gender study, and women empowerment. references arik, hulya & arik, murat. 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(1999), factors affecting infant mortality rates: evidence from cross-sectional data. applied economics letters, 6: 271-273. http://who.int/ http://worldbank.org/ journal of asean studies, vol. 1, no. 2 (2013), pp. 122–139 © 2013 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn2338-1353 electronic india’s democratic identity and its policy towards myanmar from 1988 to 2010 htwe hteik tin lwin, tsukuba university, japan abstract since the 1990s, india has reengaged with myanmar government. the indian government’s engagement with myanmar’s military junta provoked a controversial issue in international community, claiming that ‘the oldest democratic country in asia' is not doing enough to promote democracy in her neighborhood. the question raised was what has motivated india to develop cordial relations with myanmar’s military junta. the paper emphasizes the role of india’s democratic identity in indo-myanmar policy during 1988-2010. previous literatures revealed india’s policy towards myanmar in economic and security assumptions. they tended to sketch india policy as ‘in-active’ in promotion of democracy practiced from west democratic institutions norms, such as ‘isolation’ and ‘totally disengagement’. the paper briefly explains indo-myanmar relations from 1988 to 2010. security and economic interests play a larger role than the intention to promote democratic identity in myanmar. the paper argues that in the background of indo-myanmar development cooperation, india has made efforts to promote democratic value in myanmar differently from other western democratic countries. engagement policy has shaped indo-myanmar relations in the 1990s. india ‘engagement policy’, ‘non-isolation’ and ‘development cooperation’ with myanmar government has brought up contractions. keywords: democracy, military junta, democratic identity, nld introduction india-myanmar relations faced several ups and downs during 1988 and 2010. both countries regained their independent from britain in 1947 and 1948 respectively. newly democratic states enjoyed friendly relations. india and myanmar were active founders of non-alignment movement (nam). on 2 march 1962, general ne win overthrew the democratic government and seized power. he formed burma people’s socialist party (bpsp). coup d’état by general ne win from 1962 to 1988, indo-myanmar relations were ‘strained’. the relations were further strained in 1988 when the military oppressed pro-democracy movements. on 18 september 1988 military formed state law and order restoration council (slorc) and replaced the role of bpsp. in august 1988 democracy uprising movements, known as ‘8-8-88’, indian embassy in rangoon actively participated by financing pro-democracy activists and journal of asean studies 123 offering shelters to students and refugees in new delhi and indo-burma border. new delhi strongly voiced for restoration of democracy in burma and demanded the military government to recognize the 1990 parliamentary election results where prodemocracy leader aung san su kyi’s national league for democracy (nld) party won 392 out of 492 contested seats. slorc refused to recognize the election result of 1990 and placed the leader of nld, aung san su kyi under house arrest and the party was suppressed. india strongly supported nld and pro-democracy movements of students and refugees on indian land. however, the support for democracy was dimed when india was keen to link economic cooperation with southeast asia and east asia countries. look east policylep forced india to explore both regionally and globally for promotion of its economic interests. myanmar’s location at the trijunction of southeast asia, west asia and east asia creates security and economic imperatives for india. the reports of china growing presence in and around indian ocean and its technical assistance in upgrading infrastructure in the coco island1 raised security concern for india. another security concern is to eradicate northeast insurgent groups in india where the groups have their bases at 1643 km long indo-myanmar borders. in addition to this, india’s booming economy and industrialization are driving india’s energy demand higher. gas discoveries in the bay of bengal have attracted india to invest a share of the gas in myanmar. the question of indian’s value on democracy came up for debate when many generals in myanmar junta visited india. india faced severe criticism from 1 coco island is in the bay of bengal, some 300 kms south of mainland myanmar .the islands is administered by myanmar, yangon region. international community for its reengagement with the military government. india accelerated its relations with myanmar government by providing aid and development projects such as implementing road, railway, ports, upgrading infrastructures, funding power projects and establishing human resources tanning centers. india’s posture brings debatable argument that development cooperation and engagement with the military ruled neighbor foster democracy or not. some western countries considered that long term approach policy only spoil the chances and delay for early progress. india’s engagement policy also provoked controversial domestic debate to question indian’s stance on democracy. the paper argues that india’s reengagement with myanmar’s military junta is not only economic and security assumptions but the engagement also manifests india’s democratic identity. india’s engagement policy with myanmar is also a manifestation of india’s democratic identity. the actions and policy of india towards myanmar seemed to be pursuant to material forces but the forces can be regarded as a democratic identity. indomyanmar relations are not shaped only by power, interest or identity but by combination of them. indo-myanmar relations need to weigh the causal importance of different types of factors, for example, material and ideal, international and domestic. india had a sharp tone towards myanmar for oppressing pro-democratic movements from 1988 to 1990. but since 1990s, india had reversed its policy and started engaging with myanmar government. scholars had analyzed indomyanmar relations under the separate lens of realism, liberalism and constructivism. compelling analyses of empirical puzzles of indo-myanmar relations can be built through combining realist, liberal and 124 india’s democratic identity towards myanmar constructivist modes of explanation, analytical eclecticism. eclectic theorizing helps us understand complex social and political process of indo-myanmar relations. realists argue that to achieve survival, states increases power. on the other hand, liberal believes in decline in conflicts among states via transnational and increase in economic interdependence of the world. the multinational corporations and economic interdependence can produce cooperative arrangement and a rational aggregation of social preferences. realism and liberalism together, for instance, can generate powerful intuitions into the blend of interest and interdependent. indomyanmar policy also reflects a mixture of realist and liberal elements. india since the 1990s has consistently sought to engage myanmar economically and militarily. india looks out for way to maximize its economic interest to counter growing chinese economic expansion in myanmar. india’s growing interest on myanmar is also driven by the finding offshore gas fields at western costal line of myanmar. the move involves an element of maximizing economic power as india seeks to constrain chinese influence in myanmar, through economic cooperation. the rise of china in asia began a change in the indomyanmar relations in line with realist expectations. from india’s perspectives, countering chinese in myanmar is possible only through a close engagement with myanmar. in this realist-liberal perspective, india remains economically fully engaged in myanmar. india’s diplomacy aims at a slow, steady and prolonged process of encouraging myanmar to contribute more to economic development. singing of indomyanmar border trade agreement between the two countries on january 21, 1994, for example, was inspired by the belief that the likelihood of conflict between states would be reduced by creating common interest in trade and economic collaborations among members of the same geographical regions. in addition to this, look east policy of india-lep’s aim is to get closer link with booming economy of southeast asia countries. in this regard, new delhi perceives myanmar as a vital land-bridge for india’s connection with southeast asia countries. a combination of realists and constructivists’ point of view also offers insight into indo-myanmar relations. the unstable issue of indian insurgents, a serious trouble spot in india’s northeast region, illustrates the realist-constructivist analytical possibility. india is eager to eradicate northeast insurgent groups with the help of myanmar military. indian government takes a pragmatic approach. it views military cooperation can exchange information, enhances official talks and helps to build trust. indo-myanmar’s joint military cooperation (called golden bird) to counter insurgent groups in northeast of india leads to political contacts, facilitates trust between government, distributes power and enhances shared interests. india’s weapon sales do not only involve weapons and cash but also include personal ties and a web of connections among military officials. the move corroborates constructivist insight. it promotes the creation of a network of transgovernmental tie at military personnel level. in fact, military cooperation can do good transnational tie between two governments. while western democracies pursued a policy of isolation, india sought to build bridges instead of fence. for instance, myanmar’s membership at bay of bengal initiative for multi-sectoral and technical and economic cooperation (bimstec) and mekong ganga cooperation (mgc) enhanced indo-myanmar’s ties. the sub/regional organizations bring two countries closer to pursuit common journal of asean studies 125 prosperity via the use of mechanism of sub/regional economic integration. diagram 1 possibilities of eclecticism in india-myanmar relations source: j.j. suh, peter j. katzenstein and allen carlson, 2004 p.9 the first section of the paper discloses deflect in trade relations and democratic identity. the next section deals with indian policy to expedite reform process in myanmar. even under severe criticism from western countries, india continued to engage with myanmar government. like many other countries, india, too, seems to use development aid to win-over recipients’ people and influence its government. indian approach was starkly different from some others international donor institutions. for example, india’s development projects emphasized more on capacity building, media development and uplift of education as well as establishment of human resources development centers. this part looks into the works of india’s development cooperation in myanmar. a lost in trade relations compared to india’s trade with china & thailand, india’s trade with myanmar lagged far behind. the trade gap among countries is noticed as follow: table 1 myanmar’s trade with neighboring countries: exports and imports 1995-2003 1995 2000 2003 export china 11.3% 6.4% 6.2% thailand 16.9% 13.3% 33.0% india 12.3% 9.4% 12.9% import china 25.0% 19.5% 33.3% thailand 14.2% 19.8% 16.1% india 1.2% 2.1% 3.2% table 2 fdi to myanmar by country (as of march 2002) us$ million amou nt shar e (%) no. of enterpris es singapore 15.7 20.1 71 uk 14.0 18.9 37 thailand 12.9 17.5 49 malaysia 6.0 8.1 28 usa 5.8 7.8 16 france 4.7 6.3 3 indonesia 2.4 3.2 12 the netherlan ds 2.4 3.2 5 japan 2.1 3.2 23 korea 2.1 3.1 32 source: toshihiro kudo and fumiharu miedo 2002) the above study revealed reverse assumptions of economic policy being the vital factor in india’s myanmar policy. the indo-myanmar trade remained insignificant analytical eclecticism liberalismrealism constructivism 126 india’s democratic identity towards myanmar only amounting to few profit per year. additionally, the traded items between india and myanmar were mostly third country products and there was no concerted effort on the part of the government to develop the border regions and expand the tradable items. trade between myanmar and china was immense and with china, trade volume increased continually per years during 1988 to 2000. table 3 total trade between china and myanmar year total trade volume in us dollar (million) 1988 9.5 million 1989 76.03 million 1995 767.40 million 1998 576.49 million 2000 621.26 million source: poon kim shee 2000 india had no chance to compete with china in terms of engaging in trade relations with myanmar. it was obvious that india had less chance to conquer the economic field already occupied by its neighbor. although indo-myanmar trade relations did not work out well as expected by economic analysts, india was positively rather than negatively disposed to maintain indo-myanmar relations. in the age of economic interdependence, trade approach help promote not only economic activities along indo-myanmar border, but also foster mutual benefits and interconnection among people. moreover, economic activities reduce illegal trade. the more development in border region, the more stability prevails in borders. the moves corroborate liberal insights. india’s stance shifted from a policy of condemning to re-engaging with myanmar not only to counter chinese influence, expand economy and eradicate northeast insurgent groups with help from myanmar military but also with a goal to restore democracy. india is surrounded by politically unstable countries and some of her neighbours export terrorists. in this regards, india advocated for restoration of democracy and rule of law in its neighbouring countries. india understood that democratic institutions in sub-continent would ensure its security. if india had to end relations with myanmar, she also had to suspend her relations with neighboring military ruled countries. especially in her backyard, india had maintained relations with military ruled country, bangladesh and pakistan. according to the failed state index (2005), india was surrounded by the list of failed states. afghanistan placed the top 10 while pakistan, myanmar, bangladesh, sri lanka and nepal figures in the top 30 among a list of 76 countries. india faced severe impact of terrorism due to her neighboring failed states. serious deficits in democracy and governance in her neighborhood emphasized india to call on myanmar government to expedite reform process. political stability in myanmar matters since myanmar’s stability had significant impact on stability and development of northeast india region. thus, indian government, on the ground’s purpose, had a strong suggestion for military government to release pro-democracy activists and urged myanmar government to restore democracy. despite deficit in trade and energy sector, india, nevertheless maintained relations with myanmar. indian government wanted to see myanmar to restore democracy. in order to restore democracy, india pursued pragmatic approach, so that myanmar would be kept in close contact with democratic institution. sanction only pushed myanmar to stay away from international community. close contact and engagement would bring journal of asean studies 127 myanmar leaders to have broader outlook on democratic values. with a close contact, india persistently exhorted myanmar government to restore democracy and release of democracy activists. in the aftermath of 2007, when the saffron revolution revealed that ‘change’ was desperately needed in myanmar, india urged myanmar government to speed up political reform and release of prodemocracy leader aung san su kyi. india stood against sanctions on myanmar. during 6161st meeting of unsc in 2009, some countries started reviewing to work with myanmar government in order to support the reform process. indian politicians assumed that isolating myanmar government would not be the answer. disengagement with myanmar government was not in the interest of india. only engagement with myanmar would expedite reform process. besides, indian civil society played certain extent of role in pressuring indian government to urge myanmar government to restore democracy. while accessing myanmar’s market, india at the same time, called on myanmar government to restore democracy, stability, national reconciliation and release of all prodemocracy activists. the contribution of democratic identity to the enforcement of democracy india’s concern over myanmar political condition became more pronounced in the saffron revolution. the saffron revolution started on 15 august 2007 to protest against the government due to a sudden rise of petrol. led by monks, the demonstration took the form of non-violence resistance. a leading monk of the revolution explained the reason why buddhist monks took part in the political situation: “as a monk, we do not take up arms. the political situation in myanmar would not be benefited using arms. i would say our protest was not successful”. however, the revolution gave signal to the government that change was desperately needed. international community had called for further sanctions and urged india to intervene and facilitate a dialogue between the military rulers and pro-democracy groups. when indian external affairs minister pranab mukherjee met his counterpart u nyan win at the u.n general assembly in october 2007, the minister urged to take forward efficiently the process of national reconciliation and political reform. india did not remain reluctant to use its voice to expedite for change in myanmar anymore. there were reasons india did not remain silence on the saffron revolution. it was noticeable and there was some evidence that india policy was shifting in the direction towards ‘democracy promotion’. one noticeable evidence was indo-us relations with regard to nuclear issue. in 2005, united stated set up ‘new framework for us-india defense relations’ to push the latter into a strategic alliance with washington in order to counter china in asia and in return, the bush administration had offered india to lift its 30 year nuclear sanctions and to sell advanced us nuclear technology, legitimizing india’s open violation of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. india declared to create an international environment conducive to promotion of democratic values, and to strengthen democratic practices in societies which wish to become more open and pluralistic. it was difficult to tell india’s real stance in myanmar as a ‘democracy promoter’ in the eyes of major global democracies. the second reason, when the un security council issued a statement “strongly” deploring the myanmar’s oppression of pro-democracy demonstrators, surprisingly, the statement was not blocked by china, who vetoed a unsc resolution on burma in 128 india’s democratic identity towards myanmar january 2007. instead, china’s ambassador to the un, wang guangya, said that china wished to see stability, mutual reconciliation, and progress towards democracy in myanmar. in addition, premier wen jiabao confirmed china’s shift, and expressed hopes that stability, national reconciliation, and democracy to be achieved as soon as possible through peaceful means. besides, news reported that in a meeting between myanmar foreign minister u nyan win and chinese state councilor tang jiaxuan in september, the latter called on myanmar to “push forward a democracy process that is appropriate for the country”. india’s could no longer ignore to be ‘in-active democracy promoter’ when authoritarian china condemned and reacted to september 2007 saffron revolution. against sanction policy india shifted its policy was somehow connected with growing sino-myanmar military relations. according to indian defense source interviewed by author, china provided us$ 1 to 1.2 billion worth of weapons and china had been engaged in constructing and upgrading the road and rail network system to connect its inland province yunnan. besides, myanmar’s strategic 1930 km long coastline further increases india’s interest. the coastline controls the eastern arch of the bay of bengal which provides china the shortest sea route to south asia. in reverse, the route also provides india’s deadlock inland northeast states to southeast asia. india could benefit from interacting with myanmar government and lessen the latter dependency on china for military cooperation, trade and investment. in this context, indian official restricted their view towards myanmar calling on to restore democracy. on 4 november 2007, indian permanent representative at the un human rights council (hrc), swashpawan singh said that aung san su kyi played a key role in myanmar’s emergence as a democratic country, though india did not support hrc resolution in 2007 calling for sanctions on myanmar. he said india had advocated an outcome that was forward-looking, non-condemnatory, and sought to involve the authorities in myanmar in a peaceful outcome. according to former ambassador to myanmar, indian diplomats had been urging the generals to set aung san su kyi free during private meetings with them. on the other hand, india opposed the us’s call on sanction on myanmar. on 2 october 2007, the human rights council adopted by consensus on the situation of human rights in myanmar in which it strongly condemned the use of violence against peaceful civilian demonstrators. the resolution called for civil, political rights, economic, social and cultural rights. the resolution called on myanmar government to embark on a peaceful dialogue with prodemocracy leaders and all parties concerned. india had emphasized the importance of protection and promotion of human right through dialogue. international community started to rethink engaging with myanmar government. representatives from united nation security council (unsc) expressed their concerns at 6161st meeting held on 13 july 2009 at security council. during the meeting, some representatives showed sights to engage with myanmar in order to support reform process. policy of sanctions applied by the western countries had little prospect, weakening the military regime to the point of giving up power. there were disagreements among international leaders on sanction against myanmar. international community had fallen in to two general categories, one was unambiguously called journal of asean studies 129 for a democratic transition, and the other called for engagement with the military government rather than isolation. for india, india not only shares 1640 km border and sea boundary with myanmar in the bay of bengal but also shares culture and religion ties. pursuing dialogue and diplomatic engagement with military regime rather than isolation was the effective way to convince myanmar government to improve human rights and political situation. the sanctions only pushed myanmar far from democratic institutions. india felt that the way to change in myanmar was not practicing isolation strategy. despite criticism from international community for india’s engagement with myanmar, india seemed to wait tolerantly for the development of the “road map to democracy”. giving too much pressure on human right and democracy in myanmar would not work out. while india busy engaging with myanmar government, us and western countries emphasized on sanctions. sub/regional institutions and transnational ties energy rich myanmar helps india fulfills its energy strive. in a world of scarce resources nowadays, states compete with each other for their shares. individual competition in civil society and market capitalism best promotes the welfare of all by most efficiently allocating scarce resources within society. india sought to increase its regional power, expand partnership with the west and created an international rule of the system which were conducive to profile india as ‘democracy promoter’. the moves made by india to welcome myanmar into sub/regional economic institutions and competition to secure its share of economy corroborate the view of neoliberals. neoliberals assume that there is an interest to serve, therefore there is an institution. new delhi regarded that it was better to engage than to isolate myanmar.in line with the un human rights commission’s decision to enhance the role of regional and sub-regional in the promoting and consolidating of democracy, india welcomed admission of myanmar into sub/regional economic organizations, for example, bay of bengal initiative for multibimstec in 1997 and mgc in 2000. the 55th meeting of un human rights commission encouraged ‘regional and cross-regional organizations and arrangements’ to initiate partnerships to assist in disseminating knowledge about the role of democratic institutions and systems ‘in facing the political, economic, social and cultural challenges in their respective societies’. myanmar’s admission in sub/regional economic organizations would further broaden the mind sets of military regime. in this regard, india had a lead role, where big power countries located far from myanmar were not able to do so. sub/regional level constantly promotes and consolidates democracy and wider political involvement; trade facilitation and pluralism increase the possibilities of a change towards democracy. not only engagement with myanmar helped to stabilize insurgency and development of its northeast india region but a vast network of transnational and trans-governmental ties at various levels further bound networks of indian and myanmar governmental levels. an assessment of india’s interests in myanmar suggests that myanmar’s geostrategic location attracts india. for example, in 2009, south east asian analysis group scholar, subhash kapila commented on his paper with a title of myanmar strategic imperative effectiveness. his paper analyzed united states’ policy of sanction and india’s policy of engagement with the 130 india’s democratic identity towards myanmar military regime in the early 1991. under the sub-title of united states could use india as a bridge to politically reach out to myanmar, kapila argued that ‘myanmar is a strategic imperative not only for us security but overall asian security interest too’. indian officials were wary of the result of south asian association for regional cooperation (saarc) and they shifted their focuses on asean as asean has become among the successful regional associations. indian became a member of asean’s other regionwide institutions such as the asean regional forum (arf), the asia-pacific economic cooperation (apec) and the asia-europe meeting (aseam). india set trade target of us$ 50 billion with asean by 2010. india also focused to provide basic drugs at low cost and a target of 1 million tourists to india from asean region. india entered india-asean free trade agreement on 13 august 2009 with the aim of us$ 10 billion trade in the first year. india became a member of arf in 1996. myanmar as the only asean country which shares a land and also a maritime boundary with india, become a gateway to asean. on the other hand, the difference becomes clear if we think of myanmar’s membership in sub/regional institutions. the membership creates a sense of ‘regionalism’. regionalism, in the sense of the sentiment or consciousness of a common identity, is culturally or politically constructed. the presence of shared interests suggests that processes of cooperation and interdependence are likely to share common identities among member countries. india’s development cooperation india regards a philosophy that enhancing development cooperation is an attempt to introduce ‘something more concrete’ democratic government in myanmar. unlike organization for economic cooperation and development (oecd) countries, india does not have concrete policy for development cooperation. in recent years indian involvement of development projects in myanmar became noticeable. since 2000 india has been playing a role in development projects in myanmar. india’s development policy approach in myanmar is a bit distinct from neighboring countries. it is widely believed that the political and developmental approaches can be compared along several dimensions. political approach sees democratization as a process of political struggle in which political actors who can be clearly identified as democrats content with nondemocratic forces while developmental approach conceives democratization as a slow, iterative process measured in decades and marked by the gradual accumulation of grains. the developmental approach was dominant in india policy towards myanmar. this dominance manifests itself in the following india’s democratic identities: a) a focus on human resources development work, especially capacity building for state institutions; b) an emphasis, within civil society programming, on grass-root level activities and other developmental projects; c) a linkage of democracy work providing training to civil and military officials; d) to stress the concept of partnership even with authoritarian regimes. christian wagner distinguishes between support of democratic development or the participation in economic sanction and economic and bilateral development cooperation. she stresses that indian democratic identity largely prefers the journal of asean studies 131 economic and bilateral development cooperation. indian ministry of external affairs (mea) considers itself to be focal ministry for india’s development assistance. mea has various institutional programme under india development cooperation (idc), such as the indian technical and economic cooperation (itec) programme, aid to african countries through special commonwealth assistance programme and bilateral aid to neighboring and other developing countries. india did not publicly admit that they were ‘promoting democracy’ but background of development cooperation, india tried to strengthen certain element of democratic identities knowing that education is the window to democracy, india, therefore, had been participating in education development since 2000. india provided laboratory equipments worth 500,000 us dollars to yangon university aiming to enhance scientific research activities and it also provided funds for establishment of a business training institute, entrepreneurship developmental center, banking, small and medium sized enterprise and english language training courses. india supplied academic and educational needs such as exchange of research materials, publications and information, organizing of joint conferences and seminars, organizing of joint research programmes, arranging of joint training and retraining programmes, setting up sandwich progarmmes for phd students, exchange of academic and administrative staff, exchange of scholars and students and exchange of collaboration of technology. one of the obvious indian contributions in education sector is granting of 2 million us dollars to build the india-myanmar centre for enhancement of it skills centre in yangon. india’s contribution in educational development project has helped myanmar students to gain broader knowledge because myanmar needs more investment in education sector. the army cooperation between indian army and myanmar started in 1995. joint military counter insurgency operations had already taken place. joint counter insurgency operation was undertaken in order to stabilize and develop northeast region. stability is needed because india regards northeast state as the centre of a thriving and integrated economic space, an opportunity to integrate not only with indian mainland economy but also with india’s neighboring countries. in addition to joint military cooperation, india also supported the capacity building of defense officials of myanmar. india provided training to mid-level army officials. military training provides mechanism between countries to foster cooperation. defense industries involved in coproduction arrangement have formed joint committees, annual conferences all of which facilitate the development of personal ties and social networks among armies. military cooperation involves not only exchange of equipment and money but also generate interconnection among army officials. in this context, indian provided scholarship to myanmar military officers at the indian national defense college (ndc) in new delhi, which is considered one of the highest ranked defense institutes imparting comprehensive forms of training for both defense and civilian officials. indian side offered courses to defense officials who are between the ages of 40 to 50 and regarded as potential leaders in the military. these mid-rank military officials are provided with fully support of living allowance provided with housing facilities in new delhi. the course offers broader outlook towards various issues ranging from social to global issues. the course focuses on social political study, economy, 132 india’s democratic identity towards myanmar science and technology study, international security environment, study on global issues, india’s strategic neighborhood, strategies and structure for national security. national defense colleague has been the vocal advocates for a democratic transition, showcasing democracy in practice through the syllabuses offered by ndc. interestingly ndc syllabus not only focuses on national security aspect but also on boarder out look towards socio-political aspects of domestic influence, economic development, environment, strategic neighborhood and multilateralism. the course content of national defense colleague of india is different from the course content of national defense university of pakistan which also offers training to myanmar military officials. while the latter focuses on national security and war course, the syllabus of ndc highlights the essential role in cooperation and understanding between defense and civil officials. this is important as in military ruled countries where there is lack of cooperation among military officers and civil officials. david steinberg at georgetown university believes that that the most likely source of political evolution in myanmar would come from internal dynamics. since the 2000s india has emphasized more on ‘capacity building’ of the government staffs in myanmar. india’s assistance on institution buildings belong to capacity building approach. sponsoring training of young diplomats, mid-senior military officials and young journalists fall under the category of knowledge sharing approach. the courses offered by national defence college (ndc), foreign service institute (fsi) and institute of mass communication explicitly focus on information transparency, human rights, indian political system and multilateralism. myanmar ranked at the bottom for good governance among nineteen asian countries. good governance term has become widely used in development literature. according to united nations social and social commission for asia and pacific good governance has eight major characteristics; accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of law. myanmar, for example, lacked information transparency. decades of dialogue by the indian diplomats and determined engagements despite disagreement and non-support in international community finally enable india to inculcate a certain trust in myanmar government. for instance, myanmar accepted mea’s offer for special course on myanmar diplomats at fsi and mid-level military official training course at ndc. academic cooperation between indomyanmar working group was initiated by indian government for scientific and technology cooperation in which india agreed to train myanmar scientists and supports the visit of indian technicians to myanmar. academic collaboration also took place in the areas of medical instrumentation, aquaculture & biotechnology, metrology, standards and quality certification and non-conventional sources of energy. in the initial years after the launch of lep, india had given more weight on economic imperative than trainings or setting up knowledge-based institutions in myanmar. india had explicitly highlighted economic and security interests as major foreign policy for indo-myanmar relations in the first 2000s. the first indo-myanmar border trade agreement signed 21 january 1994, for example, showed india’s eagerness to open more border check points so that india could increase in border trade that led to cut down the illegal trade and closely monitor the activities of insurgent groups in northeast of india. journal of asean studies 133 but india did not get their profit target as previous section stated. however, starting from 2000, india has given more emphasis in the field of human resources development and capacity building in order to support gradual and inclusive political change in the country. india had involved itself with capacity building by sponsoring trainings for civil servants, military officials and civil society. trainings courses both in india and myanmar not only refers to development as a foundations for a country’s reformation system but also promotes rule of laws, governance, public administration, legitimacy, democratic system, human rights, government officials participation in decision making process and information transparency. whenever india had the opportunities to talk to myanmar government leaders, india had spoken about the need for reconciliation, for peaceful change. gradual implementation of india’s contribution in infrastructure and noninfrastructure was the indian way of approaching to get close in touch with military regime. efforts to gain trust of myanmar government did not work out over night for india. india invested in long term engagement and penetrated to gain trust from military leaders and persistently urged to release democratic leader aung san su kyi and the need to look forward to national reconciliation. the imperatives of idealism and democratic identity have not completely disappeared at indo-myanmar relations. india did not anymore voiced on ‘noisy democracy’; instead it approached, penetrated and built in the trust with myanmar ruling government. india’s development cooperation was actively involved in several projects both in infrastructure and non-infrastructure. india had been providing its development assistance in myanmar in the form of financial and technical assistance. financial assistance was provided as grants, concessional lines of credit-loc by the exim bank and joint venture assistance. india enhanced ‘constructive engagement’ with myanmar government since general maung aye’s visit in november 2000. the visit ended up singing several development projects, particularly cooperation in the field of science and technology and human resource development. development cooperation was the effective way of engaging with the military regime since most nations embargoed development aid in myanmar. though india’s financial assistance to myanmar only ranked five among eight countries at 4.89 million us$ in 2005-2006, 8.89 million in 2006-2007 and 4.44 million in 2007-2008, india’s contribution more or less had some effects on the general public. for example, india was interested to implement infrastructure of railways and roadways in order to develop welfare of the peoples living in the border areas. a noticeable connectivity provided by india was upgrading of india-myanmar friendship road, a 160 km long road linking northeastern state of india and northwestern part of myanmar. one might argue that india’s project india-myanmar friendship road built entirely by the indian army's border roads organization at a cost of us$30 million was to extend india’s economic interest. india regarded building and implementing of 165 km long india-myanmar friendship road which connects tamu city in northeast of india and kalaymyo2 city in myanmar was to enhance connectivity between the people and the equipment would be utilized in development of rural areas in myanmar. the stability of northeast india is essential since northeastern provides a bridge between the rest of india and 2it is situated in saigaing district, north-west part of myanmar. 134 india’s democratic identity towards myanmar southeast asia. this region plays constructive role in fostering peace and stability. in order to promote peace, stability and social welfare of border area, for example, one of the events done by india government with myanmar authority was that they conducted mega medical camp along indo-myanmar border in 2010. locals’ people on both sides benefited from the services of the general physicians, specialist doctors, dentist and veterinary doctors of the indian army. the moves of enhancing socio welfare of border people implied that india was eager to strengthen peace, stability and harmony in border areas. once border is stable, then there would be economic development. delay in economic development lead to instability in the border region, thus, sparking fuel to insurgent groups. india assistance in infrastructure development projects during 2001 to 2010 totaled about us$550 million. in line with the lep, connectivity and development cooperation become key word for facilitating indo-myanmar relations. india’s development cooperation in myanmar over the past two decades was in low profile as compared to chinese’s development cooperation. when india extended her relations with myanmar government in 1990, there was infrastructure and road construction projects only at two countries’ border areas. then, india had further strengthened into wider development cooperation. several among them, kaladan river project were prominent as people from both sides would benefits their socio-economic lives. human resource development (hrd) cooperation despite harsh criticisms from democratic countries for approaching myanmar differently from the west and its normative beliefs, india had committed to an active involvement in the field of human resource development-hrd particularly education, science and information technology and development of media. human resources development assistance was given to myanmar civil society organizations by india so that myanmar people could expand activities. for example, capacity building, human empowerment, trainings, and other development cooperation helped widen perspectives of myanmar civil servants and professionals. change comes from human empowering. engaging in broader range of civil society could generate more ideas and consensus on how to expedite or persuade or initiate reform process. thus, interaction between india and myanmar could bring necessary and possible change. the endeavor to foster democratic identity in her neighbors matters because india’s neighborhood replete with authoritarianism. indian neighbor china had enhanced its relations in south asia countries, for example, with sri lanka’s rajapaksa regime and the pakistani army. the china’s best friends threaten indian societies and domestic instability. india eastern neighbor myanmar had cemented its military ties with china since 1988. journal of asean studies, vol. 1, no. 2 (2013), pp. 122–139 © 2013 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn2338-1353 electronic table 4 indian contribution in infrastructure development some major indian infrastructural projects in myanmar no. project / name contribution us$ million year 1. tamu kalewa road and constructionand upgrading of the rhitiddim and rhi-falam road 2001 2. up gradation of yangon-mandalay railway link 56.35 2003 3. two telecom project 7 2004 4. tamanthi hydro electric power highway project 56 2004 5. revamping of the thanlyin refinery 20 2004 6. it related project 3 2004 7. to upgrade remote sensing ground receiving station in yangon 1.3 2006 8. for assistance with delineation of myanmar’s continental shelf 3 2006 9. kaladan multi-modal transport project 10 2006 10. direct telephone communication 7 2006 11. heavy duty water pumps 20 2006 12. thathay chaung hydro power project 60 2007 13. credit line for an aluminum conductor steel reinforced wire manufacturing facility 20 2008 14. financing three transmission line 64 2008 15. kaladan multimodal transport 100 2008 16. construction of the rhi-tiddim road 60 2010 17. development of transmission lines 64 2010 18. up grading microwave link from moreh to mandalay 6 2010 source: illustrated by the author according to the data from the new light of myanmar newspaper and indian embassy web page 136 india’s democratic identity towards myanmar however, contrary to india’s other neighbor, myanmar had neither exported terrorists to india nor provoked political instability. critics often argued that india had shifted its stance from earlier position of ‘voicing democracy’ to a pragmatic consideration. one of the arguments that brought forward was that india supported spdc as india wanted stability in northeast region. many scholars had depicted that india was interested in myanmar only for its strategic and economic compulsions. all of them did not properly mention the ties in indo-myanmar relation beyond these compulsions. communal riots among border people never did happened. all the four states of northeast, nagaland, arunachal pradesh, mizoram and manipur share common culture and linguistic asset with their cross-border neighbors in myanmar. the old civilization pyu people3 or sriksetra people in myanmar had a deep influence of indian culture as every stage of their civilization there were in contact with centers of indian civilization from gupta4 period up to the palas5. neither myanmar nor india annexed each other territories. after indian’s reversed policy in 1990s, myanmar born indians were able to return back to invest business, a scenario which was impossible during general ne win’s administration. the age of globalization pushes india to commit in trade competition. but with myanmar, india enjoys beyond trade. culture, religion and tradition have depth of bond between people of india and myanmar. this paper presents overview indomyanmar relations, focusing not only on material forces but also on indian attempt to bring political reform in myanmar. the signs of democratic reforms in myanmar 3pyu cities are situated northern bago region. 4gupta period that existed from 320 -550 bce 5palas empire that existed from 750-1176 bce due to the seven steps road map initiated in 2003 drove india to expedite political reform, dialogue between military regime and pro-democracy icon aung san su kyi. what is more, india took a lead in effort to engage between military regime and international community. close contact with military regime is the best way to persuade the regime to change their mind sets and urge them to speed up the process of restoration of democracy in myanmar. india’s efforts in encouragement of myanmar’s reform combined with developmental works are more helpful than international sanctions. myanmar is a small country compare to india in size and population. during the 1990s, realists believes that india placed economic and security interest priorities in the policy with myanmar government. it is always arguable that the shift in india’s policy and engagement with the military regime was based on security imperative and a share in gas. although the indian government would like to see democracy restored in myanmar, indian officials are also worried that if india does not maintain good relations with the myanmar government, myanmar would be in the mist of isolation and the leader would never have broader outlook in international affairs. as a result, india maintains its political and economic access to myanmar. beyond this political and economic access, there are some inclinations between india-myanmar relations such as cultural, tradition, religion and language affinity. from the empirical finding of indomyanmar relations from 1988 to 2010, this paper profiles india’s policy towards myanmar which reflected a mix of security, economic and moral imperatives. india has tried all its possible means and ways to call on military regime to expedite reform process, a policy differently from the west style liberal democracies but streams from journal of asean studies 137 its own ‘democracy promotion’ philosophy; development cooperation. the indian have spoken out in support of the democracy but they have been reluctant to impose economic sanctions. india has played a role in fostering consensus from some countries to engage with myanmar. after the 1616st meeting on united nations human rights council of 2009, some countries have revealed sights of engaging with myanmar in order to expedite reform process. in addition, india has achieved certain context at persuading the military regime to be involved in international community. india has combined the concept of democracy with the development cooperation and engaged relations with military regime and facilitated myanmar to restore democracy. india also has internalized the rule of good governance in myanmar. india has supported capacity building and knowledge sharing strategies in an attempt to help myanmar develop governance. india’s efforts on knowledge sharing can be seen supporting scholarships and trainings to government and military officers, as well as civil society. india has chosen to engage rather than adopted sanctions and pressured myanmar because sanctions and pressures decline back to isolation and only spoiled the process of reconciliation and political reform. india tries to strengthen bilateral relations with myanmar government on the basis for further political reform and a peaceful transition to democracy by: i) supporting technical and capacity building of administrative staffs as well as civil society, ii) supporting developmental projects particularly human resources development, iii) supporting active engagement to access un special envoy to myanmar, iv) strengthening the governance, political, human rights and know-how skills to myanmar governmental staffs and army officials, v) investing to build and rebuild economic institutions as well as infrastructure and non-infrastructures in myanmar and vi) persuading international community to initiate comprehensive dialogue with military regime and call on to review sanction as it only make the people of myanmar incline towards poverty. for indian economic investment in myanmar, it is not a big issues that in this globalized era, every country is competing each other from economic point of view but of course not at the cost of sovereignty and integrity. beyond economic assumption, india and myanmar have much in common. india’s language, multi-religion and culture, in fact, influence great deals on myanmar people. india, similarity of historical experience, cultural affinity and geographical contiguity with myanmar, initiates step of restoring democracy in myanmar. india’s outlook towards the future of myanmar is not only hybrid of economic and security imperatives. in fact, myanmar is a test for how india valued on democracy. india is at the best placed to put the pressure on military regime to enable reformation to start soon. conclusion the paper finding shows that india’s policy towards myanmar has prioritized three aspects; namely, economic, security and moral imperatives in myanmar. india acts in accordance with its need and demand of the time, sometime security, and other time economy but also occasionally moral imperatives. indian efforts to bring national reconciliation in myanmar have received less significant. myanmar location 138 india’s democratic identity towards myanmar at tri-junction and a share of gas make india prioritized security and economic dimension. during the last decade, security and economic dimensions have influenced myanmar people aspiration of democracy. myanmar not only needs economic development but also requires human resources development, capacity building and technical know how along with the former one. india’s long determined engagement policy with myanmar has somehow successful to call on myanmar government to engage with international community. decades of totalitarian governance mind sets could not be changed within days or nights. it needs year sometime decades to change. close contact with myanmar government brings a light of changes in decades of authoritarian influenced country. peaceful transition of myanmar civilian government at the end of 2010, shows that myanmar is trying to be on the path to fully democratic country. in this time of transition, india should put emphasize more on national reconciliation process in myanmar. the question of india’s way of ‘democracy promotion’ differently from the west requires more in depth case studies and timings. for this question, it will not be enough to do case study of indo-myanmar relations from the view of india way of ‘democracy promotion’. but one thing for sure that the significance of india’s way of ‘democracy promotion’ is different from the west and it remains room for further study. no one can denied the fact that globalization make the world become shrunk. myanmar, like any other country could not be left out from this wave of globalization. the wave encourages education, information technology, human capacity building, trade and investment. the best option for india is to enhance its relations with new government to further establish solid democracy in myanmar. it is primary essential for india to maintain peace and stability in myanmar both for her security and economic interests. india should invest more in capacity building, needs to strengthen its democratic institutions and engagement with civil society. india needs to invest cooperation in health, education and tourism sector, too. about author htwe hteik tin lwin, a myanmar diplomat, fulfilled the course of international relations for master of international area studies at school of humanities and social sciences, university of tsukuba, japan. she is one of the recipients of japanese grant aid for human resource development scholarship in 2012. she received her bachelor of art in english from dagon university, myanmar. she has been in diplomatic service for more than 15 years debuting from attaché. she served at myanmar embassy in new delhi as third secretary from 2005-2008 at political section. she is currently 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indonesia-china energy trade: analyzing global and domestic political economic significance in indonesia-china lng trade muhammad badaruddin universitas bakrie, indonesia abstract indonesia had been the largest lng exporter for almost three decades since 1977 to 2005. during 1970s and 1980s, indonesia’s energy industry boosted its economic growth that valued 80% of the country’s annual exports and 70% of its annual revenues. meanwhile, indonesia presents an exceptional case since it decreases its lng export while it has been developing its largest lng plant in tangguh due to prioritizing domestic energy demand. but, since indonesia eagerly links its economy to china, it uses lng export as a medium to strengthen indonesia-china strategic partnership. tangguh lng export to china, although it is not indonesia’s largest lng export contract, reflects a unique case of a developing country’s international energy trade. because it presents evolution of indonesia’s lng export policy through dynamics of regional and global economic turbulences. this paper analyses the lng export in the context of asian economic crisis and its recovery, the peak of crude oil price in 2008 and followed by global financial crisis as the context as well as indonesia’s domestic political dynamics. keywords: international energy trade, indonesia-china energy cooperation, lng export policy introduction indonesia was an early producer of oil started in the 1870s. up to the second world war, indonesia produced 148,000 barrels of oil per day (arndt 1983; hunter 1966). indonesian natural gas industry came to life when it found a large natural gas field at arun in aceh province in 1971, and then discovered gas reserves at badak, near bontang in east kalimantan province in 1972, totaling about 17.5 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of reserves (wijarso, 1985). badak exported its first cargo in 1977 while arun followed the suit the next year. badak and arun’s export had made east asia the world’s largest regional liquefied natural gas (lng) market (nugroho, 2010). the energy industry boosted indonesia’s economic growth during the 1970s and 1980s by accounting around 80% of the country’s annual exports and 70% of the central government’s annual revenues (rosser, 2007:39). lng is also indonesia’s most significant energy export and has been its largest foreign exchange earner (stott, 26 indonesia-china energy trade 2008). indonesia had been the largest lng exporter for nearly three decades since 1977 to 2005, and its peak export was in 1998 for around 36.1 billion cubic meters (nugroho, 2010). indonesia has estimated reserves of around 9 billion barrels of proven and potential crude oil and 182 tcf of gas, according to energy ministry data (reuters, 22 november 2007). profile of tangguh lng project tangguh lng plant project is indonesia’s third lng centre after badak lng plant and arun lng plant. tangguh plant is located in berau bay and fed by gas field in manokwari regency. tangguh gas project is developed by a consortium of beyond petroleum plc., (37.16%), mi berau (16.3%), cnooc (13.9%), nippon oil (12.23%), kg berau/kg wiriagar (10%), lng japan corporation (7.35%) and talisman (3.06%) (the jakarta post [jp], 31 december 2009). tangguh lng plant is planned to have a production capacity of 7.6 million metric tons (mmt) a year from two production trains (hudiono, 2005) the lng project fed natural gas from three production-sharing blocks –the berau, the muturi, and the wiriagar blocks in manokwari regency, which totally contained 14.4 tcf proven reserves of natural gas (jp, 9 august 2002). these three blocks are controlled through production sharing contract (psc) by bp indonesia plc. which has 37.5% of the reserves, along with by mitsubishi (16%), nippon oil exploration (12%), british gas (11%), kanematsu corp. (10%), lng japan (1%) and china national offshore oil corporation (cnooc) which has 12.5% stake in the gas fields (jp, 30 september 2002). until 2009, the tangguh lng plant operator has signed multi-year contracts to supply lng to several buyers, including to cnooc, which is serving the fujian province’s lng terminal in china for the amount of 2.6 million ton per annum (mtpa) for 25 years contract. another one is with korea's steel company, posco and korea’s electric company, k-power for a total of 1.15 mtpa for 20 years of tenure (alfian, 2009). the lng export contract to fujian was the first contract made with tangguh operator. it was expected to generate a total of usd8.5 billion revenue for 25 years contract period while its two trains total production capacity, will generate usd 21 billion in revenue over the same period. initially, bp and its partners had planned to install four trains at the tangguh plant, which will generate usd 45 billion in revenue (jp, 30 september 2002). the revenue will be distributed to the indonesian central government, the papua province and bp with its consortium partners. under a psc, bp and its partners would keep 30% of all revenue and give the remaining 70% to the government. then according to the intergovernmental fiscal balance law no. 25/1999, the central government has to hand over 30% of the revenue to the papua province (jp, 27 december 2002). statement of the problem referring to krasner (1976), there are four major state interests in the international trade: (1) political power; (2) aggregate national income; (3) economic growth; (4) and social stability. focusing in international energy trade, it related to ‘energy security’ which has been debated particularly concerning the transnational oil markets. moreover growing demand of gas in the global market will force consumers to put big concern of a vital gas supply. emerging cooperation among gas producers and major energy consumer journal of asean studies 27 countries will shape a new geopolitical considerations that strongly influence the highest levels of economic and security policy. energy importer country like china that commit to fulfil its large quantity of gas, put its energy security systems partly in the hands of the exporters, which will give both of the two parties a stake in each countries’ domestic political stability. thus, the ‘geopolitics of gas’ is not simply a struggle for global position, but also “the immensely political actions of governments, investors, and other key actors who decide which gas trade projects will be built, how the gains will be allocated, and how the risks of dependence on international gas trading will be managed” (barnes et al., 2006: 4-5). the focus of this study is to investigate indonesia’s lng export from its tangguh plant to fujian province in china. the export contract was signed in august 2002 to supply 2.5 mtpa of lng for 25 years in tenure. under the contract, the crude oil price –as the lng checking price—was packed in maximum price of usd25/barrel, but the oil price had risen since early 2005 and it reached above usd100/barrel during 2007-2008. it means, the original contract only valued usd2.67 per million british thermal unit (mbtu), although in fact in 2008 indonesia could even sell its lng for usd20/mbtu to south korean companies. the major emphasis of this study will be on the indonesia’s interests in exporting its lng to china. this study will particularly investigates indonesia’s interests that drove its lng export from tangguh plant to china, and the context that shaped the process of lng trading tender/negotiation. some research questions are addressed here. what interests drove indonesia to export its lng? is there a certain political interest behind the deal? how did the domestic context shape indonesia’s attitude and its bargaining position during the negotiation of fujian lng contract? how did the global energy market shape indonesia’s assumption in accepting lng pricing formula? since this research aims to reveal the dynamics of the international energy trade in depth and in detail, not shallowly and broadly, the naturalistic approach seems to be more suitable for this research. in addition, the existing data tend to be qualitative in nature as they are derived primarily from news in the mass media and interview with the resource person. this research largely uses a qualitative approach because it focuses on the detailed critical aspects using case study on a particular international energy trade. the data are collected using qualitative method, to be discursive and concerned with a comprehensive account of some event or unit. although it has a small number of cases, qualitative researchers generally discover abundant information from the research. sometimes this research is linked with area or case studies that focus on a particular event, decision, institution, location, issue, or piece of legislation (king, keohane and verba, 1995:4). this research is more likely to incorporate an inductive approach and let the data speaks for themselves. this study is multi-method in focus, involving an interpretive approach to its subject matter. therefore, by deploying a wide range of interconnected methods this approach not only helps in developing a more holistic view, but also facilitates explanation and prediction (denzin and lincoln, 1998). the main tool for data collection in this research is the analysis of secondary data, supported by a qualitative interviewing as well as internal documentation (documents of the contracts, etc.). data analysis is conducted towards the news from several highly credible english newspapers and magazines as well as online websites, such as the jakarta post (most read english-language newspaper in indonesia), antara news 28 indonesia-china energy trade (indonesia’s biggest news services in terms of subscriptions), tempo magazine english edition (most popular magazine in indonesia), bloomberg, reuters, and people daily english edition (chinese government’s media). an exploratory interview is also conducted with an energy expert and senior policy maker in energy sector in indonesia. the interviews explore the context surrounding indonesia’s lng export to china, interests that shaped indonesia’s policy to export its lng, and suggestions of indonesia’s policy response to gain its national interests through energy cooperation with china. indonesian government and lng marketing to china soon after taking over from the authoritarian suharto’s regime, president habibie’s administration (may 1998october 1999) prioritized tangguh lng project over other lng projects across the country, including the expansion of badak lng plant, development of donggi-senoro lng project and east natuna lng project (jp, 14 june 1999). president abdurrahman wahid continued implementing the policy and was involved personally in marketing the tangguh project. he was eager to offer the lng particularly to key player states in the asian lng market (jp, 13 june 2000). wahid put china’s lng market on top of his list among others due to the country’s fast growing demand of energy. china is the second largest energy importer after the us. wahid visited china and sent his minister of energy yudhoyono to find buyers for the project in china. from the beginning, efforts to sell tangguh lng to china were conducted with a governmentto-government approach involving a stateowned energy company, pertamina (jp, 30 may 2000). president megawati soekarnoputri, who took office in july 2001 used any available means to sell tangguh lng to china through a tender for guangdong province lng project. as the competition for guangdong lng contract between indonesia and australia heated up, leaders of both countries took turn to visit china to win over the preference of the chinese government. president megawati visited china and lobbied the chinese leaders to secure the guangdong lng contract. in march 2002 megawati made a state visit to china accompanied by her husband, taufik kiemas, a large number of her ministers and over 100 indonesian businessmen. australian prime minister john howard also lobbied the chinese leaders to win the lng project during his visit to china (jp, 9 august 2002). president megawati and her chinese counterpart, president jiang zemin, performed a dance together for six minutes during a state dinner. the event was widely seen as dance diplomacy by megawati to sell tangguh lng to china (jp, 25 march 2002). she also hosted another summit with chinese prime minister zu rongji in jakarta. on top of that, she sent her husband taufik kiemas to lead a government delegation that comprised some cabinet members to persuade beijing to reward indonesia with the guangdong lng contract (jp, 21 august 2002). however, on 8 august 2002, on the same day with the 12th commemoration of the normalization of sino-indonesian diplomatic relations, china announced a decision eagerly awaited by megawati. the usd13.5 billion contract to supply 3 mtpa of lng for guangdong terminal was awarded to a consortium of australia’s energy firms (jp, 9 and 21 august 2002). journal of asean studies 29 the date was only coincidence. however, as a largest lng exporter, this was indonesia’s first failure to win the contract. it was very disappointing because indonesia was so desperate for foreign exchanges to cover its budget deficit (jp, 12 august 2002). but surprisingly, china also announced a ‘consolation prize’ for indonesia without tender process. china offered indonesia to become a sole bidder for another lng project in fujian province, a smaller contract that’s expected to value usd10 billion to supply 2.5 mtpa of lng to fujian province (jp, 9 august 2002). however, the signed contract only valued usd8.4 billion for 25 years of long term export (jp, 26 september 2002). context of global lng market and the tender during guangdong lng tender in 2002, the global lng market was declining. energy supply was abundant and the energy commodity price was very low. the competition among exporters was very tight. this situation was explained by indonesian minister of energy yusgiantoro that the arrival of new players from malaysia, australia, brunei darussalam and qatar in the late 1980s has changed the regional lng market's structure from a ‘seller's market’ to ‘buyer's market’ (jp, 12august 2002). the ‘buyer’s market’ happened when the amount of supply in the energy market was higher than demand. the declining market was formed by the scaling down of industrial operation in most asia’s developing countries. it was marked by the ceasing of manufacturing machines that left a big amount of energy supply in the stock pile. although, just before the crisis, most of lng producers have increased their lng production capacity to meet high demand of energy triggered by asian economic growth. the decline in demand caused an oversupply condition in the lng energy market. the oversupply did not only scale down the number of lng markets, but also forced the contract of lng trading to be rescheduled due to the fact that most of the lng contracts were intended for long term deals ranging from 20 to 25 years. they faced a totally unprecedented condition. all of the importing countries had an oversupply situation and too many contracts. these unstable market situations have also brought about different calculations on the buyers’ side. although they were favored by the ‘buyer’s market’ condition, they prefer to have short term lng contracts as they took a wait-and-see approach to long term contracts. in their opinion, short term contracts offered better flexibility in dealing with the period of uncertainties. therefore, the energy market was flooded by ‘short term’ contracts or buyer’s preference to buy small quantities (jp, 11 april 2001). that is because the buyers did not want to be tied with longterm contracts and therefore the buyers became more and more demanding and the competition became tighter (jp, 9 december 2000). the condition continued until the second half of 2004, when energy market was still dubbed as ‘buyer’s market’. demand for indonesia’s lng from its traditional buyers, like japan, south korea and taiwan, was still running in the lowest curve. in fact, in order to extend the current contracts to supply some 12 mtpa to japan that will expire by 2010, indonesia was considering a request from the japanese to lower the price, as part of a strategy to maintain its customer loyalty (jp, 10 december 2003). this marketing strategy by decreasing the price was also applied to korea gas corp. (kogas) by discounting up to 40% should the firm agreed to extend its 30 indonesia-china energy trade contract for another 20 years (jp, 23 june 2004). this ‘buyer’s market’ condition dominated the global energy market from the peak of asian economic crisis until the second half of 2004. this is the background of china’s tender for the guangdong lng project, which drew bidders from six countries –indonesia, malaysia, russia, australia, yemen and qatar (jp, 9 august 2002). it is assumed that this energy market context had influenced the china lng tender process. domestic context and the tender it is very important to understand the political economic context in indonesia during the fujian lng bidding process. prior to the bidding, indonesia was the last country in asia to recover from the economic crisis started in 1997. not only did it hit hard indonesia’s financial sector, but also triggered a broader, systemic political reform. the crisis created a momentum to bring down the authoritarian regime of president soeharto and provided a period of transition which changed an authoritarian system into democracy. during the transition, political liberalization also opened a tight power competition among elites. provinces outside java island abundant with natural resources demanded full autonomy and even campaigned for independence. one of the richest provinces but always marginalized, papua, intended to break away from indonesia. responding to this demand, indonesia should deliver a quick and concrete action to solve the unrest in papua. the problem would bring the domino effect to other provinces, especially after east timor was separated from indonesia. the main concern of the insurgents in papua was demand for justice and welfare from the central government, particularly for larger shares in the revenues from the exploitation of their natural resources (jp, 13 june 2000). in this domestic context, development of the tangguh lng project was expected to be a strategic step in order to solve the problem. it was expected, by exporting tangguh lng, indonesia would receive sufficient money to finance development in the province with 2.3 million populations. furthermore, the development was expected to push the economic growth and bring a multiplier effect in the development of various basic infrastructures. the lng project itself was expected to provide at least 3,000 job opportunities during the construction and 1,000 would be permanently employed in the plant's operations. the central government had been guaranteeing a fairer share through the special autonomy law of papua. the law guarantees the province to get 30% of the revenue from the lng project and 70% will be for the central government (jp, 30 september 2002). competition among the energy companies another issue that also rose during the indonesia’s bidding of guangdong lng project was the competition among the multinational companies. they were mostly the investors of badak lng plant in east kalimantan –led by french firm total fina elf and american firms unocal indonesia and vico indonesia— who asked pertamina to sell lng from badak to china. the investors of badak plant wanted to sell their lng to china since their plant was already developed and had been serving international market for decades. they also proposed to build the ninth train in the badak plant (jp, 25 july 2001). journal of asean studies 31 they argued that exporting lng from badak would be cheaper than from tangguh plant, because badak lng was an expansion project while tangguh was a new one. investors of tangguh would need to spend full investment to build infrastructure and other supporting constructions, while badak project would be more efficient because it would only need to spend money for expansion project. the efficiency would help indonesia’s position to give more competitive price for the potential customers. badak investor’s reason on the competitive price was relevant with the buyer’s market condition at that time. indonesia’s chance to win the chinese lng supply contract would be greater if it proposed to supply lng from badak plant (jp, 25 january 2001). pertamina president baihaki hakim argued that tangguh lng could be less competitive, because construction of the plant had not begun yet, which raised the cost of selling the lng (jp, 11 april 2001). meanwhile, the indonesia’s bidding of guangdong was also followed by the competition behind the screen between pertamina and bp. pertamina was no longer the sole seller for indonesia’s lng for international market and was replaced by bp, although during the habibie administration, pertamina was appointed to market tangguh lng to china (jp, 14 june 1999). the change of the market leader from a state owned company to a foreign company was allowed by the new oil and gas law, number 22/2001 that stipulates foreign contractors are allowed to market their production (the state secretariat of the republic of indonesia, 2001). the appointment of bp to market tangguh lng to china was followed by a controversy. bp failed to compete with the eventual winner, an australian consortium. analysts argued that appointing bp to spearhead indonesia’s marketing effort was a mistake. pertamina should have done the job as it had marketing experience for decades. an analyst, hutapea, said despite the extensive corruption within pertamina over the past decades, pertamina had succeed in putting indonesia as the world's largest lng exporter and maintained indonesia's leadership in the asian lng market for decades. he said the government had made a mistake by allowing bp to lead the marketing, “the government made a blunder by distrusting pertamina” (jp, 12 august 2002). hutapea said the problem was the security of supply. he further explained that since the tangguh plant had not developed yet, china doubted the continuity of supply from the tangguh project. they might fear other lng plants could not be responsible to ‘help’ tangguh in case of troubles given the fact that china would deal with bp, rather than pertamina. “had pertamina led the marketing effort, china would not have been overly worried about the security of supplies because pertamina also manages the arun and badak plants” hutapea argued. china prefers to be served by pertamina as it has been reliable exporter of lng since 1970s. meanwhile, bp perceived as the relatively new player in asian lng market, and more importantly it did not has any authority to two other lng plants that already operated for years (jp, 12 august 2002). pertamina’s position was assumed stronger in the lng market because it has full authority in two other lng plants. these authorities were very important to be able to guarantee continuity of the lng supply to the importer. as an example, when lng production at arun plant in aceh was disrupted, pertamina could easily secure the continuity of supply by deliver its reserve capacity from badak plant in kalimantan. in fact, bp did not have such ability to guarantee security of lng supply to the importer. 32 indonesia-china energy trade it was the first time a foreign contractor led an indonesia’s lng marketing team. however, after assessing the failure to win guangdong contract and considering china’s special offer of fujian lng project, the government assigned a marketing team led by senior pertamina official to follow up the offer. the team comprised three pertamina officials and president of the tangguh project, gerald j. preeboom from bp. successfully the fujian contract was signed in august 2002 by pertamina, not bp (jp, 20 august 2002). following its ‘success’ to secure the fujian contract, pertamina intensified a campaign to regain its previous status as the sole seller of indonesia’s lng. an indonesian analyst argued that pertamina’s status as marketing leader would improve indonesia performance to compete in the market because pertamina had full control of the other two lng plant. it in turn would assure the security of supply, something that bp did not have. however, other contractors were not enthusiastic about the campaign as they argued that the single seller scheme would be unfair for lng players in indonesia, with pertamina no longer the regulator but rather a market player (jp, 19 september 2002). in the wake of competition among contractor companies, the oil and gas implementing body (bp migas) has appointed pertamina as the sole marketing agent for indonesia’s lng to japan, indonesia's largest lng importer. the appointment was for scheduling bp migas’ proposal on the extension of japan lng import contract that would due in 2010 (jp, 10 may 2004). pertamina was also asked to market the lng to south korea and taiwan. in late may 2004, pertamina regained its status to lead indonesia’s lng marketing team. the head of bp migas announced that they had finished terms and conditions for the appointment of pertamina as sales agent with other lng producers such as total, unocal, vico and bp indonesia for tangguh.” (jp, 28 may 2004). learning from the competition among contractor firms, the government has considered to set up an ‘indonesia inc.’, which would position the authority to market indonesia’s lng. the body, whose goal would be to help indonesia retain its position as a top lng producer, would consist of bp migas, pertamina, the indonesian gas association and contractors (19 september 2002). however, the tangguh lng export contract for fujian did have a problem that would explode in the following days. the problem was about pricing formula that caused huge lost to indonesia, because the contract involved a crude oil check price at usd25/barrel as the ceiling price for the tangguh lng for fujian. some economic and political issues emerged around the controversial fujian contract. problems over the fujian lng contract market condition that has been called ‘buyer’s market’ has made the competition very tight. it is very tough when each of the lng exporting countries had to compete by employing all possible means available to win lng supplying contracts. however, various measures deployed to win the export contracts must put a national interest on the top priority above all calculation and interests. various ways to attract potential buyers, including giving a big discount for lng price, should be calculated in order to gain long term interest. pricing of energy commodity in the international market always fluctuates. sometimes the price drops because of economic, politic or security issues, but at other times the price journal of asean studies 33 can be very expensive because of these contextual variables. as the nature of fossilbased energy is very limited and could not be renewable, the general trend of fossil energy price should be higher in the future. “the negotiator team had acted against the law of nature by assuming the fixing price” said kurtubi, an energy expert in jakarta (iswara, 2008). based on this reason, the fujian lng contract raised some question on the ‘abnormality’ of the contract. but since the contract was won during the frustrated situation for indonesia, the direct appointment as the sole bidder without tender was perceived as the ‘consolation prize’. however the ‘consolation prize’ had raised a public suspicion on the unfair transaction since its early stage. the suspicion was raised as the indonesian government was not transparent in announcing the tangguh lng export price to fujian province although some experts and politicians had questioned the issue. the indonesian government was seen to keep something behind public eye while in august 2002 minister yusgiantoro was still in preparation to send a task force to clarify the contract with the chinese government. even until second half of september 2002, the price of lng export to fujian was still in question. having failed to win guangdong contract, also with unclear details of the fujian contract, the indonesian government nevertheless speculatively declared that the result of the bidding was good enough for indonesia (jp, 7 september 2002). responding to that progress, many experts and politicians criticized the marketing team’s ability and started questioning whether the largest exporting country was still competitive in the future. “indonesia's lng industry is now facing a doubtful future,” ramses hutapea, an energy analyst said (simbolon et al., 2002). critics also questioned the involvement of the president’s husband, taufik kiemas who led indonesian delegation to ‘lobby’ chinese policy makers. the rumors in jakarta speculated that kiemas himself had been possibly taking profits from the ‘marketing activities’ (jp, 21 august 2002). indonesian government used the ‘consolation prize’ to forget the frustration for its failure to win the guangdong lng tender. the indonesian government used the fujian contract to answer various critics following the failure to win the guangdong contract and later other failure to win respectively korea and taiwan contracts. therefore, the suspicion on the ‘unusual’ terms and conditions in the fujian contract could be ignored. moreover, the price of energy commodity was very cheap, so the formula of the contract could seem normal (simbolon et al., 2002). the suspicion was justified three years later when the market shifted to ‘seller’s market’ and energy commodity price hiked in 2005. again, in answering the suspicion on the fujian contract detail, the then minister yusgiantoro said that it was a ‘consolation prize’ after indonesia failed to win guangdong lng contract and extend export contract to its traditional lng importer such as japan, korea and taiwan (simbolon, et al., 2002). minister yusgiantoro explained that the offer for indonesia to act as a sole bidder for fujian lng project was already tied with the specific terms and conditions. one of the terms was to put the maximum crude oil check price of usd25/barrel as the ceiling price, which meant that the highest lng price to be exported to fujian would be only usd2.67/mbtu for a period of 25 years. it meant that the negotiators assumed the crude oil price would always be below usd25 for period of 25 years. the ceiling price has limited the fluctuation of the lng price. if the current crude oil price is around usd75 to 34 indonesia-china energy trade usd80/barrel, then the lng price should be around usd12 to usd15/mbtu. let us compare this with the price in the fujian contract. the contract that involves 2.6 mtpa of tangguh lng for fujian puts indonesia in a huge lost (kurtubi, 2007). the use of price ceiling has been perceived as a big problem because it will cause a massive lost for indonesia, almost usd8 billion in a period of 25 years of export to fujian. this reality is very hard to swallow. since indonesia’s current status as a net oil importing country, it has to import crude oil at expensive price, but at the same time sells lng at very low price. importing crude oil is quite costly as indonesia always subsidizes oil price for its domestic market. the reactivation was followed by the increase of energy demand in the global market. however, the oil price hike in the global market did not affect significantly the indonesia’s exported lng price for fujian, china. it caused indonesia to suffer a huge lost in its foreign currency since its lng has been exported to fujian far below the market price. the lost was caused by the imposed pricing formula that restricted lng price with maximum equivalent to oil price of usd25/barrel. indonesia’s lng price for fujian could not climb in line with the oil price in the market and ultimately indonesia as an lng exporter could not benefit from the momentum. this was frustrating since the oil price could not push indonesia to raise lng price for fujian. the situation raised reaction among indonesian political elites. various discourses on the issue surfaced such as ‘resource nationalism’, demand to cancel the fujian lng contract at all cost, and idea to do more rational measure by renegotiating the contract. a visionary idea that gained strong support was the demand to review the energy export policy and to change it into one that prioritizes the natural resources to meet domestic energy demand. the ‘rising oil price’ and the irony of pricing formulation in lng export contract to fujian have raised a discourse on ‘resource nationalism’. however it did not force the indonesian government to nationalize foreign energy companies as in venezuela and bolivia. this is despite the fact that the idea is based on the vision to use the natural resources for the full benefit of the people (soesastro, 2007). in the practical terms, the idea is about to prioritize the indonesia’s national energy and mineral companies, to explore, to product, to refine and to distribute or to market the resources as long as the companies can do them by themselves. then the national companies are allowed to invite other international companies to manage the resources that the national companies are unable to manage. but, the basic rhetoric is about to free indonesia from the exploitation of the so called ‘new colonialism’. another disappointment from the fujian contract was the demand to cancel the contract and find other potential lng importers who could give more benefit for indonesia. this is because some analysts have argued that the contract could be cancelled and this scenario was actually accommodated by the agreement. as the maximum penalty for such eventuality is usd300 million, cancellation makes financial sense, rather than suffering lost for around usd75 billion in 25 years (iswara et al., 2008). following the situation, indonesian government preferred to renegotiate the fujian contract and to conduct more active effort to pull china’s investments and loans to indonesia. the investments and loans become highly important since indonesia is in deep concern to build its energy and infrastructure projects. another measure journal of asean studies 35 that was conducted at the same time is to review the policy of raw material export so that commodities will be for domestic consumption or the process of the material will be inside the country. the demand for renegotiation was very rational since the lng pricing formulation normally reflected the progressive price of crude oil in the global energy market (stott, 2009). there must be no certain limitation to the oil price that serves as the standard or checking price to formulate tangguh lng price. the maximum fixed price of the oil price was unusual in the global lng trading and this price fixing also never happened before. ironically, considering the hike of crude oil price in the global market during july 2008, when it reached its top position in usd147/barrel, the price of lng in the global market should be mirrored around usd20/mbtu. at that time, an energy analyst, kurtubi, estimated that such pricing difference would cost indonesia usd3 billion annually (iswara et al., 2008). meanwhile, when the crude oil price in the market is moving around usd100/barrel, therefore the normal price of lng in the global market should be four times higher than the indonesia’s lng price for fujian. while the renegotiations could cause a rift in china-indonesia relations, it is undeniable that indonesia has what china needs, large deposits of natural resources (stott, 2009). meanwhile, president yudhoyono changed indonesia’s strategy by pushing for enhanced energy cooperation with china, especially in the construction of power plants and infrastructure under the concessionary loan scheme. indeed, energy cooperation is an important part of the sino-indonesia relations, similar to beijing’s growing ties to other resource-rich developing countries in africa. having suffered a huge lost from the fujian contract; indonesia now has learnt to control its tendency to easily export its natural resources. on the other hand, to meet domestic energy demand, the government should change its policy by prioritizing the gas for domestic demand than exporting it. since indonesia is a net oil importer, it has been importing oil that is more expensive than the gas price. moreover, the government still subsidizes oil retail price that costs more than 10% of indonesia’s national budget. a prominent energy expert and member of national energy council, the late widjajono partowidagdo, in an interview with the author, said “it is very stupid to export the cheaper one –lng—and importing the expensive one –oil, that is simple” (partowidagdo, 2010). that logical way of thinking influenced some of the top policy makers, and the victory of the duet of susilo bambang yudhoyono and jusuf kalla, in the first direct indonesian presidential election in september 2004, has “altered the political landscape with regard to lng export” (stott, 2008). that is right what stott has mentioned, since indonesia restores its postcrisis economy and increases its competitiveness in the global market; indonesia must seriously increase the added value by processing its natural resources inside the country. that was one of the priority programs of the yudhoyono-kalla administration, who prefer to push development of resourcesbased industry and to minimize export of raw materials commodity. actually, by tracing indonesia’s energy policy through history, the policy to prioritize domestic energy demand had risen since 1977 when soeharto administration (1967-1998) handled indonesia’s early industrialization in 1970s that needed a big amount of energy supply. in the mining sector, new legislation was passed in 2009 which required mining firms to process all mining products into 36 indonesia-china energy trade metal locally instead of just exporting the raw materials abroad. these policies affect china because, besides its energy needs, china’s economic growth needs indonesia’s raw materials. to meet its industry demand, china will continue its dependence on indonesia’s material supply from large bauxite field in kalimantan. however, the indonesian parliament discussed banning future bauxite exports in favour of refining its own bauxite to alumina domestically (stott, 2008). after being widely questioned and renegotiated in 2006, the fujian contract issue was raised again. in domestic context, politicians was also used this controversial issue as a ‘political weapon’ to attack their political opponents. competition among the politicians intensified when the election was around the corner. in order to get popular support they launched a political attack against their rivals. this section will particularly discuss the domestic political context and its dynamics regarding the controversial lng export contract to fujian that was signed when megawati acted as president of the republic of indonesia from july 2001 to october 2004. the political structure in 2008 already changed, compared to the time when the fujian contract was signed. at that time, megawati, who failed to stay in power after the 2004 election, brought her party as an opposition power to the government. on the other side, both yudhoyono and kalla, who were the cabinet members of megawati administration, was in power after defeating megawati in 2004 presidential election. in 2008, one year before the legislative election in april and presidential election in july 2009, indonesia’s political tension was high. the opposition leader, megawati, and her party (pdi-p, indonesian democratic party of struggle) aggressively pushed a parliamentary enquiry to investigate the government decision to cut subsidy for fuel price in the domestic market. to balance the power exercise, the golkar party that had a majority of seats in the parliament and was led by the then vice president jusuf kalla, was very eager to criticise megawati’s decision to export tangguh lng to fujian at a very low price. the aim of the golkar’s manoeuvre was to raise public awareness that megawati had bequeathed a big problem by deciding an export contract. in countering this political attack, pramono anung, secretary general of pdip warned yudhoyono and kalla that since both of them were members of the megawati administration from 2001 to 2004, yudhoyono and kalla could also be responsible for formulating the policy. politicians in the parliament also confirmed that the fujian lng contract could be politicised and “become an effective bargaining position” said alvin lie, a politician outside the two confronting groups who posted in commission on energy (iswara, 2008). beside the political issue, tangguh lng problem also had a big magnitude and was discussed by various segments of people. this issue could also be an entry point for the businessmen to require sufficient energy supply to operate their industry machines. meanwhile, it also touched the public sensitivity since they suffer from periodical black-out as the state-owned power company did not receive sufficient energy to produce electricity. moreover, the government was unable to build infrastructure and other public facilities because a large amount of its budget must be allocated to subsidize fuel price in domestic market. in the 2010-2011 budget, the subsidy is allocated for around 150 trillion of indonesian rupiah (usd18 billion), or more than 10% of the total national budget (partowidagdo, 2010). journal of asean studies 37 in august 2008, kalla claimed that the fujian’s present formula would totally suffer indonesia of usd75 billion. he then asked the house of representatives (dpr) to review the fujian contract and the supreme audit agency (bpk) would supposedly investigate the country’s lost on it. kalla saw the formula was the worst in the history of indonesia’s energy industry (iswara et al., 2008). kalla urged, "so, the house has to investigate the tangguh lng contract because this contract is the most dangerous. this contract is the worst so far." (jp, 24 august 2008). conclusion revisiting the research question as a form of international trade, indonesia’s lng export to china has a set of interests, as mentioned by krasner (1976), namely, economic growth, aggregate national income, social stability, and political power. these interests have been reached through a set of measures conducted by the government as discussed above. discussion and analysis are provided in order to show indonesia’s interests and how the government manages them through answering the research questions. what interests drove indonesia to export its lng? is there a certain political interest behind the deal? this paper explains that the development of the tangguh lng project was expected to be a strategic step in order to solve the social and political stability in papua province. it was also expected, by exporting tangguh lng, that indonesia would receive sufficient money to finance development in the province with 2.3 million populations. furthermore, the development was expected to push the economic growth and bring a multiplier effect in the development of various basic infrastructures. the lng project itself was expected to provide at least 3,000 job opportunities during the construction and 1,000 would be permanently employed in the plant's operations. how did the global energy market shape indonesia’s assumption in accepting lng pricing formula? how did the domestic context shape indonesia’s attitude and its bargaining position during the lng contract was negotiated? this paper also discusses indonesian minister of energy yusgiantoro’s explanation about the changing lng market's structure from a ‘seller's market’ to ‘buyer's market’ that dominated the global energy market since the peak of asian economic crisis until the second half of 2004. as the background of china’s tender for the guangdong lng project, it is assumed that the global energy market had influenced the china lng tender process. as mentioned above, indonesia’s interests had shaped its lng export to china. this paper also discusses that the fujian lng contract was received during the frustrated situation for indonesia following the failure in the guangdong, korea, taiwan, and japan. hence, the contract was perceived as the ‘consolation prize’. this part later discusses suspicion on the involvement of indonesian president’s husband, taufik kiemas who led indonesian delegation to ‘lobby’ chinese policy makers and possibly taking profits from the ‘marketing activities’. lesson learned there are several things that can be learned from indonesia’s lng export to china. first, in pursuing state’s interests through international trade, the government should also consider the global market condition in the future. this is because the global market is always dynamics, 38 indonesia-china energy trade particularly energy commodity prices that always fluctuates and is influenced by the economic, politic and security situations, besides speculation in the future market. the negotiators in international trade, particularly in exporting lng, should be careful in formulating the export price, since lng prices are not internationally standardized. there are differences in every single trader and they vary by region of destinations, although the lng price mostly refers to the crude oil price in the spot market (girianna, 2009). learning from the fujian pricing formula that restricted indonesia’s lng price to a very cheap price, it would be better to use a progressive pricing formula instead of using ceiling price or putting an upper limit for the lng price. second, before releasing energy export policy, the government should consider its own country’s domestic demand first. the government should give priority to generating its own economic development by allocating the energy for domestic need. it is an irony that while indonesia was exporting most of its lng, its local industry was suffering because of its lack of energy supply. moreover, the government has to import oil and subsidize the oil retail price that costs more than 10% of indonesia’s national budget. concerning this situation, a member of indonesia’s national energy council said “it is very stupid to export the cheaper one –lng—and importing the expensive one –oil” (partowidagdo, 2010). the policy to prioritize domestic energy demand will strengthen the country’s industrial capability. in turn, this condition will create more job opportunities, give added value to its manufactured products, and offer further value from its export in a better form rather than in raw materials. third, in managing state’s interests, the government should be consistent toward its bigger mission, not being trapped in such temporary circumstances. the compass for government is neither a particular political interest nor a short-term domestic political competition. instead it should be to pursue a state’s political power, aggregate national income, economic growth, and social stability. it is also required to maintain stronger cooperation with its partners in international trade, in this case indonesia and china. moreover, the partner is the emerging economic and military power that will strategically influence the regional stability where indonesia is also situated. about author muhammad badar is the head of department of political science, bakrie university. his research interest is in the political economy of energy security. he can be contacted at muhammad.badaruddin@bakrie.ac.id. reference atje, r., gaduh, a. b. 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(2003), case study research: design and methods, thousand oaks, ca: sage publications journal of asean studies, vol. 10, no. 1 (2022), pp. 21−42 issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic received: 04th may 2021/ revised: 24th january 2022/ accepted: 10th february 2022 a visual identity-based approach of southeast asian city branding: a netnography analysis bahtiar mohamad1*, raji ridwan adetunji2, ghadah alarifi3, ahmed rageh ismail4, and muslim diekola akanmu5 1,4othman yeop abdullah graduate school of business, universiti utara malaysia, kuala lumpur, malaysia 2college of communication and media sciences, zayed university, abu dhabi, united arab emirates 3college of business administration, princess nourah bint abdulrahman university, riyadh, kingdom of saudi arabia 5faculty of applied and human sciences, universiti malaysia perlis (unimap), pauh putra campus, malaysia. 1mbahtiar@uum.edu.my; 2rajiridwanadetunji@gmail.com; 3gaalarifi@pnu.edu.sa; 4ahmed.rageh@uum.edu.my; 5adiekola@gmail.com *corresponding author how to cite: mohamad, b., adetunji, r.r., alarifi, g., ismail, a.r. & akanmu, m.d. (2022). a visual identity-based approach of southeast asian city branding: a netnography analysis. journal of asean studies, 10(1), 21−42. https:/doi.org/ 10.21512/jas.v10i1.7330 abstract cities and places had been progressively being marketed as brands by using the concept of ‘city branding', which is a unique idea. the scholars of ‘city branding’ believed that the concept of branding helps the city in marketing activities. a city metaphorically could be seen as an entity given the advantage to display its visual characteristics to tourists, visitors, and residents. unique visual identity such as iconic architecture and graphic design could make a city stands out from the others. thus, the research examined the role of visual identity in city branding. specifically, the aim was to contribute to better understanding of the concept of ‘visual identity’ in southeast asian cities. netnography approach was employed to gain better understanding of the notion of visual identity of city branding and refine a conceptual framework that has been developed based on the existing literature. elements such as iconic structure and graphic design (logo and slogan) of four cities in southeastern asia were emphasized. the research concludes that the components of the visual identity of the cities need to be reshaped to be aligned with their visual characteristics in order to boost their competitiveness among the global city brands. keywords: city branding, city identity, netnography, place branding, visual identity mailto:mbahtiar@uum.edu.my mailto:rajiridwanadetunji@gmail.com mailto:gaalarifi@pnu.edu.sa mailto:4ahmed.rageh@uum.edu.my mailto:5adiekola@gmail.com 22 a visual identity-based introduction branding, in general, focuses on making products or services easier to recognise, identify, understand, and memorize. virtually, branding can be applied in every ramification. places (cities, regions, and countries) have been promoting their attractions and images throughout history due to the need to attract settlers, customers, visitors, traders, investors, and the category of people, who are called ‘influencers’ (anholt, 2010). brand elements such as logos, slogans, motto, tagline, and colour schemes play a critical role in most of the best city marketing campaigns since they enable a city to stand out from competitors. the alignment of the branding activities with the city identity is a key to make the city brand more authentic and distinctive to build reputation based on compelling and unique sense of place (fasli, 2010). the concept of city and place branding has been widely discussed by many scholars as the image or representation developed to provide overreaching details of a city to market and generate economic, cultural, and political value for the city (balakrishnan, 2009; kavaratzis, 2004; lucarelli & berg, 2011). in addition, city branding is a way of communicating competitive advantages, quality, history, culture, and lifestyle of a place to visitors, tourists, and residents (björner, 2013; mohamad et al., 2018). one of the city’s common visual identities is an iconic architectural building which can either be new or refurbished such as the cultural facilities, public buildings, mixed-use developments, offices or towers, shopping malls, transport interchanges, public art or installations, and extensions of historic sites (evans, 2015). in addition, dinnie (2010), foroudi et al. (2016), and kavaratzis and dennis (2018) have unanimously included the development of logo and slogan as part of the crucial elements of a city and place branding. giovanardi et al. (2013) regard city branding as centralizing the marketing activities of a place on the development of symbolic logos, slogans, and other positive images to promote the development, sales, and marketing of the place. in other words, city branding is centered on the development of a unique visual identity (architecture, logo, slogan, etc.) to shape the brand of a city. in city branding, the scholars believe that the concept of branding will help the marketing activities of a city (kavaratzis & ashworth, 2007). brand enables a city to be metaphorically seen as an entity with advantage of displaying its own visual identities and characteristics for attracting visitors and tourists and ultimately enhancing the economic value of the city (stigel & frimann, 2006). previous studies have mentioned that cities and places are being progressively marketed as a brand along the line with many tremendously costly companies and product branding campaigns. as it is usually perceived in connection with branding, multiple effects are generated by city branding, placing cities with no strong branding under pressure. meanwhile, the fact that cities are increasingly rated based on their attractiveness for tourist, residents, and investors is enforcing city planners and local authorities to strategize and prioritize the branding of their cities (oguztimur & akturan, 2016). city branding is a unique idea symbolizing a collection of representations that are the result of the city’s architecture, art, lifestyle, and its reflections in mass communications such as graphic design (logo and slogan) for advertisement campaigns. in other words, a prosperous city brand should reflect journal of asean studies 23 all the dimensions of the description of the city ranging from its geography, architecture, culture, commerce, and people. the research aims to review and discuss the current elements of visual identity such as iconic architecture, slogan, and logo of four major cities in southeast asia (singapore, kuala lumpur, jakarta, and ho chi minh). it is to attain better understanding on the visual identities of the cities and provide city brand managers with insights on how to project a realistic and inspiring city image for tourists. certainly, each city has its own unique distinctive characteristics and meanings in its culture, history, economy, politics, and religions. hence, studying city branding element for each city and their roles in branding activities is of paramount. these elements can be uncovered by several methods, which complement each other; however, the current research takes the netnographic approach. the research, henceforth, broadens the process of understanding city branding especially in the region of south-eastern asia by highlighting the importance of reshaping the visual identities of the four major south-eastern asian cities. the four cities have been chosen due to the characteristics and the promotional campaigns done by the cities’ authorities in the past 10 years. singapore and kuala lumpur represent the architecture design of modern-day urban image while jakarta and ho chi minh cities are rich with the historical elements of architecture that symbolize heritage values. city branding in the context of southeast asia regions are believed to have two main problems. first, the visual identity of city brands varies in relation to the culture, social context, and lifestyle of people in the cities (kavaratzis, 2005). hence, the elements of visual identity used as basic tactics for city branding among southeast asian cities are often not centered on the unique characteristics of the cities. meanwhile, place branding scholars have argued that the primary drive for city branding is developing an all-encompassing image which represents all that a city should be known for. it can be done by reflecting the iconic architecture or the specific culture and lifestyle of the city in the logo, slogan as well as the advertisement that are created and designed by city officials and consultants to drive the process of city branding (oliveira, 2015). in contrast, the lack of uniformity in the elements of visual identities of southeast asian city brands is significantly limiting the adequate representation of the city brands (govers, 2013). second, there is a paucity of literature concerning city branding in southeast asia region. it is believed essential to focus on the process of city branding due to the increasing importance of tourism in the economic development of the southeast asia region. in addition, the majority of the southeast asian cities have recently become some of the global tourist destinations. hence, it is considered essential to study the underlying factors such as iconic architecture, slogan, and logo for developing strong and globally acceptable city brands in the southeast asia region. for instance, bangkok is occupied with modern and cultural heritage buildings as its most visible characteristics. siemreap of cambodia is an enormous ancient city recognized by the unesco as a heritage site. however, it is unclear how the city council or the local authorities of such cities takes the representation of such heritage and iconic structure importantly as part of the process of city branding. therefore, the main discussion of the research is to broaden the understanding of city branding through literature review on 24 a visual identity-based both corporate branding and city branding. the research underscores the need for integrating strategic actions towards the development of the visual identities that reflect the unique characteristics of those cities to fully capitalize on their potentials and to increase their acceptance among the global competitive city brands. literature review city branding is relatively an emerging and new concept contrary to city promotion and city marketing. in southeast asia, city branding is often delimited by advertising, campaigns, designing visual images, and slogans (kavaratzis, 2008). for example, kuala lumpur is branded along the line of its cosmopolitan characteristics through its slogan: “a city of contrast and diversity.” on the other hand, singapore exploits mind-set, serving, and attitude as global market using an attractive slogan of “passion made possible.” furthermore, ho chi minh city is simply branded as “vibrant ho chi minh." a further example is jakarta, which emphasizes its lively characteristics through the slogan “enjoy jakarta”. moreover, branding involves more than imagery but also identity building. klein (2000) adds that the core value of a place is represented by a brand meanwhile advertisement simply means a way of communicating such identity. brands are employed a means of interactions between residents, visitors, tourists, and business investors while city brand is predominantly used within the global marketplace as a competitive way of differentiation. in other words, mommaas (2002) reports that city branding enabled people to have interaction through sharing of similar identity. according to kavaratzis (2008), “the rationale behind city branding is that the city must first decide what it wants to become and how it can create the mental, psychological and emotional ties that are necessary for the city to become this brand.” additionally, city branding can be the process of sharing to the world, an existing identity. for example, the features of a creative city may be in place while there is no awareness for external audience. a branding exercise in this context is more of marketing and promotion of what is in existence rather than conscious creation of imagery identity. the creation of such identity as the core of city branding is considered by evans (2005), hankinson (2004), julier (2005), and kavaratzis and ashworth (2005). the unique characteristics of a city inspire the concept of city branding, and the same time primarily focus on the process of establishing, maintaining, and extending the identity of the city (stigel & frimann, 2006). therefore, the city is viewed metaphorically as an organization with internal management of its members (adamu, mohamad, & rahman, 2018; adamu, mohamad, & rahman, 2016) while the management acts in accordance with the values of the city brand to be kept happy with presentable publicity for the organization and encouraged to act as the city ambassadors (christgau & jacobsen, 2004). in another view, kavaratzis (2007) reports that branding is a tool to create city’s self-attribution and to create positive image in the mind of the stakeholders to gain positive outlook. additionally, places and cities are marketed increasingly as trademark with the known lines from campaigns of journal of asean studies 25 product branding and many intensive costly companies (mollerup, 1995; olins, 1999; schulz & hatch, 2000). as it has generally been observed in connection with branding, snowball effects are created by city branding, making cities with no brand to be under pressure to create selfdevelopment. however, it is made difficult for the local authority (city council) to maintain and improve the ratings of the places for attraction for residents, investors, and tourists (langer, 2001). the research tends to focus on visual identity elements to connect to the concept of city branding. the visual identity is mostly defined as a collection of visual elements that serve to represent and differentiate a brand. more specifically, it refers to any visible components of the city such as an iconic architecture, logo, and slogan that help tourists identify a characteristic of the city. methodology netnography the research is based on the data of tourist experiences on the selected southeast asian cities. caru and cova (2008) state that tourism is a singular experience enjoyed by individual which cannot be directly accessed for the purpose of the research. therefore, the research only interprets what is expressed by their subjects in writing, verbal activity or through their behaviour. caru and cova (2008) add that verbatim are argued instead to be important to understand the private nature of the experience being studied. the ethnography approach has been conducted to deeply understand the emotions or feelings experienced by tourists (caru & cova, 2008; rageh, melewar, & woodside, 2013). kozinets (2002) reports that to identify and understand the needs and decision that influence relevant online consumer groups, netnography has been employed as a tool of marketing research. many people are now adopting internet as another medium in which they can chronicle their lives since internet access becomes widely more available with the additional dimensions of having more audience. thus, alongside with the emergence of blogs, a great explosion in personal storytelling has arisen. consumers are using virtual communities and other online platforms to share ideas such as boycotters, build communities such as on-line coffee communities and contact fellow consumers such as the star trek and xfiles fans (kozinets, 1997; kozinets, 2001; kozinets, 2002; kozinets & handelman, 1998). the approach enables researcher to get access to discussion with tourists by participating or by observing in communications on publicly available online platforms and collecting data where tourist narratives are of interests to the researchers (nelson & otnes, 2005). with respect to the present research, netnography is the most suitable qualitative method done by utilizing a content analysis of tourist review of their past experiences within selected major cities in southeastern asian countries. the tourist experiences are used to conceptualize the research. in addition, the research follows kozinets’ criteria to choose the most suitable reviews. therefore, the results are considered to be valid and reliable. the 26 a visual identity-based research elaborates procedures and stages are recommended to adapt netnography to the online context (kozinets, 2002). entrée this is the identification of the online communities that are mostly related to the research interest and learning as much as possible about the identified communities. the research identifies one website called tripadvisor (tripadvisor.com), a popular review platform in the industry of tourism for users and researchers. several previous research have used the reviews on the website (taecharungroj & mathayomchan, 2019). tripadvisor is chosen since the reviews are more focused and relevant to the questions raised in the research. there is also a higher post traffics and more rich data in details. similarly, same procedures are used by yang and fang (2004) to analyze complaints and compliments from the customers with security brokerage services. in the research, a netnography in a form of non-participant observation is used in accordance with the customer reviews published on tripadvisor. the rationale behind choosing the non-participant observation is due to the undesirable effect of the outsiders to the group (elliot & jankel-elliot, 2003). furthermore, the research is unobtrusively conducted as the netnography is capable of being conducted in a way that is entirely unobtrusive (kozinets, 2002). data collection the researcher directly copied the tourist reviews that are relevant to the study from tripadvisor, while some selective parts are considered when choosing the tourist messages. for example, all messages are examined, but some irrelevant messages and reviews are discarded. moreover, the reviews are accessed for a long time to secure enough volume of reviews on city branding. analysis and interpretation examination on data collection is implemented, in which the messages that are related directly to the research questions are evaluated while the qualitative analysis involving the constant comparative methods is performed (strauss & glaser, 1967; kozinets, 2002; corbin & strauss, 1990). the research analyses the tourist reviews following the principles of analysis and interpretation of qualitative data (arnould & wallendorf, 1994; spiggle, 1994; corbin & strauss, 1990). the data is first coded into discrete parts, then closely evaluated and compared for differences and similarities with each code representing a specific aspect of the phenomenon of interests. patterns are established across multiple sources of data to integrate and contextualize coding categories. by using the selective coding, relationships are specified between the constructs and move to a higher level of abstraction described as empirical grounding for an etic understanding (arnould & wallendorf, 1994). from the review journal of asean studies 27 interpretation, the research could find out the measures of the customer’s experience, its outcomes, and the main causes. analysis and interpretation of the qualitative data of the tourist reviews are directly examined with the research questions. the research analyses the experiences of the tourists from the journal entries following the analysis and interpretation principle of qualitative data (arnould & wallendorf, 1994; spiggle, 1994; corbin & strauss, 1990). related themes such as logo, slogan, and iconic architecture have been recognized, and the emergent themes are compared with presumptions from the previous research. results and discussions the city identity and its characteristics within the personality and developmental psychology, the concepts of identity have been a problematic and contested issue for long time (erikson, 1971). it is considered a challenge when the identity of a person is constantly subject to change and dynamic (mohamad et al., 2016). similarly, the identity of the city varies about situation and social context in which the residents of the city interact. “identity is the extent to which a person can recognize or recall a place as being distinct from other places,” lynch (1960) states. identity is a distinction which is visible and obvious at first sight and active in echoing memories and striking a recall in the mind of people (mohamad, ismail, & bidin, 2017). therefore, identity is not reproducible but always exclusive. every city has a unique and peculiar identity comprising memories and images that are either positive or negative. the image of a city is formed by the characteristics of a city which includes monumental building, geography, culture, and other historic features. the evidence of such an explanation is visible among cities that are strongly branded today. the branding of a city is reflected in its slogan, name, and logo (sáez, periáñez, & mediano, 2013). first, it should be noted that when discussing the image of cities from a branding perspective, nowadays many cities make attempts to promote themselves with the aid of iconic structure, architecture, logo, and slogan. from a general perceptive, three keys and characteristics are used to qualify city branding, namely: 1) authenticity, 2) image, and 3) uniqueness. kavaratzis (2007) reports that virtually every city has city branding to redevelop its image on its agenda. mainly, branding is developed from marketing strategies, and it is more applied for promotion and marketing of city like in the case of products. kotler, brown, and knight (1999) argue that places are products of marketed values and identities. ashworth (2009) states that to create or discover uniqueness, which distinguishes a city from others, is one of the purposes of place or city branding. articulation of cities to the global world is the major purpose of creating brands for cities. the city should work to generate enticing image and economic wealth. therefore, branding of a city has to be linked with marketable identity that can be accepted by people, especially on the culture, history, social development, landscape, environment, architecture, 28 a visual identity-based and economic growth (deckker, 2000; zhang & zhao, 2009). as a holistic approach, city branding serves as a tool of promotion for creating unique image for a city. the city image accordingly can be considered as one of the most paramount key concerns for both city branding and city identity. the best interpretation of image concept can be an intersection of city identity and city branding as depicted in figure 1 since the image is an indisputable constituent of both. in addition, in one way or the other, it can also be suggested that image influences the tourist intention to visit. figure 1. city identity and city branding and their relations to image city identity is important with city marketing and place promotion to attract tourists. moreover, the visual identity (e.g. the iconic architecture, slogan, and logo) during the entangling or capturing in a capital city is determined by the arena of place marketing and promotion. this is the part of the attempts by cities to forge distinctive atmospheres and images, which act as a bait to both people and capital of the right sort (e.g. influential and wealthy). therefore, city branding and city identity are connected together through the practices of place promotion tools via images with effect on the tourist attention. the research is limited to the effects of visual identity based on iconic architecture, slogan, and logo for reshaping city branding in the context of southeast asian cities. table 1 presents the tripadvisor total number reviews for each city. singapore has the largest number of reviews (1.531.335), followed by ho chi minh city (797.098), kuala lumpur (630.800) and jakarta (359.581). on specific reviews like the iconic architecture as presented in table 2, gardens by the bay receives 59.521 and becomes the famous landmark in singapore among the tourists. petronas twin tower has maintained her popularity as an icon for kuala lumpur with 30.112 reviews. national monument (monas) of jakarta at the top rank for many years since it officially opened on 2 july 1975 with 4.142 reviews. however, the ho chi minh city hall is not listed as one of the top 5 iconic buildings based on the numbers of tourists’ reviews. it shows that the decision of city authority of ho chi minh city is not in line with the tourist perception on the best architecture. journal of asean studies 29 table 1. the total number of reviews for each of the cities from tripadvisor website cities number of reviews 1. singapore 1.531.335 2. kuala lumpur 630.800 3. jakarta 359.581 4. ho chi minh city 797.098 table 2. the total number of reviews for each location within the selected cities top 5 reviews number of reviews singapore 1. gardens by the bay 59.521 2. singapore mrt 24.047 3. singapore zoo 22.361 4. singapore botanic gardens 19.814 5. singapore flyers 17.341 kuala lumpur 1. petronas twin tower 30.112 2. klcc park 13.084 3. menara kuala lumpur 8.641 4. kuala lumpur bird park 7.959 5. jalan alor 7.502 jakarta 1. national monument (monas) 4.142 2. grand indonesia mall 3.235 3. istiqlal mosque 2.681 4. taman mini indonesia 2.289 5. jakarta old town 2.005 ho chi minh city 1. war remnants museum 32.967 2. chu chi tunnels 25.443 3. central post office 17.100 4. ben thanh market 13.049 5. the independence palace 10.200 the three elements of iconic architecture, slogan, and logo have been widely used by the selected cities for their promotional tourism activities. therefore, the comparative marketing values for the promotional strategy will help the policy makers and the advertisers to enhance their marketing and promotional tools. singapore and its branding figure 2. singapore – passion made possible (2017) 30 a visual identity-based iconic architecture singapore tries to associate its slogan with the city image, especially the new iconic building marina bay sands. it is found by an integrated resort fronting marina bay and las vegas sands corporation in singapore. in 2010 at the opening ceremony, it was named as the most expensive standalone casino property in the world with s$8 billion, which includes the cost of the land. the resort designed by moshe safdie comprises convention and exhibition centre, hotels, malls, shops, art science exhibits, a museum, the world greatest atrium casino, two floating crystal pavilions, and restaurants. the most unique complex is the 340-metrelong skypark with an infinity swimming pool placed on top of the most significant world’s public cantilevered platform which overhangs from the north tower. findings from the netnography study are more consistent with the popular iconic architecture in singapore. tourists reflect on the perception of the happiness and uniqueness of their experiences. for example, these three comments are emphasized on their experiences: “it was stunning; magnificent tree structures with plants embedded in them, all illuminated at night, different sizes and a high-rise walkway between them giving you a different eye view.” and: “i would 100% recommend visiting gardens by the bay (gbtb) whilst staying in singapore, it was one of the highlights of my trip!” another example: “it’s one of the most iconic places in singapore so you must visit to at least take a photo. you must visit this iconic place, which is large, green, crowded at times, and simply breathtaking”. these examples show that recognition of important iconic architecture is a catalyst for marketing strategy. even though the photo of marina bay sands has been used widely in many social media to represent singapore, it is not officially used as part of the logo for marketing promotional activities. slogan and logo singapore slogan of “passion made possible” aims to entice business and tourism by showcasing the mind-set and attitude of singapore to serve as a platform for singaporean to globally market their images. the brand’s development involves respondents from ten countries (australia, belgium, china, germany, india, indonesia, japan, malaysia, uk, and us) and from singapore to understand what singapore stands for. as a result, the spirit of singapore is best reflected by the themes of ‘passion’ and ‘possibilities’ as shared by the respondents. the ‘passion’ to strive is said to drive ‘possibilities’ when possibilities are strongly linked with singapore as a destination. what singapore stands for as a country is articulated by the brand of singapore supported by telling many stories about the people and destination. this is appealing to more journal of asean studies 31 influential tourists who are looking towards more inspiration and value as singapore is making shift from being primarily an investment-driven economy to one that innovation will lead. international and local companies that are seeking to create new products, services, and solution successfully handle in singapore and change possibilities to realities are sent a clear and loud signal by the brand. while a logo coined as “sg mark” is also featured by the unified brand with a circle of letters “sg," and the tsla design developed the brand identity within it. the tsla is a design and branding practice of creative shop, the secret little agency (tsla) in singapore. the coming of age with quiet confidence and the true personality of the nation of singapore are expressed by the sg mark. it can be observed in the typeface of the custom and the abbreviation of the country “sg". the logo is applied throughout the campaign of the passion made possible and stands as a trademark as applicable to text headlines and key visual icons of singapore with a ‘distinctive singapore perspective’ in the same way to a trademark logo. although the logo of singapore does not represent the iconic building such as marina bay sand and other historical buildings, the slogan “passion made possible” can be interpreted by the tourists as a representation of the iconic monument of singapore. the iconic architecture offers the spirit of singapore through “passion” and “possibilities”. however, it is difficult as a branding slogan to imagine what an associated development in tourism focus and plan should be for singapore. kuala lumpur and its branding figure 3. kuala lumpur – a city of contrast and diversity (2016) iconic architecture argentine architect césar pelli designed the petronas twin towers as a distinguished post-modern style which was selected to create a 21st century icon for kuala lumpur. petronas twin tower as the tallest twin tower in the world remains to be relevant among iconic architecture globally. its unique characteristic attracts a million tourist every year and is the most picturesque building in kuala lumpur. tourists, through expressions, are amazed in their posts which stemmed from a discrepancy between what they expect and what is 32 a visual identity-based experienced. a striking example explained the surprise element of kuala lumpur city centre (klcc) as an iconic architecture and must-visit place: “it's often said that no visit to kuala lumpur is complete without visiting the iconic petronas towers, and observing the building lit up in the evening makes it very easy to see why.” “klcc as we know is a must visit when you go to kuala lumpur. it’s an iconic scene in kl.” “i think is pretty self-explanatory. amazing twin tower. one of a kind. the pride of every malaysia. the tallest twin tower in the world. a must tower if you are in kuala lumpur. there is no way you can miss this iconic tower.” tourists consider klcc as an iconic amazing place for kuala lumpur because the view, futuristic shape, and majestic skyline, which is illustrated in the tourists’ comments: “it is truly an amazing architectural design and a must see if in kl.” “iconic building. i especially love it at night time.” “excellent tour of this iconic building. dizzying views of the city.” “what a majestic view of this skyline. it is certainly iconic! plus, the fact that you could go shopping luxury brands!” the iconic building of kuala lumpur does not appear in the logo, but the 'exciting', 'surprising' and 'enticing' elements are embedded in petronas twin tower. it shows that the city council of kuala lumpur has strategized contrast and diverse elements of the city’s characteristics. in city branding models, the cityscape (or ‘urban landscape’) is characterized in several ways as a ‘place physics’ (anholt, 2006). slogan and logo regarding kuala lumpur as a city for future, a few developments and strategies have been set up to show its uniqueness and vibrant characteristics. the current development demonstrates the kuala lumpur aggressively offered a unique identity to the stakeholders. kuala lumpur is branded as 'a city of contrasts & diversity', and coherently tagged onto its new logo are the words 'exciting', 'surprising' and 'enticing'. kuala lumpur is unique, so 'contrasts and diversity' is a way to portray kuala lumpur’s distinctiveness, and on the basis that the identity of the city is created on its people, history and traditions in the culture and arts. the words “kuala lumpur” is featured in the logo written in grey colour with a drop shadow giving the city description as ‘exciting, surprising and enticing’ and brands it as a ‘city of contrasts and diversity’. the logo and branding are specially designed to relate to the city heritage which established and grew due to tin mining industry. since kuala lumpur grew as a significant tin trading centre as the tin mining industry developed in the environs of petaling and ampang, the logical direction of the approach of the brand design to connect journal of asean studies 33 the tin and tin mining industry to the heritage of kuala lumpur. therefore, the letters in the logo are crafted to appear with a metallic finishing in the texture of raw tin. the new brand identity of kuala lumpur does not reflect the ‘contrasting heritage, multi-cultural society and religion, diverse attractions and metropolis.’ the destination attraction needs to spread throughout the city and does not concentrate on the iconic building. jakarta and its branding figure 4. jakarta – enjoy jakarta (2004) iconic architecture the national monument, well-known as monas by the locals has been highlighted as a central part of the ‘enjoy jakarta’ campaign. monas is historically important to indonesians, especially to remember their struggle for the country’s independence. the netnography analysis shows how important monas is as a central idea of the city branding campaign. the iconic architecture, people, and strong culture allow tourists to enjoy the jakarta city. the architecture reflects the slogan which focuses on the tangible value of the visual identity. the analysis of the tourist reviews shows the importance of monas as an iconic architecture in jakarta. many references are made related to how this architecture shows its own characteristic and symbolism. some particularly striking examples of this are provided by the tourists on tripadvisor website: “the iconic statue of jakarta symbolic” “the area of monas is large enough. and the place is peaceful and environmentally friendly with plants and deer around. this is iconic architecture of jakarta.” “monas now becoming one of the iconic places to visit in indonesia especially jakarta. there will be laser/light show during night time.” 34 a visual identity-based as a representation of the independence of the country, monas stands by its own quality and historical value for many years. it is evident that tourists find interesting historical monuments. for example: “monas, a historical monument, covered with gold at the top, symbolizes the city of jakarta. the build-up is impressive with white marbles and thick walls”. “the largest monument in jakarta. it's really huge and fascinating, i really enjoyed going there, and it’s good to know about heroes and history behind the monument. it’s also an excellent building concept, historical building and architecture. you can go to the top of monas to see around the city from the top… that's really amazing.” “it is a monument structure in jakarta with gold on the top, is a must visit structure” monas is considered as iconic architecture for jakarta based on two elements – symbol of country’s independence and heritage. the iconic architecture of monas is built on symbolic and heritage legacies, which creates new destinations and experiences and becomes a part of a city brand portfolio (evans, 2015). slogan and logo the tagline of enjoy jakarta was launched in march 2005. the primary objective is to find a new branding for jakarta using facts and not just the common desire of a person responsible and also to increase the number of international tourists to visit jakarta to 2.2 million people by the end of 2005. the nine slogans have been shortlisted as following: 1) enjoy jakarta, 2) jakarta, the spice of life, 3) jakarta, its real, 4) jakarta, it’s cool to be hot, 5) jakarta, there is more in jakarta, 6) jakarta, asia’s hidden secret, 7) jakarta, rhythm of life, 8) jakarta, feel the pulse, 9) jakarta smile city. finally, the ‘enjoy jakarta’ has been chosen to represent the city of jakarta. the city council has a major plan for the city, including the infrastructure development to transform jakarta as a city that people enjoy (suherlan, 2016). six areas are identified by the research where the city is “as good as or better than other southeast asian capitals”, and six areas where they are worse. the strengths are golf, shopping, dining, nightlife, marine tourism, and spas. “enjoy jakarta” is a city’s brand that promotes ‘enjoy the good bits and ignore the bad’. the national monument (monas) appears as a central symbol of the city branding logo. it is based on two colours (blue and orange) palette, while the sketch word shows the informal fonts. although, the logo appears simple, it represents the ‘enjoyment’ characteristic. the research has a problem to find the justification of the colours and the font type due to limited literatures. journal of asean studies 35 ho chi minh city and its branding figure 5. vibrant ho chi minh city (2011) iconic architecture between 1902 and 1908, ho chi minh city hall or saigon city hall was built in a french colonial style in the city of saigon. after 1975, it was renamed as ho chi minh city people’s committee. it remains one of the most stunning colonial monuments, especially in floodlights at night. although the monumental building is not open to the public, the saigon city hall is popular for its great opportunities in photos. photographs can be taken outside by the tourists, and most of the tourists choose to do so at night when the building and its grounds are lightened up. although, the ho chi minh city hall is an essential and historical monument to the city, the connection of the building to the slogan is unclear. the characteristics of the building seem not to be in line with the meaning of ‘vibrant’. moreover, the findings from the netnography analysis show that war remnants museum is the main iconic architecture discussed by the tourists. similarly, the city hall building is not in the top five list of the tourists’ reviews. although the findings are not consistent with many literatures that suggesting the iconic architecture could be a central idea of place branding, ho chi minh city hall has a unique characteristic to be considered. tourists have expressed their good experiences about the building. a further elaboration on their feelings is expressed: “looks beautiful in night when the city hall is lighted up & walking street alive, needs more development to make it more tourist friendly”. “best visit is the evening when the weather is cooler. city hall is a beautiful photographic attraction. there is also a musical dancing fountain”. “apparently, this is a beautiful garden with lots of colourful flowers and lovely fountains for a moment of calm in the middle of the busy city.” 36 a visual identity-based contrast with the marina bay and klcc, ho chi minh city has a close historical characteristic with monas of jakarta. with full of history of french architecture, tourists always associate this building with the colonial era. some tourists’ comments are: “you will be impressed with the european architecture, which is still being well taken care by local government.” “we undertook a self-guided tour of french colonial architecture, for us this building was the highlight, (built in the early 1900’s) it overlooks a magnificent square with very walkable streets lining the square (hardly any scooters to contend with), it was the centre piece of the walk”. although ho chi minh city hall is not popular based on the number of tourists’ reviews, the building has chosen to be important element for the city branding. the historical value situated in a part of the ho chi minh square makes the iconic architecture stand out as compared to other buildings. it is in line with evans (2015) suggesting that the heritage quarters indicate the importance of historical and symbolic association and contribute to the identity of the city. slogan and logo the “vibrant ho chi minh city” has been used to portray the tourism promotion program of the city. the slogan is familiarized with the part of the city’s brand development campaign since 2011. the campaign as designed by a cowan company proposes the concept of an attractive, peaceful, powerful, and friendly land with its peculiar features. moreover, many resolutions have been brought up by this company to create products for tourism and completing of traveling lines, especially the airlines in ho chi minh city. the slogan is made available in many printed materials for advertising tourism to promote the ho chi minh city, a vibrant city. besides, for foreign visitors and the economic centre of vietnam, ho chi minh city is also a top landing city. the colourful logos for the marketing tools of hcmc have presented the ho chi minh city hall buildings as a centre of vibrant activities. it shows the dynamic image regarding colours, but the iconic building does not reflect the context of ‘vibrant’. the mixed characteristic between old and new makes it confusing for tourists to recognize the identity of the city. conclusions the research illuminates that city branding is a process of developing concrete policies to achieve economic development, which concurrently serves as a channel for the residents to associate themselves with their city. notably, it is vital to address urgent social issues like cultural diversity and social exclusion on the other hand. the conceptual ideas focus on the use of city branding and its possible impact on the residents, and the ways they relate with the experiences in their city; this is based on an integration of measures of city marketing. furthermore, it is explained that the city brand is not only established in the design of logo, journal of asean studies 37 slogan, and advertising campaigns but also in the collection of all those visual identity elements including iconic architecture. therefore, a coherent branding strategy should focus on building an integrative identity along the lines of city logos, city slogans, and the iconic architecture of the cities. nowadays, modern societies are using city identity such as slogan, logo, and iconic architecture as symbols of development and admiration in the world. historic architecture has been an essential tool in communicating the symbols of cities and to entice visitors. thus, in the branding and promotion of city image, visually attractive iconic architecture turns out to play a significant role. the city agencies of some of these southeast asian cities have also attempted to create a brand for their cities across the elements of visual identity, including iconic architecture, slogan, and logo. however, the brand of those cities, including ho chi minh city, jakarta, kuala lumpur, and singapore has created disuniformity. as seen within the context of the singapore, ho chi minh city, jakarta, and kuala lumpur, iconic architecture influences the image of cities. consequently, through the selected buildings in the research, the visual identity (architecture) is affected as it has been attempted to be questioned and evaluated regarding visual and spatial features. it is revealed from the past studies that the “sand skypark” was designed by moshe safdie while the petronas twin tower was designed by an argentine architect cesar pelli. the tower has positive presentation on the visual identity of the city as they fit perfectly to the present context. in another vein, the city council in ho chi minh city is a non-contextual approach putting aside the existing context and reducing the value of the immediate surroundings. lastly, it is noted that the old french building does not reflect the ‘vibrant’ city. funding acknowledgement the research was funded by the deanship of scientific research at princess nourah bint abdulrahman university through the fast-track research funding program. about the authors dr. bahtiar mohamad is an associate professor of corporate communication and strategy at othman yeop abdullah graduate school of business, uum kuala lumpur. he teaches public relations, corporate communication, communication for managers and organizational image management, which all combine to support his hybrid profession linking communication with the management. he is carrying out research and publication in the area of corporate identity, corporate image, crisis communication, and corporate branding from the point of view of public relations and corporate communication. bahtiar has published over 100 research papers in reputed journals and conferences and has authored, coauthored, and edited 8 text-books. 38 a visual identity-based dr. ridwan a. raji is assistant professor in integrated strategic communications in the college of communication and media sciences, zayed university, uae. his research focuses on brand management, marketing communication, media management and social media. he has several publications in international journals and has a book chapter published in rutledge research in higher-education book series. he is a reviewer of indexed journals such as journal of brand management, computers in human behavior, journal of marketing communication, journal of promotion management, and spanish journal of marketing and serves as the board of the editor for the messenger journal. dr. ghadah alarifi is the dean of college of business administration, princess nourah bint abdulrahman university. her research interest is related to entrepreneurship, social entrepreneurship, social innovation, sustainability, impact investing, entrepreneurial orientation, social enterprise's performance, cognitive social perspective in entrepreneurship and gender. dr. ahmed rageh ismail received the phd degree in management studies (marketing) from brunel university, brunel business school, london, uk, in 2010. he is currently 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doner, 1991). thailand and malaysia started their auto industries in the 1960s, establishing a base for auto assembly. malaysia, however, pushed for a “national auto brand project” in 1982, one year after mr. mahathir bin mohamad was sworn in as malaysia’s new prime minister in 1981. proton bhd(perusahaan otomobilnasional), a 2 an industry without industrialization national auto company was then established, starting a new era of the auto industry in malaysia. the malaysia state then began to take a more active role (investor and producer) in the auto industry. under the protection of a series of state policies, proton bhd began to dominate domestic auto industry in malaysia, and began to export malaysiamade autos to the international market since 1989. at the peak period, proton bhd, the only national auto in southeast asia, once had assets of myr 4.6 billion,1 including 350 chain factories supplying more 6,000 auto parts, and 30,000 employees (tseng 2001: 17-22). unlike malaysia state-dominated auto industry, auto industry in thailand is dominated by private sectors, particularly since the late 1980s. the thailand government provided a series of favorable policies for multinational corporations to establish auto manufacturing base in thailand, while domestic capital were encouraged to make investment on producing auto parts. due to this corporation between multinational corporations and domestic capital, thailand’s auto industry is becoming more competitive in the world market. when mr. thaksinshinawatra became thailand’s prime minister in 2001, he further promoted a strategy of exporting autos to the world market in 2002. as a result, thailand, since 2005, has produced more than 1.12 million autos annually, becoming the largest auto producing center. this has made thailand to win the reputation of “asia’s detroit”. as compared with the auto industries in malaysia and thailand, indonesia actually was the first southeast asian country to start its auto industry from an investment by general motor on an auto assembly 1 the exchange rate between one american dollar and malaysia ringgit (myr) is roughly 1: 2.97 in 2010. factory in 1929. due to the auto expansion in indonesia, the demand of auto assembly gradually increased since the early 1940s, playing a leading role in indonesia’s national industries. since indonesia’s independence in 1945, indonesian leaders gradually realized the importance of developing local capital in order to avoid greater dependence on foreign capital (feith, 1962). with the implementation of guided democracy and guided economy, the sukarno government then made the state apparatus to direct the auto industry through the promotion of economic nationalism and localization (pribumi) since the mid-1950s. as state enterprises were expanding, national capital was playing a dominant role for indonesia’s domestic industrialization (soong 1996: 279282). auto industry then became a significant indicator showing the growth of economic nationalism in the muslim state. when mr. suharto took power in 1966, indonesia established the bureau of national planning and development (bappenas) in charge of economic development policies, which initiated a new strategy to introduce more foreign capital for auto assembly factories (ito 2002). when the first oil crisis took place in 1973, the rising oil price benefited oil-producing indonesia, thus generating huge foreign reserve that is attractive for more foreign investment to the auto industry. with more than 20 auto assembly factories for more than 50 auto brands, indonesia’s auto production grew by 5%-6% annually in the first part of the 1970s (aminullah and adnan 2010: 119-120). as foreign capital kept coming to indonesia, domestic enterprises were provoked, causing an anti-japanese riot when former prime minister kakuei tanaka visited jakarta in 1974 (chalmers 1994). president suharto then reviewed and proposed a series of indonesia’s industrial policy, including a requirement for foreign journal of asean studies 3 investment to establish “joint ventures” with local enterprises, owing 51% of assets for local enterprises after a certain period of time, forbidding foreign investment on certain industries, and regulating the number of foreign employees (pangestu and habir 1989: 224-241). accordingly, state capital was gradually accumulated by way of promoting the development of domestic enterprises, economic nationalism then once again became a major ideology in indonesia (soesastro 1989: 105-117; macintyre 1991: 369-395). this was the general scenario of the auto industry in indonesia during the 1980s. the suharto government continued this protective policy on the auto industry in the 1990s; president suharto even initiated, in1996, a “pioneer project” to promote producing autos with a national brand. (wu 2011:52) japan and the united states were not satisfied with indonesia’s subsidy policies to the auto industry, they accused of indonesia to the world trade organization (wto) by violating free trade rules under the wto framework. indonesia lost this legal case in the wto in 1997, which forced the muslim country to give up its protective policy to the auto industry. after the 1997 asian financial crisis, indonesia was forced to move towards free market economy policy, opening the door for foreign capital into the auto industry in indonesia. due to previous connections and related financial and insurance companies in indonesia, japanese auto producers benefited from this free market policy by taking 90% of the auto market in indonesia (nag, banerjee and chatterjee 2007: 26). given the increasing foreign investment, indonesia’s auto industry, unfortunately, failed to improve its knowledge and technology about auto manufacturing, continuing to rely upon imported auto parts. figure 1 shows indonesia’s vacillating policy over the development of the auto industry. figure 2 also shows the ups and downs of auto production in indonesia during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, a result of the irresolute policies on the auto industry, as argued by haryoaswicahyono. (aswicahyono, bird, and hill). having the largest auto market in southeast asia, indonesia is supposed to have more favorable conditions than thailand and malaysia on the development of auto industry (chalmers 1994). however, unlike malaysia’s auto industry that has its own national brand, indonesia does not have a national auto brand. nor like thailand as the largest auto exporting country in southeast asia, indonesia only took 0.9% of auto production in the world market in 2010, as shown in table 1. due to the low quality of the auto industry, indonesia’s auto industry falls far behind the level of auto industries in thailand and malaysia, becoming completely knocked-down (aswicahyono 2003). a japanese scholar even contends that indonesia’s auto industry is “technologyless industrialization”, (yoshihara 1998) making indonesia’s auto industry “having market without technology” or “an industry without industrialization.” based on the above analysis, the paper argues that the failure of indonesia’s auto industry has to do with the structural factors in indonesia’s political economy. this paper therefore will, by taking the perspective of political economy, explore the following four factors over the failure of indonesia’s auto industry: (1) inappropriate state intervention, (2) distorted government-business relations, (3) failure to join international complementarities in the auto industry, and (4) ineffective management on globalization. 4 an industry without industrialization figure 1. indonesia’s irresolute policies over the auto industry source: authors. table1. auto production in three southeast asian countries and their share in the world auto market (1999-2010) 1999 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 production countries production share of world market (%) production share of world market (%) production share of world market (%) productio n share of world market (%) production share of world market (%) production share of world market (%) indonesia 89,007 0.16 292,710 0.50 500,710 0.75 600,628 0.85 464,816 0.75 702,508 0.90 malaysia 254,090 0.45 282,830 0.48 563,408 0.85 530,810 0.75 489,269 0.79 567,715 0.73 thailand 322,761 0.57 411,721 0.71 1,122,712 1.69 1,393742 1.98 999,378 1.62 1,644,513 2.12 source: http://oica.net/category/production-statistics/2009-statistics/ accessed 1july 2012. protection (1949, nationalizati on） open (1965, free market） protection (1976,1983, two limited projects） open (1993, focused project） protection (1996, project on national brand auto ） complete free market (since 1998) ） http://oica.net/category/production-statistics/2009-statistics/ journal of asean studies 5 figure 2.indonesia’s economic growth rates, industrial policies, and auto production (1976-1997) inappropriate state intervention according to the theory of developmental state, developing countries are likely to use state apparatus to intervene the market, in support of the development of selective industries (johnson, 1982). taking the south korean example, dr. p. hanson argues that state intervention has played a key role for the successful economic development in east asian countries (hanson, 1976). based on the approach of developmental state, alice amsden shares similar point view with hanson (amsden 1989). these scholars contend that weak market institutions in these countries have given a leeway for state intervention (johnson 1987: 136-164). although there are other theories, such as protecting infant industry (gerschenkron, 1962) and governed market theory (wade, 1990), to support the policy of state intervention, most scholars agree that state intervention is necessary to maintain economic stability and national capital accumulation in the developing countries (macintyre 1993: 123164). the case of thailand implies that state intervention over industrial policy is possible only when state apparatus is strong enough; weak states, on the contrary, usually take a freer industrial policy (abbott 2003: 113). indonesia and malaysia are termed in the category of “strong states”, because they both have taken strong state intervention over the auto industries in their countries. in malaysia, the malays have long ruled the political system that dominates the design of industrial policies. the malay-predominated malaysia has a very clear goal on the development of the auto industry, i.e. establishing an auto industry with a national brand, which is equipped with other related trade and industrial policies (crouch 1993: 133-158). the malaysian government has then designed a series of protective policies over the auto industry, including easy access to obtain national capital, immune on import tax, efficient permit application, etc (tai 2008: 53-76). one scholar even said that the malaysian government has “the will to develop” the auto industry, i.e. using state intervention policy to make malaysia-made journal of asean studies 5 figure 2.indonesia’s economic growth rates, industrial policies, and auto production (1976-1997) inappropriate state intervention according to the theory of developmental state, developing countries are likely to use state apparatus to intervene the market, in support of the development of selective industries (johnson, 1982). taking the south korean example, dr. p. hanson argues that state intervention has played a key role for the successful economic development in east asian countries (hanson, 1976). based on the approach of developmental state, alice amsden shares similar point view with hanson (amsden 1989). these scholars contend that weak market institutions in these countries have given a leeway for state intervention (johnson 1987: 136-164). although there are other theories, such as protecting infant industry (gerschenkron, 1962) and governed market theory (wade, 1990), to support the policy of state intervention, most scholars agree that state intervention is necessary to maintain economic stability and national capital accumulation in the developing countries (macintyre 1993: 123164). the case of thailand implies that state intervention over industrial policy is possible only when state apparatus is strong enough; weak states, on the contrary, usually take a freer industrial policy (abbott 2003: 113). indonesia and malaysia are termed in the category of “strong states”, because they both have taken strong state intervention over the auto industries in their countries. in malaysia, the malays have long ruled the political system that dominates the design of industrial policies. the malay-predominated malaysia has a very clear goal on the development of the auto industry, i.e. establishing an auto industry with a national brand, which is equipped with other related trade and industrial policies (crouch 1993: 133-158). the malaysian government has then designed a series of protective policies over the auto industry, including easy access to obtain national capital, immune on import tax, efficient permit application, etc (tai 2008: 53-76). one scholar even said that the malaysian government has “the will to develop” the auto industry, i.e. using state intervention policy to make malaysia-made journal of asean studies 5 figure 2.indonesia’s economic growth rates, industrial policies, and auto production (1976-1997) inappropriate state intervention according to the theory of developmental state, developing countries are likely to use state apparatus to intervene the market, in support of the development of selective industries (johnson, 1982). taking the south korean example, dr. p. hanson argues that state intervention has played a key role for the successful economic development in east asian countries (hanson, 1976). based on the approach of developmental state, alice amsden shares similar point view with hanson (amsden 1989). these scholars contend that weak market institutions in these countries have given a leeway for state intervention (johnson 1987: 136-164). although there are other theories, such as protecting infant industry (gerschenkron, 1962) and governed market theory (wade, 1990), to support the policy of state intervention, most scholars agree that state intervention is necessary to maintain economic stability and national capital accumulation in the developing countries (macintyre 1993: 123164). the case of thailand implies that state intervention over industrial policy is possible only when state apparatus is strong enough; weak states, on the contrary, usually take a freer industrial policy (abbott 2003: 113). indonesia and malaysia are termed in the category of “strong states”, because they both have taken strong state intervention over the auto industries in their countries. in malaysia, the malays have long ruled the political system that dominates the design of industrial policies. the malay-predominated malaysia has a very clear goal on the development of the auto industry, i.e. establishing an auto industry with a national brand, which is equipped with other related trade and industrial policies (crouch 1993: 133-158). the malaysian government has then designed a series of protective policies over the auto industry, including easy access to obtain national capital, immune on import tax, efficient permit application, etc (tai 2008: 53-76). one scholar even said that the malaysian government has “the will to develop” the auto industry, i.e. using state intervention policy to make malaysia-made 6 an industry without industrialization autos popular in the world market (chu 2011: 248). while embracing free trade based on classic economic theory, thailand takes the most open policy on the auto industry in southeast asia. due to long rule under military authoritarianism, thailand is supposed to have a strong state, but state apparatus is actually quite weak in thailand due to a number of factors such as frequent military coups, elite-dominated political economy, etc. as a result, private sectors were able to play a dominant role in the decision making process of industrial policies, making thailand become a “weak state, strong society”. this is why thailand has taken an open and free industrial policy for some years. indonesia’s policies to the auto industry are indecisive, however, in spite of its statecentered policies over industrial development. in addition to industrial factors, indonesia’s auto industry actually involves political choices (aminulla and adnan 2010: 111-168). since its independence in 1945, economic nationalism has become a major ideology in indonesia’s industrial development, similar to what r. robison called “bureaucratic capitalism” （ robison 1998: 113） . with the prevalence of bureaucratic capitalism, native capital is not able to compete with national capital; indonesia government then is able to use state apparatus to adjust the structure between national capital and local capital. the auto industry, therefore, becomes an important tool to implement economic nationalism (jomo 2007: 497).when mr. suharto took power in 1967, he followed the footsteps of mr. sukarno. professor william liddle contends that suhato’s new order government often took indonesia’s development strategy for political purposes (liddle 1987: 143). this is why indonesia’s policies over the auto industry were swinging back and forth between free market policy and protective policy in the last four or five decades. due to the influence of these two entangled factors, indonesia’s auto industry has been troubled with a number of related factors, i.e. lack of a specific development goal, irresolute industrial development strategy, lack of a package of policies for establishing an industry with a national brand, etc (aminullah and adnan 2010: 111168). simply speaking, indonesia government is taking state intervention policy but without principles, which is what michael rock has termed as “priceless interventionism” (rock 1999: 691-704). this inappropriate state intervention contributes to the failure of the auto industry in indonesia, and a key difference over the auto industries between indonesia and malaysia. distorted government-business relationship the institutional school of political economy upholds that industrial growth comes from policy output, which is based not only economic consideration but also a rational choice after the involvement of political manipulation (chang, 1994). there are at least the following three considerations for state intervention over industrial development: (1) does this industrial policy meet national ideology? (2) does national elite own the autonomy to implement this policy? (3) does this policy benefit the ruling govenment? some scholars even contend that state intervention over industrial policy is a tool to satisfy political interest of the ruling elite (haggard 1997: 81-82; jomo 2007: 497). accordingly, advocates of institutionalism argue that state intervention over industrial is not always successful, because of a number of factors, journal of asean studies 7 such as the indecisive nature of public goods in the policy-making process, the weakness of operation of democratic system, selfishness of government officials and representatives, the influence of interest groups, etc. this will then result in “government failure”, which, to some extent, is even worse than “market failure” (kruger 1991: 9-23). government failure will bring about some non-economic cost, such as deterring entrance, weakening competitive capability, etc. this is the so-called rent seeking (buchanan 1980: 3-15) or political favoritism (hasan and jomo 2006: 178), which will then involve a unique government-business relationship. in a democratic and an institutionalized country, governmentbusiness connections are legally regulated, but countries like indonesia where political system is not well institutionalized, government-business relationship is usually out of legal binding. therefore, the auto industry was a tool for the ruling elite to allocate political and economic resources during the suharto authoritariansm. for example, the indonesia service company (isc) was supposed to manufacture autos in the 1950s, but actually the isc’s ruling elite, based on a distorted government-business relationship, was mainly to obtain the permit from the government to distribute auto imports licenses. the owners of the isc then greatly profited from this license distributing rather than from auto manufacturing. during the suharto presidency, only six out of twentyone auto factories were doing auto manufacturing, while the rest was mainly engaged in auto imports and exports. evidently, indonesian auto makers were more interested in managing this unique government-business relationship, rather than doing auto manufacturing. as these non-economic factors determined the development of the auto industry in indonesia, other industries followed, which has become a unique structure of political economy over indonesia’s industrial development (aswiahyono, basri and hill 2003: 214). since the early 1970s, big business corporations, having this particular government-business relationship, were able to profit from their joint ventures with japanese auto companies, while middle and small-sized auto assembly companies, due to lack of connections with the government, were losing competitive capability and eventually dependent upon big companies(chalmers 1996:28). as a result, indonesia lost the opportunity to establish an industrial complementary relationship in the auto manufacturing industry, making indonesia auto industry difficult to improve (adan, 1998). furthermore, indonesia’s auto industry was actually monopolized by business tycoons during the suharto presidency, who were either from the suharto family or had close connections with mr. suharto. for instance, mr. tommy suharto, the youngest son of president suharto, established the timor putra nasional and, with the help from the indonesian government, received, in 1997, a loan of us$690 million for two years from four government banks and twelve private banks with low interest rates. under indonesia’s “pioneer project”, timor putra then easily obtained the permit to cooperate with kia, a south korean auto company, which enjoyed immune on importing auto parts. the most important goal of the pioneer project was to establish a national auto brand, but timor putra imported kia autos without paying taxes but covered with timor brand. even though timor appears to be a native auto brand in indonesia, it is a completely korea-made auto, contradictory to the original goal of the pioneer project. 8 an industry without industrialization due to this distorted governmentbusiness relationship, indonesia’s auto industry is considered to be an output of costly interventionism, causing corruption and inefficiency. a number of auto tycoons have appeared in indonesia since the 1950s, including jadjimning who monopolized auto imports in the 1950s, william soeryadjaya (owner of astra international tbk pt) who was termed as king of the auto assembly in indonesia, etc. table 2 shows the the list of government-business connections in the indonesia’s auto industry. these business tycoons monopolized auto industry through their connections with government officials, which is the second reason contributing to the failure to be industrialized in the indonesia’s auto industry. failure to join international complementarities in the auto industry the school of dependency theory has often blamed multinational corporations to exploit and marginalize peripheral countries, causing underdevelopment in the third world countries. the school of dependent dependency, however, contends a possible change for dependent countries if international factors are involved. accordingly, peter evans contends that developing countries are likely to cooperate with multinational corporations, (evans 1979:32-54) whereas immanuel wallerstein has termed the involvement of multinational corporations as “development by invitation”. peter evans further promoted triple alliance (i.e. native government, international capital, and local capital) for the development of third world countries, which means that development in the third world countries is possible if these three actors work well. (evans, 1979) if the theory of triple alliance is applied to the auto industry in a third world country, it means that native government helps local capital to cooperate with multinational corporations, so that local government would be able to establish its own auto industry while multinational corporations would profit from the expansion of its auto market in this specific third world country. thailand actually has taken this development model and is able to become “asian detroit”, becoming one of the bases of the auto industry in the global market. thailand started an open industrial policy in the late 1980s, and further allowed, after the 1997 asian financial crisis, foreign capital to take full ownership over their investment in the buddhist country. accordingly, supply chain in the auto industry is established in thailand, because local small and medium-sized companies manufacture auto parts and supply them to the foreign–owned auto assembly companies in thailand. this is the key reson why thailand can become a hub of auto parts in southeast asia. (kohpaiboon 2007: 8) unlike thailand, malaysia does not cooperate with multinational corporations, but the malaysian government takes an active role in establishing a supply chain for its auto industry through a series of protective policies. while upholding economic nationalism, malaysia has formulated a model of “self-development”, which has also helped the establishment of a national auto brand. journal of asean studies, vol.2,no.1 (2014), pp. 1–18 ©2014by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn2338-1353 electronic table 2. government-business connections in the auto industry during the new order period business corporations market occupation political connections companies year established foreigner partners managing partners manufacturing contractors astra 50.6% government and chinese toyota astra moto 1972 toyota (49%) isuzu (12.5%) daihatsu (40%) nissan (12.5%) isuzu, bmw, ford, peugeot gay a motor 1955 pantja motor 1974 astra daihatsu motor 1992 astra nissan diesel indonesia 1996 indomobil (salim) 21.0% chinese indomobil suzuki international 1991 suzuki (49%) nissan (35%) audi, volvo, ssangyong mazda, volvo, vw, audi, nissan, chrysler ismac nissan manufacturing 1996 1973 ismac 1973 hino automobil indonesia kramayudha 18.1% native corporations kramayudhakesuma motor 1981 hino (39%) kramayudharatu motor 1975 imora 1.8% chinese honda prospect motor 1995 mitsubishi kramayudha motors mitsubishi bimantara 1.0% the suharto family (a) tricitrakarya (b) bimantarahyndai indonesia 1995 honda (49%) hyundai ford starsauto 0.2% the suharto family starsautodinamika 1995 hyundai (50%) daewoo humpus 5.0% the suharto family kia-timor nasional 1998 hyundai (30%) mercedes benz 1.3% germany mercedes-benz group indonesia 1970 daimler chrysler (95%) gm 1.1% u.s.a gm buana indonesia 1994 gm (100%) *wholly owned by gm in 1997 indonesia, however, is neither taking the thailand model nor the malaysian 10 an industry without industrialization model, due to its indecisive policies to the auto industry no matter it be president sukarno or president suharto. according the japan automobile manufacturing association (jama), indonesia, as compared with thailand and malaysia, received the least technology transfer and human resources training programs from japan, in spite of japan being the largest auto investor in these three southeast asian countries, as shown in table 3. (soejachmoen 2011:19) table 4 shows that foreign owned companies, mostly japanese companies (46.9%), dominated the production of auto parts in indonesia. table 5 shows that the level of technology in the indonesia’s auto industry is very low, playing a limited role on “brand to brand complementation” in southeast asia. (fujita and hill 1997: 317) some scholars even criticized that indonesia’s auto industry only shares a tiny part of the profits in the cross-country complementarities while foreign owned companies enjoy a huge portion of the profits. table 3. japan’s technology transfer and human resources training programs in southeast asia since 2005 year technology transfer human resources training programs 2005 toyota (thailand) 2006 nissan (all southeast asian countries) 2007 honda (philippines) nissan (thailand) honda(malaysia) 2008 mitsubishi(mal aysia) nissan (indonesia, malaysia, singapore) fuji heavy industries (singapore) 2009 toyota (thailand) 2010 isuzu (thailand) nisaan (indonesia) source: calculated fromhttp://www.jama-english.jp/asia/publications/index.html , accessed 31 august 2012. table 4: structure of foreign investments on auto parts in three southeast asian countries http://www.jama-english.jp/asia/publications/index.html journal of asean studies 11 indonesia thailand malaysia number of factores of manufacturing auto parts 200 800 250 percentage of japanese owned companies 82 (46.9％) 209 (27%) 61(27.1% ) percentage of europe and america owned companies 7 (4％) 21 (2.7%) 19 (8.4%) patterns of foreign investments＊ exports, contracted out, holding minority stocks, and joint ventures branch companies , strategic alliance, and joint ventures strategic alliance source: calculated from keiko ito, foreign ownership and productivity in the indonesia automotive industry: evidence from establishment data for 1990-1999, working paper series, vol. 2002-25, 2002, the international center for the study of east asian development, kitayushu, p. 37.＊ http//:www.boozallen.com, accessed 1 september 2012. table 5. industrial complementarities of the auto industries under the project of “brand to brand compensation” in southeast asia toyota nissan honda mitsubishi thailand diesel engines, floor large panel, interior trim stamping pump, intake manifold philippine s transmission medium-sized panel intake manifold transmission malaysia brakes, shock absorbers brakes, medium-sized panel pump door panel, brakes indonesia 5k engines none engine, back plate none source: kuniko fujita and richard child hill, “auto industrialization in southeast asia: national strategies and local development”, asean economic bulletin, vol. 13, no. 3, march 1997, pp. 317. www.boozallen.com 12 an industry without industrialization due to this structural factors, indonesia’s auto manufacturers are focused on building up a special political relationship with ruling elites, in order to take a part and profit from the auto supply chain in the cross-country auto complementarities (chalmers 1994: 25; dorner 1991: 73-79). one japanese scholar says, unlike industrialization of the auto industries in taiwan and south korea which obtain technology and management from their cooperation with advanced multilateral corporations, indonesia’s auto tycoons, or auto godfathers, only make efforts to ensure their companies to be included in the government protective policies, rather than to cooperate with foreign companies for technology transfer and management (chalmers 1994:25). for example, astra, through its particular political connections with the suharto government, obtained a permit of establishing auto assembly companies with toyota, but, astra took advantage from its joint venture with toyota to monopolize indonesia’s auto industry, instead of making efforts to upgrade the level of auto manufacturing in indonesia. simply speaking, indonesia’s local auto tycoons made use of their political connections to obtain government protection in exchange for cooperation with foreign companies, whereas multinational corporations took use of local tycoons to gain an easy access to expand their auto market in indonesia. in this way, indonesia’s local auto dealers are to purchase auto parts from foreign companies for auto assembly in indonesia. accordingly, both local auto tycoons and multinational corporations profit, but indonesia’s auto industry remains unchanged; the islam state continues to rely up the imports of auto parts, failing to reach the goal of establishing a localized auto parts manufacturing in indonesia (aswicahyono 1999:200). this development model deviates far from the model of triple alliance, because local companies, under the protection of state intervention, are making efforts in building up a special government-business relationship in favor of their own interest, rather than learning technology transfer and management from foreign companies. similarly, multinational corporations, under the umbrella of the linkage with local companies, are aimed to avoid state regulations on the imports of auto parts, rather than building up a triple alliance for the development of the auto industry in indonesia (doner: 1991). due to the absence of a real partnership between multinational corporations and local enterprises, indonesia’s auto tycoons are even being described as “supplements” for assisting foreign corporations to gain profits (nag, banerjee and chatterjee 2007). ineffective management on globalization globalization and its effect on global industrial environment are hot issues for decades, particularly the pressure of free trade under the wto framework. while upholding the ideology of cooperation in southeast asia, cooperation in the auto industry takes the major portion of industrial cooperation among the asean member countries.2 free trade and cooperation on technology can bring about a series of 2 in the 10th asean summit in november 2004, asean countries signed the asean framework agreement for the integration of priority sectors, from which the roadmap for integration of automotive products sector was reached among member countries. based on the roadmap, asean countries hope to reach the following goals for the auto industries in southeast asia, including cbu tariff elimination, effective favorable tax policy, non-tariff measures, customs cooperation, standards and conformance, future investment, improving distribution system, etc. for details, see nenham 2006: 8) journal of asean studies 13 positive effects to the auto industry, including reducing manufacturing cost on auto parts, upgrading the level of auto parts production, and expanding overseas market of auto parts. however, free trade and technological cooperation could also generate impacts over the auto industry, such as facing competition from the global market, openness of manufacturing and market, industrial repositioning, improvement on efficiency, etc. r.h. wade has pointed out that economic globalization has changed global industrial environment, making developing countries to experience new challenges. as economic liberalization and free market have reduced protective policies and state intervention, developing countries are required to propose different industrial strategies and capabilities for their economic development (wade 2003: 621644). indonesia’s auto industry, for example, is facing at least the following three challenges with the prevalence of globalization: (1) opening up domestic market after the loss of the wto legal case, (2) freeing the auto industry to meet the imf requirements in exchange for obtaining financial assistance from the imf , and (3) reducing tariff under the asean industrial cooperation project (nag, banerjee, and chatterjee, 2007: 26-41). due to these three challenges, indonesia has, since 2002, given up all protective policies over its auto industry, the first country in southeast asia to completely reduce taxes on importing autos. as comparing with thailand and malaysia, these two countries have taken different approaches to face the challenges of globalization. while thailand takes incremental steps to open up its auto market, malaysia delays its open-door policy for the auto industry. according to theories of political economy, developing countries, after regime transitions from authoritarianism to democracy, are likely to engage selfadjusting industrial policies and accept supervision from public and interest groups, laying a foundation for market openness and industrial transition (chu 2001: 67-117). thailand has presented itself as a good example. unlike thailand, indonesia did receive much foreign investment, but it did not upgrade the technology and knowledge of manufacturing autos. the key reason is because of indonesia’s continual dependence on the imports of auto parts. thailand keeps self-adjusting its industrial policies to face the rising globalization, whereas indonesia was forced to adjust its policies under external pressure. this is the fourth and final reason for the failure of indonesia’s auto industry. conclusion this paper has compared development models of the auto industries in three southeast asian countries. in a weak state like thailand, multinational auto corporations, after obtaining a permit from the thai government, established auto assemble factories and helped local auto companies to build up auto parts manufacturing. the triple alliance is then created among the state, multinational corporations, and local capital, and, under this framework, multinational corporations assisted thailand’s native auto industries to join international complementarities in the global auto market. as thailand has gradually become a part of supply chain in the global auto market, thailand is able to expand its native auto manufacturing industry. this is why thailand has been 14 an industry without industrialization termed as the asian detroit, a successful case of dependent development. being a strong state, the malaysian government, instead of multinational corporations, dominates the auto industry, with a very clear goal under the guidance of economic nationalism (doner, 1991). in order to establish a national auto brand, the malaysian government proposed a series of protective policies to accomplish this goal, including easy getting imports permit, tariff protection, making use of national capital, etc. similar to malaysia, indonesia was also under a strong state, trying to take state intervention to establish a national auto brand during the presidencies of mr. sukarno and mr. suharto. indonesia, however, failed to accomplish this goal, because of a series of indecisive policies, and, most importantly, a particular government-business relationship in the structure of political economy. the case of indonesia’s auto industry has revealed that ruling elite misused statedominated auto industry for resources distribution. due to the particular structure of government-business relationship, indonesia’s policy of state intervention failed to learn how to manage the auto market and how to become a part of supply chain in the global automobile industry, making the status of auto tycoons unchanged in indonesia. the state apparatus then lost the opportunities to establish a partnership relationship with multinational corporations, thus failing to make technology transferring. when globalization began to prevail since the early 1990s, indonesia was forced to open its auto market under external pressure, making indonesia even more difficult to establish an independent auto industry. in their book, entitled why nations fail: the origins of power, prosperity, and poverty, daronacemogl and james a. robinson contend that economic prosperity in one country is dependent upon the political and economic policies that this country takes; the failure of nation-states results from the designated economic policies that are usually in favor of those who are in power, and the entire society will pay the price for the failure of nation-states. (acemoglu and robinson, 2012) this study has also found out that as state intervenes industrial development, it will manipulate and misplace interest distribution. once the network of a particular interest group is established from this distorted distribution, it takes time to remove or make a change of it. having a huge market and with a great potential for the development of the auto industry, indonesia, unfortunately, misused auto tycoons in the auto industry due to its particular structure of government-business connections. no wonder even mr. rizwanalamsjah, deputy chairman of indonesia auto manufacturing association, is disappointed when he was asked about the future development of the auto industry in the muslim country (budiartie and primartantyo, 2012). about author dr. wan-ping tai is currently an associate professor and director of foreign affairs at cheng shiu university, kaohsiung taiwan (r.o.c.). he obtained his bachelor degree in public administration and policy at the national taipei university, and the social science of master degree and doctor of philosophy in asia pacific political economy studies at the national sun yat-sen university. his primary area of study includes the following but not limited to: southeast asian studies, asia pacific studies, indonesia studies, and taiwan’s trade and economics. he can be contacted at wanping.tai@gmail.com mailto:tai@gmail.com journal of asean studies 15 references abbott, j. p., developmentalism and dependency in southeast asia: the case of the automotive industry(ny: curzon press, 2003), p.113. abdullah, r., “business response to the regional demands and opportunity: a study of malaysian automobile industry”, paper presented at global issues and challenges in business and economics organized by department of management and marketing at corus paradise resort, port dickson. 13/12/2006-15/12/2006. acemoglu, d. and robinson, james a., why nations fail: the origins of power, prosperity, and poverty(new york: 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transformation of taiwan’s developmental state”, taiwan : a radical quarterly in social studies, no. 84 , 2011 , pp. 243-288. journal of asean studies, vol. 9, no. 2 (2021), pp. 199-217 doi: https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v9i2.7478 issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic contested interpretations of indonesia’s international leadership in the foreign policy of president susilo bambang yudhoyono and joko widodo aleksius jemadu1 and floranesia lantang2 1,2department of international relations, faculty of social and political sciences, pelita harapan university jl. m.h. thamrin boulevard, tangerang, banten 15811, indonesia 1aleksius.jemadu@uph.edu; 2floranesia.lantang@uph.edu received: 21st june 2021/ revised: 03rd september 2021/ accepted: 03rd september 2021 how to cite: jemadu, a. & lantang, f. (2021). contested interpretations of indonesia’s international leadership in the foreign policy of president susilo bambang yudhoyono and joko widodo. journal of asean studies, 9(2), 199-217. https:/doi.org/10.21512/jas.v9i2.7478 abstract the research aimed to examine the indonesia’s international leadership on foreign policy throughout the period of president susilo bambang yudhoyono and president joko widodo, who have developed different conceptualizations of foreign policy. it ultimately affects the way each of them makes an interpretation of what indonesia should do with its international leadership. the research built a solid and rich theoretical framework by consulting on previous research focusing on factors that affect the nature of international leadership especially regarding the role of the individual styles of a state leader. the research had two illustrations or brief case studies, namely, the promotion of democracy and human rights and the initiative of promoting the indo-pacific cooperation with a special emphasis on the period of president joko widodo. the research finds that he has changed the nature of indonesia’s international leadership to make it fit into his domestic agenda. while president susilo bambang yudhoyono tends to make indonesia’s international leadership as an essential part of his rigorous effort to build a post-authoritarian identity for a democratic and stable nation, president joko widodo prefers to make his foreign policy serve the accomplishment of his domestic priorities. the research concludes that indonesia’s international leadership is much contingent upon individual preferences of the presidents in both formulating their policies as well as the implementation. moreover, the research comes up with constructive ideas which might be useful to strengthen indonesia’s international leadership in the future. keywords: indonesia, foreign policy, international leadership, democracy, asean, indo-pacific mailto:aleksius.jemadu@uph.edu mailto:floranesia.lantang@uph.edu 200 contested interpretations introduction research on the role of state leaders in the characterization of indonesia’s international leadership has been previously conducted by various authors. focusing particularly on foreign policy driven by soeharto’s development, suryadinata (1996) argues that indonesia’s international behavior was very much dictated by the ongoing dynamics of international politics during the two presidents’ period in power. although indonesia had limited national capabilities to have an effective influence over the course of international events during their respective periods of government, both leaders had enough self-confidence to assert that indonesia deserved to be recognized as a leading participant in regional and global affairs. indonesia became one of the founding members of asean in 1967 and enjoyed a recognition as an informal regional leader of the association in the 1970s until 1980s. karim (2021) focuses on how president susilo bambang yudhoyono (yudhoyono, hereafter) tried to legitimize indonesia’s international leadership role by referring to indonesia’s historical experience in conducting such role and using international expectations to ensure domestic support for the president’s foreign policy endeavor. thus, karim’s argument points to the key role of a state leader in determining the nature of his foreign policy endeavor. academics provide different answers to two important questions: 1) whether indonesia has the ability to carry out its international leadership; and 2) whether there is real evidence that indonesia plays such role. reid (2012), for instance, draws our attention to some internal challenges like corruption, weak law enforcement, and bureaucratic inefficiency that need to be resolved if indonesia wants to have a bigger influence in international relations. unlike reid, acharya (2014) argues indonesia had succeeded in accomplishing three policy agendas of development, democracy, and stability in such a way that it deserves to be considered as an emerging democratic power of asia with a promising prospect in the future. roberts, habir, and sebastian (2015) focuses on the idea of how indonesia had risen as an emerging power with all the constraints and opportunities it had to face in its external environment. since their research only covers indonesia’s foreign policy until 2014, it is considered essential to examine its change and continuity especially since president joko widodo (widodo, hereafter) came to power in 2014. although the research covers the periods of president yudhoyono and president widodo, more extensive analysis will be provided to the latter with the purpose of demonstrating how a changing conceptualization of indonesia’s international leadership has affected the way it is enacted. shekhar (2018) has developed the most recent analysis of the correlation between indonesia’s rising power and its international ambition to play a leading role in regional and global politics. however, shekhar’s depiction of indonesia as an indo-pacific power raises a question whether there is indeed convincing evidence that indonesia harbors such a strong intentionality to engage in a contestation of power that is going on in the region. a more realistic interpretation would argue that indonesia’s declaration as a global maritime fulcrum is mainly meant to protect its own territorial waters without any explicit ambition to be an active and assertive player in the strategic competition among great powers. to say that indonesia has an explicit ambition to become a regional maritime power would contradict the reality of its material or military power on which such ambition could be based. journal of asean studies 201 it follows that there is a need to demonstrate through empirical research the circumstances under which indonesia can show its capability to lead, the real conduct of such leadership, and conditions which might lead to its withdrawal from such leadership and explain its reluctance to act. the research also seeks to find out how president yudhoyono dan president widodo, as well as their foreign policy conceptions might characterize the nature of indonesia’s international leadership. it is argued that the conceptualization of indonesia’s international leadership by each president matters to the extent that such international leadership is not static but significantly dynamic depending on what meaning the state leaders want to attach to such foreign policy endeavor. the argument and the theoretical concepts from the perspective of the study of foreign policy and international relations, the research is more concerned with the importance of individual level of analysis and less about the state and international system levels of analysis in explaining how the activity of international leadership by a state operates in reality (viotti & kauppi, 2014). the use of the concept of international leadership in this research refers to an effort by a state to influence other states, so they might achieve their common goals. according to destradi (2010), the concept of international leadership is different from empire or hegemony since it gives more emphasis on the mobilization of normative or ideational resources instead of capitalizing on material resources or military preponderance. such concept is quite useful in analyzing indonesia’s foreign policy as it seeks to make a projection of its influence not only among asean countries but also beyond southeast asia. thus, all along the indonesian leaders are aware of indonesia’s primacy in terms of geographical size and population in the region but how they translate such awareness into foreign policy orientation varies from one president to another. following destradi’s categories of “leader-initiated leadership” and “followerinitiated leadership”, the research aims to find out how president yudhoyono and president widodo choose the suitable type of leadership for their respective government. it will be argued that the choice made by each of these state leaders is contingent upon how each of them conceptualizes indonesian foreign policy and utilizes it to accomplish a set of predetermined policy priorities. the determinant role of foreign policy elite in indonesia’s promotion of democracy and human rights is also highlighted by karim (2016) who challenges the idea that such promotion is rooted in a solid foundation of state identity. the research also takes advantage from results by breuning (2007) who utilizes the concept of leadership trait analysis with three important elements including attitude towards constraints, openness to new information, and motivation. by using the three elements, a set of guiding questions can be made, for instance: 1) how do president yudhoyono respond to the constraints created by the great powers in indonesia’s external environment? 2) is president widodo open to new information or does he stick to the primacy of his domestic agenda? 3) what is president widodo’s motivation in promoting indonesia’s hedging strategies towards the us and china? it is quite evident that the way president widodo conceptualizes indonesia’s international leadership remains consistent with his political pragmatism and the primacy of 202 contested interpretations his domestic accomplishment. the president’s influence in the foreign policy making represents what mintz and derouen jr (2010) call cognitive consistency in the sense that his prior images and beliefs consistently determine what is important in responding to the complexity of his external environment. similar recognition of the importance of leader’s personal decision-making style can be found in beasley et al. (2013) suggesting that leaders can be selective in sticking to the information that fits into their strongly held belief systems. such conceptualization of international leadership may explain the way president widodo has promoted democracy and human rights in the region with its emphasis on the imperative of good governance to increase indonesia’s national competitiveness, indonesia’s initiative in the promotion of the asean outlook on the indo-pacific, indonesia’s hedging strategies towards china and the us, and indonesia’s reluctance to go the extra mile in pressurizing the military regime in myanmar to accept asean’s policy proposal to resolve the political crisis in that country. future uncertainties regarding the economic recovery in the post-pandemic covid-19 may only reinforce such foreign policy direction at least until 2024 when president widodo ends his second term in office. under such domestic and external circumstances, it might be relevant here to adopt three important concepts introduced by breslin (2017), which are willingness, capability, and acceptance for the purpose of explaining the nature of indonesia’s international leadership in asean. we cannot take for granted that indonesia has the willingness to lead on any issue unless it is directly tied to its own immediate interests. this is particularly the case under the pragmatism of president widodo’s presidency. with relatively limited material and military power, indonesia’s international leadership is characterized more by the mobilization of its ideational resources than material power. finally, indonesia’s international leadership among asean countries is made possible by the fact that other asean members expect such regional leadership as long as indonesia stands on the commonality of the interests of all asean members vis a vis the great powers. nabers (2010) affirms that international leadership cannot be separated from ‘the wants and needs of followers’ if it is meant to be effective. as a pragmatic leader president widodo will tend to perceive the emerging region of the indo-pacific with a narrative of economic interdependence in mind and avoid the idea of power politics by the great powers. there are, at least, three reasons why the idea of economic interdependence is more preferred than the narrative of power politics. first, in the context of economic interdependence, president widodo wants to utilize trade and investment opportunities made available by the asian economic powerhouses china, japan, and india and make them serve his domestic priorities of building indonesia’s infrastructures. second, considering indonesia’s limited material and military capabilities, it would be self-defeating to follow the narrative of a contestation of power. not only will it destabilize the region, it will also weaken asean’s unity and solidity of which indonesia is its traditional leader. third, even if the great powers choose to continue with their power politics, president widodo can capitalize on the credibility of indonesia’s tradition of independent and active foreign policy to play a mediatory role by which it could add more significance to its international leadership in the region. by using all the concepts related to the nature of indonesia’s international leadership, it is believed that there is a solid theoretical foundation to argue that president widodo is not just a passive recipient of a foreign policy legacy from his journal of asean studies 203 predecessor president yudhoyono. president widodo actively reinterprets and redefines such legacy to suit his policy priorities which are ultimately meant to strengthen his performance legitimacy in the eyes of various domestic political constituents. with this argument, the research aims to challenge the idea that president widodo is indifferent about indonesia’s tradition of international leadership in its foreign policy. the research applies explanatory methods for the analysis aiming to explain the causality between the cognitive and belief systems of state leaders and the way they practice it in a changing external environment (howard, 2010). by connecting events in a meaningful way, the research is expected to produce useful insights about the nature of indonesian’s international leadership. the research uses various sources of evidence from newspapers, government reports, books, and journal articles to support the analysis. indonesia’s leadership in democracy and human rights when president yudhoyono came to power in 2004 after indonesia’s first direct presidential election, he had two things in mind as far as the country’s international leadership in the field of democracy and human rights. first, he aspired to instrumentalize indonesia’s democratic consolidation as an opportunity to leave behind the authoritarian past by replacing it with a new identity as a nation capable of upholding universal democratic principles and norms. second, being the largest democracy in southeast asia, indonesia aspired to spread democratic norms and principles through dialogue and exchange of experiences without any intention of imposing it on other states. although president yudhoyono’s second agenda could only be materialized at the end of his first term through the establishment of bali democracy forum (bdf) in 2008, it was quite evident that he has intention to make it a logical outcome of indonesia’s new identity as a new democratic country. president yudhoyono seemed to realize that as indonesia’s first directly elected president, he had a personal mission to introduce indonesia’s new identity as a democratic country to the world. in the eyes of president yudhoyono there were several reasons why indonesia could claim to be capable of setting a good example or model for the rest of southeast asia in upholding democratic values and human rights. first, indonesia used to maintain its stability through the operation of an authoritarian government under president soeharto. however, under his presidency, indonesia had managed to consolidate its democracy by introducing a multi-party based presidential system. thus, indonesia’s political model had shown to the rest of the region of southeast asia that authoritarian political system was not the only option to create political stability and achieve economic growth. on top of that, indonesia’s domestic stability had a positive impact on the stability of the whole region. second, as a nation with the largest muslim population in the world, indonesia set a good example of a workable compatibility between islam and modern democracy. such compatibility produced a positive co-existence between religious commitment and democratic rules of the game in the organization of political power. moreover, while the democratic movements of the so-called arab spring in many middle east countries had ended up in protracted sectarian conflicts and the return of the military regime like in egypt, indonesia as 204 contested interpretations a muslim-dominated nation, stood out as a stable democracy capable of peacefully managing its multi-ethnicity. third, as new democracy, indonesia was also capable of combining coercive measures and cultural approaches to fight against terrorism. considering that southeast asia had become a new area of operation for isis (islamic state of iraq and syria) outside the middle east, indonesia’s program of deradicalization could be a model to be emulated by other countries in southeast asia. instead of relying solely on the security approach through the enactment of quite repressive legislation like internal security act (isa) in malaysia and singapore, being consistent with the progress of its democratic consolidation, indonesia had chosen to make a balance between firm law enforcement and cultural approach through deradicalization of the terrorist convicts with full support from islamic mass organizations like nahdlatul ulama and muhammadiyah. fourth, indonesia’s success in resolving the separatist conflict in aceh peacefully through the signing of the helsinki agreement in 2005 was a proof of the positive correlation between democratic consolidation at the center and the capacity to abandon military approach in resolving a separatist conflict in the region. since the collapse of soeharto’s authoritarian regime in 1998, there had been an escalation of conflict in aceh with the effect that in 2003 the indonesian government under president megawati soekarnoputri, who was backed by the military, enacted martial law. with the direct election of president yudhoyono in 2004, the indonesian military reform made a significant progress, so the process could take place without any serious obstacle. considering that separatist movements remain unresolved in places like southern thailand, myanmar, and southern philippines, indonesia’s experience in aceh can be a source of inspiration for future possibility of a peaceful conflict resolution. according to destradi’s categories (2010) concerning international leadership, the establishment of the bdf can be considered as indonesia’s initiative to set a good example of a democratic transformation that can be emulated by other asean members. there were at least two main factors underlying yudhoyono’s prompt response to the issue of democracy and human rights in myanmar. first, the indonesian government could not put aside the internal pressures from the islamic communities in indonesia who sympathized with the sufferings of the rohingyas. second, there was an external pressure from countries in asean and outside of the region as they expected indonesia to lead the process of democratization in myanmar. dermawan, purnama, and mahyudin (2018) explain that indonesia’s policies to myanmar aimed to show its ability in managing diversity, likewise internal conditions in the country. certainly, there are other case studies that can be used to analyze indonesia’s role in promoting democracy and human rights during yudhoyono’s presidency. for instance, alexandra and basuki (2014) focus on the issue of migrant workers, the rohingya case, and indonesia’s response to the iranian sanction. an exhaustive exploration of possible case studies does not end here since being consistent with the main argument of the research, it is essential to highlight how each indonesian state leader develops a distinct personal understanding of indonesia’s international leadership in his or her foreign policy implementation. journal of asean studies 205 while yudhoyono’s policy was mainly driven by his international activism, president joko widodo remains committed to his domestic priorities and does not seem to have a particular ambition in dealing with this regional issue. he did send humanitarian assistance to myanmar but mainly for the purpose of responding to the demands of the islamic opposition groups in indonesia and not for changing myanmar’s political landscape. similar thing can be said about president widodo’s reaction towards the current political crisis in myanmar since the military coup on february 1st, 2021. although there is a high expectation that indonesia would go the extra mile to pressure the military government in myanmar, president widodo has been constrained by several domestic and international factors including his own pragmatism, the inflexibility of the attitude of myanmar’s military leaders, and china’s decisive role in the whole regional situation. this may explain why the military government has a strong self-confidence to stay in power while at the same time giving the impression that it is willing to accommodate some of the aspirations of asean countries. under these political circumstances, there is not much room for president widodo to conduct any foreign policy maneuver other than an endorsement of the normative approach that has been demonstrated by asean so far. the fact that the asean leaders meeting was conducted in indonesia on the 21st of april 2021 becomes an indication of how much other asean members expect indonesia’s leadership in dealing with the political crisis in myanmar. medcalf (2020) is right in his argument that it is beyond indonesia’s capacity to handle political tensions in southeast asia. being consistent with his domestic priorities and the increasing pressure to focus on handling the dramatic surge in the daily cases of covid-19 seem to have effectively prevented president widodo from coming up with an alternative policy in convincing the myanmar’s military leaders the importance of getting out from the current deadlock in which asean’s aspirations are not properly respected at all. indonesia’s tacit withdrawal from taking more initiative in actualizing its international leadership is strong evidence of how this foreign policy agenda is sensitive to the preferential option of the president himself. the situation has become more complicated for president widodo since some leaders of asean members like thailand, brunei darussalam, and cambodia tacitly support the status quo power of myanmar’s military junta leader, general ming aung hlaing (purba, 2021). while president widodo agrees with his predecessor that as a regional power in southeast asia, indonesia should demonstrate its leadership in the field of democracy and human rights. moreover, he also wants to show his distinct personal interpretation of such leadership by introducing new elements based on his immediate concerns and policy priorities. there are various reasons why it is arguable to say that president widodo has developed his own interpretation of the meaning of indonesia’s leadership in the promotion of democracy and human rights. first, with the growing influence of the islamic radical groups trying to spread the ideology of global islamic caliphate, the president seems determined to challenge it by introducing a moderate version of islam. as part of his campaign against islamic radicalism which is perceived as a threat to the state ideology pancasila, president widodo has taken a bold decision to ban the indonesian hizbut tharir. while yudhoyono seemed to take for granted the compatibility between islam and democracy, president widodo takes strong initiatives to carry out an active campaign for the spread of moderate version of islam 206 contested interpretations with strong support from two major islamic mass organizations nu and muhammadiyah. even indonesia’s humanitarian assistance for rohingya refugees soon after the military crackdown in august 2017 was considered as a step to calm down the domestic islamic radical groups who urged the indonesian government to cut diplomatic ties with myanmar and take military action. the establishment of the indonesian islamic international university through presidential regulation no. 57/2016 is widodo’s another important initiative to contribute to the construction of an islamic civilization which is compatible with modernity and democracy. thus, like his predecessor, widodo wants to assert indonesia’s leadership in promoting democracy but at the same time he is more explicit in capitalizing on indonesia’s capacity to set a model for the islamic world as an alternative to a more radical and uncivil interpretation of the religious doctrine. on top of that, by building a university as indonesia’s vehicle to be an intellectual hub for moderate islam, the president appears to address the criticism that indonesian islamic scholars have only limited influence among the islamic world intellectuals (van bruinessen, 2012). second, the success of managing its ethnic and religious diversity has made widodo’s government more confident in sharing indonesia’s experience with conflict-torn countries like afghanistan. therefore, when president widodo visited kabul in late 2017, he offered his host indonesia’s willingness to become a mediator for the conflicting parties in afghanistan. afghanistan president, hamid karzai, welcomed such idea and agreed that indonesia would hold a dialogue as a preliminary towards a peaceful conflict resolution. as a matter of fact, jakarta hosted the meeting of representatives of afghanistan’s different ethnic and religious groups in which dialogues were conducted to find peaceful conflict resolution that was acceptable for all parties. third, another important characteristic of indonesia’s pursuit of international leadership in promoting democracy under president widodo is that he shows a strong intentionality to make indonesian democracy capable of delivering the intention to produce for a nation with a high priority for economic development. this is the reason behind the choice of the theme “democracy that delivers” for the 10th anniversary of bdf in december 2017. in fact, within three years of president widodo’s first term in office indonesia had shown better performance in several indicators of internal bureaucratic and economic reform and manage to outrank some of its asean neighbors. for instance, president widodo had managed to improve indonesia’s rank for ease of doing business from 114 in 2014 to 72 in 2018 (world bank, 2019). thus, the credibility of indonesia’s projection of democratic norms to the outside world is strengthened by demonstrating that democracy can produce good governance despite the difficulties of reaching a consensus which typically characterizes the politics of decision-making process in many new democracies. despite president widodo’s new initiative to substantiate indonesia’s promotion of democracy and human rights with additional elements such as good governance and national competitiveness, critical voices about indonesia’s limitations and weaknesses cannot just be put aside. for instance, karim (2020) draws our attention to the fact that indonesia’s role in the united nations human rights council has been constrained by the fear that human rights violations committed by journal of asean studies 207 the indonesian security authorities in the restive province of papua might be raised by the international community to embarrass the indonesian government. indonesia and the indo-pacific region how has indonesia navigated its foreign policy in responding to the dynamics of power politics in the indo-pacific region over the last decade? do president yudhoyono and president widodo have different foreign policy orientations in showing indonesia’s international leadership as expected by other asean members? during his second term in office (2009 – 2014) president yudhoyono and his foreign minister, marty natalegawa, were adamant to show indonesia’s international activism by capitalizing on the asean centrality and solidity in order to neutralize the use of balance of power politics by us and china. there were at least three foreign policy initiatives indicating that under president yudhoyono, indonesia was quite active in substantiating its international leadership which it believed to benefit not only indonesia’s own national interests but those of the region as a whole. first, when indonesia held the asean chairmanship in 2011, indonesia took a leading role in the adoption of what was known to be bali concord iii by which asean declared itself as a regional community in the global community of nations. second, in 2013 foreign minister marty natalegawa proposed the idea of indo-pacific treaty as an alternative to balance of power politics by the great powers by emphasizing what he called a dynamic equilibrium which could ensure regional stability and security as a fundamental requirement for the maintenance of the economic momentum in the region. third, through his shuttle diplomacy, marty natalegawa played an active role in mediating the conflict between thailand and cambodia over the control of preah vihear temple. it was quite evident that indonesia had a strong self-confidence in demonstrating its international leadership with a full support from other asean members. when president widodo succeeded yudhoyono in 2014, he was challenged by quite similar external environment of power politics in the indo-pacific region. instead of reproducing the international activism of his predecessor, president widodo tends to put more emphasis on the accomplishment of his domestic policy priorities. unlike his predecessor who pursued his foreign policy goals with a great ambition, president widodo decides to use foreign policy as his instrument for accomplishing his domestic goals. some foreign observers even described president widodo’s approach as more inward-looking to the extent that his political regime is depicted as having the tendency of abandoning indonesia’s tradition of international leadership in southeast asia (connelly, 2015). there is also a concern that in the first term of his administration, president widodo was surrounded by foreign policy advisors and political elites who suggests that indonesia should go beyond asean to have more diplomatic space in regional and global politics (rosyidin & pattipeilohy, 2020). the research argues that it is quite misleading to suggest that indonesia is less engaged in international politics under president widodo’s presidency. it seems more appropriate to say that indonesia has become more critical about its own domestic interests, and it adopts an 208 contested interpretations idea that international leadership can only be based on the solidity of its domestic foundation in terms of growing national competitiveness, massive infrastructure development throughout the country, and the national awakening from the underutilization of the nation’s huge economic potentials. to say that indonesia is less engaged in international politics under president widodo is contrary to some concrete facts. for instance, indonesia has managed to be elected as a non-permanent member of the un security council for the period of 2019 – 2020. in addition, indonesia also took a leading role to initiate the acceptance of the asean outlook on the indo-pacific during the 34th asean summit in bangkok on june 23rd, 2019 (septiari, 2019). as far as president widodo is concerned, the main idea behind this outlook is indonesia’s preference for an open and inclusive cooperation among countries in the region for their common prosperity. networks of economic interdependence are expected to prevent the unnecessary escalation of power politics which could destabilize the entire region. it goes without saying that indonesia needs such a stable and cooperative external environment to support its massive infrastructure development financed by an unhindered inflow of foreign investment. from the very beginning since he took office in 2014, president widodo and his foreign policy team have had real calculations on how to secure indonesia’s strategic interests amid growing tension among the great powers in the indo-pacific region. thus, it was realized from the beginning that indonesia could not stay indifferent or silent about the competing ambitions of the great powers to dominate the region. the following course of strategic events provides clear and significant evidence that great powers with their strategic stakes in the pacific ocean and indian ocean promote their respective geopolitical and geoeconomic aspirations with the effect that it is no longer relevant to talk about the two oceans as separate spatial or geographical policy entities. first, the maritime component of china’s belt and road initiative (bri) requires a direct maritime connection between the pacific ocean and indian ocean through which china wants to establish networks of “policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people to people bonds” (the state council the people’s republic of china, 2015). starting from china’s southeastern coastal areas down to south china sea through the malacca strait on to the indian ocean before it reaches africa and ultimately europe. countries that participate in this extensive maritime corridor may benefit from the free flow of trade commodities, industrial goods and services, capital, human resources, and technology as their economies become increasingly interdependent under china’s coordination as the initiator and founder of a new kind of multilateralism. the fact that such maritime corridor cuts across the pacific and indian oceans has necessitated the formation of a political geographical space within which a suitable policy framework can be proposed to make it function as china intends it to be. thus, the cooperative response of countries in southeast asia and south asia may appear to be an imperative for china so that its project of maritime connectivity can accomplish its intended goals. second, great powers are always sensitive to any possible change of the configuration of power in the international system. china’s economic and military rise which is implied in its bri especially the maritime component has triggered the reactions from the us, japan, journal of asean studies 209 australia, and india who revived the idea of quadrilateral security dialogue (qsd) on the sidelines of november 2017 east asia summit (eas) in manila. despite the peculiarity of the strategic concerns of each of these countries, they are required to formulate their strategic policies within the same regional framework of the indo-pacific. on top of that, these four countries are united by their traditional commitment to western liberal democratic norms and the upholding of international laws in maintaining the global political order. third, in his keynote speech to the audience of the shangri-la dialogue hosted by the international institute for strategic studies (iiss) in singapore june 1-3, 2018, the indian prime minister, narendra modi, suggested that he would support an open and free indopacific region and emphasized the importance of a rules-based regional architecture (anjaiah, 2018). when modi visited jakarta before attending the shangri-la dialogue in singapore, he expressed his eagerness to strengthen relationship with asean especially indonesia as an essential element of india’s act east policy. india’s intensive engagement with southeast asia can be considered as a strategic step to counter-balance chinese influence in this region not only through the maritime component of china’s bri but also bilateral mechanisms that china has built with each of the asean members. while it is true that indonesia’s geopolitical aspiration to make a projection of its ideational resources in the formation of a new regional architecture in the indo-pacific region was initially announced during the era of president yudhoyono, the contention of the research is that president widodo’s foreign policy has gone beyond just an imitation of what has been done before. it is argued that the current government has been active in embedding indonesia’s own national interests into its geopolitical strategy while, at the same time, capitalizing on the importance of regional mediatory mechanisms that cannot be easily dismissed by any great power of the indo-pacific region. under president widodo, indonesia is fully aware of the fact that the intensity of the rivalry among great powers in the indopacific region will only reaffirm the necessary role of a regional or middle power with diplomatic credentials capable of reaching out to all stakeholders in the region. indonesia also seems to capitalize on its positional flexibility to harness or embark on its own foreign policy maneuver by instrumentalizing the zero-sum game environment created by the rivalry among great powers who lock themselves in their respective exclusivity, and demand for a stability and security for the whole region. in analyzing indonesia’s initiative of international leadership as a regional power, the research does not limit the discussion on the application of the variables proposed by flemes and wojczewski (2011) but goes further by looking at how president widodo and his foreign minister, retno l.p. marsudi, strategize by combining the external opportunities and internal capabilities for the accomplishment of indonesia’s foreign policy objectives. the president himself is adamant about making his foreign policy serve the best interests of his domestic priorities. there is a conscious effort by the president and his foreign policy team to reveal a predisposition that indonesia’s assertion of international leadership is not meant to be part of an impression management project, but it is connected to the real interests of the nation. such predisposition is needed because under president yudhoyono, there was an accusation that indonesia’s international activism was not balanced by internal efforts to address many 210 contested interpretations unresolved problems including corruption among the ruling party, religious radicalism and terrorism, persecution of minority groups, and bureaucratic inefficiency from the central government down to the regional level. skeptical voices about indonesia’s emergence as a leading power in asia referred to these internal weaknesses as the reason why indonesia “punches below its weight” in international affairs (reid, 2012). president widodo has brought ways to connect his domestic policy priorities and indonesia’s foreign policy towards the indo-pacific region. first, there is no doubt that the formation of indo-pacific region through the dynamics of international politics among great powers has stimulated responses from countries whose strategic interests are affected by such policy discourse. under president widodo, indonesia has come up with the grand strategy of describing itself as a global maritime axis in line with the archipelagic nature of the country and an intentionality to contribute to the stability and security of the indo-pacific region. president jokowi realizes that geographically the pacific and indian oceans are connected through the indonesian territorial waters and obviously indonesia feels the pressure to find ways how to secure its maritime sovereignty from any external potential threat. thus, indonesia’s self-declaration as a global maritime fulcrum has two interrelated objectives. at the external level, indonesia’s assertion as a global maritime fulcrum a preliminary step towards a subsequent announcement of a plan to initiate an indo-pacific cooperation. from a domestic perspective, indonesia wants to substantiate its claim as a maritime power by building inter-island connectivity for the sake of a more efficient commercial interactions and other economic activities. the combination of good maritime infrastructures and modernization of indonesian navy is expected to eventually strengthen indonesia’s maritime sovereignty and the capacity to manage maritime resources with the mobilization of foreign resources through the cooperation that indonesia has decided to initiate. second, indonesia’s unique position with no significant conflict with any great power enables it to strengthen relationship with all of them without sacrificing its credentials as a provider of mediatory services when circumstances demand such role. with such unique position, indonesia has the flexibility of reaching out to build strategic relationship with them while at the same time inviting them to supply financial resources required for developing its infrastructures. currently, indonesia is cooperating with china to build the jakarta – bandung high speed train while inviting japan to support the development of deep seaport at patimban to the east of tanjung priok. in a move that seems to balance china’s maritime domination from south china sea down to the indian ocean through the malacca strait, indonesia has offered the building of sabang port project to india whose current act east policy requires an intensive engagement with asean member countries. indonesia’s multi-direction search for foreign investment in the indo-pacific region for the financing of its infrastructure projects turns out to be in line with its initiative to create a cooperative and peaceful architecture of diplomacy within the framework of the asean outlook on the indo-pacific. this is also an indication that president joko widodo interprets the independent and active foreign policy principle in a very pragmatic way. third, it stands to reason to say that the bilateral relationship between india and indonesia constitutes an important element of the whole construction of a new indo-pacific journal of asean studies 211 regional architecture. as a regional power, indonesia welcomes india’s intention to strengthen its relations with asean members. thus, when indian prime minister, narendra modi, came to jakarta in june 2018, president widodo welcomed him with great enthusiasm and the two leaders agreed to take their bilateral relations to a higher level considering the complementarity and interdependence between the two economies. on top of that, both india and indonesia are key members of the non-aligned movement with a strong foreign policy tradition of resisting against the use of power politics for hegemonic purposes. as far as india is concerned, its increasing engagement with indonesia and other asean members is required to balance china’s hegemonic power and military assertiveness in south china sea as the starting point of its bri’s maritime global connectivity. thus, as a result of his meeting with president widodo, prime minister modi gave his support to indonesia’s initiative for an open and inclusive indo-pacific cooperation. not only did indonesia gain india’s support for its global maritime fulcrum policy, but president widodo also asked his guest to lower tariffs for indonesia’s crude palm oil (cpo) export (anjaiah, 2018). the incorporation of economic diplomacy in the navigation of indonesia’s foreign policy with the great powers in the indopacific region is part of the strategy to utilize external opportunities as well as to capitalize on domestic potentials for the accomplishment of foreign policy objectives. finally, indonesia’s initiative to promote the indo-pacific cooperation has a distinctive characteristic that it underlines the importance of international peace, regional stability, and common prosperity. course of events before the announcement of such initiative may strongly indicate that indonesia is on the move to expand the diplomatic arena in which the integrity of the unclos principles can be defended not only for the sake of indonesia’s own maritime sovereignty but also the imperative of a bigger pressure to prevent china from violating further international laws after establishing military infrastructures in the disputed islands of south china sea. with the increasing difficulty of uniting different and conflicting policies of asean members in dealing with the territorial disputes in south china sea and china’s tendency to instrumentalize their economic dependence on china’s investment and market access, indonesia is under mounting pressure to find alternatives in addition to its traditional reliance on the collective decisions produced in asean summits. moreover, asean countries was said to be lacking in turning their collective commitment into real actions or projects to resolve their common problems (agastia, 2021). under president widodo, indonesia has come to realize that there must be a diplomatic mechanism to change the narrative of balance of power that is preferred by the great powers into what former indonesian foreign minister marty natalegawa called “a dynamic equilibrium”. on its own, asean cannot persuade china to adopt such policy narrative as it needs wider mechanisms like east asia summit (eas) and its treaty of amity and cooperation (tac) which are strong enough as common platforms to formulate decisions acceptable to all great powers including china. this is what indonesia has in mind when it seeks to maintain the centrality of asean within the framework of indo-pacific cooperation. there is no doubt that china would give highest priority to the implementation of the maritime connectivity of its bri. despite china’s obvious preference for the success of its bri, beijing cannot easily sacrifice its strategic relations with asean, otherwise it would 212 contested interpretations run the risk of losing its legitimacy in asia. the us defense minister james mattis made harsh criticisms against china’s “intimidation and coercion” in south china sea during the 17th shangri-la dialogue in singapore (anjaiah, 2018). in response, hangtian, spokesperson of the chinese embassy in jakarta wrote a letter to the editor of the jakarta post complaining that the us only made “sensationalization” in south china sea while at the same time pointing out beijing’s strong emphasis on the solidity of bilateral relations between china and asean member countries (anjaiah, 2018). it is quite evident that on one hand china wants to embrace asean as its cooperative dialog partner in dealing with the territorial disputes in south china sea, and on the other hand it resists any interference from the outside especially by the us. china’s ambiguity in dealing with asean countries can be made more complicated by the fact that under president xi jinping, china tends to be quite assertive in its security policy especially regarding the territorial dispute in south china sea (sinaga, 2020). it seems too early to say with certainty how indonesia will follow up the acceptance of the asean outlook on the indo-pacific. indonesia has used not only state to state diplomacy but also the regional platform of asean to gain support from all the stakeholders including the great powers. the optimal use of the existing asean mechanisms would probably the best way to gather all the great powers, in which they can have a common platform to conduct dialogue than to pursue power politics with its destabilizing effect. the great powers have continued to frame their strategic policies based on their respective geopolitical aspirations related to the emergence of the indo-pacific region. hence it seems that the discursive effect of the regional dynamics both on policy level and the epistemic communities cannot be put aside as the stakes are real, and the political ramifications are clearly recognized. it remains to be seen how indonesia would navigate its international leadership in promoting the indopacific cooperation despite the opportunities to start the discussion and dialogue based on the common interests of all the stakeholders. the research may see the prospect of international politics of the indo-pacific region in the post-pandemic covid-19. it seems that all countries in the region focus on the domestic management of the crisis and try to cope with the likelihood of economic downturn at the regional and national level. as far as indonesia is concerned, the priority of pushing forward the agenda of economic growth in the post-pandemic era seems non-negotiable. in this context, it might be helpful to strategize new innovations in the conduct of indonesia’s economic diplomacy by recalibrating indonesia’s enormous potential in the rapidly growing digital economy in this region (margiansyah, 2020). in interpreting the meaning of indonesia’s regional leadership in asean, president widodo never puts aside the fact that indonesia is competing with other asean countries especially in maximizing the economic opportunities that come along with the rise of china. on top of that, in ending his second term in power in 2024, the president makes sure that his performance legitimacy is secured through a smooth economic recovery and the creation of regional stability. the current extending and deepening bilateral cooperation with china in trade and investment appears to be an imperative. as a result, whatever policy indonesia will take in dealing with the contestation of great powers in the indo-pacific region, it will be navigated in a pragmatic way in order not to run the risk of damaging the momentum of bilateral cooperation with china. it remains to be journal of asean studies 213 seen how far such pragmatism will affect indonesia’s principle of independent and active foreign policy since getting too close to china would spark a domestic reaction from the nationalist groups and opposition parties in the parliament. conclusions when president widodo came to power in 2014, he was widely perceived as an inward-looking leader without a clear vision of what to do with his foreign policy. there was a speculation that he would abandon indonesia’s international activism that had characterized the foreign policy of his predecessor president yudhoyono. the research has tried to challenge this allegation by arguing that, as a matter of fact, president widodo has a different conceptualization of what indonesia should do with this tradition of international leadership. thus, the role of an individual state leader matters in understanding indonesia’s international leadership. two important foreign policy agendas, namely the promotion of democracy and human rights and the acceptance of the asean outlook on the indo-pacific, have been selected to see how the two presidents demonstrate indonesia’s international leadership. the use of the concept of international leadership in this research includes initiatives, namely the promotion of ideational resources as a normative orientation in the organization of interactions among states, setting good examples that are worthy of emulation by other countries, and the use of dialogue instead of coercive power in resolving international conflicts. as indonesia’s first democratically elected president, yudhoyono was aware that under his leadership indonesia needed to build a new international identity as a democratic country and would leave behind the era of authoritarianism that had been tainted by massive violations of human rights. with the establishment of bali democracy forum (bdf) in 2008, yudhoyono set an international stage not only for indonesia but also himself to convince the international community that indonesia had some credentials to introduce a more egalitarian efforts in spreading the universal principles of democracy and human rights. president yudhoyono himself was actively engaged in telling his international audience that indonesia had managed to demonstrate that indonesian moderate version of islamic religion was compatible with modern democracy. the experience could be offered to the islamic world, especially in the middle east where people were struggling to combine religious piety with political civility. at the regional level, president yudhoyono took the initiative to make asean recognized as a regional entity capable of contributing positively to global peace and security. thus, when indonesia held asean’s chairmanship in 2011, president yudhoyono proposed the idea of bali concord iii by which the regional organization declared itself as a reliable partner in the global community of nations. it is quite evident that president yudhoyono’s international activism had used idealistic approach in promoting indonesia’s international leadership with a rather loose connection to his domestic policies. consequently, his critics accused him of being too much preoccupied with impression management overseas while neglecting to address some critical issues at home like corruption eradication and the protection of the minority rights. 214 contested interpretations at the beginning of his presidency, president widodo created a strong impression that he would abandon international activism and focus more on his domestic priorities. it has been shown that the president remains committed to carry out its agenda of international leadership, but it is strongly connected to the accomplishment of indonesia’s own national interests. indonesia has been successfully elected as a non-permanent member of the un security council, and has held leading role in the acceptance of the asean outlook on the indo-pacific. it is used as evidence of how president widodo attempts to create a balance between his domestic policy priorities and indonesia’s international responsibilities. the concept of international leadership by destradi corresponds to what president widodo has done in his foreign policy by which indonesia capitalizes more on the mobilization of ideational resources than material capabilities. while president yudhoyono tends to rely on his idealistic approach in promoting indonesia’s international leadership, president widodo prefers to use a more pragmatic approach in the sense that the consideration of indonesia’s national interests should come first. therefore, when indonesia promotes democracy to the world, the president wants to convince his international audience that indonesian democracy is also capable of delivering good governance, national competitiveness, and poverty eradication. indonesia’s endeavor for the acceptance of the asean outlook on the indopacific is not without its strong connection with some domestic strategic needs. there is a functional connection between indonesia’s initiative of the indo-pacific cooperation and its declaration of the archipelago as a global maritime fulcrum whose realization requires a mobilization of financial resources from the great powers like us, china, japan, and india. there is also a systematic diplomacy to promote export of cpo to china and india as alternative markets since us and european union continue to instrumentalize environmental reasons in reducing export of indonesia’s strategic commodity. the fact that the global spread of covid-19 has increased tension between us and china should point to the importance of the asean outlook on the indo-pacific with its emphasis on the mechanism of dialogue and mutual respect for the benefit of all stakeholders in the region. in conclusion, the research has demonstrated that indonesia’s international leadership is very much contingent upon individual preferences of the presidents in both formulating their policies and their implementation. about the authors prof. aleksius jemadu is a lecturer of international relations department, pelita harapan university. his research interest are about global politics, corporate and international security, and the indo-pacific region. he has published journals and books focusing on the study of international relations. floranesia lantang is a lecturer of international relations, pelita harapan university. she received her master of national security policy from the australian national university. her research interests include non-traditional security, border management, papua, and indonesia-australia relations. journal of asean studies 215 references acharya, a (2014). indonesia's matter: asia's emerging democratic power. london: world scientific 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(2021). maritime security cooperation within the asean institutional framework: a gradual shift towards practical cooperation. journal of asean studies, 9(1), 25-48, https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v9i1.6919 abstract how does asean fare in addressing maritime security problems? this paper examines the shifting character of maritime security cooperation in southeast asia. in doing so, this paper looks at the outcomes of three maritime security-oriented fora that exist within the asean regional framework: the asean regional forum, the asean defence ministers’ meeting, and the asean maritime forum. by compiling and analysing data on the forms and frequency of existing cooperative activities from 2003 gathered from publicly available sources, this paper finds that maritime security cooperation among asean members continue to be largely dialogue-based, with few instances of practical cooperation. by comparing the three fora, this paper argues that the organisational design of these forums tends to affect the forms of cooperation. this paper concludes that despite asean showing progress in adopting practical security cooperation, there remain hurdles in achieving regional maritime security. keywords: asean, maritime security, regional institutions, security cooperation introduction since 2003, asean has decided to prioritise maritime security as a regional problem. as a result, there have been numerous efforts to promote regional solutions to regional maritime security problems through asean’s multilateral bodies. in the asean regional forum (arf), the security cooperation agenda has largely centred on disaster relief, counterterrorism, and maritime security. in maritime security, haacke (2009, p. 446) found that 1) dialogue among arf members have resulted in ‘basic agreement on a normative mailto:agastia@president.ac.id 26 prerequisites maritime security cooperation framework’ which serves to guide future cooperation, and 2) capacity-building exercises, which constitute the bulk of practical security cooperation, are often conducted outside the auspices of the arf. this paper seeks to expand on haacke’s initial findings to see whether the observed turn towards practical cooperation has been sustained. to that end, this paper examines the outcomes and efforts of maritime security-oriented fora, such as the arf intersessional meeting on maritime security, the asean defence ministers’ meeting (admm) and admm-plus, and the asean maritime forum. these fora are considered important interlocutors of maritime security cooperation in the asean region, as they have allowed member states to organise meetings, workshops, and operational exercises. however, these three fora are not alike; their design and purposes play a role in either expediting or inhibiting more ‘practical’ cooperation activities. this paper proceeds in four main sections. the first section reviews the literature on security cooperation in southeast asia. the second section describes the analytical framework, along with the methodology of this paper. in the third section, this paper reviews the multilateral processes related to maritime security cooperation in asean. three major regional platforms for maritime security cooperation are reviewed: the asean regional forum, specifically the intersessional meeting on maritime security (arf ism on ms), the asean defence ministers meeting (admm) and the admm plus, and the asean maritime forum (amf) along with the expanded asean maritime forum (eamf), along with their key outcomes of the platforms. the fourth section provides a discussion of the results of the third section, particularly on the relation between organisational design and character of security cooperation. literature review the maritime security discourse in asean within asean, there were already discussions of regional maritime security cooperation in the late 1990s. the 1998 hanoi declaration and subsequent plan of action to combat transnational crime in 1999 showed a regional focus on piracy and armed robbery. these declarations were issued as a response to an uptick in piracy and armed robbery after the asian financial crisis in 1997. the hanoi declaration noted piracy as a specific object of concern for asean members, though it only mentioned the need to ‘intensify individual and collective efforts’ to address piracy and other transnational crimes. the subsequent plan of action conveyed asean’s interests in institutionalising responses to transnational crime by establishing the asean centre for combating transnational crime (actc) and positioning the asean ministerial meeting on transnational crime as the highest policymaking unit. this response, however, was mostly limited to transnational crime, and while piracy does fall within this category, the plan of action does not provide specific guidelines on a regional response to piracy. in this vein, maritime security was still viewed in the narrow sense of transnational crime, which was to be addressed individually by member states. a more specific call to action was issued by the arf in june 2003. the joint statement noted the ‘indispensable and fundamental’ nature of maritime security and the urgency to ‘step up broad-based regional cooperative efforts’ between the relevant maritime law enforcement institutions. the statement journal of asean studies 27 also urged the implementation and adoption of international instruments and guidelines, such as the 1988 sua convention and the 1974 international convention for the safety of life at sea (nasu et al., 2019). in addition to intramural efforts to come together on maritime security cooperation, there were also extra-regional efforts at maritime security, most notably from japan and the united states (u.s.). in response to the 9/11 attacks, the u.s. issued three distinct security initiatives: the container security initiative, proliferation security initiative, and regional maritime security initiative (rmsi). while the first two initiatives were implemented globally, rmsi was exclusively focused on securing the malacca strait from the threat of terrorism. through rmsi, the u.s. sought to deepen cooperative ties with littoral states, namely singapore, indonesia, and malaysia, in maritime security efforts in the malacca strait. in his testimony to the house armed services committee on 31 march 2004, admiral thomas fargo of the united states navy noted rmsi would include working together with regional navies to ‘build and synchronize interagency and international capacity to fight threats that use maritime space to facilitate their illicit activity.’ (house armed services committee, 2004) fargo’s subsequent statement explaining how cooperation under rmsi would be operationalized— '…we are looking at things like high-speed vessels, putting special operations forces on highspeed vessels, putting potentially marines on high-speed vessels so that we can use boats that might be incorporated with these vessels to conduct effective interdiction’—generated staunch opposition from both malaysia and indonesia due to concerns of u.s. military presence in the malacca strait (febrica, 2015, p. 123; rosenberg & chung, 2008). in contrast, japan, seeking to secure the flow of trade in the malacca strait, proposed the regional agreement on cooperation against armed piracy (recaap) in 1999, which entered into force in 2006. the recaap initiative would be led by japan and involved increasing coast guard cooperation and the establishment of a regional information-sharing centre to monitor and counter piracy and armed robbery. these attempts, however, saw mixed reception among asean members. indonesia and malaysia were among the strongest opponents of the initiatives, citing sovereignty concerns (storey, 2009, p. 40). several institutional changes in the early 2000s drove maritime security to the forefront of asean. chief among them was the second declaration of asean concord (also known as the bali concord ii), issued in october 2003 (nasu et al., 2019, p. 117). it established maritime security as an organisational goal and specifically acknowledged the need for a regional response based on ‘common values’ in addressing maritime security threats. it noted the transboundary nature of maritime issues, which warrants a ‘holistic, integrated, and comprehensive’ response from asean members, which would take the form of an asean security community. in the vientiane action programme (specifically part ii, sec. 1.3.), maritime security cooperation was to be further promoted as a means to prevent conflict, which would be facilitated by the creation of an asean maritime forum. the idea of a maritime forum was also carried over into the asean political security community (apsc) blueprint 2015. in promoting maritime security cooperation, the blueprint endorses the establishment of the asean maritime forum, application of a ‘comprehensive approach’ on safety of navigation and security concerns that are ‘of common concerns to the asean community’, 28 prerequisites maritime security cooperation stocktaking and identifying maritime issues and cooperation among asean members, and promoting cooperation in maritime search-and-rescue activities (asean, 2009, sec. a.2.5). as a result of this regional emphasis on maritime security, maritime security cooperation activities began to become part of asean’s security agenda. however, while it was expected that the character of security cooperation would be a balanced blend of ‘traditional’ and ‘non-traditional’ security cooperation, in reality, maritime security cooperation has mostly been ‘non-traditional’ in nature. while ‘traditional’ engagements persist at the bilateral level, there is a general aversion at the regional level to these forms of engagement (bhattacharyya, 2010). part of this aversion is attributed to asean’s reluctance to be branded as a military bloc; another reason is the need for consensus, which incentivises members to focus on the lowest common denominator. as such, maritime security cooperation in southeast asia has mostly revolved around counterpiracy, maritime terrorism, and countering illegal fishing (damayanti, 2018). on the effectiveness of southeast asian maritime security cooperation in discussing security cooperation, observers often argue about the proper way of gauging the general effectiveness of regional institutions, and, in turn, the effectiveness of maritime security cooperation. while this paper does not seek to test nor examine the effectiveness of maritime security cooperation activities or that of asean’s regional institutions, the indicators of effectiveness do merit a brief review. in the literature of asean, this debate is particularly noticeable, especially in assessing institutional outcomes, leading to assessments of the perceived value of regional institutions (stubbs, 2019). these views stem from differing fundamental understandings of how power is wielded by regional institutions (eaton & stubbs, 2006). on the one hand, asean sceptics tend to point out at the lack of practical outcomes produced by asean bodies. this is often attributed to the consensusseeking, informal, and intergovernmental character of asean institutions which are enshrined in the values of the so-called ‘asean way’ (d. m. jones & smith, 2007; l. jones, 2010). viewed in this light, asean processes arguably have less power in both encouraging and discouraging conduct. on the other hand, asean proponents tend to view the development and exercise of existing regional processes as an indicator of asean’s performance as a regional institution (acharya, 2009a, 2009b; katsumata, 2006; yates, 2017). proponents argue that asean’s success and value as a regional institution should not be assessed in strictly practical terms as the sceptics suggest; rather, it ought to be assessed in asean’s progress in disseminating and shaping common values through constructive regional processes. in other words, the process matters more than outcomes. in assessing the outcomes of asean maritime security cooperation, it would seem there is a preference for outcomes instead of processes in the literature. bradford (2005, p. 64), for example, proposes a simple method for determining whether specific maritime security cooperation activities are effective. cooperation is considered effective when it is ‘operationalised’, i.e., a ‘specific type and degree of cooperation in which policies addressing common threats can be carried out by midlevel officials of the states involved without journal of asean studies 29 immediate or direct supervision from strategic-level authorities.’ this is contrasted with just ‘cooperation’, e.g., high-level consultations or information sharing agreements, which usually reflect political commitments, but not actual practices in the field. haacke (2009) adopts a similar approach, which will be discussed further in the following section. this tendency towards practical cooperation being the yardstick for organisational progress in security cooperation is also reflected in academic literature of southeast asian security cooperation (see, among others, tan, 2016, 2020). analytical framework haacke (2009) categorised cooperation into two broad forms: ‘dialogue’ and ‘practical’ cooperation. ‘dialogue’ refers to forms of security cooperation centred on the routine sharing of experiences, often with the goal of confidence-building. in some circumstances, ‘dialogue’ forms of security cooperation often generate outcomes in the form of statements, ranging from affirmation of pre-existing commonly agreed principles, pledges or plans for further cooperation, to definitive joint statements. among the three institutions, ‘dialogue’-based security cooperation generally take the form of routine meetings or workshops. ‘practical’ cooperation explicitly refers to tangible results in information-sharing initiatives, field exercises, tabletop exercise, or related capacity-building exercises. workshops which do not incorporate field activities are instead categorised as ‘dialogue’ activities. second, a temporal dimension to the previous categorisation is added. this allows further distinction between routine activities, such as annual meetings or periodical workshops, and incidental activities, such as a one-off joint naval exercise or a thematic workshop. dialogue practical incidental a form of dialogue that only occurs once. this category also covers special events, such as the bali concord. (d-i) practical security cooperation that only occurs once, with low prospect of recurrence, such as a one-off instance of a naval exercise. (p-i) sustained a form of dialogue that occurs on a routine and sustained basis. this category covers the routine meetings conducted within the forums. (d-s) practical security cooperation that is routine and sustained or has occurred once with high prospects of recurrence. (p-s) figure 1 categorisation of cooperative activities, modified from haacke, 2009. the distinction between ‘dialogue’ and ‘practical’ is not mutually exclusive. in some cases, practical security cooperation first requires robust dialogue processes. these are usually required to coordinate logistical needs and the intended objectives of the exercise. second, some workshops, which ought to fall under the ‘dialogue’ category, do involve a form of ‘practical’ activity, such as table-top exercises. the cooperative activity will be classified as ‘practical’ in the case where table-top exercises constitute the bulk of the activity. 30 prerequisites maritime security cooperation methodology in gathering the data on instances of maritime security cooperation, this paper refers to official data on maritime security cooperative activities from relevant asean sources, such as the asean website, arf ism-ms co-chair reports, the admm website, and other official sources related to asean bodies. official data is then cross-referenced with relevant press releases or publicly available news to further identify the nature of the cooperative activity. once identified, the cooperative activity is then subjected to categorization based on figure 1. the frequency of cooperative activities is then presented in a simple clustered bar graph. additional details of activities are provided in tables. discussion and analysis the asean regional forum (arf) the arf was one of the forerunners in institutionalising maritime security cooperation in southeast asia. in august 2004, following their statement on maritime security, the arf conducted a roundtable discussion on the stocktaking of maritime issues. the roundtable was an attempt to generate a common understanding of maritime security among arf members. participants of the roundtable agreed on a common set of principles of maritime security, which include adherence to unclos 1982, a respect for the ‘asean way’ and the arf principles of preventive diplomacy, and the facilitation of information-sharing efforts. the roundtable also noted six lessons for maritime security cooperation, derived from the experience of the participants:1) the need for interagency technical cooperation, 2) information sharing, 3) learning of each other’s cultures, 4) the need to complement efforts instead of competing, 5) the need to implement plans, policies, and operational activities, and 6) the need for integrating training and exercise plans, standard operating procedures, education, and legal cooperation (arf, 2007). the most notable outcome of the roundtable, however, was an agreement on common maritime security concerns, which among others, included a need for increased exchanges in information-sharing capabilities and capacity-building measures. it would, however, take five more years before the arf had a platform dedicated to discussing maritime security. the intersessional meeting on maritime security (ism on ms) was formally agreed upon in the 15th arf ministerial meeting in 2008. in march 2009, the first arf intersessional meeting on maritime security (ism on ms) was held. the meeting is designed to facilitate dialogue among members and hopefully motivate members to initiate maritime security related programs. in other words, it is intended to turn dialogue into practical cooperation (haacke, 2009). the themes, or priority areas, discussed in the ism on ms are outlined in the maritime security work plan, which is updated every three years. in the most recent 2018-2020 work plan, the priority areas covered include: shared awareness and exchange of information and best practices, confidence-building measures based on international and regional legal frameworks, and capacity building and enhancing maritime law enforcement agencies (arf, 2018). several notable discussions that have occurred in the ism on ms include finding common ground on legal interpretations; journal of asean studies 31 informational exchange and interagency cooperation; safety at sea; and coordination between regional maritime law enforcement agencies and existing maritime security initiatives (see table 1). table 1. selected discussions in ism on ms, 2009-2019 based on co-chair summary reports. priority areas examples common ground on interpretation of legal regimes • discussions on the principle of freedom of navigation in the eez (1st meeting, 2009). • development of a cooperative regional system to enforce implementation of international conventions such as colregs and solas, along with bilateral recognition of rules and a standard of behaviour at sea (7th meeting, 2015). information sharing schemes • possibility for mechanisms and procedures for sharing classified information on potential maritime security threats (4th meeting, 2012) • the use of information sharing centres to provide vital information on illegal activities at sea (10th meeting, 2018). confidence building measures • continuation of confidence building measures in enhancing maritime domain awareness (10th meeting, 2018) capacity-building and technical cooperation • prospects of operationalising a regional coast guard (4th meeting, 2012). • increasing capacity to effectively combat iuu fishing (10th meeting, 2018). key outcomes of the ism on ms the ism on ms has produced three work plans on maritime security, which provide a common point of reference for maritime security issues deemed important to the member states. in general, the work plans encourage members states to propose relevant projects, such as capacity-building workshops, table-top or field exercises, training, and studies on selected aspects of maritime security related to the priority areas defined by the work plan. since the first work plan in 2011, these priority areas have remained consistent. the activities of the ism on ms are largely dialogue-based, though several workshops may provide skills training. meetings are centred on general discussions and updates of the work plan, whereas workshops prioritise sharing of information and experience. practical cooperation tends to be rare (see table 2 and chart 1). the only arf-sponsored event involving practical cooperation was the maritime shore exercise. in the 2006 concept paper, proposed by singapore, the exercise would be an ‘important step forward following the successful dialogues on maritime security’ (arf, 2006). the exercise, conducted on 22-23 january 2007, included professional exchanges between maritime security agencies of the participants, both simulation and table-top exercises, and a tactical trainer exercise (mindef, 2007). another workshop was conducted in 2019, but the scale was less ambitious compared 32 prerequisites maritime security cooperation to the 2007 shore exercise. the exercise, dubbed the ‘arf workshop and tabletop exercise on crimes related to fisheries’, was proposed by indonesia with the u.s. as a co-chair. the aim was to ‘develop a common understanding of the serious nature and extent of criminal offences’ in the fisheries sector. like other workshops considered and endorsed by the ism on ms, the workshop aimed to facilitate experience and expertise sharing and capacity building (arf, 2019). there is also a tendency for initially thematic dialogue-based activities to be continued in the later years, such as the workshop on ferry safety and on unclos, which may hint towards more specialised practical cooperation between member states. table 2 list of track 1 activities related to maritime security. full dataset (until 2019) available online at http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/list-ofarf-track-i-activities-by-inter-sessional-year-as-of-10-dec-2019.pdf. activities in 2020 from http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/calendar-of-events/schedule-of-arf-meetings-andactivities/ name of event/activity date and location held meeting of specialist officials on maritime issues honolulu, 5 november 1998 arf workshop on maritime security challenges mumbai, 27 feb – 1 march 2003 arf workshop on maritime security kuala lumpur, 22-24 september 2004 arf cbm on regional cooperation in maritime security singapore, 2-4 march 2005 workshop on training for the cooperative maritime security kochi, india 26-28 october 2005 workshop on capacity building of maritime security tokyo, 19-20 december 2005 maritime security shore exercise planning conference singapore, 7-8 december 2006 maritime security shore exercise singapore, 22-23 january 2007 arf roundtable discussion on stocktaking of maritime security issues bali, 24-25 august 2007 arf maritime security training programme chennai, 24-29 march 2008 second (advanced) maritime security training programme for arf member states chennai, 17-22 november 2008 1st arf intersessional meeting on maritime security (ism on ms) surabaya, 5-6 march 2009 arf seminar on measures to enhance maritime security brussels, 19-20 november 2009 2nd arf ism on ms auckland, 29-30 march 2010 3rd arf ism on ms tokyo, 14-15 february 2011 arf seminar on un convention on the law of the sea (unclos) manila, 8-9 march 2011 4th arf ism on ms san francisco, 14-15 june 2012 arf workshop on shop profiling kuala lumpur, 14-15 april 2013 5th arf ism on ms seoul, 18-19 april 2013 arf maritime security workshop on marine environmental protection cooperation: preparedness and response to pollution incidents involving hazardous and noxious substances honolulu, 4-5 march 2014 6th arf ism on ms bali, 22-23 may 2014 2nd arf seminar on unclos manila, 28-29 may 2014 7th arf ism on ms honolulu, 30 march – 1 april 2015 arf workshop on maritime risks management and cooperation beijing, 13-15 december 2015 arf workshop on marine oil spill emergency response management and disposal cooperation kunming, 17-18 december 2015 8th arf ism on ms manila, 6-7 april 2016 arf workshop on illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing bali, 20-21 april 2016 arf workshop on national maritime single point of contact cebu, 28-29 april 2016 arf capacity building workshop on ship profiling kuala lumpur, 24-25 may 2016 arf workshop on management of marine hazards in the asia-pacific beijing, 6-8 december 2016 9th arf ism on ms tokyo, 8-9 february 2017 http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/list-of-arf-track-i-activities-by-inter-sessional-year-as-of-10-dec-2019.pdf http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/list-of-arf-track-i-activities-by-inter-sessional-year-as-of-10-dec-2019.pdf http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/calendar-of-events/schedule-of-arf-meetings-and-activities/ http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/calendar-of-events/schedule-of-arf-meetings-and-activities/ journal of asean studies 33 table 2 list of track 1 activities related to maritime security. full dataset (until 2019) available online at http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/list-ofarf-track-i-activities-by-inter-sessional-year-as-of-10-dec-2019.pdf. activities in 2020 from http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/calendar-of-events/schedule-of-arf-meetings-andactivities/ (continued) name of event/activity date and location held arf workshop on ferry safety guangzhou, 12-13 december 2017 1st arf workshop on enhancing regional maritime law enforcement cooperation nha trang, 18-19 january 2018 arf workshop on international cooperation on maritime domain awareness tokyo, 7-8 march 2018 10th arf ism on ms brisbane, 27-28 march 2018 arf workshop on best practices in using maritime data to combat transnational organized crime bali, 17-19 july 2018 2nd arf workshop on ferry safety guangzhou, 26-28 november 2018 1st arf workshop on implementing unclos and other international instruments to address emerging maritime issues nha trang, 26-27 february 2019 11th arf ism on ms da nang, 14-15 march 2019 2nd arf workshop on enhancing regional maritime law enforcement cooperation da nang, 25-26 march 2019 arf workshop and table-top exercise on enhancing law enforcement, preventive measures and cooperation to address complex issues in the fisheries sector bali, 26-28 june 2019 2nd arf workshop on implementing unclos and other international instruments to address emerging maritime issues hanoi, 13-14 november 2019 3rd arf workshop on ferry safety guangzhou, 12-13 november 2019 2nd arf workshop on international cooperation on maritime domain awareness tokyo, 20 february 2020 arf workshop on dispute resolution and the law of the sea dili, 27-28 february 2020 12th arf ism on ms spain, to be conducted in intersessional year 2019-2020 3rd arf workshop on enhancing regional maritime law enforcement cooperation spain, to be conducted in intersessional year 2019-2020 arf workshop on maritime law enforcement promoting comprehensive approach to address maritime crimes kuala lumpur, to be conducted in intersessional year 2019-2020 international ship and port facility security code training series and manual part 1 papua new guinea, to be conducted in intersessional year 2019-2020 international ship and port facility security code training series and manual part 2 mumbai, to be conducted in intersessional year 2019-2020 international ship and port facility security code training series and manual part 3 manila, to be conducted in intersessional year 2019-2020 http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/list-of-arf-track-i-activities-by-inter-sessional-year-as-of-10-dec-2019.pdf http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/list-of-arf-track-i-activities-by-inter-sessional-year-as-of-10-dec-2019.pdf http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/calendar-of-events/schedule-of-arf-meetings-and-activities/ http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/calendar-of-events/schedule-of-arf-meetings-and-activities/ 34 prerequisites maritime security cooperation chart 1. frequency of maritime security cooperation activities in the arf, 2003-2020. (*) indicates a year where data for activities that have yet to be conducted despite being planned for the specified year, and as such, the character of those activities cannot be precisely determined. the asean defence ministers meeting (admm) the admm was established in 2006 as the highest meeting of defence officials in asean. prior to the admm, the arf was the preferred venue for asean defence officials to convene, albeit informally, under the arf defence officers dialogue and arf security policy conference. outside of the arf, asean already had numerous venues for defence officials to interact. the asean special senior officials’ meeting (som) had provided a venue for the meeting of defence officials since 1996, and military-to-military interactions, including intra-asean military exercises, which had already been conducted since as early as 1972, in addition to specialised fora, such as the asean navy interaction and the asean chiefs of defence informal meeting (chalermpalanupap, 2011; tan, 2016). given these modalities, the admm seemed like a logical next step for asean multilateral security cooperation. there were concerns that the arf would not be wellequipped to address rising challenges, particularly the emergence of china. asean members particularly recognised the inherent limitations of the arf’s institutional design; its diverse membership meant that much time had to be spent on confidence-building and addressing diverging perceptions on the idea of ‘preventive diplomacy’, which leaves less time for exploring practical security cooperation (tang, 2016; yuzawa, 2006). at the same time, discussions of advancing the vision of an asean security community, initiated by the bali concord ii and further elaborated in the vientiane action programme, provided a push for developing intramural security cooperation. this was also in light of mounting security challenges faced by the region, such as terrorism and maritime piracy (ba, 2017). the admm-plus would later be established to include asean dialogue partners. the goal of the admm and admm-plus is similar to that of the arf; namely, to promote 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 2 0 1 2 2 0 1 3 2 0 1 4 2 0 1 5 2 0 1 6 2 0 1 7 2 0 1 8 2 0 1 9 2 0 2 0 * m a r i t i m e s e c u r i t y c o o p e r at i o n i n t h e a r f d-i d-s p-i p-s journal of asean studies 35 cooperation and dialogue on both traditional and non-traditional security issues in southeast asia. however, the admm and admm-plus are more equipped for implementing practical cooperation on top of their dialogue function. this is achieved through three methods. first, the agenda is set by defence ministers and officials instead of foreign ministers. second, the admm-plus makes extensive use of expert working groups (ewgs), which allows for a ‘focused, task-oriented approach to security cooperation’ that involves technicians rather than diplomats. third, admm-plus membership is much more selective. in addition to the ten asean member states, the admm-plus only admits eight external dialogue partners. the smaller membership pool helps reduce friction in deciding and implementing programs (ba, 2017, pp. 150–152). at the core of the admm-plus are the ewgs, which are specialised sub-units that work to provide and proposals to the admm. there are several ewgs, each dealing with a specific area in a similar fashion to the arf intersessional meetings. table 3 lists the relevant activities of the ewg on maritime security. table 3. list of track 1 activities by the admm and admm-plus related to maritime security, up until 2019. available online: https://admm.asean.org/index.php/events/pastmeetings-and-events.html. data for 2020 is unavailable as the ewg on ms has no scheduled meetings or activities. name of event/activity date and location held 1st admm-plus ewg on maritime security australia, 19-20 july 2011 2nd admm-plus ewg on maritime security malaysia, 8-10 february 2012 3rd admm-plus ewg on maritime security and tabletop exercise (ttx) japan, 17-20 july 2012 4th admm-plus ewg on maritime security australia, 26-28 november 2012 5th admm-plus ewg on maritime security and mid-planning conference for the admm-plus maritime security field training exercise (ftx) penang, 27-30 may 2013 final planning conference for the admm-plus maritime security ftx sydney, 27 june 2013 final site survey for the admm-plus maritime security ftx indonesia, 13-15 august 2013 6th admm-plus ewg on maritime security sydney, 30 september – 1 october 2013 7th admm-plus ewg on maritime security and maritime security seminar melaka, 23-24 january 2014 8th admm-plus ewg on maritime security and workshop on counterpiracy operations auckland, 23-26 june 2014 9th admm-plus ewg on maritime security and ttx brunei darussalam, 27-31 october 2014 initial planning conference of admm-plus maritime security and counterterrorism exercise brunei darussalam, 2-6 february 2015 admm-plus ewg on maritime security future leaders’ programme auckland, 13-17 september 2015 10th admm-plus ewg on maritime security auckland, 15-16 september 2015 middle planning conference of admm-plus maritime security and counterterrorism exercise singapore, 19-22 october 2015 initial planning conference for the admm-plus field training exercise on maritime security "exercise mahi tangaroa" brunei darussalam ,27-28 january 2016 final planning conference for the admm-plus maritime security and counter-terrorism exercise singapore, 1-3 march 2016 admm-plus maritime security and counter-terrorism exercise brunei darussalam and singapore, 2-12 may 2016 final planning conference for the admm-plus field training exercise on maritime security "exercise mahi tangaroa" auckland, 23-26 may 2016 https://admm.asean.org/index.php/events/past-meetings-and-events.html https://admm.asean.org/index.php/events/past-meetings-and-events.html 36 prerequisites maritime security cooperation table 3. list of track 1 activities by the admm and admm-plus related to maritime security, up until 2019. available online: https://admm.asean.org/index.php/events/pastmeetings-and-events.html. data for 2020 is unavailable as the ewg on ms has no scheduled meetings or activities. (continued) name of event/activity date and location held 11th admm-plus ewg on maritime security auckland, 13-16 november 2016 admm-plus field training exercise on maritime security “exercise mahi tangaroa” auckland, 13-16 november 2016 12th admm-plus ewg on maritime security 1-3 november 2017 ad hoc working group meeting and initial planning conference on the asean-china maritime exercise singapore, 25-27 april 2018 13th admm-plus ewg on maritime security seoul, 30 may – 1 june 2018 admm-plus experts' working group on maritime security future leaders' programme singapore, 17-21 june 2018 asean-china maritime exercise middle planning conference zhanjiang, china, 3-6 july 2018 asean-china maritime exercise final planning conference and table-top exercise singapore, 1-3 august 2018 asean-china maritime exercise field training exercise zhanjiang, china, 20-28 october 2018 admm-plus experts' working group on maritime security table-top exercise and middle planning conference singapore, 13-16 november 2018 ad hoc working group meetings on the guidelines for maritime interaction and principles for admm-wide education and training exchanges manila, 19-23 november 2018 asean-united states maritime exercise initial planning conference singapore, 26 april 2019 admm-plus experts’ working group on maritime security and field training exercise busan, 29 april – 13 may 2019 asean-united states maritime exercise final planning conference pattaya, 11-12 july 2019 asean-us maritime exercise thailand and singapore, 1-7 september 2019 admm-plus experts’ working group on maritime security future leaders’ programme seoul and busan, 2-7 september 2019 chart 2. maritime security cooperation activities in the admm and admm-plus, 2011-2019. 0 1 2 3 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 maritime security cooperation in the admm-plus ewg on ms di ds pi ps https://admm.asean.org/index.php/events/past-meetings-and-events.html https://admm.asean.org/index.php/events/past-meetings-and-events.html journal of asean studies 37 the admm and admm-plus have hosted many workshops on maritime security, particularly in maritime security cooperation and capacity building. the admm-plus have also shown to excel in coordinating practical cooperation compared to the arf. in 2016, for example, the admm-plus managed to organise counterpiracy workshops, maritime security tabletop exercises, the maritime security future leaders programme, the joint admm-plus maritime and security and counter terrorism exercise and the mahi tangaroa field training exercise. the most notable achievements of the admm are the initiation of two large-scale maritime exercises with both china and the us in 2018 and 2019, respectively. the first maritime exercise with china was held in two stages: a table-top exercise held in singapore in august, followed by a field training exercise in the waters east of zhanjiang. singapore, thailand, vietnam, brunei, and the philippines sent vessels, while indonesia, malaysia, cambodia, and myanmar observed. the field exercises included search-and-rescue and medical evacuation drills based on the code of unplanned encounters at sea (cues). the asean-u.s. maritime exercise (aumx) took place in september 2019. while the u.s. has maintained maritime security cooperation with individual asean members through bilateral initiatives such as the carat exercises, the 2019 aumx represented the u.s.’s first attempt at engaging with all asean member states simultaneously (parameswaran, 2018). the asean maritime forum (amf) and expanded asean maritime forum (eamf) the vientiane action programme planned for the eventual creation of an asean maritime forum as a means to promote regional maritime security cooperation, a goal which was further emphasised in the apsc blueprint. hitherto, asean lacked a specialised intramural forum for discussing maritime security issues, as maritime problems would often be discussed in conjunction with other sectoral bodies, such as the asean ministers meeting on transnational crime and the asean environment ministers meeting. in september 2007, indonesia hosted a workshop on the concept of the amf, resulting in the concept paper on the establishment of an asean maritime forum, which was proposed to the asean senior officer meeting in may 2008. a year later, the concept paper was adopted and in 2010, the inaugural amf was held in surabaya. it would be the only intramural asean forum where maritime security issues could be discussed comprehensively based on asean principles (rijal, 2019). though the amf was intended to be an intramural forum for building maritime security cooperation, there was support for its expansion. at the 6th east asia summit in 2011, japan proposed to expand the amf to include asean dialogue partners (midford, 2015). the idea was endorsed by asean leaders, noting that the expanded dialogue would allow members to ‘utilize opportunities and address common challenges on maritime issues’. in october 2012, the inaugural eamf was held. the forum exchanged views on the relevance of unclos, maritime connectivity and capacity building, infrastructure upgrading, seafarers training, marine environment protection, promotion of eco-tourism and fisheries regime in east asia, and identifying best practices. as of 2020, there have been ten amf and eight eamf meetings. the main topics of discussion are summarised in table 4. 38 prerequisites maritime security cooperation table 4. summary of amf and eamf meetings. compiled by author from press releases, open-source news, government statements, and conference reports. issues discussed 1st amf in surabaya, indonesia, 28 – 29 july 2010 maritime connectivity maritime security problems search and rescue future work of the amf, including updating the amf concept paper, identifying topics and plans for future amf meetings, and exploring avenues for concrete maritime cooperation (ministry of foreign affairs of indonesia, 2010). 2nd amf in pattaya, thailand, 17 – 19 august 2011 safety and security of sea lanes of communication (sloc) in southeast asia maritime domain awareness regional maritime cooperation in search and rescue future work of the amf, including stocktaking of issues and implementation of sloc safety, maritime domain awareness, and maritime cooperation (permal, 2011). 3rd amf in manila,3-4 october 2012 maritime security and cooperation in asean freedom and safety of navigation, and addressing sea piracy in the high seas protecting marine environment and promoting eco-tourism and fisheries regime future work of the amf (asean, 2012) 1st eamf in manila, 5 october 2012 relevance of unclos maritime connectivity and capacity building infrastructure and equipment upgrading seafarers’ training proposal protection of marine environment promotion of eco-tourism and fisheries regime identification of best practices of cooperation (asean, 2012) 4th amf in malaysia, 1 – 2 october 2013 enhancing maritime cooperation fostering sectoral coordination and cooperation within asean, mostly centred on the need to reduce operational redundancies between the amf and asean sectoral bodies, and discussions of a possible reporting mechanism. future work of the amf (briefing on the outcomes of the 4th asean maritime forum and 2nd expanded asean maritime forum by malaysia, 2014) 2nd eamf in malaysia, 3 october 2013 promoting maritime cooperation between asean and dialogue partners. endorsed u.s. initiative of civilian asean seafarer training. discussion on freedom of navigation in the eez some discussions on the south china sea (briefing on the outcomes of the 4th asean maritime forum and 2nd expanded asean maritime forum by malaysia, 2014) journal of asean studies 39 table 4. summary of amf and eamf meetings. compiled by author from press releases, open-source news, government statements, and conference reports. (continued) issues discussed 5th amf and 3rd eamf in da nang, vietnam, 26 – 28 august 2014 evaluation of implementation of initiatives proposed in previous for a future work for the amf and eamf experience sharing in marine research, disaster response, maritime security and connectivity, search and rescue, and prevention and managements of incidents at sea (da nang today, 2014). 6th amf and 4th eamf in manado, indonesia, 9-10 september 2015 regional regimes on marine resources enhancement of maritime cooperation regional maritime security challenges (badan keamanan laut, 2015) 7th amf and 5th eamf in jakarta, indonesia, 6 – 7 december 2017 advancing cooperation in maritime safety, such as in search and rescue and prevention of incidents at sea countering piracy, iuu fishing, and human trafficking protection of marine environment: reducing pollution and coastal management (setnas asean indonesia, 2017) 8th amf and 6th eamf in manila, 6-7 december 2018 maritime security and safety maritime environment protection future work of the amf and eamf (ministry of foreign affairs of japan, 2018) 9th amf and 7th eamf in da nang, vietnam, 5-6 december 2019 maritime security and safety search and rescue and anti-piracy combating illegal fishing promoting environmental protection and dealing with plastic waste (da nang today, 2019) 10th amf and 8th eamf in hanoi, vietnam, 12-13 december 2020 addressed ‘emerging challenges’ at sea need to take steps to ‘enhance information exchange and coordination’ ‘promoting links between strategies and initiatives on maritime cooperation’ support for the asean outlook on the indo-pacific (viet nam news, 2020). discussion comparing the arf, admm, and amf: a thematic analysis the arf ism on ms and amf (along with the eamf) tend to be heavily processoriented, resulting in a format which privileges dialogue and agenda-setting over practical acts of cooperation. granted, a degree of dialogue is necessary to facilitate smoother cooperation in the future and to allow states to progress at a comfortable pace, especially in a setting where member states have divergent threat perceptions and preferred approaches to maritime security cooperation. in this respect, these institutions fulfil their intended purpose, as it provides a meeting point where these differences may be discussed, and common ground be found. however, as yuzawa (2006) rightly observed, uniting the divergent and often opposing perceptions of arf members (particularly on preventive diplomacy) is often labour-intensive. the intergovernmental nature of the organisation also adds to the high possibility of discussions 40 prerequisites maritime security cooperation becoming stalled, either intentionally or unintentionally. critics of these processes have pointed out the relatively lacklustre stream of practical output as evidence of either failure or a lack of value of these institutions. an oft-repeated criticism levied on the arf is that it is a ‘talk shop’ with limited means of delivering results (see, for example, garofano, 1999). proponents of the arf process point out that the forum was never intended to act as a sort of hub where practical maritime security cooperation was the main goal. as katsumata (2006) writes, the arf should be considered as a ‘norm brewery’ in the asia pacific, as it allows member states to develop and practice relevant norms in security cooperation. in this sense, the constant stream of dialogue-based outcomes of the ism on ms ought to be viewed as a positive sign of the arf’s relevance. as the data shows, though the arf has indeed been engaged in more sustained dialogue, this does not necessarily translate to more sustained practical cooperation in maritime security. this is consistent with the conclusions of previous research on the arf (haacke, 2009; mak, 2010). in fact, the more intricate practical cooperation initiatives, such as regional information-sharing and naval and field exercises, are often practiced outside of the arf. the admm and admm-plus demonstrate a refinement of promoting and institutionalising maritime security cooperation beyond the bilateralism that characterised asean security (usually military-to-military) cooperation in the 1970s to 1990s. having learned from the pitfalls of the arf, the admm-plus actively sought to limit its membership, reducing the probability of friction due to divergent threat perceptions and interests. as dialogue partner members are required to have ‘significant interactions and relations with asean defence establishments’ and must show commitment to be ‘able to work with the admm to build capacity so as to enhance regional security in substantive manner’ with admm members prior to their acceptance into the admm-plus, the admm-plus can dedicate more time to addressing practical solutions instead of building trust through exchanges and dialogue (chalermpalanupap, 2011). in a way, the previous ‘informal luncheons’, which then evolved into the arf defence officials dialogue, provided the foundation the admm-plus needed to expedite the implementation of practical cooperation (tan, 2012, p. 242). in other words, though still being process-oriented, the admm-plus is also more outcome-oriented compared to the arf and amf, as the formal working group setting allows the admm-plus members to quickly formulate plans of cooperation in multiple areas. while the admm and admm-plus have indeed contributed much to advancing practical security cooperation, they have also been criticised of being exclusively focused on non-traditional maritime security issues. the primary scope of the ewg on ms continues to be issues of maritime piracy, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and counterterrorism. the non-traditional focus prevents deeper discussion and preparation on other, often pressing traditional maritime security issues which would require a higher degree of operational sophistication in the maritime domain, such as the south china sea dispute (mukherjee, 2013; tan, 2017; tang, 2016). in addition, as the admm-plus programmes continue to increase in complexity and intensity, tan (2020, p. 37) fears members may suffer from ‘participant fatigue’. in the long run, there are concerns that admm-plus members may grow disillusioned journal of asean studies 41 of the capability of the admm-plus to address ‘high politics’ issues related to the maritime domain. the amf occupies an awkward position within asean’s intricate network of maritime security cooperation, which impacts its performance. on one side, the arf continues to be the premier forum for region-wide dialogue on maritime security due to its expansive network. on the other side, the admm and admm-plus already provide platforms for practical maritime security cooperation on top of existing bilateral and ‘mini-lateral’ maritime security cooperation. the presence of the amf and its expanded version seems to be overshadowed by these existing fora. as muhibat (2017) observed, this might indicate members questioning the value of the amf and eamf as venues for maritime security cooperation, especially as other venues provide similar benefits. in addition, the amf also adds to the many annual events that asean members are already required to attend, stretching diplomatic resources thin. despite holding routine discussions, the output of the amf and eamf remains rather limited. one form of cooperation to emerge from the eamf was the first expanded asean seafarer training counter-piracy workshop, held in manila on 23-25 september 2013. the workshop was joined by all 18 eas members and resulted in numerous recommendations for increasing support and training for seafarers (eamf, 2013). as a dialogue-first and processoriented forum, the amf and eamf can only pass on these recommendations to the relevant asean sectoral bodies. implementation, then, is highly dependent on the sectoral bodies and member states. in other words, the amf and eamf may still need to carve out their own niche among the many regional platforms for cooperation within asean. does the driver matter? still along the lines of institutional design, there is an obvious difference of the main drivers involved in the three fora. in the arf and amf, the primary drivers are foreign ministers, whereas in the admm, the primary participants are defence officials. tan (2016, p. 74) points out that defence officials, with their ‘mission-mindedness and the military assets and resources at their disposal’, often perform better compared to foreign ministers. the data corroborates this observation; the practical output of the admm-plus eclipses the combined output of arf and amf. could this be attributed to the functional expertise of the drivers? there are at least two reasons to accept the hypothesis. first, asean militaries have had a long history of functional interaction. from the 1970s, security cooperation was usually centred on bilateral annual and intermittent military-to-military exercises. these exercises were deliberately kept separate from the formal multilateral channels, as foreign ministers were cautious of presenting asean as a military bloc during the cold war (chalermpalanupap, 2011, p. 19). these military-tomilitary interactions were then integrated within the asean framework in the 2000s, as asean defence officials were provided with specific sub-regional umbrellas to conduct cooperation. it stands to reason that this prolonged period of cooperation, free from the constraints of regional diplomacy, has provided asean militaries with the modalities to 42 prerequisites maritime security cooperation formulate security cooperation at a pace comfortable to all. second, foreign ministers tend to be overtly bound by the formalities attached with regional diplomacy and national interests, whereas defence officials tend to take a pragmatic approach to security cooperation, albeit still within the constraints of regional and national preferences. these different approaches may be observed within the arf and admm. advancements of maritime security cooperation in the arf tend to be hindered by an aversion to overt military-to-military exercises, which were deemed ‘unfeasible’ by the foreign ministers of the arf (tan, 2016, p. 74). this may stem from the arf’s emphasis on respecting sovereignty and a lack of interoperability among arf militaries (haacke, 2009, p. 445). in stark contrast, the admm-plus, defence officials were quick to discuss and plan exercise mahi tangaroa in 2016, requiring only eleven months from discussion to implementation. practical cooperation guided by preferences? despite these trends towards deeper formalization of maritime security cooperation at the multilateral level, most of the practical maritime security cooperation in southeast asia occurs outside the purview of asean-related institutions. the data in the previous section is limited to intra-asean practical maritime security cooperation; however, asean members have long cooperated with extra-regional powers in maritime security. the united states, for example, continues to provide capacity building, training, and funding through its southeast asia maritime security initiative (which was renamed the ‘indo-pacific maritime security initiative’ during the trump administration). since 1995, the united states has been carrying out the cooperation afloat readiness and training and southeast asia cooperation against terrorism (seacat) exercises, which provide training and capacity building in counterpiracy and counterterrorism. likewise, japan has made significant contributions to southeast asian states in the form of technical assistance, capacity building, and funding, mostly under the recaap framework (llewelyn, 2017; son, 2013). asean members also sometimes resort to intra-regional cooperative options outside the institutional boundaries of asean. one notable example is the trilateral patrols in the sulu sea (modelled after the malacca strait patrols), launched by indonesia, malaysia, and the philippines in 2017 in response to rising levels of transnational crime. the initial idea for the patrols was proposed in as early as may 2016 and formal operations began in june 2017. though not having to go through the complex bureaucracy of asean, the delay in the implementation was caused by sovereignty concerns and logistical constraints between the three parties (storey, 2018). these examples may indicate that a ‘mini-lateral’ approach to maritime security cooperation may be preferable to asean members, particularly if asean members were to increase cooperation to include more contentious regional issues (heydarian, 2017). journal of asean studies 43 conclusion this paper sought to expand on haacke’s initial observation that security cooperation in asean was more dialogue-oriented compared to being practical, although there is a slight positive trend towards more practical forms of cooperation. the review of the activities and outcomes of the arf ism on ms, the admm and admm-plus ewg on maritime security, and the amf and eamf generally supports haacke’s observation. among asean institutions, maritime security cooperation is largely dialogue-based in the form of routine dialogues and periodic thematic workshops designed to increase the capacity of relevant state maritime security agencies. practical cooperation, however, remains few and far between, particularly in the arf and amf, due to the respective organisational design and purposes. the notable exception is the admm-plus, which has been shown to be capable of organising sustained feats of practical maritime security cooperation among asean members and nonasean members. from 2003 onwards, asean decided to focus on maritime security as a problem to be handled collectively, which necessitated a more formal, institutionalised approach to solving the maritime security problems. the institutionalisation of maritime security is reflected in the further specialisation of multilateral fora within the asean framework, namely the arf, admm, and amf. these three institutions have their respective strengths and weaknesses in promoting maritime security cooperation, many of which stem from their institutional purposes and design. at the core of these weaknesses are divergent perceptions of maritime security. in these regional institutions, which are well-designed to promote confidence-building and dialogue, opposing views often require a lot of time to reach an operational level of accommodation before action is taken. as a result, the outcomes of these institutions are mostly dialogue and exchanges, with more concrete, practical forms of cooperation being few and far between, and often conducted outside the confines of regional institutions. as regional institutions remain hamstrung in promoting practical maritime security cooperation, further research might be interested in investigating the ‘mini-lateral’ turn in maritime security cooperation, particularly its proposed benefits and drawbacks compared to multilateralism. additionally, future research may choose to investigate the divergent perceptions between the foreign policy elite with the defence officials, which have been hypothesized to affect institutional preferences. about the authors i gusti bagus dharma agastia is an assistant professor at the international relations study programme at president university. 44 prerequisites maritime security cooperation references acharya, a. 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today. the post-world war ii era brought a fresh start to a new chapter of dispute, as china, taiwan, vietnam, the philippines, malaysia, and brunei darussalam laid their claims one by one. this study contends that under suharto’s iron fist rule, indonesia’s interest to the south china sea dispute grew from maintaining indonesia’s territorial integrity to maintaining domestic stability. the former took shape after being threatened by china’s map which claimed a part of the former’s territorial waters, while the later grew in through establishing deeper trade cooperation with china. despite the half-hearted normalization with china, indonesia managed to establish a track-two forum for parties involved in the south china sea dispute, which is later proven to be instrumental. under president yudhoyono, indonesia gradually played its initial role from a passive into an active honest broker, which brought improvements to the process. this research attempts to show that constraint to indonesia’s role in the south china sea dispute originates from both the ideological and historical factors. indonesia’s long-running ideological constraints set its priorities to its interest to the dispute, while its foreign policy doctrine serves as a pragmatic means to achieve its goals of interests. indonesia’s past relationship with china also played a part in influencing indonesia’s response which later evolved as the relations went through ups and downs. moreover, the unclear integration process of asean sets the task of the honest broker became a onecountry-show for indonesia. key words: south china sea, dispute, indonesia, china, asean introduction the south china sea (scs) dispute ensued as a result of inter-overlapping territorial claims from brunei darussalam, china, malaysia, the philippines, taiwan, and vietnam. although the dispute may have developed into a complex phenomenon of what it is today, it actually started as a result of an even more complex 2 indonesia’s response in the south china sea disputes occurring which directly or indirectly involved a lot more states. simply put, the dispute is a situation which serves as an outcome of an ongoing interaction among the entities in perceiving their territories. although it may give less weight from the international legal perspective, we may trace the beginning of the dispute through extensive chronological review of any recorded activities in the scs, dating from as early as the ancient times to give a better understanding of the situation which lead to the one we currently see today. another way to trace the origins of the dispute is to selectively present the historical records which suggest that there were any indication of dispute among two or more parties to the area. this study investigates reaction of the indonesian government and what may cause that reaction since the authoritarian soeharto until the democratic regime of susilo b. yudhoyono. this study found that indonesia’s response to scs dispute during the new order era grew from maintaining over territorial integrity to actively accommodate peaceful talks between claimant countries in the reform era which might reflect indonesia’s growing interests of the dispute itself or parties to the dispute. it was steadily developing from a simpler honest broker role into an active bridge builder, and ultimately holds asean’s leadership in preserving interregional peace and stability. this article will discuss the issue in two consecutive sections: the new order era and the reform era. the following section discusses and analyzes indonesia’s response to the scs dispute during the suharto era and how the archipelagic country conveyed its interests into policies to maintain the dispute. next, it will discuss indonesia’s foreign policy during the reform and democratic era, and how the transformation alluded indonesia’s foreign policy with the country’s ongoing response to the scs dispute in particular. indonesia’s response to the south china sea dispute during suharto’s period indonesia and the normalization of the diplomatic relations with china suharto’s reign to power marks the era called the ‚new order‛ for indonesia. the dichotomy was created to serve as a distinction from the era where sukarno ruled indonesia for more than two decades, which is dubbed as ‚old order‛. this means aside from suharto as the new head of state, the ‚new‛ terminology also brought new faces in indonesian sociopolitical life, which in turn brought indonesia to a new style of leadership. the leadership, where suharto remained in the center, was an alliance of the armed forces, intellectuals, religious groups, and political parties, under the political system known as the pancasila democracy. by utilizing such a system that knows no opposition, suharto had the complete control of indonesia’s domestic and foreign policies. during suharto’s rule from 1968 until 1998, the foreign policy of indonesia claimed the neutral posture of free and active principal inherited from the previous reign. in practice, suharto’s foreign policy was stealthily sided with the western bloc as an attempt to distance indonesia from the communist world and while gaining financial and technical assistance from the western bloc. new order indonesia’s 3 journal of asean studies economy was engineered by the westerncentric economists, while the country’s defense assets were geared by arms imported from nato countries. this postsukarno indonesia also foresaw the founding of asean with southeast asian countries and the suspension of diplomatic relations with communist china. the scs dispute was initially not of indonesia’s concern since the focus of suharto was building indonesia’s economy which was torn by inflation in the mid1960s, however at a certain point indonesia decided to involve itself to the dispute as a response. in the beginning, indonesia did not put much interest in international issues. like most developing countries in the world, the focus of indonesia under suharto was to rebuild the country’s economy which was collapsed under sukarno’s administration which suffered massive hyper-inflation (panglaykim & thomas, 1967). since economic recovery was the main focus of the country, suharto set up his men to formulate and carry out initiatives with the aim to recover indonesia’s economy. as a result, during the beginning of suharto’s tenure indonesia’s foreign policy was aimed at achieving national economic recovery. suharto’s plan to rebuild the economy was carried out with the reinvigoration of the gear of production by inviting investments and capitals to indonesia. for such cause, suharto and his men began a tour with a mission to promote and introducing new investment law in indonesia to countries such as west germany and japan. the effort showed progress; in the initial phase indonesia successfully attracted foreign enterprises to establish production and extraction facilities to mine the country’s abundant natural resources with notable few including freeport-mcmoran and international nickel company (pease, 1996). to ensure the process going well as well as to ensure suharto’s regime enjoyed sustainable benefits from it, the new regime sought political stability. in fact, suharto’s leadership was well known for its high regard for stability. his quest for indonesia’s development required incessant political sustenance and social order, which in turn shaped indonesia as an inwardlooking country for at least two-thirds of new order era. suharto’s foremost concern for the stability to support indonesia’s development transformed indonesia into a pseudo-democratic country where political aspirations were limited and dissents within the society were suppressed. during his three decades of rule, suharto successfully created and instilled a stable political culture, whiles his legacy has shown as a prominent yet inspiring figure for the leaders of neighboring countries, namely mahathir mohammad of malaysia and lee kuan yew of singapore (woolcot, 2008). new order brought growth and development to indonesia, thus earned suharto’s famous nickname of ‚indonesia’s father of development‛ in the 1980s. with indonesia economy’s flourished, it became inevitable that indonesia had to expand its growth through international trade and investments to sustain its growing economy, especially when the world saw the oil crash in 1980s. during that period, suharto was trying to increase non-oil exports to be more competitive since the 4 indonesia’s response in the south china sea disputes country saw a decrease of revenue in oil sales (indonesia oil – exports, 2013). apart from making the non-oil exports more attractive, it was also logical to approach inaccessible markets to increase potential revenues. these underlying conditions then led to the re-opening trade relations of indonesia with china, which consequently paved the way to diplomatic normalization between the two countries. the normalization of the diplomatic relation between indonesia and china was seemingly something that china had been eagerly seeking. indeed, indonesia maintained the gesture of the proposed side of the offer, hinting that it was the chinese government who wished to rekindle the bilateral relations (van der kroef, 1986). as reluctant as it seem for indonesia to normalize its bilateral relationship with china, the archipelagic country needs to sustain its economic growth through the reestablishment of diplomatic relations (sukma, 2013). if the political stability of domestic was the one that ensured and sustained indonesia’s economic development of most of the time during suharto’s rule, the late 1980s saw the need of indonesia to sustain the stability through a wider economic activity (sukma, 2013). indonesia and china’s first postsukarno’s official meeting was in 1985 asian-african conference in bandung, indonesia. this meeting of suharto and the indonesian foreign minister mochtar kusumaatmadja with chinese foreign minister wu xueqian resulted in an immediate progress of the two countries which came into motion with the normalization of the trade relations in the same year (indonesia, china, to normalize, 1989). however, the talks of resuming diplomatic relations did not happen until 1989 (van der kroef, 1986), when president suharto attended the funeral of the late emperor hirohito in tokyo. during the visit suharto met chinese foreign minister qian qichen who was also attending the funeral under his capacity as a statesman. their rendezvous inevitably led to the further conversation of normalization of diplomatic relations of the two countries year (indonesia, china, to normalize, 1989). as mentioned earlier, indonesia displayed reluctance to push the normalization agenda for the process require a lot of time and preparation, but it was trade, as it was indonesia’s main interest that was pushed forward into realization almost immediately. the resumption of the trade relations between the two countries might serve as beijing’s gambit to appease suharto who was so adamant in creating an indonesia free from chinese influence for almost 20 years (van der kroef, 1986). aside from maintaining the current socio-political status quo, indonesia’s reluctance to carry out the normalization with china was partly caused by ideological reasons. indonesia sought china’s word on not to support any communism causes in indonesia. foreign minister kusumaatmadja reiterated indonesia’s prerequisite conditions to china, as not to offer any kinds of support to anything that opposes the legal government of indonesia. formally, this was interpreted as an acknowledgement of sovereignty from one country to another, a normative procedure in international relations. on the other side, this could also be interpreted as an official request from indonesia to china, not to do anything that could harm the current regime. this 5 journal of asean studies confirmed that indonesia might still bear suspicions to china. although china’s allegation of involvement in the 1965 attempted coup is still debatable, suharto has made it clear that to resume diplomatic relations with indonesia; china needs to abide by indonesia’s terms, something which china eventually acceded to despite ideological incoherencies between the chinese communist party’s ideology and the terms (van der kroef, 1986). nevertheless, the diplomatic normalization agenda was already set in motion. after the initial encounter in 1985, the process was filled with the exchanging visits of indonesian high officials to their chinese counterparts. for the second time, suharto met qian qichen when the foreign minister made an official visit to the president in jakarta. as a response, indonesia’s foreign minister ali alatas visited china later in 1990.alatas’ visit to beijing produced a communiqué of the resumption of indonesia – china’s diplomatic relations, which was then followed with chinese premier li peng’s visit to indonesia then formalized with the signing of memorandum of understanding on the resumption of diplomatic relations. indonesia and china have officially reestablished their diplomatic relations in 1990. suharto’s indonesia and its initial response to the south china sea dispute despite its non-claimant status, indonesia has been aware of the scs dispute as the clash of claims is situated in close proximity to its territorial waters. the earliest indonesia’s expressed concern of scs dispute ever documented was in 1980, when diplomatic relations with china was still frozen. at that point indonesia’s military commander, m. yusuf commented that there is a possibility of war in the scs. indonesia responded to the scs dispute in a traditional fashion: by the deployment of military might in the disputed border as it then deployed 35 battalions for military exercise within waters surrounding the natuna islands. it is worth noted that indonesia’s response to the dispute was arguably because indonesia was more concerned to its own domestic security, especially border and territorial issues which had the potential for disintegration in particular. indonesia’s involvement in international disputes was not new to suharto’s indonesia. the country has sent troops known as garuda contingents for peace keeping operations in a number of southeast asian countries. from more than 68 missions taken by the garudas, suharto’s administration had their share of at least 40 missions. it is worth noting that until the 1990s most of the contingents for peacekeeping operations were deployed to middle eastern countries, while contingents to neighboring countries such as cambodia and the philippines were sent after 1991. as conjecture it may be, these deployments of contingents showed indonesia’s grown interest and awareness in maintaining the stability of the southeast asian region, or in other words indonesia began to see the regional instabilities as threat to its national interest. but it is also important to point out that indonesia’s involvement with the garuda contingents is nothing as similar as the country’s involvement in the scs dispute where indonesia plays the role of the honest broker for southeast asian 6 indonesia’s response in the south china sea disputes countries and the diplomatically reestablished china. after the successful normalization with indonesia has taken place, china swiftly mingle itself with the southeast asian community under the asean. china became an official dialogue partner for asean after minister for foreign affairs and state councilor qian qichen attended the 24th asean foreign ministers meeting in kuala lumpur in july 1991. this turn of events brought a new air to southeast asia as this enabled both china and asean member countries to establish dialogue which was previously hampered by the tensions of cold war. unfortunately, china’s inclusion to asean’s forum did not suppress the dispute from becoming a stumbling block. aware of the brewing situation in the scs, it was in 1991 foreign minister ali alatas warned that the regional dispute could be developing into a conflict (johnson, 1997). amidst indonesia’s neutrality in the dispute, the country expressed concerns regarding the situation in scs which involved its southeast asian neighbors. this indicated that suharto’s administration recognized the scs dispute as a concern to indonesia. but what kind of threat did this dispute possess to indonesia? after all, the claims made by brunei, china, malaysia, the philippines and vietnam were revolving an area distant in proximity to indonesia. none of the islands claimed were actually owned by indonesia, so how this dispute did actually equate to indonesia’s interest? indonesia’s interest to the scs is not a single unitary factor. the archipelagic country’s interest can be interpreted into multiple factors. the first one might be related to the immediate interest of the country, which is its own territorial integrity. according to satyawan, indonesia’s national interests in the scs are security and territorial integrity, economic interest, constitution mandate and asean unity (satyawan, 2013). during a stage of suharto’s administration, indonesia shifted the course which seemed irregular to the regime’s resolve to focus on national stability. this shift was demonstrated by indonesia’s involvement in international issues such as the scs dispute. in 1993 china laid out the 9 dashed lines map and integrated it effectively as part of its national law, which covers the entire south china sea area, including the areas which the southeast asian countries claimed as theirs, and as expected, this course of action was then responded negatively from the claimant countries. at that time, indonesia as a country which held their principles with a rigorous fashion under suharto’s stern leadership, might have felt threatened by china’s unilateral actions. it has been only a few years after the diplomatic relations between indonesia and china was normalized, and seeds of wariness and uneasiness against communism were still deep-planted within indonesia’s indoctrinated society, while ethnic chinese were precariously treated as the second class buffer citizens by suharto’s regime design. indonesia in general was apparently threatened, as they were the main target of suspiciousness if there was any indication of disadvantageous scheme from china which will hurt indonesia (sukma, 1999). should any disruptions occur, this will surely bring an impact to indonesia’s stability and ultimately security. 7 journal of asean studies figure 1. the nine-dotted line map source: asia maps, the university of texas the other factor to indonesia’s interests is economy. the immediate threat to the region was caused by the nature of the dashed lines map, which included indonesia’s northwestern territory, the seas of natuna. the natuna islands area, which is rich with gas and minerals, is one of indonesia’s biggest energy assets which supply the country with abundant gas reserves and revenues from gas exports (azwar, 2013). the effect of losing such valuable territory would not only caused indonesia to suffer a major loss of potential revenues and gas reserve, but also something which generate an immense disadvantage to indonesia’s strategic policy. the scs issue is a multifaceted phenomenon to indonesia, as it does not concern only a single tangible aspect. in a strategic perspective, the logic of the scs dispute would suggest that should the southeast asian countries lost their claimed territories to china, then the risk of territorial loss for indonesia is amplified. 8 indonesia’s response in the south china sea disputes this logic is based on the domino effect and spillover effect, but rather than ideological or economical the argument is based on historical jurisprudence from the legal perspective. historical jurisprudence refers to a legal approach which considers the past legal method in resolving an issue as the evidence and legal method are used as the benchmark for resolving a similar case. should the claimant southeast asian countries lose their claimed territories to china through international legal procedures; it would possess a threat to indonesia’s legal authority over the natunas’ waters. another reason as to why indonesia refused to not taking any direct action is suharto’s high regard for stability. as a country which has enjoyed stability for more than three decades, indonesia was in the midst of developing itself into one of asia’s emerging economic powers, or commonly known as one of the ‚tigers of asia‛. indonesia’s diplomatic normalization with china was intended to sustain the domestic development of indonesia which was considered to be on the verge of ‚tinggal landas‛ or literally defined as transitioning into a developed country (harian ekonomi neraca, 2013). to associate itself among the newly emerging developing countries, indonesia felt the need to secure the stability of the region through diminishing potential threats which might arise in the coming periods. indonesia’s past hostility with china could be an even greater threat whereas the diplomatic absence was to be kept suspended while the country’s immense power continues to grow. although it is unclear whether the normalization of the diplomatic relation was also factored by the growing dispute in the scs, it is safe to assume that indonesia sought reassurance of stability from its foreign policies by neutralizing the amount of potential threat the southeast asian region could bring to the country. indonesia’s response to scs dispute: track ii diplomacy, shuttle diplomacy, and defensive posture response as the opinion of two institutions were divided: the department of foreign affairs (deplu) which leaned to the accommodation and diplomatic approach to engage china; the indonesian armed forces (abri) that preferred to terminate and sever diplomatic relations with china, the government of indonesia maintained a balance of the soft and hard approach to manage the dispute. since indonesia was reluctant to do a direct approach and mediate the dispute g-to-g, deplu sponsored a series of workshops which facilitated talks and dialogues between stakeholders of the issue. the workshop mechanism was intended to de-escalate the atmosphere which was tense from the previous standoffs. another purpose of the workshop was also to strengthen and consolidate the asean unity among member states, namely the philippines and malaysia, as the two countries not only clashed with china on the claimed territories, but also with each other. the other purpose was to bring non-member states to the dispute such as taiwan to sit together with china and discuss the issue among each other. indonesia deliberately constructed an informal workshop format so that the 9 journal of asean studies respective delegates can attend and participate with ease. participants should feel safer to engage in dialogues and exchanging views with each other since everyone attending is within their respective personal capacities. if the realist perspective perceives the security dilemma and perception of threat as something generated from the lack of communication among states, then the workshop would serve as the bridge which would close the gap of information and miscommunication, thus foster further understanding and cooperation. as it was intended, asean member countries and claimant countries were the ones who participated in this informal forum. these countries served as the main ‚pillars‛ of the workshop and addressed as supporting regional authorities (sras). the attendees of the workshop were basically divided into four classifications: the first one being the participants, who was appointed by the sras to attend under their private capacities. these participants were from various institutions such as the foreign affairs department/ministry, academicians, and representatives of private companies. the second category of the attendee was the observers. similar to the participants’ category, the observers consisted of participants that consisted of academicians and researchers, with the additions of nondiplomatic government officials, military officers, journalists, non-governmental organization (ngo) members. the third attendee category was the resource persons. the individuals belonged in this category were appointed by the committee to provide the workshop with their work and expertise, most of the times to provide points of discussions. while the last category of attendee was the committee members, mostly consisted of the individuals from the foreign affairs departments/ministries. with de-escalation as one of the workshop’s main concerns, the committee set the condition to be more conducive for discussions. for example, to avoid confrontations among the participants, the committee set the agenda of the workshop to avoid issues which are too sensitive to discuss. most the time the highlight of the discussions revolves around establishing new methods of cooperation between countries in less-political fields such as environmental protection, navigational safety, and scientific research (djalal, 2001). in line with the asean way, recommendations and conclusions of the workshops were agreed upon based on consensus and not formally enforced. should a participant disagree to a point of discussion, it should hold the discussion from having a conclusion which reflects the general idea of the discussion process. since the initiation in 1990, the workshop has been held annually. the indonesian-led workshop was considered to be successful in keeping the dispute from escalating further among claimant countries. in addition that the forum has successfully made informal discussions approach more familiar to the participants, the range of issues has also developed over the time as well. for example, after covering the basic fields of cooperation as theme of discussions for the first three workshops, the topic of discussion became more specific while the a number of aspects generated from the discussions were agreed upon and became implemented for cooperation (satyawan, 2013). 10 indonesia’s response in the south china sea disputes excerpts written by indonesia’s senior diplomat hasjim djalal entailed points of basic principles of the workshop. while the guidelines put forward principles which reflects flexibility and inclusiveness, the guidelines also mentioned that managing potential conflicts is a long term process (djalal, 2001), which then hints that it is a continuous, if not gradually improving process. indeed, aside from the workshop the senior diplomat made efforts which were known today as the shuttle diplomacy. in 1994 djalal made a series of visit to asean member countries to introduce a proposal which was later known as the ‚doughnut proposal‛. djalal proposed that the middle of south china sea which consisted of islands should be ‚negotiable for joint development‛. despite the shuttle diplomacy undertaken by djalal, the proposal was rejected by asean countries. in the mean time, indonesian armed forces responded the dispute in a more conventional way. during the past decade of the ‘90s, abri have held military trainings in the waters of the natuna islands. this military training was a reaction to china’s unilateral action in 1993 which included the natuna’s waters into their official map (republika online, 1996). dubbed as ‚loud diplomacy‛, in september 1996 indonesia deployed 40 combat aircrafts, 50 warships, and 19,500 armed personnel. while earlier in august, indonesia and malaysia had joint military exercise in the island of kalimantan. the exercises was conducted in the natuna waters under the pretext of sea as a suitable place for military exercise in larger number and gives a specific vision of defense exercise in bordering waters. (imn, 1996). but the military commander, wiranto, gave a clear message to china that the exercise is conducted within indonesia’s territorial waters and if china or any other countries considered that such activities might leave a different impression, it was entirely beyond control (imn, 1996). this suggests that the indonesian abri was fully aware with the ‚inevitable consequences‛ generated from the large scale drill; however, they still conducted the activity and exercise authority over what they believe is theirs: indonesia’s authority over the natuna islands and its adjacent waters. indonesia’s response to the south china sea dispute during the post-suharto’s period bj. habibie’s administration (1998-1999) with suharto stepping down from presidency, the plea for political reform was clear that the transitional government led by president b.j. habibie named his cabinet as the indonesian development reform cabinet. despite the lukewarm and pessimistic responses generated from the general public opinion, habibie’s administration played its part to initialize the transitional period with bringing change to indonesia’s political, social, and legal aspects as the precursor to indonesia’s democratic state. the changes brought by habibie gradually changed the face of indonesia from a centralized quasiauthoritarian state into a plethora of openness and freedom, which to an extent brought a massive hope for change that was culminated during the 1999 election. 11 journal of asean studies for certain, the change brought positive impacts to indonesians; rising transparency, accountability, and efficiency are to name a few from the positive changes brought by the ‘98 reform movement (febrian, setiadi & suprapto, 1999). but changes also brought other unwanted excess from the other side of the coin; retroactive allegations of misconducts from past suharto’s tenets, indonesia’s fading prestige and the decline of authority to other countries particularly its asean neighbors, increasing socio-political instabilities, domestic dissents and separatist movements were some of the problems indonesia faced during the reform era. indonesia sustained a major blow with the separation of timor-leste in 1999, which generated distrust among the military higher-ups to the civilian-led government, with the addition that a number the armed forces personnel were charged with the allegations of human rights abuse (o’rourke, 2002). another flaw to the administration led by habibie was the less effort made toward the reconciliation of the ethnic chinese who fled for safety after the riot broke out. an interview reflected how habibie’s view to the minority group that controlled most of indonesia’s economy as somehow ‚dispensable‛ or replaceable by people who stayed in the country (soebagjo, 2008), which might reflected how the leader’s inward looking orientation. indonesia has always been taking an inward looking orientation when it comes to foreign policy during suharto’s rule, and habibie’s era was no exception. when the wave of reform struck the country in may 1998, indonesia faced multi-dimensional crises, with monetary and social crisis to name a few. indonesia’s transitional government led by habibie focused even more on domestic issues, most of which required active and direct response as the situation regularly fluctuated. aside from established and regular day-to-day activities such as the working group on the scs, this initial reform period dramatically reduced indonesia’s active role in international relations (mulyana, 2011). the country tried to allocate more resource and effort for the national recovery of the country, consequently disabling the government to give more attention to the scs dispute. after more than three decades living under oppression of suharto, indonesia was anticipating for change and most of the energy and resources was allocated and concentrated for the 1999 general elections which marked the first post-new order election. abdurrahman wahid’s administration (1999-2001) the reform which gave rise to the demands for transparency, accountability, and good practice of politics sparked minor controversies regarding the results of the election which pitted two political party giants namely the established golkar party and the biggest challenger indonesian democratic party of struggle (pdi-p). despite the legislative victory of the pdi-p, megawati sukarnoputri did not manage to secure the presidential throne (kpu, 1999), after a grueling voting session in the house of representatives, the nadhlatul ulama leader abdurrahman wahid was elected as the president, with megawati as vice president. 12 indonesia’s response in the south china sea disputes wahid, who was popularly known with his nickname ‚gus dur‛, launched policies to recover indonesia’s post-crisistorn reputation. wahid traveled the world, one of his missions was to reach the middleeastern world, a world he was already familiar with but yet minimum in financial contribution to indonesia, to gather funds for the republic’s development (sutiono & akbar, 2001). aside from asean, he strived to bring more indonesian exposure to multilateral forums such as the developing countries (d-8) forum, the world economic forum, and world summit for social development (mulyana, 2011). although the efforts were carried out extensively, gus dur’s expectations and objectives of a number his foreign policies were never made clear. domestically, wahid made efforts to rehabilitate the victims of past regime ‚misdemeanors‛ such as political prisoners and the racially discriminated when the president lifted the communist and marxist ban from the national law, which then helped smoothed out the rocky path of ideological antagonism legacy of suharto (taufik, 2013). moreover, this move helped rectify the historical misunderstandings between indonesia and communist china which turned sour after the suspension of diplomatic relations. discussions and literatures related to the leftist ideas flourished, historical reviews and reinterpretations became a common theme in the literature and research, while the scholars and media alike are striving to find the missing links in history which can be utilized in invalidating the past in the name of uncovering the truth. as mentioned before, in addition to lifting the ideological ban gus dur helped suharto’s political prisoners and chineseindonesians in rehabilitating their names and social integrity to the society. after decades of living under racial discrimination and political oppression by the new order regime, chineseindonesians enjoy more freedom in sociopolitical fields while their dominance of the national economy proven to be resilient, despite a number of notable individuals flee the country in reaction to the civil unrest targeting the chinese-indonesians and their assets during the may ’98 riot (soebagjo, 2008). nevertheless, wahid’s efforts to integrate and rehabilitate the chineseindonesians into the society have proven to be a success, with most of sino-phobia sentiments gradually faded and for the first time the government of indonesia acknowledged the chinese racial identity as part of the national identity (taufik, 2013). over a few years after the reform, the relations of indonesia – china improved significantly. china’s great economic rise by the end of the 20th century brought the country’s influence to indonesia. paired up with the reformed indonesia which showed a friendlier face toward china, the two countries enjoyed a renewed relationship (kyodo news international, 1999). under the reform introduced by wahid, china’s influence and culture has become more acceptable and accessible; mandarin chinese language gained larger popularity as the chinese enterprises and investments grows steadily in indonesia. china itself has become one of indonesia’s biggest trading partners, (international trade center, 2015) with chinese commodities flooded indonesia’s domestic market, indonesia was also aiming at china to sell its products as the country’s growth warranted the rise of 13 journal of asean studies the middle and middle-upper class group which are known for their spending prowess. for some people, wahid’s figure was considered to be a savior with his domestic and foreign policies (cooper, 2010), but his leadership was not without criticism. despite his travels abroad which covered 90 countries, the endeavor were considered to be unnecessary while he was criticized for his negligence to domestic affairs (mares, 2002). his unconventional demeanor received mixed receptions from the public, political allies, rivals, and adversaries alike. to his critics, his behavior and policies are considered to be from erratic to absurd as they tend to be disorganized, enigmatic, and incomprehensible for general public. his non-compromise and confrontative attitude turned his allies into adversaries who would later brought his downfall by impeachment. megawati sukarnoputri’s administration (2001-2004) after wahid was impeached by the house of representatives (mpr) in 2001, indonesia’s foreign policy has taken an even improved route with megawati sukarnoputri helming the country’s presidency. started from a modest background in politics, megawati was very inexperienced when it came to foreign affairs and its policies. her grassrootsoriented political party was focusing on domestic barebones issues such as regulating basic commodity price, inflation, and infrastructure. according to sukma, megawati’s lack of vision concerning foreign affairs was a blessing in disguise for indonesia since she entrusted the diplomatic affairs to hassan wirajuda, a professional diplomat who succeeded alwi shihab as minister for foreign affairs in 2001. with wirajuda commandeering the course of indonesia’s diplomatic vessel, the country embarked for a larger role in international affairs. the indonesian foreign minister introduced the term ‚intermestic‛, a confluence between domestic and international aspects (mulyana, 2011), which means the country wanted to maintain national interests through the seamless connectivity between its domestic issues and foreign policy. in a way, the new guidance to foreign policy could be understood to improve efficiency of the foreign policies’ goals in lieu to the essential domestic needs. dissenters to the government may consider the new foreign policy jargon was created to minimize criticisms from the public which felt there was a disconnectivity between national interests and foreign policy under wahid (tribun news, 2013). this could be understood from a perspective of accountability of foreign policy, which might not bring results which were expected from the public. this could also mean that in case the public was less informed about the foreign policies, efforts could be made to help the public to obtain better understanding about the objective of indonesian foreign policies, or what the country’s foreign policies could bring to the lives of ordinary citizens. in addition to the intermestic approach, wirajuda also introduced ‚total diplomacy‛. total diplomacy is an approach of diplomacy which incorporated 14 indonesia’s response in the south china sea disputes the various elements of the society to contribute to the success of diplomacy (mulyana, 2011). in other words, total diplomacy is essentially an integrated concept of multi-track diplomacy, except instead of having the tracks reserved exclusively for the respective groups of individuals and/or institutions; the tracks are interchangeably utilized by the groups to interact which each other and ultimately contributing to the goals of the intermestic foreign policy. indonesia’s role in international forums such as asean was expanded under wirajuda’s direction. during the foreign minister’s tenure, indonesia helped to expand asean to grow into a more close-knitted community, thus the concept of asean community was born after the bali concord ii concluded (moorthy & benny, 2012). indonesia’s foreign policy became inseparable to asean, as the regional organization’s agenda was closely in conjunct with indonesia’s foreign policy concerns that indonesia’s leadership within asean was considered to be substantial. the commitments to adopt the asean community concept has then lead to the member states affirmation for democratic values, which arguably led to democratic transformation in myanmar (emerson, 2005). it was under wirajuda that previously in 2002, asean member countries successfully brought china together to agree on the declaration on the conduct of parties (doc) in south china sea. according to wirajuda, the doc as the guideline to accommodate the peaceful resolution of the dispute is the fruit of the annual track-two informal workshop which has been conducted since 1990 (dewan pertimbangan presiden). the content of the doc itself contains points of reaffirmation of both the claimant and non-claimant states to settle the dispute through peaceful means, to not partake in any actions which could escalate the tension in the disputed area, while committing to further cooperation which was discussed during the informal workshops. therefore, it could be said that during megawati’s administration that indonesia managed to give a significant improvement in terms of response to the scs dispute since suharto’s reign ended, as it managed to level-up into the track one multilateral diplomacy in the scale of asean countries plus china. regardless of the flaws during her tenure, megawati was lauded as the progenitor of democracy in indonesia as her administration facilitated the transformation of the state into the democratic indonesia the world knows today. despite assertion of her political interest to ensure her victory in the presidential election, megawati’s administration passed the bill for the presidential general election in 2004, which symbolized the commitment for change and conformity to global norms. democracy: susilo bambang yudhoyono’s era (2004 – 2013) perhaps the biggest challenge to indonesia’s foreign policy during megawati’s administration was to maintain indonesia’s resilience to global issues such as terrorism, something which became the main intention since the country suffered the numerous terrorist attacks during megawati’s presidency. indonesia also gained the spotlight since the country is 15 journal of asean studies home to the largest muslim population in the world and the hotbed for alleged religious intolerances and terrorist training facilities. to this concern, wirajuda subsequently played the diplomatic cards correctly by building the image of indonesians muslims as moderate among equal (hughes 2010), while indonesia’s counter-terrorism initiative gained commendation for its effectiveness in curbing terrorism and cooperativeness with their foreign counterparts. for indonesia, after gaining post-reform momentum megawati’s administration is the start when the country’s foreign policy pendulum began to swing. it was until 2004, the world began to see indonesia’s leadership in a different light when susilo bambang yudhoyono was elected as indonesia’s sixth president. with his pre-election rising popularity, combined with the unexpected coalition with fractions of golkar and other parties against megawati’s pdi-p (bulkin, 2013), yudhoyono became the first directly elected president in indonesia, cementing indonesia’s prestige of ‚democracy‛ which the country later capitalize on. under this new banner, indonesia steadily regains and even goes beyond the vestige of its former glory which was tarnished after the ’98 tragedy and the post-9/11 terrorist attacks. yudhoyono’s experience serving in bosnia for peace keeping operations and studying abroad signified his familiarity with international issues. his close relation with foreign ministry official which was reflected on his book harus bisa! written by his staff for international affairs and presidential spokesperson, dino patti djalal (then former indonesian ambassador to the us) indicated that he has been briefed on international issues. yudhoyono himself was already familiar with the executive work environment as he was serving under the previous two administrations as minister for mines and energy and coordinating minister for political and security, in which during his previous tenure should have gave him the insight about what worked well and what did not in the government, and indeed, yudhoyono might have entrusted his views on indonesia’s expanded foreign policies based on such evaluation. in 2004 yudhoyono picked wirajuda to resume his post as the foreign minister. wirajuda recommenced his previous work and expand indonesia’s role further which remained grounded on strengthening the most on bilateral relations with stronger cooperation and partnerships, thus moving forward with the expansion and role of indonesia in regional and international organizations (mulyana, 2011). indeed, indonesia established economic partnership agreement (epa) with japan during abe’s administration in 2007, nurtured a comprehensive partnership with the us in 2009, in which once again indonesia gained the recognition as the world’s model for moderate islam from secretary of state hillary clinton (hughes, 2010). in 2007 wirajuda managed to have the asean member countries to sign for the asean charter, the constitution for the regional organization which have been drafted since 2005. the signing of the charter by the member states have effectively transformed the organization into a legally binding entity, a community, while enlist the commitment of the member states to pursue a mechanism for unresolved disputes. this means, through asean mechanism, 16 indonesia’s response in the south china sea disputes indonesia has moved a step further in creating a ‚tighter‛ environment for dispute settlement among asean member countries which would constitute the signatories to abide to such mechanism when the time arise. however, it is not clear how the charter can be implemented to resolve an inter-regional dispute such as the one in the scs. yudhoyono was re-elected to serve for a second term in 2009. marty natalegawa succeeded wirajuda’s post as the foreign minister and further expand indonesia’s role in asean and southeast asia with his ‚millions friends zero enemies‛ concept, which is in conjunction to yudhoyono’s new reinterpretation of indonesia’s free and active doctrine. indonesia according to yudhoyono, has succeeded in passing the two reefs which pointed out that the country should take an even greater challenge, which is ‚navigating the turbulent ocean‛. this new point of view hinted that indonesia shall take on a larger role in the world, by actively establishing cooperation with other countries which affiliations and alliances in nature were rather constructed with fragmented-power relations which change dynamically as it was personified by a turbulent ocean (mulyana, 2011). in addition, natalegawa introduced the ‚dynamic equilibrium‛ concept, which suggests that the possibility for a country to rise to power is larger. this concept is a reinterpretation of powers to countries like indonesia, which has the means and opportunity to play a larger role-if not to obtain more power and influence. should natalegawa’s concept holds true, this means that the concept of power now has evolved into determined by factors such as roles, values, and identities, as opposed to conventional components of power. with this renewed view of foreign politics, indonesia actively strived to maintain, if not enhance, its role as a bridge builder among worlds, stabilizer, and peace builder. in playing these roles, yudhoyono’s administration utilized the existing elements of indonesia, namely the muslim population, the country’s role in asean and other international organizations and forums. in addition to non-aligned movement (nam), the organization of the islamic conference (oic), indonesia gained even a bigger role with its inclusion as the member of g-20, owing to the us nomination for membership. sukma argued that indonesia’s expanding role was something happened by default and not by design, or in other words the country’s active participation was not planned or not intended from the beginning, but rather a reaction or a response to a condition and opportunity (sukma, 2013). to reinforce this argument, perhaps we can see that in terms of power indonesia is rather weaker compared to its neighbors, but due to the development of the international politics, such as obama’s administration and the scs dispute, indonesia managed to secure a larger role as it is today. the yudhoyono’s administration saw an even more pro-active indonesia in the efforts of resolving the disputes in southeast asia, particularly during indonesia’s asean chairmanship in 2011. during its leadership in asean, indonesia successfully mediated the border dispute between thailand and cambodia which generated tensions among member states. to this cause, indonesia sent observers to monitor the ceasefire, brought the 17 journal of asean studies conflicting parties, and encouraged negotiations which ultimately diffused the dispute. in the same year, indonesia was actively endorsing asean member countries and china in implementing the doc during the asean ministerial meeting (amm) with china. natalegawa as asean chairman urged the members to step-up the dispute resolution process by reaching a consensus on the guidelines for the implementations of the doc (thayer, 2012). the meeting went successful with the consensus from the asean countries and china was reached (khalik & nurhayati, 2011), furthermore the talks resumed in beijing in january 2012 where the senior officials from respective countries have agreed upon setting up four expert committees based on the doc (thayer, 2012). before the talks began in beijing, there were discussions on setting up the code of conduct (coc) as the continuation of the doc, and a number of officials have already worked on the coc (thayer, 2012). regardless, while china expressed its preference to stay clear from discussing the coc and maintained the original priority of the meeting which was to discuss the guidelines of the doc, the philippines resumed producing and circulating the coc draft agenda among members. when asean convened later that year for the annual ministerial meeting, the chairmanship was already shifted to cambodia, which pushed the agenda of having china in the asean discussions; something which was deemed irregular considering china is not a member state to the southeast asian organization. the coc and china’s interference would later become the precursor to one of the biggest rift spikes within asean members. it was later in july 2012 when the 2nd half of the amm was held in phnom penh, when the chair led by cambodian foreign minister, hor nom hong concluded that a joint communiqué could not be produced due to a lack of consensus from the members. namhong concluded that the inclusion of the south china sea paragraph in the communiqué will have the potential to escalate the tension since there were intentions from the member countries to be more specific with the naming of the disputed areas in question, whereas others expressed discontent with the direction the chairman was leading. this turn of event drew a tense atmosphere among the member countries, particularly the philippines and cambodia which blame each other for the failure to reach a joint communiqué. natalegawa, with the intention of preserving the unity of asean, went for a shuttle diplomacy over a two-day period to manila, hanoi, bangkok, phnom penh and singapore. the tour started from the philippines to discuss the six-points proposal with the country’s foreign minister del rosario. once agreed, natalegawa went to vietnam, another asean claimant country which has shown a desire to have a south china sea paragraph in the joint communiqué which reflects the event occurred. from hanoi, natalegawa went to see his counterpart, namhong, in phnom penh to discuss the six-point proposal which have been green lit by the previous two. namhong agreed to natalegawa’s proposal, and the indonesian foreign minister entrusted it with his cambodian counterpart when he left for his final destination of his tour to singapore. 18 indonesia’s response in the south china sea disputes later in july, namhong on behalf of the chair released the six point proposal as the asean’s six principles of the south china sea. the six principles is basically a substitution for the missing joint communiqué to address the scs dispute, which exists to reaffirm the member states of the asean and china to the existing principles of doc with its implementations and guidelines, to the early conclusion of the regional code of conduct (coc), respect to the international law with unclos in particular, the commitment to self-restraint and non-use of force, and seeking a peaceful resolution to the dispute. the six principles which was originally proposed by indonesia successfully prevented the absence of consensus about the dispute resolution, which has the potential widening the rift among asean member states. conclusion this study has attempted to discuss how the post-suharto regime’s approach to the scs varies considerably from the suharto era. the latter was characterized with an undisputed ruler to indonesia’s political aspects during the new order regime, including the country’s foreign policy. despite suharto’s ‚ends justifies the means‛ principle to govern indonesia for three long decades, the president’s power was not without constraints, as absolute as it may seem, suharto’s control over everything in indonesia was surpassed by forces beyond the geographical limit: economy. indonesia’s response to scs dispute during the new order era grew from maintaining over territorial integrity to actively accommodate peaceful talks between claimant countries might reflect indonesia’s growing interests of the dispute itself or parties to the dispute. indonesia’s relation with china is an example how the country’s dynamic of interests influenced its policies, notwithstanding the fact that there were contesting interests between indonesia’s influential decision-making institutions, it was suharto who gave the final says to everything. the post-suharto era brought a different approach for indonesia’s response to the scs dispute. the red line which connects the four administrations would be identified as conditions that would determine indonesia’s response. the first condition would be the domestic situation in indonesia; as we can see the democratic indonesia has more room for its foreign policy to maneuver due to a more stable domestic situation, while the earliest postsuharto domestic situation was marred with instabilities and crises, which require further attention and resources from the authorities; the second condition is the authority figure, in this case it would be the president as the highest executive power holder, and the foreign minister as the spearhead, or second-in-command of the foreign policy, after the president; the third condition would be the given role, as in to what extent does indonesia had the capacity to execute its foreign policy from its given role in an international environment, such as asean. one thing worth noting about indonesia’s growing response to the scs, it was steadily developing from a simpler honest broker role into an active bridge builder, and ultimately holds asean’s 19 journal of asean studies leadership in preserving inter-regional peace and stability. at a glimpse we might see that indonesia made its best achievements when it was chairing asean, but the events after 2012 amm shows us that indonesia can make a proper response to the scs dispute regardless it holds the asean chairmanship or not. about the author derry aplianta holds a master of arts from the graduate school of international relations, ritsumeikan university; he is currently a diplomat at asia pacific section, center for policy analysis and development for asia-pacific and african regions, ministry of foreign affairs, republic of indonesia. reference books djalal, dino patti, 2008, harus bisa! seni memimpin ala sby: catatan harian dino patti djalal, red & white publishing, indonesia. o’rourke, kevin, 2002, reformasi: the struggle for power in post-soeharto indonesia, allen & unwin, new south wales, australia. sukma, rizal., 1999, indonesia and china: the politics of a troubled relationship, routledge, london, uk. soebagjo, natalia, 2008, ‚ethnic chinese and ethnic indonesians‛ in suryadinata, leo, 2008, ethnic chinese in contemporary indonesia, institute of southeast asian studies, singapore. journals emerson, donald k., ‚security, community, and 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http://www.rsis.edu.sg/indonesia_prog/resources/transcript/seminar%20notes%20-%20dr%20yayan%20mulyana.pdf http://www.rsis.edu.sg/indonesia_prog/resources/transcript/seminar%20notes%20-%20dr%20yayan%20mulyana.pdf journal of asean studies, vol. 1, no. 2 (2013), pp. 140–163 ©2013 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic economic and socio-cultural relations between indonesia and taiwan: an indonesian perspective, 1990-2012 luh nyoman ratih wagiswari kabinawa bina nusantara university abstract this paper analyzes the puzzle why did indonesia maintain durable economic and sociocultural relations with taiwan? in order to answer that question, this paper argues that due to the indonesian people as promoter of ideas lead interactions with taiwan, indonesia is able to maintain its durable economic and socio-cultural relations with taiwan despite under the absence of diplomatic relations. people-to-people interaction builds three kinds of interactions between indonesia and taiwan on the issue of economic and socio-cultural: unofficial interaction, semi-official interaction, and official interaction. this paper employs indonesian perspective approach that stressed on the pattern of relations that stem from people-to-people interactions between indonesia and taiwan. thus, the paper aims to fill the gap in the literature on taiwan and indonesia relations that mostly focus on analysis of economic diplomacy, interest (leifer 2001; ku 1995, leong 1995, lee 1990, klintworth 1995, rich 2009), shifting on international order (ku;1998), and the prc’s factor on indonesia and taiwan relations (ku 2002; irawan 2006). keywords: indonesian businessmen, indonesian migrant workers, indonesian students, economic and socio-cultural relations, people-to-people interactions introduction indonesia and taiwan are two entities that do not have official diplomatic relations but maintain durable economic and socioculture relations. though indonesia adheres one china policy principle, this country continues to nurture its relations with taiwan in economic and socio-cultural aspects. the most important event in indonesia’s relations with taiwan occurred in 1989 when taipei was allowed to rename its chamber of commerce in jakarta from chinese chamber of commerce into taipei economic and trade office which gave politically meaningful status to taiwan. indonesia-taiwan’s harmonious relations did not stop there; in 1994 taiwan launched a program called “southward policy” which aims to increase its investment and political relations with countries in southeast asia including indonesia. economic ties between indonesia and taiwan found within investment and trade activities while sociocultural ties lied within the existence of indonesian migrant workers and indonesian students in taiwan. statistics on economic and socio-cultural relations between indonesia and taiwan journal of asean studies 141 showed improvement after the year of 1990s. in terms of economic investment, taiwan was the eighth-largest foreign direct investor for indonesia in 2010 (center for political studies (p2p) lipi 2011, p.6). in terms of trading activity, indonesia was taiwan’s eleventh-trading partner in 2010, being the thirteenth-largest export market and eleventh-largest supplier or imports (center for political studies (p2p) lipi 2011, p.6). on the context of sociocultural relations, indonesian migrant worker is the first biggest population of foreign workers in taiwan. in addition, indonesian student is the third largest population of foreign students from southeast asia after malaysia and vietnam. the table clearly shows that each year statistics on economic and socio-cultural relations experience some improvements. however, durable economic and socioculture relations between indonesia and taiwan do not necessarily give positive impact toward their political-diplomatic relations. indonesia since its independence in 1945 never recognized taiwan as an independent state. indonesia recognized the people’s republic of china (hereafter prc) as the sole legitimate representative of chinese government in 1950. even after indonesia suspended its diplomatic relations with prc in 1967, indonesia has never recognized taiwan. furthermore, indonesia is one of the countries in southeast asia that strongly supported the principle of one-china policy and signed strategic partnership relations with prc in 2005. thus, politically speaking, indonesia does not have any incentive to improve its relations with taiwan. economically speaking, however, indonesia and taiwan are able to maintain strong economic and socio-cultural relations. hence, this paper will explain the underlying reason that caused indonesia and taiwan are able to develop economic and socio-cultural interactions under the absence of diplomatic relations. based on state-centric approach, a state that does not have political diplomatic relations with another state would be difficult to engage in formal governmental relations among each other. nevertheless on the case of indonesia and taiwan, both nations are able to develop their economic and socio-culture relations even though official diplomatic ties are missing. thus, this paper tries to answer the question: “under the adherence of one-china policy principle and the absence of diplomatic relations with taiwan, why did indonesia table 1. statistics on economic and socio-cultural relations between indonesia and taiwan 2010-2012 source: compilation from <http://www.moeaic.gov.tw/>; <http://web02.mof.gov.tw/> and bureau of foreign trade: trade statistics, republic of china (taiwan), http://cus93.trade.gov.tw year investment (us$ 1000) export (us$ 1000) import (us$ 1000) indonesian migrant workers (person) indonesian students (person) 2010 389 4.509.630 6.020.156 156.332 2,274 2011 1.145 4.836.625 7.428.224 175.409 2,472 2012 17.200 5.190.198 7.324.792 191.127 2,723 142 indonesia-taiwan relations: indonesian perspective maintain durable economic and sociocultural relations with taiwan?” this paper argues that due to the indonesian people as promoter of ideas lead interactions with taiwan, indonesia is able to maintain its durable economic and sociocultural relations with taiwan despite under the absence of diplomatic relations. people-to-people interaction builds three kinds of interactions between indonesia and taiwan on the issue of economic and sociocultural: unofficial interaction, semi-official interaction, and official interaction. the paper employs indonesian perspective approach to examine indonesiataiwan relations. in addition, this paper will also examine case studies of economic and socio-culture issues. economic issues involve aspect of investment, and trade while socio-culture issues include aspect of migrant workers and indonesian students. this paper consists of four sections. first is the introduction. second section covers theoretical framework to set up the main indicators. third section presents the discussion of main analysis. the last section is conclusion. theoretical framework the main analytical tool on this paper is people as promoters of new ideas (snyder 2004, p.59) lead state’s interaction with other states. the importance of people within the study of international relation has been acknowledged to promote state’s relations with others. people-to-people interaction goes beyond the boundaries and sovereignty of the state. this part will examine the role of the people within state to state relations. discussion will begin with conceptual approach from realist into constructivist’s core ideas to explain their views on state to state relations. later on, the conceptual approach will be narrow down into the proposed framework. realism approach treats state as the main unit analysis on international relations studies (mingst 1996, p.70-78 and snyder 2004, p. 59). state is the single and the main actor within the analysis of international relations phenomena. the idea of state is built from de facto and de jure idea. de facto consist of citizen, boundary and government, while de jure relates to the idea of sovereignty and recognition from other states1. the idea of sovereignty and recognition relies on the practice of acknowledgement of diplomatic relations among states. state practice government-togovernment contacts under the leverage of diplomatic relations. thus, from realist point of view, interaction in the international order is filled by state to state interactions under the leverage of official diplomatic relations. figure 1 official state to state relations the above picture describes that state’ a has official diplomatic relations with state b, thus both interact each other without any hesitation. both states practice governmentto-government relations within various kinds of issues. under official diplomatic relations, state is easier to conduct interactions with others. nevertheless, not every state has official diplomatic relations with other states. government-togovernment relations are unlikely occurred among state that lack of diplomatic relations. therefore, state’s interactions with others are not conducted under the official government level but through the existence 1 the idea of de facto and de jure is the basic term to define one entity as a state. various discussion about the nature of the state can refer to stephen d. krasner, “abiding sovereignty”, international political science review, jul., 2001, vol. 22, no.3, pp. 231-233 journal of asean studies 143 of third parties which are people2. people from one state interact with other state through their movement that goes beyond the state’s boundaries and sovereignty. together with the development of globalization, people could easily move from one state to another state. people-to-people interactions under the absence of diplomatic relations among two states often called as informal relations. this term appear because the relations among states not conducted by the government but by the people. the picture below shows how interaction between states occurred through their people’s interaction. figure 2 non-official state to state approach the above picture explains that state a does not have diplomatic relations with state b, thus both will be difficult to exercise official governmental exchanges. however, both countries still able to manage their relations due to the interactions that led by the people. people build the network and provide information for the states, thus, both states can manage their relations within various issues. on this case, state exercises its basic function as security and economic provider for the people. to exemplify, people from state’ a would like to do business in state b. therefore, the people should move from state a into state b to run his/her business. in order to be able to enter state b, people from state a has to prepare some official 2 third parties within state-to-state relations not only on the context of people but also on the context of other non-state actors such multinational corporations, international organizations or non-governmental organizations. due to the limitation of this thesis, however, this thesis only focuses to the role of people as third parties within taiwan and indonesia relations. documents primarily resident or working visa. the issuance of visa is the matter of governmental issues, thus the government from state a has to cooperate with the government in state b to issue visa for the people from state’ a that would like to do business in state b. hence, both governments are forced to work each other in order to fulfill the needs of issuing visa for the people. from the above case, it explains two things. first, state as a security provider has to protect their people whose going overseas, without consideration whether the state has diplomatic relations or not with the other state. thus the state has to work with other state in order to issue entry permit as a legal protection for their citizen when going overseas. second, state as economic provider allows people from its state to do business overseas in order to fulfill economic interest of the people. those two activities as security and economic provider cannot be conducted, unless the state also builds connection with designated state that has no diplomatic relations the above mentioned explanations show how people from different state interacts each other and influenced state’s relations. however, the explanation has not addressed the interest of the people that would like to enter the country that do not have official diplomatic relations with their state. the explanation has not answered the underlying reasons that endorse people from state's a willing to interact or to move with state b. constructivist approach that focuses on the concept of ideas and values will be employed in order to explain the underlying reasons of people’s migration. as mentioned before, realist approach treats state as the key actors on the study of international relations. on the opposite side, constructivist builds their arguments based on the analysis of individual or promoters of new ideas (read: people) as the key actors in 144 indonesia-taiwan relations: indonesian perspective international relations (snyder 2004, p.59 and walt 1998, p.38). constructivist argues that interest is formed through the process of reciprocal interaction which constitute by the distribution of ideas. interest is not given by order but rather than constructed through reciprocal interactions. it is said that interests being formed in the process of interaction rather than being formed prior to interaction (baylis and smith 1997, p.185). constructivist treats ideas and values as their main instruments to analyze the construction of interest (snyder 2004, p.59). people act under the command of its ideas in which they will share it with others that created a formation of ideas. “shared ideas making up norms, institutions, threatsystem, and so on – that constitute the meaning of the distribution of power, either by constituting state’s perceptions of that distribution or by constituting their identities and interests” (wendt 1999, p.104). clear explanation about distribution of ideas as follows (wendt 1999, p.104). figure 3 constructivist approach on state to state relations above diagram explains the formation of interest that closely associated with material things such economic and/or security interest. those interests are actually shape through distribution of ideas that promote by the people. distribution of ideas mixed together with cultural-values making up norms and institution which at the end constitute identities and interests of the state. the process of interest formation also lurks by the culture (wendt 1999, p.104). thus interest are not given and shaped through material things, but rather from the process of distribution ideas or non-material elements. in sum, analysis of ideas that shared by the people will be employed to examine the underlying reasons that caused people’s migration under the absence of diplomatic relations among their government. ideas are the reasons that endorse those people interact with another countries and societies. wendt narrow down the concept of ideas into “knowledge” (wendt 1999, p.104) that can be either private or shared knowledge. “private knowledge consists of beliefs that individual actors hold that other do not”(wendt 1999, p.104). this private knowledge refers to the domestic or ideological considerations that being the key determinant of people to frame and act toward the surrounding environment. meanwhile “shared knowledge or culture is the knowledge that becomes common knowledge among individuals” (wendt 1999, p.141). thus on this sense, socially shared knowledge or culture also play a role to influence actor’s interactions. private and shared knowledge are the foundations that influence people to interact with others. private and socially shared knowledge will be formed into an institution. institution plays important role in bridging the governmental relations and providing network sharing and information. as argued by wendt (1992), “institutions are fundamentally cognitive entities that do not exist apart from actor’s ideas about how the world works”. this institution embodied journal of asean studies 145 the distribution of ideas that socially shared by the people. distribution of ideas together with the creation of institution constitutes the interest of the state that eventually influences the state’s behavior to nurture its relations with the country that does not share diplomatic relations. analytical framework drawing from the above mentioned theoretical explanations, indonesia and taiwan relations could be explained by looking at the people-to-people interactions that existed among their ties. moreover, the concept of distribution of ideas – making up norms and institutions – constitute interest will also be employed to further analyzes the underlying reason that caused indonesia is able to nurture its economic and socio-cultural relations with taiwan. the clear explanation will be below above is the clear picture of indonesia and taiwan relations that built from peopleto-people interaction. both countries can keep their contact due to the interactions that constructed by the people. a clear note must be made that people on the context of indonesia and taiwan relations are not limited to those above written, which this paper will be dealt with3. further analysis 3 the term people within indonesia and taiwan relations are not limited to indonesian businessmen, indonesian migrant workers and indonesian students. there are also other people such foreign spouse and/or indonesian academic community. however, due to the limitation of this thesis will be addresses the underlying reasons that push or pull indonesian businessmen, indonesian migrant workers and indonesian students come to taiwan for their own purposes. concept of ideas, institution and interest are the main analytical tools to examine the underlying reasons. the term ideas consist of private knowledge and socially share knowledge. these two knowledge narrows down into several frameworks that caused indonesian people interact with taiwan. there are three main frameworks that help to explain the underlying reasons of people’s migration: environmental, economic, and cultural frameworks. these frameworks will be used to examine factors that endorsed indonesian businessmen; indonesian migrant workers; and indonesian students choose taiwan as their destination for business, study and work. above is the clear picture of indonesia and taiwan relations that built from peopleto-people interaction. both countries can keep their contact due to the interactions that constructed by the people. a clear note must be made that people on the context of indonesia and taiwan relations are not limited to those above written, which this paper will be dealt with4. further analysis that will analyze the economic and socio-cultural ties between indonesia and taiwan, hence the tool of analysis only consists of those former three categories of people. 4 the term people within indonesia and taiwan relations are not limited to indonesian businessmen, indonesian migrant figure 4 indonesian diplomatic relations with taiwan i. taiwanindonesia no diplomatic relations people-to-people interactions: 1. indonesian businessmen 2. indonesian migrant workers 3. indonesian students 146 indonesia-taiwan relations: indonesian perspective will be addresses the underlying reasons that push or pull indonesian businessmen, indonesian migrant workers and indonesian students come to taiwan for their own purposes. concept of ideas, institution and interest are the main analytical tools to examine the underlying reasons. the term ideas consist of private knowledge and socially share knowledge. these two knowledge narrows down into several frameworks that caused indonesian people interact with taiwan. there are three main frameworks that help to explain the underlying reasons of people’s migration: environmental, economic, and cultural frameworks. these frameworks will be used to examine factors that endorsed indonesian businessmen; indonesian migrant workers; and indonesian students choose taiwan as their destination for business, study and work. workers and indonesian students. there are also other people such foreign spouse and/or indonesian academic community. however, due to the limitation of this thesis that will analyze the economic and socio-cultural ties between indonesia and taiwan, hence the tool of analysis only consists of those former three categories of people. furthermore, ideas contribute to the making-up institution such indonesian business association, indonesian student association and indonesian migrant workers association. these institutions serve as independent agent that promotes indonesia and taiwan relations on the context of economic and socio-culture issues. these ideas and institution resulted in interest of indonesia to maintain economic and socio-cultural relations with taiwan. at the end, it will conclude that people-to-people interaction creates three kinds of interactions between indonesia and taiwan: unofficial interaction, semi-official interaction, and official interaction. in order to get the valid results about the proposed indicators below, this paper conducts several interviews with relevant people to support the secondary data. this proposed framework will be discussed on the next section of this paper. figure 5. proposed framework explaining indonesia-taiwan relations journal of asean studies 147 discussion this section covers the main analysis of the paper, ideas, institution and interests. to analyze ideas, institutions and interests within indonesia and taiwan relations, this section will be divided into three main parts. first part discusses three main frameworks of ideas that caused indonesian people come to taiwan for the purpose of business, working, and studying. second part concerns on the making up institutions due to the shared ideas of the people. third part talks about the resulted interests from the process of distribution of ideas and making up institutions. framework of ideas there are a lot of factors that endorse indonesian students, indonesian migrant workers, and indonesian businessman to come to taiwan. to explain factors related to the people’s migration, this paper conducts interviews with three different groups of people. the first is representative from indonesian businessmen who is being in charge as the head of indonesian employers associations store in taiwan or asosiasi pengusaha toko indonesia di taiwan (hereafter apit) and representative from indonesian federation of taiwan alumni associations or ikatan citra alumni taiwan se-indonesia (hereafter icati). the second is the representative from indonesian migrant workers in taiwan, represented by the head of indonesian migrant workers association in taiwan or ikatan pekerja indonesia taiwan (hereafter ipit). the last is representative from indonesian students in taiwan, represented by the head of indonesian student association in taiwan or perhimpunan pelajar indonesia di taiwan (hereafter ppi taiwan). in addition, the interview was also conducted to some government officials that are relevant to the case studies. based on the results of interview, exist three main frameworks to explain the underlying reasons that influence student, migrant worker, and businessman choose taiwan as their destination for study, work and run business. first is environmental framework which relates to the domestic and external situations that endorse people move to taiwan. second, economic framework relates to economic consideration of the people. third is cultural framework that associate with cultural aspects that both develop in taiwan and indonesia. environmental framework environmental framework relates to the domestic and external factors that endorse people move to taiwan on the purpose of studying, working or doing business. domestic factor is internal conditions within the state that force people to seek working, studying or business’ opportunity overseas. meanwhile, external factor is certain conditions in the host country that attract people to look for better prospect abroad. this factor associated with the comparative advantage which is earned by the designated country compare to others. indonesian businessmen, indonesian migrant workers and indonesian students go for taiwan due to domestic and external factors that stem within environmental framework. based on the interview conducted with the representative of indonesian businessmen, migrant workers and students, this paper sum up several environmental frameworks that cause indonesian people go to taiwan for doing business, working and studying. 148 indonesia-taiwan relations: indonesian perspective economic framework economic framework relates to economic reasons that endorse people seeking opportunity abroad for business, working and studying. this framework focuses on maximum economic benefits that people could earn if they go to taiwan rather than to other countries. three categories of people consider economic framework as one of the important pushing factors that stimulate their willingness to look for better opportunity in taiwan. based on the interview conducted with the representative of indonesian businessmen, migrant workers and students, this paper sum up several economic frameworks. (see table 3). cultural framework the last framework is cultural framework that concern about the influence of culture within people-to-people interactions. as argued by wendt, ideas consist of private and socially share knowledge. socially share knowledge closely related to cultural matter that influences interactions. this framework will explain the impact of culture that eventually stimulates indonesian people to connect with taiwan. culture could be related to language and society’s beliefs and values. summary of cultural framework listed in table 4. table 2 summary of environmental framework category of people environmental framework domestic factor external factor indonesian businessmen (run business in taiwan) unfriendly experience of socio-political conditions in indonesia toward ethnic chinese huge population of indonesian in taiwan indonesian businessmen (doing business with taiwan) unfriendly experience of socio-political conditions in indonesia toward ethnic chinese ---indonesian migrant workers 1. wants to gain working experiences overseas 2. low degree of education and skills faster working placement procedure and process in taiwan indonesian students demands to transform the structure of the university in indonesia 1. taiwan will be an important country in the future 2. taiwan offers international environment for study 3. taiwan has good quality of research equipments and professors 4. taiwan share similar education system like in the u.s. source: from the author journal of asean studies 149 in sum, indonesian businessmen, migrant workers and students come to taiwan due to several ideas that narrow down into three main frameworks: environmental, economic, and cultural framework. these ideas or private knowledge will be very “thin” idea unless it mixes with the shared knowledge or culture (wendt 1999, p.141). thus, ideas combines with the influence of culture will endorse people from one state to interact with others. these frameworks successfully explain the underlying reasons that cause indonesian people look for taiwan in the purpose of business, working and studying. creation of institution and norms drawn from the previous explanations, shared ideas either private or shared knowledge making up norms and institutions. the previous sections, already addressed the shared ideas of doing business in and with taiwan, working, and studying in taiwan. this section will examine how shared ideas contribute to the creation of institutions and norms within indonesia and taiwan. institutions and norms relate to the existence of association that built by those three types of people. table 3 summary of economic framework category of people economic framework indonesian businessmen (doing business in taiwan) 1. business opportunity in taiwan 2. small amount of capital to run business indonesian businessmen (doing business with taiwan/taiwanese business people) sizes of taiwan’s enterprises indonesian migrant workers 1. high rate of unemployment 2. bigger amount of salary in taiwan indonesian students 1. taiwan offers sufficient amount of scholarship 2. taiwan offers reasonable cost of tuition fees and living source: from the author table 4 summary of cultural framework category of people cultural framework indonesian businessmen (doing business in taiwan) mandarin as means of communication indonesian businessmen (doing business with taiwan) 1. mandarin as means of communication 2. sense of ownership to the motherland in china 3. familiar and experienced with taiwanese culture and ethic indonesian migrant workers 1. beliefs of filial piety that create high demand of migrant workers 2. mandarin as means of communication indonesian students taiwan offers mandarin’s environment for study source: from the author 150 indonesia-taiwan relations: indonesian perspective therefore, this part will discuss the existence of institutions such asosiasi pengusaha toko indonesia di taiwan (hereafter apit), ikatan citra alumni taiwan seindonesia (hereafter icati), ikatan pekerja indonesia taiwan (hereafter ipit) and perhimpunan pelajar indonesia di taiwan (hereafter ppi taiwan). as argued by wendt, institution exists due to share ideas of the people. hence these institutions and norms are existed due to the consequence of private and shared knowledge or ideas. institution plays important role in bridging the governmental relations and providing network sharing and information. furthermore, these institutions serve their role as independent agent either independent economic agent and/or independent socio-cultural agent5. they have valuable strategic and bargaining positions on the context of strengthening indonesian and taiwan relations particularly on economic and socio-cultural issues. in order to address the role of those institutions, this paper also conducts indepth interview analysis with the head of the representative of the institutions. the result of the interview is showed in the figure 6. asosiasi pengusaha toko indonesia di taiwan or apit was established in 2008 with the main aims to coordinate business activities among indonesian businessmen in taiwan. due to a huge interactions and populations of indonesian stores in taiwan, it needs an association to coordinate business activities to reduce the unfair business competition and stigma among the indonesian businessmen (head of asosiasi 5i used the term independent agent for those institutions that help to promote indonesia and taiwan relations. the term independent agent means this institution promotes economic and socio-cultural relations between indonesia and taiwan but has independent status because their movement not based on the order of the government. the term will be used for those institution throughout this section pengusaha toko indonesia di taiwan (apit) 2013). so far apit has 70 members that spread-out from the north into the south of taiwan. apit serve as independent social agent or “social ambassadors” because this institution has two main social programs: provide social assistances programs and passport services for the migrant workers (head of asosiasi pengusaha toko indonesia di taiwan (apit) 2013). social assistances program is apit’s activity related to the financial action’s given toward indonesian migrant workers that have serious illnesses or get accident during the working time, but not affordable for the medication cost. the other program is providing passport services for the indonesian migrant workers with reasonable prices. the original price to apply for new passport is ntd 750, however, due to several technical reasons such taking photo, fingerprint process, and interview, the migrant workers should spend around ntd 3,000 – 5000 for those who live in taipei and ntd 5,000 – 10,000 for those who live in kaohsiung (head of asosiasi pengusaha toko indonesia di taiwan (apit) 2013). thus, to reduce the cost of passport services, apit works together with the ieto to provide passport services program with reasonable prices for the migrant workers (head of asosiasi pengusaha toko indonesia di taiwan (apit) 2013). hence, those migrant workers that require to extent their passport only need to go to apit branch offices and give the mandate of passport to apit. on this case, apit also works as “social ambassadors” both for the indonesian government and migrant workers. furthermore, apit also serve as independent economic agent through their business activities that contribute to the foreign remittance and tax for both indonesia and taiwan. the second institution is icati. icati serves as independent cultural agent and independent economic agent that help to journal of asean studies 151 promote the economic and socio-cultural relations between indonesia and taiwan. on the context of independent cultural agent, icati conducts several programs such as hosted the calligraphy class which sponsored by taipei economic and trade office (hereafter teto), provide assistances for indonesian students that willing to continue their study in taiwan, and promoter for the sister-city mou between singkawang, west kalimantan with taoyuan, taiwan (icati website 2013). icati activities always include the representative from teto, thus icati build socio-cultural network with taiwan through its representative office in jakarta. on the context of independent economic agent, icati served as a bridge for the taiwanese investors that going to invest in indonesia (president of indonesian federation of taiwan alumni association (icati in bahasa) 2013). they create a bridge that has two main functions. first, icati built economic cooperation and network with taiwan business club in 2008 and teto economic division (president of indonesian federation of taiwan alumni association (icati in bahasa) 2013). these cooperation and network help to promote investment activity in indonesia which is done by taiwanese business people. second, icati also help to reduce language barrier that occurred between the taiwanese investors and local partners in indonesia. icati’s members are graduated from taiwan universities thus made them able to speak fluent mandarin. the third institution that also builds from the shared ideas of the people is indonesian migrant workers association in taiwan or ikatan pekerja indonesia taiwan (hereafter ipit). ipit was established in 2008 as a response toward a bunch of violations against indonesian migrant workers from the taiwanese employer (head of ikatan pekerja indonesia taiwan (ipit) 2013).there are two categories of violation against the migrant workers: labor case violations and non-labor case violations (head of labor department, indonesian economic and trade office (ieto) in taipei 2013). labor case violations relate to the problem of payment of salary, taxes and savings procedure with agents; meanwhile non-labor cases include the case of sexual harassment. in order to reduce the burden and raise solidarity among migrant workers against the violation, the indonesian migrant workers formed ipit. ipit also serves as an independent social agent that concern over the capacity building activity for the migrant workers. this institution has two main activities that help to build the capacity knowledge of the indonesian migrant workers (head of labor department, indonesian economic and trade office (ieto) in taipei 2013). first, provide training such language enrichment program (mandarin and english), music, and computer learning. second, hold a discussion forum to search a solution for the indonesian migrant workers that have to deal with some violation problems. in order to solve the violation problems, ipit also work together with ieto office. from these two programs, ipit play as independent social agents which help to solve the problem of migrant workers by building a linkage between indonesian representative government and taiwan’s nongovernmental organization that focus on migrant workers issues. the last institution is ppi taiwan. ppi taiwan was established on may 2nd, 2010 with four main aims: to strengthen the sense of brotherhood and unity among indonesian students in taiwan, to actualize academic community and environment among indonesian students, to perform actively as an indonesian cultural ambassador abroad, and to strengthen international cooperation and partnership within people and society both toward taiwan, indonesia and international 152 indonesia-taiwan relations: indonesian perspective community (the statute of indonesian student association in taiwan, article 7). the member of ppi taiwan comprises all indonesian students in taiwan, hence, ppi taiwan actually has a lot of network from its member because it includes indonesian students all over taiwan that also have various professional background or knowledge (head of perhimpunan pelajar indonesia di taiwan (ppi taiwan) 2013). ppi taiwan has several main programs to fulfill its function as independent sociocultural agent. first, ppi taiwan routinely conducts capacity building activity with migrant workers. this capacity building activity always includes the director of labor department ieto as the guest speaker with various topics such immigration, employment, consular and how to solve problems related to the migrant workers. in addition, the capacity building also involves health counseling on the issues of hiv/aids. this kind of capacity building not only takes place in northern taiwan but also held in central or southern taiwan. source: from the author second, ppi taiwan also actively organized focus group discussion, seminar or public discussion that discusses various academic topics and invites professional guest speakers. this activity aims to increase the capacity building of indonesian students in taiwan. third, ppi taiwan also involve within governmental research project facilitated by ieto. fourth, ppi taiwan always participates and supports indonesian culture exhibition or festival which held by indonesian students to introduce indonesian culture toward taiwanese society. this activity can create mutual understanding between indonesia and taiwan both in present and future time. the last, ppi taiwan provide information and networking center for indonesian students that are going to study in taiwan. in this way, ppi taiwan also helps taiwan to improve the number of international students from indonesia that would like to earn degree in taiwan. in sum, the emergence of ppi taiwan helps to promote people-to-people interactions between indonesia and taiwan under the absence of diplomatic relations. apit •serve as independent economic and social agent •apit’s activities fully supported by the ieto office in taipei icati •serve as independent economic and cultural agent •build economic cooperation and linkages with tbc and teto ipit •serve as independent social agent •work and cooperate with the ieto to solve the violations against indonesian migrant workers ppi taiwan •serve as independent socio and cultural agents •ppi taiwan’s activities legally supported by the ieto •create a linkage between people/students and government figure 6 the role of institutions in indonesia-taiwan relations journal of asean studies 153 overall, similar distribution of ideas about coming to taiwan for the purpose of business, working, and studying contribute to the making up institutions. these institutions are formed under the sense of unity and brotherhood to help each other and to improve interaction within businessmen, migrant workers and students. furthermore, those four institutions work independently as economic and sociocultural agent; hence they can promote indonesia and taiwan relations without any fear of political interventions or pressure that could occur from any sides as a consequent of one-china policy that hold by indonesian government (head of perhimpunan pelajar indonesia di taiwan (ppi taiwan) 2013). the existence of these institutions also provides an incentive for the indonesian government to maintain its economic and socio-cultural relations with taiwan. it proves through several official governmental exchanges that occurred through the incentives that stem from the people-to-people interactions. economic and socio-cultural interests between indonesia and taiwan according to wendt (1999) shared ideas both private knowledge and socially shared knowledge making up norms and institutions that constitute state’s identities and interests. the two previous sections of this article have already discussed about shared ideas and making up institutions between indonesia and taiwan. hence, this section will analyze the third indicators of independent variable about economic and socio-cultural interest between indonesia and taiwan. these interests stem due to the shared ideas and creation of institutions by the indonesian businessmen, indonesian migrant workers and indonesian students. furthermore, these interests cause three levels of interactions between indonesia and taiwan that stem from people-to-people interactions. the first is unofficial interaction that purely consists of only economic and sociocultural interactions that do not include formal governmental exchanges. the second is semi-official interaction that has average political implications. this level includes official governmental exchanges either from taiwan or indonesia. the last is official interaction that comprises of official government-to-government exchanges between indonesia and taiwan. this level gives highest political implications because it contains official government exchanges. in order to explain economic and sociocultural interest between indonesia and taiwan as well as the level of interactions this section will be divided into two parts, economic interests and socio-cultural interest. economic interests economic interests of indonesia toward taiwan stem from people-to-people interactions that build from indonesian businessmen together with taiwanese investors. indonesia that adhere one-china policy principle will be difficult to define and conduct its economic relations with taiwan. however, due to indonesian businessmen that collaborate with taiwanese investors created massive economic interactions and networks, both countries are able to maintain its economic relations. there are three levels of economic interactions that appear to measure economic interests between indonesian and taiwan. the first is unofficial economic interaction. on this level, interactions between indonesia and taiwan purely built through economic activities such trade and investment conducted either by indonesian businessmen or taiwanese business people. there are no official governmental 154 indonesia-taiwan relations: indonesian perspective exchanges between the two countries on this level of interactions. economic activities on this level include but not limited to foreign direct investment from taiwan to indonesia, recruitment of indonesian workers to work at taiwanese factories built in indonesia, trade through private firms, business or trade conference conducted by private sector, seminar and/or fairs that not include government officials, and other activities that only rely on purely economic interactions. so, the final outcome from those activities would be to fulfill the economic interest between indonesia and taiwan. the second level is semi-official economic interactions that comprise economic exchanges between officials either from indonesia or taiwan with indonesian businessmen and/or taiwan business people. economic activities within this level were mostly conducted by independent economic agents such as icati and taiwan business club that also invite governmental officials whether from indonesian or taiwan. from 1990 until 2012, there have been 6 semi-officials economic interactions between indonesia and taiwan. the table 6 shows semi-official economic exchanges between indonesia and taiwan. these activities mostly run by taiwan business people that work together with indonesian businessmen, which also involved government officials either from indonesia or taiwan. the outcome not only contributes to economic benefits but also average political implications because involving some of government officials. table 6. semi-officials economic exchanges between indonesia and taiwan, 19902012 date semi-officials economic exchanges main aims may 1991 jakarta-taipei school was established to fulfill the needs of better education of taiwanese businessmen’s children that reside in jakarta july 1995 surabaya-taipei international school was established to fulfill the needs of better education of taiwanese businessmen’s children that reside in surabaya 2000s taiwan reduce the amount of capital to invest or run business in taiwan to attract more investment or business activity from foreign countries including indonesia july 2011 indonesia and taiwan business day organized by taitra was held in taipei to discuss and to improve future economic relations between indonesia and taiwan september 2011 moea taiwan launched a business tour to indonesia for the investment and business activities to facilitate the investment and business activities of taiwanese investors in indonesia july 2012 hon hai chairman (foxconn) terry gou, visited indonesia as the invitation from the indonesian government to survey the market for investment in indonesia source: data collected randomly from reliable sources such governmental official webpage and indonesia and taiwan newspaper source: data collected randomly from reliable sources such governmental official webpage and indonesia and taiwan newspaper journal of asean studies 155 the third level is official economic interaction. this level of interaction includes official economic exchanges that involve high-level of government officials such as minister or deputy representative between indonesia and taiwan. official economic exchanges embrace two main activities: sign mou to strengthen economic relations and governmental visit or exchange. table 7 officials economic exchanges between indonesia and taiwan, 1990-2012 date official economic exchanges main aims 1990 indonesia and taiwan signed bilateral investment protection agreement to give protection and non-discrimination status for foreign investment in indonesia, including taiwanese investment january 1995 the indonesian chamber of commerce in taipei was renamed into the indonesian economic and trade office (ieto) in taipei to further strengthen the economic and trade activity between indonesia and taiwan. this ideas stem due to the increasing number of investment and trade activities that stem from people-to-people interactions 1995 indonesia and taiwan signed agreement for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income to regulate the taxation system in order to avoid double taxation that could stem from economic activities between indonesia and taiwan july 2010 indonesia's minister for maritime affairs and fisheries visited taiwan to propose joint development in morotai island to president ma ying jeou to develop morotai island and to diversify taiwanese investment in indonesia. taiwanese investment in indonesia mostly concentrated in java island under the area of jababeka group august 2010 the chairman of indonesia investment coordination board (bkpm), gita wirjawan, visited taipei and kaohsiung for investment purpose to increase investment activities between taiwanese investors and indonesian businessmen septemberoctober 2010 taiwan ministry of economic affairs, dr. yen-shiang shih made a visit to jakarta together with taiwanese business delegation to make a co urtesy call on bkpm and to vi sit j aba beka and lippo ci karang expo rt processing zo ne for assessment of investment. march 2011 indonesian minister of marine affairs and fisheries visited taiwan to participate in the "forum for cooperation in morotai" and advocate bilateral cooperation toward development in the island to discuss the further implementation of jont development over morotai project may 2012 indonesian trade minister visited taiwan to discuss the investment possibility of foxconn december 2012 taiwan-indonesia signed memorandum of understanding on a plan to jointly develop morotai island to develop morotai island through investment activities that conducted by taiwanese investors and local partner of indonesian businessmen source: data collected randomly from reliable sources such governmental official webpage and indonesia and taiwan newspaper 156 indonesia-taiwan relations: indonesian perspective from 1990 until 2012, there have been 9 official economic interactions in terms of trade and investment that conducted by both indonesia and taiwan government. these official economic contact, mainly are driven to accommodate the investment and trade interests that stem from people-topeople interactions. the official interactions can be in the table 7. based on the table 7 above, it shows that official governmental interactions between indonesia and taiwan were mainly formed through the interests of taiwanese investment and indonesian businessmen that would like to further increase investment and trade activities. economic activities that conducted through indonesian businessmen and taiwan business people, give political implications toward government affairs. their activities force both governments to work together though under the absence of diplomatic relations. the government works as economic facilitator and economic provider for the massive interactions that emerge from people-to-people interactions.6 the term economic facilitator and provider refer to some activities such issuing visa for those who want to run business both in indonesia and taiwan, formulating regulations to ensure investment activities, searching local partners for taiwanese investments, providing information about trade and investment activities, signing mou to lure investment and trade relations.7 in sum, indonesia’s economic interest toward taiwan stems and shapes from the interactions that built by indonesian businessmen and taiwanese investors. 6 this statement also supported by indonesian representative officials in ieto based on the interview with the head of industry department, indonesian economic and trade office in taipei, done in march 13rd, 2013 and interview with the head of investment department, indonesian economic and trade office in taipei, done on march 13rd, 2013 7 ibid. socio-cultural interests indonesia’s socio and cultural interest toward taiwan mostly stem from the interactions that built by indonesian migrant workers and indonesian students in taiwan. their huge population and interaction in taiwan also caused three different levels of interactions. on the context of socio-cultural relations, interest not only forms through people but also from the existing institutions. unofficial socio-cultural interactions between indonesia and taiwan occur through several socio-cultural activities done by indonesian migrant workers and indonesian students. indonesian migrant workers through its institution called ipit usually conduct a discussion forum to solve violation related to migrant workers. this discussion forum involves other institutions from taiwan such as taiwan international workers association. both institutions create unofficial social interactions through their discussion forum. furthermore, migrant workers that work as care-taker also contribute to unofficial socio-cultural interactions both for taiwanese society and indonesia. in addition to indonesian migrant workers, indonesian students in taiwan also build unofficial socio-cultural relations with taiwan. these students periodically held indonesian cultural festival or exhibition in order to promote indonesian culture to international community particularly taiwan. this event not only invites students from indonesia to perform but also students and faculty member of taiwan’s university to enjoy the cultural performance. this activity creates unofficial cultural exchanges between indonesia and taiwan through indonesian’s dance, music and drama performance. journal of asean studies 157 the second level of interactions is semiofficial interactions. on this level, sociocultural interactions is not only built by indonesian students but also conducted by indonesian businessmen under their own institution. from 1990 until 2012, there have been six semi-official interactions between indonesia and taiwan as shown in the table 8. the table 8 clearly describes several semi-official exchanges between indonesia and taiwan in terms of socio-cultural relations. exchanges mostly occurred due to the interactions built from indonesian students and indonesian businessmen. on this context, indonesian businessmen under icati not only contribute to semi-official economic exchanges but also semi-official sociocultural exchanges. the outcome of these exchanges will improve the number of indonesian students in taiwan, strengthen socio-cultural interactions in the future, and create mutual understanding among the society. the last level of interactions is official socio-cultural interactions that include government to government exchanges between indonesia and taiwan. table 8 semi-officials socio-cultural exchanges between indonesia and taiwan, 1990-2012 date semi-official exchanges main aims 2004 taiwan through its ministry of education provide taiwan government scholarship for indonesian students to encourage outstanding international students to undertake degree studies in taiwan so as to familiarize themselves with academic environment in taiwan and promote communication, understanding and friendship between taiwan and countries around the world april 2010 icati together with taiwan business club and teto representative visited west kalimantan, indonesia in order to realize mou sister-city between taoyuan and singkawang, west kalimantan may 2010 the elite study in taiwan (esit) delegation visited indonesia to enhance education cooperation with indonesia october 2010 the ministry of education taiwan held the first taiwan higher education fair in indonesia to strengthen cultural and educational interchange between taiwan and indonesia septemberoctober 2011 the second taiwan higher education fair took place in aceh, yogyakarta and surabaya to facilitate indonesian students with information of scholarship and university admission procedure october 2012 the third taiwan higher education fair held in surabaya and jakarta to facilitate indonesian students with information of scholarship and university admission procedure source: data collected randomly from reliable sources such governmental official webpage and indonesia and taiwan newspaper 158 indonesia-taiwan relations: indonesian perspective under the absence of diplomatic relations, it would be difficult for indonesia and taiwan to conduct formal governmental exchanges; however, peopleto-people interactions contribute to the official socio-cultural interactions between the two countries. furthermore, the existence of institutions in taiwan also helps the indonesian government to have better understanding toward taiwan. during 1990 until 2012, there have been 7 governmental exchanges between indonesia and taiwan on terms of socio-cultural issues. detail exchanges sum-up in table 9. source: data collected randomly from reliable sources such governmental official webpage and indonesia and taiwan newspaper journal of asean studies 159 the table above shows that official socio-cultural exchanges stem after the massive interactions lead by indonesian migrant workers and indonesian students in taiwan. on the context of migrant workers, indonesia signed mou in 2004 and 2011. in 2004, indonesia signed mou to overcome the problem of ban indonesian migrant workers. moreover, in 2011 indonesia renewed the mou with taiwan’s government. furthermore in july 2011, the ieto office set up labor department to undertake the migrant workers affairs. those efforts are in line with the dynamic interaction which emerged from the massive connection produced by indonesian migrant workers in taiwan. the indonesian government that adhere one-china policy will be difficult to conduct official governmental relations in terms of socio-cultural relations. however, due to the existence of indonesia migrant workers in taiwan, the indonesian government is able to conduct official governmental exchanges. on this manner, the indonesian government serves its basic function as economic and security provider for its citizen. in addition, the government also works together with institution such ipit, apit and ppi taiwan to maximize the state’s function as economic and security provider toward indonesian migrant workers. similar case with the migrant workers, indonesian students in taiwan also shape the socio-cultural interests of indonesia toward taiwan. indonesian government signed mou on higher education cooperation in 2011 in order to improve the socio-cultural exchanges between two countries. furthermore, both countries also worked to hold indonesia and taiwan higher education summit. those efforts conducted to strengthen socio-cultural exchanges between indonesia and taiwan that already well-established through the intense interactions of indonesian students in taiwan. moreover, the indonesian government representative in taipei also works with ppi taiwan to further discuss about the possibility of opening up the education attaché in ieto in the near future (head of perhimpunan pelajar indonesia di taiwan (ppi taiwan) 2013). thus, in this line, shared ideas of entering taiwan in the purpose of study contribute to the making up institutions that eventually influence state-to-state interactions. in sum, indonesia economic and sociocultural interest toward taiwan stem and constitute from the process of distribution ideas and creation of institutions which built by indonesian businessmen, indonesian migrant workers and indonesian students in taiwan. these three categories of people that serve as the promoter of ideas lead the interaction with taiwan which eventually encourages the indonesian government to maintain its economic and socio-cultural relations with taiwan. in addition, people-to-people interactions resulted in three different levels of exchanges: unofficial, semi-official and official exchanges. conclusion as mentioned before, the main aim of this paper is to analyze the underlying reason that caused indonesia is able to nurture its economic and socio-cultural relations with taiwan even though under the absence of political diplomatic relations. in order to analyze the underlying reason, this thesis employs constructivist approach that focus on the role of people-to-people interactions between indonesia and taiwan. this paper argues that indonesian people as the promoter of ideas lead the interactions with taiwan thus made the indonesian government maintains its economic and socio-cultural relations with taiwan. ideas that narrow down into 160 indonesia-taiwan relations: indonesian perspective private knowledge and socially shared knowledge influence the indonesian businessmen, indonesian migrant workers and indonesian students to conduct peopleto-people interactions with taiwan. moreover, these distributed ideas contribute to the making up institutions. those institutions served as independent economic agent, independent social agent and independent cultural agent that influence the work of the structure which is the government. the distribution of ideas together with creation of institutions constitutes interest of indonesia toward taiwan. economic interest of indonesia toward taiwan stem from people-to-people interactions that built from indonesian businessmen together with taiwanese investors, meanwhile indonesia’s socio and cultural interest toward taiwan stem from the interactions that built by indonesian migrant workers and indonesian students in taiwan. during 1990 until 2012, there were both 6 semi-officials exchanges in terms of economic and socio-cultural issues. meanwhile, in terms of economic official exchanges, indonesia conducted 9 contacts with taiwan; while 7 government exchanges in terms of socio-cultural issues. these contacts occurred after intense interactions conducted by indonesian businessmen, indonesian migrant workers and indonesian students. under the absence of diplomatic relations, indonesian government served as economic and security provider for the activities built by indonesian businessmen, indonesian migrant workers and indonesian students. it is the basic function and the obligation of the state to protect their citizen interest wherever the citizen reside or living. on the context of economic and security provider, the government facilitates people-to-people interactions through some activities such issuing visa, signing mou that can strengthen the mutual interactions, providing better environment for economic activities, formulating regulations and other activities that categorized as the basic functions of the state. the clear picture of indonesia and taiwan relations shows below (figure 7). semi-official exchanges between taiwan and indonesia taiwanindonesia no diplomatic relations people-to-people interactions: 1. indonesian businessmen 2. indonesian migrant workers 3. indonesian students un-official exchanges between taiwan and indonesia official exchanges between taiwan and indonesia economic and sociocultural interests ideas – knowledge institutionalism – apit, icati, ipit and ppi taiwan figure 7 analytical framework on indonesia-taiwan relations journal of asean studies 161 at first indonesian and taiwan do not have official diplomatic relations. however, people in terms of indonesian businessmen, indonesian migrant workers and indonesian students keep coming to taiwan or keep in touch with taiwan for business, working and studying activities. these people shared their ideas about private and socially shared knowledge that caused them to come to taiwan. moreover, in taiwan, these people build some institutions to further strengthen their interactions with taiwan. furthermore, shared ideas that contribute to making-up institutions constitute the economic and socio-cultural interests of indonesia. the economic and socio-cultural interests define through three different levels of exchanges between indonesian and taiwan: unofficial exchanges, semi-official exchanges, and official exchanges. the second and third level of exchanges not only consists of economic and socio-cultural interest but also contribute to the political implications in terms of government-to-government relations. hence, due to the indonesian people as promoter of ideas lead the interactions with taiwan; indonesia is able to maintain its durable economic and sociocultural relations with taiwan despite under the absence of diplomatic relations. about author luh nyoman ratih wagiswari kabinawa is a junior lecturer at department of international relations, bina nusantara university. she obtained her master degree from institute of china and asia-pacific studies, national sun yat-sen university, taiwan, roc. her area of interest includes taiwan’s relation with southeast asia, ethnic chinese in southeast asia, people-to-people relations, and international political economy. she can be contacted at lratih@binus.edu, references journal article chen, xiangmiang. 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(2021). of benevolence and unity: unpacking china’s foreign policy discourses toward southeast asia. journal of asean studies, 9(1), 1-23, https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v9i1.7037 abstract while much attention has been directed on the security and economic implications of china’s rise in the region, research on the normative implications of china’s persistent attempt at projecting a positive major power identity continue to be lacking. this paper seeks to contribute to this growing literature, as it applies social identity theory (sit) in analyzing china’s discourses toward southeast asia from mao to xi. more specifically, it unpacks social identity phenomena within discourses reflected in official documents by using predicate analysis. insights from the findings of this paper underscore china’s growing role as a normative power driven by a longstanding objective to be perceived positively and distinctively. likewise, this paper also finds that there is a continuity with respect to china’s foreign policy discourse of depicting sino-southeast asia relations as unique and united. there are also indications that southeast asia has consistently been presented as benefiting from its relations with china, thereby treating it as a prototype of what a sino-centric order might offer for the rest of the world. ultimately, china’s discourses of itself, southeast asia, and sino-southeast asia relations point to major power aspirations of constructing a united in-group and a positive identity. keywords: china’s foreign policy, southeast asia, sino-southeast asia relations, social identity theory, discourse analysis mailto:evgloria@up.edu.ph 2 of benevolence and unity: introduction how do we make sense of china’s foreign policy discourse toward southeast asia since the founding of the people’s republic? how have china’s discourses toward the region further its objective of presenting a positive and unique identity as a major power? this paper seeks to provide a discussion of china’s foreign policy discourses toward southeast asia as reflected in its official foreign policy pronouncements since the founding of the prc. indeed, sinosoutheast asia relations since mao zedong’s leadership has gone through considerable changes in terms of imperative global issues and domestic political developments. but despite these changes, this paper takes the critical assumption that southeast asia remains a consistent focus for china with respect to its overall foreign policy direction. and given china’s growing influence in the region, it is important to take a more comprehensive appreciation of how china has represented and thought of southeast asia with respect to its overall foreign policy logic. southeast asia plays a unique role in china’s foreign policy. china’s current leadership under xi jinping has been consistently straightforward in highlighting sino-southeast asia relations as a “priority” region “in its relations with developing countries” and in china’s overall “peripheral diplomacy” (mofa, 2013; li, 2013; xi, 2015a; li, 2020a). for instance, the idea of a maritime silk road initiative (msri) bore out of what china considers as southeast asia’s important role along its ancient silk route, thereby prioritizing the region in the establishment of this initiative (xi, 2013). and as argued by jeffrey reeves (2018) in his study of xi jinping’s peripheral diplomacy, the current leadership “has made peripheral relations central to all its flagship foreign policy concepts” (p. 977). apart from narratives and concepts, the current strategic reality of sino-southeast asia relations also provides evidence on the region’s uniqueness and significance for china. it has been noted that china has been making “unprecedented inroads” in prioritizing new security partnerships with asean countries, which points to the region’s importance in china’s geopolitical ambitions (parameswaran 2020). in terms of economic relations, asean-china trade grew by 7% despite the global health and economic crisis, making asean as china’s largest trading partner for the first time. this is a further testament not just to the resilience of sino-southeast asia cooperation, but also to china’s growing concentration on the region. china has also never failed to underscore that it is consistently the “first” major power to lodge support in various asean initiatives-from acceding to asean’s treaty of amity and cooperation, to the launching of an asean-china free trade area (li, 2013b). and with respect to managing the current pandemic, china has also hinted on motivations to prioritize southeast asia in receiving covid-19 vaccine donations (li, 2020b; strangio, 2020; tan and maulia, 2020). indeed, compared to other partnerships, southeast asia as a region plays a unique role in china’s overall external relations as it is the logical recipient or “testing ground” for china to channel the expansion of its power and influence (stromseth, 2019). this makes it important for observers of china’s foreign policy to focus on sino-southeast asia relations for a more nuanced understanding of china’s continuous ascent to major power status. journal of asean studies 3 literature review currently, mainstream explanations on china’s foreign policy logic in southeast asia tend to assume the realist logic that its behavior is simply informed by a much larger major power competition for regional hegemony between china and the united states (see beeson and li, 2012; xinbo, 2016; suehiro, 2017; kim, 2014). li xiaoting (2015) for instance argues that china uses its growing capabilities to “seek the assistance of its neighbors in turning away a rival great power from china’s periphery” (p. 25). other scholars forward this argument by focusing on great power influence as currency to purchase small neighbor allegiance in the face of the sino-us geopolitical competition (huong, 2019; rüland and michael, 2019; storey, 2012). overall, this group of observations stems from a realist logic of considering southeast asia solely as an arena of major power competition, thereby treating sino-southeast asia relations as the zero-sum counterpart of us-southeast asia alliance. another set of explanations rooted in a similar realist logic highlights china’s ‘core national interests’ as the primary motivation for restraint or assertiveness observed in china’s behavior toward the region. as rumi aoyama (2013) argues, “the simultaneous achievement of three national interests of security, sovereignty, and economic development” influences china’s foreign policy in the neighborhood (p. 91). while this group tend to highlight a perceived proclivity for peace and non-aggression as a significant factor in determining the shape and form of china’s behavior toward southeast asia, these explanations are rooted in an assumption that china’s national interests come first, especially those concerning its economic development at home (takahara, 2012; boon, 2017; goh, 2014). in this sense, national interest trumps other potential variables that may also explain china’s foreign policy in southeast asia. despite mainstream realist explanations on china’s foreign policy in the region, there are those who also highlight the importance of norms, ideas, and discourses in understanding china’s southeast asia approach. as song weiqing (2020) has argued in his research on china’s multilateral engagements in asia, he claims that china’s rise in the region is also informed by a “growing normative agenda” which therefore makes china a “normative foreign policy player” as it strives to dictate values and behavior that can be considered as “normal” hence shaping the way international relations ought to be conducted (p. 231). this group of explanations tends to highlight china’s pursuit for non-material gains such as identity and status beyond security calculations (see smith, 2021; gloria, 2020; callahan, 2016; qin, 2006). lastly, and related to the above constructivist explanations emphasizing non-material gains, there is also a growing attempt in the literature to highlight the consequential role of southeast asia and how it is an important arena for china as it aspires to become a normative and distinct major power vis-à-vis western powers in history. as argued by william callahan (2016), the current leadership under xi seeks “to forge a new network” in southeast asia “guided by chinese values” which ultimately serves the “much larger end of promoting china’s new vision of global governance” (pp. 13-14). song (2020) and reeves (2018) also concur with this observation highlighting an increasingly prominent sino-centric network in southeast asia ushered in by the normalization of specific norms and ideas, which in turn seeks to reshape the greater regional and global order. for these scholars, southeast asia acts as a 4 of benevolence and unity: convenient ‘prototype’ for china in terms of showing the world how a sino-centric order, founded on benign values and benevolent major power identity, may work for the future. this paper seeks to contribute to the above constructivist literature, as it takes the assumption that china’s foreign policy discourses on southeast asia have been guided by more persistent objectives of presenting a positive and distinct identity as a benign normative power. more specifically, this research aims to contribute to the ongoing scholarly discussion on sinosoutheast asia relations in two ways. first, it refers to social identity theory (sit) as a fitting theoretical framework in analyzing how identity manifested through discourse prevails in china’s foreign policy thinking toward southeast asia. as discussed in the next section, there is a growing literature on the application of sit in international relations and chinese foreign policy, but none yet in terms of a specific application in understanding sino-southeast asia relations. second, the paper also attempts to provide a much larger scope hence an overview of china’s foreign policy discourse towards southeast asia as it focuses on sample documents and excerpts in conducting its discourse analysis of official texts since the leadership of mao zedong. in this way, the findings of this paper allows for an identification of discursive continuities and changes, which is similar to what has been done in other explanations of chinese foreign policy (see qin, 2014; li, 2019). while the existing literature have yet to make a systematic attempt at a more specialized focus on discourse and southeast asia as subjects of interest, this research does not promise a definitive interpretation of china’s overall discourse in the region. following a discussion of sit, the paper proceeds with an explanation of how discourse analysis was conducted in a sample of texts. analytical framework social identity theory is one of the main theoretical developments in social psychology, which primarily deals with the study of intergroup relations. its main assumption, as far as its applicability in the discipline of international relations is concerned, is the centrality of social identity or status in determining prospects for conflict and cooperation. social identity, as defined by henri tajfel and john turner (1986), refers to “those aspects of an individual’s selfimage that derive from the social categories to which an individual perceives himself as belonging” (p. 277). sit assumes that individuals naturally aspire a positive social identity or self-image, the evaluation of which is relative to how it perceives a significant out-group or an ‘other’ (p. 288). applying sit to ir, states such as china are assumed to also undergo social identity phenomena of seeking to achieve a positive and distinct identity. to uncover social identity phenomenon at work as internalized by the ‘self’ or the ‘ingroup’, the underlying socio-cognitive processes of categorization and self-enhancement must be initially articulated and identified. the process of categorization refers to how the ‘self’ or the state in question assigns and affiliates itself to a relevant category or grouping, and how the boundary between itself and the out-group is consequently sharpened through “groupdistinctive stereotypical and normative perceptions” (hogg, m., terry, d., & white, k., 1995 p. 260). for the purposes of benchmarking other actors, this category or grouping is represented by a particular prototype, which may be a subset of the in-group that equates to an exemplary journal of asean studies 5 representation of the distinctive qualities of the larger in-group. the prototype essentially allows the in-group to judge potential members, and to further enhance the group’s entire image as discriminatory comparisons with the out-group are made. the latter refers to the process of self-enhancement. more specifically, this process requires specific positive-negative comparisons to be made between an in-group and out-group, which results to improved selfesteem as it magnifies a positive depiction of the ‘self’ relative to the ‘other’(hogg et al, 1995 pp. 260-261). this paper assumes that china, through the discourses it has promoted on its foreign policy and relations with southeast asia, exhibits social identity behaviors akin (1) to categorizing itself within a self-constructed in-group and, (2) to enhancing a positive major power image and status in contrasting itself from an out-group of western major powers. moreover, there are also indications that this constructed sino-southeast asia in-group unity is treated as a prototypical in-group as china seeks to universalize the norms and ideas it has consistently promoted, thus consistent with the observations made by existing literature on china’s normative power. overall, this paper adds to the growing literature on sit’s application in nuancing chinese foreign policy (see yi, 2020; gloria, 2020; larson, 2017; lee, 2016; larson and schvenchko, 2014; gries, 2005) . most of them had hitherto focused on the implications of sit in understanding china’s rise vis-a-vis major power competition by emphasizing different ‘identity strategies’ china undertakes as it aspires for top major power status. this paper takes a slightly different direction as it considers the initial social identity process (categorization and self-enhancement, as well as prototyping) which existing studies have not sufficiently touched upon. the paper also contributes to the growing sit-ir literature by also focusing on a much narrower subject of study such as sino-southeast asia relations. research method another crucial assumption that this paper takes is that “identity construction” and ‘self-other’ distinctions are manifested in discourse, and therefore can be uncovered using discourse analysis (lindgren & lindgren, 2017 p. 381; also see van dijk, 2001; wodak, 2001). discourse as conceptualized in this paper is consistent with michel foucault’s (1972) understanding that language depicts modes of representation that serve to establish domains of knowledge. related to this, “social representations in the mind of social actors” regarding the ‘self’ and ‘other’ are treated as the “theoretical interface” linking power and discourse, thus making discourse and identity simultaneously occurring (van dijk, 1993 p. 251). therefore, consistent with sit, social cognition and representation, or the way states think about their place in international society, becomes an important element of understanding discourse. the paper conducts its discourse analysis in a sample of publicly available high-level government documents describing china’s foreign policy rationale in southeast asia. purposive sampling was done to select few but information-rich sample texts (schreier 2018, p. 88). this sampling decision and approach is guided by the main objective of presenting an in-depth description of the five paramount leadership-periods-mao zedong, deng xiaoping, jiang zemin, hu jintao, and xi jinping-and their respective distinct operational codes or 6 of benevolence and unity: foreign policy rationale (he and feng, 2013). consistent with the parameters of purposive sampling, identifying candidate documents were limited by a selection criteria that is practical yet consistent with the main research objective (schreier 2018, 93). first, the selected documents were all obtained from open-access online repositories ensuring their wide availability. second, the naturally occurring documents were either penned or articulated by high-level foreign policy officials (e.g. president, premier, vice president, foreign ministers, and ambassadors) to ensure representativeness of a particular leadership policy legacy or operational code. and lastly, the subject focus of these documents pertain to a specific discussion of china’s overall vision and main rationale for sino-southeast asia relations. limiting the selection search using this set of criteria yields a selection of a few sample documents that are homogenous for each of the five leadership-period, and are still relevant, representative, and information-rich (patton 2014, p. 429). and to control for the differences resulting from variations in the number of publicly available documents within each leadership period, as for instance cold war leaderships would have relatively fewer documents that satisfy the criteria, a quota of three documents was determined to be sufficient given the objective of conducting an in-depth analysis of a few information-rich texts common in qualitative studies (see crouch and mckenzie, 2006; ruiz, 2009). similarly, the three unique documents selected for each leadership-period were purposively determined based on their consistency with the identified criteria. lastly, all official documents analyzed are english translations. while referring to official chinese foreign policy documents do provide a closer approximation of the leaders’ operational codes and logic, focusing on widely accessible english-language documents ensure that the specific descriptions unpacked are representations of relevant subjects (e.g. china, southeast asia) that china wants its foreign audience to specifically appreciate. since social identity is about status curation and projection, texts meant for external audiences also fit the analytical logic of this research. the focus is on uncovering salient discursive themes from the texts, which could point to the sit phenomena of categorization and self-enhancement, and ultimately china’s overall discourse of its foreign policy logic in southeast asia. these discursive themes are uncovered by conducting predicate analysis in reading the sample texts. doing predicate analysis entails looking for discursive devices that assigns “stereotypical, evaluative attributions of negative and positive traits” to relevant subjects-or the main actors in china’s story-telling (wodak 2001, p.73). the identified relevant subjects are (1) sino-southeast asia relations, (2) china, (3) southeast asia, and (4) western major powers. identifying and focusing on these four subjects is also consistent with the analytical objectives of sit to uncover the “defining characteristics” of “social categories” or the perceived in-groups and out-groups, which in this case are broadly represented by the four subjects (hogg et al 1995, p.259). analysis this section provides a discussion of the salient discursive themes from the sample texts that were uncovered through predicate analysis. the analyses below are guided by the following questions: (1) how has china described the subject, (2) what consistent themes in journal of asean studies 7 terms of common representations (i.e. predicates and descriptors) employed by various leaderships can be identified? the first part focusses on how china predicated or described ‘sino-southeast asia relations’ and the themes that they constitute. it is argued that ultimately, these themes make up china’s specific ‘discourse of unity’ in terms of how it perceives sino-southeast asia relations throughout the five leaderships. while there are notable changes in context and therefore the rallying point for in-group unity, what has been continuous is china’s commitment to discursively portray china and southeast asia as belonging to a similar ingroup. sino-southeast asia relations and china’s ‘discourse of unity’ china’s reference to ‘southeast asia’ as a distinct group only occurred substantially in recent political history. more specifically, china under the leaderships of mao zedong, and deng xiaoping tend to describe and refer to southeast asia within the larger ‘third world’ or ‘asia’ grouping. indeed, this observation is consistent with the division of the three worlds that mao zedong has formally stipulated in 1974, specifically stating that “developing countries in asia, africa, latin america and other regions belong to the third world” (ministry of foreign affairs of the people’s republic of china, 2014). on the other hand, clear reference to either a distinct southeast asian region, and asean as a single political entity, only started appearing in official texts during the post-cold war period, beginning with jiang zemin’s leadership. this is consistent with joseph cheng’s (1999) observation that china during this period has started to consider asean as one of the “poles in the multipolar power transfiguration in the asia-pacific region” (p. 177, also see wong, 2007). this represents a shift towards a more increased focus and a more specialized approach on the region within china’s foreign policy. despite this obvious change, china’s overall discourse towards southeast asia has been anchored on a continuous commitment to portray the two sides as being united as one in-group, as evidenced by four distinct discursive themes uncovered in this analysis. indeed, regardless of the changing international circumstances and leaderships in the last 70 years, china has often described sino-southeast asia relations on terms that evoke longstanding friendship and affinity. this points to china’s cognitive representation of itself and southeast asia as belonging in the same in-group of likeminded nations. discourse of unity: shared legacies and struggles the first theme under china’s discourse of unity points to shared victimhood, as both sides have jointly been victims of western imperialism and underdevelopment. this idea of a shared victimhood has mostly been invoked by the cold war leaderships of mao zedong and deng xiaoping. for instance, speaking to then indian prime minister jawaharlal nehru in 1954 on the overall conditions of asia as a region, mao zedong stated that asia as a whole is united by the “common experience” of having “suffered from foreign rule” (mao, 1954a). and in 8 of benevolence and unity: zhou enlai’s speech in front of the historic asian-african conference in 1955, he referred to the same discourse of common victimhood to make the point that the developing world “found it easier to understand each other and have long deep sympathy and concern for one another” because of this shared suffering (zhou, 1955). continuing this story of shared victimhood, succeeding leaderships have also invoked the idea, although less prominently during jiang zemin’s and hu jintao’s regimes. as stipulated in deng xiaoping’s description of “china’s foreign policy of peace”, the “third world” have been “victims of hegemonism,” thereby making “union and cooperation” to safeguard world peace and oppose hegemonism a rational group focus (1982). likewise, xi jinping in 2013 also referred to the same discourse of a common struggle between china and asean, stating that the two “had sympathized and supported each other in their respective struggle for national independence and liberation in the last century”. indeed, china has constantly pointed to this unique experience of being subjected to imperialism, or the general antagonism coming from the west, to argue for a natural affinity between southeast asia and china. and this only served to sharpen the group boundaries that constitute china’s constructed in-group. in addition to shared victimhood, china also turns to the discursive theme of shared historical legacies to solidify its claim to in-group affinity with southeast asia. for instance, it is common to find predicates within high-level speeches referring to china and southeast asia’s long history of contacts, friendships, and overall good relations, thereby justifying ingroup affinity and solidarity (see xi, 2013; wen, 2011; li, 2009; jiang, 1997; mao, 1963). although this discursive theme emphasizing ‘traditional friendship’ can be uncovered in most high-level speeches since mao’s era, this is found to be most prominent in speeches under hu jintao’s and xi jinping’s leaderships. xi jinping in particular came to support the decision to make southeast asia a crucial component of the maritime silk road initiative (msri) owing to both sides’ “long history” of friendship and contacts (2013). in addition to this, he would also describe longstanding neighborhood unity by referencing specific historical anecdotes and images that underpin a “history of amicable exchanges” between the two sides (xi, 2015a). in the inaugural speech of the msri delivered in front of indonesian legislators, the chinese leader points to the voyages of admiral zheng he as testament to “stories of friendly exchanges” between china and the peoples of southeast asia (2013). extending this pattern of referring to history, premier wen jiabao (2011) under the previous leadership talked about how asean and china “enjoy geographical, cultural, and historical proximity” and pointed to cherishing “traditional friendly ties” as part of the usual assessment of asean-china relations. just like with what was observed in china’s shared victimhood discourse, this constant reference to shared historical legacies constitutes a discursive theme in itself that serves to solidify china’s claim to having a natural in-group affinity with southeast asia. a contemporary version of the above representations of in-group unity has also emerged, owing to transnational challenges posed by the post-cold war order. china has also turned to shared struggles as a discursive theme to depict in-group solidarity amidst emerging transnational issues. for instance, then vice president hu jintao (1998) under the leadership of jiang zemin, recalled in his speech to the asean summit how china and asean “have journal of asean studies 9 pulled together in times of trouble and supported one another” during the asian financial crisis. succeeding leaderships of hu jintao and xi jinping have also frequently referred to this shared experience of surviving the financial crises to emphasize china-asean solidarity (wen, 2011; tong, 2011; li, 2009; xi, 2013, 2015; li, 2020). in other instances where this discourse of shared experiences have been utilized, china-asean bilateral relations was described as being cooperative towards each other, especially when it comes to jointly “responding to major natural disasters” as well as “controlling such communicable diseases such as sars and avian influenza” (tong, 2011). almost a decade after, this narrative of jointly combatting transregional issues finds its way in li keqiang’s most recent speech delivered during the 2020 bilateral summit: “in times of adversities, from the two financial crises, to major natural disasters such as tsunamis and sars and to the sudden onslaught of covid-19, we have always stood together and looked out for each other in the spirit of a community with a shared future” (li, 2020). indeed, natural disasters, pandemics, and financial crises serve the same purpose as ‘colonialism’ and ‘underdevelopment’—central world issues that were most commonly invoked during the time of mao and deng—in allowing china to claim solidarity and natural affinity with southeast asia. across the five leaderships, continuity in terms of maintaining a consistent discursive agenda of projecting a unified in-group can be observed. this constitutes china’s discourse of unity when it comes to how it perceives sino-southeast asia relations. more specifically, the three discursive themes discussed so far all point to perceived common internal characteristics between the two sides, often emphasizing similarities in ways of life as a result of common roots and experiences. moving to the last discursive theme that make up china’s discourse of unity, china refers to shared goals and dreams, or common destiny, to emphasize why both sides persistently enjoy solidarity therefore in-group unity. discourse of unity: towards a common destiny counting as a fourth discursive theme under china’s broad discourse of unity, china’s leaders also frequently point to shared trajectories and objectives of maintaining peace and achieving genuine development to emphasize natural affinity with southeast asia. if the above three discursive themes emphasize past and present characteristics that have made the in-group naturally constituting, this last discursive theme points to how the in-group shares a common vision of what the future should look like. as wen jiabao (2011) has declared in front of asean leaders, both sides “hold similar positions and views, face the same situations and challenges, and pursue the same goals on many key issues”. this fourth discursive theme appeared to be the most common across all five leaderships and the respective texts inspected, albeit adapting with each different contexts. more specifically, while cold war era leaderships under mao zedong and deng xiaoping tend to focus on china-southeast asia unity against an imperialist western bloc, post-cold war era leaderships from jiang to xi on the other hand tend to focus on unity towards establishing and maintaining good-neighborliness within the region. 10 of benevolence and unity: during mao zedong’s leadership, the main shared objective according to leaders would be to categorically oppose western powers and colonialism. zhou enlai (1955) for example referred to “complete independence” as the common “objective for which the great majority of asian and african countries have to struggle for a long time”. during this time, much of the common objectives of asia as described would pertain to the more salient conflict between china and the west, or what china perceives as between arrogant big powers and unwilling victims. as such, china frequently referred to the shared objective of asia and the ‘third world’ to mutually “rise against colonialism,” to “protect ourselves” from the western powers, and even “jointly propose that [west] hand over their big-power status” (zhou, 1955; mao, 1954a). although this narrative of going against western major powers grew less salient over time, it was still noticeably present under the leadership of deng xiaoping. as reflected in one of deng’s speeches on china’s foreign policy, china and asia jointly maintains an “opposition to hegemonism” as both sides seek to “safeguard world peace” (deng, 1982). it was also crucial for china during this period to emphasize that the in-group should “depend on ourselves to develop and lift ourselves out of poverty” (deng, 1988). as evident in these excerpts, the ripe opposition to major powers that was prevalent in official texts during mao’s leadership was gradually being combined with justifications resting on common economic prosperity, and world peace. in succeeding leaderships of jiang, hu, and xi, a gradual change in subject and tone can be observed, where win-win cooperation and regional peace took center-stage as main objectives uniting china and southeast asia. indeed, succeeding leaderships have introduced foreign policy ideas that go beyond the previous common objective of rising against the west and its perceived legacies of hegemonism or cold war politics, towards a more benign objective of achieving common prosperity . under jiang zemin’s leadership, the idea of maintaining good-neighborliness between asean and china was introduced. the concept first appeared in a joint statement released by both parties during the first china-asean summit in 1997 (asean, 2012). the concept itself stands for peaceful resolution and negotiations among china and asean countries with respect to conflicts, an emphasis on regular bilateral dialogue, and pursuing deeper economic cooperation within the region (liu and tsai, 2014). it subsequently appeared in speeches delivered under jiang’s leadership, often describing china-asean relations as jointly pursuing a “good neighborly partnership of mutual trust to the 21st century” (jiang, 1997; zhu, 1999). ensuring discursive continuity with previous leaderships, zhu rongji in 1999 has also reiterated that the “partnership of good neighborliness and mutual trust with asean countries” is pursued “on the basis of the five principles of peaceful co-existence”. the five principles were proposed by china in 1954, together with india and myanmar, as guiding principles inspired by the conditions and needs of the developing world in doing international relations. beyond the emphasis on good-neighborliness and its component values, the three postcold war leaderships have always articulated pursuing win-win or mutually beneficial cooperation between asean and china as their shared objectives. as wen jiabao (2011) has put it, pursuing “economic development and improvement of people’s lives” in the region are the “most urgent and important task” for both asean and china. under the leadership of hu journal of asean studies 11 jintao, there was much emphasis on asean-china relations pursuing deeper economic cooperation (wen, 2011; tong, 2011; li, 2009). this was also the same case for china under xi jinping, where much detail is usually spent on discussing how practical cooperation in various areas, including extensive cooperation via institutional innovations such as the belt and road initiative, have consistently been improving. indeed, it is this dual focus on ensuring a peaceful environment and deepening economic cooperation in the region, which china has referred to as “a more closely knit china-asean common destiny,” that defines a united ingroup according to this discursive theme. takeaways the sociocognitive process of categorization accounts for china’s continuous emphasis on in-group unity. the discourse of unity uncovered in the analysis of the sampled texts shows that china persistently sees itself as belonging in the same in-group with southeast asia by virtue of their unique background (e.g. victimhood, histories, experiences), and their common future or destiny. moreover, this uniqueness in terms of what the two sides share together, makes the in-group distinct from an out-group of western major powers in history led by the united states. this points to self-enhancement at work. overall, china’s discourse of unity toward sino-southeast asia relations allow for a positive representation of china, which speaks of how imperative the region is for china’s identity construction as a major power. discourses on relevant actors: ‘benevolent china’ for a ‘developing southeast asia’ this section discusses the predicates and descriptors china has exclusively attached to the remaining subjects—(1) itself, (2) southeast asia, and (3) an out-group of western major powers. similar to the discussion above, this section focuses on identifying continuities and changes that characterize china’s respective discourses with respect to these relevant actors. benevolent china: non-hegemonic and not a ‘threat’ across the five leaderships, there has been a consistent trend of presenting china as a benevolent and therefore peace-loving major power. benevolence (rén 仁 ) in chinese philosophy largely refers to one of the core ideas of confucianism where if applied to foreign policy, tends to emphasize great power empathy and fairness (yan, 2018). in addition to these values, benevolence also point to a general aversion toward hegemonic behavior and policies (xu jin 2011). indeed, china is well-known for frequently infusing its official speeches and documents on its foreign policy behavior with promises of rejecting hegemonism and of never seeking power politics; the sample of texts in this paper also represent this consistent trend (see deng, 1982; jiang, 1997; zhu, 1999; hu, 2011; xi, 2015a). yet despite the continuity of stressing the benevolence of the ‘self’, china’s presentation of this norm has varied across the five leaderships as they emphasize different priorities and experiences. 12 of benevolence and unity: for instance, pronouncements made under the cold war era leaderships of mao and deng are situated within the rigid ideological competition between the west and china. as such, china’s depiction of the self as a benevolent power is often made in explicit comparison with what it perceives to be the immoral or unrighteous legacies of its out-group consisting collectively of western major powers. in fact, it was only during these two leaderships that china often mention the west, or the united states more specifically as a hegemon. and these claims were in direct contrast with china’s consistent pledge to non-hegemony. for instance, deng has once openly accused the west of “practicing hegemonism and sowing discord” among countries in the developing world (deng, 1982). likewise, mao zedong noted that the united states in particular have “benefited from the two world wars” in terms of its overall progress, while continuing to rely on its “atomic bomb, heavy artillery, and a strong navy and air force” to maintain their dominance of the current international order (mao, 1954b). he has also often appealed for solidarity with his asian counterparts, noting that “us people of the east, have been bullied by western imperialist powers” and that the dominance of these “colonial powers” will inevitably face opposition from their victims (mao 1954a, 1954b). indeed, it is common for cold war narratives of china’s foreign policy as reflected in official speeches to directly highlight the perceived immoralities of the western major power out-group, while depicting china as “hoping for peace more than anything else” (deng, 1982). therefore, within the background of intense ideological differentiation between china and its perceived outgroup, china ambitions a benevolent power image by highlighting its benign qualities at the expense of putting the western powers in a bad light. mentioning its out-group explicitly ensures a clearer picture of the zero-sum comparisons china promotes for itself. for the post-cold war leaderships on the other hand, these discursive zero-sum comparisons are mentioned less explicitly in official speeches and documents. yet despite this tamed rhetoric, the spirit of these comparisons remain noticeable in high-level discourses (see wang, 2013). for example, jiang zemin (2000) underscores chinese benevolence by focusing on its commitment “to promote a multi-polar international configuration” that “differs from the old one in which big powers contend for hegemony and carved up spheres of influence as seen in history”. as for more explicit negative descriptions that mention these big powers, in particular the united states, china’s responses to specific conflicts and criticisms to its own initiatives provide examples (see wang, 2015). for instance, china has explicitly accused the united states of “practicing unilateralism and economic hegemony” as it engages in “trade bullyism practices” against china under the previous trump administration (information office of the state council on the prc 2018, p. 52). and in former mofa vice minister he yafei’s book titled china and global governance (2019), the distinctions are more explicit as he refers to “the united states and other developed countries in the west [as] having always upheld global governance by the elite class” at the expense of the interests of developing countries (p. 85). crucially, china’s also argues for its benevolence by highlighting the logic behind a sino-southeast asia in-group and by contrasting its out-group’s relationship with the region. for instance, china still harkens back to how asia is the first to forward the five principles in bandung as they collectively struggled against western “imperialism, colonialism, and journal of asean studies 13 hegemonism,” and how this forged an “asian way of cooperation” toward “a community of common destiny [that] has increasingly taken shape” in 21st century asia (xi, 2015b; liu, 2014). and in the more focused context of sino-southeast asia relations, china would often remark that “close neighbors are better than distant relatives” to qualify the unique relationship of china and southeast asia on the basis of shared histories, common struggles, and common destiny (xi, 2015b; zheng, 2005). being close neighbors also implied that intrusion by western powers in regional affairs prove counterproductive toward “good-neighborly friendship and mutually beneficial cooperation” which has served the in-group well for many years (huang 2020). indeed, when it comes to china’s discourse of its benevolent self under post-cold war leaderships, china has still referred to implicit categorizations between a china-led in-group and a western-led out-group that emphasizes value-laden narratives of their respective relationships with southeast asia. china has also sought to highlight its benevolence under the post-cold war leaderships by reasserting its commitments to settling disputes fairly, and emphasizing peace and development as the central tenets of its foreign policy. at the same time, narratives of a ‘china threat’ also provided added rationale for further emphasis on these objectives. meant to distort global perceptions on china’s rise, this “master narrative” of a ‘china threat’ traces its origins from us scholarly and policy debates as well as mass media descriptions, that zoom in on perceived “military and economic threats towards its neighbors and the united states” (wu 2007, p. 135) as such, china has consistently emphasized throughout these three leaderships that it is a “good neighbor, good friend, and a good partner” to asean despite frequent challenges in their relationship (jiang, 1997; wen, 2011; xi, 2013). in 1998, then vice president hu jintao underscored china’s commitment in ensuring “friendly consultation on an equal footing” in managing ongoing disputes it has with some asean members. this predication describing china’s commitment to an impartial dialogue and negotiation among concerned parties has been a mainstay in the pronouncements of succeeding leaderships (tong, 2011; wen, 2011; xi, 2013; li, 2020). even the cold war leaderships of mao and deng have consistently tried to reassure the developing world of its foreign policy trajectories as they always stress that china is “in urgent need of a peaceful international environment for the development of [their] independent and sovereign economy” (zhou, 1955). deng xiaoping’s foreign policy doctrine of ‘keeping a low profile’ has very clear similarities in terms of making a strong connection between peace in the international front, and economic development for china (pang, 2020). this commitment to international peace for the sake of internal development became more pronounced under the leadership of hu jintao, through the relative institutionalization of the concept of “peaceful development” in china’s foreign policy doctrine, even going as far as pledging that “china will not deviate from [this] path… even when [it] becomes stronger in the future” (dai, 2011; also see zheng, 2005). and while the current academic literature on xi jinping’s foreign policy has observed that china is increasingly becoming more assertive at the expense of this longstanding peaceful foreign policy doctrine, its official pronouncements still maintain that “china is committed to peaceful development and pursues an independent foreign policy of peace,” even claiming it as a doctrine that has been held by china “starting with [their] 14 of benevolence and unity: forefathers” (xi, 2013; xi, 2015a; li, 2020). overall, this narrative of peaceful development not only pose as a counternarrative to the ongoing discourse of a ‘china threat’ but it also serve to sharpen the distinction between what china portrays as its benevolent self, and the hegemonic dispositions it has tried so hard to dissociate from since the time of mao. in relation to its neighbors in southeast asia, china has consistently described itself through discursive themes that highlight its perceived benevolence as a trustworthy partner and ultimately, a good neighbor. as xu jin (2011) has noted in his analysis of mencius’ philosophy of benevolent leadership and its applications in understanding chinese foreign policy, “the various chinese governments have firmly opposed hegemony and hegemonism… since 1949” thereby in line with how the pre-qin thinker understood the importance of benevolence (p. 170). whether this can be observed as being true or not on the ground, for instance with how southeast asian nations perceive china’s actions, is another topic for discussion. but what is certain is china’s persistent commitment in constructing a discourse of itself as a benevolent partner for southeast asia. developing southeast asia and china’s consequential role as what has been observed in the earlier discussion on predicates describing sinosoutheast asia relations, china only started substantially referring to southeast asia as a group under post-cold war leaderships. in terms of china’s frequent descriptions, the predicates uncovered have frequently described southeast asia as an economically developing region, which often times struggle in this objective, together with portrayals depicting china as its supportive partner. ultimately, this combination of consistent predicates seek to depict southeast asia as a recipient of a beneficial partnership from china. the discourse of a ‘developing southeast asia’ intends to emphasize the region’s focus on economic development, while also recognizing the relevant progress of the region in this area. approaching the 21st century, china’s pronouncements often highlight the region’s progress in “pressing ahead with its process to attain industrialization, modernization, and integration,” as well as in “recovering the economy” after surviving the asian financial crisis (jiang, 1997; hu, 1998). similarly, this was also the theme for the first decade of the century, as china continues to describe the region as casualty to the “imbalanced development between developing countries and developed counterparts,” while also recognizing how the region has been “plagued by serious financial and debt crises” (li, 2009; wen, 2011). likewise, the region’s efforts to “address instability and underdevelopment” through “a distinctive asean approach” has been a consistent point of recognition for china in characterizing the development of the region (xi, 2015a). yet it is in this context of presenting southeast asia’s development experience that china associates itself as having a consequential presence in the fate of the region. for instance, citing financial crises, china claims that its decision “not to devalue its currency” comes from the initiative to “help other southeast asian countries” obtain economic recovery (tong, 2011). likewise, china would often indicate that it is asean’s largest economic partner in terms of overall trade, as well as often the first outside player to come into formal agreements with the journal of asean studies 15 group (wen, 2011; tong, 2011; xi, 2015a; li, 2020). as li keqiang (2020) has prided, “china has been number one on many fronts among asean’s dialogue partners” in terms of “forging strategic partnerships… and giving unequivocal support”. china has also been consistently vocal in expressing its support for asean integration as well as supporting asean in taking a more proactive role in regional cooperation in greater east asia. and when it comes to china’s flagship projects such as the bri and other recent development initiatives, china’s leadership has not been shy in declaring the region as “the first to benefit” from these ambitious projects (xi, 2015a; li, 2020). ultimately, these predications press the discourse of a developing southeast asia largely benefiting from sound relations with china. from ‘good neighbors’ to reliable ‘business partners,’ china continues to portray in-group solidarity as it presents southeast asia in a way that matches its discourse of itself as a benevolent major power. takeaways the discourses of a ‘benevolent china’ and a ‘developing southeast asia’ also point to categorization and self-enhancement processes at work. in terms of further self-enhancement, china’s portrayal as a benevolent power was constructed through comparisons to a western major power out-group, as well as through commitments to principles and norms that challenge major power hegemonism. in terms of further categorization, the discourse of a ‘developing southeast asia’ benefiting from ‘benevolent china’ seemingly portray a purposeful in-group where peace and development are simultaneously achieved. to this latter point, it can be said that southeast asia’s relations with china also serves as a valid prototype for its growing ingroup, as china is able to showcase what a non-threatening, benevolent china can mean for developing countries alike. conclusions this paper has attempted to uncover china’s ‘story-telling’ of its relations with southeast asia on the basis of the theoretical assumptions outlined by social identity theory. as such, this paper sought to contribute to the growing literature on sit as applied in the discipline of international relations and chinese foreign policy in three specific ways. first, it focused on the dual sociocognitive processes of categorization and self-enhancement as indicators of social identity phenomena at work, which existing works on sit’s application in ir have yet to adequately explore. second, it sought to supplement the existing focus on great power status rivalry and competition as usual points of inquiry, and focused more on how such status rivalry can be manifested in specific relationships and policy areas such as sinosoutheast asia relations, as opposed to broad arenas of grand strategies and international norms which hitherto have been the focus of inquiry in this growing research area. and lastly, this paper has also provided analytical evidence indicating that sino-southeast asia relations is being treated by china preferentially and in sit language, prototypically as an in-group stereotype worth emulating (hogg et al, 2005). therefore, this paper systematically provides evidence on how the prototyping dimension of social identity phenomenon can also be explored 16 of benevolence and unity: within interstate dynamics. and in this specific case, it was shown that china portrays its relations with southeast asia as hard evidence of its benevolence towards developing countries. this last point also has several implications for existing and future research on sino-southeast asia relations. in terms of being portrayed as a prototypical in-group consistent with sit assumptions, it can be said that china is also trying to send the message to prospective members of its growing in-group, ideally developing countries adhering to its normative causes, that a mutually beneficial relationship with benevolent china is possible. indeed, this observed dynamics of prototyping southeast asia is also consistent with the xi administration’s focus on the region in terms of its relative significance within china’s neighborhood policy. likewise, it also echoes existing studies highlighting a step-wise process to china’s “grand strategy to reshape the regional order in asia, and eventually the global order with new ideas, norms, and rules for ir and global governance” (song, 2020, p. 245; also see callahan, 2016, reeves, 2018). china has constructed a story of a ‘benevolent china’ united with ‘developing southeast asia’ to provide a positive representation of itself in light of its continuous rise to great power status. from this story-telling, it can be said that china has indeed benefited from southeast asia ideationally as much as ‘developing southeast asia’ has materially benefited from china. given the important role of sino-southeast asia relations in china’s overall pursuit for and presentation of a positive identity, it is highly likely that the region will continue to be a crucial strategic as well as diplomatic focus of china. the relatively fast disbursement of donated vaccines for covid-19 in the region is a recent example of this continuing prioritization. likewise, it could also be likely that china leverages on this grand story of sino-southeast asian unity it has constructed ever since in moments where its benevolence is being questioned, most particularly when it comes to territorial conflicts with specific southeast asian countries, to shed light on the good and downplay the unpleasant. perhaps as a next step for observers interested in inspecting this dynamics further, potential gaps and consistencies in terms of actions and discourses of southeast asia’s role in china’s foreign policy can also be examined. overall, this paper has highlighted the centrality of a pursuit for a positive and distinct identity in china’s foreign policy. china aspires to be perceived differently vis-à-vis other western major powers in history, and it has sought this alternative image by forwarding norms and values in international relations that it perceives to be unique, which allows it to construct a discourse of itself as a benevolent major power. in terms of how identity is manifested in discourse, it is also clear that china has referred to a discourse of deep cultural and historical affinity with southeast asia, as it argues for natural familiarity, thereby allowing it to paint a picture of a major power cut from the same thread as southeast asia. in this way, china’s benevolence can be easily appreciated. but southeast asia as a region ought to be wary. as this study has shown, china is indeed a discourse power as song (2020) has emphasized. china actively utilizes historical narratives and recollections of particular experiences in highlighting a certain reading of how the region has fared in the face of a rising china. the power also lies with small countries in the region. china’s preferred discourses will only have sufficient power and believability if subjects being depicted, as well as audiences targeted, lend meaning to journal of asean studies 17 these messages and proclaim them to be accurate as well. in this sense, china’s aspiration for a distinct and positive image is not a one-way street—southeast asia can be a grateful partner, as well as an impartial auditor of china’s longstanding identity ambitions. about the authors enrico v. gloria is an assistant professor at the department of political science, university of the philippines diliman. his areas of interests include chinese foreign policy, philippine foreign policy, foreign policy discourses, and major power status. he obtained his master of laws (politics) degree from tsinghua university, and his bachelor’s degree (economics) from up diliman. references aoyama, r. 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coffeetalk forum? this article evaluates the bases for asean and demonstrates that asean has reasons to stay strong as regional cooperation. rather than denying tensions, this article agrees that there are tensions among members but it also recognizes such challenge as the one that unites asean members together. there are some dilemmas among members of asean that does not left much room for members but to cooperate with each other: the dilemma of risking higher tensions among members, the dilemma of risking the benefits of existing pooling of resources, the dilemma of improving connectivity among members and the dilemma of facing global pressure on good governance and liberal democracy. keywords: asean, regionalism, dilemma, commitment, diplomacy introduction how sustainable is asean (association of south east asian nations) as a regional organization? the confidence in asean used to be high, but the recent case of failure of asean to issue a joint communique at the 45th asean ministerial meeting in phnom penh had raised serious doubts on the centrality of asean in the hearts of asean members. at some levels, it brought concern externally too on how competent asean is as an organization to handle disagreements on sensitive issues. no confidence means lesser confidence in working coherently as a regional cooperation, which means asean could become mere groups of coffee-talk between members. is asean that close to jeopardy? asean may be like any other regional groupings; created based on agreements on members to uphold certain values and maintained because of certain common interests. its dimensions of cooperation are also similar, socio-cultural engagement, economic cooperation, political and security building measures. but these are not the sole ties between asean members. this paper evaluates the bases for asean to stay strong as regional cooperation. it argues that asean is not built and maintained based on consensus and agreements alone but also on dilemmas and common challenges. the current developments in regional setting and global power shift have significance too in how members see and cooperate with each other. of course, there is always a potential for severe unusual circumstance that would challenge asean unity, but current unfolding of events do not suggest such path. all would be discussed in light of principles of diplomacy, current events and historical ties between country members. 16 why asean could stay stronger reasons for common agreements no man is an island and so is a nationstate. no nation-state can bear the reality of being alone, isolated, let alone encircled by external pressures that they have no influence to mitigate. regionalism is one means to wither external pressures through agreements, trust and intensive cooperation among countries in certain territory. theoretically speaking, regionalism is a grouping of countries that share either common history, common values, or common goals or combination of all of these. the idea is to create common identity (such as those aimed by european countries through eu), enhance economic cooperation, or other kinds of cooperation. with that logic, the policies developed in regionalism tend to favour protectionism in favour of members’ (socioeconomic) growth. however, in 1990s, there’s the-socalled “new regionalism” where the idea is to create “open regionalism”. the focus becomes heavy on economic cooperation, particularly trade. countries seek trade deals, have no problem (or are actually happy about) welcoming more countries to join the grouping. as grugel (2004) said, the new regionalism is a state-led project in the context of global transformation, part of state strategy to secure or holding onto markets and investment in the face of global transformation; and to adopt multilateral approach in handling issues considered important for the time. in reality, asean is different from the typical regionalism. on the one hand asean indeed share common values and goals, but parts of their history (including among members and with outside countries) are divergent. when asean was founded, the idea was less about establishing common identity and more about downsizing and preventing tensions among members. the case of regionalism in asean, particularly in the early years, should be seen in light of a search for new identity as countries used to be known as mere colonies of western countries, who had successfully supported (and initiated) a massive and influential movement of the developing world to stand different from the western-eastern divide during the cold war: the non-aligned movement. while asean and non-aligned movement are two separate things, there is the similar desire between members in the two groupings to assert firm position that are different from stands asserted by “big” powers. the two groupings enhanced each other’s presence. established in bangkok on 8 august 1967, asean members began with just 5 countries: indonesia, philippines, malaysia, singapore, and thailand. five foreign ministers agreed to sign the asean declaration: foreign minister adam malik of indonesia, narciso ramos of the philippines, tun abdul razak of malaysia, s. rajaratnam of singapore and thanat khoman of thailand. the five agreed to build a tool and space to allow enhanced cooperation in the economic, social, cultural, technical, educational and other fields in the promotion of regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice, rule of law, and adherence of principles of the united nations. everyone agreed to bind countries in friendship, joint efforts and sacrifices for the sake of peace, freedom, prosperity in the region. touching upon the principle of “open regionalism”, actually since the start, asean already stated its openness for participation by all states in the southeast asian regions which subscribe to its aims, principles and purposes. its goal was not to be exclusive but to be open in creating manageable relations in the region. journal of asean studies 17 what made the five asean leaders agreed on the terms of regional grouping is most impressive, especially considering the young-age of these countries, all (except thailand) are former colonies and all are developing nations (with limited resources and experiences in sustaining economic growth). instead of competing, they agree to join hands. this was ground-breaking in their own times. based on documents from asean secretariat, there were several issues that brought them together: 1. repeated tensions between indonesia, the philippines and malaysia. thailand brokered the reconciliation between these countries. 2. awareness that each country are pursuing own limited objectives and dissipating its meagre resources in the overlapping and often conflicting resources. this was raised by philippines’ narciso ramos. 3. desire as “a region to stand on its own feet, strong enough to defend itself against any negative influence from outside region”. this was raised by indonesia’s adam malik. on similar count, tun abdul razak of malaysia said that southeast asian countries need decisive and collective action to prevent the eruption of intra-regional conflicts and manipulation against one another. rajaratnam of singapore feared the risk of “balkanization” affecting southeast asia. unlike the case of european union or mercosur in latin america, asean despite its birth during the “old regionalism” concept, it was not aimed at protectionism per se, let alone narrowly-defined economic cooperation. in fact, since its birth, asean already calls this an open grouping for any countries in southeast asia to join. the idea is to create strength that can withstand political whirlwind in global relations, while at the same time develop mechanism to tap resources in this region in wise way. while asean members agreed to defend themselves from external forces, it was not a political or military alliance. there was not even an idea of using this grouping as a tool to joint military forces in defending the region. in fact, despite the desire to be an independent-minded region, asean doesn’t oppose military and political alliance of some members with external powers (e.g. philippines and singapore with the us). in terms political security cooperation, the inclusion of countries in greater mekong sub-region (gms) suggests that asean’s goal is indeed to be inclusive of all countries in the region, despite different ideologies. asean saw the potentials and wanted to take advantage of the gms cooperation, which had been established with initiatives from the united nations, cambodia, laos, thailand and south vietnam. the cooperation opened ways for countries in gms, laos, thailand, myanmar, cambodia, vietnam, to exploit the waterways for energy, irrigation, transportation and fisheries instead of engaging in on-and-off wars like they used to be (mya than & george abonyi 2001). so there is a foundation to belief that gms countries would evolve stronger when tied together in a frame of cooperation. over time, we also see how asean built more tools for confidence building measures among members and beyond. the creation of zopfan (zone of peace, freedom and neutrality) on november 27, 1971 was aimed at declaring shared responsibility for members to create social stability in the region and to reject any forms of external interference in any manifestation in the region. the idea also was to preserve local identities which would bring closer cooperation and trust among members. in declaration of asean concord in bali 1974, such commitment is strengthened with the treaty of amity and cooperation (tac) to respect zopfan and 18 why asean could stay stronger if any inter-country problems happen in the region, immediate actions would be taken to settle dispute in most effective and efficient means. in the treaty, members agree that the use of force against each other should never be done and everyone agree to refrain from interference in other countries’ internal affairs. the tool chosen to manage tension was cooperation. today tac becomes the tool to reach out to big powers and non-southeast asian countries with stakes in southeast asia such as the united states, european union, india, china, even australia, russia and new zealand. in the political security front, there is asean regional forum (arf) formed in 1994, a dialog forum to build confidence among asean members and partners and to be utilized as preventive diplomacy in the region. this forum is used as a tool to reduce tensions and avert the possibility of war by eliminating elements of secrecy in military activity, discussing potential adversary, and working together in building norms and communication lines that would enhance confidence with each other. by being members of arf, countries agree to manage tension, avoid conflict, and find peaceful resolution in cost-effective ways. in arf, asean has 10 dialogue partners (australia, canada, china, the eu, india, japan, new zealand, rok, russia and the united states), one asean observer (png) as well as the dprk, mongolia, pakistan, east timor, bangladesh and sri lanka. so, the strength of asean as a regional organization is supported by three major commitments: 1. amity based on respect and principle of non-intervention, 2. confidence to each other that most effective and efficient ways to settle tension and dispute would be chosen, and 3. asean as instrument to strengthen cooperation for member countries and with those beyond. these factors alone are unique, where asean is never intended to be exclusive but rather as a key instrument agreed by all members and any countries “passing” this region to settle potential differences. the vision of asean has been built for further futures. the tricky part here is the commitment that is exclusive for the member, isn’t it? what is cooperation if the members cannot feel any exclusive benefits for being members? on the one hand asean has provided prestige in international relations, which is crucial for diplomacy by developing countries but the “openness” of asean as a regional cooperation allows the challenges for asean centrality to grow. the fourth major commitment any organizations, especially those that have chosen to legalize its status as binding organizations with standard-operatingprocedures applied to members, need to keep evolving based on the needs and wants of members. by choosing to be an organization that is based on compliance, asean must be present to cater to the needs of members and, to some extent, just to members. the plus-plus partners may enjoy some benefits, but theirs should be a second or third priority. in other words, when asean codified its norms, rules and values and established the asean charter on december 15, 2008, there is a responsibility (and automatic expectation from members) to set clear (tangible) results for asean members and then hold accountability to their achievements over time. how to reconcile this fourth major commitment with the previous three? all must return to the members of asean. the secretariat of asean, which is agreed to be the focal points of actions, journal of asean studies 19 coordination and direction for members, can only be strong when empowered by initiatives, people and financial support from members. unlike a corporation whose board of executives can be recruited apart from the pool of internal people, asean board of executives must be selected from asean bests. but i am not going to dissect the management issues within asean here. after all, as much as it is a legal institution, asean was and still is a political organization. it exists and remains strong for political reasons and because of political commitments from the higher authorities in each country members. here, the nature of conflicts today becomes an important variable to take into account in the strength of asean. robert kaplan (2011) wrote in foreign policy, that the future of world conflict is in the sea in asia. he made notes on the high potential for world-class conflict emanating from the south china sea conflict. paul wolfowitz, former us ambassador to indonesia who was also the second-senior person from pentagon, said in 2009 that if only asean as a regional organization is absent, conflicts between asian countries might escalate to an unprecedented level. in parts, although very implicitly, robert kaplan had sensed the unsettled issues among members in asean, which is territorial borders. on the seas, there are no agreements yet (that is not even pending) on borders between indonesia-philippines, malaysia let alone with non-members such as indonesia-timor leste, indonesiaaustralia, philippines-china, malaysiachina and so-on. on land, there is still pending homework on border agreements or monitoring between thailand-cambodia, indonesia-malaysia, logically, if non-intervention is among the major commitments of asean, then the unsettled border agreements could jeopardize relations. yetwe should remember that asean came together because of bad relations between them in the first place. would they render to destructive measures facing challenges in their border front? it would jeopardize their efforts for decades, wouldn’t it? this is the first dilemma that would keep asean members in amity with each other despite tensions. there are problems but highlighting the problem for the sake of raising the issues would trigger more problems. secondly, the world has changed. theories have suggested that the practice of international relations in the 21st century have changed much compared to the previous century. the complexity have grown much due to the growing numbers and types of actors involved, i.e. state and non-state actors (from business mogul to media professionals, criminals and nongovernmental organizations). the number of diplomatic activities have more than tripled in the past decade (leguey-feilleux, 2011); requiring heads of states, ministers and diplomats to travel extensively and frequently around the world to “make a difference” in their missions. while conventional power of military weapons and nuclear still creates jitters in the relationships among countries, the socioeconomic interdependence among nations have induced countries to be more cautious in building relationship with other countries. as noted by temsak chalermpalanupap (2009), there were no summits held during asean’s first decade. but in the wake of asean’s inaugural summit in 1976, meetings among the top leaders of the members grew more frequent and more formal. by 2007 there are summits of asean plus one (with japan, south korea and india); asean plus three (with china, japan, and south korea) and since 2005 the east asia summit (eas) comprising 20 why asean could stay stronger asean, australia, china, india, japan, new zealand and south korea. there are also more ministerial sectors involved in asean meetings including economics, finance, culture, society and environment. there are also other meeting formats including senior official meetings (som), committees, subcommittees and task forces. in other words, there is the component of “pooling of resources” that members have invested through dozens summits and thousands of coordinative meetings. when asean enlarged its membership to 10 nation-states, the numbers of meetings proliferated even more. would members risk those investments by hardening positions against each other? it is most likely not. this is the second dilemma that would keep asean members in amity with each other despite tensions. tough talk between policymakers is by no means the dominant tone of conversation between countries, even if they are so eager to resort to it. it is not the tone that would make things workable. in the 21st century engagement of countries, there is no such thing as non-negotiable values. core values are neither absolute nor rigid. the interdependence between nationstates has rendered rigidity impossible in managing difficult situations. hence we need to explore the interpretations and transformation of those values for countries under consideration (joseph fraenkel 1979, p.93). fraenkel once mentioned that the common denominator of all countries’ traditional basic core values is selfpreservation, which is flexibly defined, not only in political and socio-economic structure but also in ideological and cultural aspects. with increasing levels of comprehensive partnerships, regionalism and multilateralism, this way of looking at the defense of other countries would be more useful than comparing claims of sovereignty. the increasing mobility of people, money, investment, and information across borders had rendered rigid core-values of people, state and government obsolete. while asean citizens have yet to all feel and speak on behalf of asean, the identity of asean is an important part of discourse across asean countries. most people in asean may not know everything about asean but they won’t discard asean either. there is something emotional about asean among members, which is mostly about having friends to collaborate with in the uncertainty of world affairs. among diplomats in asean, the emotion is even greater, which is anchored on the hope for having a big single community that is economically advanced and politically respected around the world. such hope is what keeps the “investments” among members going through asean activities. so, when it comes to creating exclusive benefits for asean members, the existing opportunity for that is the array of partnerships with the asean plus members and beyond. the politicians and diplomats in asean are the ones mostly at work for garnering such partnerships. at least at the current stage, they are the busiest one. they build links, networks and dialogs which foster connections between governments, business entities and in very few instances also academic/research institutions. an important project for asean members is the asean connectivity project. the idea of this project was first proposed by thai prime minister abhisit vejjajiva at the opening ceremony of the 42nd asean foreign ministers’ meeting on july 20, 2009 in phuket, thailand. he proposed that “community connectivity” should be one objectives of the asean community 2015, meaning that goods, people, investments and initiatives should travel obstacle-free throughout the region. asean’s software and hardware should be journal of asean studies 21 connected. the initiative was endorsed and a master plan was created. on october 28, 2010, asean adopted the hanoi declaration of the adoption of the master plan on asean connectivity, giving task to ministers, asean connectivity coordinating committee and the national coordinators supported by the asean secretariat to oversee the implementation of the plan and report back to asean leaders. a study by the center of policy analysis and development for asia-pacific and african region at the indonesia’s ministry of foreign affairs (2011) concludes that the asean connectivity project is central to promote growth and cross-border socioeconomic interaction among asean members. if all country members share a strategic vision with strong commitment for all, then the limitations of current infrastructure facilities could be improved significantly. to date, there is still big homework not only in land connectivity but also in maritime connectivity. if the asean connectivity project works well, all parts of the countries in asean would not only enjoy business and social connectivity but also get the power generation they need for industrialization in the remote areas. the asean connectivity project is among those that asean as a legal organization should take accountability on and where members could feel the exclusive and direct benefits for being asean members. such project shows us the third dilemma in asean that then ties members together, i.e. that they can only grow stronger as economic powers if they join hands in building connectivity. on the one hand, the connectivity project is very costly financially. the socioeconomic gaps between members of asean are significant; some members are not happy if they have to minimize the gap through aids to the less-wealthy member countries. in the face of foreign investments and cooperation, there are occasions where some member countries prefer to stand on its own identity rather than as asean members. on the other hand, the bigger goodness of developments coming from partnership of asean plus can only be felt through asean membership. projects as big as the asean connectivity attract series of foreign investments. indeed, the fourth major commitment of asean, which is to bind members in agreements and concert of actions have generated more energy and hope to the world. it gives hope to non-asean members that asean after all could be a reliable organization that can make decisions and act on behalf of members. it gives a new meaning to the “asean way” where acharya (2001) mentioned that members are tied by norms. with the asean charter commitment, members have the responsibility to speak as one through one policy. is it too tough for asean? let us scrutinize this fourth major commitment of asean. david martin jones (2008) argued that the asean charter promotes two incompatible norms: one that maintains the traditional formula of non-interference in internal affairs as the basis of regional peace, and one that promotes democracy and fundamental freedoms. he noted that the charter calls, though somewhat ambiguously, for regional transformation, namely a transformation in the “legal and institutional framework” for the “promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms”. hence implicitly the charter calls for active strengthening of democratic values, good governance and rejection of unconstitutional and undemocratic change of government. it would rather be more cautious in concluding that asean is promoting two incompatible norms. i’d say instead that this is a reflection of the fourth dilemma that 22 why asean could stay stronger binds member countries in asean together, namely in responding to global pressure for good governance and liberal model of government accountability. not all country members in asean agree with the commitment implied in asean charter, but there is not much choice. the risk for standing alone on this issue is far greater. hence, the asean’s goal of promoting human rights and protecting freedoms should be seen from the perspective of political adjustment to the changing nature of diplomacy today. in the past, diplomacy did not go much further than bridging communication and cooperation between nations. at most diplomats may be assigned for counterintelligence activities, but changing domestic politics remained the domain of politicians rather than diplomats. today, diplomacy bears the responsibility to promote similar values to partner countries, and diplomats must be sensitive to the domestic political developments of partners. consequently, it is quite common today to observe missions for bringing likeminded-countries together and closer to each other. and the mission is clearer, which is to endorse leaders and countries that support peaceful elections as mechanism for transfer of power. why? partly because democratic countries are believed to garner more peace and distribute more to people (ratnitzky, 2003) and partly because democratic governance is believed to be the triumphant and final form of human government (fukuyama, 1992). imagine if each country member in asean must bear such international pressure alone. the governments in singapore, malaysia and myanmar, for instance, would easily be condemned for their lack of support in democratic practices. standing alone as individual countries, they would be prone to external intervention for “more democratic change” in their governance. together as asean members, however, they’d be buffered by the “asean way” of transition; smoother and more suitable in pace of change.or if one wants to speak more bluntly, asean would provide the blanket security (and guarantee too) foranyone cooperating with asean members that peace and the values democracy and freedom are understood in southeast asia. diplomacy as asean’s lifeline as we can see, asean is unique in that it has been sustained by tensions and dilemmas across stakeholders and time. if in other forms of regionalism there is a strong secretariat that operates based on centralization of power pooled from the authorities of country members, in asean the practice has been different. zhongqi pan (2008) grouped asean regionalism together with east asian regionalism which is open, inclusive, and soft (because it was driven by smaller nations and followed by great powers) compared to the european union model that is closed, exclusive and hard (because it was driven by great powers and followed by smaller nations). implicit in his analysis is the doubt that asean regionalism is defined by the members, and not by the great powers engaged in its frameworks of cooperation. he described the non-uniform approach toward each other, e.g. china and japan chose different paths in its relations to the united states. consequently, it brings implications in the relations of asean with the united states. on similar note, peter katzenstein(1996) gave recognition to the unique regionalism in asia. he argued that regionalism in this region is created on the basis of asian identity, which is the result of interaction between real and imagined factors. it was a journal of asean studies 23 product of globalization and the growing links of economic activities. katzenstein, however failed to recognize the socio-political and security reasons behind asia’s, particularly asean’s, regionalism. asean as regional cooperation and institution is more than just an economic instrument for deeper cooperation among members. the case of asean demonstrates that regionalism may go beyond promoting similar interest and values. instead, regionalism can also be a product of awareness of stark differences, challenges, and dilemmas surrounding the relationship among members and beyond. the case of tensions and disagreements among members and beyond, such as that found in south china sea, therefore should not be seen as a challenge that weakens asean. on the contrary, it gives more reasons for members to stick together. of course, one must understand that as a political institution, asean is messy in decision making process. there are times when disagreements occur and no jointstatement can be made. and there is nothing wrong about it. each party of dialog in asean learns to speak their mind and fight for what they believe. after all this is an organization of the less-likeminded nations. but at the end of the day, it is much more sensible to keep working together as members of asean than to stand alone in the harsh international politics. the key here is diplomacy among members. the intensive talks and breakdown of activities is the lifeline of asean. at some points, members must see the exclusive benefits for being asean members. the pride for being asean must be disseminated as broad as possible among citizens of asean. at the end of the day this would help asean more alive. about author dr. dinna wisnu is a lecturer in paramadina university. currently, she is a director of paramadina graduate school of diplomacy. she received her doctoral degree from ohio state university. she can be contacted at dinna.wisnu@paramadina.ac.id references center of policy analysis and development for asia-pacific and african region at the indonesia’s ministry of foreign affairs. 2011. asean connectivity in indonesian context: a preliminary study on geopolitics of hydropower and maritime transport. jakarta: center of policy analysis and development for asia-pacific and african region. chalermpalanupap, t. (2009). institutional reform: one charter, three communities, many challenges”. in donald k emmerson (ed.), hard choices: security, democracy and regionalism in southeast asia (pp. 91-131). singapore: iseas & walter h shorenstein asia-pacific research center. fukuyama, f. (1992).the end of history and the last man. new york: avon books. grugel, j.b. (2004). “new regionalism and modes of governance: comparing us and eu strategies in latin america” in european journal of international relations, 10 (4): 603-626. jones, d.m. (2008). “security and democracy: the asean charter and the dilemmas of regionalism in southeast asia”. international affairs 84:4, 735-756. katzenstein, p. (1996). regionalism in comparative perspective.working paper 96/1 arena centre for european studies, university of oslo. 24 why asean could stay stronger leguey-feilleux, j. (2011).the dynamics of diplomacy.boulder, co: lynne rienner publishers. pan, z. (2008). dilemmas of regionalism in east asia, korea review of international studies, 17-29. ratnitzky, g. (2003). is democracy more peaceful than other forms of government? in hans-hermann hoppe (ed.), the myth of national defense. ludwig von mises institute. than, m.and abonyi, g. (2001). “the greater mekong subregion: cooperation in infrastructure and finance” in asean enlargement: impacts and implications, mya than and carolyn l gates (eds). singapore: iseas. journal of asean studies, vol. 8, no. 1 (2020), pp.15-39 doi: https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v8i1.6433 ©2020 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic revisiting indonesia’s economic diplomacy in the age of disruption: towards digital economy and innovation diplomacy defbry margiansyah research center for politics – indonesian institute of sciences jln. jend. gatot subroto 10, dki jakarta 12710, indonesia defbry.margiansyah@lipi.go.id received: 7th may 2020/ revised: 15th june 2020/ accepted: 5th july 2020 how to cite: margiansyah, d. (2020). revisiting indonesia’s economic diplomacy in the age of disruption: towards digital economy and innovation diplomacy. journal of asean studies, 8(1), 15-39, https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v8i1.6433 abstract with the rise of digital technologies and innovation disrupting the economy, the global phenomenon challenged the current concept and strategies of “conventional” economic diplomacy that have increasingly gained importance in contemporary foreign policy, including indonesia. in the meantime, the digital economy had been significantly growing as a potential driver of growth and an inclusive economy which becomes central in the indonesian development agenda. a new or innovation-based economy such as the digital economy did not only become one of the priorities in national policies but also emerge to be an essential variable to the foreign policy of indonesia amid diplomatic deficit. this research examines indonesia’s economic diplomacy in optimizing the potential of digital and new economic activities in facing the challenges of digital disruption. by employing integrative diplomacy concept, this research argues that indonesia’s government should pursue intermestic, comprehensive and integrative strategies in its economic diplomacy by integrating new economy through the construction of “innovation diplomacy.” this research finds that the existing economic diplomacy is strongly directed to “conventional” commercial diplomacy, while it gives insufficient space for a new economy to develop significantly, due to the absence of concept supporting the operation of innovation-focused economic diplomacy. consequently, it is suggested that jakarta urgently has to reconceptualize its economic diplomacy more strategically in order to achieve “diplomatic sophistication,” by way of constructing “innovation diplomacy” as a subset of economic diplomacy. keywords: digital economy, disruption, diplomatic studies, economic diplomacy, indonesia’s foreign policy, innovation diplomacy https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v8i1.6433 revisiting diplomacy in the age of disruption 16 introduction the growing global competition and power asymmetries between political-economic systems have characterized contemporary international relations as indicated by the 2008 global financial crisis and the shifting of power balances to east asia and asia-pacific. this tendency encourages a more significant role of the state in the national economy with more effective politico-economic strategies within domestic and foreign policies to anticipate the unexpected threats of security and development. in this sense, the economy grows to be a dominant discourse in policy agenda at international, regional, and national levels. thus, national governments are more likely to apply economic instruments to achieve foreign policies’ goals. within this context, economic diplomacy gains importance for states in pursuing economic prosperity and political stability (okano-heijmans, 2013). at the same time, the nature of the economy, in general, faces fundamental disruption by digital technologies and business models. the so-called disruption,1 a buzzword in the last decade following the digital revolution presents new challenges and opportunities for both the public and private sectors. it does not only urge business leaders to rethink more coherent and effective strategies and corporate culture for value creation, but also government to reconsider new ways and approach in regulating society, optimizing economic opportunity, and fostering innovation (deloitte australia, 2012). the worldwide digital disruption has rendered the role of technology and innovation as new sources of economic value, and ultimately the significance of knowledge-based economy for the prosperity of countries while generated enormous influence of multinational tech companies in the world political economy. in this regard, the profound change in technology and power diffusion to a much more extensive range of actors has created a “diplomatic deficit” in the traditional structure of international relations. the notion challenges the “classic” governance and diplomatic system in encountering with the speed and impact of emerging technologies. the formal diplomatic system is no longer sufficient to represent the interests of the most affected players by international decision-making (donaldson & younane, 2018). the diplomatic deficit also challenges formal diplomacy in the field of technology, innovation, and digital economy, emerging agendas in the age of disruption. in response to the challenge in the areas, many countries and regional organizations come up with a breakthrough in their diplomacy initiative or approach in various ways in order to confront the impact of issues revolving around technology and innovation for the sake of political, security, or economic interests. the prominent instances are shown in france’s ambassador for digital affairs (previously ambassador for cyber-diplomacy and the digital economy), denmark’s techplomacy (klynge et al., 2020) and innovation centre denmark, switzerland’s swissnex, the uk’s science and innovation network (rüffin, 1 disruption denotes the historical period where standardized processes and hierarchical structures are transformed into flexible and networked in the economy, political institutions, and social fabric (owen, 2015). journal of asean studies 17 2018), the dutch innovation attaché (leijten, 2019), and the us science and technology adviser (ruffini, 2017). likewise, some initiatives or forum have been established by major regional actors to face new technological challenges and opportunities namely the “global tech panel” launched by european union external action and the asean ministerial meeting on science, technology, and innovation (ammsti) in the committee on science, technology, and innovation (costi). during the singapore’s asean chairmanship 2018, asean leaders set a “resilient and innovative” vision for strengthening the grouping ‘s resilient against common threats, while promoting the economies to innovate and to utilize technology toward building more dynamic and connected community through smart cities and digital economy as major priorities (asean, 2018; iseas, 2018). against this background, indonesia, as an active international and regional player, acknowledges the fundamental effects of new technologies and innovation for economy and development. economic diplomacy becomes central in the country’s foreign policy under joko widodo (jokowi) administration with the principal aim of increasing trade and investment flows for export-led growth (the jakarta post, 2020). at the same time, the largest southeast asian country set several policy actions to develop a "latent” competitive advantage in the emerging digital economy. for jokowi, the digital economy is seen as a new force to drive the more competitive economy through boosting social welfare and inclusive economic development, stated in his speech in indonesia digital economy summit 2020 (jakarta globe, 2020). indeed, these concerns can be interpreted as the improvisational and innovative response of international actor toward the uncertainty of digital disruption that challenges the existing economic development and foreign policy agendas (margiansyah, 2020). in this context, it is vital to examine how the government of indonesia develops the concept and conduct of economic diplomacy amid the rising importance of technology and innovation-based economy like the digital economy. the results of this research are then useful in seeing what concepts need to be developed to support economic diplomacy to strengthen the development of the digital and innovation-based economy. such analysis is essential to understand how indonesia’s foreign policy deals with a diplomatic deficit and the diffusion of power for achieving economic prosperity and political stability in the age of disruption. therefore, this research aims to analyse indonesia’s economic diplomacy in optimizing the digital economy potential and its challenges faced by the strategy of economic diplomacy. with this respect, it is believed that the government of indonesia has to pursue integrative economic diplomacy by integrating new economy like the digital, technology, and innovation-based economy through the construction of “innovation diplomacy” as a subset of indonesia’s economic diplomacy. the new diplomatic instrument is essential to engage multi-stakeholders in multidimensionally emerging issues, enable domestic-international linkages, as well as build synergies between domestic actors in creating holistic policies for economic, technology, and human resource developments. meanwhile, innovation diplomacy is very likely to allow indonesia to adapt with new opportunities and coping with the diplomatically disruptive challenges, which are imperative to play strategic and innovative revisiting diplomacy in the age of disruption 18 roles to enhance the country’s contribution to stability and prosperity-creation in the international affairs. literature review this research constructs the framework by applying the concept of integrative diplomacy combining with economic diplomacy. this framework is important to guide the analysis contextualizing the country’s experience on economic diplomacy encountering diplomatic deficit and disruption. this analysis can subsequently provide some new insights within the literature of economic diplomacy, particularly in the case of indonesia. by emphasizing technology and innovation inclusive to economic diplomacy, this research is essential to contribute in enriching scientific researches about indonesia’s economic diplomacy and foreign policy amid digital disruption. it is a vital contribution, given some literature of that areas mostly focusing on the topics of values and principles (wanto, 2016), indexation (sabaruddin, 2018), institutional problems (killian, 2012), the roles of sub-state (pujayanti, 2018), and social media (pohan et al., 2017). in the modern era, diplomacy is commonly understood as political activities of a sovereign state to secure and promote the national interests and values in its international relations without resort an action or means of coercion, propaganda, or the law. in achieving those objectives, a state formulates a foreign policy, an extension of domestic policy process and goals, implemented using dialogue, negotiation, and representation in managing the relations with other countries or various international actors. these tasks of state-centred diplomacy are chiefly performed or coordinated by state or diplomatic actors, namely the foreign ministry with its diplomatic infrastructures, as gatekeepers of domestic and international policy (berridge, 2015; white, 2001). meanwhile, the rapid change landscape of world politics has affected diplomacy in the 21st century. it is marked by overlapping and complicated interactions between global, regional, and national diplomatic systems. such a diplomatic environment makes the nature of international policy issues and agendas increasingly intermestic or interconnected (manning, 1977). it turns the patterns and characters of contemporary diplomacy as a complex milieu. this complexity is characterized by the intermingling of “old” and “new” elements determining structures and processes, the integration between agendas and arenas that were once considered as relatively separated, and increasing emerging multi-stakeholder and network participating in diplomacy beyond professional diplomats. as a result, the dramatic change of the international environment challenges policymakers and diplomatic actors to consider their roles and functions in the structure of diplomacy, a determinant factor for the capacity of the state in managing and achieving its international policies, as well as responding the external pressures from the global arena. as long as digital disruption is a concern, there are two notable impacts brought about to the concept of diplomacy. according to hocking and melissen (2015), diplomacy is redefined by changing and adapting its processes and structures to the digitalization. journal of asean studies 19 diplomacy and its functions, namely negotiation, representation, and communication, has undergone the adaptation by infusing technological innovation (internet and social media platform) to diplomatic practices, which is termed as digital diplomacy/e-diplomacy/cyber diplomacy. concurrently, the structure and machinery of diplomacy have been reconfigured by that changing processes and, in turn, has arisen question about the relevance of the foreign ministry in the policy environment, particularly its efficiency and legitimacy. the change of diplomatic structure may provide the shift of a government’s perception towards external pressures and demands. this impact urges us to see the role of foreign ministry as the integral component within a broader policy network called the national diplomatic system (nds), the toolkit for national government’s interaction and capacity for the pursuit of international policy goals. the nds encourages “domestic” ministries and agencies to involve in the formulation and implementation of specific international policy, through integrated coordination and collaboration. table 1 state-centred and integrative diplomacy differences state-centred diplomacy integrative diplomacy context and location state as unchallenged terminal authority. diplomacy located outside domestic arenas. diplomatic sites primarily intergovernmental. primary purposes of diplomacy negotiated outcomes. multiple spheres of authority and legitimacy in diplomacy. diplomacy crosses domestic-international arenas. multiple diplomatic sites and domains. purposes of diplomacy more complex: agenda setting and managing issues through ‘thought leadership’ and agenda setting. rules and norms clear normative expectation of behaviour derived from sovereignty-related rules. centrality of protocol. immunity of diplomatic agents. influenced by diplomatic legacy of secrecy/confidentiality. underdeveloped rules. clash of sovereignty and non-sovereigntybased rules. openness, accountability and transparency. institutional tensions in expanded patterns of diplomatic communication. clashes of expectations between stakeholders. communication patterns hierarchical information flows focused on governments. relations with stakeholders defined in quasi-hierarchical terms as “outreach”. multidirectional flows of information underpinned by media and social networking. open and inclusive networks but which can be fluid and unstable. public diplomacy mainstreamed into diplomatic structures and processes. actors and roles diplomats whose credentials are based on principles of multiple participation based on varying models involving revisiting diplomacy in the age of disruption 20 sovereignty. non-state actors as consumers of diplomacy. structures: focused on ministries of foreign affairs. emphasis on guild-like qualities of the diplomatic profession; clearly defined roles with emphasis on the diplomat as gatekeeper between domestic and international policy environments stakeholders whose credentials are based on interests and expertise rather than status. non-state actors as producers of diplomacy. structures more diffuse: more broadly constituted national diplomatic system. diplomat as internal coordinator in expanded international policy environment and external boundary-spanner. redefinition of roles as facilitators and entrepreneurs in complex policy environments. source: hocking et al., 2012. as seen in table 1, this research employs the concept of “integrative diplomacy” developed by hocking et al. (2012) as the framework of analysis is powerfully relevant to explain diplomatic activities in the context of digital disruption. the concept is based on “a whole of government,” an approach denoting collaborative works or actions carried out by across governments ministries, agencies, and public officials for providing a shared solution and achieving a common goal towards particular issues and problems. integrative diplomacy emphasizes the importance of effective collaboration on diplomacy by integrating various change and continuity, agendas and arenas, process and structure, and various state and nonstate actors to diplomacy. due to its contrast to state-centred diplomacy, integrative diplomacy acknowledges the diplomatic environment consisted of complex and multifaceted networks and patterns of interactions with distinctive context and location, rules and norms, communication patterns, actors, and roles as summarized in table 1. technology innovation and diplomacy are generally understood as separate issues. since most countries currently treat innovation embedded in their economic and trade policies, technology and innovation are focused on tip market scale for improving the production and promotion of domestic technology and technologically innovative products and services, through internationalization of innovation-based economy. in that respect, using state-centred diplomacy is not enough to examine the changing nature of economic diplomacy amid a highly dynamic of global economic affairs and digital disruption, as the traditional diplomacy highly accentuates on the exclusivity of state authority, hierarchical information flows, confidentiality, and domestic-international antagonism. therefore, this research adopts integrative diplomacy to allow the integration of technology and innovation notions into a broader discourse of economic diplomacy. in addition to the key analytical framework, it is crucial to clarify the definition of economic diplomacy used continuously in this research to avoid conceptual confusion. economic diplomacy is defined as a set of diplomatic activities or issues relating to a foreign economic policy aimed at obtaining economic benefits from foreign relations based on national interests (berridge, 2015; rana & chatterjee, 2011; woolcock & bayne, 2013). it journal of asean studies 21 treats the economy not only as a modality to strengthen the country’s development and economic well-being but also to achieve political stability and national security. the concept of economic diplomacy must be understood comprehensively as part of a broad country strategy that integrates political, strategic, and economic interests in constructive relations with international actors. the implementation of economic diplomacy includes a continuous relationship between domestic policymaking and international negotiations, such as the establishment of a regulatory framework, norms, and procedures for the practice of market and trade activities between countries (woolcock & bayne, 2013). the strategy of economic diplomacy is characterized by the use of both political and economic capacities in influencing the dynamic of international negotiations in order to enhance welfare or national political stability. at the practical level, economic diplomacy covers main issues related to trade diplomacy (negotiating economic and free trade agreements), commercial diplomacy (investment promotion, export, tourism, and business advocacy), and development cooperation (official development aid, science, and technology cooperation, technology transfer, and other technical assistance and collaboration) (okanoheijmans, 2016; rana & chatterjee, 2011). research methods this research attempts to gain a deeper understanding of how government of indonesia develops the concept and conduct of economic diplomacy amid the rising importance of technology and innovation-based economy. referring to such a purpose, this research is an exploratory qualitative research based on the grounded theory method. the research design opted is not simply used to find relevant answers to the research question through analysing existing data and documents, but rather to enable the analysis applying different ideas or concepts for addressing relevant challenges to indonesia’s economic diplomacy, particularly amid disruptive technological innovation and diplomatic deficit. the grounded theory method was adopted considering its approach of systematic data collection and analysing (glaser & strauss, 2006) that allows flexibility on changes in research and analysis processes. though lack of published work in international relations uses the method (tucker, 2014), the grounded theory method enabled the author to apply existing theoretical statements and then develop it based on the result of further analysis and re-examination of the collected data. in this research, the author himself become the instrument of qualitative data collection and data analysis for acquiring the core of study, which is the examination of the state perception of the age of disruption and its embodiment in the concept and practice of economic diplomacy. data collection technique is mostly relied on secondary data dan academic literatures, involving official documents, research reports, scientific books, journal articles, expert opinion, and other kind of publications. those main data sources enable the researcher to focus on undiscovered points and ideas of previous studies or international relations research on similar issue, such as economic diplomacy and technological revolution revisiting diplomacy in the age of disruption 22 or disruption. furthermore, facts and finding are interpreted by exploiting inductive reasoning as data analysis technique through which research question guided examination process to focus on exploring salient factors or variables neglected by various perspectives or viewpoints in prior studies. analysis digital economy: a catalyst of technology and innovation development digital disruption has generated rapid development of the digital economy, which unstoppable in terms of value, market, and business in terms of value, market, and business (britton & mcgonegal, 2007). the benefits of digital economy enable to create more inclusive and sustainable prosperity through various channels, such as lowering production cost, increasing existing market efficiency, enhancing market size, creating new markets, improving quality and productivity, developing micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (msmes), and promoting new opportunities to other sectors (dahlman et al., 2016). this is the reason why the digital economy, a form of the knowledge economy, becomes a new concern of development for various countries to maximize its enormous value for innovation growth, social prosperity, and economic well-being (oecd, 2017). the digital economy is a prominent narrative in indonesia’s development agenda and a part of the effort to shift its economic structure from resource-based economy to knowledge economy in facing global competition (shetty et al., 2014). it is increasingly considered due to an increasing number of nationwide internet penetration where the users constitute around 171.17 million in 2018 (apjii & polling indonesia, 2018). the growth of e-commerce businesses and digital start-ups has provided broader market opportunities for micro, small, and medium businesses or industries through the concept of economic sharing. the great dynamism of the digital economy in indonesia is evidenced in the report of google & temasek/ bain (2019) titled e-conomy sea 2019. the data depicts that the size of indonesia’s internet economy in 2019 is estimated usd 40 billion in size, in which this gross merchandise value (gmv) contributed over 3 per cent to gdp in the same year. the country also becomes the fastest growing one in southeast asia, with an average growth of 49 per cent during the 2015-2019 period. indonesia's digital economy has spawned the biggest local unicorns, one-billion-dollar start-up or tech companies, in the region, such as traveloka, tokopedia, go-jek, and bukalapak (google et al., 2019; google & temasek, 2018). those unicorns potentially give indonesia a new source to growth and investment significantly, and hence digital economy is projected to be the primary driver of economic growth in 2045 (republika, 2019). acknowledging the massive potential of the digital economy for growth and prosperity has encouraged the government of indonesia to set up a vision to be the region’s largest digital economy in 2020. the government targeted e-commerce transaction usd 130 billion worth and creating 1000 technopreneurs with a business value of usd 10 billion in 2020. to achieve this goal, in 2017, jokowi issued presidential regulation (perpres) no. 74 / journal of asean studies 23 2017 about the road map of the electronic-based national trading system 2017-2019 (kominfo ri, 2016; sekretariat kabinet ri, 2017). although the existing policy had some obstacles (salahuddin, 2018), it can be seen as a part of the initial effort to create a conducive ecosystem to the internet economy by opening up various access to msmes to the state supports. with this respect, jokowi’s cabinet subsequently introduces the so-called making indonesia (mi) 4.0 to unleash digital economy potential maximally through industrial revitalization. the policy aims to invigorate the digitization of the productive sector, specifically the manufacturing industry (ministry of industry, 2018). the mi initiative is an important policy to reinforce the promotion of local products in e-commerce and msm industries technology adoption, as the current state of the digital economy is predominantly occupied by information, financial, and services sectors (google et al., 2019; kominfo ri, 2016). however, there are existing institutional and socioeconomic issues challenging the indonesian digital economy. first, the road map on the digital economy has been a short-lived policy merely containing what-to-do list, instead of grand strategy, and strategic goals, systematic planning, and technical mechanism to achieve its primary purpose. as a result, the responsible government actors have different perception in policy implementation, which hence created partial understanding and fragmented targets among stakeholders (salahuddin, 2018). second, the digital divide remains an underlying problem among indonesian society to access the internet economy. the problem should not be understood beyond infrastructure issues between urban and rural areas, namely education, institutions, and digital skills. although some nationwide infrastructure gap may be narrowed down by providing more information communication technology (ict) facilities, the rest of the division problems remains intact. among those are 1) income or financial status and technophobia cause a low motivation of using the internet; 2) contribution of internet users between west-east and urban-rural areas in the countries is still unequal; 3) low education level disfavours indonesian digital skills; 4) because of low digital skills, usage of internet or digital technology produces the limited benefits of productive activities for society (apjii & polling indonesia, 2018; hadi, 2018). the remaining digital divide demonstrated how digital technology development has not been able to overcome inequality that inclines to favour skilled and high-income groups, instead of unskilled and low-income workforces (fuady, 2019). third, the growing cyberspace in indonesia is vulnerable to cybercrime and cyberattack by which indonesia label as the world’s largest source of cyberattacks, as shown by some reports. such an analysis demonstrates how cyber legislation, cybersecurity awareness among citizens, and incomprehensive data protection law become the main factors engendered cyber vulnerabilities (paterson, 2019). fourth, the wave of local start-ups or techcompanies acquisition by foreign investors challenges the indonesian effort to promote local products and exports and to empower msmes in its national digital economy (kominfo ri, revisiting diplomacy in the age of disruption 24 2016). for instance, products sold via e-commerce in indonesia are dominated by imported consumer goods that constitute around 90 per cent (liputan6.com, 2019). this tendency is very likely to be a severe threat for local businesses when inflow foreign investment is characterized by market-seeking and resources-seeking investors. hence, more proactive regulations on imports are critically required to gain a quality foreign investment in boosting the sustainable and inclusive digital economy (cnbc indonesia, 2019). finally, the problem of innovation capabilities is still lagging behind major countries in southeast asia. the drawbacks are indicated in global innovation index 2019. the report reveals that indonesia tends to rely on market sophistication (credit, investment, trade, competition, and market scale), rather than to exploit the capacities and capabilities in strengthening its digital economic potential. the report furtherly shows that aspects of the regulatory environment, knowledge workers, knowledge creation, and knowledge diffusion of indonesia are severely weak and inconducive (cornell university et al., 2019). the digital economy issues above represent a big picture of technology and innovation challenges for indonesia in attaining a sustainable, competitive, and robust economy. in the meantime, the emerging digital economy is placed as an essential indicator to target improved value-added in the real sector, one of strategy in strengthening economic resilience and quality growth, on recently mid-term development policy 2020-2024 (bappenas, 2019b). in general, the current innovation is poorly performed and limitedly available due to a lack of science, technology, and innovation (sti) culture, including its base and resource. the government is required to prioritize several vital factors to encourage more innovation-related activities and enabling conditions facilitating sti, knowledge creation, and knowledge diffusion. among those essential factors are conducive r&d ecosystem, rising r&d expenditure, intellectual property right/ipr protection, financing mechanism, integrated innovation system, academia-industry linkage, local innovation involvement (damuri et al., 2018; margiansyah, 2017a, 2017b). the government’s policies, however, have presented inadequate efforts to overcome existing problems of national technology and innovation. the road map e-commerce in 2017 and road map for industry 4.0 in 2018 have not concerned with important aspects regarding strong enforcement of ipr, data protection, cross-border e-commerce, recognition of digital goods and services, and incentive for msmes and local product. the two initiatives tend to merely focus on issues of domestic institutions and stakeholders while neglecting the role of innovative activities and international policy instruments in supporting the new economic potential. furthermore, those policies still adopt inward-looking strategies, as those have not recognized the importance of international cooperation and collaboration in encouraging technological upgrading and innovation capacity-building sufficiently. it is revealed by no apparent role of the ministry of foreign affairs (mofa) found within the respective official documents. inappropriately addressing these matters is remarkably essential, taking into account that technological capacities and innovation capabilities are critical aspects for accelerating industrial revitalization, productivity, technological upgrading, and ultimately journal of asean studies 25 escape middle-income trap (damuri et al., 2018; paus, 2017). thus, the government needs to reconsider its policy effectiveness in developing technology and innovation beyond a business-as-usual approach. to achieve robust innovation capabilities, i argue that indonesia’s government should pursue intermestic, comprehensive, and integrative strategies by finding a niche instrument within existing policies. this attempt can be started from an internationalization effort that refers to the extension of domestic policy on the digital economy into a broader international economic agenda. as long as internationalization is concerned, foreign policy tools should be revisited in-line with sti-oriented vision. so that, the diplomatic instrument needs to be recalibrated to disruption trends by integrating the digital economy as a new focus on existing economic diplomacy. the next section will explain further about existing economic diplomacy and its relevance to the digital economy issue, as well as its prospect to strengthen the indonesian new economy. recalibrating economic diplomacy towards digital economy the pursuit of economic diplomacy is highly prioritized in the current foreign policy since the president took office. this is a different diplomacy’s strategy from his predecessor that tends to conduct a multi-direction or total diplomacy (parameswaran, 2014). economic diplomacy is a focus on the foreign ministry reform agenda, one strategy of strengthening and restructuring diplomatic infrastructure, within his four foreign policy priorities2 (connelly, 2015). the emphasis on economic diplomacy as a result of jokowi’s pro-people approach in reshaping the conduct of diplomacy or known as down-to-earth diplomacy. this attempt is expected to present direct benefits of diplomacy to the interests and prosperity of the people and the state through quality growth (kemlu ri, 2015). by employing the approach on economic diplomacy, jokowi has attempted to reshape the role of diplomats into salespeople and embassies into economic showrooms. the president requested all diplomats to devote around 90 per cent of a diplomatic mission to economic diplomacy. it was expected to perform a better effort in representing and protecting indonesia’s economic interests in international affairs. hence, the president has appealed to intensify his government to exploit foreign policy as the main instrument to boost the economy beyond the mofa. prioritizing economic diplomacy should be understood as the strategic response to reap maximum economic gains from economic and geopolitical challenges, as well as the shift in the world’s centre of economic gravity to asia (weatherbee, 2016). at least, there are three implications of such pro-people diplomacy to jokowi’s vision of international affairs. firstly, the meaning of friendship is changed in indonesia’s foreign 2 four foreign policy priorities under jokowi administration 2014-2019 were explicitly stated in the nawacita, nine priorities of jokowi-kalla, namely (1) the promotion of indonesia’s identity as an archipelagic state and maritime nation; (2) the enhancement of global role as middle power; (3) the expansion of indonesia strategic engagement in indo-pacific; (4) the promotion of greater role, interest, and aspiration of the people in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy revisiting diplomacy in the age of disruption 26 relations. the countries are perceived as real friends only for those who can provide benefits for national interests, while those who cannot give many advantages are likely to be eschewed. this doctrine is in contrast to yudhoyono’s “a thousand friends, zero enemies” doctrine (the jakarta post, 2014; weatherbee, 2016). secondly, bilateralism and economic cooperation become principal focuses of jokowi’s international agenda. these tendencies have been shown by his desire to increase more bilateral strategic partnerships and his participation in economic-related forums like g20, apec, asean, and east asia summit. jokowi has actively engaged in those summits due to its strategic values in bringing direct and concrete business deals for indonesia’s social and economic developments (kemlu ri, 2015). lastly, jokowi tends to prioritize specific sectors in foreign policy agenda, particularly one that directly links to the people’s economic welfare and has vast potential for growth. in his first term, jokowi strongly emphasized the maritime sector as the core of his global maritime fulcrum doctrine. the sector is crucial due to their economic potentials are worth usd 1.2 trillion a year and likely to create new jobs for 40 million citizens (cabinet secretariat, 2016b). accordingly, these implications should be used as underlying assumptions to analyse the direction of indonesia's foreign policy under the jokowi office in upcoming years. those assumptions implied that the economic-oriented foreign policy is susceptible to a rapidly changing environment of the global economy and has to be able to readjust to it. to that ends, economic diplomacy has to discover the new market and emerging business opportunities for supporting the more significant contribution of indonesian products and investment to economic growth. according to jokowi, in the second term’s inauguration speech, his administration would focus on economic and human development agendas, including the transformation of the economy from resources-dependent to high-value-added manufacture and modern services, which arguably based on the digital economy (investor daily, 2019; kompas.com, 2019). it is in contrast to his first term’s stressing the critical importance of maritime as the future for indonesia (cabinet secretariat, 2014). since the global maritime fulcrum is no longer the heart of jokowi’s foreign policy, the maritime sector as the priority sector has been replaced by emerging economic sectors deemed to have immediate impacts on growth (tim jokowi-amin, 2019). in translating the jokowi’s goals, the mofa has renewed indonesia’s foreign policy priorities by presenting the “4+1” 3 the concept for the next five years, which places economic diplomacy will be the number one priority. there are several strategic moves in improving economic diplomacy. it constitutes focuses on capitalizing domestic and traditional markets, while innovatively penetrating non-traditional markets learned from experience market expansion in africa via indonesia-africa forum 2018 and indonesiaafrica infrastructure 2019. simultaneously, these efforts are reinforced by continuing existing strategies, namely the trade and investment negotiations (cepa/fta/pta) and the integrated promotion of trade and investment, including boosting outbound investment. the 3 the 4+1 priorities of foreign policies consist of (1) improving the economic diplomacy (2) protection diplomacy (3) sovereignty and nationality diplomacy (4) indonesia's role in the region and the global. the “plus” one is about the improvement of diplomacy infrastructure. journal of asean studies 27 tool of diplomacy will also be optimized to protect strategic economic interests, particularly from discriminatory acts like in the case of the eu biofuel ban against indonesia’s palm oil. the preceding moves will be encouraged by the so-called economy 4.0 comprising digital industries, creative economy, and human capital to improve industrial productivities and open up lower-middle groups wider access to international markets (kemlu ri, 2019a, 2019c). of six strategic moves, the last action has showcased government recognition of the importance of internationalization for new economic activities based on digital technologies and innovation. however, some important questions remain unclear; how the mofa will perform its strategy to drive economy 4.0 in economic diplomacy agenda; what instruments will be employed to practice this action; and with what institutions or stakeholders will the mofa cooperate or collaborate to perform in achieving this focus. as a consequence, the indonesian government needs to develop a new instrument of economic diplomacy based on the spirit of digital transformation, which the mofa seeks to improve within its diplomatic infrastructure (kemlu ri, 2019a). this new instrument should be able to substantiate the digitalization of diplomacy and maximize the digital diplomacy tools in the conduct of economic diplomacy more effectively. with this respect, prioritizing the digital economy, including technological innovation, has been an important element of domestic policies in the jokowi's era, but increasingly became national interests in international affairs. since the president took office, several official documents are underscoring the critical role of the digital and innovation-based economy in national development. for instance, those include two editions of medium-term national development plan 2015-2019 and 2020-2024, vision indonesia 2045, and jokowiamin vision and mission statement for the 2019 concurrent elections (bappenas, 2014, 2019a, 2019b; tim jokowi-amin, 2019). in the context of foreign relations, the digital economy has initially been articulated at the 2016 us-asean summit (cabinet secretariat, 2016a) and resonated more seriously at the 2019 osaka g-20 summit. during the latest summit, jokowi accentuated the digital economy and inclusiveness as the main idea voiced to address economic and social inequalities between countries. subsequently, indonesia offered the initiative of establishing the inclusive digital economy accelerator hub (idea hub), an international platform for curation, governance, exchange experiences, and ideas about a digital economic model that are inclusive for governments and businesses among g20 countries (kemlu ri, 2019b). jokowi’s articulation should be interpreted as the government’s attempt to exploit the digital economy potentials at home and to maximize latent opportunities abroad through internationalization strategy. the strategy refers to the aims of inviting the active participation of the international community, developed economies, and diplomatic partners for the global digital economy development. for jokowi, the domestic digital economy is placed as an important indicator to target improved value-added of the real sector in a strategy of strengthening economic resilience and quality growth. in this regard, bringing the digital economy in the strategic international forums implies jokowi’s a manoeuvre to make the potential sector as an emerging intermestic sector. in turn, the internationalization of the digital economy to some extent affects the future conduct of indonesia's economic diplomacy revisiting diplomacy in the age of disruption 28 by which the concept is commonly understood as the use of foreign policy tools to gain economic rewards for national development. this tendency indicates that the "4+1” formula underlining economy 4.0 and digital transformation represents the mofa effort of recalibrating the prior focus and strategy of economic diplomacy with the jokowi’s strategic vision above. the attempt includes the digital or innovation-based economy into a framework of diplomacy. this is an important measure presented in order to improve the inward-looking policy digital economy by establishing a more holistic environment. taking into account that kind of innovation-based economy requires an ecosystem that enables a multiagency/actors collaboration to work mutually (perez, 2010). therefore, the new concept of economic diplomacy should be able to formulate an instrument or a mechanism that includes stakeholders of government, business, academia, and technological innovation professionals. however, jakarta’s concept and conduct of economic diplomacy merely focused on commercial diplomacy, emphasizing on promotional activities that project the country’s economy and foreign investment portfolio (intan, 2019). those activities, such as the expansion of new export to non-traditional markets, improvement of foreign investment, and boosting foreign tourists, have been accentuated in the mofa strategic plan in 2015-2019 and foreign policy priorities in 2019-2024 (kemlu ri, 2015, 2019a). commercial diplomacy is conceptually a subset of economic diplomacy, mainly consisting of trade, tourism, investments (tti) promotion, and business advocacy. by focusing on commercial diplomacy as the main strategy, it displayed that jakarta simply concerns to pursue business ends for the national development as its foreign policy goal. (okano-heijmans, 2011). as a consequence of the commercial-oriented measure, some important strategies are missing in the jakarta’s economic diplomacy. among them are regional dynamics, a holistic, unambiguous coordination mechanism, clear international economic cooperation policy (djumala, 2015; intan, 2019), a holistic concept, and an emerging economy in the diplomacy. indeed, the strategies have to be supported with an intermestic approach in domestically strategic economic policies wherein the mofa included, unlike in the earlier the road map of e-commerce and making indonesia 4.0. in the context of disruption, commercial diplomacy alone is insufficient to cover a multidimensional nature of the new economy like the digital economy and industries, along with their various stakeholders in the triple or quadruple helix sense. jakarta needs to consider the digital economy problems as a part of economic diplomacy tasks. the strategy should be able to overcome critical issues such as digital divide, data protection, ipr, cyber threats, foreign investment on tech companies, and poor performance of technological and innovation capabilities through multilateral, plurilateral, and bilateral cooperation. although the mofa has already made a breakthrough by including the digital economy as a part of bilateral economic cooperation with sweden in november 2019 (kemlu ri, 2019d), indonesia entails the more precise concept of economic diplomacy dealing with the economy 4.0 for gaining more strategic outcomes and ensuring effective conduct. that concept must be not merely pursuing business ends of the digital economy, but strategic gains for indonesia’s journal of asean studies 29 human resource, technology, and innovation developments. therefore, indonesia’s economic diplomacy is lack of capacities, and conceptual clarity in engaging with multidimensional issues and agents/stakeholder as integrative diplomacy suggested. therefore, i argue that jakarta urgently has to reconceptualize its economic diplomacy more strategically in order to achieve “diplomatic sophistication.” the term is defined as an awareness of current diplomatic actors to adapt and change towards new opportunities and challenges beyond traditional areas or dimensions by developing novel capacities or using existing efforts as ways of maximizing possible advantages. it is a very important behaviour to confront with a diplomatic deficit and digital disruption. it should not merely seek a welfare-enhance effect, but rather to achieve the strategic goals of a government following the political logic for more contribution to international affairs and stability in an innovative way (okano-heijmans, 2011). constructing innovation-focused economic diplomacy the prior section demonstrated how the concept of indonesia’s economic diplomacy needs to be strategically revisited following the digital disruption. this can make the digital economy as a turning point to reconceptualize the concept. that economic diplomacy concept promptly requires the focus on technology and innovation upgrading, which subsequently integrates those capabilities with the productive sector (elisabeth et al., 2016). revisiting economic diplomacy can be understood as an effort of using foreign policy for better optimizing opportunities of rapid technological change and disruptive economy for the country’s development, on the one hand, strengthening the capacity building of human resources through outward-looking technology and innovation development on the other. to that ends, this article suggests indonesia develops what is called “innovation diplomacy”4 as an integral part of economic diplomacy, despite no agreed definition and recognized as under construction concept in scientific literature, the innovation diplomacy is mostly referred to the use of a full spectrum of foreign policy tools to achieve national innovation interests in the international political arena, which allows a state to strategically engage in the field of international scientific exchange and transfer of technology (carayannis & campbell, 2011). the concept involves the use of diplomatic instruments to foster innovations (“diplomacy for innovation”) and the use of innovation to improve the interstate relations or broader politico-strategic purposes (“innovation for diplomacy”) built on foreign policy-innovation policy nexus. innovation diplomacy is not merely constituted by science and technology diplomacy but also embedded in trade and foreign economic policy (leitjen, 2017). thus, innovation diplomacy in this study should be understood as a part of economic 4 innovation diplomacy theoretically encompasses various efforts of connecting between conceptual and practical realms involving different development aspects (socioeconomic, culture, technological, and institutional) through well-designed initiatives. those efforts aim to articulate “the ideas and solutions with markets and investors markets and investors ready to appreciate them and nurture them to their full potential” (carayannis & campbell, 2011). revisiting diplomacy in the age of disruption 30 diplomacy with the focus on achieving national gains in trade, investment, technology, human capital, and innovation-based economic activities. at the implementation level, innovation diplomacy involves a number of strategic activities and tools to obtain mutual benefits from international collaboration and economic cooperation for boosting national innovation capabilities. for instance, the government starts to promote its innovation attraction and potential to exert influence and soft power in foreign affairs through establishing a framework condition such as ipr, r&d partnership, businessacademia linkage, ipr, trade conditions, information sharing in international innovation or economic partnerships. at the same time, it develops practical toolkits to encourage and enable multi-stakeholder collaboration by incentivizing collaborative r&d partnerships, providing various forms of policy dialogue, improving information and capabilities accesses, reaffirming national priorities for innovation with targeted partners, and addressing globally shared innovation challenges. those activities and toolkits are performed by engaging several ministries and agencies (bound, 2016). furthermore, innovation diplomacy bridges a wide range of players, dimensions, and interests into a larger network of innovation to internationalize domestic technology and innovation-based industries. these players include not only foreign and economic ministries, but also national innovation agencies and academia, industries, philanthropic, and influential non-governmental organizations, civil society, and regional and multilateral institutions (bound, 2016; leitjen, 2017). therefore, innovation diplomacy aims to provide (1) the access of inbound capacities building on the country’s technological and innovation development, (2) the promotion of domestic new economy products and potentials to international markets and environments, (3) the influence of the state in regional, inter-regional, and international relations of technology and innovation (flink & schreiterer, 2010). for indonesia, innovation diplomacy should be constructed as a subset of economic diplomacy with some additional tasks focusing on technological innovation. simultaneously, the diplomacy initiative needs to be understood as a new form of digital diplomacy bolstering strategic foreign policy arenas that treat technology and innovation sectors as primary interlocutor, more than just digitalization of public diplomacy or diplomatic communication tools. indeed, this concept is inspired by lessons learned from the danish “techplomacy” initiative represented by the so-called tech-ambassador in the heart of tech industries, silicon valley and beijing (frijs-madsen, 2018; klynge et al., 2020). however, the initiative should be initially mandated with a commercial goal rather than political for gaining currency in indonesia’s foreign policy, taking account of the incumbent government’s strong emphasis on economic benefits. once the conduct of innovation diplomacy is well-established, its mandate must be extended into a political one for regional and global affairs. with this respect, the government of indonesia is required to create several new duties and responsibilities in order to operationalize the innovation-focused economic diplomacy initiative, as listed below: 1. indonesia needs to appoint digital/cyber/tech/innovation ambassadors or special envoys, supported by a technology or innovation division in the embassies, that is journal of asean studies 31 mandated to engage with tech and innovation-based industries formally and to build a coalition among responsible governments on technological and emerging economic issues. the positions should be posted in the world’s most innovative countries/cities with advanced digital technologies and innovation powerhouse. 2. the functions of the ambassador and tech/innovation division should be mainly focused on (1) the formalization of communication and dialogue with tech companies or stakeholders, (2) the collection of information and new knowledge regarding new opportunities and dynamics of technology and innovation worldwide for companies, universities, and research institutes, and policymakers at home, (3) the promotion of indonesia’s digital and technological industries to new export, market, and investment opportunities abroad, (4) the strategic communication and engagement on indonesia’s international roles in the tech sector for opportunities and challenges of technological change and digitalization bilaterally and multilaterally. 3. indonesia's innovation centre should be established in leading innovative cities/countries for strengthening the function of the economic division. the centre is not necessarily a new entity but can be included within the indonesian trade promotion center (itpc) network abroad. 4. science, technology, or innovation attachés should be assigned as innovation intelligence who maps potential markets, products, sectors, competitors, investors, and consumers and seeks opportunities for potential funding, capacity building for creative and knowledge workers, learning process for domestic tech-companies and technopreneurs in leading technology and innovation centres. 5. the attaché position must be performed not limited to government officials but has to be highly capable and experienced professional experts and practitioners mastering theoretical, institutional, and technical matters of the fields for the country’s economic and social development. 6. all responsible policy actors or government bodies and stakeholders have to be synergized their paradigms and be included in producing diplomacy strategies with reference to knowledge and evidence-based practice in the decision-making process. linking innovation diplomacy with the grand concept of economic diplomacy would enable indonesia to facilitate multifaceted interests and the nature of economy 4.0 based on technology and innovation capabilities. of course, its effectiveness depends on the mutual support of diplomatic infrastructures, within which tools of diplomacy can be innovatively developed in concert with digital transformation and disruption. this way could render the existing economic diplomacy, and ultimately foreign policy is adaptable and responsive to opportunities and challenges that emerged from digital disruption and geopolitical shift more appropriately. as a subsequent effort, stronger diplomatic or international linkages in tech and innovation sectors could provide the government a platform to address critical issues within the digital economy and tech sectors by way of an intermestic and integrative approach. all of such attempts are aimed to generate more effective and comprehensive measures in dealing with digital technologies and global economic challenges to indonesia. revisiting diplomacy in the age of disruption 32 conclusion based on the analysis above, the diplomatic deficit and digital disruption have created a sense of urgency for indonesia to recalibrate its foreign policy through responsive and innovative strategies of economic diplomacy. the foreign policy has arguably been disconnected to the main goals of domestic policies related to the digital economy and another new economy like industry 4.0 or e-commerce roadmap. in those policies, government still adopts inward-looking, incomprehensive, and fragmented strategies, while disregarding the critical importance of international cooperation and collaboration in the implementation of the “domestic” policies. building innovation diplomacy as a subset of economic diplomacy is can be viewed as a new way to recalibrate its foreign policy tools in facing digitally disruptive challenges. this diplomatic instrument would allow indonesia to link strategically domestic or inwardlooking policies, such as the digital economy and industry 4.0, to internationalization effort. moreover, the new instrument is essential to engage with major non-state players from multilevel stakeholders and to deal with multidimensionally emerging issues around the international dynamic of technological change and disruptive innovation in a more strategic manner. in the meantime, innovation diplomacy would improve synergies between responsible “domestic” government actors and relevant stakeholders in consolidating common interests and aspirations in international policy and diplomacy, including bridging different paradigms and understandings. it is a compelling way to render existing diplomacy adaptable and responsive to unexpected and unprecedented challenges, and opportunities emerged from digital disruption and power balances shift phenomena. coping with the limited capacity of economic diplomacy and digital economic strategies that remain domestic-oriented should be focused on indonesia's strategic response. otherwise, the vision of jokowi to internationalize the digital economy as a component of foreign policy and to exploit technology and innovation as latent unlimited resources for future prosperity and development faces significant obstacles. thereby, the innovationfocused economic diplomacy would enable the government to effectively address critical issues of the digital economy and tech sectors through a more integrative approach. therefore, this study has brought about at least four implications to the study of indonesia’s economic diplomacy and foreign policy in general. first, technology and its related phenomena should be no longer perceived as an exogenous or external factor, but as an endogenous or internal factor in reshaping the actor’s behaviours or policy preferences and determining changes and continuities in the world politics. second, technology should be seen beyond technical matters but involves institutional and politico-strategic dimensions in understanding certain actions of the sovereign states or actors. third, economic diplomacy has to be understood as political action consisting of power-play and business ends, as long as national interests in economic and technological-related issues is a concern. a similar study on this topic inclines to conceive the concept of economic diplomacy as a non-political strategy or action, which treats it as a mere concern of economist, trade practitioners/policymakers, or business professionals. fourth, analyses on the conduct of journal of asean studies 33 economic diplomacy must not be understood as an exclusive issue of the state or foreign ministry, but rather a strategic issue comprising multi-stakeholder, which links state and nonstate actors in formulation and implementation of economic diplomacy strategy. fifth, economic diplomacy and foreign policy should not only explore technology-related issues with state-centric approach exclusively focusing on state self-interests but rather employing various approaches emphasizing on state behaviours as an integral part of collective interests and common goods shared by broader international communities. in context of digital disruption, the underlying reason why this article encouraging non-state centric approaches to be applied in the study of economic diplomacy and foreign policy is because the consequences of technological changes are relatively different and varies for some countries in spatio-temporal context and experience. they are impossible and undesirable things to do if many scholars use the state-centric paradigm to gains analytical explanation on the cause-effects of technological transformation for the international actors or states in a more holistic and innovative manner. about the authors defbry margiansyah is a researcher at research center for politics – the indonesian institute of sciences (p2p-lipi), jakarta, indonesia. defbry margiansyah can be 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(2013). economic diplomacy. in a. f. cooper, j. heine, & r. thakur (eds.), the oxford handbook of modern diplomacy. oxford university press. http://perludem.org/2019/01/17/visi-misi-dan-program-pasangan-calon-presiden-dan-wakil-presiden-pemilu-2019/ http://perludem.org/2019/01/17/visi-misi-dan-program-pasangan-calon-presiden-dan-wakil-presiden-pemilu-2019/ http://www.tabloiddiplomasi.org/index.php/2017/03/29/diplomasi-ekonomi-sebagai-salah-satu-instrumen-pentingdalam-politik-luar-negeri/ http://www.tabloiddiplomasi.org/index.php/2017/03/29/diplomasi-ekonomi-sebagai-salah-satu-instrumen-pentingdalam-politik-luar-negeri/ journal of asean studies, vol. 3, no. 1 (2015), pp. 42-52 ©2015 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic a spatial analysis on international remittances, food consumption and deprivation in indonesia maria elfani london metropolitan university, united kingdom abstract this paper aims to illustrate how international remittances may relate to food consumption and deprivation in indonesia. the idea is that international remittances may contribute to the reduction of poverty, and since food consumption is an element with which to measure poverty line, this paper intends to show whether international remittances are more likely to be received by poorer households–based on food consumption level in the households. using geographic information systems (gis) and the data from the indonesia family life survey (ifls4), this paper illustrates the mapping of international remittances and food consumption in some of indonesia’s provinces. the spatial analysis shows correlation between international remittances and food consumption. international remittances tend to be received by households who have less spending on food. the geographical pattern shows that international remittances are more likely to be received by poorer households based on their food consumption. the result to some extent supports the view that international remittances might benefit the poor the most, particularly on tackling poverty, as poorer households are more likely to receive the remittances. keywords: remittances, indonesia, deprivation, food consumption introduction international migration has played an important role on influencing the economic condition of the home countries: countriesof origin where migrants are coming from. the world bank estimates that 3.2 percent of the world population, orapproximately 215.8 million people, lived outside their country of birth in the year 2010 (ratha et al., 2011). of the countries with the highest emigration, based on the number of emigrants in 2010, indonesia was nineteenth; it is estimated that 2.5 million indonesians emigrated in that year (ratha et al., 2011). one of the economic benefits of international migration is to produce international remittances to the home countries where the remittances are seen as one of the tools to reduce the level of poverty of the home countries. indonesia received approximately us$ 6.9 billion in remittances from all over the world in 2010; it ranked seventeenth of top remittance-receiving countries in that year (world bank, 2011; ratha et al., 2011). international remittances are found to reduce the poverty level in developing countries (adams and cuecuecha, 2010). international remittances also play significant roles in reducing poverty in indonesia. this paper is concerned with understanding the role of international remittances in relation to deprivation using geographic information systems as the methodology. in particular, it aims to look (at province level) at any geographical (spatial) relationship between food consumption level 43 journal of asean studies in the households and the receiving of international remittances in the households. the hypothesis is that those households that receive remittances tend to be poorer by looking at their food consumption spending; and likewise households who do not receive remittances are thus considered as better off. if the spatial analysis could confirm this hypothesis, it would support the view that international remittances benefit poorer households, since they are the ones that receive and thus enjoy the advantage of remittances (i.e. by consuming or spending more on household expenditure). international migration and deprivation the push-and-pull theory of international migration suggests that people migrate because they are pulled towards the economic benefits of migration, for example the higher wages and better jobs in the host country (country of destination). on the other hand, people are pushed to migrate because of the economic disadvantage they experience in their home country, for instancedue to deprivation or poverty conditionsin the household. stark and taylor (1989) show that international migration brings an income gain especially to the deprived household. they surveyed two villages in mexico consisting of 61 randomly-selected rural households and found that the initial relative deprivation wasa significant pull factor for people to migrate to the united states. in other words, if the members of a household feel that theirs does not have enough commodities in comparison to other households in their neighbourhood, that is the relatively deprived condition, the probability that those members will migrate is higher. thus, the more deprived the household condition, the more incentive for the household members to migrate. better-off households, on the other hand, have less incentive to migrate. international migration may, to some extent, produce international remittances which may directly or indirectly contribute to the spendingbehaviour of the household. the assumption isthat if members ofdeprived households are more likely to migrate, the remittances produced by international migration may also benefit the deprived households the most. international migration may therefore, to some extent, play an important role on deprivation (poverty reduction) of the home country. international remittances and deprivation international remittances are seen to have an important role in reducing the poverty of the country who receives them. international remittances might, to some extent, influence household spending on consumption and investment. adams and cuecuecha (2010) illustrate three views on how international remittances might be spent by the receiving households. firstly, a household might treat an international remittance as an additional source of wage and would thus spend it as it would normally spend an additional wage. secondly, international remittances might be consumed by the household, therefore household spending on food or consumable goods might increase. the third view suggests thatinternational remittances might beinvested on investment goods such as human investment (education) and physical-capital investment (housing) which may lead to economic development in the country (adams and cuecuecha, 2010: 3). previous studies of adams and page (2005) and acosta et al. (2006) show how international remittances create significant impacts on the reduction of poverty in the countries that receive remittances. adams and page (2005) construct a new data set on international migration, remittance, inequality and poverty from 71 developing countries and found that a 10% increase in the share of international migrants in a country’s 44 spatial analysis on international remittances, food consumption population may lead to a 2.1% reduction in the share of people living on less than $1 a day. they also suggest that a 10% increase in percapita official remittances may lead to a 3.5% reduction in the share of people living on the poverty line. acosta et al. (2006) in their study on remittances and development in latin america, using household survey data from ten latin american countries, suggest that, on average, a 1% increase in remittances-to-gdp ratio leads to a 0.35% to 0.40% reduction in the poverty headcount. the economic impact of international remittances on indonesia is extensively studied by adams and cuecuecha (2010). using the indonesian family life survey, they find that international remittances reduce the poverty headcount by 29.7% and reduce the squared poverty gap by 69.9%. they also find that the household consumption on food is increased by 8.5%. this paper supports the findings that international remittances contribute to the reduction of poverty although it does not aim to investigate such a thing per se. this paper also agrees on the view that international remittances change the household behaviour on consumption, particularly on food consumption, although the spatial analysis used in this paper could not confirm such a cause and effect relationship. what this paper aims to understand is whether the international remittances are received by poorer households according to their food consumption. such confirmationmight strengthen the previous findings of adams and page (2005), acosta et al. (2006), adams and cuecuecha (2010) that international remittances significantly contribute to reduce poverty. this is particularly the case in indonesia where adams and cuecuecha (2010) found that the remittances are being used to spend more on consumption goods (food), as they argue that householdswho receive remittances areconsiderably poorerthus the remittances are mainly used to spend on the very basic necessity: food. geographic information systems (gis) the contributions of geographic information systems (gis) to discover and share new understandings in social sciences have been acknowledged in social sciences research (longley et al., 2011). gis is a powerful tool to solve major problems affecting the governments, society, and individuals, such as the problem of poverty, population growth, disease, and crime. it could measure the characteristics of geographic phenomena, represent the measurements to highlight spatial themes and relationships, and use the representations to produce more integrated frameworks of relationships (chrisman, 2003; longley et al., 2011). sipe and dale (2003) use gis to research and control the problem of malaria in indonesia. gis is used to map the incidence of malaria in some geographic areas in indonesia and correlate the incidence with the population in order to illustrate the pattern of population at risk. they also map the relationship of malaria incidence with variables such asdemography (age, gender), population movement, temperature, and rainfallto see if any relationship exists. the application of gis in social sciences research is presented in hamnett’s (2003) study. it uses the spatial analysis to examine inequalities in london by looking at the relationship of unemployment and deprivation. hamnett (2003) found that the geographical pattern of unemployment is consistent with social deprivation, which is measured by: index of deprivation, index of underprivileged area, long-term illness population, and low household income distribution. he also applies the spatial analysis to describe the occupational and social characteristics of london. the analysis of gentrification (the increase in the middle class) and the distribution of professional and management occupations, for instance, are presented using the mapping format. 45 journal of asean studies coy et al. (2011) also demonstrate the use of the mapping technique in solving the problem in social sciences. they use the gis to assess spatial characteristics of violence against women (vaw), specialized support services, and the distance women travelled to access these services when fleeing domestic violence. through the mapping technique, they found that the provision of the vaw specialized-support services is inadequate. they viewed gis as an innovative tool to solve problems not only in the field of violence against women, but also on gender equality and social change in broader theme. in relation to this paper, the use of gis is expected to represent geographically the relationship between international remittances and food consumption. it is expected that the spatial analysis, through mapping would provide a better understanding, at least from the visual point of view, about how international remittances are represented in connection with food consumption and deprivation. the use of gis is considered to be one of the innovative methodologies in the study of international remittances. it is expected that this paper will show the original contribution of using geographical / spatial analysis to visually understand the relationship of international remittances and deprivation. despite the usefulness of gis, however, it is still less reliable as a tool in explaining the statistical relationship between variables. one of the weaknesses of gis, this paper argues, is that it could not demonstrate the statistical relationship between international remittances and deprivation. it could suggest the association between them, but it could not determine any cause and effect relations. it could visually show the association but it could not measure (statistically) the strength of the association (or the correlation) between variables. therefore, there is still the limitation that the gis result, or indeed the result of this paper, could not suggest any statistical relationship between international remittances and deprivation. what this paper does suggest, is only a spatial / geographical association. mapping the international remittances and food consumption in indonesia this paper hypothesizes that international remittances tend to be received by deprived households. the basis of what constitutes a deprived household is based on food consumption per household, i.e. the less the consumption of food, the more deprived the household. the food consumption is simply chosen following the measurement of poverty line by the statistics for indonesia (badan pusat statistik – bps). bps measures the poverty line using the expenditure approach by calculating food and non-food consumption. food consumption is calculated by the amount of money spent on foodto reach the minimum calorie requirements (maksum, 2004). this paper therefore suggests that food consumption is an important component to measure poverty or deprivation of a household.it is one of the basic necessities that if a household or a household member spent less than the average person (or household) spent on the minimum calorie requirements, the respective household or household member can be considered as deprived or poor. although it is also understood that food consumption is not the only component for measuring poverty, as non-food expenditure such as housing, health, and education is also taken into account on measuring the poverty line. to test the hypothesis, this paper uses spatial analysis by utilising geographic information systems to create a map. there are basically two steps in examining the geographic relationship between international remittances and deprivation. the first step is to map the geographic distribution of deprived households and the second is to map the geographic location of the households who receive international remittances. from these 46 spatial analysis on international remittances, food consumption two steps, it can be seen from the spatial analysis whether the two maps produce a similar geographic pattern or not. the hypothesis is to test whether households who receive international remittances are indeed the deprived households. this paper uses data from the fourth wave of the indonesia family life survey (ifls4) year 2007/2008. ifls4 is conducted jointly by rand, the centre for population and policy studies at the university of gadjah mada and the metre survey. this paper also uses softwarearcgis version 9.3.1 to create the maps. food consumption and deprived households as food consumption is one of the determinants to measure poverty line, this paper focuses on food consumption to determine what constitutes a deprived household. figure 1 shows the mapping of monthly food consumption peraverage household in each province. it is understood that the ifls does not cover all provinces in indonesia, thus figure 1 only shows provinces covered by the survey. figure 1 is portrayed based on ifls data from 12,977 households spread throughout 23 provinces. it is also noted that the ifls data does not represent the entire population of indonesia. the limitation is that some provinces for instance have very few household respondents than others. even so, ifls is worth studying because of the large coverage of provinces and thenumber of households that participated in the survey. figure 1. mapping of monthly average food consumption 47 journal of asean studies the mapping of deprived households in each province is subsequently illustrated in figure 2. the measurement criteria for determining what constitutes a deprived household is solely based on food consumption and bps (badan pusat statistik) poverty line. it calculates the number of households with monthly food consumption less than the bps poverty line per capita (in the year 2007 it is idr 166,697 per capita per month). based on this information, there are 2,174 deprived households or 16.75% of the total 12,977 households. this percentage figure resembles closely the bps figure which states that 16.58% of indonesia’s residents were living below the poverty line as of march 2007 (bps, 2007), although discrepancy occurs as food consumption per household is being matched directly with poverty line per capita. it acknowledges the limitation that it does not include other household consumptions and does not use the per capita measurement unit (i.e. per household is used instead). the map on figure 2 shows that the province with the largest number of deprived households is jawa barat, followed by jawa timur and jawa tengah. figure 3 shows in detail the percentage of total deprived households in each province. it is noted that only 20 provinces (out of 23 in the survey) have a deprived household(s) in it. the possible explanation is because lack of respondents for those particular provinces. the first step of using spatial analysis to map the deprived households in each province is, therefore, completed. the second step is then to map the distribution of households receiving international remittances in each province. figure 2. mapping of number of deprived household 48 spatial analysis on international remittances, food consumption figure 3. total deprived households source: indonesia family life survey-fourth wave deprived households and international remittances in order to examine the spatial relationship of deprived households and international remittances, the second step of mapping households who receive international remittances is established. figure 4 presents the distribution of households receiving international remittances in each province. it is clearly seen that some provinces have a larger proportion of households receiving remittances although it is also understood from the map that not all provinces have households receiving international remittances.only 14 provinces (out of 23 provinces in the survey) have households that receive international remittances. it may have been explained in a previous study of adams and cuecuecha (2010) that not all householdshave migrants whoremit. a prior study of de la briere et al. (2002) also confirmed that in general, half of migrants do not remit. there is also the limitation that the ifls survey is not designed as a remittances survey and therefore the number of households who receive international remittances in this survey is considerably small. only 1.90% of households (out of the total households) receive international remittances. the province with the most number of households receiving remittances is nusa tenggara barat, followed byjawatimur and jawa barat.figure 5 describes in detail the percentage of households receiving remittances in each province. 49 journal of asean studies figure 4. mapping of number of household receiving remittances figure 5. total households receive remittances source: indonesia family life survey-fourth wave despite the limitation that the data is not geographically representative, i.e. each province does not have an equal number of household respondents, the indonesian 50 spatial analysis on international remittances, food consumption family life survey provides useful data and presents a powerful map on linking international remittances and deprivation. the two steps for testing the hypothesis that international remittances are related to deprivation are explained in maps, mainly through figure 2 and figure 4. on linking these two maps, the spatial analysis confirms similar geographical patterns in figure 2 and figure 4. looking at the province level, the maps show a spatial relationship between deprivation and international remittances, that is, provinces with a large number of households receiving remittances (figure 4) are more likely to be provinces with a large number of deprived households (figure 2).it could also be seen from the comparison of the charts that the top five provinces with the largest percentage of households receiving remittances (figure 5) are also the top five provinces with the largest percentage of deprived households (figure 3). the provinces of nusa tenggara barat, jawatimur, jawa barat, jawa tengah, and sulawesi selatan, are the top five of both international remittances and deprivation. through the spatial analysis, the hypothesis that international remittances are linked with deprivation is evident. in other words, through the mapping technique, there is a strong geographic indication that international remittances are linked with deprivation of the households. more precisely, there is a strong possibility that international remittances are more likely to be received by poorer households – according to the level of food consumption. thus, the result strengthens the previous findings of adams and page (2005), acosta et al. (2006), and adams and cuecuecha (2010) that international remittances are undeniably linked with poverty as this study shows a strong indication that international remittances are more likely to be received by poorer households. conclusion the hypothesis that international remittances are linked with deprived households is tested using the indonesia family life survey-fourth wave (ifls4) data. geographic information systems (gis) is used as a tool to present spatial analysis of international remittances and deprivation. the food consumption level is used as an indicator of deprivation. the method consists of two mapping steps: the first is to produce the map of total deprived households in each province, and the second is to create the map of total households receiving international remittances in each province. by looking at the two maps, the spatial analysis confirms a similar geographical pattern between international remittances and deprivation. the result shows that provinces with a large number of household receiving international remittances are certainly provinces with a large number of deprived households. the top five provinces with the largest number of households receiving remittances are: nusa tenggara barat, jawatimur, jawa barat, jawa tengah, and sulawesi selatan. these are also the top five provinces with the largest number of deprived households. the spatial analysis shows a strong indication that international remittances are more likely to be received by the deprived households.however, there is the limitation that the results do not suggest any statistical correlation between international remittances and deprivation. this paper also demonstrates the usefulness of gis to project the socioeconomic characteristics of indonesian households in various provinces. it shows how complex socio-economic data can be analysed using a simple mapping technique. it is therefore recommended as an innovative tool to understand the socio-economic issues affecting the society. 51 journal of asean studies acknowledgement funding from the ministry of national education of indonesia through p3swot scholarship is gratefully acknowledged. about the author the author is a ph. d candidate at london metropolitan university. references acosta, p., calderon, c., fajnzylber, p. and lopez, h. (2006) ‘remittances and development in latin america’, world economy, 29 (7), 957-987. adams, jr., r. and cuecuecha, a. (2010) ‘the economic impact of international remittances on poverty and household consumption and investment in indonesia’, world bank policy research working paper 5433, washington, dc: world bank. adams, jr., r. and page, j. (2005) ‘do international migration and remittances reduce poverty in developing countries?’,world development, 33 (10), 1645-1669. badan pusat statistik (2007) ‘tingkat kemiskinan di indonesia tahun 2007’, berita resmi statistik, 38/07/th. x, 2 july 2007. chrisman, n.r. (2003) exploring geographical information systems, 2nd ed., new jersey: wiley. coy, m., kelly, l., foord, j., bowstead, j. (2011) ‘roads to nowhere? mapping violence against women services’, violence against women, 17 (3), 404–425. de la briere, b., sadoulet, e., de janvry, a., and lambert, s. (2002) ‘the roles of destination, gender and household composition in explaining remittances: an analysis for the dominican sierra’, journal of development economics, 68, 309-328. hamnett, c. (2003)unequal city: london in the global arena, london: routledge. longley, p.a., goodchild, m.f., maguire, d.j., rhind, d.w. (2011) geographic information systems and science,3rd ed., new jersey: wiley. maksum, c. (2004) ‘official poverty measurement in indonesia’, paper presented at 2004 international conference on official poverty statistics, 4-6 october 2004, mandaluyong city, philippines. rand, the centre for population and policy studies (cpps) of the university of gadjahmada and survey metre (2007/8)indonesia family life survey(ifls4). ratha, d., mohapatra, s., silwal, a. (2011) ‘the migration and remittances factbook 2011’, washington dc: world bank migration and remittances unit. sipe, n.g. and dale, p. (2003) ‘challenges in using geographic information systems (gis) to understand and control malaria in indonesia’, malaria journal, 2 (36). stark, o. and taylor, j.e. (1989) ‘relative deprivation and international migration’, demography, vol. 26, pp.114 world bank (2011) ‘migration and remittances data’, available from 52 spatial analysis on international remittances, food consumption <www.worldbank.org/prospects/migrat ionandremittances> journal of asean studies, vol. 8, no. 2 (2020), pp. 129-145 doi: https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v8i2.6769 issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic policing cyberspace: understanding online repression in thailand and the philippines fernan talamayan institute of social research and cultural studies, national chiao tung university, taiwan ftalamayan.srcs07g@nctu.edu.tw received: 25th october 2020/ revised: 07th november 2020/ accepted: 28th november 2020 how to cite: talamayan, f. (2020). policing cyberspace: understanding online repression in thailand and the philippines. journal of asean studies, 8(2), 129-145. https:/doi.org/10.21512/jas.v8i2.6769 abstract social networking sites have become increasingly relevant in the study of democracy and culture in recent years. this study explores the interconnectedness of social networks, the imposition of state control, and management of social behavior by comparing various literature on the operation of repression in thai and philippine cyberspaces. it examines the overt and covert policing of daily interactions in digital environments and unpacks governmental technologies’ disciplinary mechanisms following michel foucault’s notion of government and biopolitical power. subjugation in the context of social networks merits analysis for it sheds light on the practice of active and passive self-censorship—the former driven by the pursuit of a moral self-image and the latter by state-sponsored fear. in tracing various points of convergence and divergence in the practice of cyber control in thailand and the philippines, the study found newer domains of regulation of social behavior applicable to today’s democracies. keywords: cyberspace, algorithm, policing, online repression, self-censorship introduction according to habermas (2006), political communication on the internet claims “unequivocal democratic merits” in the context of undermining censorship of authoritarian regimes (p. 423). quite the contrary, it could be observed that in nations like thailand and the philippines, the internet has been instrumental in silencing dissent or harassing or jailing opposition members. while the internet has long been regarded as a facilitator of democracy (benkler, 2006; gillmor, 2004; grossman, 1995; rheingold, 1993/2000) and a platform for political discourse (poster, 1997 in geiger, 2009), it has also been utilized by authoritarian and mailto:ftalamayan.srcs07g@nctu.edu.tw mailto:ftalamayan.srcs07g@nctu.edu.tw 130 policing cyberspace authoritarian-like governments as an instrument to suppress people’s freedom (sombatpoonsiri, 2018) and exert hegemonic control in cyberspace (frechette, 2005; laungaramsri, 2016; schaffar, 2016; sinpeng, 2013). the motivations and objectives of these governments may vary, but the exercise of hegemony and the operation of repression are relatively similar. mainly, in their attempts to dictate the political discourse in “digital public spheres” (hearn, 2010; macnamara, 2008; mahlouly, 2013; valtysson, 2012), such regimes instigate fear or assert a peculiar sense of morality to manage citizen behavior and police information flows. this study surveys the current scholarship on thailand and the philippines, where the incidence of cyber repression and manipulation has increased at an alarming rate in recent years. as both thailand and the philippines are suffering from disinformation and extreme polarization, these countries are interesting case studies in understanding the operation of online repression in democratic states in southeast asia. in comparing their experiences, the study elaborates on how various scholars identify the roles of the authorities (military junta in thailand and the rodrigo duterte administration in the philippines) and their supporters in the development of new and more efficient forms of cyber control. it discusses the activities of the thai junta’s cyber scouts and duterte’s keyboard army in an attempt to compare and unravel the systematic operation of hegemonic control in these two countries’ cyberspace. the study raises the following questions: how does the internet become instrumental in the reproduction of the state’s domination over individuals’ daily affairs? what are the tools and techniques that authoritarian regimes use in patrolling and controlling cyberspace? how is normative power exercised in cyberspace? how does cyber trolling and harassment influence the governance of the self and others? these questions will be answered following michel foucault’s concept of government and biopolitical power while employing a comparative approach to establish and analyze the essential systemic features of governmental and political interventions in contemporary digital spaces. literature review this research extends sombatpoonsiri’s (2018) exploration, which compared the thai and philippine governments’ strategies of political repression and cyber control. observing the striking similarities in the internet regime and political situation in thailand and the philippines, she explained how autocratic and illiberal regimes exploit existing social divides to consolidate power. she argued that the government’s instrumentalization of cyberbullying is a manifestation of the deeper crisis of social polarization. complementing her analysis on the correlation between the crises of polarization and governments’ mobilization of the public in controlling cyberspace, this study refers to sombatpoonsiri’s described forms of political repression as governmental techniques that conduct people’s conduct in digital environments. similarly, recognizing the vulnerability of democracy under authoritarian regimes, sinpeng (2013) zeroed in on thailand’s internet regime (p. 421) as she examined the role of journal of asean studies 131 the internet in the entrenchment of democracy. sinpeng questioned the internet’s democratizing role in the cyber era, positing that the internet serves as a tool for repression through state online coercion, as was the case in thailand. along these lines, laungaramsri (2016) tackled thailand’s “troubling” shift toward censorship, surveillance, and suppression in cyberspace. drawing on foucault’s “governmentality,” she described the normalization of surveillance in post-coup thailand through the politicization, securitization, and militarization of the internet by the thai junta. meanwhile, ramasoota (2016) touched on cyber-witch hunting in thailand in the post-2014 coup as she elaborated on how cyber-witch hunters harass people with differing views and undermine their privacy rights. despite the absence of cyber-witch hunts and anti-royalism in the philippines, the promotion of fear and the exercise of hegemonic control of an authoritarian-like regime such as duterte’s also threaten freedom of expression and privacy rights. incidence of cyber trolling and harassment of political opposition in the philippines has increased dramatically since duterte’s assumption of the presidency. ong and cabañes (2018) pointed out that many filipinos who expressed disgust towards duterte were repeatedly hounded and harassed with the use of negative speeches, expletives, and death threats. whereas the research of ong and cabañes explained the “moral justification in the disinformation project” (pp. 29-30, see also ong & cabañes, 2019) and impressed how cyber trolling has become a tool for cyber manipulation and control, most noteworthy is their effort to expose the existence of an industry responsible for the manipulation of algorithms of online platforms, which help the promotion of political propagandas in the philippines. while this study often refers to the works of the previous researchers throughout its discussion, it simultaneously deviates by suggesting categories in which the described coercive activities could be plotted. by making apparent the characteristics of identified repressive actions, the study determines the type of technology that a state and its supporters execute to govern and influence groups and individuals, such as algorithmic gatekeeping, algorithmic policing, and cyber policing. as an art of government, these technologies are often employed synchronously whenever possible. in the next sections, the study briefly explains foucault’s notion of biopolitical power, which is mobilized as a conceptual tool to analyze internet regimes and the practice of government in thailand and the philippines. this concept acts as a bridge that links governmentality with new technologies of policing (algorithmic gatekeeping, algorithmic and cyber policing). these technologies exploit the vulnerabilities of social network designs by manipulating the flow of information and discourse on the internet. to adequately describe these new technologies of government, the supposed democratizing effect of the internet is questioned as it explains how the “illusion” of freedom is manufactured through and within the internet’s internal and external logic. 132 policing cyberspace analytical framework the supposedly “mutually beneficial” arrangement between citizens and the state (controlling the population to foster both citizen’s life and the state’s strength) introduced the paradigm of biopolitical power (foucault, 1981, pp. 248-252). the goal of biopolitical power is to optimize and multiply life by subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations (foucault, 1978, p. 137). this kind of power is exercised through constant supervision of its subjects (the individual). individuals regularly police themselves and others by examining and controlling their and other people’s thoughts and behavior in accordance with what society has constructed as the norm (bevir, 1999, p. 65). with the birth of biopolitical power, social norms have become a critical regulator of people’s communication and daily activities. moreover, with the promise of the society to secure life and happiness, people subject themselves to such power. the society’s essence gives teeth to biopolitical power. in describing the intrinsic nature of the society, john stuart mill (1859/2003, p. 139) wrote: though society is not founded on a contract, and though no good purpose is answered by inventing a contract in order to deduce social obligations from it, everyone who receives protection of society owes a return for the benefit, and the fact of living in society renders it indispensable that each should be bound to observe a certain line of conduct towards the rest. the idea that one is bound to observe a certain conduct towards the rest gives the society the authority to conduct the conduct of an individual. mill (1859/2003) added that society is granted jurisdiction over a person’s behavior, especially when it prejudicially affects other people’s interests (p. 139). because of this jurisdiction, individuals are expected to discipline themselves and act following the norms. this arrangement between the individual and society would also have an impact on the construction of the moral self-image, since morality is understood as “the attempt to make oneself accountable for one’s own actions” (dean, 1999/2010, p. 19). self-regulation is treated as a moral activity, as the practice of government is presumed to know “what constitutes good, virtuous, appropriate, responsible conduct of individuals and collectives” (p. 19). that said, conducting other people’s conduct becomes a moral activity too. this explains why public opinion, which is presumed to constitute ethical principles, is used to regulate, or in some cases, punish individuals who, for instance, have dissenting and opposing views. in other words, government is the “conduct of conduct” (foucault, 1982, pp. 220-221 in dean, 1999/2010, p. 17). the different meanings of conduct imply some sort of calculation as to how government is carried out. it also influences today’s understanding of self-control or self-regulation, as conduct in this framework involves conducting oneself (pp. 17-18). to govern is to manage human behavior via social norms, structure the field of possible action, and act on individuals’ capacities for action (p. 22). in this light, an actor’s (state or supporters) journal of asean studies 133 exploitation of digital platforms’ architecture and manipulation of social media algorithms play a significant role in shaping human behavior and delimiting social interaction. meanwhile, it is the law that gives programs and technologies its coercive power (foucault, 1978/2001, p. 232). although foucault was originally referring to the programs in educational, medical, and military institutions when describing the relationship between law, power, program, and technologies, it can be argued that the same principles may apply in digital spaces. social media users are similarly subjected to coercive measures that follow sets of calculated prescriptions (i.e., algorithms and software designs), arranged spaces (i.e., filters, sitemaps, or firewalls), and regulated behaviors (i.e., website’s privacy policies or terms of service that govern the use of a digital platform). additionally, these sets of rules are stacked on top of laws and state policies that govern citizens. research method apart from conducting a survey of literature that reflects on the state of democracies in thailand and the philippines, the author gathered empirical evidence from various facebook pages of public figures (or of those supporting and promoting public figures) such as duterte’s duterte media, duterte sa pagbabago bukas (duterte for tomorrow’s change), duterte diehard supporters (dds),1 duterte phenomenon, pinoy monkey pride, thinking pinoy, mocha uson blog, du30 trending news, or pro-junta’s platforms such as the new atlas, alt thai news network, and new eastern outlook.2 as a qualitative research, the author treated these online groups and platforms as his field and employed purposeful sampling to provide “information-rich cases” (patton, 2005, p. 2). immersion in these groups involved observation of several state supporters’ posts and activities. the author also analyzed the content and comment section of several youtube videos that promoted the state’s agenda. to discover various pro-state channels, the author followed the recommendations on youtube, as they often suggest similar contents and channels. analysis this section compares several scholars’ discussion on how people’s conduct is conducted in the thai and philippine cyberspaces. in navigating various works, this study intervenes by hinting on digital governmental techniques that are observably practiced by authoritarian regimes such as algorithmic gatekeeping, algorithmic policing, and cyber policing. to understand these technologies, it is imperative to introduce what an algorithm is and describe what it can do. algorithms are sets of instructions designed to perform specific tasks or operations efficiently. offering a more critical definition, tufekci (2015) describes algorithms as “computational processes that are used to make decisions of such complexity that inputs and 134 policing cyberspace outputs are neither transparent nor obvious to the casual human observer” (p. 206). while some computational processes involve simple operations such as multiplication of numbers, issues could be raised on other algorithms that involve “subjective decision making” wherein no single correct answer could be determined (pp. 206-207). in the context of digital journalism, algorithms affect the selecting, sorting, and ordering of news (carlson, 2017, p. 2). it also prioritizes and shapes the content that becomes visible to the people. in environments where popularity drives the production of contents and personalization is valued over mass messaging (carlson, 2017, p. 7), relevance becomes critical in determining algorithmic calculations. as tech giants present social networking sites as spaces that individuals could control through the logic of relevance, these sites give an impression to their users that one could curate their news feed, block contents that they deem foul or obscene, or follow and share stories which they consider informative or entertaining. however, it must be noted that what becomes relevant to the public may be influenced by what is presented or offered to them. hence, when algorithmic manipulation limits content selection, what becomes relevant to social media users become regulated without the public’s knowledge. this lack of visibility of algorithmic decisions reinforces the “illusion” of freedom appropriated to and by the people. it is this lack of visibility of algorithms that makes social media users vulnerable to manipulation. the maneuvering of internet content, as well as the discourse in the said platform, in effect, creates an illusion of choices as choices become pre-determined by an algorithm. tufekci (2015) notes that such manipulations are performed routinely in many online platforms. she writes, “they range from purposes as mundane as deciding the color of a button, to decisions as which news article is shown to the public” (p. 205). the regulation of digital content consumed by the public is carried out through algorithmic gatekeeping and algorithmic policing. tufekci (2015) defines algorithmic gatekeeping as “the process by which transparent algorithmic computational-tools dynamically filter, highlight, suppress, or otherwise play an editorial role…in determining information flows through online platforms and similar media” (pp. 207-208). algorithmic gatekeeping is instrumental in managing public opinion, for it helps actors control political communication and meaning-making processes through algorithmically driven filters. on the other hand, algorithmic policing is used as a formal apparatus of control (norris, 2008), which involves big data surveillance tasked to predict risks and future crimes (brayne, 2017). several facebook pages and communities contribute largely to the algorithmic gatekeeping and policing of the philippine and thai cyberspaces. like-minded filipino supporters of duterte gather in facebook pages of public figures (or of those supporting and promoting public figures) such as duterte’s duterte media, duterte sa pagbabago bukas (duterte for tomorrow’s change), duterte diehard supporters, pinoy monkey pride, thinking pinoy and du30 trending news,—together they disseminate content that supports duterte’s policy decisions and actions. similarly, the case in thailand is where the right-wing and antiliberal online media such as t-news, chaophraya news, deep news, the new atlas, alt thai news network and new eastern outlook align their content and activities with those of the journal of asean studies 135 cyber scouts, garbage collector organization (gco), and the military junta (sombatpoonsiri, 2018, p. 4). following the logic of social media algorithms, the government, social media influencers, and supporters’ (duterte’s dds in the philippines and the pro-junta online media in thailand) combined effort would have, in theory, an impact on their countries’ information flows. the sheer volume and frequency of the production and proliferation of pro-duterte and pro-junta contents would have influenced the computational processes of these sites and created a sense of relevance in various social media’s programming language. facebook’s banning of fake accounts linked to pro-state groups and the military in 2019 (thailand) and 2020 (philippines) provides clues on the potential influence of algorithmic gatekeeping and policing on people’s activities and behavior in digital platforms. social politics curation or the practice of curating news and political content on social networking sites (thorson, 2014, p. 207) has become instrumental in exercising algorithmic manipulation in the philippines. a number of celebrities and bloggers like mocha uson (a former singer-dancer and a current appointive public official), rj nieto (the author of the produterte facebook page thinking pinoy), mark lopez (a pro-duterte blogger), and many others who have large followings have taken the lead in curating news in the philippines. reports show (see vera files year-ender report 2017) that their active sharing and distribution of content that support and venerate duterte have sustained the generation of likes for such posts. duterte’s keyboard army and supporters backed these social media influencers. believing that duterte is the “leader that filipinos need” (maboloc, 2018, p. 93), they “willingly” participate in spreading pro-duterte content on the internet, regardless of the content’s credibility.3 further, duterte’s cyber troops have been relentless in attacking his critics, particularly those who oppose the government’s war on drugs, which has claimed thousands of lives through extrajudicial killings (sombatpoonsiri, 2018, p. 3). although most celebrities, bloggers, or other fervent supporters of the duterte administration claim that they act on their own accord, ong and cabañes (2018) expose the existence of an institutionalized network of disinformation that guides them by explaining how politicians utilized this network to influence digital platforms’ algorithms. they also report that in its operation, “high-level strategists operators pass on the 24/7 running of these accounts (facebook fake accounts) to lower-level account operators” (ong & cabañes, 2018, p. 50). multiple fake social media accounts are used in their operation to amplify their propaganda and ensure a “high degree of algorithmic visibility, as they can maintain intense interactivity and engagement with their followers and supporters” (pp. 37, 50). these accounts often manifest “inauthentic behavior,” defined by facebook as the use of deceptive behaviors to conceal an organization’s identity, making the organization and its campaign seem “more popular or trustworthy” than it actually is (gleicher, 2019). as propaganda becomes highly visible in digital platforms, the more it can “hook” or “capture” users. this is possible through political actors’ constant production of propagandistic materials and social media’s internal computational processes that help users further immerse in materials and contents related to what they click on their feed. since algorithms assume its 136 policing cyberspace users’ choices and behavior, users who interact with a particular content may end up seeing more of that material. once users become “captives” of both the platform and certain content, it is highly likely that the social networking site, guided by its algorithm, would direct them to other videos and threads with similar content. for instance, if a youtube user who has just started following a propaganda lets youtube’s autoplay function work, the platform will decide to immerse that user in more videos that it deems relevant. youtube also has a mechanism that remembers watched videos. suggestions and updates based on viewing history welcome a user when they reopen the platform. this design makes it convenient for pro-duterte vloggers to promote pro-duterte content as the platform helps them reach out to and update their audience. youtube’s relevance, ranking, and search algorithms can also induce the repetition of key propaganda messages. this repetition helps propaganda become the “truth” to propaganda believers, and this “truth” is instrumental in influencing how they pass judgment on others. while this study highlights certain actors’ manipulation of algorithms to affect people’s moral compass, attention must be given to media content production, especially since media content also drives faithful readership or viewership. several audio-visual materials from produterte bloggers use the vernacular of the “people” (by “people” the study pertains to the supporters of duterte). their tone is often conversational, and their choices of words appeal to the ordinary filipino, as they employ common street language and even profanity on some occasions (see the regular posts of mr. riyoh, banat by, mark lopez, etc.). they also sound as if they represent the filipino people, providing their people with a voice that has long been silenced or neglected by technocrats or reformists. their videos follow duterte’s “antiestablishment strategy” (maboloc, 2019, p. 170) and follow an “us-versus-them” narrative, a characteristic familiar to populist rhetorical styles. these political communication techniques make some of their followers assert that their likes should reclaim “power” from the educated and landed elite. more importantly, the repetition and multiplication of such political content aid in transforming propaganda into a “basic grammar” (vatsov, 2018, p. 77) that frames state supporters’ articulation of moral intuitions. another form of policing that has gained popularity in contemporary authoritarian regimes is what several scholars refer to as cyber policing (ramasoota, 2016; sinpeng, 2013; sombatpoonsiri, 2018). what distinguishes cyber policing from algorithmic policing is its overtness—while the latter operates outside the conscious, that is, often stealthy and invisible (tufekci, 2015, pp. 208-209), the former allows itself to be known to instigate fear. cyber policing also involves the policing of information flows by controlling citizens’ behavior (sinpeng, 2013, p. 423). this mode of policing is often supported and normalized by the state through legislation or state policies. in other contexts, the head of state’s public statements could also promote the normalization of cyber policing, for, in such places, people may regard every word uttered by the head of state as the policy of the state. as such, cyber policing may enforce self-censorship. the promotion of self-censorship in cyberspace is further discussed in the subsequent paragraphs. journal of asean studies 137 thailand’s cyber scout program and cyber-witch hunting are examples of what the study pertains to as cyber policing. according to laungaramsri (2016), the initiation of the cyber scout program and cyber-witch hunt and the junta’s employment of deceptive tactics curtails freedom of expression in thailand (pp. 195-204). observing the practice of cyber policing in thailand, the computer crime act (cca) in 2007 and article 112 or the lèsemajesté act of the thai penal code provide guidelines (or “programs”) that inform individual behavior. apart from acting as “grids for the perception and evaluation of things” (foucault, 1978/2001, p. 232), they also create a blueprint that dictates how society should regulate its people in thai cyberspace. briefly, the cca of 2007 legalizes the blocking of internet content by the government, and it makes internet content providers liable for any direct or indirect violations (ramasoota, 2011 in sinpeng, 2013, p. 428). it also legalizes the infringement of people’s right to privacy, as the law permits the exposure of the identities of internet users without the users’ consent (p. 428). sinpeng notes that this law does not provide clarity as to what exactly it specifies as a crime and any actions committed online, which the government deems as a threat to national security could be legally charged (pp. 428-429). article 112 or the lèse-majesté act, on the other hand, prohibits defamation, insults or threats to the king, the queen, the heir-apparent, or the regent. violators of article 112 could face three to fifteen years of imprisonment for each count of offense (ramasoota, 2016, p. 271). needless to say, these laws serve as regulatory mechanisms in directing people’s offline and online activities and behavior. these laws empower the cyber scouts, and they also serve as the driving force behind several cases of cyber-witch hunting in thailand. the cyber scout program is a project initiative of the royalist-conservative government of abhisit vajjajiva that professionalized online royalist vigilante groups in thailand (schaffar, 2016, p. 224). it established the organization called the cyber scout thailand, which was set up to “create ethical and moral online conduct and ensure the creative and appropriate use of information, communication and technology” (cyberscout.in.th). the members of this program, called cyber scouts, are given instructions on the historical significance of the monarchy, as well as the cyber laws and ethics, and are provided with technical training (schaffar, 2016, p. 224; sinpeng, 2013, p. 432). they work undercover to befriend suspects on facebook, start conversations about sensitive issues, patrol cyberspace, and report violators of the lèse-majesté to the authorities (schaffar, 2016). it is important to note that while thailand’s ministry of information and communication technology (mict) supports these cyber scouts, the members participate voluntarily (ramasoota, 2016, pp. 273-274). volunteerism, in this context, appeals to people’s sense of morality. activities such as identifying and locating violators of the cca of 2007 and article 112 are perceived as altruistic, as they are deemed to contribute to the reduction of nonconformity and social tensions. moreover, these volunteers work in incognito mode (invisible to others). since anyone, such as friends or colleagues, can be a cyber scout, it encourages people to be careful with whatever they do or post online. hence, apart from the laws’ vagueness regarding what the state deems punishable, knowledge about cyber scout’s 138 policing cyberspace existence potentially creates a cloud of fear. in such a context, fear becomes a fundamental tool in governing the self and others. another thai organization that monitored people’s behavior on the internet for the purpose of protecting the monarchy is the self-proclaimed ultra-royalist garbage collector organization (gco). founded by major general rienthong nanna, a retired medical doctor and a director of mongkotwattana hospital, the gco derived its name from the idea that people expressing contrary views are trash (stapleton, 2015 in ramasoota, 2016, p. 276). schaffar (2016) states it is an organization of ordinary people from the streets who participate in cyberwitch hunting, or the reproaching and public lynching of “social rebels or those expressing nonconforming views online” through the circulation of the nonconformists’ “unorthodox attitudes” to the “conforming community” on the internet (ramasoota, 2016, p. 269). their activities included the public humiliation and pacification of the supporters and business partners of the exiled prime minister thaksin whom the people refer to as the red shirts (schaffar, 2016). they also collectively campaigned to expose violations of lèse-majesté. the gco’s cyber-witch hunt activities were considered more threatening since they involved privacy rights violations and offline mobbing. cyber-witch hunt undermines thai citizens’ privacy rights through doxxing, defined as the hacker’s habit of collecting personal and private information to be released publicly against a person’s wishes (ramasoota, 2016, p. 273). gco’s activities often involved doxxing. a welldocumented example of such is the case of a red shirt activist, tananun buranasiri. the gco disclosed tananun buranasiri and her family’s personal information to the public after she posted comments that are perceived as violating article 112. the disclosed information included the location of her workplace, and when the mob started appearing in front of her workplace, her employer decided to fire her. the misfortune of tananun buranasiri did not end with the termination of her employment as the gco unrelentingly harassed her online by “insulting her and exchanging fantasies about how to ‘get rid’ of her” (schaffar, 2016, p. 216). other pro-monarchy political groups such as the seri thai movement, thai netizen network, and the people’s alliance for democracy movement encourage their members to participate in the policing of the thai cyberspace by reporting online violators of lèse-majesté to mict. in 2012 the thai free news reported that the people’s alliance for democracy movement alone was responsible for “filing 16 complaints accusing individuals, including some high-profile journalists, of committing computer crimes” (sinpeng, 2013, p. 432). in the philippines, it is in the network disinformation described by ong and cabañes that cyberbullying and trolling, which are more subtle forms of cyber policing (compared to thailand), are exercised. it is, in a sense, the modern form of foucault’s “government of men by men.” cyber trolling police people in several ways. for instance, filipinos who express opposing views in public facebook pages are repeatedly hounded and harassed by duterte’s keyboard army not only through negative speech or expletives but also death threats (ong & cabañes, 2018, p. 13). amplification of pro-duterte messages by both duterte supporters and journal of asean studies 139 troll accounts also creates a sense of “public consensus” in threads that touch upon controversial political issues. it is also a common practice to attack “nonconformists” by appealing to people’s morality and “patriotism;” pro-duterte accounts, for example, accuse duterte’s critics as evil, self-centered, elitist, anti-filipino, or anti-progress. there are also instances when they would just repeatedly dismiss dissent as “stupid,” “ignorant,” or “misinformed.” the way the keyboard army attacks and silences duterte’s critics are easily comparable with how thailand’s gco conducts cyber-mobbing. both groups are notorious for their usage of indecent language and offensive speech. stemming their strength from the grassroots, they fearlessly harass non-conforming people all in the name of defending their respective champions. the activities of these cyber trolls promote self-regulation among social media users, especially to those who wish to spare themselves the trouble of engaging or being harassed by the duterte or thai junta supporters. this form of cyber policing could enforce self-censorship as it encourages individuals to discipline and control their thoughts and actions to avoid state punishment or societal judgment. there are, however, fundamental differences between the two. since the type of authoritarianism in thailand and the philippines varies, the type of supporters and the policing activities will also vary. arguably, duterte enjoys a rather stable popular support while the thai regime relies heavily on many autocratic techniques to remain in power. as a result, duterte’s keyboard army shows no interest in cracking down or spying on their targets, unlike the thai cyber scouts or gco. keyboard armies focus their energy on silencing political enemies and spreading disinformation to gain greater support and attract more followers. meanwhile, thailand’s gco has been known for infiltrating anti-monarchy pages to search and destroy anti-monarchists. they pretend to insult the monarchy to provoke similar action (ramasoota, 2016, p. 279) and ultimately identify those who violate the lèse-majesté. in foucauldian terms, these fundamental differences manifest the specific regularities, logic, strategy, and reason for distinct regimes of practices. as exhibited by the practices of online policing in thailand and the philippines, the seemingly overwhelming presence of cyber scouts and trolls and their constant harassment of the “enemies” of the state contribute to the normalization and legitimization of repression in cyberspace. in the case of thailand, its transitioning back to democracy paved the way for the reinforcement of increased censorship and control over the internet through legislation and cyber policing. the government’s imposition of harsh penalties for violating internet-related laws and their supporters’ active collaboration in identifying and harassing nonconformist citizens has resulted in greater self-censorship in online discussions (sinpeng, 2013, p. 429). the domination in social networking sites of duterte’s keyboard army and other supporters, whose activities were directed at manipulating social media algorithms and shaping public opinion in favor of the current philippine administration, has discredited and silenced dissent (ong & cabañes, 2018, p. 3). like the cyber scouts or gcos, the actions of duterte’s keyboard army may promote self-regulation, especially to those who wish to spare themselves the trouble of engaging or being harassed by the duterte supporters. in these cases, one would see a 140 policing cyberspace combination of what foucault (1982/2001) described as “individualization techniques” and “totalization procedures” (p. 332). the stories of cyber repression and “patriotic” trolling in thailand and the philippines show that cyber control, as a technology of government, conducts people’s conduct. following foucault’s concept of “government of men by men,” the idea that it is the responsibility of every thai citizen to respect the monarchy and uphold the agenda of the state transfers the responsibility of policing individuals to individuals. it becomes the responsibility of every filipino to protect and defend the president and his administration from “destabilizers” and “detractors.” conclusions in examining the practice of censorship and control in contemporary cyberspace, the study compared existing literature on thailand and the philippines, as both have been particularly active in exercising newer forms of surveillance and political repression on the internet. since power in this context operates in digital environments, the exercise of policing requires new techniques of administering and maneuvering. new governmental technologies such as algorithmic gatekeeping, algorithmic policing, and cyber policing are utilized by different agents to instigate fear, engineer public consensus, and control people’s activities and behavior. this study reassessed the current scholarship on thai and philippine cyber control by highlighting the intersection of political actors (state and supporters), state policies, and social networks. it argued that the relationship between the three framed the nature and structure of policing practices in thai and philippine cyberspaces. the study also intervened by demonstrating how varying forms of autocracy affect the modes of governing the population. in this regard, foucault’s notions of government and biopolitical power were operationalized to flesh out fundamental differences between the regimes of practices in thailand and the philippines. in thailand, the literature showed that mass surveillance is conducted to maintain the order prescribed by the state (laungaramsri, 2016, p. 209). the violation of people’s privacy rights was done in the name of “protecting” the national security, and the enactment of projunta and pro-monarchy cyber-related laws and the normalization of spying and cyberbullying on the internet were legitimized by a peculiar sense of morality. citizens were encouraged to patrol cyberspace and take part in the activities of organizations that have aligned their objectives and ideals with the state. in the philippines, despite the lack of strict cybercrime laws, repression is similarly promoted through algorithmic gatekeeping and cyber trolling. the so-called network of disinformation architected by the camp of duterte (or by his followers) has been very active in maneuvering internet traffic and silencing dissent as it takes advantage of the current incapability of the philippines to identify online trolls who use fictitious names. journal of asean studies 141 state supporters’ apprehension of others and their projection of virtuous self-image are done in the name of “patriotism,” morality, and progress. note, however, that despite comparing the situation in thai and philippine cyberspaces, the study does not claim that the above-mentioned autocratic practices are exclusive to both countries. in fact, they can be perceived as symptoms of the general decline in internet freedom among the member states of the association of southeast asian nations (asean). as foucault reminds, government does not only pertain to the political structures or management of states. instead, it defines or directs the way individuals or groups conduct and behave themselves (foucault, 1982 in felluga, 2015, p. 121). surely, with an ever-increasing number of citizens who become active participants on social networking sites, it would make sense for governments to adopt new techniques and rethink how it would govern its people. while new technologies affect and transform daily life, new regulatory and ideational mechanisms persistently control social behaviors. and with the evolution of technology, the techniques of policing become more comprehensive and penetrating. the regulatory and ideational mechanisms of such technologies allow for the manipulation of public consensus in digital communities. capitalizing on the existing social divide in thailand and the philippines, both governments have effectively used the us-versusthem perspective and mobilized people’s sentiments to promote their brand of totalitarianism. admittedly though, observing glimpses of resistance and identifying the apparent systemic features of governmental and political interventions in cyberspace may not necessarily solve the host of issues that surround it. nevertheless, unraveling the fundamental nature of government and policing in the context of today’s internet is a start. notes 1dds derives its name from the davao death squad, the infamous vigilante group in duterte’s hometown known for committing extrajudicial killings. 2in 2019, facebook removed 12 social media accounts and 10 pages linked to the new eastern outlook and the new atlas. these accounts and pages were removed for using fake accounts, creating fictitious personas, and driving users to “off-platform blogs posing as news outlets” (“facebook shows posts,” 2019). 3it is common for the producers of such media texts to claim that they voluntarily publish content that supports the government. an interview conducted by ong and cabañes (2018) explains the rationale behind the perceived credibility and morality in volunteerism. as an anonymous filipino social media influencer informed, it is a must for them to avoid any sign of control in engaging in debates or promoting campaigns in social networking sites. showing signs of control would potentially result in losing followers, as they become branded as “bayaran” or “paid stooge” (p. 36). 142 policing cyberspace about the author fernan talamayan is a ph.d. candidate at the institute of social research and cultural studies, national chiao tung university, taiwan. he holds master’s degrees in sociology and social anthropology from the central european university, hungary (2018) and history from the university of the philippines diliman (2014). his dissertation project investigates governmental practices of populist and fascist regimes in social media. he also conducts research on the marginalization of indigenous communities, colonial advertising, historical revisionism, and propaganda. acknowledgment this research was awarded the empowering network for international thai and asean studies (enitas) research scholarship 2020 by the institute of thai studies, chulalongkorn university, thailand. 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(2016). new social media and politics in thailand: the emergence of fascist https://doi.org/10.14764/10.aseas-2016.2-2 https://doi.org/10.1080/089356902101242288 https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v6i1.4458 https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v6i1.4458 https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v7i2.6163 https://doi.org/10.1177/1329878x0812900103 https://doi.org/10.1177/1329878x0812900103 https://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_279211_en.pdf https://doi.org/10.1080/09627259508552710 https://doi.org/10.1080/09627259508552710 https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/11417/2879 https://doi.org/10.1002/0470013192.bsa514 journal of asean studies 145 vigilante groups on facebook. aseas – austrian journal of south-east asian studies, 9(2), 215-234. https://doi.org/10.14764/10.aseas-2016.2-3 sinpeng, a. (2013). state repression in cyberspace: the case of thailand. asian politics & policy, 5(3), 421-440. https://doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12036 sombatpoonsiri, j. 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http://verafiles.org/articles/vera-files-yearender-who-benefited-most-fake-news-and-other http://verafiles.org/articles/vera-files-yearender-who-benefited-most-fake-news-and-other journal of asean studies, vol. 1, no. 2 (2013), pp. 164–175 ©2013 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic enhancing people-to-people cooperation between asean and east asia countries through counterparts: the case of indonesian student in taiwan paramitaningrum tamkang university, taiwan abstract besides businessmen and workers, indonesian students have become one of the recent important actors in indonesia taiwan bilateral relations. currently, taiwan became one of the popular destinations among indonesians to pursue their highest degree. in 2013, the numbers of indonesian students has reached 3000 persons, made them the third largest group of southeast asian students in taiwan after vietnamese and malaysians. the indonesian students are quite organized and active. giving the lack of diplomatic relations between both countries, these students are potential to be one of the significant actors to bridge indonesia taiwan relations. however, they have some limitations on conducting their activities. on the taiwan side, this trend has not gained sufficient responds. indonesia is still considered an unattractive object to study, comparing to other southeast asian countries. therefore interaction tends to be one side only. this paper would discuss on (1) what the indonesian students in taiwan can do to maximize their capabilities to attract taiwanese to learn more about indonesia; (2) how the taiwanese should respond to these trends, in order to create two ways of interaction. in that case, the counterparts are significant to bridge the limitations of mutual interaction between both states, especially to eliminate the unclear perceptions among taiwanese to indonesia, which might affect indonesia – taiwan bilateral relations, and to promote indonesia in the better outlook. keywords: soft power, actor, indonesian students, people-to-people interaction, counterparts, indonesia-taiwan introduction besides businessmen and workers, students have become one of the recent important actors in enhancing cooperation between asean countries and their pacific neighbours. interaction among students and scholars from both sides is getting common. multiple channels of contacts facilitate interaction among students and scholars from both sides. the workshops on managing potential conflicts in the south china sea, and council for security cooperation in the asia pacific (cscap) are some examples of the multilateral forum which scholars from asean countries can have interaction with their asia pacific counterparts, including taiwan (ku, 1998). apart from that, several bilateral contacts between students and scholars from both regions are getting intensive. journal of asean studies 165 indonesian students have become one of the recent important actors in indonesia taiwan bilateral relations. in the past few years taiwan became one of the popular destinations among indonesians to pursue their higher degree. the numbers of indonesian students are around 3000 persons in 2013 and it made indonesians as the third largest group of southeast asian students in taiwan after vietnamese and malaysians. indonesian students are organised and active. there are several indonesian students’ organizations, which also promote indonesian culture, in taiwan. giving the lack of diplomatic relations between both countries, people-to-people interactions are the suitable way to bridge indonesia – taiwan relations. these students are likely to be one of the ‘liaison officers’ between both sides, although, they also have some limitations on conducting their activities. on the taiwan side, this trend has not gained sufficient responds. indonesia is still as an unattractive object to study, comparing to vietnam, the philippines or malaysia. very little taiwanese scholars and students learn about indonesia. therefore interaction tends to be one side only. this paper discusses on (1) what the indonesian students in taiwan can do to maximize their capabilities to attract taiwanese to learn more about indonesia; (2) how the taiwanese should respond to these trends, in order to create two ways of interaction. in that case, the counterparts from the taiwan side are significant to encourage the interaction process. therefore, it would strengthen people-topeople relations in indonesia – taiwan relations. framework of analysis actors play a significant role in international relations. traditionally, state is always seen as the most important international relations actor. however, in the past two decades, the role of non-state actors, including individual in international relations is increasingly important. however, papp (1988) argued that the role of individual in international relations is often difficult to determine because of the role that same individual may have head in an organisation, agency, or in government participating in international affairs. therefore, an individual can play role is because of its own personal capability or its affiliation in certain institutions or both of them. furthermore, papp (1988) explained that other types of private individual contacts also play definite but undocumentable roles in international affairs, such as student exchanges, foreign teaching & research, long term job-related migration or permanent settlement, and similar activities all yield personal level interactions between citizens of different countries. individual can play diverse roles in contemporary international affairs and also play major roles in transmission of culture and values. individual can also involve in policy formulation and implementation, and even in economic affairs. the indonesian students are categorised as an ‘individual actors’ of international relations, because they migrate to other countries, interact with local people and other people from different countries. they also promote indonesian culture, in the place where they stay. due to the lack of diplomatic relations between indonesia and taiwan, the interactions between both countries are focused more on non-political issues, such as economic and social-culture. these states (both indonesia and taiwan) are still the 166 enhancing people-to-people cooperation main actors but both have limitation to do its function. as a result, non-state actors also have to be involved. indonesian students, with other non-state actors, such as indonesian workers, indonesian spouses and indonesian businessmen are expected to support state actors on doing such relations. apart from economic activities, social-cultural activities are the supporting component, which facilitates people-topeople interaction. furthermore, when people-to-people interaction is implemented, the soft power is also applied. soft power is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. it arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies (nye, 2004). nye further added “when our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced". the soft power of a country depends on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority). therefore, people from a particular country promote their soft power in their interaction with people from other countries. through social and cultural activities, they introduce their own values through their culture, attitude and performance. in the level of state-to-state relations, a country will do the same like the ordinary people do, but their action is described through its foreign policy and its stance on international affairs. soft power would call of people’s attention if the ideas are unique and adjustable with to the prevailing global norms (for instance multiculturalism and pluralism). besides, the multiple channel of communication is significant to deliver the ideas. for that reason, state and non-state actors should work together. meanwhile, the interaction between states actors in international relations somehow has not been enough, due to some limitations (e.g. national priorities, lack of diplomatic relations). therefore another official mechanism to back up the interaction, who involves non-state actors, is needed. currently, such interactions which involve state and non-state actors are common. in this paper, indonesian students and their efforts on promoting indonesia can be categorised as soft power because they represent indonesia and try to make other people feel attracted and would like to get to know more about indonesia for the sake of those people’ interests. these students are categorised as the non-state actors because they are considered as nonsovereign entities that exercise significant economic, political, or social power and influence at a national, and in some cases international level.1 these students represent indonesia but they are ordinary citizen, not government officials. therefore, they are more flexible on having interaction with people across border, refers to josselin and wallace said that the non-state actors are not fully autonomous from central government funding and control, but they are participating in networks which extend across the boundaries of two or more states –thus engaging in ‘transnational’ relations (josselin and wallace, 2001). being young scholars in a foreign country, these students are also concerned about how to improve indonesia to be a better country and shared their thoughts through internal and external academic forums. there are two main frameworks through which the world of scholars intersects with the world of policy which can accommodate them. the first is “epistemic communities,” which is a network of professionals with recognised 1 “non-state actors: impact on international relations and implications for the united states,” accessed at http://www.fas.org/irp/nic/nonstate_actors_2007.pdf journal of asean studies 167 expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area. (haas, 1998). the professionals may be from a variety of discipline and backgrounds but are bound by shared normative and causal beliefs, shared notions of validating knowledge claims, and “a set of problems to which their professional competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence.” the second is “track-two dialogue” which means “unofficial policy dialogues focused on problem solving in which the participants have some form of access to official policymaking circles” (kaye, 2007). wanandi further added that track two involves the participation of government officials in a private capacity, a principle that supposedly allows for free discussion and flexibility (wanandi, 1995). acharya also explained how epistemic communities and track-two forums may impact on policy. the first is through policy innovation, or generation of new policy ideas. the second is the “constitutive localisation”, whereby local actors proactively build congruence between global norms and preexisting local ideas and practices. as part of this, they may serve as “filtering” mechanism for approaches to cooperation developed in other parts of the world so as to make them locally applicable. thirdly, epistemic communities and track-two dialogues also serve as platforms for validation and legitimization of the ideas and policies of governments. fourthly, they can generate dissent; which while not be to the liking of policymakers, alerts them to alternative ideas and approaches out there in terms of which their own preferences will be benchmarked and assessed (acharya, 2011). the epistemic community may have different opinion and stance with the policymakers, and both sides recognise it. despite of such differences, the epistemic community’ opinion will still be acknowledged publicly. a brief overview about indonesia indonesia is an emerging regional power, which has attractive physical and non-physical modalities. the republic of indonesia is the largest archipelagic state in the world, located in southeast asia. its size is 1.919.440 square kilometres. indonesia is situated in the equator between the asian and australian continents and between the pacific and indian oceans. indonesia consists of 18,000 islands with population around 251,160,124 million. 2 this made indonesia the fourth largest populated country in the world, after china, india and the usa in 2012.3 these facts made indonesia as one of the significant countries in southeast asia because its population is almost half of total asean population. indonesia is an emerging economic powerhouse in southeast asia. economic annual growth rate is about 6.23 %, little bit lower than in 2011, which reached 6.5%.4 indonesian per capita gdp has reached $ 3495 (2011). 5 it is reported that indonesia has 45 million members of the consuming class, 55 million skilled workers, and $0.5 trillion market opportunity in consumer services, agriculture and fisheries, resources, and education (mckinsey, 2012). it is also understandable because around 42.2% of indonesian population is in the 2based on the estimation of cia the world fact book (july 2013), retrieved in https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/id.html 3 http://www.indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?v=21&t=20 4 indonesia's economic growth slows, the wall street journal, february 5, 2013, accessed in http://online.wsj.com/article/sb1000142412788732444590457 8285081322220700.html 5 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.pcap.cd 168 enhancing people-to-people cooperation productive age (25-54 years).6 that means indonesia is developing its capacity to strengthen its position as an emerging power. furthermore, indonesia’ long process development to be a democratic country is remarkable. in the level of state-to-state interaction, the participation in asean, east asian summit (eas) and g-20 forum is good indicator to show that indonesia is an active player. in other words, indonesia prefers to work together, instead of being a solo player. nevertheless, not all indonesians enjoyed their countries achievements. non-state actors have not been more involved, since the opportunities are still limited. after indonesia had political turbulence in 1998, the domestic condition is changed. indonesia encountered a transition from an authoritarian to the democratic country. within a democratic order, state is still an important actor but non-state actors started to play important role in the indonesia political arena. this means people aspiration and views can be no longer being ignored. therefore indonesian foreign policy should be re-formulated also to accommodate such condition. according to sukma (2011), the confluence of democracy & moderate islam – described as assets of foreign policy and construed as key elements of soft power – has become an important element of indonesia’s foreign policy and public diplomacy since 2002. however, he also recommends these two things (democracy and moderate islam) should be better constructed to be the value to create indonesia’s image in the world. although it has not been completely perfect, indonesia is seen as a role model for building democracy and pluralism. bali democracy forum and the interfaith dialogue forum help indonesia to project its international 6 ibid posture. such abovementioned modalities and achievements made indonesia have enough capacity to raise its soft powers. those two abovementioned events were organised by indonesian ministry of foreign affairs. this institution so far is the main actor to promote indonesian soft power. since 2002, the ministry of foreign affairs had internal reform program and adjust its foreign policy machinery, in order to meet the new challenges in indonesia post-authoritarian government. after indonesia had transformation from authoritarian to democratic government, ministry of foreign affairs started to hold several events to invite nonstate actors. these are aimed to gain some valuable input for indonesian foreign policy strategy. in addition to that, indonesia has tremendous numbers of human resources to promote its soft power. the biggest number of indonesian population is in the productive age (25-54 years old). some of them live in the foreign countries, as students, foreign workers, and immigrant spouses. the number of indonesians studying abroad is between to 40.000 to 50.000 (british council 2010).7 australia, u.s, the uk and singapore were the most desirable destination for indonesians. they have several reasons to study abroad such as gaining the better education environment, increasing the horizon, the future jobs opportunities, improving foreign language skills, and train the personal maturity and independence. recently, japan, korea, malaysia and taiwan become the popular destination to study, because of those abovementioned reasons, the quality of education in such 7 http://www.britishcouncil.org/eumd-informationbackground-indonesia.htm. also see, “vice minister of national education, fasli jalal, said now the number of indonesian students abroad reached 40,000 people,” seputar indonesia, 19 january 2010, http://www.seputarindonesia.com/edisicetak/content/view/298794/1/ journal of asean studies 169 countries, and the geographical location. in addition to that, those countries also provide scholarships for international students. this is also another triggering factor to attract indonesians study to study there. indonesian students in taiwan taiwan is an interesting case study. since there is no diplomatic relations with indonesia, the relation between both sides is focused more on non-political issues. trade is the main activities, followed by cooperation in the field of economy, agricultural, health and education. besides indonesian businessmen and workers, indonesian students also become one of the recent important actors in indonesia – taiwan bilateral relations. as it is seen in the table 1, the numbers of indonesian students are increasing in the past few years. the table shows that until 2012, indonesians are the third largest group of foreigners studying in taiwan after vietnamese and malaysians. the indonesian students in taiwan are consisted of the students of mandarin language programs and non-language programs or degree seeking programmes (undergraduate and graduate level). the non-language program students are mostly majoring in engineering, technology and businesses management. recently, studying in taiwan becomes much more popular, since taiwan government offered several kinds of scholarships for international students since 2004.8 in 8 five government agencies (ministry of education (moe), ministry of foreign affairs (mofa), ministry of economic affairs (moea), national science council of the executive yuan (nsc) and icdf (international cooperation and development fund) ---have jointly established the scholarship program of taiwan to encourage outstanding international students to undertake degree programs in taiwan. see addition to that, taiwan government has bilateral memorandum of understanding (mou) with the government of aceh province, to give scholarships for a number of indonesian students from aceh to study postgraduate in taiwan. meanwhile, several universities in taiwan also proactively recruit students from several universities in indonesia. as a result, several indonesian universities now also have several kinds of cooperation with universities in taiwan, such as offering double degree and sandwich programme.9 in addition to that taiwan higher education fair is annually held in several big cities in indonesia. in 2011, taiwan education center (tec) is established in surabaya, east java.10 recently, indonesian ministry of education also provided many kinds scholarships for indonesian teaching staffs to pursue their higher academic degree abroad and some of them also choose taiwan.11 here, interactions between both countries are increasing to enhance cooperation on education sector. http://english.moe.gov.tw/ct.asp?xitem=6798&ctnode=1063 2&mp=1 9 national taiwan university of science and technology (ntust) and national pingtung university of science and technology (npust) are one of taiwan universities have double degree program with university of brawijaya in malang and institute of technology sepuluh november (its) in surabaya. both brawijaya and its are located in east java, indonesia. 10 tec is a non-profit organisation, funded by taiwan ministry of education and aimed to promote higher education in taiwan and strengthen bilateral academic exchange between taiwan and indonesia. tec official website “about tec” retrieved in february 14th 2014 from http://portal.tecindonesia.com/?page_id=13&lang=en. 11 this scholarship program is managed under program beasiswa dikti or the directorate of higher education’ scholarship program 170 enhancing people-to-people cooperation besides scholarships offers, there some other factors influence indonesian to choose taiwan to be their study destination: (1) taiwan is only a short distance from indonesia; (2) taiwan expertise on science and technology also can meet indonesians lack of competence; (3) taiwan also becomes a favourite place for indonesians who wants to improve their mandarin language skills. those factors, categorised as ‘push and pull’ factors by mazzarol and soutar (2002), attracted indonesian students and increased the number of them in taiwan. indonesian students organisations in taiwan there are three indonesian students’ organizations: perpita, formmit, and ppi-taiwan. perpita (台灣印尼僑生聯誼會 ) is an abbreviation from persatuan pelajar indonesia di taiwan. it was established in 1960 in national cheng kung university (ncku) with 35 members. this organization aimed to help indonesian students to gain and exchange information about studying and living in taiwan and to facilitate indonesian students to get together. the establishment of perpita also obtained support from 僑委 會 or organization of overseas compatriot affairs commission (ocac) and 印尼歸僑 協會 (indonesian overseas chinese association). until the year 2001, the memberships of perpita reached to 800 students. formmit (forum mahasiswa muslim indonesia di taiwan) or indonesian moslem student forum in taiwan (台灣印尼學生穆 斯林論壇) is established in 2006 in taichung. it is aimed to maintain relationships between indonesian muslim students in taiwan and to become a forum of gaining and exchanging skills and experiences among indonesian moslem students. the number of formmit members roughly is 130 students, spread out from northern to the southern of taiwan. table 1 number of asean student in taiwan year country 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 brunei darussalam cambodia 24 14 6 8 indonesia 2281 2275 2274 2472 2723 3200 laos malaysia 1001 1560 1961 2286 myanmar/bu rma 47 33 17 17 philippines 302 313 292 336 singapore 67 103 99 102 thailand 549 637 760 848 vietnam 1779 2592 3282 3687 sources: from various sources journal of asean studies 171 formmit has regular and special activities. regular activities are mostly concentrated to the religious activities, such as reciting al qur’an together and listening to religious lecture by a cleric. but forrmit members also has special programmes, such as teaching some skills such as computer and basic accounting, conducting workshop on entrepreneurships for indonesian workers, and having a regular scientific discussion about the current issues with indonesian and taiwanese experts. formmit also have an annual special activity, the annual indonesian scholars conference in taiwan (aisct). it had been held three times, and had various topics from economic, agriculture and information and communication technology. aisct was attended by indonesian scholars from indonesia, singapore, japan and the indonesian students in taiwan. ppi taiwan (perhimpunan pelajar indonesia di taiwan 台灣印尼學生聯合會) or indonesian student association in taiwan is established in the 2nd of may 2010, in the commemoration of indonesian national education day, in chung yuan christian university, chungli. this organization is also aimed to gather indonesian students in taiwan and to play some role on developing indonesian human resources by encouraging indonesian students to study and to learn some skills, to develop their personal capacity. ppi taiwan mostly cooperates with other ppi in the university levels, when these organizations conducted some activities.12 there are some examples of 12 several universities in taiwan, which has around 15-300 students, such as national taiwan university of science and technology (ntust), national cheng chi university (nccu), national cheng-kung university (ncku), national central university (ncu), national dong hwa university (ndhu), national pingtung university of science and technology (npust), chung yuan christian university (cycu), chinese culture university (ccu), asia university, established indonesian student association in these partnerships such as giving some support to several ppi in the university level, which held indonesian cultural events, or academic conferences, and they work together on making a serial ‘lentera ide’, about the life of indonesian students or non-students in taiwan. ppi taiwan also has some other related student activities.13 one of their latest and current activities is to cooperate with indonesian economic and trade office in taipei, to run taiwan branch of indonesia open university (universitas terbuka – taiwan or uttaiwan). this university was opened in 2011 in taipei. currently, universitas terbuka taiwan has about 100 students, who are mostly indonesian workers in taiwan, tutored by indonesian students, who are pursuing their graduate studies in taiwan. previously, universitas terbuka already had opened its branches in saudi arabia, singapore, malaysia, hong kong and south korea. in april 2012, the first taiwan – indonesia higher education summit was held in taipei. this is the second high level meeting between indonesia and taiwan to discuss about education. the first one was held in bali in 2011, while indonesia and taiwan signed an agreement of cooperation in the field of higher education. under this umbrella agreement, the cooperation between both countries are enhanced in several items, such as scholarships programme, academic matters (double degree, credit transfers, bridging programmes for indonesians, who will attend phd programme in taiwan) and research collaboration. the last taiwan – indonesia higher education summit in bali their school. these organisations are affiliated with ppi taiwan. 13 one of the example is helping and coordinating indonesian students to buy flight ticket to go back to indonesia, 172 enhancing people-to-people cooperation in 2013 concluded that both sides agree to establish networks.14 all those abovementioned examples show that indonesian students are quite active. besides studying, the indonesian students’ activities also prove that they made positive contribution to their fellow indonesians. these students are concerned on how to make use of their knowledge and living experience in taiwan and how those things can be applicable in indonesia. during their interaction with the taiwanese people, they promote indonesian multiethnic culture, indonesian language, attitudes and values. as a result, the taiwanese are better informed that indonesia is not only big in term of size but also its population. they know that indonesia has many more islands instead of bali, and many ethnic groups. therefore, indonesian culture is very rich, in terms of arts, food, outfit, and customs. some indonesian students teach indonesian language (bahasa indonesia), formally or informally, to their friends or their professors. they wear batik and other indonesian traditional outfits in several occasions. gradually, these students promote indonesian language and culture to the taiwanese society. despite of their good achievements on promoting indonesia, these indonesian students have limitations. the first is time constraint. as a student, they have to prioritise studying and other related works. as a result they only have limited time to do some other things. secondly is status constraint. most of indonesian students are scholarship recipients. therefore, they are 14第2屆臺灣印尼高等教育論壇與臺灣高等教育展成果豐碩 (the 2nd taiwan and indonesia higher education summit and the taiwan higher education are fruitful). retrieved in http://www.edu.tw/pages/detail.aspx?node=1088&page=214 04&wid=409cab38-69fe-4a61-ad3a-5d32a88deb5d&index=1 not supposed to do other works which are not related to their study. if they want to do other work, they should meet some requirements, such as providing a proof that they are currently not taiwan scholarships recipients and having a work permit for foreign students. based on such limitations, these indonesian students are not able to allocate their time and commitment professionally to promote indonesian culture within their environments. at the same time, indonesian economic and trade office in taipei (ieto) or kantor dagang and ekonomi indonesia di taipei (kdei – taipei), also have limitations to promote indonesia. ieto/kdei, which also becomes an indonesian representative office in taiwan, does not have a special official, who is fully responsible for information and cultural affairs. therefore they also could not do their function completely. from the government side, indonesia has not been able to raise its high profile in taiwan on cultural affairs. on the taiwan side, this recent development on indonesian students has not gained sufficient responds. indonesia has being seen as an unattractive object to study, comparing to vietnam, philippines or malaysia. there are still small numbers of research about indonesia done by taiwanese scholars, and only few taiwanese scholars understand indonesia and its complexities. in taiwan, there are only two universities has a graduate school of southeast asian studies , but they do limited study on indonesia.15 in other words, indonesia is still a marginalised study object among students and scholars in taiwan universities. 15 there are two taiwan universities which has a graduate school of southeast asian studies: national chi nan university (a state university) and tamkang university (a private university). in tamkang university, southeast asian studies is a sub-division of the institute of asian studies. journal of asean studies 173 in general, there is still lack of comprehensive information about indonesia among taiwanese, as it is explained by the head of taipei economic and trade office (teto), ambassador andrew hsia.16 he explained that only a few taiwanese knows that indonesia now is a democratic country with good political and social stability. but most of them still tend to think that indonesia as a part of bali island and/or as a migrant workers exporting country. this kind of perception and their partial understanding made indonesia a less important country, in taiwan, compared to other southeast asian countries. furthermore, taiwan government is still lack of approach on how to engage indonesian students, in the professional way, such as how to make use of these students availability in taiwan and how to accommodate their skills, knowledge and expertise to enrich taiwanese understanding about indonesia. indonesian students, like other international students are still viewed only as a scholarship recipient although some of them have been working as a professional in their field. if taiwan government is aware of the potency of indonesian students, their presence can be a bridge between taiwan and indonesia relations. language barrier probably becomes the main obstacles for the indonesian students to mingle with the locals. most of them have limited skills on chinese language, except the ones, who study chinese language. at the same time, most taiwanese people still have strong tendency to think that all foreigners should have ability to speak and read chinese, when they are in taiwan. given the fact that 16 “taiwan and indonesia to enhance economic relations”, the president post, march, 02, 2013. retrieved april 2, 2013 from http://www.thepresidentpost.com/2012/03/02/taiwanand-indonesia-to-enhance-economic-relations/. indonesian workers are much more fluent in speaking chinese and even taiwanese, this problem may affect the indonesian students’ daily interaction with the local taiwanese people. as a result, this barrier may affect the students’ efforts to promote indonesian culture and to have access to the local community to do such things. some initiatives to promote people-topeople interaction however, there are some breakthroughs by some taiwanese academicians in order to manage such abovementioned obstacles. firstly, there are two annual conferences which have a special panel on indonesian development. first panel is held in the annual conference of taiwan association of southeast asian studies (taseas) at the each of 2012 and 2013. the panel, initiated by prof. ching-lung tsay from institute of asian studies, tamkang university, discusses about indonesian development. second panel about indonesia is held in international conference on asia pacific studies (icaps) in national sun yat sen university at the each of 2012 and 2013.17 several indonesian young scholars were invited to join those panels, which are aimed to promote indonesia as one of appealing object to study and to build collaboration between taiwanese and indonesian scholars. secondly, since september 2013, institute of asian studies, tamkang university offers a course, “the rise of indonesian economy and its implications for taiwan and japan.” the main idea of this course is to the study the master plan percepatan, perluasan, dan pembangunan 17 for information about international conference on asia pacific studies, 2012 and 2013, in national sun yat sen university, kaohsiung, taiwan, can be seen in http://icaps.nsysu.edu.tw/files/11-1122-7648.php 174 enhancing people-to-people cooperation ekonomi indonesia or mp3ei (the master plan for the acceleration and expansion of economic development of indonesia) and the rise of indonesian economy and how these phenomenon implies taiwan and japan. initiated by prof. ching-lung tsay (institute of asian studies, tamkang university), this is the first formal intellectual forum in taiwan for expert lecturing, class discussions and professional interactions among taiwanese and indonesian specialists on specific issues of indonesian economic development. taiwanese and indonesian students took this course. they are taught by prof ching-lung tsay and other taiwanese senior and junior scholars, and some indonesian experts. the two panels in taseas and this course are under the program collaboration between indonesia and taiwan (the cinta program). this initiative is also aimed to promote mutual interaction among scholars and professionals from taiwan and indonesia. those above-mentioned case studies showed that each side works step by step to use soft power to establish epistemic community for indonesian studies. however, it will be much better if such activities done by indonesian and taiwanese scholars received proportional attention from the taiwan side. establishing a so-called a counterpart from the taiwan side, to accommodate will be a good step. this counterpart can be in the form of forum or association, who works on indonesian issues. any taiwanese, either they are students, academician, businessmen, artists, or ordinary people, which have any interests about indonesia and indonesia – taiwan relations, can join this forum or association. they can share their knowledge and experience each other. this forum or association would be the bridge between indonesia and taiwan and support indonesian – taiwan relations. refers to the previous explanation about epistemic community and second track diplomacy, this ‘counterpart forum or association’ can support the current activities of 2nd track dialogue and epistemic community between indonesian and taiwan, if any. since epistemic community and 2nd track dialogue usually has privileges to the government access, the ‘counterpart forum or association’ can be invited to be involved in the decision making policy. it is expected that their contribution can improve indonesia – taiwan bilateral relations. conclusion giving the lack of diplomatic relations between indonesia and taiwan, both countries should be creative to minimize this gap. people-to-people interaction is the suitable way to bridge indonesia – taiwan relations. in this case, the state actors on both sides have some limitations to do the function as normal bilateral relations always work. therefore, state actors should give significant support to people-to-people interaction and facilitate them. indonesia should assign an official who is fully in charge on culture and education affairs in ieto/kdei, to help indonesian students and scholars efforts to have interaction with their taiwanese counterparts, and to establish an epistemic community between both countries. taiwan government is strongly suggested to do similar one. furthermore, indonesian students are potential to bridge indonesia taiwan relations. although their number is much smaller than indonesian workers18, they are potential to help raising indonesian soft power. education became a media to share 18 the number of indonesian workers in taiwan reached 205.213 (2013). these workers mostly work as a caregivers and fishermen. it made indonesia as the biggest southeast asian migrant sending country in taiwan (44% among total number of southeast asian migrant workers in taiwan). journal of asean studies 175 and exchange their knowledge, skills and experience with the taiwanese local people in their school and place to stay, and to mingle with them. although, it has not gained enough response from taiwanese society, indonesian students send a message to taiwanese society about their positive achievements and help taiwanese society to understand more about indonesia and the diversity of southeast asia. these interactions rely on the students’ selfpotential and it creates an opportunity to expand the networking among them. these are useful for the students will be the professionals in their own fields and become the future leaders of indonesia. this kind of interaction is less politically constrained then it should be more enhanced. in sum, indonesia and taiwan still needs to work hard to maximise their bilateral interaction. the good strategy and collaboration between state and non-state actors in both sides still needs to be improved. here the ‘counterpart forum or association’ is significant to bridge the limitations of bilateral interaction between both states, especially to eliminate the unclear perceptions among taiwanese to indonesia, which might affect indonesia – taiwan bilateral relations, and to promote indonesia in the better outlook. about the author paramitaningrum is a phd candidate at the graduate institute of european studies, tamkang university, tamsui, taiwan. she is one of the recipients of the taiwan scholarships from taiwan ministry of education in 2008. she can be contacted at paramita.sp@gmail.com. references acharya, a. (2011). engagement or entrapment? scholarship and policymaking on asian regionalism. international studies review, 13: 12-17 cia the world fact book (july 2013). retrieved in february 11, 2014 from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/th e-world-factbook/geos/id.html haas, p.(1992). epistemic communities and international policy coordination, international organization, 46: 3 josselin, d & wallace, w. (eds.). (2001). non-state in world politics, hampshire: palgrave. p.3-4 ku, samuel c.y. (1998). taiwan’s diplomatic maneuvers in the asia pacific: a perspective of complex interdependence, issues and studies 34 (6) 80-97 mazzarol, tim & geoffrey n. soutar. (2002). “push-pull” factors international student destination choice, the international journal of educational management, 16 (2): 8290 joseph s. nye, jr. (2004). soft power: the means to success in world politics, new york: public affairs. kaye, dalia dassa. (2007). talking to the enemy: track two diplomacy in the middle east and south asia. arlington. va: rand corporation. papp, daniel s. (1988). contemporary international relations: framework for understanding, 2nd edition. london: macmillan publishing company. p. 93-95 sukma, rizal. (2011). soft power and public diplomacy: the case of indonesia. in jan melissen and sook jong lee (eds), public diplomacy and soft power in east asia, new york: palgrave-macmillan. wanandi, jusuf. (1995). the regional role of “track two” diplomacy: asean, arf, and cscap, japan review of international affairs, 9: 155-168 “non-state actors: impact on international relations and implications for 176 enhancing people-to-people cooperation the united states,” accessed at http://www.fas.org/irp/nic/nonstate_actors_ 2007.pdf cia the world fact book (july 2013), retrieved in https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/th e-world-factbook/geos/id.html indonesia's economic growth slows, the wall street journal, february 5, 2013, accessed in http://online.wsj.com/article/sb10001424127 887324445904578285081322220700.html “the archipelago economy: unleashing indonesia’s potential,” september 2012, retrieved in october 1st, 2012 in http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/asiapacific/the_archipelago_economy http://portal.tecindonesia.com/?page_id =13&lang=en in february 14th 2014. 2013印尼臺灣高等教育展圓滿落幕 (2013 indonesia and taiwan higher education fair was over succesfully). retrieved november, 27, 2013 from http://www.oia.ntust.edu.tw/files/14-101738060,r553-1.php 第2屆臺灣印尼高等教育論壇與臺灣高等 教育展成果豐碩 (the 2nd taiwan and indonesia higher education summit and the taiwan higher education are fruitful). retrieved november 27, 2013 from http://www.edu.tw/pages/detail.aspx?node =1088&page=21404&wid=409cab38-69fe4a61-ad3a-5d32a88deb5d&index=1 “taiwan and indonesia to enhance economic relations”, the president post, march, 02, 2013. retrieved april 2, 2013 from http://www.thepresidentpost.com/2012/03/0 2/taiwan-and-indonesia-to-enhanceeconomic-relations/. http://formmit.org/main-menu/aboutformmit.html http://www.indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?v =21&t=20 http://perpita.freeinterchange.org/zh_tw /about1-02.htm http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gd p.pcap.cd 60 state and industrial policy journal of asean studies, vol. 1, no. 1 (2013), pp. 55–82 © 2013 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic state and industrial policy: comparative political economic analysis of automotive industrial policies in malaysia and thailand wan-ping tai cheng shiu university, taiwan samuel c. y. ku national sun yat-sen university, taiwan abstract numerous differences exist between the neoclassical and national development schools of economics on how an economy should develop. for example, should the state interfere in the market using state resources, and cultivate certain industries to achieve specific developmental goals? although the automotive industries in both thailand and malaysia developed in the 1970s with considerable government involvement, they have evolved along very different lines. can these differences be traced to different interactions between the state and industry in these two countries? this paper examines this issue and finds that although industries in developing countries need government assistance, the specific political and economic contexts of each country affect the policies adopted and their effectiveness. the choice between “autonomous development” (malaysia) and “dependent development” (thailand) is the first issue. the second issue is that politics in malaysia has deterred the automotive industry from adopting a “market following” position. this paper finds that the choice of strategy and political interference are the two main reasons the automotive industry in malaysia is less competitive than that in thailand. keywords: automotive industry, developmental state, malaysia automotive industry, thai automotive industry, proton, political economic analysis introduction in the wake of the 2008 economic crash, whether the u.s. government should financially support the domestic automotive industry has become a matter of debate. the automotive industry has been one of the three main industries in the u.s. for the past hundred years, and is involved in other sectors and industries as diverse as iron, oil, manufacturing, sales, the stock market, credit, and insurance. because of the huge knock-on effects that a collapse of this industry might have on the wider economy, the possibility of government intervention in the u.s. automotive industry remains an option (yun-han chu, 2008: 20). 56 state and industrial policy this debate has touched on issues related to developmental economics such as, when a new industry is launched or faces crises, should the state intervene and help the industry, or should they follow the selective policy to help only certain firms? in what type of situation should governments intervene? will state resources devoted to the industry be used efficiently to reach the development goal? these topics have been the focus of debates that have never reached a consensus. most scholars of developmental economics feel that because of lacking market mechanisms and limited resources in developing nations, policy intervention in industry is necessary to accelerate industrialization. however, although industries in developing countries need state intervention, not all such interventions yield expected results. could such supported industries survive when the government withdraws its protection? what are the costs and benefits for the government under these policy interventions? how can international pressure to remove such protection be handled? to protect vested interests, manufacturers might use non-financial resources to raise barriers to entry, thus weakening their own market competitiveness, which lead to poor results in the long term. all of these issues are important for studies of economic policies adopted in developing countries (wan-wen chu, 2001: 67). differing from the diverse studies of east asian countries such as taiwan, japan, and south korea, on official organization and industry development, relevant issues between the state and industrial policies in southeast asian countries are seldom focused. this study discusses the policies for the automotive industry in malaysia and thailand because both of these developing countries have been eager to upgrade their domestic industrial base by developing the car sector (rasiah, 1999). however, despite sharing a number of similarities in their developmental backgrounds and with governmental organizations taking a leading role in the industry, they have also diverged and chosen relatively different paths to further development. malaysia has adopted its automotive industry as a national industry, with an “independent development” strategy applied to establish a national brand, whereas thailand has chosen to cooperate with international car manufacturers and adopted the “dependent development” strategy, which has made its domestic automotive industry part of the worldwide supply chain. the results of these two strategies show that the “independent development” of malaysia has yielded fewer benefits (fuangkajonsak, 2006: 1-3). examining the development of the automotive industry with the development of politics and economics in countries can obtain a clearer picture of the relationship between the state and industrial development. this article does not focus on the theoretical study of specific issues related to developing countries, but analyzes how different historical systems result in different strategic choices and developmental effects by integrating international and domestic political and economic factors ( abbott, 2003). although industrial development in developing countries relies on government intervention, the economic and political background of each country affects their selection of specific strategies: namely, the strategic choice between the “independent development” of malaysia and the “dependent development” of thailand; then the “politicality” of the automotive industry in malaysia intervened with the “follow-the-market” policy. the results of “strategic selection” and “political intervention” are the two main reasons this article concludes that the development of journal of asean studies 57 the automotive industry in malaysia has been inferior to that in thailand. theoretical study: the state, industrial development, and automotive industry policies. the state and industrial development scholars typically discuss the developmental patterns of a national industry from two perspectives. under a good economic environment, scholars following neo-classical economics believe that industry grows spontaneously with a comparative advantage. in their view, competition should be free and open at the start of an industry to allow private investors to allot resources based on economic rationality because this is best able to raise competitiveness (balassa, 1988: 27-57; bhagwati, 1988: 27-57). scholars of liberalism accept this view (kruegert, 1993). the east asian miracle: economic growth and public policy, published in 1993 by the world bank, is a typical work from this school (stiglitz and shahid, 1994). its main conclusion was that giving up market price control is essential when hoping to develop industrial competitiveness in transforming agriculture in developing countries. however, scholars from the school of development economics have raised numerous doubts of the neoclassical approach (fishlow, 1994; lindauder, 1994: 12). some make a case for the so-called “dependency theory,” which proposes that international factors, particularly the political and economic power from hegemonic countries, such as the united states, play an active economic role in developing countries. this type of development is known as “invited development.” other scholars state that economic progress is not mainly caused by “market” and “internationality.” they do not believe that economic development in developing countries, particularly east asian countries, should ascribe to governments remaining neutral, and they also criticize the world bank report for neglecting the importance of the state in industrial development. these scholars offer an extremely different explanation from neoclassical economics (jomo, 1994): 461-508). for example, johnson introduced a concept of “developing-type country” for japanese industrial research in 1982, which stated that industrialization in the so-called new nations is related to the great promotion of economic development by the state (johnson, 1982; shumpei kumon and henry rosovsky, 1972: 109-141). taking south korea as an example, hasan claimed that its successful economy was based on government intervention. hasan also stated, “the economy in south korea relies on the operation of private enterprises that are in fact directed by the central government. the state not only establishes policies and rules, but also dominates the economy by controlling market mechanisms, and thus has a critical impact on all entrepreneurial decisions (hasan, 1976). those scholars who support “developmental state theory” think that industrial development in developing countries relies on intervention and protection from the state. this authorizes the government to control the production, allotment, and price of goods to reach the best arrangement of resources (kuckiki, 2007: 3-6). they believe that despite liberalism aiding industrialization, the lack of a market mechanism might lead to an environment that increases the risk to industry and adversely influence production. with insufficient private investment and limited resources, selective government intervention becomes necessary for rapid industrialization (wanwen chu, 1997: 99-100). these ideas highlight the following two phenomena for 58 state and industrial policy the relationship between the state and industrial policies: 1. the state provides necessary production factors: to facilitate economic development, the government commands the financial system to finance industries for upgrading or expansion. these funds are typically preferential loans with interest rates that are substantially lower than the market rate, and are helpful for industrial growth. 2. the state launches policy intervention to protect industries: at the initial stages of development, industries are typically unable to compete with foreign firms; therefore, to encourage industrial development and expand export trade, the state provides support with preferential tax policies and work to limit competition (freeman, 1982: 90-112). industrial policy and automotive industry policy automotive industry has been an important issue for scholars involved in research on “the state” and “industrial policy” in developing countries (jenkins, 1987; jenkins, 1995: 625-645; doner, 1991). many developing countries, such as brazil, mexico, south korea, and previously taiwan, have attempted to make the automotive industry the motivator of industrialization. however, for some countries (such as taiwan), such intervention has proved unsuccessful in the car industry and needs further research (jenkins, 1995: 642). the application of automotive industry technology often expands to other industries, thus contributing greatly to the national economy by promoting technological abilities, increasing employment opportunities, and revenue (dicken, 1998: 316; humphrey, 2000: 245-271). the automotive industry belongs to a high value-added industry, which is also a capital-intensive and technology-intensive industry. the production process involves upstream industries such as steel, electronics, and plastic industries, and has great influence on downstream industries such as marketing, service, maintenance, insurance, and finance industries (konosuke, 1993). therefore, based on the goal of industrial development and political and economic backgrounds, many countries employ various policies, such as “limited local content rate,” “energy consumption standards,” “limited auto import tax,” “limited import quantity,” “import quotas,” and “import substituting industrialization strategy,” to fulfill the purpose of policy intervention in the auto industry rasiah, 1997). scholars normally divide automotive industry development into four stages: 1. importing completely built up vehicles (hereafter referred to as cbu) 2. semi-knocked down (skd) and completely knocked-down (hereafter referred to as ckd) 3. full assembly 4. manufacturing national intervention has three goals in these stages (fitzgerald eds, 1995): first, to establish the industrial scale. the state normally assists local enterprises to establish an industrial supply chain to promote local production of key components through an “import substitution” policy. second, to help the automotive industry transform through the “assembly,” “semi-assembly,” “fully assembled,” to “manufacturing” stages, which requires that the rate of locally made parts must reach certain percentages. third, the state becomes the driver of industrial journal of asean studies 59 internationalization. when the local automotive industry has the capacity to manufacture a whole car, the state can help them export products to other countries through consolidation, production control, and a unified development model. the final goal is for local firms to be able to set up production plants in other countries and form transnational automotive groups. during the transformation process from “assembly” to “manufacturing,” the state normally has two choices, “dependency development” and “independent development”. first, the dependency development mode is a way to increase industrial competitiveness that relies on foreign technology and fund of funds. therefore, it is necessary to open domestic markets to attract foreign investment-led industrial development. this typically means that after transnational automotive corporations (tncs) obtain a license, they set up local assembly plants and help domestic enterprises establish an industrial scale of component manufacturing. for example, local firms in mexico, brazil, and spain were all aided by multinational corporations and thus able to develop highly efficient supply chains to then build an internationalized automotive industry with some areas of comparative advantage (such as market, location, and labor force). second, the independent development mode is a policy that can raise competitiveness of the local automotive industry by relying on the development of a monopolistic market, with the supply chain formed by local investors and enterprises. for example, south korea relied on its own strength to develop an automotive industry, gradually building up r&d capabilities and a local brand.1 1 taking south korea as an example, the automotive industry promotion law was passed in 1962. auto imports were prohibited and large-scale enterprises were chosen as the main participants of the automotive industry. south korea thus became the these two approaches have both advantages and disadvantages (see table 1). based on this discussion, this research makes the following analysis: because of the lack of market mechanisms and limited resources, to accelerate industrialization, developing countries rely on state intervention as a protection measure; therefore, selective intervention is necessary. furthermore, the automotive industry plays a major role in promoting industrialization in developing countries. national intervention has the following three targets: first, to establish the foundation of the industry; second, transform the industry from “component assembly” to “manufacturing;” third, the state becomes the driver of industrial internationalization. moreover, industrial interventions do not necessarily reach the goal of nurturing the automotive industry. considering whether the industry could be self-reliant after receiving protection, and if the benefits outweigh the social costs produced in the protectionist period, is necessary in addition, how will a protected industry eventually adapt to a more open international market? world’s key auto production base and the fourth largest auto production country in a short period. 60 state and industrial policy journal of asean studies, vol. 1, no. 1 (2013), pp. 55–82 © 2013 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic table 1: analysis of different automotive industry development approaches approach advantages disadvantages dependency development  smaller financial burden on the government  less pressure on the open market  the automotive industry is dominated by foreign capital  more difficult to develop the economic scale of mass production  cannot bring about the growth of related industries independent development  protection brings mass production  more likely to support the growth of related industries  can use the home country’s resources  greater financial burden on the government  over-protection cannot respond to pressure from trade liberalization source: organized and rewritten by the author, based on rashid, 2006. establishment of malaysia’s automotive industry establishment of the automotive industry malaysia’s automotive industry was established in 1963. under the colombo plan, the malaysian government formulated a localized production policy for the automotive industry. in 1964, the malaysian government set out a policy of promoting vehicle assembly and localized component production, and thus prohibited the import of completely built vehicles and implemented localized production. the ministry of trade and industry founded the motor vehicle assemblers committee (mvac), responsible for reviews of related investment. consequently, companies engaged in the import of cbu had to manage complex import processes and pay high import taxes, and thus the import of assembly cars grew very rapidly (torii, 1991). certain restrictions were employed, such as an import duty on cbu or control of the auto dealer by license renewal twice a year. in 1967, the malaysian government approved the establishment of six auto assembly plants. in the same year, it passed the investment incentive act to encourage more assembly cars to use locally made auto parts. at this early stage, assembly plants were established by joint ventures between european manufacturers and local enterprises, and the assembled vehicles were mainly european and japanese cars, with the latter coming to dominate the malaysian car-assembly market in the 1970s. although malaysia hoped to promote the growth of the local component production industry by increasing the level of local manufacturing, because of numerous assembly manufacturers and different vehicles needing various components, it was impossible to conduct mass production, and thus the products produced did not have any price advantage. to elevate the quality of locally made components, the malaysian government proposed the mandatory deletion program in 1979, to weed out unqualified manufacturers, simplify production, and journal of asean studies 61 increase industrial competitiveness. however, the japanese-based group of foreign car manufacturers and chinesemalaysian investors still controlled automotive assembly, component production, and marketing. therefore, the malaysian government began to consider transforming its assembly-oriented industry into a car manufacturing one. homemade vehicle plans and internationalization of the automotive industry the transformation of malaysia’s automotive industry began in 1982, when prime minister mahathir announced the homemade vehicle production plan, which was controlled by the heavy industries corporation of malaysia berhad (hicom), the group responsible for implementing the country's national heavy industries plan and industrial master plan project (imp). these actions were taken in hopes of leading the automotive industry into the self-development mode. to reach this goal, hicom chose to cooperate with japan's mitsubishi motors to establish proton motors (perusahaan otomotif). hicom held 70% of the shares in this company, and mitsubishi motors had the remaining 30%. at first, proton was only responsible for vehicle assembly, but with government support, it gradually began to take charge of design, mechanics, logistics, and marketing. in 1985, proton saga launched its own brand car, saga. in the mid-80s, malaysia underwent an economic crisis caused by the oil market collapse, existing markets re-shuffled, and proton became the leading brand in the malaysia auto market (wad, 1999). the state of malaysia and automotive industry the form of the state, its structure, and developmental strategy have an obvious connection to its interaction with civil society. in the social structure of malaysia, conflicts among ethnic groups are closely related to industrial policy (soong, 1996). in 1969, because of economic inequality, the so-called “513 race riots” broke out and became an important turning point in the economic development of malaysia.2 afterwards, the malaysian government proposed its new economic policy (nep) in 1971, developed a technocrat bureaucrat authoritarian regime, and directly intervened in economic development through the “kuota” (quota) system to reduce economic inequality between ethnic groups. the new economic policy was based on the concept of “national capitalism,” and tried to raise the proportion of the indigenous malay group” (or bumiputra), an ethnic group that participated in the economy,3 thus promoting the ethnic redistribution of wealth, and relieving conflict. the development mode of national capitalism in malaysia in this period was state-driven, with the government directly intervening in the market (soong, 1996). the state during this period primarily focused on the automotive industry and considered it the national industry of 2 malaysia's three main ethnic groups are malays, chinese, and indians, and the respective proportions are approximately 62%, 30%, and 8%. most scholars think “racial communitarianism” is the main characteristics of malaysia. see samuel c.y. ku, government and politics in southeast asia, (taipei: wunan, 1995), p.71. in the election of may, 1969, malaysia's ruling coalition suffered defeat, which caused a series of racial conflicts, claimed 196 lives, and wounded 439. the malay ruling elite believed the fundamental reason was long-term conflicts, unequal policy, mistrust, opposition, and ethnocentrism between malay and chinese. see b. t. khoo, the paradoxes of mahathirism (new york: oxford university press, 1995), pp. 52-54. 3 bumiputra originates from sanskrit, which means sons of the soil. according to the constitution of malaysia, it refers to the malay community in malaysia and the minority groups in sabah and sarawak. 62 state and industrial policy malaysia.4 malaysia’s automotive industry development started with car assembly (1963-1982), and then mahathir promoted the homemade cars plan in 1982 and encouraged the local automotive industry to work on exports. the aim of this plan was to improve the low domestic rate and alter the industrial structure, which was dominated by ethnic chinese investors. in an attempt to lead private sector investment, the state of malaysia used various strategic industrial policy tools, such as tax incentives and subsidies, preferential bank loans, market protection, government orders, and technology development to develop a strategic industrial policy (camilleri, 2000). to ensure smooth development of its domestic vehicle plan, the state of malaysia instituted a series of industrial policy interventions, including the following actions (gustafsson, 2006): 1. increased import tariffs on completely built vehicles and components; 2. implemented quotas for imported cars; 3. encouraged foreign capital to participate in domestic car programs 4. offered production subsidies to domestic auto parts manufacturers, lowered the price of components from 10% to 12%, increased tariff on imported components, and prolonged items tax relief, so that the price of homemade vehicles would be lower than that of imported cars of the same standard 5. encouraged domestic car manufacturers to export vehicles and auto parts (especial oem parts) to asean countries, and used the 4 automotive federation of malaysia (afm), “submission of afm on the industrial master plan,” in the asean motor industry in economist intelligence unit (kl: eiu, 1984), p. 1. export channels of technical cooperation plants to sell them to other asian countries. 6. offered civil service low-interest loans to purchase domestic cars. with the homemade cars plan to build up the brand proton, malaysia employed the independent development strategy in an attempt to build the industry through state protection, which was initially effective. in 1989, proton began to export vehicles to other countries. from the latter 1980s to the early 1990s, the domestic market share of proton saga models was nearly 45%. proton merged with lotus, a leading british brand, in 1997, and became the focus of the international automotive market. in addition to proton, the second domestic car, perodua, was also developed with state support in october 1992, with the aim to provide a large-scale supplier for the spare parts market. in its heyday, because of the automotive group formed by proton and perodua, the supply chain had 350 chain-related companies, with a total investment of rm 4.6 billion, employing more than three million people, and producing 6,000 auto parts, nearly rm 20 billion worth. proton has not only become the largest brand in the malaysia car market, but also the only domestically manufactured car brand in an asean country. establishment of thailand’s automotive industry contrasted to malaysia, the industrial development of thailand was led by foreign capital and the private sector, and the state did not participate as an active leader. in the case of the automotive industry, the thai government mainly cooperated with multinational corporations (mncs), offering various incentives to encourage them to build production bases in thailand. journal of asean studies 63 local enterprises produced spare parts and became peripheral industries. the development of thailand’s automotive industry is divided into four stages: first, the establishment stage (19611970), focusing on creating production capacity; second, the national regulatory period (1971-1989), focusing on strengthening production and further localization; third, and fourth: liberalization (1990-now), focusing on full liberalization and export promotion, in response to the liberalization trend of world trade. the establishment period (1960-1980): import substitution policy the automotive industry in thailand began in the 1960s, following the period in which all cars were imported. the first auto company, thai motor industry company, was established in 1961. the next year, the office of the board investment was set up and offered many preferential terms for the automotive assembly industry. industrial development can bring economic development; therefore, the state began to nurture the domestic automotive industry, hoping to cooperate with european and japanese manufacturers to establish an industrial base. in this stage, the state of thailand offered foreign investors the following preferential terms (fujita, 1998): 1. fifty percent reduction in import tariffs on completely knocked-down vehicles (ckd) for five years; 2. five-year joint venture income tax relief; 3. free remittance of foreign exchange; 4. free flow of capital and technology in thailand after implementing these preferential terms for industrial development, the numbers of car assembly plants rapidly increased. in 1967, the state of thailand established the federation of thai industries, which took charge of integrating and planning thailand's state-led industrial development. at that time, thailand lacked industrial experience and local personnel who were good at management, and thus needed help from foreign investors and firms. therefore, during the early days of the automotive industry, the state allowed multinational automotive groups to cooperate with local investors to form joint ventures. those assembly plants that were granted privileges from the state enjoyed lower tariffs for whole vehicle components. however, importing large quantities of components led to serious payment deficits in thailand. this problem became more apparent in the late 1960s, and thus in 1969, the state ceased establishing auto manufacturing companies under the advice of the parliament automotive industry development committee, reexamined the developmental direction of the industrial sector, and changed to nurturing the domestic industry by “import-substitution industrialization.” to ensure industrial autonomy, the ministry of industry (moi) announced a comprehensive reform program for the auto industry in 1971, which required that local assembly vehicles use at least 25% locally made components. the policy of economic nationalism upheld by prime minister thanom kittikchorn was the main reason for this change. thanom tried to implement national capitalism to revitalize industry, avoid economic exploitation of foreign capital, and achieve the modernization of thailand. he believed the state should lead in the development of the automotive industry through working with domestic investors and the federation of thai industries, and help local producers compete against imports through protectionist policies. to strengthen the development of local industry and reach an enhanced economic scale of production, in the 1970s, the state of 64 state and industrial policy thailand restricted the number of domestic assembly car models and further promoted localization, which aided the development of the component sector (fujita, 1998). the thai auto-parts manufacturers association (tapma) was established in 1978 and served as a mechanism for industrial integration and development of the component manufacturing industry. in the same year, the state of thailand announced the prohibition of whole vehicle import (cbu) and increased tariffs on import assembly (ckd) as the first step to protect the domestic automotive industry. under these measures, the state ceased granting production privileges and increased the required proportion of domestic production parts, gradually increasing the number of local component manufacturers. the relaxation period (1980-1989) following the second oil crisis in 1979, the prices of agricultural products in thailand fell and caused heavy economic losses. in the hope of obtaining loans from the world bank, and facing pressure from multiple forces in society and multinational corporations, civil society groups, led by the joint public private consultative committee (jppcc, established in 1981), required a change in economic policies in thailand from import substitution to export-oriented. this change had a significant influence on the development of the automotive industry (abdulsomad, 2003). in 1982, thailand froze the 1978 “ratio of origin” requirement. in addition to policy transformation, the state of thailand also hoped that the automotive industry could develop a key competitive advantage, and thus focused on pick-up trucks as the main product, and worked to position the nation as the global production center for such vehicles. to increase the use of local components, in 1984, the government announced a joint project between peugeot france and local enterprises, known as the domestic car manufacturing project (kesavatana, 1989). the plan projected that 95% of thai car components were to be locally produced. however, because this might have caused a significant loss of tariffs for imported components, several interest groups and government agencies opposed this plan, which ultimately suspended the domestic car project. after 1985, thailand's automotive industry underwent several significant changes. the “plaza accord” forced the appreciation of the yen,5 and japanese enterprises needed to move overseas to lower-cost locations, causing thailand to become the first overseas investment choice for the japanese automotive industry.6 taking this opportunity, the state of thailand offered increasing tax concessions to japanese-based multinational corporations, and created an environment that was more conducive for their investments. these industrial liberalization measures caused foreign investment (fdi) to rise. increased foreign capital maintained thailand’s economic growth rate at 9% on average, causing the rise of a middle class, which increased demand in the domestic automotive market. the rising middle class and the development of a partially liberalized automotive industry forced the 5 september 22, 1985, united states, japan, britain, france, and west germany, the five industrial countries, gathered at the plaza hotel, new york, for a secret meeting. their finance ministers and central bank presidents signed the famous “plaza accord” to undertake joint intervention in the foreign exchange market, forcing the u.s. dollar down against the japanese yen, german mark, and other major currencies in an orderly manner, to resolve the massive u.s. trade deficit, which led to significant appreciation of the japanese yen. 6thailand particularly welcomed japanese capital, mainly because japanese investment was laborintensive and could create more job opportunities. moving the major market to a foreign country (i.e. reexports) could reduce the exploitation potential by the japanese market. journal of asean studies 65 state to consider reopening the market for import cars. the export-oriented period (1990-2000) under the ruling of reformist prime minister anand punyarachun, the state of thailand gradually abolished the restrictions on the automotive industry in the 1990s by partially reopening the market for imported vehicles, and substantially lowering tariffs on imported cars and components. in 1993, the thai government announced the export promotion project of the automotive industry, and abolished restrictions on setting up auto assembly plants by foreign firms, transformed the domestic market-oriented industrial policy to an export-oriented one, and boosted exports to deal with increasing import competition. these changes led the growth rate of automotive manufacturing to become the highest in the world from 1990 to 1994, resulting in 20% annual growth of the domestic market. the thai government relaxed controls on the automotive industry because the state sensed the necessity to closely follow the trends of technological development in major producing countries, such as japan and europe, to reach its internationalization goal. in view of this, it implemented an open industry policy, and chose the development mode of cooperation with foreign investors. the thai government thus developed a series of measures including reduced tariffs, eight years of corporate income tax exemption, offsetting import taxes on machinery and equipment, material import duty rebates, and further relaxations of trade restrictions. table 2: comparison of thailand’s import tariffs on cbu and ckd (1986-2000) mode year sedan under 2300cc sedan over 2300cc one-ton pickup truck big truck 1986 1991 1992 1994 1997 1999 2000 cbu ckd cb u ck d cbu ckd cb u ck d 180 60 42 42 80 80 80 112 20 20 20 20 20 33 300 100 68.5 68.5 80 80 80 112 20 20 20 20 20 33 120 60 60 60 60 60 60 30 20 20 20 20 20 33 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 source: based on data obtained from the board of investment, thailand, and the thai embassy in japan, the period of embracing free trade (2000-now) the internationalization of thailand’s automotive industry began in the 1990s. after the financial crisis of 1988, thailand continued an active policy of opening its economy.7 to mitigate liquidity problems, it 7 the asian financial crisis of 1997 hit the thai adopted deregulation to allow foreign investors to own 100% of their thai subsidiaries. this policy could solve the overcapacity problem caused by a shrinking economy and caused great damage to the automotive industry, causing a sharp fall in the domestic and regional market demand, and thus shrinking car production by 40%. 66 state and industrial policy domestic market by increasing exports. however, it was a response to globalization and the need for greater regional economic integration. after joining the world trade organization (wto) in 2000, thailand abolished its rules of origin on vehicle and components, and allowed multinational companies to set up wholly owned enterprises. consequently, foreign investors dominated the auto assembly industry, while local firms were engaged in the supply chain related to spare parts. in addition to the wto norms, regional integration in the asean free trade area (afta) accelerated the liberalization of the thai automotive industry. the afta norms lowered import tariffs and non-tariff measures to between 0% and 5% in 2003 for old member states of the asean (brunei, indonesia, malaysia, philippines, singapore, and thailand). the automotive industry in thailand was included in the list of five main industries by the board of investment (boi) that the government used to attract more multinational manufacturers to build plants in thailand. the asean industrial cooperation scheme (aico) states that when the auto parts manufacturing industry of a country meets the standard of using parts that are 40% locally made, it can then enjoy a 0% to 5% special tariff within asean. thailand implemented a liberalization policy and its tariff reduction projects met the time frame and standards set out in this free trade agreement. therefore, since 2003, thailand has reduced tariffs on imported cars to 5% (hsu, 2002). the dependent development mode of thailand’s automotive industry led to the following results: its automotive industry ranks as the fifth largest export industry; as a car exporter, thailand ranks the first among asean countries and the third in asia after japan and south korea; and thailand made cars are sold in the united kingdom, canada, and australia. thailand also has the largest automotive assembly base in southeast asia, and has become one of the top ten auto manufacturers; it has 16 domestic car assembly plants and 1,800 component production plants; and after 2005, it has produced more pick-up trucks than any other country worldwide (zhao, 2006). thailand’s auto industry policy in view of thailand’s auto industry policy, the ministry of industry has been responsible for its control and adjustment and the secondary automotive industry association has been in charge of setting up specific industrial policies and development plans. the following chart shows the industrial policies implemented from 1962 to 2000 to nurture the thai automotive industry. table 3: thailand's auto industry policies year industrial policy 1962 implemented an automotive assembly industry-promotion system (five-year reduction in import tariff on ckd to 50%, five-year reduction of corporate tax). 1967 increased the import tariff on whole vehicles to 60%; lowered the import tariff on ckd for sedans by 30%, special trucks 20%, and trucks 10%. 1975 implemented 25% localization. 1978 prohibited auto imports, reexamined import tariff rates, and journal of asean studies 67 prohibited the establishment of car assembly plants. 1980 began domestic car parts design (achieving the goal of 50% in 1983). 1982 froze the ratio of automotive localization at 45%. 1983 proposed a new auto industry development policy, the goal of localization, with sedans at 54% in 1987, special trucks at 62% in 1988, and included the norms for new models, that imported body or engine parts and gearboxes only have one selection. 1985 allowed vehicle importation with over 2.3 l displacement, although the import tariff was 300%. 1986 small commercial vehicles must use domestic engines. 1989 implemented the use of 20% domestic engines. 1991 allowed the import of vehicles with under 2.3 l displacement, reduced import tariff rate for sedans with over 2.3 l displacement from 300% to 100%, that for under 2.3 l displacement from 180% to 60%, for bulk-type sedans from 112% to 20%, and bulk-type trucks from 30% to 20%. 1992 changed import tariffs on whole cars, with sedan under 2.4 l displacement falling from 60% to 42%, sedans with over 2.4 l displacement from 100% to 68.5%, special trucks from 120% to 60%, including value-added tax and the repeal business tax. 1993 abolished the restriction of setting up auto assembly plants, allowed vehicles less than two years old to be used as taxis. 1994 implemented preferential tariffs on whole car exports. 1997 abolished a unified price system for vehicles with under 1.6 l displacement; repealed consumption tax on vehicles for less than ten passengers and priced below 100 million baht. the value-added tax rate was increased from 7% to 10%, all import tariffs on vehicles were raised to 80%. excise tax on sedans and special trucks was raised to 5%. 1998 relaxed the restriction on auto financing payment caps, which were relaxed from 48 months to 72 months, and lowered the down payment ratio of the total selling price from 25%-30% to 10%-20%. 2000 repealed all requirements for auto parts localization. thailand chose the dependent development mode based on its attitude toward foreign capital. thailand has adopted an open-door policy since 1885, particularly under the effect of british colonial policy development, and thus the long relationship between thailand and transnational corporations has been very close. because of this, the early stage of economic development in thailand relied on dependency and economic interaction, formed in the context of having a “uk-core” and “thailand-frontier.” since 1950, the state has acted to gradually improve the position of thailand in the international economic structure. therefore, its continued cooperation with foreign investors and multinational corporations has enhanced its domestic industrialization, dependent development has become the key policy for industrialization, and the relationship and interaction between the state and 68 state and industrial policy multinational corporations has also become more important (soong, 1996). in the 1970s, during the early developmental stage of thailand’s automotive industry, high tariffs and restrictions of origin were used to protect the domestic industry, while a limited number of car models were produced to gain the economic benefits of scale. however, these protectionist measures did not lead to the rapid development of the local automotive industry, because high car prices limited domestic demand, which was not conducive to industrial development. after the 1980s, the middle-class had grown considerably in thailand, the state gradually lost its ability to lead industrial policy, and the government bureaucracy lacked effective tools to undertake this. therefore, in the developmental mode, opening and renewing cooperation with foreign investors, particularly japanese multinational corporations, became necessary (heggard, 1998). economic growth in the 1990s caused considerable domestic demand for automotive, which forced the government to open the market to car imports and relax restrictions on car models. hence, the automotive industryinvestment promotion policy in thailand attracted multinational auto manufacturers to set up plants in the country, expand the scale of the industry, and establish a regional production centre. after the financial crisis in the 1990s, the state turned its industrial policy objectives toward the international market. because joint ventures produced most of the cars and components, through the market channels and international operating experience of their international cooperation partners, thai firms acquired the ability to integrate with the international market. similar to malaysia, thailand attempted to develop a domestic car in the 1980s. however, because high import tariffs resulted in substantial revenues for the state, this plan was cancelled under the pressure of domestic tax units. the evolution of thailand's automotive industry policy has shown that the state implemented import tariffs and localization as protection measures and set up major development models, limiting car production to assist main products in reaching market size. comparison of the development of the automotive industry in malaysia and thailand sales, production efficiency, and technology malaysia also began to develop its auto industry in the 1960s; however, the different development mode adopted achieved different results to those in thailand. in the initial stages of their industries, vehicle production volume and sales in thailand were both less than those of malaysia, with the former implementing protectionist policies. however, since the adoption of an open market policy in thailand in 1990, both its production and volume not only surpassed malaysia, but also entered the international auto market. in 2000, auto exports in thailand exceeded sales in the domestic market, and since 2004, approximately one third of all vehicles produced in thailand have been for export. in contrast, the auto industry in malaysia has been substantially more limited and with far fewer exports, shown in table 4. journal of asean studies 69 table 4: comparison of auto production and sales in malaysia and thailand year thailand malaysia homem ade car production domesti c sales homema de car production domesti c sales 1985 83,105 85,222 107,030 94,999 1990 304,843 304,062 191,580 165,861 1995 525,680 571,580 288,838 285,792 2000 411,721 262,189 360,105 343,173 2003 750,512 533,176 426,646 405,745 2004 928,081 625,435 471,975 487,605 source: fuangkajonsak, 2006, p. 24. table 5: jama manufacturing capacity ratings for thailand and malaysia item thailand malaysi a engine high low engine parts high low electronic systems high standard braking system standard high interior high low source: fuangkajonsak, 2006, p. 45 table 6: price comparison of the same vehicle in malaysia and thailand model price in thailand price in malaysia remarks nissan x trail 120,909 136,030 rm units calculated on the thai baht 1:11(price in 2006) toyota camry 2.0e 105,000 149,149 honda civic 2.0e 92,727 127,465 source: organized from brand websites in both countries. at the technical level, research by the japanese automotive manufacturers association (jama), indicates that the auto industry in malaysia performs worse than thailand for industrial technology, export capabilities, product cost, manufacturing capacity, and other measures of industrial competitiveness, shown in table 5. when comparing the same models, the prices of imported cars in malaysia are more than 10% higher than in neighbouring countries, shown in table 6. in contrast, driven by the state and foreign capital, thailand has earned the reputation of being the asian detroit. compared with thailand's “dependent development,” malaysia’s “independent development” has led to a lack of industrial competitiveness. from an economic point of view, researchers believe that the competitive advantage of the automotive industry in thailand lies in the following elements: the investment of foreign capital; emphasis on technology transfer from foreign enterprises, and training local technical staff to build up the industrial development 70 state and industrial policy base; and support from the state encourages car exports.8 in contrast, the literature provides six main reasons for the decline of the malaysian auto industry: (1) increased competition in global markets, making it difficult for domestic companies to enter into direct competition with multinational corporations (mncs)9; (2) increasingly stringent new vehicle standards in the international automotive market, of which most small factories cannot afford the related r&d costs; (3) a new era of high oil prices, which has reduced page: 70 consumer demand; (4) a globalization trend, which has led to the concept of a “world car,” of which small regional firms cannot compete with such approaches; (5) improved economy in malaysia, resulting in consumer desire to buy foreign cars10; and (6) an already saturated domestic market in malaysia. although malaysia has promoted its domestic cars as an export brand, the country's limited market cannot achieve the economies of scale needed to reduce costs. the financial crisis of 1997 shrank the domestic market, and hurt the industrial environment for the development of malaysia's domestic auto industry (holland, 2001). although malaysia built up the industrial scale of its automotive industry, and the government continued its intervention and protection, it never considered the issue of industrial selfreliance. state protection caused laziness and complacency in production and 8 jing liu, “the development status and prospects of thailand's automotive industry,” auto industry research, no. 6, 2005, pp. 1-3. 9 international auto plants brought the following production modes and technologies, such as: “just in time” (jit), global logistics, better component supply relationships with upstream and downstream secondary and tertiary level plants, and outsourcing, which depends on a great market size. 10 to date, proton's production has still not reached economies of scale, and only a limited range of car models is offered. operations, and managers lacked the power to seek cost minimization, which led to low production efficiency. compared with malaysia, the thailand automotive industry courted multinational corporations, which not only brought capital, but also advanced technology and management methods. this is why a more open attitude is considered the main reason for the positive development of thailand's automotive industry. response to free trade in addition to technology and sales issues, the bigger challenge for the automotive industry in southeast asian countries comes from international pressure related to removing market protection. besides the world trade organization, the cooperation of automotive industries in asean countries, under the concept of economic cooperation, has become a key element in the region's industrial cooperation plan. asean countries thus believe that technical cooperation and trade liberalization can help auto part and vehicle production companies achieve economies of scale, and thus reduce production costs. if the automotive industry in asean countries is unable to cooperate actively to reach greater market size, it will be unable to increase its industrial competitiveness. the cooperation of regional industries can reduce the development costs of shared components, and help expand overseas markets. however, under economic cooperation, the removal of trade barriers would cause the automotive industry in asean countries to face challenges related to greater international competition, the liberalization of production and sale, and industrial repositioning and efficiency improvement. the auto industry in malaysia had enjoyed protection in many areas, and was thus adversely affected by asean’s cooperation plan, which lowered journal of asean studies 71 tariffs on vehicle imports and removed the “approved permit” of non-tariff barriers, increasing the pressures related to free trade (abdullah, 2006). to protect its automotive industry, the malaysian government has persistently entered it in the list of sectors temporarily excluded from tariffs, and thus delayed tariff reductions from 20% in 2005, to 0%-5% in 2008. the government replaced import tariffs with excise duties, which proved to be a more flexible approach to avoid much of the effects of the asean open market policy and did not consider abolishing import licensing until the end of 2010. these practices all violated the terms of the asean economic cooperation agreement specification, and have been criticized by other member states. table 7: asean countries’ tariff reduction schedule for imports of fully assembled cars country 2002 2003 2004 2005 2 006 2 007 2 008 2 009 2 010 thailand 15% 5% → → → → → → 0% philippines 20% 5% → → → → → → 0% indonesia 5% → → → → → → → 0% malaysia no reduction no reduction no reduction 15% 5% → → → 0% vietnam no reduction no reduction no reduction no reduction 20 % → 20% 5% → source: asean automotive integration: private sector perspective, reference paper in the 8th apec automotive dialogue, bali, indonesia, 15-18 may 2006. in contrast to the situation in malaysia, the asean industrial cooperation (aico) agreement offers tax incentives to automotive factories in this region, and one of the conditions for receiving this aid is that over 50% of the products must be exported (jing, 2001). thailand has the largest automotive market and production in southeast asia, and thus is the biggest potential beneficiary of this policy. based on the concept of free trade, thailand also included auto parts as the main tariff reduction item in its free trade agreements with australia, new zealand, and india. in addition to having export advantages, the thai government also announced that, since 2009, for small vehicles worth less than us$15,300, the excise tax would fall from 30% to 17%. the main purpose for this policy was to develop an eco-car model as the country's second industrial development plan, following the successful experience of the plan focused on pick-up trucks. given these preferential terms, some important international manufacturers chose thailand as their production base. thailand also allows transnational automotive groups to fully own their factories, thus reducing the problem of patent violations. the ultimate goal of thailand’s national industrial policy has been to make it the global production center for pick-up trucks and eco-cars (jian, 2008). the developmental scholar r. h. wade (2003), has noted that economic globalization has changed the global industrial environment and forced developing countries to face diverse situations. when the ability to engage in protectionism and state intervention becomes limited, the state must face trade liberalization issues by adopting different 72 state and industrial policy strategies to obtain further economic development. the threshold for a country’s automotive industry to enter the international market is rather high, and when facing the challenges of globalization, thailand has been more flexible and forward-looking, while malaysia, due to its protectionist policies and the lack of multinational strategic alliances, has lost the opportunity to enhance competitiveness. response and reflection: the political economy of the state and industrial policy the choice of industrial strategies: “independent development” and “dependence mode” for the automotive industry the preceding discussion of the different industrial development strategies adopted by thailand and malaysia shows that the state played an important role in the automotive industries of both countries, and that both economic development modes are state-led. both countries hoped to develop an automotive industry with the aid of state intervention, and both achieved rapid establishment of industrial scale, with the goal of industrial internationalization to export their production to other countries. the main difference between the industrial policies of thailand and malaysia is the specific developmental strategy adopted: the former chose the “dependence mode,” while the latter, “independent development.” while thailand’s dependence mode went through an industrial protection stage involving national intervention, the purpose of this was not to replace, but rather promote, local enterprises and investment. the state then chose to form a relationship of production and technological cooperation with transnational automotive companies. this situation is similar to what wade mentioned: transnational (automotive) groups that wish to invest in developing countries not only consider the domestic market, but also aim to incorporate the industrial base of developing countries into their global production and supply chains. the automotive industry in thailand was built on the following basis: the state’s "interactional voluntarism” was combined with international and domestic capital to form a “triple-alliance,” and this created the mechanisms needed for independent development. the developmental experience of thailand’s automotive industry demonstrates how the government of developmental states can remain independent and make the industry selfreliant after it has first been established and built up. scholars of developmental states propose that even though state intervention or protection might cause rent-seeking and laziness, a period of protectionism might benefit industrial development in the long run. when facing pressure from a more open market, and finding that national intervention and other strategies could not prevail, thailand amended its industrial strategy to one of following the market, and thus was able to continue to maintain industrial competitiveness. this approach is similar to a more recent idea in national development theory, the state-market condominium approach, which does not see the state and the market as opposed to each other. professor wan-wen chu noted that although national intervention might help, it will not necessarily promote industrial development. an examination of how different countries developed their automotive industries revealed that south korea as one of the few successful cases that undertook an independent development strategy. thus the question must be asked as to why this is so rarely successful. the answer is because the automotive industry in developing countries must rely on the local market to establish the production journal of asean studies 73 scale. however, the domestic market is limited by the country's economic development, and manufacturers must thus fight in a highly competitive and rather small market. to achieve greater success, most domestic manufacturers choose to introduce transnational capital, technology, and brands. hence, most automotive manufacturers in developing countries have cooperated with major firms from the u.s. and japan, and have become part of the global network of large, transnational automotive groups. in contrast to thailand, after the 1970s, malaysia developed a more active form of national capitalism based on the new economic policy and economic nationalism, which considered the automotive industry as a national industry, and one that should follow the mode of independent development. however, the policy of protecting a national brand, in this case proton, meant that the industry lost the opportunity to integrate with the global market. the small domestic market could not create economies of scale, the state did not change its policy from one of marketleading to following the market, and thus, the proton project gradually declined. this shows that within the global system structure, it is difficult for industries in developing countries to undertake selfreliant development. finally, research in the field of political economics shows that so-called triple alliances, the combination of international and domestic capital, and the state, can be both dynamic and transformative. the external structure (competition among transnational corporations) and the internal structure (national and local business alliances) change over time and allow the fluctuation of forces, which affects the form of such alliances. however, although there may be changes, as the studies of arrighi and drangel and gereffi (1992) have shown, it is rare to maintain their status of a consistent upward or downward structure. in the world system, 95% of countries still maintain their original structure. therefore, even though a triple alliance can be transformative, whether the automotive industry in thailand can break the structural relationship of the international political and economic system, and move toward complete self-reliance in the industrial development, remains doubtful. political nature of the industry: national political and economic structure and rentseeking comparing the economic development strategies of malaysia and thailand shows both economic and political differences. for some developing countries, state involvement in industrial policy is based on political considerations, and thus industrial policy is an important tool for implementing nationalism. as mentioned earlier, due to specific factors related to certain domestic groups, the automotive industry in malaysia was not fully established based on economic considerations, and political factors became an obstacle to its reform. during development of malaysia’s automotive industry, prime minister mahathir proposed a “domestic car production project” with the aim of promoting the businesses of local malay groups. malay firms were thus a beneficiary of this project, from which emerged the new rich class. this consolidated mahathir’s leadership of both the united malays national organization (umno, malay group’s ruling party) and barisan nasional (malaysia's ruling coalition), and suppressed chinese-based opposition forces. the state’s industrial policy became a vehicle for arbitrary political and economic decision-making in mahathir’s 22year reign. in brief, the automotive industry became an important means of maintaining sovereignty for the malay community. this 74 state and industrial policy is consistent with the criticism of neoclassical economics of state intervention in industry. further analysis of the proton ownership structure found that the shareholders were mostly the state or enterprises from the malay community. this proves that in malaysia's domestic car protection plan, social outcomes were far more important than profit. therefore, even though the project was not economically successful, the state continued to support it, and reform was difficult to achieve. table 8: proton ownership structure in 2005 ranking shareholder number of shares ％ political and economic background 1 khazanah nasional berhad 210,484,69 3 38.32 % state-controlled 2 employees provident fund board 60,017,000 10.93 % government controlled fund 3 rhb nominees (tempatan) sdn. bhd. pertroliam nasional berhad 35,676,680 6.50% national petroleum holdings 4 cimsec nominees (tempatan) sdn. bhd. security trustee (kcw issue 2) 24,250,000 4.42% indigenous government-led investment bank 5 lembaga tabung haji 16,820,427 3.06% islamic funds, based on a vast rubber plantation 6 cartaban nominees (asing) sdn. bhd. government of singapore investment corporation pte.ltd. for goverment of singapore (c) 14,185,300 2.58% singapore's statecontrolled fund (foreign capital) 7 permodalan nasional berhad 8,838,000 1.61% indigenous education development fund 8 cartaban nominees (tempatan) sdn. bhd. amanah sscm nominees (tempatan) sdn. bhd. for employees provident fund board (jf404) 8,094,900 1.47% malaysia employment fund 9 perecom industries sdn. bhd. 7,444,000 1.36% malaysia technology group 10 hsbc nominees (asing) sdn. bhd. tntc for saudi arabian monetary agency 6,835,998 1.24% hsbc, foreign capital source: proton holdings berhad, annual report 2006. journal of asean studies 75 as for the protection of the automotive industry, in addition to state regulation of the ownership structure and industrial supply chain, the malaysian policy that was most criticized by other asean countries was the use of approved permits (ap) to protect domestic assembly plants, and offer more opportunities for malay enterprises to participate in the sales of imported cars. as the country's economy developed, the demand for imported cars also increased, and those who had an ap could control import quotas, leading to political competition. malaysia's industrial policy eventually evolved into chips-distributing political favouritism, which weakened the competitiveness of external competitors (foreign car manufacturers) when they tried to enter the domestic market. in contrast to malaysia, by following economic development policies and open politics, public and private sectors in thailand have transformed from a relationship of “clientism” to “partnership” since the 1980s. the industrial sector improved the effect of state policy, and industrial policy accordingly adjusted to regime change. before the 1980s, thailand had an authoritarian military regime, and preferred the policies of state capitalism and economic nationalism. after the 1980s, thailand adopted the industrial policy of a self-adjusting market, and supervision from public opinion and interest groups helped the automotive industry make adjustments in the direction of market liberalization and transformation (shen, 2004). differing from thailand’s frequent coups and lack of effective state intervention, malaysia has a strong state and the ethnic malay community has continued to dominate the political system, and lead the industrial policy formulated by the state. the automotive industry appears to have adopted “rent-seeking” behavior, the political effect of market intervention, with political factors being the major obstacles to industry transformation. because of the political and economic structure, the state (controlled by ethnic malay communities), domestic capital (controlled by chinese enterprises), and foreign capital could not build a cooperative relationship and was not able to follow thailand’s dependency development example and form a triple alliance. the country's economic policy and heavy industry policy have deterred chinese capital from investing in the automotive industry, and thus impeded the capital investment required for industrial transformation (lubeck, 1992). when noneconomic goals became more important than economic ones, the lack of an adjustment to malaysia's development strategy in the face of the challenge of opening up to international markets eventually leads to significant problems with industrial development. conclusion comparing the automotive industries in two newly industrialized southeast asian countries, malaysia and thailand, this research examines how, during the process of economic development, the state chose to intervene in industrial development, and how it influenced the political and economic situation. as in many other developing countries, malaysia has a strong state and was able to use the new economic plan and the national plan of heavy industry as policy tools to establish a domestic industry. establishment of the automotive industry in malaysia was thus the result of protectionist policies based on political and economic reasons, consistent with the ideology of “indigenous priority.” differing from malaysia, the early automotive industry in thailand also chose 76 state and industrial policy to employ market protection, and use import-substitution as the developmental strategy. this research found two significant differences between malaysia and thailand in how the state conducted its industrial policy. first, two different industrial strategies were chosen, namely independent development in malaysia and dependency development in thailand. second, the political nature of the malaysia automotive industry hindered its subsequent industrial policy, and made it difficult to adopt a policy of following the market. in short, industrial development, particularly the automotive industry, has been closely related to malaysian political and economic characteristics. in contrast, as the thai government stated in its “automotive industry in thailand,” the country was able to have the largest car assembly market among asean countries and produce the highest quality vehicles because it opened its domestic market and attempted global integration. the country has also had greater potential for market growth and a stable political climate, and a state that supports free trade and open investment policies. thailand possesses no ethnic conflict or national car program. with a more open attitude, thailand has attracted more investments into its automotive industry. however, the lack of ethnic problems does not necessarily mean that there is no political interference in the industry, while the lack of a national car program and greater liberalization do not necessarily mean that rent-seeking is not a problem. table 9: political and economic comparison of different developmental strategies used in malaysia and thailand criteria automotive industry in malaysia independent mode automotive industry in thailand dependency development key important dates in the development of the of industry  in 1962, the domestic automotive industry was first established  in 1982, the domestic car production project was implemented.  in 1985, the first domestic car was introduced, to become the only domestic car brand in southeast asia  in 1961, thailand’s automotive industry corporation was established  in 1980, the import substitution industrial policy was implemented  in 1985, cooperation with japanese capital gradually relaxed industrial restrictions  after the 1990s, industrial policy was revised to become more export-oriented the role of the state  a strong state dominated industrial policy and considered the automotive industry as a national  industrial policy changed because of political changes  after the 1980s, politics became open and the journal of asean studies 77 industry. domestic car manufacturers were protected by this policy.  the political regime remained unchanged, and no major revisions to the industrial policy were made state adjusted the industrial policy with or without national brand and specific models  yes  proton and perodua  no  focus on the development of specific vehicles—, such as pickup trucks the relationship between the industry and politics  the automotive industry protected the distribution and employment opportunities of ethnic malay individuals, and placed restrictions on other ethnic groups.  import licenses became the privilege of malay individuals  the industry relied on the state and was not market-oriented  industrial policy was more independent of political influence the relationship with international car manufacturers (multinational enterprises)  the new economic policy and heavy industry policy deterred domestic chinese investors from entering the automotive industry  limited cooperation in the international market, and the state dominated industry development  state, domestic, and foreign capital formed a triple alliance  cooperated with multinational enterprises and employed industrial division of labour sales market  a high proportion of domestic sales, and thus the problem of a saturated domestic market  a high proportion of exports, up to one third of production the attitude toward  implemented tariff  tariff reduction since 78 state and industrial policy asean industrial cooperation and free trade agreements protection until 2008  non-tariff protection of import licenses was continued until 2010 2000  support for industrial cooperation and free trade source: organized by the author jenkin (1995) compared the automotive industry in taiwan and south korea and believed that the reason why the latter could build up an independent automotive industry was because the state could overcome pressure from the private sector and multinational companies and gain control of the industry. in contrast, the state in taiwan could not handle the conflict arising from integration of the domestic private sector and multinational companies, and it became difficult for the government to lead the industry, and thus it lost the opportunity to establish an independent automotive industry. in short, the reasons for the success of south korea's automotive industry are as follows: a strong state, highly distorted market mechanisms, and the cooperation with a large consortia. however, this research finds that the opposite situation holds in the countries examined. specifically, although malaysia has a strong state, the projects conducted by state-led enterprises have not helped industrial development, while thailand, which followed an open market model, allowed multinational auto groups to enter the domestic market, which resulted in good industrial development. why are the results between this study and the earlier one so different? jomo stated that the developmental modes of newly industrialized countries in east asia and southeast asia differ. however, is this related to a country’s relative position in the structure of the global system? this remains a question for future southeast asian political and economic research. returning to the first discussion about the relationship between the state and the global automotive industry, as global and regional supply chains were formed, the automotive industry in developing countries was increasingly affected by free trade agreements, and it became necessary for them to choose between the strategies of dependency development and the independent mode. intel's former ceo, andrew grove, in his letter to the wall street journal stated: “what can detroit learn from silicon valley?” in the letter, he stated that when one of a country’s industries encounters difficulties, they must figure out whether it is because of a fall in competitiveness, or global industrial restructuring. if the former, then national intervention would prove helpful, while it would prove harmful in the latter condition, and even eventually cause the whole nation to lose its competitiveness (grove, 2009). grove further stated that the future of the automotive industry, just as the division of labor in the technology industry, is undergoing an ongoing restructuring from a vertical to horizontal mode. therefore, future vehicles would thus be produced by the assembly of standardized components. in this context, although many asian manufacturers might not be able to produce a whole car, the ability to control key components would gain them future industry opportunities in these countries. grove’s point of view could serve as the answer to these questions, that is, the state could follow the market and find a new business model and new competitive advantage, all of which are important journal of asean studies 79 strategies to maintain national industrial development. about author dr. wan-ping tai（戴萬平）is currently an associate professor and director at the department of international business the cheng shiu university, kaohsiung. samuel c y ku is professor at the institute of china and asia-pacific studies, national sun yat-sen university, kaohsiung, taiwan. references: geoffrey, r., d. underhill and 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of our bi-annual peer-reviewed scholarly international journal that discusses an invigorating debate on current milieu of southeast asian affairs. in this issue, journal of asean studies introduces a series of discussions that are mainly focused on the dynamics of indo-pacific relations and the power struggle in the highly highlighted south china sea disputes. besides, this issue also comes up with an inquiry on the spatial analysis of the impact of remittance in indonesian households. in this volume, derry aplianta, whose article is entitled indonesia’s response in the south china sea disputes: a comparative analysis of the soeharto and the post-soeharto era, contends that different response and reaction are evident from both regimes. the former characterizes indonesian response with a strong push from the normalcy of sino-indonesia relations during the gradual opening of china. it was also evident that indonesia’s policy was decisively conflated with a determining soeharto figure at the foreground. in the latter era, it is argued that democratic transition has brought a change in indonesia’s foreign policy direction that in turn affects indonesia’s response to the dispute in the south china sea. indonesia’s international exposure was part of dominant foreign policy aspiration at the time. aplianta took a historical analysis in order to collect the data, as well as interviews to policy makers in the indonesia’s ministry of foreign affairs. this july 2015 issue also attempts to discuss the prospect of indo-pacific cooperation. two articles in this volume offer different angles. one attempts to view whether indo-pacific scheme will boost cooperation in the region, while the other looks for the possible implementation. vignesh ram, whose article is entitled the proposal for an indo-pacific treaty of friendship and cooperation: a critical reassessment, conducted an in-depth literature review and media tracing to complete the possible puzzle to depict how well the southeast and northeast asian states comply with the indo-pacific treaty. meanwhile, i.g. bagus dharma agastia and a.a. banyu perwita are experimenting at finding the connection between the indonesia’s maritime fulcrum doctrine and indian ocean rim association (iora) amidst the imminent challenge of maintaining asean’s centrality. these two articles offer a new spectrum which sees that ocean can be an impetus in broadening the regional cooperation scheme. other than security issues, this issue also offers a discussion that focuses on examining how international remittance may relate to food consumption and deprivation in indonesia. in her paper, maria elfani suggests that the correlation between international remittances and food consumption is prevalent. drawing a reflection from the level of food consumption, her research shows that poorer households are more likely to receive the remittances. this issue also presents a research note entitled media dissemination “the threat of tsunami unleashed from the eruption of mount anak krakatau” through documentary movie, which was written by m. yudhi rezaldi and wahjoe soeprihantoro. . we choose to include this research note because it gives pundits an extended understanding on how disaster mitigation can be best socialized among the inhabitants. based on a case study conducted in the anyer coastal area, this research note reveals that the media (tools) available to support the campaign of the tsunami prevention are simply not suitable for the (local?) society. in their effort to solve this problem, the authors have been experimenting with an animated documentary movie that turns out to be significantly acceptable in the society. it is hoped that this research note could provide information to civil society regarding what to conduct when encountering a disaster mitigation mission. in this publication, we are also glad to announce that the journal of asean studies has been indexed by the social science open access repository (ssoar) starting from january 2015. as such, journal of asean studies has now been indexed by eight international journal indexing entities. in order to continue this achievement, we are working hard to provide a qualified and most invigorating debate in the area of southeast asian studies both domestically and regionally. we hope that this issue will contribute to stimulating a significant intellectual discourse in the area of southeast asia. jakarta, 30 july 2015 prof. tirta n. mursitama, ph.d editor-in-chief journal of asean studies, vol.1,no.1 (2013), pp. 1–13 ©2013by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn2338-1353 electronic the mandala culture of anarchy: the pre-colonial southeast asian international society pandu utama manggala australian national university, australia abstract throughout the years, study on pre-colonial southeast asian international relations has not garnered major attention because it had long been seen as an integral part of the chinacentred tribute system. there is a need to provide greater understanding of the uniqueness of the international system as different regions have different ontologies to comprehend its dynamics and structures. this paper contributes to the pre-colonial southeast asian literature by examining the interplay that had existed between pre-colonial southeast asian empires and the hierarchical east asian international society, in particular during the 13th16th century. the paper argues that southeast asian international relations in pre-colonial time were characterized by complex political structures with the influence of mandala values. in that structural context, the majapahit empire, one of the biggest empires at that time had its own constitutional structures of an international society, albeit still sought close relations with china. keywords: pre-colonial history, southeast asia, mandala, tributary system introduction throughout the years, study on precolonial southeast asian international relations has not garnered major attention because it had long been seen as an integral part of the china-centred tribute system. moreover, southeast asia has often been regarded as a political backwater compared to east asia because southeast asia as a region is seen as relatively passive , always subjected to the influence of great powers (penger & teo 2012, p.2). it is often said that under the chinese hierarchical order, asian international relations was seen as stable and regional order had been achieved until the arrival of the western powers in the 19th century (kang 2007). however, pre-colonial southeast asian countries were far from peaceful and stable under the tribute system. fierce competition for survival and domination had characterized the balance of power politics throughout the precolonial era (shu 2012b, p. 46). for that reason, there is a need to provide greater understanding of the uniqueness of the international system as different regions have different ontologies to comprehend its dynamics and structures. this paper contributes to the pre-colonial southeast asian literature by examining the interplay that had existed between precolonial southeast asian empires and the hierarchical east asian international society, in particular during the 13th-16th century. the paper draws a boundary from kang s and suzuki s 9 article 2 the mandala culture of anarchy that too much focus on the centrality of china-dominated regional hierarchy. nevertheless, both articles are used to understand the nature of china s hegemonic presence in pre-colonial southeast asia. the paper argues that southeast asian international relations in pre-colonial time were characterized by complex political structures with the influence of mandala values. in that structural context, the majapahit empire, one of the biggest empires at that time had its own constitutional structures of an international society, albeit still sought close relations with china. therefore, the paper debates the nature of hierarchical china s tributary system in pre-colonial southeast asia. in policy terms, the findings of the article indicate that the interactive dynamics within the subsidiary system created norms that are rooted in what rother (2012) calls as the cultural memory of a region . this helps to explain, for example the conduct of foreign policy in the southeast asia. the method of this paper is crossdisciplinary studies which combine the finding of area studies and international relations theory to provide a deeper understanding of the process of socialization and mutual adaptation between the southeast asian and the east asia international society. the term international society used in the article refers to bull & watson (1984) understanding of international system which is a society of state that is built upon inter-subjectivity through common interests and common values. this society bound themselves by a common set of rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations. furthermore, detailed analysis of pre-colonial southeast asian international relations is elaborated using reus smit s three normative beliefs of constitutional structures of an international society (1999). these three normative beliefs are the moral purpose of state , the organizing principle of sovereignty , and the norm of procedural justice . the rest of the paper is organized in the following way. the next part elaborates some theoretical grounding to be used in the analysis. the comparative investigation of kang s and suzuki s article is the starting point to analyse the complex political structure that existed in the east asian international society and further added with wendt s conception of anarchy. the second part discusses some essential characteristics and the constitutional structure of the majapahit empire. the third part explores the interaction between the majapahit empire and hierarchical east asian international society. the focus is to highlight the international structures that existed and how those structures shape the relationship between the majapahit empire and the china s tributary system. lastly, the paper concludes with a summary of the main findings and discusses the implication of the study. anarchy, hierarchy and the east asian international society anarchy is a crucial yet highly contentious concept in international relations. in its formal sense, anarchy means that there is no supreme authority above states. in the classical texts of international relations theory, anarchy is often became the central theoretical debate. on the one hand are proponents of the realist theory who accept the condition of anarchy but argue that this does not necessarily preclude order, society, and community beyond the nation state. the other hand are liberalists who assert that anarchy is incompatible with order and the realization is only possible once anarchy is replaced by governance of one sort of another (evans & newnham 1998, p. 19). journal of asean studies 3 in the development stage of the debate, kenneth waltz with his influential theory of international politics employed anarchy and power as central analytical concepts to the balance of power theory. waltz (1979) argued that the international system functions like a market which is interposed between the economic actors and the results they produce. it conditions their calculations, their behaviour and their interactions pp. 9 -91). by this, waltz asserted that it is structure that shapes and constrains the political relationship of the component units. in an anarchical world, states need to rely only on self-help and balance of power is created through balancing behaviour by weaker states towards the potential hegemon (shu 2012a, p. 4). moreover, waltz and other neorealist proponents have sought to contrast the concept of anarchy with the idea of hierarchy. according to neorealist, because the system is anarchy it cannot be a hierarchy (evans & newnham 1998, p. 224). several ir scholars have made surpassing arguments to reject the exclusiveness of anarchy and hierarchy. for example, lake (2009) uses the notion of degrees of hierarchy along a singledimensional continuum between total anarchy and complete hierarchy to identify different forms of hierarchical relations. however, not many scholars have specifically examined the relationship between anarchy and hierarchy from an asian international relations perspective. david kang (2007) and shogo suzuki (2009) are among those who have analysed from an asian perspective. kang s article explains that “sian international relations have historically been hierarchical order under chinese domination prior to the intervention of western powers (p. 164). nevertheless, it was the hierarchical order that had created stability in the region as there was no evidence of external balancing or other coordinated efforts to constrain china. kang derives the hierarchic model from assumptions that states are the main unit of analysis and anarchy is the prevailing condition for international system. although he draws on his argument from realist assumptions, kang rejects the neorealist notion that hierarchy cannot coexist with anarchy in the international system, and instead uses hierarchy as shorthand for unequal relations amongst states, but short of hegemony or empire goh 9, p. 107). in short, kang tries to combine the logic of anarchy and hierarchy in the sense of realist understanding. the main premise for kang s argument is that the region more comfortable with a strong china because of the cultural prominence of confucianism, the disparity in economic and military strength, and the long-standing influences of the tribute system kang . in contrast with neorealist that emphasizes balancing against the predominant power, kang believes that lesser states will most likely bandwagon for profit (kang 2007, p. 167). some of the benefits are security protection, bigger opportunities for market and trade, and external arbitration. the hierarchical order itself is preserved through a combination of benefits and sanctions that the central power provides to the lesser power. kang s article provides a new analytical framework for asian international relations. his elaboration shows that eurocentric s international relations theories do poor jobs as they are applied to “sia rother 2012, p. 53). nonetheless, his conclusion with the focus on bandwagoning and the absence of balancing in asian international relations is not convincing and tends to be reductionist realism (rother 2012, p. 53). kang s claim neglected the fact that southeast “sia as part of the china s tribute system was also dominated by competition for survival and domination throughout the pre-colonial time (lieberman 1993). 4 the mandala culture of anarchy furthermore, states are in no position to choose black and white between balancing and bandwagoning. in the real world, states opt for other options such as hedging, containment, neutrality, engagement, and non-alignment. therefore, kang s argument is not able to decode the complexity of interaction between the pre-colonial southeast asian and the chinese empires. shogo suzuki s 9 article tries to elaborate more deeply in the east asian international society. it helps to comprehend the complexity of the deep constitutive values that define the social identity of the state and brings discursive mechanism that link intersubjective ideas of legitimate statehood and rightful state action to the constitution of fundamental institution. in elaborating his arguments, suzuki adopts hedley ”ull s view on international system. bull asserted that international system is a society of states and this society is built upon inter-subjectivity through common interests and common values which they bound themselves by a common set of rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations (bull & watson 1984). any given international system does not exist because of unchallengeable structures, but rather the very structures are dependent for their reproduction on the practices of the actors koslowski & kratochwil 1994, p. 216). therefore, suzuki recognizes that the identity of state is grounded in a larger complex of values and these values provide states with substantive reasons for action. suzuki accepts the notion of hierarchical order in the east asian international society. however, quite different from kang s arguments, suzuki uses reus-smit s 999 conceptualization of the constitutional structure of international society to help understand the dynamics of interaction in the east asian international society. reus smit offers three primary normative elements that constitute the structure of international society, which are: 1) a hegemonic belief about the moral purpose of centralized, autonomous political organization. such purposes are moral because they always entail a conception of the individual or social good served by autonomous political organization, and are hegemonic because they constitute the prevailing, socially sanctioned justification for sovereign rights. 2) an organizing principle of sovereignty that differentiates political units on the basis of particularity and exclusivity, creating a system of territorially demarcated. 3) 3) a norm of procedural justice. these norms specify the correct procedures that legitimate or good states employ, internally and externally, to formulate basic rules of internal and external conduct. (reus smit 1999, pp. 30-33) grounding on reus smit s three normative belief, suzuki explains that the moral purpose of the state within the east asian international society was derived from confucianism that aimed the support and maintenance of the moral, social, and cultural order of social peace and harmony (suzuki 2009, p. 34). as a consequence, the justificatory foundations for the principle of sovereignty within the order were to maintain the social hierarchy that would promote cosmic harmony. moreover, drawing his analysis from the time of the ming (1368-1644) and qing (1644-1911), suzuki (2009) claims that the systemic norm of procedural justice were the tribute system that prescribed rightful state action (p. 37-38). ”oth kang s and suzuki s article are giving insights into an asian international relations. nevertheless, the position of other non-chinese states within the hierarchical order has not been really elaborated. in suzuki s 9 article, he admits that the journal of asean studies 5 position of non-chinese states depended on the degree to which the chinese judged them to have been assimilated into chinese culture and their geographical proximity to china (pp. 37-38). hence, it is necessary to explores pre-colonial southeast asia as there are evidences of interactive dynamics that constitute international structure within that region. having been comparing and contrasting kang s and suzuki s article, this paper tries to synthesize their arguments to understand the dynamic of interaction between the precolonial southeast asian empires and the hierarchical east asian international society. the paper explores the pre-colonial southeast asian empires using reus smit s three normative beliefs of constitutional structure and draws on wendtian constructivism to explain the logic of anarchy that shaping the interaction. wendt (1992) makes his famous claim on the logic of anarchy that anarchy is what states make of it . he asserts that the absence of hierarchic authority in the international system does not inevitably equate to perpetual interstate conflict in a self-help environment, as neo-realists contend. moreover, wendt argues that anarchy is only a permissive cause of conflict and not an efficient cause. in relation to kang s article, wendt is taking different position as he argues that it is the social and ideational, rather than material aspect of international politics which determines how actors behave. furthermore, wendt also asserts that states have the ability to transform the social structure within which they operate. from this understanding, wendt creates the concept of culture of anarchy which is the bodies of norms and institutions that make up an international social structure (flawith 2011, p.266). wendt argues that there are at least three configurations that the international society may take, the hobbesian , lockean , and, kantian anarchies. a hobbesian anarchy refers to the true self-help system where there are constant existential threats of warfare between states (wendt 1999, pp. 259-260). lockean anarchy is characterised by a rivalry and as a consequence, states will form status-quoism towards each other. moreover, violence is recognised as a legitimate way to settle disagreements and warfare is one way to form a balance of power (wendt 1999, pp. 279). whereas kantian anarchy is the most cooperative culture of anarchy in which states identify the other as friends and collective security is the dominant norm (wendt 1999, p. 297). however, these three configurations are not mutually exclusive. as rother pointed out, in the above wendt s argument, there are still rooms for different configurations based on different identities because states have the ability to transform the social structure within which they operate (rother 2012, p. 57) before elaborating the dynamics of interaction between the two regions, there has to be an understanding of what constitute the pre-colonial southeast asian international structures in which is discussed in the following section. the majapahit empire and the southeast asian international society in the course of asian studies prior to the european intrusion in the indian archipelago in mid-19th century, the traditional international order is often considered consisted of civilized (china) and barbarians (southeast asian states). as kang (2007) points out in his article, the chinese emperor required the barbarians to demonstrate formal obedience in the form of kowtow in order not to be invaded (p. 9 . in kang s view, southeast “sia was a peripheral region, a part of the rim land . the minimal role of southeast asia 6 the mandala culture of anarchy continued to play until well into the twentieth century where both the us and the soviet union, superpowers at that time, were vitally interested in the politics and the economic potential of the region. despite very few studies have specifically examined pre-colonial southeast asian region from an ir perspective, this region was in fact interesting to examine due to its unique structures. the southeast asian region is not a unit in the religious, historical, geographical, or ethnic senses. there are at least four different religions in southeast asia, which are islam, hinduism, buddhism, and christianity. historically, the whole southeast asia never came under the rule of a single state or empire. on the mainland, the khmers created a large empire, which at its height in the 9th to the 13th centuries embraced the region from burma, thailand, laos, cambodia, and south vietnam (sardesai 2010, p. 2). there were other large polities in pre-colonial southeast asia, but they did not cover the entire region. however, during the golden era of the majapahit empire notably under the prime minister, gajah mada (13311364), large area of southeast asia was under the majapahit empire. therefore, in the pre-colonial southeast asia era, the greatness of the majapahit empire could not be neglected. the majapahit, literally means the bitter fruit, was an empire of 98 tributaries stretching from sumatra to new guinea which consists of present day indonesia, singapore, malaysia, brunei, southern thailand, the philippines, and east timor (sardesai 2010). moreover, the capital of majapahit was situated in trowulan, east java. it was one of the last major empires of the region and considered to be one of the greatest and most powerful empires in the history of southeast asia due to its political, economic, and social influences. scholars who study the majapahit empire are mostly interested in the course of history, the matter of structure, foreign relations, and how the majapahit shape international relations in the region unfortunately have been neglected for many decades. in this part, an attempt has been made to examine the structure of the majapahit, the type of order, and the sources of legitimacy that bounded the empire. the constitutional structures of the southeast asian international society were primarily derived from ancient indian political discourse based on the book of arthasastra by mauryan chief minister, kautilya in the 4th century (boesche 2003, p. 9 . furthermore, kautilya s concept, the mandala was then adopted by wolters (1968) to denote pre-colonial southeast asian political formations. the regional system was built of larger political unit, in which the dependencies preserved a great deal of internal autonomy in exchange for acknowledging the pole s spiritual authority (gesick 1983, p. 3). southeast asian polities did not conform to the chinese view as the polity defined by its centre rather than its boundaries, and it could be composed of numerous other tributary polities without undergoing administrative integration (dellios 2003). the mandala displayed the cosmopological characteristics of hindubuddhist persuasion prior to the expansion of european international society. mandala is a sanskrit word for sacred circle in which humans become centred and diffuse that state of being outwards into action (grey 2001, p. 2). therefore, the mandala highlights the importance of charismatic leadership in a political system that fluctuates. moreover, whoever can claim the centre of this system, can claim the title of universal emperor, the cakravartin . the mandala in its sacred dimensions is a centring device for spiritual purposes. when this idea was applied to the political journal of asean studies 7 field within religiously oriented society, it permits a political leader to claim a degree of divinity. such was the case in the majapahit empire, particularly when its prime minister gajah mada took his famous oath sumpahpalapa . gajah mada said that he would not taste palapa fruits / spices until he could unify external territories under the majapahit (purwadi 2004, p. 157). it can be seen that gajah mada s oath was based on the mandala philosophy that requires recognition of the emptiness. the notion of centre consisted of power that is personal and devotional rather than institutional. it was the ability of gajah mada to tap into cosmic power through virtuous behaviour that created the power of conquest. thus, gajah mada represented the charismatic centre of a mandala and is considered a person of prowess wolters 1968, pp. 94-95). with the mandala being a significant tradition of knowledge in pre-colonial southeast asia, the fundamental interests of states, the majapahit and other polities became those of enhancing and protecting the society and its values. the mandala became the moral purpose of the majapahit that spoke universality through moral conquest (dellios 2003). the organizing principle of sovereignty within the southeast asian international society was thus along the networks of loyalties. the majapahit integrated vertically with the divinity as well as horizontally across a territory of people, land, and resources organised in the form of vassal loyalties tucci 9 , p. . in regards to this, the principle was applied in the geopolitical term. geopolitical mandala, as mentioned by kautilya was about how the cakravartin being able to deploy his friends to contain his enemies. as such, the mandala consists of circles of mitra (friends), ari (enemies), madhyama(medium power) and udasina (major powers) with the vijigisuas the centre. in relations to this concentric circle, the majapahit foreign relations also adopted the geopolitical of mandala. the majapahitcreated its concentric circle, defining its mitra, ari, madhyama, and, udasina. nagarakretagama book by the poet prapanca noted there were several neighbouring foreign polities that in friendly terms with the majapahit, among those were syangka, ayudhya (siam), rajapura, champa, kamboja and yawana (slametmuljana 2006). three important friendly polities of the majapahit, champa, syangka, and ayudhya are worth to be observed. the majapahitattempted to build a friendly relations with the champa in particular because the champa was perceived as rearfriend of the majapahit as it had also refused to allow the mongol to use its harbor for embarking logistics during the great invasion of kublai khan upon java in the end of 13th century. the similar case applied to the syangka that had been seen opposed the chola s domination in indian sub-continent, in which the majapahitalso refused to accept. the majapahit maintained a good relations with the syangka because it adopted the doctrine my enemy s enemy is my friend . while for the ayudhya, the majapahit maintained relations with the ayudhya because it had established over the populations of the central indo chinese peninsula where there was no record of the influence of the majapahit empire (slametmuljana 1976, pp. 144-146). the observation shows that in the first two cases, the majapahit tried to assure that his ari(the mongol and chola) was accordingly counterbalanced by his mitra(the champa and syangka). whereas the latter case shows that the majapahit foreign relations also tried to accommodate the interests of its empire as well as the madhyama (the ayudhya).the following diagram tries to illustrate the way geopolitical mandala being contextualize by the majapahit: 8 the mandala culture of anarchy diagram 1. the majapahit’s geopolitical mandala “dopted from rosita dellios description of the statal circle the third normative belief, which is the systemic norms of procedural justice, laid in the conduct of diplomacy within the structures. there were two distinguished forms of diplomacy that the majapahit exercised, which were through small tributary system and marriage. the tributary system, although it was a small annual tribute, had a role as a ritual justice within the southeast asian international society. the majapahit required only a small amount of tribute from the ruler of any country to be recognized as the majapahit s suzerainty and to be classified as a dependency slametmuljana 9 , p. . by giving a small tribute, dependencies were promised effective protection against potential threats. however, unlike the china s tribute system, the majapahit s dependencies were required to make substantive contribution to the wealth of their suzerain (shu 2012b, 50). to be more specific, the highly regarded substantive contribution was to present valuable local products as their tributes annually. the other form of diplomacy was forming alliance through marriage. one prominent example of this was when hayam wuruk, the majapahit s king during its golden era, decided to marry a princess of sunda named dyahpitaloka as an effort to obtain the kingdom of sunda in 1357. unfortunately, the effort failed because of the maharaja of sunda rejected gajah mada s request to delineate the marriage as a tribute to the majapahit. from the above exploration of the constitutional structures of southeast asian international society with the majapahit as a focus, one remaining question lies: how did the structures shape the majapahit s interaction with the east asian international society? the next part discusses how the majapahit identities informed fundamental vijigisu (centre) themajapahit udasina (major power) china (ming dynasty) mitra (friend) syangka madhyama (middle power) ayudhya mitra (friend) champa other mandalas in greater mekong other mandalas in malay peninsula ari (enemy) the mongol ari (enemy) the chola dynasty journal of asean studies 9 interest in its interaction with the china s tributary system and its implication to the anarchy-hierarchy understanding within the region. the majapahit and the china’s tributary system: the mandala culture of anarchy the previous part has informed that the pre-colonial southeast asian international society had different constitutional structures to the east asian. there was also a southeast asian empire, the majapahit that ruled over large area of southeast asia. the interaction between the chinese empire and pre-colonial southeast asian polities was relatively limited in the early imperial period. the historical interactions of china and pre-colonial southeast asia were started from 6th century onwards, predominantly constructed by merchants, traders, and missionaries passing through the region (penger & teo 2012, p. 4). trade in the form of tributary system was therefore the dominant practices in the interaction. the narrative of the chinese world order has been grand to examine the pattern of interaction. it has been said that the vassal states had to pay tribute to the chinese emperor confirming the superiority of the chinese culture and civilization (penger & teo 2012, p. 5). having examined the different constitutional structures of southeast asian international society, this section debates the nature of the act of paying tribute to the chinese emperor. the tribute was actually the practice of trade strategy for a better market access to the major kingdoms in east asia, rather than acknowledgement of their superiority. it debates kang s argument that china for most of the time had been culturally, economically, and military dominated the region. moreover, the paper also debates shu s a argument that southeast asian polities were keen to be involved in the hierarchical east asian international society to seek imperial recognition (shu 2012a, p. 15-16). the majapahit apparently did not seek recognition when it paid tribute to the chinese emperor as many scholars have suggested. from the interpretation of its geopolitical mandala, the majapahit was always perceived its interaction with the chinese empire as engaging with the udasina(major powers) in order to build a favourable regional architecture. it is without doubt that the majapahithad regularly dispatched its own envoys to the ming dynasty, but it was carried out to manage the constantly changing and evolving regional challenges (pramono 2010). moreover, the fundamental interest of the majapahit was to benefit from the highly profitable trade, to open access to the china s market and products. furthermore, unlike suzuki s 9 claim that the lesser states never challenged the constitutive norms of the order (p. 35), the majapahit had challenged the system several times. for instance, when the ming envoy went to brunei in 1370 to demand the polity to acknowledge the chinese power for a return of full protection (laichen 2010, 46), the majapahit soon warned the brunei not to pay tribute to china. had the majapahit was considered itself to be in the same structure with the hierarchical east asian international society, the majapahit would not have interfered to the ming envoy s request. furthermore, the immediate reaction from the majapahit was because brunei had been one of the vassal polities of the majapahit. hence, brunei conformed to the majapahitorder and thus only sent one mission to china and continued to pay annual tribute to the majapahit(wang 1968, p. 51). the best analysis on why brunei decided to act in favour of the majapahitwas because the geopolitical mandala made 10 the mandala culture of anarchy southeast asian polities to perceive their intensified security threats came from their neighbours, rather than from china. at that time, brunei saw the majapahitas the one that could give better protection than anyone else. the other analysis for brunei behaviour can be scrutinized by examining the different values and norms that both the brunei and the china held. confucianism was of little significance to the pre-colonial southeast asian polities. as wolters (1999) points out, most of the pre-colonial southeast asian empires practiced the mandala s knowledge. due to lack of shared cultural understanding and a common value system, china s intention towards brunei was misunderstood and resisted (shu 2012b, pp. 50-51). china, therefore, had failed to generate desired outcomes on precolonial southeast asia. nonetheless, there had also been several moves from china to balance the power of the majapahitin the region. one example was when the ming dynasty created new alignments of power in pre-colonial southeast asia with the kingdom of melaka in the 15th century. the move had great effects on the political topography as the support provide by the ming helped melaka to experience a rapid rise during the early of 15th century (wade 2010, p. 31). the rise of melaka, which was an islamic kingdom, squeezed the majapahitinfluence in the first quarter of the 16th century (sardesai 2010, pp. 53-54). as the majapahitdeclined because of its bad governance following the demise of prime minister gajah mada and the death of the charismatic leader hayamwuruk in 1389, the chinese trading fleets started to dominate most of the trading activities in pre-colonial southeast asia. as reid suggested, it was the starting point for the “ge of commerce to emerge in the region, introducing spices to the world (wade 2010, p. 4). the dynamic interactions between the pre-colonial southeast asian empire with the china s tributary system have enlightened the nature of order in precolonial southeast asian region. the above exploration demonstrates that hierarchical china s tributary system was not embedded in pre-colonial southeast asian region. as suggested above, the relations between the majapahitand chinese empires in particular the ming dynasty was merely trade relations and the majapahitdid not consent to the hierarchical china s tributary system. in regards to the pre-colonial southeast asian region, the hierarchical structure of east asian international society came to be replaced by the geopolitical mandala. the majapahittransformed the social structure within which it operate under the logic of mandala. therefore, adopting wendt s famous quote, hierarchical tributary system is what chinese empires made of it . furthermore, the pre-colonial southeast asian international society had been defining its own approaches to the cultures of anarchy. the pre-colonial southeast asian international society positioned its logic of anarchy in between the lockeanrivalry and the kantian peace. there were still rivalries in the region as the majapahithad been striving for the centrality of its political position in the regional political landscape. however, the principal way to form a balance of power was not through warfare but instead through cooperation. the geopolitical mandala advised that strategic grouping, manifested in deploying as many friends for the vijigisuremains vital in preserving peace, common stability, and common security. from this understanding, states and norms in the pre-colonial southeast asian international society had worked to produce their own logic of anarchy. journal of asean studies 11 conclusion this paper proposed a model based on area studies and ir theories to challenge the view that pre-colonial southeast asia had long been dominated by china under the tribute system. many scholars have suggested that china influence through the tributary system was so prominent for both the northeast and southeast asian regions. however as this paper has examined, international relations in the pre-colonial southeast asia featured a complex political structures. the region had developed its own culture of anarchy under the mandala values. the paper has elaborated the constitutional structures of international society in the pre-colonial southeast asia, drawing upon the majapahit empire. in the case ofthe pre-colonial southeast asian empire, the legitimate state was expected to preserve the mandala values as a sacred circle and a cosmic power. it is designed for the protection of society and its values in contrast with the confucianism; the mandala was not so much about territory, but about the relationship between the leader and his/her people. the polity was defined by its centre rather than its boundaries and it could be composed of numerous other tributary polities without undergoing administrative integration (dellios 2003). hence, the geopolitical mandala as the organizing principle of sovereignty was materialized. the majapahitmaintained its relationship with other polities based on the concentric circle approach. accordingly, the conduct of diplomacy in the form of small tributary system and building alliance through marriage occurred as the systemic norms of procedural justice. in addition, the investigation of the precolonial southeast asian international society has help to understand the interplay between the majapahit empire and the china-centred tribute system. the paper questioned the view that pre-colonial southeast asian polities were willing to submit to the hierarchical order in east asia by taking part in the china-centred tribute system. politically, the pre-colonial southeast asian empire, particularly the majapahit had never been under china s control. the majapahit managed to assert strategic partnership with china as the udasina in its geopolitical mandala. hence, the relationship was merely a trade relations with the chinese empire and not a form of tribute trade. theoretically, this paper has suggested that the southeast asian international society had built their own logic of anarchy based on the region ideas and culture. the pre-colonial southeast asian international society had successfully implemented the mandala from ancient indian political discourse origin with the southeast asian elaboration, building the mandala culture of anarchy that focus on cooperation. lastly, theory-guided historical analysis can also sheds light on the understanding of contemporary international relations. even though there is no straight line leading from the majapahit empire to the modern day of southeast asia, there has to be resonances as norms are rooted in the cultural memory of a region (rother 2012, p. 63). the geopolitical mandala remains vital for southeast asian states in conducting their foreign policy. for instance, the priorities of indonesian foreign policy are still determined using the concentric circle perspective. moreover, the way asean manages its regional architecture by building strategic grouping from asean+1, asean+3, asean+6 to east asia summit could be the illustration of asean asserting the mandala culture of anarchy. about author 12 the mandala culture of anarchy pandu utama manggala, an indonesian diplomat, is a graduate student at the australian national university, canberra. he is one of the recipients of the australia awards scholarship in 2012 and is currently serving as the president of the indonesian students association in the australian capital territory (ppia act). he received his bachelor of social science degree, cum laude in international relations from the faculty of social and political sciences, universitas indonesia (fisip ui). his writings have been published in many journals and newspaper. his latest piece was published in the ritsumeikan journal of asia pacific, japan. he is also the book editor in 'mengarungi samudera yang bergolak: sumbanganpemikiran diplomat muda indonesia , published by center for education and training, indonesian ministry of foreign affairs in 2010. he can be contacted at pandu.manggala@anu.edu.au references acharya, a 2003, “will asia’s past be its future?”,international security, vol.28, no. 3, pp. 149-164. boesche, r 2003, kautilya’sarthaśāstra on war and diplomacy in ancient india, journal of military history, vol. 67, no. 1, pp. 9– 37. bull, h & watson, a (eds) 1984, the expansion of international society, oxford university press, oxford. dellios, r 2003, “mandala: from sacred origins to sovereign affairs in traditional southeast asia”, cewces research paper, no. 10. evans, g & newnham, j 1998, the penguin dictionary of international relations, penguin group, london. flawith, rw 2011, “the regressing ‘culture of anarchy’ in ancient china and its implications for wendt’s progressive constructivism”, australian journal of international affairs, vol. 65, 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vol.46, no. 2, pp. 379–396. wendt, a 1999, social theory of international politics, cambridge university press, cambridge. wolters, ow 1968, ‘ayudhya and the rearward part of the world’, journal of theroyal asiatic society, no. 3 & 4, pp. 166-78. wolters, ow 1999, history, culture and religion in southeast asian perspectives revised edition, southeast asia program publications (seap) in cooperation with the institute of southeast asian studies (iseas), ithaca & singapore. journal of asean studies, vol. 7, no. 2 (2019), pp. 138-149 doi: https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v7i2.6115 ©2019 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic digitalization in the community-based tourism development in peripheral areas: a case study of sumbermanjing wetan village, malang regency ayu dwidyah rini universitas trilogi, jakarta abstract the paradigm of digital-based peripheral area tourism development is carried out within a broader development of technology and communication in indonesia. this is done as a way to reduce the level of disparity between the city and the peripheral region. this study examines the paradigm of local communities related to digital-based tourism development. this digital-based tourism development is illustrated through the case of communitybased tourism in the sumbermanjing wetan area of malang regency. this article shows that community participation in tourism is classified into three forms of local participation. first, digital-based tourism can be solutions for tourism development in the sumbermanjing wetan region. second, the community also understand the digitalization of tourism as an effort to alleviate poverty and improve the welfare of local communities. third, digital-based tourism can be the strategy for improving the quality of life of the sumbermanjing wetan community. key words: community-based tourism, peripheral area, gua cina beach and local economy introduction effective collaboration between existing resources, community, and government create a healthy and sustainable regional economy. the government, as a regulator, plays a strategic role in seeking broad opportunities for local people to participate fully in every economic activity, one of which is the tourism sector. indonesian statistics agency shows a rapid increase in tourist visits to indonesia. the number of foreign tourists coming to indonesia before 2015 is always under 10 million people. international tourist visits then surged above 10 million in the following period. foreign tourist arrivals in 2018 grew by 12.6% compared to 2017, which amounted to seven million visits. overseas tourist growth exceeds neighboring countries such as malaysia and singapore. even in 2018, malaysia experienced negative growth in bringing in foreign tourists. journal of asean studies 139 however, the interest of foreign tourists to stay longer in indonesia is still low. this is indicated by the relatively short duration of tourist visits. indonesian statistics agency (2019) also recorded the average length of stay of foreign tourists in indonesia is 2.81 days in bali province, 2.42 days in papua province, and 2.33 days in southeast sulawesi province, while the shortest average length of stay of guests occurred at 1.25 days in central java province. the numbers of occupants of the hotel rooms in indonesia decreased in december 2018. the most significant number of decreases occurred in four islands: (1) sulawesi island, namely central sulawesi province at 14.38 points, (2) sumatra island consisting of aceh province 14.37 points and north sumatra province at 14.31 points. (3) papua island decreased by 12.80 points in west papua. (4) java island decreased in three provinces, namely central java province by 4.23 points, di yogyakarta province by 2.01 points and east java province by 1.73 points. this shows that efforts to improve equity and improve the performance of tourist destinations other than bali still need to be adjusted. the above conditions show the government’s lack of attention to peripheral tourism. okech et al. (2012) study on kenya show that the government has done very little to boost rural tourism and justified by lack of tourism offices in various provinces. thus, the role of government is enormous in developing peripheral tourism areas. the peripheral region can be defined as an area far from the population and economic centers, travel to them requires time and costly. peripheral tourism development is expected to increase value-added peripheral area and triggering peripheral region development process. peripheral tourism is part of the development strategy of the periphery. peripheral tourism can be used as the choice of tourist destinations to extend the length of stay of tourists. besides, the development of peripheral tourism is also expected to encourage the development of the local economy by utilizing the momentum of increased tourist visits. the results of the probst et al. (2013) study on the alpine area show that the development of peripheral regions is very instrumental in maintaining economic sustainability in the region. the development strategy must be oriented towards a unique experience for tourists. a preliminary study on the mediterranean region in turkey shows that people in the region did not feel that they were competing with the main tourism area (seckelmann, 2002; burak et al, 2004). this has led to differences in behavior between communities in the coastal zone and communities in the main tourist destinations. research on peripheral area tourism in indonesia is still rare. lew (2011) explored the indonesian peripheral region in manado and lembeh straits in indonesia and stated that tourism in the area was still disguised and had not yet 140 digitalization in the community-based joined the global tourism network. primadany et al. (2013) conducted a study tour in nganjuk, indonesia and showed that optimizing regional tourism development faced obstacles in the lack of funds for the development of facilities and infrastructure to support tourism activities. khotimah et al. (2017) in a study related to the study of trowulan cultural tourism in mojokerto, indonesia explained that limited funds, limited promotion and supporting facilities and infrastructure for tourism activities were obstacles in developing cultural tourism sites. therefore, the pattern of setting up tourist destinations is needed in optimizing peripheral areas. local government, as the leading sector has a strategic role in developing the facilities and infrastructure needed. tourism 4.0, in its development also became a significant concern in developing peripheral tourism areas in indonesia. the results of the study conducted by hakim (2018) related to the rise of cyberculture in the tourism sector indicates a significant change in tourism ecosystems, where the strategy of developing tourist destinations and tourist attraction will be influenced by digital information developed and obtained. this phenomenon explains that the era of tourism 4.0 is an excellent opportunity for the development of tourism, especially the peripheral region. however, technology and information development in tourism 4.0 is still hampered by the lack of supporting infrastructure in the peripheral region. sumbermanjing wetan are faced with communication inconsistencies that are still concentrated in the core region; this harm tourism destinations in the peripheral region. digitalization of the tourism sector has so far been built downstream, this has led to the promotion of peripheral tourism areas that have not been able to be received in full and detailed by tourists. tourists do not know in detail the accessibility of tourist attractions to interpret tourism products such as cultural attractions, souvenirs, language and customs of the people. sumbermaning wetan is part of peripherally located far from the city center of. malang. sumbermanjing wetan has tourism potential which is a chinese cave beach tour; unfortunately, this is not widely known by the general public. so, that tourism has not been able to increase regional income (supriadi, 2016). the tourism sector which is located in sumbermanjing wetan is seen as not being able to benefit the local community. tourism development must provide economic, social and cultural benefits to the communities around the destination. therefore, the community has a role in the development of sumbermanjing wetan tourism. community-based tourism is an approach in optimizing tourism development, especially in the digital era. local communities take the initiative to build, own and manage tourism facilities and services directly so that the community is expected to receive direct economic benefits and reduce journal of asean studies 141 urbanization. community-based tourism is expected to be an instrument developing tourism digitalization in sumbermaning wetan. there are four principles in the development of tourism digitalization, namely: (a) sustainability of potential tourism, (b) the development of local community institution and partnership, (c) digital education in society (d) tourism digitalization strategy plan. the problem is that there are still a few local people who have the financial ability and expertise in utilizing technology and information in supporting the tourism digitalization. the formulation of the problem in this study is 1) how is the community paradigm related to digital-based tourism development by the sumbermanjing wetan malang area? and 2) how is the application of community-based tourism conducted by the sumbermanjing wetan community in managing digital-based regional tourism? this paper finds that tourism digitalization is essential in optimizing the sumbermanjing wetan tourism sector. the tourism sector is believed to be able to improve the welfare of local communities. communities paradigm related to digitalization is the basis for building a community-based tourism digitalization strategy. review of related literature supply and demand in the tourism sector there is growing literature discussing the relations between tourism and development. they can be divided into two types of approach; first, is supply approach, the supply approach focuses on developing tourist destinations. second, is the demand approach; the demand approach focuses on tourist spending. utami et al. (2016) estimated the function of tourism demand in seven tourist destinations in indonesia. the study shows that tourism prices are the primary determinant of tourist spending. this phenomenon shows that the factors influencing the development of supporting tourist areas in terms of supply and demand include four main issues. first, attractions of tourist destinations, defined as tourism product components that can attract tourists include natural wealth, developing culture and special events or interests. potnov and david (1999) in the results of their study regarding the growth of peripheral regions indicate that the attractiveness of migration of an area affects the growth of a sustainable regional population. in this case, the ability of a region to attract new tourists and maintain the number of tourists is a significant factor in developing peripheral areas. second, accessibility in reaching tourist destinations, these factors include; terminals, ports, airports, systems and transportation routes, travel costs, travel time and frequency of transportation to the destination. third, amenity, supporting facilities for tourism, including; accommodation, food and beverage, shopping, entertainment and money changers, and tourist information centers. four, institutions. these can be 142 digitalization in the community-based institutional elements, partnerships or supporting organizations in developing and marketing tourism destinations and activities of local communities. based on the study of the drivers of the development of the tourist area, a strategic plan is needed in tourism development. the tourism development strategy has implications for three things. first, improvement of existing products. in our case, the potential for peripheral tourism is increased through the development of potential areas that will be used as tourist destinations. second, identification of opportunities in determining new markets. in this case, internal and external factors in the peripheral region determine the tourism development strategy. third, the existence of the local industry as a priority in the long term. regional and local policies are expected to be oriented towards the growth of the peripheral tourism sector. policy orientation refers to six principles of developing the peripheral tourism sector. first, tourism development strategies are oriented towards improving quality growth. the approach aims to develop potential locations and the quality of tourist area attractions. secondly, digital-based promotional activities are part of the development of tourism areas. third, cooperation in the form of public and private partnerships is a form of interaction between stakeholders. fourth, tourism development at the destination level must be actualized in regional and local policy planning. fifth, peripheral tourism areas that are developed must be able to stimulate business in supporting regional development. this is supported by regional and local policies in accelerating the formation of peripheral tourist areas. sixth, business activities with government and non-profit attractions can be integrated through system. this is written in the form of the realization of the attraction business planning policy (natural and cultural) which is supported by travel and accommodation business. peripheral tourism peripheral tourism can be defined as tourism in an area that is not a major destination. peripheral tourism can be in a less strategic area (chaperon & bramwell, 2013). the relationship between core and peripheral tourist destinations has been discussed in various previous studies. kurnianingsih et al. (2014) explain that as the relationship between rural and urban areas, exploitation can be carried out by the core region to the peripheral region. core tourism areas usually have a higher economic level, high innovation and are equipped with infrastructure and amenities. widodo and lupiyanto (2011) explain that the lack of attention to tourism development in the periphery of the region precisely in the bantul regency of yogyakarta had an impact on the waning of the region’s superior potential and environmental degradation. this phenomenon shows that development in the peripheral area are needed in improving people's welfare, optimizing its potential, preserving the environment, journal of asean studies 143 strengthening community participation in developing peripheral tourism destinations. peripheral tourism activities are believed to have an impact on the economy of bukit tinggi city. the activities also create multipliers effects on the hospitality industry with the increasing number of tourists around tourism objects (arianti, 2016). this phenomenon implies that indonesia's tourism development strategy is oriented to increase the socio-economic sustainability of peripheral tourism areas. this has implications for the reallocation of the government's financial budget in encouraging the acceleration of peripheral tourism development. the strategy for planning peripheral area development can be realized in four strategic steps, including; (a) establishment of tourist destination clusters based on evolving geographical, economic, social and cultural characteristics, (b) financial concentration of the central and regional governments on potential area development, (c) active promotion by involving the private and public, and (d) land use limitation regulations in the core region (potnov, 1999). community-based tourism community-based tourism is defined into three perspectives, among others; 1) form of tourism that provide space for the community to actively participate in planning, developing and controlling tourism development, 2) form of tourism that benefit the community both actively and passively involved in tourism businesses, 3) tourism strategies oriented to political empowerment and democratization, and 4) a form of tourism that makes the people of rural areas prosper. thus community-based tourism is an approach to tourism development that is oriented towards local communities (both those who are directly involved and not involved in the tourism industry). community-based tourism provides access in planning, building and developing tourism based on community empowerment and equitable distribution of benefits to the community. community-based tourism has the following basic principles: a) recognizing, supporting and developing community ownership in the tourism industry, b) including community members in the planning stage, c) developing community pride, d) developing community quality of life, e) guaranteeing environmental sustainability, f) maintaining the uniqueness of character and culture in the local area, g) developing learning of cultural exchange in the community, h) tolerance of cultural differences and human dignity, i) distributing benefits equitably to community members, j) playing a role in determining income distribution processes (suansri, 2003). these basic principles are the essence of implementing development in local communities. community-based tourism implements ten basic principles by establishing a balanced relationship between local communities and tourists in terms of community ownership status, fair distribution of benefits, mutual respect, 144 digitalization in the community-based and awareness in protecting the environment. community-based tourism is developed in the community by containing three dimensions, including 1) economic dimension, explained through three indicators, among others; funds available for community development, employment in the tourism sector, local people's income generated from the tourism sector; 2) social dimensions explained through four indicators, among others; the quality of life of the community, the emergence of pride in the community, the distribution of roles fairly in the community, the formation of cooperative relationships in the community; 3) cultural and environmental dimensions are explained through four indicators, among others; community initiation for mutual respect for different cultures, the creation of close ties of society with local culture, concern for environmental sustainability and the existence of community rights in managing natural resources. therefore, the local government, in this case, plays a role in assisting the community so that the objectives of community-based tourism can be carried out. community-based tourism is an approach oriented to community participation to achieve the goal of equitable distribution of benefits, poverty alleviation and efforts to preserve the culture and the environment. community-based tourism also has implications for strengthening local institutions, where the development of tourism businesses in rural areas is difficult to regulate by existing institutions. therefore, community-based tourism is an institutional approach involving community members. community-based tourism also has implications for the creation of strong relationships at regional and national levels. community-based tourism bridges local communities with national or international markets so that domestic and foreign tourists can enjoy peripheral tourism areas. digitizing peripheral region tourism digitalization of tourism has been built up in the downstream region or the main destination so that attention to peripheral tourist destinations has not been optimal. the digital transformation of the tourism sector has resulted in major changes in the world. foreign tourists who visit indonesia as much as fifty percent consist of millennial tourists with an average age of 15-23 years. the digital era has also changed tourist behavior to be more independent and individual. for example, chinese tourists who were initially been famous for group tourism are now more into individual tourism. this is the right moment for the development of indonesian tourism. human resources are the main key in building and developing digital tourism. therefore, the paradigm of local communities related to tourism digitalization is the main factor in efforts to understand and build solutions to the problems faced by peripheral regions. the paradigm of digital-based peripheral area tourism development is carried out amid the development of technology and communication. this is journal of asean studies 145 done as a form of reducing the level of disparity between the city and the peripheral region. the peripheral community also needs accurate information in determining the right solution in building the quality of the tourism area and the participation of the community. the results of arifin (2017) study of tourism digitalization explain that digital-based tourism can provide a positive image for regional tourism and human development. hence, a change in the paradigm of peripheral tourism development from traditionally based into digital-based needs to be done. the strategies that can be carried out in building a digital-based peripheral tourism development paradigm are as follows (badri, 2016). first, building the website of village areas with desa.id domains. second, migration of open source technology. third, developing peripheral tourism partners with various online tourism service providers. fourth, building regional interconnections that support the development of the potential of local tourist destinations. discussion a paradigm of digital-based peripheral tourism development gua cina is beach tourism in sumbermanjing wetan region that has developed from year to year, but in its development, there are still many tourism potentials that have not been optimally worked on. accommodation and transportation facilities are still an obstacle for several tourists who want to visit gua cina. this is certainly a challenge in tourism digitalization. digitalization is expected to bring positive changes to the improvement of the sumbermanjing wetan area. the community also understand the digitalization of tourism as an effort to alleviate poverty and improve the welfare of local communities. people put high hopes in developing digital-based tourism, where the region will grow and economic productivity increase. the tourism development of gua cina in malang regency is expected to be able to absorb large numbers of workers every year so that it will have an impact on the welfare of the sumbermanjing wetan community. the strategy for improving the quality of life of the sumbermanjing wetan community is through digitalization. digitalization can encourage infrastructure improvements in the telecommunications and internet, transportation and information sectors carried out by the regional government. the paradigm of the digital-based development of the gua cina beach can be identified as a form of positive public trust in economic and social improvements. tourism digitalization in the tourism industry's supply and demand perspective is a medium in integrating the behavior of tourism industry players and tourists. gua cina beach still has potential problems, which are identified by three factors. first is accessibility. public transportation facilities leading to coastal tourism objects are still very minimal. the road to gua cina beach is still very 146 digitalization in the community-based limited in lighting, thus hampering tourists' interest. second is amenities. promotion of tourism objects is still the biggest problem because there is no travel agent incorporated in the promotion of tourism objects. tourism activities, including the creation of souvenirs developed by local people, do not exist. this has implications for the lack of attractions that can be displayed to tourists. there are inadequate supporting facilities such as atms, lodging and health posts that are not yet available. telephone and internet networks are not yet available. the above phenomenon is obstacles in the realization of digitalization of the gua cina beach tourist destination. therefore, it is necessary to strengthen the communication and information technology infrastructure that is maximally integrated. information, communication, and technology available make it easier for tourism industry players to access data such as destination promotion, destination development, tourism industry growth, and tourism human resource needs. the central government has a role in supporting digital transformation so that the changes are in the right direction. regulations determined by the government will help businesses and the local governments in carrying out integrated digital transformation. the paradigm of the digital-based development of the gua cina tourism built by local communities is carried out in several stages. the first stage is to develop peripheral tourism information networks by creating integrated regional tourism websites on malang regency website. the second stage is to develop the attractiveness of tourist destinations including local cultural attractions, local crafts such as souvenirs and culinary snacks that are promoted online. the third stage is to improve online promotion, not only through instagram, twitter and websites but also various other digital platforms. the fourth stage is to establish cooperation and partnerships with online travel agents, governments, universities and community social institutions. development of peripheral tourism community based tourism community-based tourism is a form of approach in increasing community participation in regional tourism. the perspective of community participation in tourism is classified into two forms of local participation, first is community participation in the decisionmaking process. with the participation of local people, the benefits of tourism activities can be received by the local community. second is the involvement in the process of determining and distributing profits derived from local tourism development. the community is directed in the process of identifying needs, interests, and commitment to planning tourism to improve the welfare of the local community. thus, the community is given the full right to manage resources and allocate potential resources by regional characteristics. the journal of asean studies 147 local people can get benefits according to the use of resources. community-based tourism can be developed using three approaches. the first is spontaneous community participation (spontaneous participation). spontaneous participation is defined as community efforts to initiate ideas and implement the ideas together. thus, the planning and tactics implemented are from the community (bottom-up). this is proven in the stages of building community commitment, where the sumbermanjing wetan village community is aware of tourism opportunities that can be developed and are committed to developing them. spontaneous participation is also implemented in the decision-making process, where communities are involved as decision-makers in shaping the institutions and management of existing tourist attractions. the second is the establishment of tourism village institutions, involving village officials, district governments, the private sector, and local communities following their roles and functions in developing sumbermanjing wetan tourism potential. the institution is needed as an effort to optimize the tourism performance of sumbermanjing wetan. therefore, the involvement of community members in the institutional element is very necessary. it aims to regulate relations between residents, resources, and visitors. institutions can be strengthened by training and developing community skills with the essential soft skills (including management, communication, entrepreneurial experience, and organizational experience). the third is diversification of business products. local communities are encouraged to initiate in creating potential tourism business products such as making souvenirs, marine tourism education, homestays, and culinary businesses. the community is not only directed to manage the tourist attraction but also creates other business products that are interrelated with each other. thus, the variety of business products that are raised, can provide many choices for tourists to enjoy a tourist village product. the community involved can feel and experience the economic benefits of china cave tourism activities. conclusion digital-based tourism has indeed provided solutions for tourism development in the sumbermanjing wetan region. the community also understand digitalization of tourism as an effort to alleviate poverty and improve the welfare of local communities. the strategy for improving the quality of life of the sumbermanjing wetan community. digitalization provides positive trust in the peripheral community to get a better life. community-based tourism can be developed through three approaches. first, community-based tourism can be developed through mobilizing spontaneous participation of local communities. this is an effort to build community awareness and commitment 148 digitalization in the community-based to tourism opportunities that can be developed and encourage the community in making decisions in the process of establishing tourism village institutions. second, community-based tourism can be achieved by establishing tourism village institutions by involving sumbermanjing wetan community members as administrators. institutions function in regulating relations between residents, resources, and visitors. therefore, institutional strengthening is done by training and developing community skills with the necessary soft skills. lastly, community-based tourism can be developed through the creation of a diversification of the potential of tourism products. diverse business products can provide many choices for tourists to enjoy a tourist village product. thus, the people involved can feel and experience the economic benefits of gua cina tourism activities. about the author ayu dwidyah rini was born in jombang, east java. she had been studied master of economic education at state of malang university. prior to working at state of malang university, universitas ciputra, east java, and in 2017 until now she became a lecturer in economics at universitas trilogi. references arifin, s. (2017). digitalisasi pariwisata madura. jurnal komunikasi, 11(1), 53-60. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.21107/ilkom.v1 1i1.2835 arianti, d. (2016). pengaruh sektor pariwisata terhadap perekonomian dan keruangan kota bukittinggi (pendekatan analisis input output). jurnal wilayah dan lingkungan, 12(4), 347360. doi: https://doi.org/10.14710/pwk.v12i4. 13502 badri, m. (2016). pembangunan pedesaan berbasis teknologi informasi dan komunikasi (studi pada gerakan desa membangun). jurnal risalah, 27(1), 62-73. doi: 10.24014/jdr.v27i2.2514 badan pusat statistik. (2019). perkembangan pariwisata dan transportasi nasional desember 2018. berita resmi statistik. 12(2), 1 16. burak, s., dogan, e., & gazioglu, c. (2004). impact of urbanization and tourism on coastal environment. ocean & coastal management, 47(9-10), 515-527. chaperon, s., & bramwell, b. (2013). dependency and agency in periheral tourism development. annals of tourism research, retrieved august 17, 2019, from https://www.researchgate.net/publ ication/256987123 hakim, i. n. (2018). pergeseran budaya siber & visual di sektor pariwisata indonesia. in seminar nasional seni dan desain unesa. kurnianingsih, n. a., & rudiarto, i. (2014). http://dx.doi.org/10.21107/ilkom.v11i1.2835 http://dx.doi.org/10.21107/ilkom.v11i1.2835 https://doi.org/10.14710/pwk.v12i4.13502 https://doi.org/10.14710/pwk.v12i4.13502 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/256987123 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/256987123 journal of asean studies 149 analisis transformasi wilayah peri-urban pada aspek fisik dan sosial ekonomi (kecamatan kartasura). jurnal pembangunan wilayah & kota, 10(3), 265. khotimah, k., wilopo., & hakim, l. (2017). strategi pengembangan destinasi pariwisata budaya. jurnal administrasi bisnis, 41(1), 56-65. lew, a.a. (2011). “adjectival, specialty and niche tourisms”, retrieved august 17, 2019 from http://alew.hubpages.com/hub/adj ectival-tourism. okech roselyne., morteza haghiri., & babu p. george. (2012). rural tourism as a sustainable development alternative: an analysis with special reference to luanda kenya. cultur revista de cultura e turismo, 6(3), 36 -54. potnov, a., & pearlmutter, d. (1999). sustainable urban growth in peripheral areas. elsevier, 52(4), 239-308. primadany, r., mardiyono., & riyanto. (2013). analisis strategi pengembangan pariwisata daerah (studi kasus dinas kebudayaan dan pariwisata daerah kabupaten nganjuk). jurnal administrasi publik, 1(4), 135–143. probst, l., donnini, m., probst, a., frondini, f., marchesini, i., & guzzetti, f. (2013). the contribution of weathering of the main alpine rivers on the global carbon cycle. geophysical research abstracts, 15, 71-85. retrieved august 17, 2019, from https://www.researchgate.net/publ ication/258777106 seckelmann, a. (2002). domestic tourism—a chance for regional development in turkey?. tourism management, 23(1), 85-92. suansri, p. (2003). community based tourism handbook. bangkok: responsible ecological social tour-rest. supriadi, b. (2016). pengembangan ekowisata pantai sebagai diversifikasi mata pencaharian. jurnal pesona, 18(1), 1-20. utami, r. c., & hartono, d. (2016). analisis daya saing harga pariwisata indonesia: pendekatan elastisitas permintaan. jurnal kepariwisataan indonesia: jurnal penelitian dan pengembangan kepariwisataan indonesia, 11(1), 93118. widodo. b, dan r. lupyanto. (2011). pengembangan kawasan pinggiran kota dan permasalahan lingkungan di kampung seni nitiprayan bantul. jurnal sains dan teknologi lingkungan, 3(1), 31 51. http://alew.hubpages.com/hub/adjectival-tourism http://alew.hubpages.com/hub/adjectival-tourism https://www.researchgate.net/publication/258777106 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/258777106 book review “think globally, act locally:” the state transformation approach in governing borderless security threats book title: hameiri, shahar, & jones, lee (2015), governing borderless threats: non-traditional security and the politics of state transformation, cambridge: cambridge university press, isbn13: 9781107110885, x + 286 pages lidya christin sinaga indonesian institute of sciences, indonesia the nature of security issues has changed significantly in recent decades. they are no longer just about war, but have also extended into complex and transnational security issues or the socalled non-traditional security (nts). shahar hameiri and lee jones in their new book governing borderless threats argue therefore that the emergence of nts issues requires new modes of governance, instead of a simple extension of the logic of war suggested by the copenhagen school or new responses of post-national governance. the premise of this book is that the existing approaches on nts issues neglect how to manage threats in practice once they have been securitized. while the existing literatures on security studies neglect how and why the nts issues are governed, existing theories of global governance pay little attention to security issues. in addition, although the authors acknowledge the significant contribution of security governance as an adequate approach to fill the gap between those approaches, it lacks a theoretical framework on how and why governance regimes are constructed and operated. therefore, this book offers a new approach in the study of security governance, namely the state transformation approach. by arguing that ‚as security is becoming ‘non-traditional’, so too are states‛ (p. 4), this approach emphasizes that dealing with transboundary security threats is no longer by empowering supranational organizations or creating supranational authority, but by transforming or rescaling domestic state apparatuses and integrating them with international or regional regulations, and then networking them with their counterparts across national boundaries. in a nutshell, according to the authors, politics of state transformation is an inherent part of efforts to govern transnational problems, through which global governance emerges. at a glance, this book consists of two main parts. the first part covers theoretical discussion, both a review of existing approaches on security and governance and their introduction to the journal of asean studies, vol. 4, no. 2 (2016), pp. 183-186 doi: 10.21512/jas.v4i2.1557.g1743 ©2016 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic 184 book review: hameiri, shahar, & jones, lee (2015), governing borderless threats state transformation approach, which is the novelty of this book. then, the second part entails detailed case studies to further explain how the state transformation approach works. by using three in-depth case studies – which are the ‘haze’ problem in southeast asia, the avian influenza (h5n1) pandemic in southeast asia, and money laundering in southeast asia and southwest pacific – the authors describe how governing nts issues are contested and problematic since ‚the scale at which any issue is governed is not natural or pre-given‛ (p. 52). accordingly, as argued by the authors, the outcomes largely depend on two main factors, which are the politicaleconomic context and state-society relations. these factors cannot be separated from the fact that the state transformation approach gains new insights from critical political geography and marxist state theory. since state in the marxist theory is seen as a social power relation, political outcomes including governance outcomes are viewed as ‚the contingent products of struggles between contending forces‛ (p. 52). in this light, since state transformation involves social and political forces, such as parts of state, non-governmental organizations (ngos), and business, therefore the outcomes will be determined by the political economy context in the relations between these forces and also the historical development of specific statesociety relations. both factors are perfectly described by the three case studies. in the ‘haze’ problem, which was caused by land and forest fire in indonesia, the rescaling of domestic state apparatuses in indonesia has been resisted by a coalition of state officials, in the local and national level, and powerful business interests. as argued by hameiri and jones, both have ‘mutual benefit’ in patronage and political funding. this emerged particularly after the decentralization in the late 1990s that gave authority to local government to issue logging permits. the ‘mutual benefit’ enforces the business groups to resist governance transformation by preserving local governance to ‘save’ their business. therefore, while indonesia has transformed and rescaled its forest governance institutions and has coordinated with other asean countries, the process of state transformation does not work well here. in addition, in case of containing avian influenza in southeast asia, the authors prove that different local context between thailand and indonesia makes different result. while the rescaling of state apparatuses occurs in both countries, powerful forces linked with the poultry industry determine the transformation process. when the rescaling impacts on business groups’ profitability, the poultry conglomerates in thailand, which are very export-oriented, stand in the front to support the implementation of international regulations on biosecurity, and refuse international intervention. conversely, since the production is for domestic consumption, the poultry industries in indonesia, including the same poultry conglomerate that operates in thailand, resist the rescaling at the local level and deflect to ‘backyard’ poultry. however, indonesia accepts most international funding for this program. another example is shown by the case of tackling money laundering in vanuatu and myanmar. local power relations are evidently clear in both countries. although vanuatu and myanmar have adopted recommendations of financial action journal of asean studies 185 task force (fatf), which is the international standards of an anti-money laundering (aml) regime, the implementation is insofar as they are not blacklisted from global financial market. as a result, strong links between business interests (in this case is the offshore financial centers/ofc) and political elites in vanuatu obstruct the implementation. in myanmar, the compliance of aml regime is low and does not change the drug production and trafficking networks that have deep-rooted in state-building strategies. to put it simply, the three case studies above illustrate that local power relations, especially the political-economic factors shaping state-society relations, are powerful forces that cannot be overridden by multilateral agencies in managing nts threats. although state transformation and rescaling of government happen in all case studies, local power relations make various outcomes in one issue in different states. therefore, the authors suggest ‚aligning global regulatory efforts with local interests and power relations‛ (p. 223). the great strength of this book lies in its innovation to offer a new approach of governing border-spanning threats, and also its in-depth case studies that are gained from extensive field research. the latter result in the ability of the authors to capture the real situation on the ground, especially in the developing countries, which seems to be overwhelmed by ‚superficial ‘quick wins’‛ (p. 222), such as training and capacity-building workshops related to the nts issues. in fact, these are fruitless since the superficial activities do not comprehensively address the roots of the problems; instead make the problems as business as usual. consequently, the government and powerful business sectors can easily deflect the related governance regime away to the weaker actors, such in the ‘haze’ and avian influenza cases, and therefore leaving the problems unresolved. land clearing by using fire remains happening and likewise the avian influenza cases, both in indonesia. additionally, this is an interesting book because it applies non-western case studies in examining their approach. it seems to address critiques from nonwestern international relations scholars who argued that ‚scholars have often simply deployed concepts, theories, and experiences derived from the european experiences to project onto and explain asia.‛ furthermore, the way the authors criticize and challenge the structure of western donors and agencies, for example in the case of avian influenza when they argued that ‚western donors appear less concerned with the suffering of local people in these relatively impoverished societies than with containing nts threats … global governance as reflecting not truly ‘global’ but rather ‘northern’ priorities‛ (p. 219), makes a timely contribution to the literature on global governance. however, the arguments may rise in regards to the generalization of their findings. while the authors argue that focus on specific geographical areas is needed since generalization cannot help to understand variations in security governance and also for understanding how local power struggles over the rescaling of states influence the outcome of regional or global security governance, at first it is not really clear why the authors only focus all of their cases in asia region. their further argument that ‚asia thus provides an extremely unlikely venue for the process of state 186 book review: hameiri, shahar, & jones, lee (2015), governing borderless threats transformation and rescaling that we suggest are occuring‛ (p. 7) seems to be a clue, but provokes another question whether this approach can be applied in explaining, for instance, the securitization of ebola virus in africa. despite the importance and relevance of the topic, this book seems to cover too much theoretical explanations, especially the way hameiri and jones compare the limitation of realist, liberal, constructivist, neo-gramscian, and poststructuralist approaches to global governance. however, through the explanations, they essentially intend to map the background of the rise of state transformation approach. nonetheless, parts of this book, especially the case studies, make for a good read. it is not only for academics or students in the field of politics, international relations and international development, but also the policymakers. for those who often see asean as a weak and ineffective regional arrangement in advancing regional cooperation on nts issues due to its principle of sovereignty and non-interference, this book offers another way of looking at this problem. instead of blaming asean as the only cause, the state transformation approach can arguably complement the analysis, but not as the only explanation. in the end, this book reconfirms the significance of domestic political contestation in international relations studies since we have to ‚think globally but act locally.‛ about the author lidya christin sinaga is a researcher in the centre for political studies, indonesian institute of sciences (lipi). she obtained her master degree from the school of history and international relations of flinders university in 2016 with a thesis titled ‚indonesia’s china foreign policy under joko widodo: projecting the global maritime fulcrum.‛ her recent publication is ‚china’s assertive foreign policy in south china sea under xi jinping: its impact on united states and australian foreign policy,‛ published in the journal of asean studies, 3(2), december 2015. reference kang, d. c. (2003). getting asia wrong: the need for new analytical frameworks. international security, 27(4), 57-85. 1 military expenditure and economic growth journal of asean studies, vol. 1, no. 2 (2013), pp. 106–121 © 2013 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn2338-1353 electronic relationship between military expenditure and economic growth in asean: evidence from indonesia tangguh chairil, indonesia defense university, indonesia dedy s. sinaga, indonesia defense university, indonesia annisa i. febrianti, indonesia defense university, indonesia abstract world military expenditure in post-cold war world shows increasing trend especially in asean region; indonesia is no exception. the trend may have been supported by the argument that military expenditure has positive multiplier effects on economic growth. unfortunately, there have been not too many studies on the effect of military expenditure on economic growth in the indonesia context. this paper examines the topic by first reviewing literature on the relationship between military expenditure and economic growth, then by empirically testing the causal relationship between the two variables by using the augmented sollow growth model. the result shows that indonesia's military expenditure has positive effect on the country's economic growth, which is most possibly caused by development of human capital as effect of military expenditure. keywords: military expenditure, economic growth, indonesia, augmented sollow growth model introduction in the post-cold war world, the global strategic environment endured changes, in which the intensity of inter-state conflicts has been decreasing while internal conflicts have been more emphasized. along with the end of cold war, global military expenditure constantly decreased from us$1,613 billion in 1988 to us$1,052 billion in 1996. however, after 1998, global military expenditure had been increasing again. in 2012, sipri estimated world total military expenditure at us$1,733 billion, increasing 51 percent from us$1,146 billion in 2001. one of the regions that have been experiencing constant increase in military expenditure is the southeast asia. while global military expenditure fell by more than 40 percent in real terms between 1987 and 1997, the military budgets of the five original members of asean (indonesia, malaysia, the philippines, singapore, and thailand) increased by more than 75 percent in real terms over that period. according to andrew l. ross (1990), indonesia military expenditure is journal of asean studies 107 determined by two types of threats: internal and external threats. indonesia military expenditure was fluctuating between 1988 and 2010. before the 1997-98 economic crises, the share of military expenditure in the gross domestic product (gdp) had already decreased from 4.2 percent to 1.5 percent in the previous 15 years, despite annual gdp growth averaged to 5.5 percent. in 1998, indonesia military expenditure increased by 38 percent in local currency from rp4.78 trillion in 1997 to rp6.60 trillion in 1998. however, the drop of indonesia’s currency exchange caused the military expenditure to decrease in real terms, from us$2.50 billion in 1997 to us$2.10 billion in 1998. from 2001 to 2012, indonesia military expenditure increased by 366 percent from us$1.93 billion to us$7.05 billion. it decreased in 2005 and 2008, but overall it experienced an absolute rise. in 2010, the country with the biggest relative increase of military expenditure in asia is indonesia by 28 percent, followed by mongolia by 26 percent and philippines by 12 percent (sipri, 2010). this trend seems to be supported by the argument that military expenditure has positive multiplier effect on economic growth. benoit (1973, 1978) concludes that military expenditure has positive relationship with economic growth. eichenberg (1984), studies germany military expenditure and finds that it has the smallest trade-off compared to other public expenditures. the study shows a more specific factor, i.e. the positive relationship between the increase of military expenditure and the urge to increase tax revenue that can consequently be used to fund social spending. contrary to that argument, there are also studies that show negative relationship between military expenditure and economic growth, e.g. hong (1979), lim (1983), deger (1983), smith and dunne (1994), heo (2010), and dunne (2011). in line with this, anggoro (2003) states that the relationship between the military expenditure will still be a never ending debate among defense economists. so far, the increasing trend of indonesia military expenditure has been caused less by the argument about the relationship between military expenditure and economic growth, and more by the needs to fulfill the minimum essential force (mef). mef is “a force level that can guarantee the attainment of immediate strategic defense interests, with the procurement priority given to the improvement of minimum defense strength and/or the replacement of outdated main weapon systems/ equipment.” in 2010-2014, indonesia defense sector needs approximately rp279.8 trillion, which will be allocated to developing the mef (sukma, 2012). in political aspect, indonesia military expenditure is very changeable compared to other government expenditures. it is because most stakeholders do not think that military expenditure will give much effect on economic growth. in some theories, government expenditures have heterogeneous effect (pieroni, 2009). the effects can be either positive or negative to the economic growth. the empirical phenomenon of the constant rise of indonesia military expenditure, coupled with the various arguments about the relationship between military expenditure and economic growth, make the topic of the relationship in indonesia context very interesting. the previous studies that discuss this topic specifically are not widely available and only in very few number. therefore, this study aims to revisit the relationship between military expenditure and economic growth in indonesia, given new theoretical development and newly available empirical data. 108 military expenditure and economic growth graphic 1 indonesia military expenditure in constant 2011 usd, 1988-2012 source: sipri military expenditure database literature review the following literature review sees several theoretical and empirical studies that discuss the relationship between military expenditure and economic growth specifically and between the defense sector and the economy generally. the results find three propositions: 1. the relationship between military expenditure and economic growth is significant and negative; 2. the relationship between military expenditure and economic growth is not significant; 3. the relationship between military expenditure and economic growth is significant and positive. the explanation of each proposition is as follows. first preposition: negative relationship the first proposition argues that military expenditure has negative effects on economic growth. this relationship is related to the production possibility frontier model applied to the trade-off between the defense sector and the civilian sector, often termed as “guns versus butter”. in this model, the state must choose between two sectors to spend its limited resources (represented by the gdp): the guns (defense sector) or the butter (civilian production). there are various explanations to this proposition, which have been clustered as follow. productivity this explanation argues that the defense sector can decrease domestic productivity, caused by the trade-off between the productivity of the defense sector and of the civilian sector. hong (1979; cited in heo, 2010), shows empirical evidence of a u.s. productivity decline due to a resource shift journal of asean studies 109 from civilian to military use. this explanation is in line with ward and davis (1992) who find that the factor productivity of the civilian sector in the u.s. is higher than that of both the military and the nonmilitary public sectors. aizenman and glick’s study (2003) also tell that the impact of military expenditure on growth is found to be non-significant or negative. grobar and porter (1989) study several empirical literatures and uncover the negative effect of defense spending and economic growth, e.g. kaldor (1976), who samples 40 least developed countries (ldcs) for 1963-1973 and produces a correlation coefficient of -0.18 between military burden and the rate of growth. there was also lim (1983), who reexamines benoit’s analysis (that military expenditure affects growth through aggregate demand) for 54ldcsover 1965-1973 period within the context of harold-domar growth model of the form, and concludes that military spending is detrimental to growth in ldcs. nabe (1983) looks at the effects of military spending on growth in 26 african countries over the period of 1967-1976, and finds that military spending reduces manufacturing gdp through the indirect effects of military spending on social and economic development factors. faini, annez, and taylor (1984) test for the effects of military spending on economic performance in the context of 69 countries over 1950-1970 with pooled time-series/cross-sectional data and find the coefficients on defense burden to be consistently negative except for the group of developed countries. smith (1977, 1978, 1980) finds statistical evidence for oecd countries that military expenditure has a substantial negative effect on capital formation and consequently significantly reduces growth rates even when "spin-off" effects are allowed for. melman (1983) states that defense industries attract highly trained workers and engineers and thus have a draining effect on human resources for private industries. deger (1986) similarly argues that military expenditure diverts the limited resources away from the civilian economy. goldstein (1988) argues that a 1 percent increase in the defense share of gross national product (gnp) in the united states reduces economic growth by about 1.5 percent because of the opportunity costs, i.e. a trade-off in the budget and the bottleneck effect of defense spending on capital stock. cuaresma and reitschuler (2004) also argue that defense expenditure can be unproductive, although they provide insurance against wars. dunne and uye (2009) review several empirical literatures and find results showing negative or insignificant effects of military spending. blond (1980) finds that the average 10 percent rise in military budget of the united states can reduce employment by 0.6 to 2.4 percent. another explanation regarding productivity topic sees that the defense sector has destructive effect on the productivity of civilian sector. murdoch and sandler (2002), in alptekin (2009),look at countries experiencing civil war could not recover easily as their scarce physical and human capital has been destroyed, and as the intensity of civil war increases, the effect on growth is more negative. another explanation focuses on the relationship between monetary policy between the legislatures, armed forces, and the defense industry base that support it, referred as “military industrial complex” (mic). dunne and skons (2011) reveal that mics create inefficiencies in the economy and so can have negative economy effects, particularly as the nature of defense production changed during the cold war and became very different from civil production, which can also lead to other externality effects through influences on the civil sector and crowding out. 110 military expenditure and economic growth investment this explanation argues that the defense sector can hinder investment. lim (1983) obtains that there is a negative effect of military expenditure on growth through foreign capital inflow (fci) that may control investment and military expenditure together. faini et. al. (1984) also show that military expenditure can influence investment negatively, hence growth of output, through absorptive capacity. lindgren (1984) reviews a dozen studies and reports that increase in defense expenditures result in the decline of private investment. mintz and huang (1990, 1991) report that defense spending and private investment vie for the non-consumption portion of the total capital available in the economy, which means that more spending on defense programs is likely to result in the decline of private investment. heo and eger (2005) also find that defense spending has a dampening effect on private investment with one-year delay. more generally, this explanation also relates military expenditure with the peace dividend, i.e. the potential long-term benefit as budgets for defense spending are assumed to be at least partially redirected to social programs and/or a decrease in taxation rates. for example, gleditsch et. al. (1996) use large structural models that tend to show the existence of a ‘peace dividend’ as the benefit of reducing military spending and reallocating it. fiscal this explanation argues that the defense sector can worsen the fiscal condition of a country. smith and dunne (1994) state that military expenditure would be a very bad fiscal regulator because of the lags before it comes into effect: it takes too long to plan and implement to be an effective stabilizer. saving this explanation argues that the scale of domestic saving will decrease in line with the increase of tax to fund military expenditure. deger (1983) estimates the relationship between defense expenditure and economic development using national average data of 50 ldcs for the period of 1965-1973 and finds that military spending has a negative coefficient on saving. second preposition: insignificant relationship the second proposition argues that military expenditure bears no significant relationship with economic growth. this proposition is based on various empirical researches that find the regression analysis on both variables doesn’t produce a statistically significant coefficient of correlation. some of those researches include biswas and ram (1986) who reestimate benoit’s equations for 58 countries over the periods 1960-1970 and 1970-1977 and find that the coefficient on military burden for the low-income ldcs is statistically insignificant. biswas and ram (1986) for asserting that defense expenditures in general may affect economic growth positively or negatively, but the effect is unlikely to be consistently significant on the grounds that the nature and the amount of the spending vary over time. joerding (1986) even states that economic growth may be causally previous to defense expenditures. landau (1986), in grobar and porter (1989), finds that the estimated impact of the share of military expenditure in gdp on the gdp growth rate is rarely, and never significantly, positive. heo (2010) as well as payne and ross (1992), conduct vector auto-regression analysis to test if u.s. defense spending and economic growth have a causal relationship, and both studies find results that indicate no causal relationship between journal of asean studies 111 the two variables. heo (2000) conducts an empirical analysis employing various versions of the feder-ram–based defense– growth models to test the direct effects of defense spending on economic growth in the united states for 1948 through 1996 and finds a consistently insignificant relationship between both variables. gerace (2002) and becker (1991) to argue that defense spending per capita in the united states is simply not large enough to have a statistically meaningful effect on economic growth. third preposition: positive relationship the third proposition argues that military expenditure is directly proportional with economic growth. there are various explanations to this proposition, which have been clustered as follow. security this explanation argues that military expenditure is important to guard national security that is vital for supporting economic activities. baran and sweezy (1966), in dunne (2011), see military spending as important in preventing realization crises, through absorption of surplus without raising wages or capital; other government expenditure could not do this. in line with the statement, thompson (1974), in mylonidis (2006), argues that government activities, such as the provision of national defense, which maintain property rights, can indirectly support growth by increasing citizens’ incentive to accumulate capital and to produce. dunne (1990) also notes that that war would have a negative impact upon the economy, and to prevent a war outbreak, military expenditure to provide defense is required. sandler and hartley (1995) point that defense spending contributes to maintaining both internal and external security, which is critical for economic activities. hall and jones (1999) explains that military expenditure in the developed countries is needed to maintain the fragile structure of the government, which will not be without any economic cost. in the study by aizenman and glick (2006), as quoted in alptekin (2009), argue that the non-linear relationship between growth and military expenditure is associated with the degree of security and this is related to the level of threat. their model specifies that if there is a threat (resulting insecurity) above a threshold value, then a country benefits by increasing its military expenditure. aggregate demand benoit (1973, 1978), as quoted in alptekin (2009), is the proponent of the idea that military expenditure may positively affect growth through aggregate demand. it is related to the capacity utilization, and also that when an economy is in a phase of recession an increase in military expenditure will boost the economy. benoit's analysis (1978), quoted in deger and smith (1983), finds a significant, positive correlation between defense expenditure as a proportion of national income and the growth rate of civilian output between 1950 and 1965. other studies that follow benoit's methodological approach have also derived positive crosssectional effect of military expenditure on growth. chan (1995), in heo (2010), similarly explains that the positive employment effects of defense spending also boost aggregate demand in the united states economy, in which those who earn income through defense programs or department of defense (dod) contract awards consume their earnings, which enhances aggregate demand employment this explanation argues that military expenditure leads to employment. nincic and cusack (1979) as well as blank and rothschild (1985) report that defense 112 military expenditure and economic growth programs generate employment in the u.s. because of the large size of the u.s. armed forces. this is in line with former secretary of defense casper weinberger's argument (1983, p.68) that defense cutbacks of $1 billion would result in the loss of approximately 35,000 jobs in the u.s. alone. cuaresma and reitschuler (2004), in heo (2010), report that the externality effects of u.s. defense spending on economic growth are positive, with one of the reasons commonly cited for it being the positive association between the two variables is job creation. technology this explanation argues that military expenditure allocated to develop military technology will create spin-off to civilian technology. one of the literatures that argue likewise is adams and gold's research (1987) in which they contend that the defense industry has been a source of significant technological innovation in the u.s. and has promoted growth through a spin-off effect on the private sector. in line with this explanation, deger and sen (1995), in stroup and heckelman (2001), note that various studies have considered whether technology spin-offs arising from defense weapons production in countries with capital intensive military sectors might enhance growth. human capital this argument sees the relationship between a part of the military expenditure and the development of human capital. barro (1990), in heo (2010), notes that a portion of defense spending is used to support education, which enhances human capital. weede (1983), in grobar and porter (1989), argues that military spending encourages economic growth because "the military teaches discipline and creates a useful habit of obeying orders" and "the more capable and disciplined the work force is, the better the economic performance should be." weede estimates 95 ldcs using data from the period 19601977. economic stimulus this explanation argues that military expenditure can stimulate the economy. pivetti (1992) and cypher (1987) suggest that military spending is a conscious instrument of economic policy and has a stimulating effect on economy. mueller and atesoglu (1993), in their empirical analysis quoted in heo (2010), also find that defense spending stimulates the u.s. economy. the various explanations of the three propositions are summarized in the following table: journal of asean studies 113 table 1 explanations of the relationship between military expenditure and economic growth methodology the main purpose of this study is to test the causality relationship between military expenditure and economic growth. the relationship will be tested by using the augmented solow growth model, as suggested by dunne, smith, and willenbockel (2005). another model often used to test the relationship between military expenditure and economic growth in the literatures of defense economics is the feder-ram model. according to dumas (1986) and heo (2010), this model can distinguish the effects of government expenditures for the military sector and nonmilitary sector (heo, 2010). the federram model also includes the externality factors from government expenditure (heo, 2010). despite that, dunne, smith, and willenbockel (2005) criticize that there is a severe simultaneity problem between the dependent variable and the independent variables in this model (heo, 2010).they further argue that this model has multicollinearity between independent variables (heo, 2010). therefore, they recommend the use of augmented solow significant, negative relationship insignificant relationship significant, positive relationship defense sector can decrease domestic productivity regression analysis on both variables doesn’t produce a statistically significant coefficient of correlation military expenditure is important to guarantee national security, which is vital to support economic activities defense sector may hinder investment the nature and the amount of defense expenditures vary over time military expenditure can influence growth through aggregate demand related to the capital utilization defense sector can worsen fiscal conditions defense spending is not large enough to have a statistically meaningful effect on economic growth in recession, rise of military expenditure may encourage the economy the scale of domestic saving will decrease in line with the increase of tax to fund military expenditure military expenditure can lead to employment military expenditure to develop military technology will create spin off to civilian technology a portion of defense spending is related to the development of human capital 114 military expenditure and economic growth growth model commonly used in literatures about economic growth. to see the complete explanation about the specifications of the augmented solow growth model for defense economics study, read dunne, smith, and willenbockel (2005). the final model that is tested in this study is: ( ( ))= ( )+ ( )+ ( + + )+ ( )+ ( ) note: y : gross domestic product (gdp) at constant prices s : share of investment (formation of gross domestic fixed capital) in gdp m : share of military expenditure in gdp g, n, d : factors determining the steady-state of an economy, in which g represents technological progress, measured by the share of population working in the industry sector in the total of workforce; n represents share of employment in the total population; d represents share of depreciation in gdp. table 2 data source for variables used in this study variables data source y using data of gdp (constant local currency unit) in the database of world development indicators (wdi) accessed from databank.worldbank.org s taken from data of gross fixed capital formation (constant local currency unit)from the database of world development indicators (wdi) accessed from databank.worldbank.org m using data of military expenditure taken from sipri(stockholm international peace research institute)military expenditure database. g proxy by using share of population working in the industry sector in total workforce. the data of the share of employment in the industry sector is taken from the database of world development indicators (wdi) accessed from databank.worldbank.org n taken from data of total labor force and population from the database of world development indicators (wdi) accessed from databank.worldbank.org d taken from data of depreciation in gdp based on expenditures in the database of indonesian economic and financial statistics (seki)accessed from www.bi.go.id in social science, to conclude that there is a causal relationship between two variables, there are at least three requirements: association, nonspuriousness, and direction of influence (singleton and straits, 2010). association is fulfilled when there is strong association or correlation between military expenditure and economic growth. non-spuriousness requires this study to eliminate probability of association or relationship produced by other external factors. direction of influence requires the direction of the causal relationship to be clear: meaning, this study journal of asean studies 115 shall be capable to limit military expenditure as the cause of economic growth. if it appears that economic growth also in turn plays a causal role for military expenditure, the pattern of causal relationship between the two variables becomes unclear. results association can be evaluated by seeing the coefficient of correlation (r) betweenthe variable of military expenditure (ln(m)) and the variable of economic growth ((d(ln(y))). the coefficient of correlation between both variables is 0.3612 (see attached stataoutput). this shows that both variables have positive relationship, despite not too high. however, there is a probability that the correlation is significant in explaining the relationship between military expenditure and economic growth. spurious relationship is usually produced by non-stationary data that is not co-integrated in long term. therefore, to test whether the data used in this study have the probability to produce spurious regression, this study conducts the dickey– fuller test (df test) for unit root, to test the data stationarity. the result is that all independent variables are non-stationary in level 0, but are stationary in level 1. therefore, the regression model is further modified into: ( ( ))= ( ( ))+ ( ( ))+ ( ( + + ))+ ( ( ))+ ( ( ))) to test the pattern and direction of the relationship between the variables, this study conducts the granger causality test. the result is that the variable of economic growth has simultaneous causality with military expenditure, meaning that not only economic growth is affected by military expenditure, but military expenditure is also affected by economic growth. to find the parameter that can estimate the simultaneous relationship between the variables, this study conducts a regression using the three-stage least squares(3sls) model, which follows the following equations: ( ( ))= ( ( ))+ ( ( ))+ ( ( + + ))+ ( ( ))+ ( ( )) ( ( ))= ( ( ))+ ( ( ))+ ( ( )) this study suspects that other than the independent variables in the system, there is also a linkage between the disturbance factor from both equations in the system that also explains the relationship between military expenditure and economic growth. to summarize it, the disturbance factor in each equation is suspected to affect the military expenditure and economic growth. therefore, this study also conducts 3sls model regression using the seemingly unrelated regression (sur). prior to discussing the regression result, the descriptive statistics for each variable will be presented as follows. 116 military expenditure and economic growth journal of asean studies, vol. 1, no. 2 (2013), pp. 106–121 © 2013 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn2338-1353 electronic table 3 descriptive statistics of variables used in this study variable mean std. deviation median unit gross domestic product at constant prices (y) 1,460 420 1,440 trillion rupiah share of investment (formation of gross domestic fixed capital) in gdp (s) 22.73 2.48 22.47 percentage share of military expenditure in gdp (m) 1.06 0.16 1.06 percentage share of employment in the total population (n) 62.58 0.93 63.00 percentage share of population working in the industry sector in the total of workforce (g) 17.09 2.75 18.00 percentage share of depreciation in gdp (d) 4.90 1.76 5.00 percentage observations: 1988-2010 (23 units) in the above table, the median and mean of each variable is relatively the same, thus bias due to extreme lower or upper value needs not to be concerned. the share of investment in indonesia is relatively small, only 22.73 percent of gdp. it is rather low compared to the number of other countries in the region: china’s 35.76 percent, south korea’s 32.03 percent, thailand’s 30.55 percent, singapore’s 29.51 percent, malaysia’s 28.95 percent, and japan’s 25.87 percent (databank.worldbank.org). in an economy, investment encourages current gdp and develops productive capitals that the economy runs on: both physical infrastructures such as buildings, roads, and machines, and also soft infrastructures such as software and patents. the higher the share of investment, the higher the capacity of an economy to increase its productivity; thus increasing its economic growth. the portion of military expenditure in indonesia’s gdp is relatively small. indonesia’s 1.06 percent is lower than the average 2.61 percent of 164 countries, especially to other countries in the region: singapore’s 4.51 percent, south korea’s 3.05 percent, malaysia’s 2.31 percent, china’s 2.05 percent, thailand’s 1.90 percent, and the philippines’ 1.75 percent (sipri military expenditure database). only japan’s 0.94 percent figure is lower than indonesia’s since because of the article 9 of its constitution, which limits its defense spending to 1 percent of its gdp. with the small share of military expenditure in indonesia’s gdp, hence it is expected that the burden it may cause to the economy is also relatively small. the 62.58 percent share of employment in the total population shows that more people works than the dependents. however, the 17.09 percent share of population working in the industry sector is medium-to-small. in 2010, 19.30 percent of total indonesian employment was working in the industry sector, slightly above half of czech republic’s 38 percent as the country with highest percentage of employment in industry. among east asian countries, china's 28.70 percent was top of the table and 15th among 93 countries with available data of share of employment in the total population from databank.worldbank.org, followed by 20th-place malaysia's 27.60 percent, and 26th-place japan's 25.30 journal of asean studies 117 percent, while indonesia was ranked 61th out of 93. theoretically, the higher the number, the higher the technological progress of the economy. the 4.90 percent share of depreciation shows degree of capital need to be replaced. logically the higher the number, the higher the investment or technological advancement needed to produce economic growth. table 4 the results of the 3sls regressions 3sls 3sls, sur dependent variable: economic growth, d(ln(yt)) economic growth of previous year, d(ln(yt-1)) 0.1613. 0.1496 . capital investment, d(ln(st)) 0.3032*** 0.3147*** growth of steady state factors (labor), d(ln(gt+nt+dt)) 1.3155*** 1.2741*** growth of military expenditure, d(ln(mt)) 0.1786 ** 0.0652 ** previous growth of military expenditure, d(ln(mt-1)) 0.0020. 0.0188 . “r-square” 0.6933. 0.8461 . chi-square 89.85. 116.71 . prob (chi-sq) 0.0000. 0.0000 . dependent variable: growth of military expenditure, d(ln(mt)) economic growth, d(ln(yt)) .1996 . .7138 . previous growth of military expenditure, d(ln(mt-1)) .1647 . .1641 . growth of government expenditure, d(ln(govt)) -.0222 . -.0305 . “r-square” 0.0471 . 0.0617 . chi-square 89.85 . 1.73 . prob (chi-sq) 0.8763 . 0.6310 . *** significant at α= 1% ** significant at α= 5% * significant at α= 10% standard solow growth model conceive that main engines of growth, are investment and steady state factor in which labor or human capital investment is the dominant element. table 4 shows that the steady state factor has greater positive impacts (1.3155 or 1.2741) than investment (0.3032 or 0.3147). it can be interpreted that for indonesian economy, in order to boost growth, investment in human capital and other factors affecting the steady state level postulated by solow is needed more than additional physical capital or gross fixed capital formation. therefore, it is expected that allocation of resources to this factor will result in a higher economic growth than the one allocated to physical capital. from the regression results, it can be seen that military expenditure has positive effects on economic growth in indonesia. the positive relationship between military expenditure and economic growth is most 118 military expenditure and economic growth probably caused by the development of human capital as a portion of defense spending. in military expenditure, personnel expenditure can contribute in developing the human capital through means of training and community involvement conducted by military personnel in the forms of military operations other than war (mootw).the share of personnel expenditure is the highest compared to other types of spending in military expenditure: capital and goods expenditures. personnel expenditure makes up to 48 percent of the total military expenditure in 2011, while capital spending only makes up to 31 percent and goods spending up to 21 percent. graphic 2 indonesia military expenditure by types source: appendix 1 of the presidential decree no. 26 year 2010 a look at gyimah-brempong (1989)’s study can help to elaborate more discussion on the results. using cross-national data for 39 sub-saharan african countries during the 1973 to 1983 period, gyimah-brempong also arrives at a relatively similar conclusion to his study regarding labor factor. he uses a four-equation simultaneous model and 3sls estimation procedure to investigate the relationship between defense spending and economic growth in sub-saharan africa, and withdraws the following conclusions from his econometric analysis: 1. the total effects of defense spending on economic growth are negative and statistically significant, 2. defense spending affects economic growth through increased supply of skilled labor and decreased investment, 3. defense spending does not have significant effect on economic growth while it has positive effects on labor’s skill formation. having found that african countries' defense spending contributes to the development of human capital in the form of skilled labors, gyimah-brempong (1989, p.88) then suggests that defense policy shall focus on labor-intensive armed forces. this will result in increasing stock of skilled personnel while attending to the defense needs of the country. “emphasis on weapons acquisition at the expense of skill formation is also likely to slow economic growth in foreign exchange scarce economies” (p.88). conclusion military expenditure is a public spending by governments that has influence beyond the resources it takes up, and consequently beyond the defense sector itself; indonesia is no exception. whether the influence is positive, negative, or insignificant does not in indonesia's case, since indonesia must inevitably increase its military expenditure gradually to meet its mef requirements. as the director-general of defense potential (pothan) of the personn el expendit ure 48%material expendit ure 21% capital expendit ure 31% journal of asean studies 119 indonesian ministry of defense, dr. ir. pos m. hutabarat, explained, the mef would be fulfilled approximately in 2024 with a nominal approximately rp300 trillion. he added that the ideal budget to fulfill defense requirements, especially in developed countries, was around 2 to 3 percent of the gdp, while indonesia military expenditure had merely been under 1 percent. to null this gap, indonesia military expenditure has been increased gradually each year, notwithstanding the effect it may cast upon economic growth. however, it is best for indonesia’s interests to know the nature of the relationship between its military expenditure and economic growth, so that the future policy regarding defense spending can be based upon this understanding. this study concludes that the relationship between military expenditure and economic growth in indonesia is positive. this is because most of indonesia military expenditure is used for personnel expenditure, which consequently increases the human capital and eventually affects the economy positively. the findings tell us that indonesia needs not to worry about the damaging trade-off between defense and other government spending on civilian goods, because the former also reinforces the latter, in the form of the development of human capital as a portion of military expenditure. this may be the case in indonesia, where the national armed forces (tni) holds the doctrine of “manunggal tni dengan rakyat” (unified armed forces with the people) and conducts many community development activities, one of which is humanitarian assistance disaster relief operations. the task is the implementation of law no. 34 of 2004 on the indonesian armed forces, article 7, paragraph 2, item 12. other sectors in which military expenditure may have influence show no other significant effect from indonesia military expenditure. in developed countries, military spending tends to have an impact on growth through its effects on technology. the findings tell us that indonesia defense industry still cannot contribute to the advancement of technology in indonesia. this is where indonesia military expenditure should be highlighted. by the enactment of law no. 16 of 2012 on defense industry, indonesia needs to put more emphasis on the military technologies that can also affect growth positively. another interesting find in this study is that the augmented solow growth model recommended by dunne, smith, and willenbockel (2005) still has simultaneity problems for the indonesia study case, requiring the model to be further modified in order to obtain more robust results. about authors tangguh chairil earned his bachelor's degree in international relations from universitas indonesia in 2011 and master's degree in defense economics at the indonesia defense university in 2013. his thesis is titled "determining factors of proportion of military expenditure as percent of gross domestic product of countries: cross-country statistical analysis". currently, he is acting as special assistant to the director of maritime security studies program at the indonesia defense university. he can be contacted at tangguhchairil@hotmail.com. dedy s. sinaga received his bachelor's degree in economics from universitas indonesia in 2009. he then received scholarship from the ministry of defense of republic of indonesia in 2011, to pursue postgraduate study in defense economics at the indonesia defense university. his thesis is titled "the impacts of defense spending increase on economic growth, inflation, and employment in indonesia: simulations using computable general 120 military expenditure and economic growth equilibrium". currently, he is working at the indonesian central bank. annisa i. febrianti received her bachelor's degree in international relations in 2011 from universitas paramadina. she earned the best international relations graduate student in the 5th judicium of universitas paramadina. she received scholarship to continue postgraduate study at the indonesia defense university. she earned her master's degree in defense economics in 2013. she focused her study in the defense industry. her thesis is titled "the impact of defense offset towards the indonesian defense industry: case study of pt. pindad". she has also conducted research about united nation peacekeeping operation 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(1992). sizing up the peace dividend: economic growth and military spending in the united states, 1948-1996. american political science review 86. retrieved february 4, 2014, from http://prq.sagepub.com/content/63/4/760.ref s asean socio-cultural community (ascc) in conflict prevention: the role of civil society organizations (csos) jerry indrawan paramadina university, indonesia abstract in the end of 2015, the asean community is fully implemented in southeast asia. the community is expected to bring asean countries to the next stage of cooperation in order to bring prosperity to the region. however, several obstacles still have to be faced by asean. territorial disputes between indonesia and malaysia, disputes concerning preah vihear temple between thailand and cambodia, disputes over sabah between malaysia and the philippines, etc. are some of the problems. even another problem, which is the dispute related to the south china sea, involves five asean members. although it is clear that asean member countries agreed to settle their problems according to asean mechanism as the most respective organization in the region, on several occasions they preferred to solve it bilaterally or by bringing it to the hague. the assumption of noninterference principle as the organization’s dispute settlement mechanism does not apply accordingly. as such, we have to find other ways. peace can only be achieved through closer relations between asean countries. closer relations create better understanding between people within those countries. if ‘high level’ (g to g) conflict resolution does not work, we have to turn to the people. closer relations among people will be a ‘grass root’ power to force the governments to end their dispute. this paper examines how asean socio-cultural community (ascc), alongside civil society organizations (cso), work in creating closer relations among asean countries, in order to solve disputes in the region. key words: asean community, asean socio-cultural community, dispute, civil society organizations (csos) introduction asean is an organization and also a community comprised of different races, languages, and religions, which are connected with historical closeness and bond. cities in asean give a little clue about its harsh past. skyscrapers now stand on the sites that were once destroyed by war and prolonged conflict, spread over an area of 4.48 million km² with a population of more than 540 million inhabitants, consisting of indigenous people, immigrants, etc. as a region, asean offers a rich diversity of talents, traditions, resources, and opportunities (kotler, 2007, p. 5). although formally asean is an organization of economic, social, and cultural cooperation, the background and aspiration of the early bangkok journal of asean studies, vol. 4, no. 2 (2016), pp. 142-155 doi: 10.21512/jas.v4i2.1787.g1746 ©2016 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic journal of asean studies 143 declaration was a part of political commitment of member countries to unite and work together for southeast asia, at the time was marked by upheavals and disputes between countries, especially between indonesia and malaysia, as well as between non-state forces outside the region. political aspirations underlying the bangkok declaration was essentially an effort to realize the regional stability that can support national development in all fields for asean member countries. the founders realized that among asean countries there were differences in historical background and political attitudes as well as the fact that, in most countries, there were competitions as commodity producers. therefore, sometimes asean members can be very pragmatic. although they are competing, asean growth is actually running in slow fashion. asean needs mutual understanding and to eliminate mutual suspicion among members to establish cooperation, which are of course to be developed to a better direction. we need to realize that asean is a regional organization and a single association based on common interest. equality in membership is one of the principles in this cooperation. this regional cooperation was not designed to be integrative, but instead cooperative. asean member countries are still fully sovereign to the inside or outside. the main foundation of this cooperation is the consensus to help each other for the sake of common interest. positive peace and the role of civil society conflicts have been seen as a form of conflicts of interests between states. whether it is realized or not, conflicts are undeniable. national interest is an implementation of policy taken by a state as the consequence of its geography, the terrain from the geography itself, its natural resources, and the character of its people. those three form a perception of threats and goals of the state, implied in the patterns of policymaking in the political system of the society. this situation is known as anarchy, as mainstream scholars debate on it. the debate on anarchy in international system increased as scholars try to solve how to eliminate it. some reject the elimination of anarchy as it is assumed as a given situation, while others believe that the anarchic situation can be avoided through cooperation that creates peace (lentner, 1974, p. 295). classical theory on peace proposed by galtung proposes the ‘positive and negative peace’ concepts. nowadays, peace condition is still dominated by negative peace, i.e. the absence of violence. galtung explains that peace is a condition without violence that is not only direct or personal, but also indirect or structural. galtung stresses that a peace condition is a condition without violence and unjust in the society (castro and gallace, 2010, p. 19). meanwhile, on positive peace, galtung mentions the obligatory good relations and justice on all aspects of life, including social, economy, politics, and ecology. by then, the structural violence such as poverty and hunger; the socioculture violence such as racism, sexism, religion intolerance; or ecological violence such as pollution and over consumption can be avoided. according to galtung, positive peace condition should be achieved after negative peace exists, with no physical (macroor micro-) violence, such as war, torture, as well as violence to children and women (castro and gallace, 144 asean socio-cultural community (ascc) in conflict prevention 2010, p. 21). however, as indirect violence does not exist, structural violence often still exists and gives violence a way to the surface and harm peace (webel and galtung, 2007, p. 6). men live in groups as a unity and form unique identities between them. these identities sometimes create problems between men in the context of interaction in order to achieve their interest. this situation exists as culture follows to the existence of the power (avruch, 1998, p. 310). huntington points out that values in society, such as races, ethnicity, culture identity, and other social grouping, matter (avruch, 1998, p. 305). some often assume conflicts as a negative form of a situation, while on the other side others believe conflict as a positive process to a better change; as for that the presence of conflict should be acknowledged as useful for society. therefore, uri savir mentions that peace can only be achieved through cooperation and good attitudes between societies of the conflicting states. savir sees the relations among men are influenced by their culture, social institutions, and political processes. the main power to create peace is not on the central government, but on the local government and mainly through the involvement of the civil society in the process of peacemaking itself. savir believes that youth involvement as one of the factors of peacemaking plays an important role by placing co-existence as a common value in the society (savir, 2008, p. 76). asean three pillars in the 1980’s, asean has already developed into a significant and integral part of southeast asia. it happened because asean’s role in regional problems was significant and in a large scale. in fact, countries around the world recognized asean as the key to understand the problems of southeast asia. therefore, asean leaders in the december 1997 asean summit in kuala lumpur decided to transform asean into a stable, prosperous, and highly competitive region without uneven levels of economic development, socio-economic inequalities, and poverty. in 2003, asean planned to create three asean communities (economic, security, and socio-cultural), to some extent echoing the structure of the european union (eu) and the three european communities (european coal and steel community [ecsc], european economic community [eec], and european atomic energy community [euratom]), which became the ‘european community’ in 1992. the eu was also created by the maastricht treaty in the same year. it encompassed the community (first pillar) and added different forms of cooperation policy, including the common foreign and security policy (cfsp, second pillar) and cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs (jha, third pillar). these policies are intergovernmental in nature and though they have institutions in common with the european community, equally they possess their own institutions and procedures (henry, 2007, p. 869). at the october 2013 asean summit in bali, asean leaders declared bali concord ii to jointly establish the asean community by the year 2020. the community would include three pillars, which were political and security community, economic community, as well as socio-cultural community, that intersect and encourage each other in order to support the creation of peace, journal of asean studies 145 stability, and shared prosperity in the region (directorate general of asean cooperation, ministry of foreign affairs, republic of indonesia, 2010c, p. 9). at the january 2007 12th asean summit in cebu, philippines, asean leaders reiterated a strong commitment to accelerate the establishment of an asean community by the year 2015, with the signing of the cebu declaration on the acceleration of the establishment of an asean community by the year 2015. in particular, the leaders also agreed to accelerate the establishment of the asean economic community (aec) in 2015 and to transform asean into a region where there would be a free flow of goods, services, investment, and skilled labor, as well as freer flow of capital (directorate general of asean cooperation, ministry of foreign affairs, republic of indonesia, 2010b, p. 7-8). at the november 2007 13th asean summit in singapore, asean leaders agreed to sign the asean charter, which marked the commitment of the heads of states of asean to build a shared community based on regional cooperation and integration. in line with this, the blueprint of asean political-security community (apsc) was adopted as a roadmap for the formation of apsc 2015 (directorate general of asean cooperation, ministry of foreign affairs, republic of indonesia, 2010a: 5). in addition, they also agreed on the formation of a blueprint of asean sociocultural community (ascc) to ensure the concrete follow-up in promoting the establishment of an asean socio-cultural community (directorate general of asean cooperation, ministry of foreign affairs, republic of indonesia, 2010c, p. 9). asean community with its pillars would play an important role in the future of complex international relations. the apsc was designed to be able of norms sharing, conflict prevention and resolution, as well as peace development through positive political increase. the apsc would be used to fight terrorism and transnational crime such as drugs and human trafficking (directorate general of asean cooperation, ministry of foreign affairs, republic of indonesia, 2010a, p. 18-19). the aec would bring capital, goods, services, and human resources to a single market and production base. these kinds of integration needed acceleration of free trade and businesses facilitation to develop small and medium enterprises (sme) and to gain investors into asean (directorate general of asean cooperation, ministry of foreign affairs, republic of indonesia, 2010b, p. 9 & 2122). meanwhile, the ascc was designed to represent the social and cultural interests of asean people, as this region was moving into economic integration and globalization. the resources will be located to the education and training sector, the development of science and technology, the creation of jobs, and social protection (directorate general of asean cooperation, ministry of foreign affairs, republic of indonesia, 2010c, p. 13-14). in the latter section, we will discuss more about the ascc, especially in terms of conflict prevention. the asean socio-cultural community (ascc) and conflict prevention there is nothing comparable for asean; the submission of disputes to a third party and, a fortiori, to a tribunal would no longer be considered as an attack on, or an act inimical to, national sovereignty. in fact, for a long time, dispute resolution was understood as the 146 asean socio-cultural community (ascc) in conflict prevention re-establishment of social harmony, where there was neither winner nor loser, but rather the resolution of litigation settled on the basis of law. the opposite of the community legal order, the asean legal order is subject to fluctuations of interpretations of a political character carried out principally by the member states, which leads to unique and very individualized solutions (davidson, 2004, p. 167). moreover, asean law is not always binding and for the moment deals very little with the rights of individuals. the asean system has two institutionalized methods of dispute resolution, which are very different in their nature and their function. the first is an effort to resolve ‘within the family’ differences that can be qualified as ‘political,’ or at least considered as such by the states and which can degenerate into armed conflict. it is a voluntary, intergovernmental system, provided by the treaty of amity and cooperation in southeast asia (tac). in effect, if parties, who have a dispute or situation capable of affecting regional peace or harmony, so wish, they can submit it to the high council, composed of one representative of ministerial rank from each member state (henry, 2007, p. 864). that is why disputes and conflicts among asean countries are difficult to overcome. it needs different methods to solve and prevent conflicts from ever occurring. i would like to offer a mechanism to deal with the situation by the role of ascc and civil society organizations (csos). the ascc actually reflects asean's social agenda that is focused on poverty eradication and human development. it is linked inextricably with the economic and security pillars of the asean community. social inequities can threaten economic development and in turn undermine political regimes. economic instability can exacerbate poverty, unemployment, hunger, illness, and disease. social instability can emerge from environmental scarcity or the inequitable distribution of environmental assets among stakeholders. failure to address these critical and persistent social issues can further cause both economic and political dislocations. the ascc will evolve amidst profound changes that are taking place in asean's social landscape. these include (1) the rise of consumerism and lifestyle changes resulting from rapid economic growth; (2) increased personal mobility resulting from advances in infrastructure and more open regimes; (3) transformation of the family roles and structures, with implications on the care of children and the elderly; (4) the potential of information technology to enhance the speed and quality of learning and development of human skills, thus narrowing the digital divide; (5) the rapid pace of urbanization and its impact on employment and the delivery of basic services; (6) shifts in the labor market resulting from economic integration; and (7) unsustainable exploitation of natural resources in the process of meeting developmental needs (asean, 2012). embedded in asean vision 2020, declaration of asean concord i (1976), declaration of asean concord ii (2003), and the hanoi plan of action (hpa) is asean's goal of a community of cohesive, equitable, and harmonious societies, bound together in solidarity for deeper understanding and cooperation. asean must evolve into a ‘community of caring societies,’ and respond to the issues of poverty eradication, equity, human journal of asean studies 147 development, and conflict prevention (kraft, 2012, p. 14). there are five key features in the ascc. first, equitable access to opportunities will be universal, rising above the barriers of religion, race, language, gender, and social and cultural background. second, human potentials are nurtured to the fullest, so that all individuals can participate meaningfully in a competitive world in a manner that gives paramount importance to their welfare and dignity. third, norms of social and distributive justice are upheld by addressing issues of poverty and equity, and special care is given to vulnerable groups, children, youth, women, the elderly, and persons with disabilities, who could be the subject of abuse, neglect and discrimination. fourth, the environment and natural resources are protected to sustain development, and as a legacy for future generations. fifth, the most important of all, related to civil society organizations. the ascc will encourage civil society organizations to engage in providing inputs for policy choices (asean, 2012). in my perspective, i feel that the ascc provide the means to involve csos in conflict prevention efforts. the steps undertaken by asean states (government) must include csos as an integral part of the conflict prevention or resolution efforts. the ascc also inserts features such as community interaction in their action plan. asean citizens interact in a community conscious of its ties of history, aware of its cultural heritage and bound by a common regional identity. this kind of interaction between asean citizens is the best way to solve or prevent conflict from occurring. one of the main problems in asean is trust. the non-interference principle shows that asean states do not trust each other. for instance, the burmese government will never allow asean to conduct deeper investigation regarding to the rohingya people in rakhine. the accusation of gross human rights violation has never been solved. that is why, with different race, religion, background etc., asean people do not interact well among each other. there is no regional identity. asean itself is not an identity, but it is an organization. what we need is one common identity to bind us as fellow asean citizens and as a community. we need to create an asean single identity. in doing so, we can resolve whatever problems that might come because we already feel as one family. an asean single identity will create a perfect atmosphere for positive peace to happen. under the ascc action plan, the goal of creating an asean single identity involves mainstreaming the promotion of asean awareness, regional identity, and values in national communications plans, educational curricula, people-to-people contact mainly through culture, arts, and sports, especially among the youth, and the promotion of asean languages learning through scholarships and exchanges of linguists. with asean awareness, arising conflict will be minimized and asean states can achieve regional peace and security within their own region. people interactions are also seen here as they conduct contact through culture, arts, and sports. with the high level of interactions among asean people, better understanding between them will happen. related to people interactions, social cohesion is a good way in building asean single identity. the ascc was formed to create a desire to 148 asean socio-cultural community (ascc) in conflict prevention live together, a ‘we-ness’ feeling. thus, one of the main objectives of the ascc is to maintain regional cultural heritage and forming asean single identity. with asean single identity, the ‘we-ness’ feeling will help disputing asean countries to end their conflict. asean is one. csos will play an important part in making an asean single identity (henry, 2007, p. 874). the presence of civil society is an early sign of positive peace to occur in a post-conflict area. it is very interesting to discuss about social and cultural aspects, especially if the aim is youth. the ascc could facilitate asean youth to take more active role in conflict prevention and resolution. they can create activities, events, discussions, and campaigns on conflict issues. such method, starting from grassroots, is an effective way to be conducted as a problem solving mechanism if the governments cannot do anything significant to prevent or stop the conflict. therefore, the ascc must establish a forum to muster asean youth to discuss conflict issues. in addition, volunteering programs, such as the asean young professionals volunteer corps program that was held to enhance the role and contribution of youth in asean in the field of socio-cultural and economic development of the region, can be used also in terms of conflict prevention and resolution (asean centre for biodiversity, 2013). asean youth will benefit much from this program, especially in giving more knowledge about conflict prevention and resolution issues. in the future, the asean single identity cannot merely talk about cultural identity. in the context of the eu, the european identity is defined not only based on cultural aspect, but also has a political concept (meyer, 2008, p. 103). why? this is because if the eu identity is only culturally defined, then it means only christian or catholic identity will indicate the whole eu. during its development, the eu has expanded (as has asean) to consider the inclusion of muslim countries, such as bosnia and herzegovina, and turkey as a potential candidate for joining the eu (european commission, 2015). asean expansion brings multidiversity. asean does not only belong to one culture or belief. that is why asean youth should practice tolerance among asean people and countries. toleration is a key word to prevent conflicts from ever occurring. asean culture must be the culture of tolerance, disseminated all across the region. in doing so, regional peace and security in asean will be created. the identity as asean citizens should be based on solidity of each asean countries’ tolerance culture, and it eventually will sustain asean single identity. democratic culture should be put as fundamental factors for the implementation of the asean charter and its three pillars. all asean member states must comply with this term. noncompliance will result in economic sanctions for member states that still practice intolerance and authoritarianism. eventually, asean diversity will lead to ‘one asean,’ comprised of one vision, one identity, and one community, and covered by principles of peace and secure regionalism. in other words, a positive peace. journal of asean studies 149 the role of asean civil society organizations the youth and asean tolerance culture are related to the power of asean people. in realizing them, the role of csos is important. csos are organizations outside family, non-governmental and non-market, that organize themselves for specific purposes. a cso can be classified based on the type of membership, background establishment, as well as service-oriented or voluntarism character (directorate of bilateral foreign funding, ministry of national development planning/bappenas, republic of indonesia, 2011, p. 7). further, the oecd defines csos as a multitude of associations around which society voluntarily organizes itself and which represent a wide range of interests and ties. these can include community-based organizations, indigenous people organizations, and non-government organizations (oecd, 2007). in the field of development, there is a tendency to associate non-state organizations with non-governmental organizations (ngo). however, csos also include farmer associations, professional associations, organizations community, environmental groups, independent research institutes, universities, religious organizations, trade unions, and non-profit media (directorate of bilateral foreign funding, ministry of national development planning/bappenas, republic of indonesia, 2011, p. 8). csos have become important actors for delivery of social services and implementation of other development programs, as a complement to government action, especially in regions where the government’s presence is weak, such as in post-conflict situations. perhaps the most valid example and visible case of csos’ involvement in a postdisaster/conflict situation occurred in asia during the post-tsunami reconstruction after 2004, including the peacebuilding efforts after years of conflict between the indonesian government and the aceh separatists. csos’ influence in shaping global public policy has also emerged over the past two decades. this dynamism is exemplified by successful advocacy campaigns around such issues as banning of land mines, debt cancellation, and environmental protection which have mobilized thousands of supporters around the globe. a recent manifestation of the vibrancy of global civil society has been the world social forum (wsf), which has been held annually since 2001 on different continents, and which has brought together tens of thousands cso activists to discuss global development issues. another example of the vibrancy and importance of civil society is the global call to action against poverty (gcap), an international civil society campaign advocating for debt relief and greater aid to poor countries. in 2008, the gcap was estimated to have mobilized more than 116 million citizens to participate in the stand up against poverty events held in cities throughout the world (world bank, 2013). the civil society sector is not only emerging as a clear societal actor in many parts of the world; it is also quite varied in its nature and composition. for this reason, definitions of civil society vary considerably based on differing conceptual paradigms, historic origins, and country contexts. the world bank has adopted a definition of civil society developed by a number of leading 150 asean socio-cultural community (ascc) in conflict prevention research centers: ‚the term civil society to refer to the wide array of nongovernmental and non-for-profit organizations that being present in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations. civil society organizations therefore refer to a wide of array of organizations: community groups, non-governmental organizations (ngos), labor unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, and foundations‛ (world bank, 2013). csos work in various fields and always become productive counterparts for their government in their own countries. one of the global development issues is related to conflict prevention or resolution. csos in asean must cope with this challenge. in terms of conflict prevention, csos work in many ways to promote peace between asean countries. hopefully, regional peace and security can be reached with the help of asean csos. the role of asean civil society’s interaction in the making of asean community that is ‘people-oriented’ and ‘people-centered’ is important. the interactions among asean csos are among the possible ways to prevent conflict between countries. as asean charter states ‚we, the people‛ on its first line to mention the people of southeast asian nations, the leaders of asean countries should start to work together hand in hand with the civil society within their organization. the initiative of working together does not only come from the government of asean countries, but also from the csos that proactively approach the government to give input, especially about conflict prevention. csos in all asean countries can urge their own governments to put forward diplomatic measures to solve conflicts with fellow asean countries. the power of csos lies on their neutrality and their comprehensive studies regarding certain issue. csos, through their public relations, can also play a role as a hub to give information to the people regarding the progress of cooperation agenda among asean countries. one of their active roles is to participate in conflict prevention or resolution efforts, which usually belong to the government domain. asean people’s forum (apf) is a yearly agenda that involves csos of all asean countries in many sectors, such as education, women and children empowerment, human rights, climate change etc. to discuss on those issues. the results of the discussion are a brief agenda on the asean leaders summit with csos. the apf can work through this mechanism to ensure conflict prevention steps are to be taken by disputing governments (ministry of foreign affairs, republic of indonesia, 2013). as asean heads towards developing its post-2015 vision of a people-centered and peaceful asean, key members of csos see the crucial task for the regional bloc to strengthen their role in addressing the issues of regional peace and human security that continue to challenge the entire regional community. it is interesting to look at the opinion of gus miclat, the regional initiator of global partnership for the prevention of armed conflict-southeast asia (gppac-sea) and executive director of the regional nongovernment advocacy and solidarity organization initiatives for international journal of asean studies 151 dialogue (iid), in a press conference held last april during the 2015 asean civil society conference/asean people’s forum (acsc/apf) in kuala lumpur (burma partnership, 2015). in miclat’s opinion, with the continuing armed conflicts and disputes within countries like myanmar, the philippines, and in south thailand, asean should go beyond its rhetoric of conflict management and prevention by creating concrete mechanisms to proactively prevent and resolve existing conflicts in the region. in demonstrating asean’s commitment to a comprehensive security as stated in the asean political-security blueprint, asean member governments must strengthen its preventive diplomacy to address comprehensive human security issues and the social impacts of recurring conflicts by establishing partnerships especially with civil society movements (burma partnership, 2015). preventive clause in the existing asean dispute and settlement mechanism must be included in the asean charter to serve as a catalyst for dialogue, good governance, and peacebuilding. towards this goal, the asean institute for peace and reconciliation (aipr) that was created in 2011 should create consultative and partnership mechanisms with the csos to facilitate more active and inclusive citizen participation especially of communities directly affected by conflicts. the aipr can be an effective tool to urge the governments of asean countries to put dialogue and peaceful solutions to conflict situations. as asean tackles peace and security issues in this year’s summit, csos should appeal to the collective wisdom of the asean leaders to make this event a landmark of new hopes, genuine peace, and inclusive regional progress by providing greater attention to the legitimate concerns of all the people in the region (burma partnership, 2015). civil society organizations in peacebuilding efforts besides conflict prevention, csos can also take a significant role in peacebuilding efforts. the civil society is widely assumed to be an important actor for peacebuilding. as such, substantive focus has been given towards building and strengthening the civil society, especially in countries experiencing or emerging from situations of armed conflict. in such environments, the civil society is understood as playing an important role in reducing violence and in facilitating the conditions necessary for building a sustainable peace. however, despite this evergrowing emphasis on the role of civil society in peacebuilding, little systematic research has been undertaken to empirically support this assumption. as an effort to systematically examine the role of civil society in peacebuilding processes, the centre on conflict, development and peacebuilding (ccdp) has conducted a three-year comparative research project under the direction of thania paffenholz titled civil society and peacebuilding. this report provides an overview of the findings thus far and focuses explicitly on their policy implications. the project began by developing a comprehensive framework through which the relevance and effectiveness of the role of civil society in peacebuilding could be more fully analyzed. this framework, derived from democracy, development, and peacebuilding theories, outlines seven 152 asean socio-cultural community (ascc) in conflict prevention possible functions to be played by civil society within various stages of conflict. these functions are: protection, monitoring, advocacy, socialization, social cohesion, facilitation, and service delivery. through the comparative study of thirteen case studies, this project analyzes the performance of civil society in regards to the above functions within situations of both war and armed conflict. it also looks at the potential and actual role of civil society when a window of opportunity appears for peace negotiations and when large-scale violence has ended (paffenholz, 2009, p. 20). the project finds that civil society can play an important supportive role, though the impetus for peacebuilding comes in most cases from political actors and the conflict parties themselves. the findings of the research project demonstrate that the relevance of the seven civil society functions varies tremendously during different phases of conflict. however, activities of high relevance, such as protection during wars, are not necessarily equally implemented by civil society organizations. the effectiveness of activities also varies substantially. overall, protection, monitoring, advocacy, and facilitationrelated activities are of higher effectiveness, whereas socialization and social cohesion-related activities are of low effectiveness across all cases. these findings stand in stark contrast to the actual implementation and funding level of these activities (paffenholz, 2009, p. 2021). there are several csos in asean that play a role in peacebuilding efforts. one of them is the asia-pacific inter-faith network (apin) that has representatives in all asean countries. the mission of apin is to promote dialogue and foster mutual understanding, respect, and collaboration between the followers of the various world religions. because southeast asia is a region full of different religions, apin helps to promote peace between them (interfaith network, 2015). another cso worth mentioning is the asian resource foundation (arf). its main secretariat is in bangkok, thailand; however, they operate all over southeast asia. the arf was established in 1996 as an asian initiative to respond to the needs of vulnerable communities, particularly in the areas of children education, child rights, women empowerment, and youth leadership development (uri, 1996). lastly, the human rights working group (hrwg). the hrwg works in different sectors, such as women’s rights, indigenous people’s rights, labor rights including migrant workers’ and domestic workers’ rights, housing rights, health rights including sexual and reproductive rights, rights of persons with disabilities (pwd), rights of people living with hiv, rights of minority groups including religious minority group, rights to clean water and sanitation, mining network and rights to environment groups, as well as rights to development. in 2006, the hrwg expanded its advocacy work to the asean human rights mechanism (hrwg, 2014). all of those csos play a role in peacebuilding efforts in asean. if peacebuilding process can work well, asean can be a region categorized as positive peace, just like europe. conclusion the ascc was designed to represent the social and cultural interests of the asean people, as this region is moving into economic integration and globalization. the resources will be located to the education and training journal of asean studies 153 sectors, the development of science and technology, the creation of jobs, and social protection. the fifth sector is the most important of all, as it is related to csos. the ascc will encourage csos to engage in providing inputs for policy choices. in my perspective, i believe the ascc would provide the means to involve csos in conflict prevention efforts. the steps undertaken by asean member states (government) must include csos as an integral part of the conflict prevention or resolution efforts. citizens of asean must interact based on common regional identity, no longer based on country identity. if only country-based interaction still applies, there will be no trust among asean countries and also their communities. therefore, the creation of an asean single identity is a must. rejection from member states should result in economic sanction. if asean has a single identity, asean can resolve whatever problems that may come because we’ll already feel as one family, not as divided countries. in terms of conflict prevention, csos work in many ways to promote peace among asean countries. the apin, arf, hrwg are three of the many csos that play a role in peacebuilding efforts in asean. in a way, they promote peace in the region in order for positive peace to occur in asean. hopefully, regional peace and security will be reached with the help of asean csos. the interactions among asean civil society are important in the making of asean community that is ‘people-oriented’ and ‘people-centered.’ the interactions among asean civil society are one possible way to prevent conflict between countries. as asean charter said ‚we, the people‛ on its first line to mention the people of southeast asian nations, the current leaders of asean countries should have started to work together hand in hand with the civil society around asean. the apf is a yearly agenda that involves csos of all asean countries in many sectors, such as such as education, women and children empowerment, human rights, climate change etc. the results of the discussions are a brief agenda on the asean leaders summit with the csos. csos can work through this mechanism to ensure that conflict prevention steps are taken by disputing governments. the apf meetings held in jakarta evaluate the suggestions that are already given on asean summits and its actions. as asean tackles peace and security issues in the summit, csos should appeal to the collective wisdom of the asean leaders to make this event a landmark of new hopes, genuine peace, and inclusive regional progress by providing greater attention to the legitimate concerns of all the people in the region. about the author jerry indrawan is a lecturer at the department of international relations at paramadina university. he also teaches international relations at satya negara indonesia university and 17 agustus 45 university. his research interest is in international security, especially peace and conflict resolution. reference asean. 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(2013). defining civil society. retrieved from http://web.worldbank.org/wbsite/ex ternal/topics/cso/0,,contentmd k:20101499~menupk:244752~pagepk: 220503~pipk:220476~thesitepk:228717 ,00.html journal of asean studies, vol. 7, no. 1 (2019), pp. 1-17 doi: https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v7i1.5756 ©2019 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic understanding sustainability-oriented innovation (soi) using network perspective in asia pacific and asean: a systematic review budi harsanto universitas padjajaran, indonesia chrisna t. permana university of liverpool, uk abstract sustainability-oriented innovation (soi) is particular type of innovation that is not only economically oriented, but also environmentaland social benefits-oriented. soi is now being widely discussed due to the increasing environmental and social problems that accompany various innovations around the world. in this paper we conducted a systematic review of empirical literature regarding soi in the asia pacific region, which were discussed through network perspectives. for network perspectives, researchers focused on process view to explain how soi is mobilized and practiced throughout different social, institutional, and political contexts. we chose the asia pacific as the context because the region is the most dynamic part of the global economy, with asean being the prominent parts of it. in conducting the review, we used the tranfield, denyer, & smart's protocol (2003) to ensure its rigorousness. the search focused on the academic database of scopus with specific inclusion and exclusion criteria. the results show that soi has been rapidly developing into practices in countries in the asia pacific, not only in profit sectors, but also in non-profit sectors such as government and community. our review emphasized that actor-network theory (ant) emerged as the currently most adopted framework to explain the dynamics process of soi mobilizations and practices in the asia pacific region. ant frameworks contribute to defining the structure of soi networks as well as identifying social, institutional, and political challenges of soi implementation. regionally, the focus of the study so far is in north america (us and canada), while studies in asean are still very limited. key words: sustainability-oriented innovation, actor network perspective, actornetwork theory, asia pacific, asean introduction innovation with orientation not only toward financial returns, but also paying attention to environmental and social benefits has recently been widely discussed by researchers, industry players, as well as policy makers. this particular type of innovation is known as sustainability-oriented innovation (soi). academically, in the last decade, the study of soi has rapidly increased, marked with a graph of significant peer-reviewed publications in the field (adams, jeanrenaud, bessant, denyer, & overy, 2 understanding sustainability-oriented innovation (soi) 2016; de medeiros, ribeiro, & cortimiglia, 2014). for the industry, this challenge facing managers is to be successful in the modern world that requires companies to be sustainable. this, for example, can be seen in market research, which reports that consumers now prefer to buy from innovative and sustainable brands, and managers consider environmental and social aspects when developing new products (mckinsey & vanthournout, 2008; unilever, 2017). for policy makers, various indices that measure innovation and sustainability, such as global innovation index (cornell university, insead, & wipo, 2018) and country sustainability ranking (robecosam, 2018) become benchmarks to be able to improve the conditions of innovation and sustainability within the scope of their socio-economic and ecological ecosystem. soi is a process that is temporal and relational, and involves various stakeholders interacting each other (kadia georges aka, 2019). consequently, the process view through network perspective is essential to elaborate these complex phenomena comprehensively (whiteman & kennedy, 2016). network perspective that analyses the network to develop soi effort, including actor-network theory (ant), is considered to be the suitable approach to explore the temporal and relational nature of soi development (garud, gehman, kumaraswamy, & tuertscher, 2017). although important, studies with this approach are still limited and have only recently emerged (xavier, naveiro, aoussat, & reyes, 2017). this paper aims to understand development of soi using network perspective through systematic review of the literature in the academic database. the asia pacific region become the focus considering that this region is economically playing a role as the most dynamic region in the world, with asean being the prominent parts of it. (imf, 2018; yates & beeson, 2019). sustainability-oriented innovation (soi) and network perspective soi is a combination of two main areas that have already been established, namely eco-innovation and social innovation (hansen & große-dunker, 2013). a more comprehensive discussion lately, among others have called it as soi, sustainability innovation or sustainabilitydriven innovation or sustainability-related innovation. in the business context, soi gets attention regarding the increasing concern of consumers, regulators, and other stakeholders that require companies to act more responsibly in their innovations. this issue is now a strategic issue that can lead companies not only to compliance with the regulation, but also to use them strategically as opportunities to improve company reputation, reduce costs, and obtain better overall financial returns (ghisetti & rennings, 2014). this type of soi as conventional innovation can be divided into product, process, and organizational innovation. in its development, soi is not only relevant to business organizations, but also non-profit organizations such as community, village, educational institutions, government, city, or region. this can happen by adopting the soi journal of asean studies 3 framework which is in the form of innovation by targeting three economic, environmental, and social aspects simultaneously. in the context of rural or village development, for example, soi is implemented in the form of social innovation with the formation of intermediaries to facilitate the optimization of relations between stakeholders in the community (martiskainen, 2017). for university, this initiative for example is realized by connecting multi-players including producers, r & d, societal groups, user groups, and public authorities to be able to effectively link the problem environment and social (morioka, saito, & yabar, 2006). academic interests towards various discussions of complexities of the emergent and dynamic nature of intervention-based projects, in which the soi projects are a part of it, have increasingly popular in the current periods (sage, dainty, & brookes, 2011). such complexities are generally emphasized as ‘network complexities’ or processes involving compositions and changes of the networks structuring the projects (boonstra & boelens, 2011; byrne, 2003; de roo & silva, 2010). the most common discussed topic around ‘network complexities’ of projects appeared in the understanding of various projects as a product of interactions between different actors with their values, strategies, and many other characteristics in the process (p. c. chen & hung, 2016). second other most discussed topic is the identification of how such projects are mobilized, changed, progressed, and challenged through the dynamic assembling and disassembling of the involved actors within a project network (albrecht, 2013). other academics have been even going further recently by comparing ‘network complexities’ of a number of projects to justify their feasibility, strengths, and weakness (goulden, erell, garb, & pearlmutter, 2017; stephens & jiusto, 2010). various theoretical foundations and analytical methods were developed by academics to guide and assist research on network complexities. such theories and methods are clustered into an umbrella term of ‘network studies’ (vicsek, király, & kónya, 2016). these contain quantitative and qualitative approaches emphasizing different set of indicators and mechanisms (boelens, 2010; caniglia, frank, kerner, & mix, 2016; farías, 2011; yvone rydin & tate, 2016). for instances, urban regime theory containing theories explaining power and political behaviors in a network (lowndes, 2009), actor-network theory (ant) containing the ontological and semiotic meanings of the actors in networks (farías, 2011), social network analysis (sna) concerning the level of capacity and role of actors in networks (caniglia et al., 2016), actor relational approach (ara) focusing on interactive and communicative repertoires of actor networks in specific episodes (boelens, 2010), and the agent-based modelling representing various computational perspectives simulating autonomous 4 understanding sustainability-oriented innovation (soi) actors in a set of self-organized systems (batty, 2005). in wider academic perspectives, ant-studies have been emerged as one of the most popular ‘network studies’ applied to draw the understanding of various projects. it is particularly in the western, mainly in european (yvone rydin & tate, 2016). pioneered by the likes of law and hassard’s actor network theory and after (1999) and latour’s reassembling the social (2005), antstudies, arguably, penetrated to many subjects beyond sociology as its origin, which include to planning (yvone rydin & tate, 2016), governance and public policy (albrecht, 2013), management (sage et al., 2011), environment (goulden et al., 2017), and architecture (farías, 2011). ant concerns on networks, specifically dynamic networks surrounding social, science and technology related-studies and their intersections (farías, 2011; yvonne rydin, 2012). having a term ‘theory’ on its name, does not mean ant is an actual theory. instead, it is more suitable to be considered as a flexible and adaptive framework or method (latour, 2005). the ‘actor’ in ant means a flux element constructed by several other elements (yvonne rydin, 2012). it refers to both human such as individual in general or in specific roles and non-human such as materials, technologies, machines, policies, and regulations (sage et al., 2011). the network, on the other hands, is fluid and dynamic relations built by actors, and has characteristics such as unstable, uncertain, and continuously reshaping (latour, 2005; yvonne rydin, 2012). the way ant work is tracing the actor or continuously extracting how an actor is defined by its relations within a network: the thoughts, feelings, actions, and identities (boelens, 2010; latour, 2005; sage et al., 2011). the contribution of ant to understand phenomena is based on its ability to draw socio-material relations in the arrangement of orders and hierarchies and to define how the temporarily stable relationships of ‘actor network’ can deliver certain meanings, actions, and solutions (farías, 2011; yvonne rydin, 2012). ant analytical process comprises of four stages, which are problematization, interessement, enrolment, and mobilization (kadia georges aka, 2019; yvonne rydin, 2012). problematization is a stage of framing problems (yvone rydin & tate, 2016). interessement is a stage of identifying actors and establishing the networks where the obligatory passage point emerged as its center (h. w. chen & lin, 2018). enrolment is a stage of strengthening the networks by expanding more actors into network and define their roles (yvone rydin & tate, 2016). mobilization is a stage of stabilizing and destabilizing of the networks (yvone rydin & tate, 2016). asia pacific and asean asia pacific refers to the area that covers the pacific rim region. for clarity of definition, in this study the asia pacific was narrowed down to the countries journal of asean studies 5 incorporated in asia-pacific economic cooperation (apec) which included 21 countries members (figure 1) from north america, south america, asean, east asia, russia, and oceania (apec, 2019). this area is the most dynamic area in the global economy, with considerable margins, covering almost two-third of the world economic growth (imf, 2018). figure 1. asia pacific economic cooperation member economies source: www.apec.org the asean association is a prominent part of apec (yates & beeson, 2019). asean consists of brunei darussalam, cambodia, indonesia, lao pdr, malaysia, myanmar, philippines, singapore, thailand and vietnam (asean, 2019). asean is an area that includes more than 500 million people with gdp of more than us $ 700 billion (asean, 2012). this area has a strategic location in the world geopolitics, abundant natural resources as well high potential of quality and quantity of human resources (prakash & isono, 2012). methodology in conducting a systematic review we followed the tranfield et al.'s (2003) protocol which described three stages in a systematic review including: (1) planning the review, (2) conducting the review, and (3) reporting and dissemination (figure 2). in the first stage, planning is carried out through dialogue among the author team to determine the research scope through articulation of review questions, and criteria for exclusion and inclusion. by considering various aspects that have been explained in the introduction section, the specific review question raised in this review are: what literature known about sustainabilityoriented innovation using actor network perspective in asia pacific? our strategy is to search for peerreviewed literature in the academic database of scopus which is the largest http://www.apec.org/ 6 understanding sustainability-oriented innovation (soi) peer-reviewed database today. the search syntax that we use is: "sustain* innovate*" which reflects the concept of soi and combines it with "actor network perspective" or “actor network theory” that reflects the concept of actor network perspective. this comprehensive search generates 123 articles form the database. figure 2. systematic review process the criteria of inclusion/ exclusion for the specified filtering process is the publication type, language, and region. for the year of publication, we did not set specifically so that the timespan in this review is open from any year up to may 2019. the type of publication chosen is empirical peer-reviewed articles because what we are looking for is research that has been successfully published after passing the peer-reviewed process. conference proceedings, reviews, chapters and other types of publications are excluded because of these criteria. furthermore, for language, we only included english-language articles considering this is the main language in publications for international audiences. filtering by type of publication and language resulted in 79 articles. for region filtering, we use screening feature in the database by limiting searches to the members of apec as listed earlier in the asia pacific and asean section. at this stage the search results in 22 articles. after that we filter the relevance by reading the title, abstract and full text to ensure the relevance of the article for the purpose of our review. from this screening process 5 articles were excluded for several reasons. first is the type of publication that is theoretical not empirical. although we have filtered the database from the beginning by restricting searches to empirical peer-reviewed articles, we found this filtering was not 100% perfect and still allowed other types of publications to be included in the search results. the second reason is relevance to soi and actor network perspective, and the third is the focus region not in the asia pacific region. so that at these stage 17 articles were obtained. after that, as a supplement, we did hand-search yang which produces 3 articles. this strategy is as the previous researcher did to supplement the systematic review (e.g. adams et al., 2016). at these stage 20 articles were journal of asean studies 7 obtained, which became the final results to be analyzed in more depth. the analysis was carried out on two aspects of the article namely attributes and findings. by attribute, we analyze it using descriptive statistics to find out the publication outlets, years of publication, and country focus in publications. we also identified the types of organizations that were the focus of those studies. visual display of figure and tables are provided to help understand the attributes of a publication included in this review. 20 articles from the previous stage were then reviewed based upon their methodological approaches to identify ‘network complexities’ within the soi projects. on each article, we focused on understanding how various frameworks and methods were used systematically to explain meanings, structures, characteristics, aims, and strategies of actors within soi projects. in addition, we also analyzed how the frameworks and methods were performed to assess strength and weakness as well as success and fail of soi projects in both individual and comparative ways. having done the above reviews, we identified the most method used and identified how the method is contributed into soi project’s analyses. in doing this process, we firstly classified the 20 articles into a table linking information such as author, title, methods, and findings. based on tabulation results, we justified the most used method and began to summarize the works and findings of such methods in their article. based on the summary of works and findings, we concluded several roles of the network method in more detail way. in this regard, we explained the roles using general terms instead of actual terms presented in the reviewed articles. for instance, in explaining the role of a method in defining soi in an article with tourism and transport context, we used the term ‘policymakers’ instead of tourism agency (in tourism context) or ministry of transport (in transport context). finally, to support our explanation, we borrowed a simple sna (social network analysis) illustration figures comprising of symbols such as circle referring the actors and line referring the network or interaction (caniglia et al., 2016; yvonne rydin, 2012). however, our illustration figures do not represent any quantitative result analysis, and instead, they are simple unweighted figures to show distribution, composition, and linkage of actors. the size of symbol does not refer to any quantitative measurement. results & discussion most articles included in this review, three-quarters, are published in the last decade signify the increasing study of soi using actor network perspective (figure 3). these articles are published in journals in different fields indicate the multidisciplinary nature of soi using actor perspective. these journals include: journal of cleaner production (2 articles), sustainability 8 understanding sustainability-oriented innovation (soi) (switzerland) (2), ecology and society (1), regional environmental change (1), frontiers in public health (1), environmental education research (1), administrative science quarterly (1), maritime policy and management (1), journal of sustainable tourism (1), journal of marketing (1), language learning and technology (1), research policy (1), energy policy (1), accounting (1), auditing and accountability journal (1), technovation (1), progress in planning (1), and rural sociology (1). figure 3. publication year regionally, the focus of the study so far is in north america while studies in asean are still very limited for country focus (figure 4), the study of soi using actor network perspectives so far in conducted in seven economies context includes australia (3 articles), china (1), canada (6), chinese taipei (2), japan (1), singapore (1), and us (9). most of the studies (18 out of 20) were conducted in single-country focus and the remainder was done with multi-country focus. from this profile it is known that almost all of these studies are in advanced economies setting (except china). the focus of the study, regionally, mostly (around three-quarters) are in north america (us dan canada). studies in asean context are still very limited, so far only done in singapore context. figure 4. country focus from sustainable rural agriculture to ‘environmentally-friendly’ cycling: the dynamic implementation of soi using actor network perspective the type of organization studied in the articles reviewed is diverse ranging from business organizations, community, city, governmental, school, university, particular industry, region, and rural agriculture. to analyze findings from these articles, we classify them into two implementations focus, namely profit and nonprofit (table 1). if a study is multiimplementation, for example a combination of business-community, we categories it based on the emphasis. if its emphasis on profit organization, we include it in profit and vice versa. journal of asean studies 9 table 1. implementation focus implementation focus author and year profit (business or industry) or mixed with emphasize on profit organization. (aka, 2019), (tatarynowicz, sytch, & gulati, 2016), (acciaro et al., 2014), (albrecht, 2013), (giesler, 2012), (garud & gehman, 2012), (stephens & jiusto, 2010), (caron & turcotte, 2009), (johnson, 2008), (tseng, chiu, tan, & siriban-manalang, 2013), (tseng, wang, chiu, geng, & lin, 2013), (lin, tan, & geng, 2013) nonprofit (community, city, region) or mixed with emphasize on nonprofit organization. (parlee & wiber, 2018), (h. w. chen & lin, 2018), (mallett & cherniak, 2018), (mccalman, bainbridge, brown, tsey, & clarke, 2018), (lynch, eilam, fluker, & augar, 2017), (hinkelman & gruba, 2012), (holden, 2008), (milton, 2003), (tang, chen, & chiu, 2018) building the understanding of the dynamic of soi implementation through network perspective: the emerging role of actor-network theory (ant) from the following table 2, our review has found 14 articles (nearly 70% from the total article reviewed) applied actor-network theory (ant) as both analytical method, discussion framework, and logic of description. linking to the characteristic of ant as a flexible and adaptive method, our review found that ant was applied into various analytical process in such articles. most articles applied a general analytical process of ant such as defining the networks and highlighting the process through four ant’s stages. nevertheless, some others borrowed ant’s philosophy and logic to be diffused into other analytical platforms such as social network analysis (sna) (albrecht, 2013), (2) obligatory-passage point (h. w. chen & lin, 2018), and (3) analytical network process (anp) (tseng, wang, et al., 2013). table 2. network method applied method author and year actor network theory (ant) (kadia georges aka, 2019), (lynch et al., 2017), (giesler, 2012), (hinkelman & gruba, 2012), (stephens & jiusto, 2010), (caron & turcotte, 2009), (milton, 2003), (tang et al., 2018) ‘ant-diffused’ method (h. w. chen & lin, 2018), (albrecht, 2013), (garud & gehman, 2012), (johnson, 2008), (holden, 2008), (tseng, wang, et al., 2013) other methods (parlee & wiber, 2018), (mallett & cherniak, 2018), (mccalman et al., 2018), (tatarynowicz et al., 2016), (acciaro et al., 2014) from articles that applied ant for their research, we have found that, at least, ant contributed in three roles in soi research. first, ant contributed in explaining the structure and composition of actors in soi projects. second, ant contributed in analyzing soi mobilization, progress, and change based on network changes. third, ant contributed in 10 understanding sustainability-oriented innovation (soi) assessing the strengths, weaknesses, potentials, and challenges of several alternative soi projects. the explanations of these are presented as follows: ant for analyzing structure and composition of actors in soi network in this role, ant described the interaction processes of certain networks of soi projects and then derived all possible actors in the networks and discussed their roles, responsibilities, and relationship each other. for instance, aka k. g. (2019) explained the development of soi from conventional bikes to electric mechatronic and then hybrid bike. ant was used to extract the actors and identify their role, which came into findings that from more than 20 actors ranging from policymakers to employees that establishing a complex system of developing soi for hybrid bike, the manager of hybrid bike company and researcher played the most important role to developing and maintaining soi project. in other case, lynch et al (2017) studied that soi in learning process was implemented through the logic of multiple realities as an opportunity to learn about the environment. the used of ant emphasized several possibilities of soi project going into different meanings and impacts for different actors due to their ‘background’. this confirmed the nature of soi as a complex project built upon ‘multi-perspective’ of the involved actors. the following figure 5 illustrates the process of ant describing the structure of actors and their roles within soi projects compiled from all article cases. figure 5. understanding the networks ant for analyzing mobilization, progress, and change of soi project in this role, ant analyzed the process of soi following the dynamic changes and interactions between actors. this includes how the project being mobilized from the beginning to an end, how the project going into a particular direction, and how the project is slowly transformed and improved. for instance, albrecht (2013) discussed the process of implementing soi in tourism development in a particular area was determined by the changing of values, roles, interests, and power of actors involved in all stages of the process. his ant research highlighted that certain actors in the network continuously shared roles and values in problematization, interssement, and enrolment, such as public sector that switched roles with private company to provide financial and regulatory support or public sector and tourism group that change position as a mediator for all other stakeholders in the network including community, service providers, and many others. this situation, where power is openly distributed to several actors, has journal of asean studies 11 been described as a key important factor that maintaining the continuation of innovation. meanwhile, giesler (2012), against the backdrop of rapid changes of nature and technology innovations, assessed the overall process of promoting soi in cosmetic industries. in his study, ant was used to learn how the innovation process was comprehensively organized from branding to selling activities with attempts to revitalize the brand image in the upstream as well as the change of consumer behaviors in the downstream. the ant analysis has identified that the most important step determining a whole success of the implementation of innovation lied in the enrolment process involving experts and their research outputs and engagements. again, using an illustrative figure, this research summarizes the general process of mobilizing soi through the lens of ant based on several reviewed articles with relevant discussions (figure 6). figure 6. understanding the process comparing soi projects using ant ant contributed in assessing the strengths, weaknesses, potentials, and challenges of several alternative soi projects. this role is important for soi’s enablers or initiators especially when they want to maintain, develop, and select a particular soi project with regard to other alternative projects due to various constraints such as financial, technological, knowledge, and human resource. this research found that stephens and jiusto (2010) provided a useful insight of the uses of ant in analyzing several soi project alternatives for further intervention purpose. their study concerned on the examination of the effectiveness of two soi projects, the carbon capture and storage (ccs) and enhanced geothermal system (egs), to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from electrical power generation in the united states. by focusing on several indicators such as technical, environmental, financial risk, and benefit of each system which were discussed through the ant logics, their study found that social and political dimensions such as involvement, engagement, and association of involved stakeholders became the most important aspects determining the success of two soi projects. the success, in this regard, was defined by the likelihood of a particular project to enhance wider technical, environmental, and financial support so they can be maintained in the long-run. ant analysis was able to suggest that the ccs project, with its stronger and wider network engagement in comparison to the cgs, had 12 understanding sustainability-oriented innovation (soi) successfully established a more sustainable innovation program with large technological, regulatory, and financial arrangement supports. conclusion having through all the review process, our paper summarizes several important findings from the study of understanding soi in asia pacific and asean through network perspective. this is presented in four conclusion points as follows: 1) soi has been rapidly developing into practices in countries in asia pacific, which not only in profit sectors, but also in non-profit sectors such as government and community. 2) actor-network theory (ant) emerged as the current-most adopted framework to explain the dynamics process of soi mobilizations and practices in the asia pacific region. 3) ant frameworks contribute in defining the structure of soi networks as well as identifying social, institutional, and political challenges of soi implementation. 4) regionally, the focus of the study so far is in north america (us and canada) while studies in asean are still very limited (only singapore so far). about the authors budi harsanto is a lecturer at universitas padjajaran, indonesia. he is curently phd researcher as well as graduate teaching 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(2019). understanding asean ’s role in asia-pacific order. palgrave macmillan uk. editorial: southeast asian readiness vis-à-vis the asean economic community the journal of asean studies proudly presents the recent issue, volume 2 number 2, which is also the fourth publication of our bi-annual peer-reviewed scholarly journal. this batch of articles offers a series of discussions focused mainly on the practical industrial performance in southeast asia. we consider that the exploration of this topic is a substantial contribution to the preparation for asean economic community. however, one crucial and sensitive issue pertaining to the south china sea border disputes will also be highlighted. our first article intriguingly discusses about the determinants of new product development in malaysian manufacturing industry. written by oon fok-yew, this study is aimed at generating a theoretical framework of the determinants of new product performance, thereby providing ‘ground’ for further empirical test. the discussion begins with an exploration of the four main determinants in assessing the effective product development: customer orientation, crossfunctional team, new product development (npd) team proficiency, and management support. the case examined throughout this article is projected to be partly used as a lesson that might be learned by other manufacturing industries, particularly in malaysia, although its impact throughout the asean countries has yet to be advanced by further research. under this issue, the journal of asean studies also discusses the political economy of industrial development in thailand. in this volume, shangmao chen raises the stake that thailand plays domestically in the process of inevitable liberalization and privatization that prevails in southeast asia. it examines thailand’s regulatory mechanism in responding to the rising need of providing better financial infrastructure through the conduct of granting a greater degree of autonomy to domestic decision makers without neglecting its supervisory system. this study draws conclusions from three interrelated sectors: telecommunication industry, automobile industry, and cultural creative industry. this study also finds that thailand inevitably harmonizes their involvement in part of the process of both regionalization and localization. this volume also binds to explore the performance of microfinance in asean countries through the examination of growing microfinance institutions. in this issue, tulus tambunan highlights the development of microfinance institutions in asean, a topic which has not been sufficiently raised in the discussion of investment. tambunan conducts an in-depth analysis based on the statistical data from indonesian case, and concludes with two engaging facts: (1) majority of micro, small and medium enterprises (msmes) do not have sufficient access to credit from formal financial institutions; and (2) microfinance grows extensively fast and is popularized under the kredit usaha rakyat (kur). it is also concluded that there is a significant increase of the expansion of msme in southeast asia. on the other hand, a sustainable and functional financial infrastructure to tackle the lack thereof is yet to be established. other article, which exposes a considerably significant issue, brings about a discussion on china’s foreign policy strategy in dealing with south china sea disputes. through her rigorous examination, eryan ramadhani argues that china’s recent engagement in the south china sea, which is manifest in the form of the so-called ‘signaling strategy’ is part of their crisis stabilization strategy,. this signaling strategy might be discerned in both positive and negative remarks, with its invariable applications, which china managed to offer from 2010 up to 2013. ramadhani redefines ‘stability’ as a condition in which a crisis does not escalate to open military conflict. by arguing so, it is also contended that this conduct is achieved by potentially managing the dispute to stay in the domain of status quo. however, at certain occasion, china also deliberately conducts its negative signaling to ripe for their interest in winning the claimgame. besides scholarly articles, this volume also presents a practice note that addresses the possible role played by foreign banks to sustain high economic growth in the national development. kemal stamboel, in his notes, fundamentally explores four pressures that affect the wellbeing of indonesian economy: (1) the external balance; (2) budget deficit; (3) inflation; and (4) rupiah’s exchange rate. at the heart of discussion, he outlines the critical contributions banking practitioners could endorse to be part of the solution for the national economy. under the publication of this issue, we would also like to announce several updates pertaining to our journal. first and the foremost, we are very glad to inform that our journal of asean studies has been indexed by the directory of open access journal (doaj), besides being widely indexed by other competitive indexers, which in turn, reach a wider range of readers. secondly, we also made several improvements to ensure high quality and accessibility of the journal as appeared on our website (http://journal.binus.ac.id/index.php/jas/index). as our editorial team is now dealing with articles from a wider scope of areas, the journal has assigned a second managing editor. meanwhile, we also proudly announce that professor lu guangsheng of yunan university has joined our international advisory editorial board . as to our associate editors, we also welcome dr. sumedi andono mulyo, dr. paramitaningrum, dr. kiki verico, and mr. m. faishal aminuddin and thank them fortheir contribution. last but not least, we proudly announce that beginning in the year 2015, we will fully utilize open journal submission system (ojs). this marks our strong commitment and high expectation in spearheading southeast asian studies into the world. we thank our contributors, authors, reviewers, editorial team members and readers who have made this journal receive greater http://journal.binus.ac.id/index.php/jas/index recognition from epistemic community as well as practitioners in the field of southeast asian studies. jakarta, 23 december 2014 tirta nugraha mursitama, ph.d editor-in-chief journal of asean studies, vol. 9, no. 2 (2021), pp. 181-198 doi: https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v9i2.7517 issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic the effects of interest rate on real effective exchange rate volatility spillover in malaysia and thailand: empirical evidence mohd jaffri abu bakar1, nanthakumar loganathan2, tirta nugraha mursitama3, and asan ali golam hassan4 1,2,4azman hashim international business school, universiti teknologi malaysia, 54100 kuala lumpur, malaysia 3international relations department, faculty of humanities, bina nusantara university, jakarta, indonesia 11480 1mohdjaffri@graduate.utm.my; 2n4nantha@yahoo.com; 3tmursitama@binus.edu; 4asanali@utm.my received: 26th june 2021/ revised: 17th december 2021/ accepted: 17th december 2021 how to cite: bakar, a. m. j., loganathan, n., mursitama, t. n., & hassan, a. a. g. (2021). the effects of interest rate on real effective exchange rate volatility spillover in malaysia and thailand: empirical evidence. journal of asean studies, 9(2), 181-198. https:/doi.org/ 10.21512/jas.v9i2.7517 abstract the research examined this asymmetric effect between the interrelationship of the interbank rate on the external competitiveness purchasing power represented by the real effective exchange rate for malaysia and thailand using monthly data covering the period of 1994 until 2020. the empirical findings confirms an asymmetric effect between interbank rate and real effective exchange rate based on the nonlinear autoregressive distributed lag estimates. the research also finds a unidirectional asymmetric causal relationship running from real effective exchange rate on interbank rate thailand, which indicate the monetary policy has a direct relationship on interbank rate volatility. while in malaysia, there is no causality running between both variables since the country has proposed several soft monetary policies and more concentrating on the short-term borrowing by improving the tight money supply circulation based on the domestic inflation, global economic, and financial market volatility. therefore, the research recommends a specific need of monetary stabilizer policy to stabilize both countries’ currencies and put more effort to liberalize the foreign exchange rate system in a globalized economy. keywords: asymmetric analysis, interest rate, nonlinear causality, real effective exchange rate mailto:mohdjaffri@graduate.utm.my; mailto:n4nantha@yahoo.com; mailto:tmursitama@binus.edu; mailto:asanali@utm.my 182 the effects of interest introduction the internationalization wave has made the country purchasing power indicators become one of the most widely studied macroeconomic indicators in the world. these indicators gauge the value of imports and exports between countries by determining the intrinsic purchasing power of a country with respect to its trading partners. thus, the stabilization of purchasing power indicators have become one of the main objectives of monetary policy for most countries, especially among asian countries (cobham, 2021). the monetary policy is a powerful tool used by a country’s authority to regulate macroeconomic and financial indicators such as the inflation rate, the exchange rate conversion, and the employment rate. the policy is formulated using different tools such as interest rate, government securities, and reserve to control the amount of money circulated in the market. since 1950, malaysia has employed multiple targeting monetary policies to avoid price volatility, spur economic growth and maintain financial stability without elucidating potential conflicts and trade-offs in-line with the charter objectives of the central bank of malaysia (cheong, 2005; ariff & yap, 2001). malaysia has also adopted the soft monetary policy, however, since the 1997 asian financial crisis, the monetary policy committee of the central bank of malaysia has embedded financial stability as one of the country’s monetary policy objectives. the principal objective of monetary policy as per central bank of malaysia act of 2009 is to develop a conducive monetary and financial stability to support economic growth (hossain, 2017). figure 1. the trend of real interest rate for malaysia and thailand between 1976 to 2020 source: world bank (2021) journal of asean studies 183 figure 2. the trend of ppp conversion factor (private consumption) for malaysia and thailand between 1991 to 2020. source: world bank (2021) thailand monetary policy framework is slightly different compared to that of malaysia, whereby the thailand government has undergone three phases of regime development until now. the first phase started after the end of world war ii with the baht value being pegged to the gold value, major currencies or a basket of currencies. the second phase of monetary targeting regime took place with the adoption of the floating exchange rate system starting in 1997 with the financial support and monitoring by the international monetary fund (imf); with the objectives to maintain the macroeconomic stability, ultimate sustainable growth, and price consistency. the third phase began on may 2000 by employing flexible inflation targeting with the main focus on the price stability and inflation rate framework supporting the sustainable economic growth (bank of thailand, 2020; mccauley, 2006). figure 1 and figure 2 show the trend of selected macroeconomic variables for malaysia and thailand for the past few decades. generally, the interbank rate and external competitiveness purchasing power of malaysia and thailand were quite volatile and this created an atmosphere of economic uncertainty even though they have recovered from the 1997 asian financial crisis (afc). undeniably, the instability of these indicators can dampen the economic growth if not properly managed by the relevant authorities. although previous studies have documented the relationship and impact between these variables, the empirical findings show mixed results, with different directions and arguments on sampling and exchange rate regimes issues. thus, the main objective of this study is to examine the interrelationship between interest rate (ibr) and external purchasing power indicator for malaysia and thailand. 184 the effects of interest literature review generally, it is believed that higher interest rate can significantly contribute to the stabilization of purchasing power indicators. however, the possible trade-off from the higher interest rates includes fragile financial system, production loses, and higher unemployment rate. sarac and karagöz (2016) and furman et al. (1998) point out that, although some scholars opined that interest rate can play a role in stabilizing the purchasing power indicators, the empirical validation of its effectiveness remains inconclusive until to date. however, interest rate parity theory states that the difference between domestic and foreign interest rates equals to the supply and demand of the change in the exchange rate, so no party could misuse the interest rate differential to create arbitrage profit due to depreciated currency of the countries with high interest rate (wu & cheng, 1998). although there have been many research on the effectiveness of monetary policies and interest rate, kayhan et al. (2013) argue that the interest rate in emerging, developing, and developed economies behaves differently and has varying impacts on the same type of purchasing power indicators. recently, karamelikli and karimi (2020) have used the linear and nonlinear estimates, which result in different empirical statistics and relationships between interest rate and purchasing power indicators in turkey. the movement of interest rate due to the short-term borrowing and money supply circulation in the market by the government authority reflects the volatility in purchasing power performance. interest rate and purchasing power indicators are interrelated to play a role in stabilizing the growth and development in the country. therefore, lower interest rate promotes growth of money in the market, which results in an increase in spending and thus promotes development; but at the same time causes inflation rate to increase (oliver, 1997). due to the effect of monetary policy changes on the volatility purchasing power indicators, many studies attempted to investigate the relationship between these variables using assorted models and econometric approaches. for example, hoang et al. (2020), cecchetti et al. (2020), alsamara and mrabet (2019), aizenman et, al. (2016) and bagchi, chortareas, and miller (2004) have explained the impact of monetary policy on the changes in value of purchasing power indicators. moreover, brailsford et al. (2006) also indicate that many asian countries’ exchange rate benefit from the interest rate fluctuation especially during the financial crisis. in addition, curran and velic (2019) and patel and mah (2018) have found that the monetary policy tools as well as interest rate have a strong causal relationship with the real external purchasing power indicators in the emerging countries. abudalu and ahmed (2014) find a significant relationship between interest rate and competitiveness exchange rate indicator performances in thailand. andonov et al. (2017), hanson and stein (2015), and bowe and saltvedt (2004) show that interest rate is an important factor that attracts foreign investment flows, and this can be achieved through interest rate manipulation by the authorities. interest rate volatility, however, can affect the ion volatility of inflation rate and a country's internal purchasing power. pattanaik and mitra (2001) prove that inflation rate, interest rate, and external purchasing power are highly correlated with each other. sun and de journal of asean studies 185 (2019) postulate that the depreciation of external purchasing power rate seems to create an inflationary effect in the us due to the circulation of money in the market as compared to quantity production. the situation will spark arbitrage activities as a result of profit arising from the disequilibrium price between countries. ahmed and mazlan (2021) update the finding of asean countries by revealing that the effect of interest rate on the external purchasing power indicator varies with the existence of short run and long run asymmetries within asean members. according to phuc and duc (2019), although inflation volatility, trade openness, and interest rate significantly influence changes of external purchasing power indicators in australia, japan, new zealand and south korea, the impact varies across the studied sample. similarly, barbosa et al. (2018) proves varying impacts of selected independent variables on the volatility purchasing power indicators in developing and emerging countries. nonetheless, the impact of interest rate on purchasing power indicators especially real exchange rate movement is still ambiguous. kalemli-ozcan and verela (2019) provide an evidence of weak influence on the impact of interest rate differentials on purchasing power indicators in emerging countries. hnatkovska (2013) concludes that the impact of interest rate on external purchasing power indicators vary, and is dependent on the variation of interest rate, especially for thailand. moreover, tari and abasiz (2009) reveal that the causal relationship between the external purchasing power indicator and interest rate is just valid in the short run. in contrast, khin et al. (2017) and sarac and karagöv (2016) provide an evidence of non-significant relationship between external purchasing power indicator and interest rate especially in a long-run relationship for malaysia and turkey. interestingly, engel et al. (2019) have recently found the importance of inflation rate on the volatility of exchange rate rather than the interest rate in the case of us dataset. table 1 indicates some of the previous studies capturing the causal relationship between external purchasing power and interest rate worldwide. table 1. causal relationship between external purchasing power indicators and interest rate authors time span country method causality balduzzi and chiang (2020). 1983 2012 emerging countries vecm eppis ir nguyen et al. (2020) 1999 2014 asean countries svar eppis ir hoang et al. (2020) 2005 2018 vietnam var eppis ir sun and de (2019) 1973 2017 us favar eppis ir alsamara and mrabet (2019) 1986 2014 turkey linear and nonlinear ardl eppis ir eppis ir draz et al. (2019) 1981 2013 asian countries gmm eppis ir khin et al. (2017) 2010 2016 malaysia vecm eppis ir adler and grisse (2014) 1980 2011 oecd countries beer ppis ir aizenman et al. (2011) 1989 2006 emerging countries var ppis ir source: author’s compilation 186 the effects of interest alsamara and mrabet (2019) and chowdhury (2012) have found that external purchasing power indicators are negatively related with interest rate differential and money supply in turkey and australia, respectively. moreover, bagchi et al. (2004) also find that real interest rate differential has a long-run pressure impact on australia’s real purchasing power indicators, and the pressure impact may change due to the different exchange rate regimes implemented. furthermore, engel (2019) and draz et al. (2019) also prove that the interest rate indicator has significant impact on the volatility of real purchasing power indicators in selected asian economies. kia (2013) finds that the money supply, interest rate, growth rate, government expenditure, commodity prices, and debt have significant impact on the volatility of purchasing power indicators in canada. furthermore, andries et al. (2017) and granville and mallick (2010) provide empirical evidence of a robust relationship between interest rate and external purchasing power indicators in romania and russia, respectively. verico (2017) suggests that in order for asean economic community (aec) to be economically integrated, the private sector in the asean countries needs to be strengthened. understanding the complex relationship between monetary policies especially interest rate and purchasing power indicators is crucial because the disequilibrium between the variables can have a big impact to country sustainable economic growth and development. however, previous empirical findings documented mixed results with different direction and argument on sample observation, exchange rate regime and the macroeconomic indicators used. therefore, this research fulfils the gap by employing the asymmetric empirical analysis to get a comprehensive outcome focusing on the emerging asean’s small tigers, mainly malaysia and thailand. research methods the research analysis relies on monthly data from january 1994 to december 2020. the data on external purchasing power indicators, which is represented by the real effective exchange rate (reer), are obtained from j. p. morgan’s time series data sources (“data and analytics”, 2021). meanwhile, the data for interest rate based on the ibr were obtained from the central bank of malaysia (2021) and the bank of thailand (2021). the reer is a proxy for the external purchasing power indicator and is the dependent variable in the research. this indicator represents the intrinsic value of comparing exchange rate fluctuation on the quantity of goods and services offered internationally between local currency and other currencies as suggested by bartolli (1995). in order to obtain a specific relationship between the external purchasing power indicator and interest rate, a general empirical model specification is created: reer = f(ibr) the reer and the ibr are transformed into natural logarithm formation to avoid bias estimation. based on the nature of the time series data, the research firstly performs several journal of asean studies 187 unit root tests to ensure the tested variables are free from stationary problems, and at the same time, appropriated econometrical models are chosen. the unit root tests performed include: 1) the augmented dickey fuller (adf), proposed by dickey and fuller (1981), 2) kwiatkowski–phillips–schmidt–shin test (kpss) by kwiatkowski et al. (1992), 3) the endogenous structural break stationarity test by perron (1989), and 4) the nonlinearity test of the fourier adf (fadf) test proposed by enders and lee (2012). the fadf nonlinear unit root test is used because the reer series may entail structure breaks due to the exchange rate regimes implemented during the period of the study (peg exchange rate regime and managed floating regime). furthermore, the nonlinearity test based on the fadf is also utilized to capture the nonlinearity condition of the tested variables. the auto-regressive distributed lag (ardl) cointegration approach introduced by pesaran et al. (2001) is utilized, and it uses the f-statistics value against the upper and lower critical bounds value for the cointegration decisions. in general, the ardl cointegration model for the research can be defined as follows: the symbol represents the first difference operator; the coefficient refers to the short-run elasticities; represents the long-run elasticities; and indicates the normal white noise of the ardl estimates. the aim is to determine the long-run cointegration between reer and the ibr. therefore, the null hypothesis can be expressed as , with the alternative hypothesis expressed as pesaran et al. (2001) formulate critical value based on the f-statistic is used in the research. if the estimated fstatistic is higher than the upper bounds i(1), it indicates that there is a long-run cointegration between the estimated series of this research. for the purpose of ardl bounds estimation, the akaike information criterion (aic) to select the optimal lag for estimation purposes (yakubu et al., 2021) is employed. considering the assumption of limited information revealed by the symmetric model in permitting the strong inference for yielding a predictable forecast in wide range of economic and finance situations, the nonlinear ardl (nardl) test is performed to explore the actual long run relationship between external purchasing power indicator and interest rate in malaysia and thailand. based on shin et al. (2014), the positive and negative components in the test will capture the existence of asymmetric relationships of underlying variables. shin et al. (2014) defines the equation of positive and negative components as presented: 188 the effects of interest therefore, the nardl specification can be written as follows: the are the independent variables and the parameter are lag order. in order to examine the cause-effect relationship, the hatemi-j causality test as used by nguyen et al. (2015) and gozgor (2014) is used to capture the possibilities of the asymmetric effect relationship between external purchasing power indicator and interest rate. hatemi-j (2012) proposes the equation as presented: where, and are the constant value, and are white noise disturbance term, , , and represent the positive and negative parameter. this can also be expressed as and ). this can be rewritten based on the presented expressions: the positive and negative value for each variable will be defined as a cumulative form as and . thus, each underlying variable has a permanent impact of positive and negative shocks. after that, the test of causal relationship between variables done by the var model of order p value: , by assuming ; and , by assuming journal of asean studies 189 where, the is the vectors of the variable, is the vectors of intercepts, is the vectors of error terms and is the matrix of parameter for lag order and the lag order selection will based on the aic specification. results and discussions table 2 summarizes the test statistics for the employed unit root tests. the adf and pp unit root test statistics show that all variables are stationary in their level, but become nonstationary after taking the first difference, whereas the kpss unit root test statistic demonstrates a non-stationarity in level and stationary in first difference. thus, all variables are confirmed stationary in first difference despite using a multiple traditional unit root test and endogenous structure break unit root test. however, the fourier adf unit root test shows that the reer variables for thailand has a unit root issue. thus, this warrants the utilization of ardl and nardl approach since the unit root tests statistics are mixed. table 2. unit root test results at level at first difference fadf adf kpss perron adf kpss perron malaysia reer -2,299 1,050* -3,066 (1998; nov) -17,177* 0,046 -17,344* (1997; dec) -2,443 ibr -2,021 0,803* -2,801 (2002; feb) -13,917* 0,085 -8,872* (1999; jan) -2,233 thailand reer -2,040 0,632** -4,573 (2000; dec) -16,171* 0,108 -8,137* (1998; feb) -4,721* ibr -1,686 1,212* -3,054 (2001; sept) -7,545* 0,059 -10,780* (1998; nov) 1,033 note: * and ** denote rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 1 and 5% significance levels, respectively. the finite sample critical values for fadf and f-test are taken table 1 of enders and lee (2012). furthermore, the result of ardl bounds test confirms that there is no long-run relationship between interest rate and purchasing power indicator being studied (see table 3). in malaysia, there is an endogenous break for reer in november 1998 and for ibr on february 2002, respectively. this could be due to the asian financial crisis in 1998, where malaysia manipulated the interest rate policy and increased the government spending in order to stimulate economic growth (“malaysia: december 2001”, 2001). thailand encountered the reer endogenous break in december 2000, and ibr in september 2001. these periods referred to changes of thailand monetary policy which stressed exchange rate stability and fostering an economic recovery. in addition, it is also attributed to the victory of telecoms tycoon thaksin shinawatra’s thai rak thai party in thailand general election (“timeline: thailand’s turbulent”, 2019). 190 the effects of interest table 3. bounds test for the ardl and nardl cointegration specifications f-statistics results malaysia thailand ardl 2,064 1,484 no cointegration nardl 4,088* 3,605* cointegrated significance value critical values lower bounds upper bounds 1% 4,94 5,58 5% 3,62 4,16 10% 3,02 3,51 note: * denote rejection of the null hypothesis of no long run cointegration at 1% significance level. the lag selection is based on the aic. in addition, the empirical results are parallel with abdoh et al. (2016) which also reveal that there is no long-run relationship between interest rate and exchange rate for brunei, malaysia, philippines, singapore, thailand, indonesia, cambodia, laos, and vietnam, using the symmetric cointegration approach. in addition, when the nonlinear ardl test is used, a significant long-run relationship between the series of both countries are found. this result is in-line with karamelikli and karimi (2020), and katrakilidis and trachanas (2012). in golit et al. (2019), an asymmetric approach was used in examining the sample of g7 countries, which showed a stronger relationship between interest rate and exchange rate. the findings on the long run and short run asymmetric estimates are presented in table 4. for malaysia, the findings verifies the existence of long run asymmetry positive effect of ibr on the reer. when the ibr increases in the long-run period, the reer decreases by almost 22,1%. looking at thailand, the estimation confirmed a significant relationship for both of positive and negative asymmetric effects especially in the short-run. an increase of ibr in the short-run period is able to increase the reer around 13,4%, and decreases in ibr will reduce the reer value around 12%. for thailand, the nardl estimates indicate the overall positive effect around 0,1% higher compared to the negative effect faced by the country. table 4. the nardl estimates country variable coefficient f-statistics malaysia -0,221 3,75*** 0,112 1,473 7,832* 0,534 thailand 0,134 3,289*** -0,120 4,137** 0,416 19,750* note: *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis of no asymmetric relationship at the 1, 5 and 10% significance level, respectively. the lag selection is based on the aic. journal of asean studies 191 figure 3 depicts the long-run dynamic multiplier effects with positive and negative changes in ibr for malaysia and thailand over the estimation period of the research. it is found that approximately after the third period, the solid line of asymmetric effect in malaysia indicates decreased condition with almost four periods before it rises and overshoots positive and negative effects during the fourth period, and consistently facing constant condition over the estimation period. the negative changes showed by the dotted line have crossed-out the asymmetric line at the 13th period, which is approximately in year 2000 due to the recovery effect of asian financial crisis and the economic recession period for many developed countries in the early 2000s. thus, an increase of ibr has a long run negative effect on the reer in malaysia. however, there is a different situation with the dynamic multiplier effects in thailand, where the positive effect overshooting the asymmetric line for all periods are involved in the research. hence, an increase in ibr totally has a positive effect on the reer since the country has overcome the financial issues with a comprehensive tight monetary policy over the estimation period. -. 2 0 .2 .4 0 10 20 30 40 50 time periods positive change negative change asymmetry ci for asymmetry note: 95% bootstrap ci is based on 10 replications cumulative effect of lnibr on lnreer -. 3 -. 2 -. 1 0 .1 0 10 20 30 40 50 time periods positive change negative change asymmetry ci for asymmetry note: 95% bootstrap ci is based on 10 replications cumulative effect of lnibr on lnreer (a) malaysia (b) thailand figure 3. asymmetric effect of ibr on reer for malaysia and thailand in order to validate the asymmetrical relationship between interbank rate and real effective exchange rate, the research performs the hatemi-j (2012) asymmetric causality test, and the summary of the causal effect tests are reported in table 5. based on the estimation, the research found that there is no asymmetric causal relationship between ibr and the reer in malaysia. however, there are two coefficient values that are statistically significant, and this proves the existence of asymmetric causal relationship between ibr and the reer for thailand. this is especially in the situation where positive components of real effective exchange rate cause the positive components of ibr; and negative components of the reer cause the negative components of ibr. the research findings are almost in-line with those of 192 the effects of interest karamelikli and karimi (2020) and capasso et al. (2019), which confirm that the short and long run relationship with positive and negative explanatory power of the ibr components is greater than positive explanatory components. table 5. hatemi-j asymmetric causality test results causality directions malaysia thailand w-statistics null hypothesis w-statistics null hypothesis 0,011 accept 0,727 accept 0,542 accept 0,554 accept 0,564 accept 0,976 accept 1,084 accept 6,257** reject 0,247 accept 0,696 accept 1,869 accept 6,979** reject note: *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis of no causality at the 1, 5 and 10% significance level, respectively. conclusions the interrelationship between ibr and purchasing power indicator, especially the reer, has become an important and complex issue for stakeholders. according to the interest rate parity theory, interest rate affects the real exchange rate in short time horizon and becomes reversed in the long run. the assumption of the interest rate parity theory is particularly true in emerging economies, especially when the countries’ authorities attempt to stabilize and manage the exchange rate volatility through monetary policy tools. the research provides new evidence in explaining the interrelationship between ibr and purchasing power indicator in the context of malaysia and thailand. it has been proven that there is an existence of asymmetric interrelationship between the interest rate and purchasing power indicator variables. the malaysian data reveal that the asymmetric long-run cointegration between variables and the negative explanatory components of ibr variation have a greater effect on the variation of the reer. on the contrary, thailand data reveal that an asymmetric short-run interrelationship and the positive explanatory components of ibr variation have greater effect than negative explanatory components. moreover, thailand data support the assumption of ibr affects the reer on a short time horizon and reverse on the long-time horizon as explained by the interest rate parity theory. an increase of interest rate, especially the short-term interest rate, causes a depreciation to the malaysian purchasing power indicator value for long time period, but appreciates the thailand purchasing power indicator value in a short period. thus, due to the asymmetric relationship, the countries’ authorities, especially the central banks of both countries, should be more cautious on the dynamic interrelationship between ibr and purchasing power indicators in designing future monetary policy strategies especially in the global financial liberalization scenario. although only thailand shows an asymmetric causal relationship, the volatility of interbank rate and real exchange rate has a huge impact on the country’s future economic development. counterbalance of money supply changes is the best journal of asean studies 193 tool in achieving some combination of exchange rate fluctuation and output stabilization. despite the available number of strategies, the loosening or tightening of interest rate term is an effective option that can be implemented in the exchange rate open market operation in achieving both price and output objectives. about the authors mohd jaffri abu bakar is a current enroll as a doctoral (phd) student in azman hashim international business school, univeristi teknologi malaysia (utm). his research interests include financial issues relate to economics. nanthakumar loganathan is currently attached with azman hashim international business school, universiti teknologi malaysia as associate professor in development economics. he also has been appointed as a visiting professor for bina nusantara university. his research focuses mainly relate development economics, tourism, and resource economics which relate to time series modelling. tirta nugraha mursitama is a professor of international business at international relations department, faculty of humanities, bina nusantara university. his research interests include internationalization strategy of the firms, digital economy, and economic integration in southeast asian countries. asan ali golam hassan is a professor of economics at enroll with azman hashim international business school, universiti teknologi malaysia. his research focus concentrates on economic planning related to government policies and research activities worldwide. acknowledgement the research is funded under the fundamental research grant scheme (frgs) from the ministry of higher education malaysia (vote number: frgs/1/2020/ss0/utm/02/10). we would also like to thank universiti teknologi malaysia (utm) for the continuous support for the successful completion of this research. references abdoh, m. m. y., yusof, m. n. h., zulkifli, m. s. a, bulot, n., & ibrahim, n. j. 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(1998). a re-examination of real interest rate parity. the canadian journal of economics, 837-851. https://doi.org/10.2307/1913712 https://doi.org/10.1002/jae.616 https://doi.org/10.1080/1540496x.2018.1534682 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/s2212567116301903?via=ihub#! https://doi.org/10.1016/s2212-5671(16)30190-3 https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12723 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-thailand-election-timeline-iduskcn1r30hr https://doi.org/10.1142/s1793993321500010 http://www.worldbank.org/ https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp180_e.htm practice note asean’s role in shaping nuclear security future in the region mutti anggitta bina nusantara university, indonesia abstract the objective of this essay is to discuss the potential future of nuclear security in southeast asia by examining the roles of the association of southeast asian nations (asean) in establishing and maintaining regional cooperation on nuclear security. this essay will first outline nuclear renaissance and security challenges in the region. it will then discuss the steps that have been taken and could be taken by asean to lead the region to a safer nuclear security future. key words: nuclear security, asean introduction the last session of nuclear security summit (nss) held last year was not very successful. similar to the three previous sessions, the last nss only produced a toothless joint communiqué urging the participating states to maintain effective security of all nuclear materials, without a legally binding agreement. also, only 19 out of the 56 participating states pledged to join some form of successor nuclear security conference in 2018. the nss was initiated by the u.s. president barack obama during his famous 2009 prague speech, and largely driven by the u.s. however, he had left the white house. will his successor, president donald trump, make nuclear security a continuing priority? if not, what will happen to international cooperation on nuclear security, especially in southeast asia where ‘nuclear renaissance’ meets a number of serious security challenges? the objective of this essay is to discuss the potential future of nuclear security in southeast asia by examining the roles of the association of southeast asian nations (asean) in establishing and maintaining regional cooperation on nuclear security. this essay will first outline nuclear renaissance and security challenges in the region. it will then discuss the steps that have been taken and could be taken by asean to lead the region to a safer nuclear security future. nuclear renaissance and security challenges in southeast asia the interest in nuclear energy is not new to southeast asian nations. it was promoted by the u.s. in 1953 through the atoms for peace program. however, the development of nuclear energy has been difficult since the region is not only subject to large-scale and frequent natural disasters, but has also faced various political, financial, and technical difficulties. this may explain why the four journal of asean studies, vol. 4, no. 2 (2016), pp. 178-182 doi: 10.21512/jas.v4i2.1950.g1741 ©2016 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic journal of asean studies 179 projects to construct nuclear research reactors (two in indonesia, one in thailand, and one in myanmar) and one project to construct a nuclear power plant in the philippines were canceled since 1971 (cns, ceness, and vcdnp, 2012). in spite of previous interest, southeast asia has just recently put nuclear energy in its main agenda. there are currently sixteen projects to construct nuclear power plants by 2025 in the region: six in vietnam, four in indonesia, four in thailand, and two in malaysia (cns, ceness, and vcdnp, 2012). the reason behind this ‘nuclear renaissance’ in the region is potentially because southeast asian countries, just like any other countries in the world, want to fulfill their domestic energy needs and to ensure their energy security. between 2000 and 2013, the region’s energy demand has increased by approximately 50%. studies by iea and eria (2015) show that the region’s total electricity generation will almost triple, from 789 terawatt-hours (twh) in 2013 to approximately 2,200 twh in 2040. indonesia, malaysia, thailand, and vietnam seem to have been driven by the rising electricity demand and growing dependence on fossil fuels to consider restarting the postponed or starting new nuclear power plant projects. after the 2011 fukushima incident, there was much uncertainty about the future of nuclear industry in southeast asia. public rejection has been apparent especially in indonesia, malaysia, thailand, and the philippines, but not in vietnam. there is no major public protest against the nuclear power plant program in vietnam, a country with single-party rule where freedom of speech is very limited, if not non-existing. vietnam was progressing much faster than other countries in the region in developing its nuclear power plant program. in fact, it aims to start construction of a russiansupplied nuclear power plant in 2019 (wna, 2016). however, in november 2016, the national assembly of vietnam voted to halt its nuclear power plant program due to economic reasons. if the halt is to be temporary, and vietnam’s nuclear project runs smoothly and successfully becomes a part of the country’s energy mix, then other states in the region may even follow vietnam’s lead. although currently there is no nuclear power plant in operational in southeast asia, several countries in the region possess and use highly enriched uranium (heu) and other radioactive materials for various purposes as can be seen in tables 1 and 2 (cns, ceness, and vcdnp, 2012). considering the increased flow of nuclear and radioactive materials in southeast asia, not to mention the security challenges the region is facing, it is crucial for the region to have a strong nuclear security. there are at least three main security challenges in the region. firstly, the region is home to a number of active terrorist groups, such as jemaah islamiyah, jemaah ansharut tauhid, and abu sayyaf, not to mention several radical groups and clerics that have pledged their allegiance to the islamic state of iraq and syria (isis). fortunately, they have not shown a serious interest to use nuclear or radiological materials in their attacks. there is also little evidence that they have the capacity and the capability to mount mass casualty attacks (liow, 2016). however, this situation may change in the future. there is a rising fear that isis is pursuing radioactive materials for its attacks, since it has been known in november 2015 that some of the group’s 180 practice note: asean’s role in shaping nuclear security future in the region operatives have been spying on a senior official of skn-cen, a belgian nuclear research center (bunn et. al., 2016). table 1. heu in southeast asia table 2. use of radioactive materials in southeast asia secondly, southeast asia has very long land and sea borders, but weak border security capabilities. this makes states in the region targets for illicit arms, drugs, and human trafficking networks. weak border security may also facilitate the illicit transfer of nuclear and radiological materials. on 13 june 2003, journal of asean studies 179 the royal thai police arrested narong penanam, who smuggled some amount of cesium-137. such material has long been high on the list of security-critical isotopes. a similar incident also took place in other region just a few weeks before the smuggling incident in thailand. the police discovered two metal containers of cesium-137 and strontium90 in georgia (ferguson and andreoni, 2003). these trafficking incidents indicate that smugglers are interested in cesium137, a radioactive material that can be used to develop a radiological dispersion device (rdd), also known as ‘dirty bomb.’ thirdly, southeast asia has insufficient export control of dual use commodities. studies by cns, ceness, and vcdnp (2012) show that the a. q. khan network was active in or had links to indonesia, malaysia, and singapore. the network employed several firms in the region to produce centrifuge parts for libya’s nuclear weapons program. the network also transferred sensitive commodities through several ports in the region. lieggi (2016) also notes that besides the a. q. khan network, iran and north korea have also used ports in the region to obtain dual-use commodities. since the region is experiencing nuclear renaissance, the flow of dual-use commodities is increasing and likely to continue to grow in the future. states in the region potentially can no longer afford to ignore the importance of creating and implementing sufficient export control enforcement. it is just logical to think that an improved export control of dual use commodities is strongly needed in the region. asean’s roles – steps already taken southeast asia has an established framework for cooperation through asean and its subsidiary bodies. they have been serving as the primary forum for all ten member states to address and manage regional hopes and concerns. in terms of nuclear security, the regional grouping has not considered the issue as one of its main priorities. however it has developed a number of mechanisms that could serve as a model for cooperation on nuclear security. asean has created a considerably useful mechanism for cooperation on counter-terrorism and transnational crime in the region. during the 7th asean summit on 5 november 2001 in bandar seri begawan, asean heads of state adopted the declaration on joint action to counter terrorism, which underscored their commitment to combat terrorism in the region (asean, 2012a). in april 2002, the asean ministerial meeting on transnational crime held a special discussion about proposals on information sharing and training of counter-terrorism staffs. these efforts did not focus on nuclear security issues, but they covered customs and border control issues as a part of the wider scope of counter-terrorism and transnational crime activities (asean, 2012b). in 2007, asean finalized a significant security cooperation agreement for the region during the 12th asean summit. the heads of state signed the asean convention on counterterrorism (acct), which serves as a framework for regional cooperation to counter, prevent, and suppress terrorism and deepen counter-terrorism cooperation. the acct also aims to strengthen preparedness for dealing with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (cbrn) terrorism. after the ratification of six member states, the acct came into force in may 2011, and it has been ratified by all ten asean member states since january 180 practice note: asean’s role in shaping nuclear security future in the region 2013. under the acct, asean member states must take measures not only to secure materials that can be used to develop cbrn weapons and their delivery system, but also to improve export control enforcement, as well as to prevent cbrn proliferation (asean, 2012b). this seems to be in line with efforts related to the implementation of united nations security council resolution (unscr) 1540, which imposes binding obligations on all un member states to adopt legislation to prevent the proliferation of cbrn weapons including their means of delivery, and establish domestic controls over related materials to prevent their illicit trafficking (un, 2004). another mechanism used by asean to discuss security matters in the region is the asean regional forum (arf). many experts believe that the forum is the most appropriate instrument for regional initiatives related to nuclear security issues (cns, ceness, and vcdnp, 2012). this forum was established in 1994 and aims ‚to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern; and to make significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the asia-pacific region‛ (arf, 2016). the forum does not only consist of all ten member states, but also ten asean dialogue partners (the u.s., australia, canada, china, india, japan, south korea, russia, new zealand, and european union), papua new guinea, mongolia, north korea, pakistan, east timor, bangladesh, and sri lanka. on 2 july 2004, the arf made its first statement on nonproliferation and encouraged its participants to improve domestic control of weapons of mass destruction (wmd) related materials, to cooperate on the prevention of illicit trafficking of wmd related materials, and to provide technical assistance when possible towards these ends (arf, 2004). within the arf, there are inter-sessional meetings, which discuss specific issues of importance to the region every year. one of them related to nuclear security is the inter-sessional meeting on nonproliferation and disarmament (ismnpd). this forum discusses nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control issues in the region, as well as challenges in implementing the unscr 1540 implementation. in july 2010, the hanoi plan of action (poa) was adopted during the arf meeting in vietnam. according to the poa, by 2020 the arf should establish a network of law enforcement and military agencies for information sharing and capacity building to respond terrorist threats timely (arf, 2010). given the transnational nature of security challenges in the region, the arf is potentially an essential forum for discussions about coordinated policies on nuclear security issues. asean’s roles – steps can be taken the asean’s cooperative framework known as the asean security community (asc) can provide a basis for facilitating nuclear security cooperation. since all member states possess various radioactive materials and there have been a number of radioactive trafficking incidents in the region, it seems logical and wiser to put more attention on how to secure radioactive materials and how to respond to such radioactive incidents. moreover, considering that the majority of nuclear power plant programs in the region are still in the early development phase, there is a great opportunity to establish an effective nuclear security culture in the region. journal of asean studies 181 in establishing an effective and a strong nuclear security culture in the region, it is perhaps useful to have asean nuclear community as the fourth pillar of asean community. such forum can serve as a center for all member states to share information, knowledge, and experiences regarding nuclear safety and security issues. this forum can also serve as a coordinating instrument, including coordinating training programs for nuclear specialists, professionals, academia from all member states. although individual member states in the region have their own domestic situations, it is important for them to engage with each other and increase their commitment to securing nuclear and radioactive materials due to the transnational nature of nuclear security challenges in the region. about the author mutti anggitta received her bachelor’s degree in international relations from university of indonesia and m.a. in science and security from king’s college london. she is a member of the international nuclear security education network (insen) and a certified nuclear security professional (cnsp) with specialization in science and engineering for nuclear security. reference arf. 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(2012). prospects for nuclear security partnership in southeast asia. retrieved from http://www.nonproliferation.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/01/120515_prosp ects_nuclear_security_partnership_sou theast_asia.pdf ferguson, c. d., & andreoni, a. (2003). analysis of june 2003 seizure of cesium in thailand. retrieved from http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/an alysis-june-2003-seizure-cesiumthailand/ iea & eria. (2015). southeast asia energy outlook 2015. retrieved from https://www.iea.org/publications/free publications/publication/weo2015_sou theastasia.pdf 182 practice note: asean’s role in shaping nuclear security future in the region lieggi, s. (2016). dual-use technology in southeast asia: nonproliferation challenges for the next decade. retrieved from http://www.str.ulg.ac.be/wpcontent/uploads/2016/03/5.-dual-usetechnology-in-southeast-asianonproliferation-challenges-for-thenext-decade.pdf liow, j. c. (2016). isis in the pacific: assessing terrorism in southeast asia and the threat to the homeland. retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/testimoni es/isis-in-the-pacific-assessingterrorism-in-southeast-asia-and-thethreat-to-the-homeland/ united nations. (2004). united nations security council resolution 1540 (2004). retrieved from http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/ world nuclear association. (2016). nuclear power in vietnam. retrieved from http://www.worldnuclear.org/informationlibrary/country-profiles/countries-tz/vietnam.aspx editorial politics and creative economy in tourism sector warm greetings from journal of asean studies. we are proudly presenting to all readers volume 7, no 2, 2019 with distinguished theme on “political and creative economy in tourism sector”. in this volume, several issues related to politics and creative economy especially on tourism sectors are discussed by various authors from different backgrounds from indonesia and philippines. this volume is comprised of five articles; two articles related to politics and other three articles on creative economy in tourism sector. first article is written by amalia sustikarini. her paper discusses the peacebuilding process in aceh indonesia. she examines the role of special autonomy fund in accelerating economic development in aceh in the past ten years by utilizing the concept of the peace dividend and the model of fiscal-sharing. the author argues that while this fund has been successfully increasing aceh economic growth compared to the conflict era, it has not been optimally utilized to reduce poverty and inequality. according to the author, it is due to the nature of peace in aceh as an elite-based peace, the peace dividend has contributed to the patronage politics particularly among the former combatants. next article is written by roseno aji affandi and others. they assess how sustainable development goals, sdg awareness and implementation in the village level could be enhanced. in this regards, the authors’ argue that there is a need to look at two essential factors namely; the notion of social capital, and value chain management in order to fulfill sdgs at the local level. the authors’ argue that social capital can be mobilized by the local leaders to socialize the importance of sdgs at the village level. at the same time, value chain management enables local leaders to manage sustainable economic activities at the village level. it is evident in the authors’ illustration in the case of three tourism village development areas in yogyakarta namely; pentingsari in sleman, mangunan in bantul, and bleberan in gunung kidul. the following chapter is ayu dwidyah rini’s case studies on the paradigm of local communities related to digital-based tourism development. this digital-based tourism development is illustrated through the case of community-based tourism in the sumbermanjing wetan area of malang regency. she asserts that community participation in tourism is classified into three forms of local participation; first, digital-based tourism can be solutions for tourism development in the sumbermanjing wetan region. second, the community also understand the digitalization of tourism as an effort to alleviate poverty and improve the welfare of local communities. finally, digital-based tourism can be the strategy for improving the quality of life of the sumbermanjing wetan community. in relations to creative economy, i nyoman gede maha putra and ida bagus gede parama putra discuss about promoting creative economy of sanur through public participation. both authors highlight reinventing place-identity and embracing new economic opportunities. to them, collaboration among different actors in managing the transformation of such place could maintain the place-identity of a place, which ensures its attractiveness to visitors, sustains its economic values amidst rapid changes. the collaboration confirms no one is left behind. the authors argue that sanur is evident in showing the sustained place-identity could economically benefit all actors. in addition, the last article on the philippines politics is written by christopher ryan baquero maboloc. in his article, christopher examines the radical approach to politics of president rodrigo duterte. to him, the predatory nature of the state implies that politics in the country is still defined by vested interests. duterte’s brand of politics is antagonistic. the president is a polarizing figure. despite the declaration that he will punish corrupt officials, traditional politicians and elite clans continue to rule the land with impunity. the author argues that the country’s political ills are actually systemic. elitism is rooted in colonial history that is perpetuated by an inept bureaucracy. in addition, he asserts that the strong resolve and charisma of a leader is inadequate to remedy the troubles in fledgling democracies such as the philippines. finally, as the editor-in-chief, i would like to express my deepest gratitude to all authors who submitted their manuscripts to the journal of asean studies (jas). i would also like to extend my highest appreciation to all reviewers who have contributed to the quality of the manuscripts published in jas. all parties that supported the journal from the indonesian association for international relations (aihii) and the center for business and diplomatic studies (cbds) of the department of international relations, bina nusantara university are also very much appreciated. jakarta, 28 december 2019 prof. dr. tirta n. mursitama, ph.d. editor-in-chief journal of asean studies, vol. 8, no. 2 (2020), pp. 111-127 doi: https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v8i2.6622 issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic mediating civil conflicts in southeast asia: lessons from aceh and mindanao john lee candelaria graduate school for international development and cooperation hiroshima university jpcandelaria@hiroshima-u.ac.jp received: 13th august 2020/ revised: 23rd october 2020/ accepted: 15th november 2020 how to cite: candelaria, j. l. (2020). mediating civil conflicts in southeast asia: lessons from aceh and mindanao. journal of asean studies, 8(2), 111-127, https:/doi.org/ 10.21512/jas.v8i2.6622 abstract southeast asia has been a hotbed of intractable civil conflicts motivated by several issues such as ethnicity, ideology, and historical injustice, among others. despite the intractability, there have been instances when third-party assistance through mediation has been vital in achieving peace agreements in the region. using the cases of the third-party mediation of the conflicts in aceh, indonesia and mindanao, philippines, this research identified the kinds of mediation and qualities of mediators that led to the achievement of peace agreements in these two cases. this research mainly focused on path dependence, critical junctures, and periodization approaches in the comparative analysis of aceh and mindanao third-party mediation through a qualitative examination that involved comparative process tracing (cpt), a two-step methodological approach that combines theory, chronology, and comparison. the results showed that the mediators instrumental to the aceh and mindanao peace agreements allayed the commitment issues of the negotiations and ensured the trust and confidence of the conflict parties. thus, mediators should create relations of trust among parties and a mediation environment where the commitment fears are relieved through the promise of thirdparty monitoring. keywords: mediation, civil conflicts, third-parties, southeast asia, aceh, mindanao introduction southeast asia is one of the most ethnically diverse regions of the world. consequently, it also hosts some of the most protracted civil conflicts in modern times. between 1993 and 2004, 14 out of 32 low-intensity conflict dyads in asia are in southeast asia, yet there have 112 mediating civil conflicts in southeast asia been few formal third-party attempts in the region than the rest of the world (möller et al., 2007). among southeast asian countries, indonesia and the philippines have received the most significant number of formal third-party mediation attempts (derouen & bercovitch, 2019), which have resulted in relative success and the signing of peace agreements instrumental to conflict termination. therefore, the mediation of the protracted aceh and mindanao conflicts could serve as exemplars of third-party mediation success. the conflicts in aceh and mindanao have individual contexts yet share some similarities. the free aceh movement (gerakan aceh merdeka or gam) in indonesia and the moro national liberation front (mnlf), and later on, the moro islamic liberation front (milf) in the philippines claim to fight for their historical grievances rooted in a distinct identity that formed the foundation of their call for separation. both conflicts lasted for multiple decades, with their respective governments being initially reluctant to accept third-party involvement. on the other hand, the conflicts were mediated with a variety of strategies and actors. these conflicts have also been a subject to investigation and analysis of many scholars, as either individual or comparative cases. this research seeks to understand how the third-party mediation of aceh and mindanao peace processes led to peace agreements. these cases were mainly chosen since they stand out among mediation efforts in the region. non-state actors, i.e., nongovernmental organizations or ngos (the henry dunant centre or the hdc and the crisis management initiative or the cmi), mediated the aceh conflict. in contrast, the mindanao conflict was mediated by an intergovernmental organization or igo (the organization of the islamic conference or oic) and later a neighboring state (malaysia). the varying actor types provide an opportunity to explore how ngos, igos, and states could serve as third-party mediators, while the differing lengths of conflict interventions provide a nuanced analysis of how mediator strategies affected the success of third-party mediation. these mediation episodes of the peace processes were analyzed through a qualitative examination that involves comparative process tracing (cpt), a two-step methodological approach that combines theory, chronology, and comparison, whose logic could be relevant in comparing fast-moving political processes such as peace negotiations (bengtsson & ruonavaara, 2017). this research mainly focuses on path dependence, critical junctures, and periodization approaches in the comparative analysis of aceh and mindanao third-party mediation using cpt. literature review third-party mediation bercovitch defines mediation as “a process of conflict management, related to but distinct from the parties’ own negotiations, where those in conflict seek the assistance of or accept an offer of help from an outsider to change their perceptions or behavior and to do so without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law” (2008, p. 343). the mediation situation is comprised of parties to the conflict, a mediator, a process of mediation, and the context of mediation. journal of asean studies 113 effectiveness of mediation in assessing the literature on how mediation helps secure peace, beardsley (2008) observed a lack of consensus on mediation’s long-term effect on peace but contended that mediation positively influenced short-term outcomes of conflict management. the extant literature on mediation, therefore, focuses on these immediate and short-term gains. in identifying factors for mediation success, haass (1990) considered the following as prerequisites: 1) a mutual desire for an accord, 2) a formula with benefits for all parties, 3) a negotiating process that is acceptable to all, and 4) a leadership strong enough to maintain compromise. kleiboer (1996), on the other hand, identified four factors associated with mediation success, namely: 1) characteristics of dispute, 2) characteristics of the mediator, 3) the interrelationship among the parties, and 4) the international context. mediators perform at least three important roles, according to touval and zartman (1985). the first is informational: mediators can supply missing information, transmit messages, highlight common interests, and encourage meaningful communication so that combatants can better locate common middle ground. the second is an essential procedural role as they arrange for interactions between the parties, control the meetings' pace and formality, and structure the agenda to keep the process focused on issues. the third role is, in some ways, more coercive. mediators can reward the parties' concessions and punish intransigence for making disagreement costly (walter, 2002). mediator actors mediator types and their position relative to the conflict parties have been widely explored in mediation literature. traditionally, a third-party mediator is a neutral outsider, and neutrality has been regarded as a necessary tool for the successful mediator (carnevale & arad, 1996; young, 1967). smith and stam (2003) argued that to earn the designation of a genuine, honest broker, a mediator must be unbiased and not prefer outcomes that favor one side to the other. equally important, it must not have an aversion to war. nevertheless, mediator impartiality has been hotly debated by scholars. an essential work by lederach (1991) found that instead of neutrality, conflict parties seek trust and confidence from mediators. this work was further expanded by wehr and lederach (1991), who suggested that insider-partial mediators, i.e., mediators from within the conflict, embody trust and confidence, whose acceptability is rooted not in the distance from the conflict but instead in connectedness and trusted relationships with the conflict parties. insider-partials also have a stake in the conflict outcome and will have to live with the consequence of their mediation. the trust and confidence that conflict parties feel for an insider mediator is not because of the perception of neutrality, but rather the inherent knowledge and connections the mediator has about the conflict parties. wehr and lederach contended that this type of mediator would work well in conflicts where parties rely heavily on interpersonal trust and personal relationships, complementing outsiderneutral mediators. 114 mediating civil conflicts in southeast asia elgström, bercovitch, and skau (2003) expanded on the concept of mediator partiality by identifying three possible meanings attributed to the concept: 1) relational partiality, which rests in the closeness and previous ties a mediator has to the disputants; 2) processual partiality, where the mediator favors one party during the negotiation process by listening more closely to that party; and 3) outcome partiality, where the mediator deliberately favors one of the parties in its proposal for settlements. international mediation in indonesia and the philippines studies on the mediation of aceh and mindanao conflicts also zoned in on the mediation effectiveness and mediator types. huber (2004) investigated the role of the henry dunant centre (hdc) in the aceh conflict and identified three emerging themes: 1) while political dynamics in indonesia was significantly shifting, it was not certain if the conflict was “ripe” and truly amenable for resolution; 2) the hdc was confronted with the limits of what an ngo could do to achieve a successful accord while lacking formal power; and 3) the hdc may have chosen not to address several issues that could have led to more successful ends. heiling (2008), on the other hand, credited the success of the aceh mediation to procedural factors such as mediation behavior and mediation strategies employed by the cmi, and their use of contacts with official track one actors, all of which were crucial in securing the signing and implementation of the peace accord. furthermore, higgins and daly (2010) pointed out that while the devastating tsunami signaled the impetus for improving the negotiation parties' commitment, it is still the mediator who ensured a successful peace deal. shea (2016) echoed the same findings, attributing the success of the peace process to the characteristics of the cmi as a mediator despite their apparent limitation being a small ngo. more in-depth research on the mindanao conflict mediation was also carried out, such as the work of fitrah (2012), who argued that in the context of the multiparty mediation of the mindanao conflict, mediators with higher standing, i.e., those that are well-coordinated and supported by the power and status of the organization are more likely to succeed in helping the parties come into a peace agreement. in comparing the mediation of the government of the republic of the philippines (grp) and the mnlf to the then ongoing grp-milf, fitrah noted that unlike the oic, malaysia had limited influence over the negotiations. malaysia’s role as mediator was further investigated by na thalang (2017). in comparing the country’s involvement in the southern thailand and mindanao conflicts, the research argued that various developments had paved the way for malaysia to play a more decisive role in the mindanao conflict, which was attributed to the philippine government’s openness towards third-party involvement, regional security concerns, and less-polarized politics. on the other hand, taya et al. (2018) offered insights in comparing the mindanao conflict mediation by oic and malaysia, which differed on their peacebuilding models. they argued that malaysia’s thirdparty involvement model is more successful because it was not confrontational, and unlike the oic, malaysia’s “quiet diplomacy” brought a positive impact to the conflict mediation. some studies examined the aceh and mindanao conflicts by employing a comparative approach, such as harish (2005) and odaira (2009), whose analysis showed that it is not the journal of asean studies 115 mediator's impartiality that mattered, but the leverage it had over the disputants. buendia (2005) investigated the two conflicts to gain lessons that could be valuable for conflict resolution. he argued, among others, that while the peace process was arduous, it remained the only sensible means and that painstaking confidence-building measures and dialogue that deal with the core problems of the feuding parties were imperative for success. sangsuwan (2014) applied comparative framing analysis to explore the conflict and peace process in aceh and mindanao and concluded that the success in aceh is a result of the strong political will of its government leaders and the trust they received from gam, while the failure of the peace process in mindanao was attributed to the government’s weak political will and lack of trust by the mnlf and the milf. these attempts at a comparative analysis of the aceh and mindanao conflicts are noteworthy. however, it appears that there has been no comprehensive comparative analysis of conflict mediation that looks at the mediators as actors and the respective strategies they introduce. this research fills that gap at an opportune time—while the aceh conflict was terminated, and a definitive and durable peace agreement was signed in 2005 (sustikarini, 2019), the final peace agreement of the mindanao conflict and the enabling law for its implementation were only achieved in 2014 and 2018, respectively. in light of these developments, the mediation of both conflicts could be revisited to gain new insights on how instrumental mediation became in the signing of peace agreements. aceh and mindanao: conflict roots and international mediation the foundation of the muslim separatist movements in aceh and mindanao is the assertion of a religious, cultural, and historical uniqueness, making them distinct from the rest of the population. thus, their historical grievances, rooted in marginalization and exclusion, formed part of the rebel groups’ rationale to seek independence from the government. this section traces the roots of the conflicts, focusing on the rebel groups in indonesia and the philippines. the free aceh movement (gerakan aceh merdeka/gam) while the historical difference of the acehnese is usually identified as the root of the conflict, it is the indonesian state's activities that caused the contemporary conflict. in unpacking the aceh conflict, miller (2008) explained that the conflict precursors in the 1950s and 1960s led gam to assert that the state exploited aceh’s resources, broke promises of a special region status for the province, and enabled depredations against the acehnese by the state military. the 1970s caused acehnese discontent to resurface after the indonesian state's centralizing policies through president suharto’s new order did not fulfill the acehnese aspiration to restore islam’s dominance in indonesia, as well as the tightening grip of the central government in the affairs of regional governments. the discovery of vast reserves of oil and natural gas in north aceh and the growth of a nearby industrial zone fueled further discontent, as profits were siphoned off to the central government without introducing sufficient 116 mediating civil conflicts in southeast asia interventions to improve aceh’s local economy. as the industrial zone expanded, nonacehnese and non-muslim workers from outside aceh came in droves, while the villages near the zone were displaced because of the expansion. a large number of indonesian security forces were also deployed to secure the zone, which further exacerbated the acehnese's injured feelings as the depredations of the security forces changed the way the acehnese viewed the indonesian central government. on 4 december 1976, tengku hasan muhammad di tiro, a descendant of precolonial sultans and participant of an earlier rebellion, declared aceh independence, creating the gerakan aceh merdeka (gam) or the free aceh movement. the government quickly suppressed gam, whose leadership fled to europe. gam was able to relaunch in 1989, with the indonesian government launching a brutal counterinsurgency operation that almost immediately obliterated gam military capabilities but continued until 1998 (sukma, 2004). the moro national liberation front and the moro islamic liberation front the mindanao conflict is identified to have roots from the spanish colonial period when muslim mindanao is not effectively subjugated by spain, separating them from the rest of the country’s development. spain ceded the philippines to the united states after 300 years, and the americans proved more successful in subjugating the muslims and created the moro province to integrate muslims into the rest of the country. however, the americans concentrated the state's powers to luzon's christianized elites, leaving out the muslims of the south in the whole project of nation-building while initiating the steady stream of christian migration to mindanao. as the philippines was granted independence, political power was institutionalized under the christian majority. tensions soon arose between the christians and the muslims when the government adopted the us resettlement program, resulting in the substantial movement of different groups to mindanao. the influx of resettlers led to a fight for the region's land and resources, increasing the animosity among christian resettlers, non-christian groups, and the muslims. separatism or muslim nationalism was first expressed through the moro independence movement, founded in 1968 as a reaction to the jabidah massacre, the massacre of moro army recruits by the philippine armed forces in the same year. this event is an important turning point because it fueled significant issues within and outside the country. the moro recruits thought they were training as army recruits, only to find out that they were to be sent to sabah, malaysia, to agitate for war since the philippines claimed the said territory. the moro recruits were massacred, which angered muslims in the philippines and malaysia. thus, the mnlf was formed in 1972 by students and politicians. it aimed to create the bangsamoro republic (abinales & amoroso, 2017) and was supported to some extent by malaysia (che man, 1990). the moro islamic liberation front (milf) took on the role as the standard-bearer of muslim separatism after the mnlf signed a peace agreement with the government in 1996. journal of asean studies 117 analysis mediators of the aceh and mindanao peace processes different actors mediated various stages of the conflicts in aceh and mindanao. for aceh, ngos were instrumental in achieving peace agreements since the indonesian government preferred non-state actors after the un intervention in east timor (shea, 2016). for the philippines, the oic mediated the peace process by forcing conflict parties to negotiate for a peaceful resolution. later, malaysia was sought by the philippine government to mediate, following a disastrous foray into unmediated bilateral talks with the rebel group. this section explores how these different mediators approached the peace processes and the strategies utilized to achieve settlements. aceh: the henry dunant centre abdurrahman wahid, the new indonesian president in 1999, invited the hdc to mediate between the government and gam, knowing that the rebel group would be more open to dialogue through an international actor. thus, choosing an ngo was seen as something that satisfied gam leadership and the indonesian government (kivimäki & gorman, 2008). the parties first met in geneva in january 2000. in a few months, an agreement called the “joint understanding on humanitarian pause for aceh” was reached. also referred to as the humanitarian pause, it was essentially a ceasefire while the parties further negotiated. a local security committee consisting of representatives from gam, the indonesian army, and the hdc was created to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire. the ceasefire was upheld until january 2001 and not renewed due to the increasing animosity between conflict parties. as a result of the humanitarian pause's failure and his weakening political capital, wahid authorized an all-out security operation against gam in april 2001. later in july, wahid was replaced by megawati sukarnoputri. the hdc pushed on despite the challenges and achieved a breakthrough in 2002. megawati appointed a popular officer, lt. gen. susilo bambang yudhoyono, as coordinating minister for political and security affairs. the dialogue continued in geneva in february and may. a formal ceasefire agreement, the cessation of hostilities framework agreement (coha), was signed in december 2002 (merikallio, 2006). while identical in principle with the humanitarian pause, the coha presented a more comprehensive framework (braithwaite et al., 2010). the coha was achieved through “proximity talks,” in which the government and gam were kept separately, and the hdc shuffling between jakarta, banda aceh, and stockholm (huber, 2004). however, the coha was short-lived: in a matter of weeks, the agreement unraveled as both parties accused each other of breaking the agreement terms. aceh: the crisis management initiative watershed events in 2004 opened opportunities for negotiations to resume. indonesia held its first-ever presidential elections, and megawati’s minister for political and security 118 mediating civil conflicts in southeast asia affairs yudhoyono was elected president while yusuf kalla, also a former minister under megawati, was elected vice president. before the elections, kalla had already initiated informal talks with some moderate acehnese outside of gam’s leadership in exile and came across the cmi, a small ngo started by former finland president martti ahtisaari. cmi was identified as a potential mediator (huber, 2008). the informal talks continued after the elections, and by december 2004, ahtisaari was informed that both sides were ready to negotiate. in the same month, the indian ocean earthquake and tsunami struck, bringing destruction and devastation in many areas, especially aceh. negotiations resumed on 27 january 2005 in helsinki. the yudhoyono administration was adamant about reaching a comprehensive resolution to the conflict, while gam was also more open and amenable to finding a resolution as it relinquished its claim for independence (huber, 2008). this openness was a crucial concession that led to the government permitting the creation of local-level political parties, allowing gam to be transformed into a non-violent political force. the memorandum of agreement was signed on 15 august 2005. it authorized a more robust third-party to monitor the agreement, which called for a 300-strong force of european union (eu) and asean personnel, with the cmi chair, ahtisaari himself, empowered as the final arbiter of disputes that could not be resolved at lower levels (huber, 2008). mindanao: the organization of the islamic conference the oic was instrumental in bringing the mindanao conflict parties to the table. it recognized the mnlf’s struggle for independence by giving the group an observer status in the conference, while oic members threatened the philippine government with sanctions if they refused to negotiate and a peace agreement was not concluded (fitrah, 2012; harish, 2005; taya et al., 2018). in the pre-negotiation phase, the oic reframed the conflict through a joint communique, where the organization called for “a political and peaceful solution… within the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the philippines” (noble, 1981, p. 1099). the formal talks mediated by the oic committee of four (libya, saudi arabia, senegal, and somalia) happened in jeddah in january 1975 (lingga, 2006). the subsequent meetings resulted in the signing of the tripoli agreement in tripoli, libya, on 23 december 1976. the agreement stipulated ceasefire arrangements and terms of the peace settlement, as well as autonomy for thirteen provinces in mindanao. the agreement unraveled quickly, as parties disagreed with implementation. the mnlf rejected how the philippine government implemented the agreement, and violence reoccurred. disagreements within the mnlf ranks resulted in the birth of the milf in 1977, a breakaway faction led by salamat hashim. the mnlf quickly returned to its independence demands. as marcos was ousted through mass mobilizations in 1986, a new democratic government was ushered in, led by journal of asean studies 119 president corazon aquino. this event provided an opening for the peace talks to resume. the oic mediated for another peace agreement called the jeddah accord signed in 1987. the mnlf once again accepted autonomy but contended that they were “pressured thrice by the oic to talk with the government” and did not want to accept the autonomy deal in the first place (marohomsalic, 2001 p. 296). challenges to agreement implementation persisted, while the jeddah accord's signing also further alienated the milf since they were not included in the talks. the disagreements resulted in deepening the incompatibilities brought about by varying interpretations of earlier agreements. the oic proceeded with its mediation of the peace talks with a new president elected in 1992, fidel v. ramos. the original committee of four was expanded to six with bangladesh and indonesia's inclusion, with the latter taking the leadership role. four rounds of talks from october 1993 to august 1996 came up with the signing of the final peace agreement (fpa) on 2 september 1996. mindanao: malaysia and the international contact group with the conclusion of the 1996 fpa, the milf became the standard-bearer of muslim independence in the country. talks between the government and the milf commenced immediately, this time without a third-party mediator. however, the agreements signed during this period of unmediated negotiations were limited to ceasefires and cessation of hostilities. clashes between the parties also continued and reached its climax when new president joseph estrada declared an “all-out war” in april 2000, while the milf responded with an “all-out jihad war” (iqbal, 2018). in 2001, malaysia was involved in mediating the peace talks upon the invitation of the newly installed president gloria macapagal-arroyo and the concurrence of the milf. the positive attitude towards malaysia by both parties was rooted in the fact that malaysia, while having a majority islamic population, also hosts many non-muslim citizens, an exemplar that islam can co-exist peacefully with other religions (fitrah, 2012). milf peace panel chair mohagher iqbal also noted that “the common malay culture and temperament among the key players…eased facilitation, and [malaysia’s] role made it the constant figure in the ups and downs of the peace process” (iqbal, 2018). nonetheless, malaysia seemingly had weak leverage in terms of resources, which was remedied through the international monitoring team (imt), a joint military and civil monitoring group deployed since 2005 and composed of malaysia, libya, brunei, japan, norway, and the eu; and the international contact group (icg) created in 2009, whose primary role was to ensure implementation of mutually-agreed approaches and was comprised of japan, united kingdom, turkey, and saudi arabia with four international ngos: muhammadiyah, the asia foundation, the hdc, and conciliation resources. 120 mediating civil conflicts in southeast asia the most contentious aspect of the peace talks at that point was the discussion on the issue of ancestral domain, a territorial issue in the creation of the bangsamoro juridical entity that will exist within national sovereignty. in 2008, the government and the milf released a joint communique to end the formal talks on the ancestral domain. a memorandum of agreement on ancestral domain (moa-ad) called for a referendum for about 700 villages in mindanao to decide if they want to join the bangsamoro. local christian officials in mindanao challenged the moa-ad and asked the philippine supreme court to block the signing of the agreement. later that year, the supreme court declared that the moa-ad was unconstitutional and illegal, practically dissolving the ongoing peace talks and plunged mindanao into a severe level of violence that displaced over half a million citizens in the region (williams, 2010). the peace talks once again stalled. in 2010, a new philippine president was elected, benigno c. aquino iii. he initiated exploratory talks with the milf in 2011, and the peace talks resumed with malaysia once again mediating. on 15 october 2012, the parties signed the framework agreement on the bangsamoro (fab), a significant breakthrough in the sixteen-year negotiations. the agreement called for the creation of a bangsamoro government, which would allow filipino muslims the authority to regulate on their own. what followed the fab signing is the incremental progress towards finalizing other terms of the agreement referred to as annexes. on 27 march 2014, the comprehensive agreement on the bangsamoro (cab) was signed by the parties. the insider-outsider mediators of the aceh and mindanao peace processes the two conflict cases present an opportunity for analyzing mediators within the insider-outsider mediator typology: the hdc and cmi are ngos considered to be outsiders to the aceh conflict, while the oic and malaysia are insiders to the mindanao conflict. this analysis is elaborated in this section. the outsider mediators: hdc and cmi both ngos legitimized their position as mediators because they were outsiders perceived to be neutral and impartial. the conflict parties trusted the mediators; however, the mediator (in the hdc case) could not build trust between the conflict parties. on the one hand, the hdc led an ambiguous negotiation that did not actively push for an agreement and did not settle the parties' incompatibilities. on the other hand, the cmi was able to outline at the onset that the negotiation was aimed at an agreement, which resulted in a definitive settlement enabling the signing of an agreement. the cmi also showed its partiality early on, as ahtisaari informed gam that independence is not an option (heiling, 2008). while this angered gam, it allowed them to develop a self-government proposal, a workable setup that emanated from their ranks. ahtisaari also built trust among conflict parties by championing the spirit of compromise—parties must first commit to the process before committing to the agreement (kingsbury, 2006). journal of asean studies 121 ahtisaari also understood the limits of an ngo-led mediation. he believed ngos should not be responsible for monitoring peace agreements due to their limitations. bringing the eu and the asean to the aceh monitoring mission proved instrumental in strengthening the parties' trust and confidence in the agreement and bolstering the leverage and legitimacy of the mediation led by cmi. the conflict parties also praised ahtisaari’s leadership of the mediation. as the lead gam mediator malik mahmoud noted, “ahtisaari is an exceptionally good intermediary and negotiator. i believe he is also a man who stands behind his word and wants to see the process succeed. i am confident that he will continue to follow it up” (merikallio, 2006, p. 26). this trust emanated from the mediator’s processual partiality to gam and outcome partiality to the indonesian government, made apparent by the skillful strategies employed by ahtisaari. what is evident in this analysis is that while both the hdc and the cmi were outsiders that could have used their perceived neutrality as leverage, in the end, it was the trust and confidence of the conflict parties to the cmi through ahtisaari that proved most useful in ensuring the peace agreement. the insider mediators: oic and malaysia the mindanao peace process mediators from 1975 to 2014 could be considered insiders to the conflict. the oic, as an organization of islamic states, had an evident religious and cultural proximity to the mnlf. meanwhile, malaysia was a close neighbor and ally that had a majority muslim population. the oic mediation of the mindanao conflict was initiated through coercion, which affected the trust and confidence of the conflict parties in the mediators. the libya-led oic mediation that resulted in the tripoli agreement and the jeddah accord used the oic’s leverage to threaten the philippine government and entice the mnlf with incentives to participate, eroding the government’s commitment to the peace agreement implementation. the dynamics changed when indonesia led the oic mediation of the conflict. the conflict parties’ trust was secured since the leader was an insider that offered an approach that is uniquely “asean.” according to former philippine president fidel v. ramos, “the approach of musyawarah (consultation) and mufakat (consensus) proved to be the most productive” in the achievement of the 1996 fpa (santos, 2013). however, the fight for muslim separatism continued through the milf. this development could be attributed to the fact that, in the first place, the mnlf did not desire autonomy, and when it finally agreed to it, the breakaway faction that created the milf already expressed that the fight for independence would continue. the milf only accepted the autonomy that bore their concurrence, which was evident in the developments that led to the signing of the 2014 cab. the conflict parties quickly trusted malaysia because the philippine government, with milf concurrence, sought the state’s service as a mediator. their mediation style was focused 122 mediating civil conflicts in southeast asia on shuttling between parties to dissolve deadlocks and a more consultative method of resolving incompatibilities. elaborating on their mediation strategy, malaysia’s chief facilitator tengku noted: “what we did was, we agreed on the principles and they would discuss them in detail. when i move the principles in, i don’t get involved in the discussions… i never issued ultimatums. nobody can say ‘you do this, you do that…’ it required lots of compromises and understanding” (karim, 2012). while being an insider-impartial mediator, malaysia lacked leverage when compared to the oic. the trust and confidence that the conflict parties had in the mediator could quickly be shattered by unexpected events, which materialized when the moa-ad debacle in 2008 threatened the peace process altogether. the milf began questioning malaysia’s position as a mediator of the conflict. the entry of the international contact group (icg) as an ad-hoc mediator in 2009 was essential to bolster malaysia’s leverage since the icg was composed of japan, the united kingdom, turkey, and saudi arabia, together with four international ngos. the icg entry was instrumental since it introduced hybrid mediation assistance composed of states and ngos, the first time this configuration was ever attempted. the icg, together with the imt, provided clearer monitoring capabilities that renewed the parties' trust in the mediation efforts. in the mediation of the mindanao peace process, what mattered more than being insiders was how the mediators used their proximity to the conflict or conflict parties to gain their trust and confidence that led to mediation success. conclusions the analysis on the aceh and mindanao peace processes presented in this study emphasized the crucial roles of positioning (insider or outsider) and partiality (relational, processual, and outcome) in identifying factors that lead to mediation success. it was found that while both insider and outsider mediators have relative strengths in leading the peace process to a resolution, it can only do so by ensuring the conflict parties’ trust and confidence in the mediator, the mediation, and the resulting agreement. moreover, this research echoed the recommendation of elgström et al. (2003) on the importance of exhibiting processual impartiality at the least in achieving durable solutions. the cmi and malaysia mediation showed this level of impartiality by making the conflict parties commit first to the negotiation and set aside contentious points until compromise and concessions were ready to be made. on mediator actors and approaches in aceh and mindanao, this research provided compelling support for mediation and the mediators' role in solving conflict parties' incompatibilities. it is evident that no conflict, however protracted, is invincible from peace efforts such as mediation. however, what matters in achieving a durable peace agreement is how mediators secure the parties' trust and confidence. such finding could lead us to argue that the kind of mediator is not crucial, whether a state, igo or ngo, outsider or insider; as long as the strategies they utilize create relations of trust and maintain an environment conducive for allaying commitment fears, they are capable of leading negotiations towards agreements. journal of asean studies 123 another critical finding presented in this research is that the limited mediator leverage can always be augmented through international cooperation, which could lead to an upsurge in mediator legitimacy. both aceh and mindanao peace processes involved third parties in the promise of monitoring and enforcement, ranging from state actors, ngos, and igos. as it is true in mediation, third parties as monitors and enforcers might also have the same effect of increasing trust and commitment, this time, in the implementation phase of the process, which could be another research subject in the future. the realm of conflict resolution is increasingly complex, but various actors, insider or outsider, could explore the strengths they could bring to the negotiation table. in southeast asia, the asean has been involved in some peace processes, but only as part of the monitoring team. as a regional intergovernmental association, the asean’s potential role as a mediator could be explored. after all, it is in the best interest of regional organizations to take on a conflict management mandate to offer solutions that could aid its members towards its development aims. the asean’s potential role as a mediator could be examined by other scholars studying conflicts in the region. ultimately, this research showed that while resolving civil conflicts through peace processes and mediation could be arduous, laborious, and excruciatingly slow, the bulk of the work is on the mediator’s shoulder. the snags and hurdles of the process could be solved by carefully reevaluating and recalculating strategies aimed at resolving the parties’ incompatibilities, building trust in the mediator and the process of mediation, and finding an agreement that parties could commit to credibly. about the author john lee candelaria is a ph.d. student at the graduate school for international development and cooperation, hiroshima university, japan. he finished his ba and ma in history from the university of the philippines diliman. his research interests include international relations, peace and conflict studies, heritage studies, and philippine and southeast asian history. references abinales, p. j. and amoroso, d. j. 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(1967). intermediaries: third parties in international crises. princeton, nj: princeton university press. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343391028001009 https://doi.org/10.1177/186810341002900106 research note liberal world order in the age of disruptive politics: a southeast asian perspective moch faisal karim university of warwick, united kingdom abstract there is no question that the current liberal world order faces yet another challenge. the upcoming challenge that we are about to confront is an exceptionally different kind of challenge. this challenge is the emergence of what i call a disruptive politics in the heartland of consolidated liberal states. the two main side effects of disruptive politics can be seen at both the domestic and international levels. domestically, there is growing rise of populism in stable western democracies epitomized with the election of donald trump as president of the united states of america. internationally, there is a growing rejection of globalization and integration, exemplified by the uk leaving the eu. many commentators and pundits have observed that the rise of disruptive politics is the very threat to the liberal world order that could eventually cause it to collapse from within. while the side effects of disruptive politics should be addressed with caution; however, it is misleading to equate the disruptive politics with its side effects such as the rise of populism and the growing contend with the globalization. i would argue that disruptive politics is necessary for the survival of the liberal world order. disruptive politics is a way to make us realize that liberal democracy is not perfect, and we need to fix it. this essay explores the notion of disruptive politics and the challenge it poses. it begins by unpacking the notion. it then offers three insights on how to maintain the liberal world order in an age of disruptive politics. key words: disruptive politics, liberal world order, donald trump the challenges from within there is no question that the current liberal world order faces yet another challenge. indeed, since its inception by the western power from the ashes of world war ii, the liberal world order has always been challenged, by the spread of communism during the cold war, and the rise of terrorism after 9/11, which is becoming even more diffused and decentralized. despite the challenges, the liberal world order has survived and flourished. it provides a relatively more stable world than before it existed. even the non-western rising power that seemingly challenges the liberal world order has, for the most part, accepted this order and hugely benefitted from it. nevertheless, the upcoming challenge that we are about to confront is an exceptionally different kind of challenge. many have thought that the main challenges of the liberal world order come from the without especially pressure from the others. surprisingly the challenge in fact comes from the within. this challenge is the emergence of what i call a disruptive politics in the heartland of journal of asean studies, vol. 5, no. 1 (2017), pp. 68-74 doi: 10.21512/jas.v5i1.2129 ©2017 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic journal of asean studies consolidated liberal states. the two main side effects of disruptive politics can be seen at both the domestic and international levels. domestically, there is growing rise of populism in stable western democracies epitomized with the election of donald trump as president of the united states of america. internationally, there is a growing rejection of globalization and integration, exemplified by the uk leaving the eu. many commentators and pundits have observed that the rise of disruptive politics is the very threat to the liberal world order that could eventually cause it to collapse from within. international experts like stephen walt (2016), ian buruma (2017), and the new york times’ roger cohen (2017) have warned about the dark times facing the liberal world order with the recent disruptive politics happening in the western liberal democracies. joe biden even stated that the liberal world order is at risk of collapsing in his last international remarks as us vice president at the world economic forum in davos (biden, 2017). while the side effects of disruptive politics should be addressed with caution; however, it is misleading to equate the disruptive politics with its side effects. i would argue that disruptive politics is necessary for the survival of the liberal world order. disruptive politics is a way to make us realize that liberal order is not perfect, and we need to fix it. this policy note explores the notion of disruptive politics and the challenge it poses. it begins by unpacking the notion. it then considers the way in which global leaders should manage the liberal world order in the age of disruptive politics. this note concludes that there is a need for world leaders to rethink the way in which the liberal world order should be maintained. understanding disruptive politics within the liberal order in 1995, clayton christensen (1997) put forward the notion of disruptive innovation as “an innovation that creates a new market and value network and eventually disrupts an existing market and value network.” borrowing the notion of disruptive innovation, i define disruptive politics as a politics that interrupts the established order of things, particularly in the core constituency of the liberal order. disruptive politics is particularly different from conventional contentious politics, defined as “a politics that uses disruptive methods to make a political point or to change particular government policies” (tilly & tarrow, 2015). while contentious politics can be seen throughout both democracies and autocracies, disruptive politics is a slow process within liberal democracy that strikes at the very core of the liberal world order, namely liberal democracy and global capitalism. just like the call for democracy in an authoritarian regime, disruptive politics within democracies is mainly caused by the politics of resentment, particularly towards the status quo and the elites who undermine the ordinary people. in the authoritarian setting, disruption often occurred due to the lack of freedom to contend the authoritarian rule and demand on regime change. in liberal democracies with a stable democratic transfer of power, the very same disruption rarely happened. liberal democracy has embraced protests and dissidents as part of its legitimation strategy and provided democratic platforms that neutralize resistance 69 liberal world order in the age of disruptive politics towards the status quo. but it does not address the issue of inequality where the accumulation of power in the hands of the few has made the voice of most of the people unheard. an interesting study conducted by political scientist martin gilens and benjamin page on the us democracy reveals that ordinary citizens have a non-significant influence on public policies compared to the economic elites (gilens & page, 2014). with this condition, democracy has been habituated as a ceremonial celebration for the ordinary citizens while the decisions are dominated by rich and powerful elites. in the long run, just like in authoritarian rule, liberal democracies, instead of being the government of the people, by the people, and for the people, as envisioned by abraham lincoln, have metamorphosed to become an oligarchy. the recent predicament in the liberal democracies is perfectly summed up in animal farm’s famous remarks, “all animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others” (orwell, 2003). to tame these circumstances, disruptive politics is needed. borrowing from carol hanisch (1969), the occurrence of disruptive politics has made politics become more personal and personal is political. while the status quo within democracies has disconnected the politics from the people, disruptive politics could empower people to be more involved in politics for better or worse. some commentators have even argued that the recent rise of populist nationalism in mainstream western political discourse might have been made possible by a collective loss of faith in democracy. it is possible to read what i have written here as a defense of the rise of populism and the decline of liberal principles. but my message is the exact opposite. disruptive politics can have dangerous outcomes, but this is by no means the end of the liberal world order. it is janus-faced. on the one hand, it might lead to the decline of liberal democracy with the rise of populist nationalism where angry democratic majorities rule, which might lead to the rise of authoritarian strong men. on the other hand, it could provide us with an opportunity to reform the core principles of liberal world order, which the national and global agenda have been aggressively pursuing, particularly since the end of the cold war. disruptive politics is a harsh wake up call to both the elites and the average citizens that the liberal world order is not without its shortcomings. through disruptive politics, we have been given a chance to step back and reassess the national and global agenda of the liberal world order. managing disruptive politics: a southeast asian perspective with the emergence of disruptive politics, what kind of global political order will emerge in the aftermath? this is indeed a very important question that has attracted the attention of the brightest minds. to contribute to the debate, i offer three insights on how to maintain the liberal world order in an age of disruptive politics. first, the disruptive politics happening in the western world could provide fresh voices from the non-western powers to come up in defense of the liberal world order. rather than antagonizing over the non-western powers’ motives in pursuing global leadership, it is time for western leaders to trust the non-western world in terms of the burden of leadership sharing to maintain the global order. the disruptive politics unfortunately has brought the discourse of protectionism and 70 journal of asean studies anti-globalization into mainstream western politics, with president trump’s statement “buy american hire american” (chu, 2017). surprisingly it was the chinese president, xi jinping who denounced protectionism and defended globalization (fidler, chen, & wei, 2017). the so-called rising power that is considered illiberal is the one that seemingly holds the principle of the liberal order dearly. this suggests that even though non-western powers may not yet fully embrace the liberal principles, they are aware of the importance of maintaining the liberal world order. in the case of southeast asia, indonesia has tried to play a constructive role in supporting global world order particularly through the promotion of its democratic values albeit in its own way and with its own caveats (karim, 2017b). indonesia has been a promoter of democratic ideals and human rights values at the regional level. this shows that nonwestern power could become the supporter of western-dominated world order in promoting western liberal norm. other than being supporter of westerndominated liberal order, countries within southeast asia also concern on the importance of the western military presence as a force of balancing in the region (karim & chairil, 2016). indeed that disruptive politics create uncertainty for southeast asia given that regional architecture built by asean has been based on us-sponsored liberal international order through which asean aimed to diffuse the norms into its regional norm and mechanisms (chong, 2017). moreover, under obama’s leadership, asean has been leveraged into one of the most important agenda within the us foreign policy with its pivot to asia strategy thus boost asean strategic important in the region. the disruptive politics with the election of trump that focus on his “american first” slogan, has indeed shaken this progress and thus might change the balance in favor of china. however, the disruptive politics certainly create a new space for second-tier countries in the asia-pacific to show their willingness to cooperate and initiate their own commitment without the need to have the great power on board. although donald trump has succeeded in getting the united states out of the trans-pacific partnership (tpp), it does not necessarily make asia-pacific countries unable to spawn similar things without the united states. at the apec summit in danang, vietnam, trade ministers from 11 asiapacific countries agreed on to press ahead with a major trade deal without the united states, as they seek to go it alone without the involvement of donald trump’s america. secondly, the disruptive politics has demonstrated how economic resentment towards global capitalism emanating from perceived inequality could tear apart the social fabric of the liberal order. global capitalism has indeed lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty around the world, especially in asia. yet, it also brings huge inequality and social injustice too. in the eastern world, china’s embrace of economic globalization has not only made it an economic powerhouse but has also led to it becoming a country with one of the highest levels of income inequality in the world, where one percent of the richest households own a third of the country’s wealth. the conundrum that most of the time is happening on the periphery has now reached its core. in the us, inequality has become even greater, reaching its most extreme point since the great depression 71 liberal world order in the age of disruptive politics (desilver, 2013). in europe, inequality has risen substantially since the mid-1980s (fredriksen, 2012). basically, inequality has become the achilles heel of the liberal order. i believe that the explanation for the rise of racism and xenophobia as well as the allure for the strong men in western democracies cannot be separated from the growing inequality within society. inequality will incite fear and insecurity among people. in return they can be easily mobilized for hatred towards others (karim, 2017a). it is time for the global leaders to genuinely focus on solving the tension between the inequality produced by market capitalism and the equality that is required by democracy. southeast asia is also home for the rise of inequality particularly due to the impact the lack of the government to address market failure and reduce rentseeking activities. while in general, the case of inequality has been experienced by southeast asian countries, however, lao pdr and indonesia have inequality trends that should be a cause of concerns (yap, 2013). in a long run, the economic growth without inequality would only create dissatisfaction that may lead to social unrest. the inequality could also endanger the regional integration project in southeast asia once the project deemed to be detrimental toward the poor and vulnerable section of the society given the benefits of economic integration have often been unequally distributed. it is the time for southeast asian countries to find out what is the best way to increase its wealth while at the same time reduce the gap of inequality. to do this, at least, there should be a shift in how the economic elites should see the development paradigm of neoliberal economic agenda which shows its failure in creating wealth with equality. thus, asean countries should pay attention to concept of inclusive growth seriously. the inclusive growth could start with the economic policy that focus on investing in public goods such as infrastructure, healthcare and the environment. thirdly, we need to reconsider the way in which the core values of the liberal order should be promoted. democracy will be the most desirable form of government and the global standard for legitimate governance, despite the seemingly democratic decline and the variety of models that might not be particularly liberal (ikenberry, 2011). and so is capitalism. though not always subscribing to the notion of a liberal free-market, most of countries will eventually embrace capitalism as the way in which to govern their economy in the foreseeable future. however, the assumption that liberal principles should be universally accepted is not only wrong but also dangerous. we should learn on how the two decades of liberal interventionist policy have failed and created more instability in some parts of the world. it has even nurtured antipathy from the periphery states of the liberal order. the challenge posed by disruptive politics also cautiously shows us that even mature liberal democracy is not immune from shifting towards an illiberal one. we should learn from history that there is always a danger of imperial overstretch even when it comes to ideas. liberal principles might be the last man standing in history. yet just like many other ideas, it is far from perfect. it is time to be humble and let the two core liberal principles evolve into a variety of models that stem from different cultural and historical contexts. indeed, that there is a steady decrease of democratic space as well as the protections of human rights in southeast 72 journal of asean studies asia. many countries remain undemocratic, and others have taken a worryingly repressive turn (edwards & karim, 2016). this might be caused by the negative views on democratic norm due to the liberal interventionist policies that are failing in any other parts of the world. rather than seeing it as a failure of democracy alone, disruptive politics should remind us the need to create our own system and norm that also reflect the universality of democratic and human rights norm while at the same time accept the cultural and historical differences. in this case, southeast asian countries should able to increase the role of asean human rights mechanisms as well as enabling its own civil society to foster its local norm on democracy and human rights. a move forward it seems quite self-evident to say that change always creates uncertainty, and the way we perceive changes often determines how we respond to them. but this is straightforward advice for us in an age of disruptive politics. disruptive politics has certainly changed the course of the liberal world order into unchartered territory. we can see it as a threat and hence react accordingly. or we can see it as an opportunity and thus mitigate its negative side effects. the disruptive politics happening in the western world should remind us that no matter how globalized and integrated our world is, our thousand-year old tribalistic dna is still there. as long as a large segment of the population do not feel the benefits and feel alienated 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https://econpapers.repec.org/paper/esswpaper/id_3a6432.htm https://econpapers.repec.org/paper/esswpaper/id_3a6432.htm journal of asean studies, vol. 3, no. 1 (2015), pp. 53-67 ©2015 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic media dissemination “the threat of tsunami unleashed from the eruption of mount anak krakatau” through documentary movie m. yudhi rezaldi information and technology unit, lipi, indonesia wahjoe soeprihantoro center for geo-technology, lipi, indonesia abstract the eastern side of the sunda strait coastal line is an area which faces directly towards the source of the disaster. mount krakatau’s explosion causes major eruptions and destructive tsunami waves back in 1883, causing severe damages to the area and a death-count reaching 30,000 people. learning from past, it is important to convey the understanding of natural hazards to the public. spreading knowledge of the threat needs to be done by using methods that can easily be accepted, understood and implemented by any kind of communities. this preliminary research compels that the general population does not have sufficient understanding on this natural disaster. they are also oblivious to what procedure should be taken when such a tragedy occur. the research also illustrates that the audiovisual media is the most appropriate and favored method of gaining knowledge by the community. the media is constituted of multiple segments of 3d animations, digital computer animations, and short field-filmed clips, which are then assembled into one single documentary presenting both a virtual-reconstruction of the event whilst giving a variety of information concerning the subject. the content of the documentary will provide information about the krakatau tsunami, the current condition of mount anak krakatau, the signs leading to a volcanic eruption and a tsunami, and the necessary steps that they will have to follow in response to such threat. this documentary movie will hopefully become an educational tool to expand people's knowledge and awareness at the event of an eruption and a tsunami. keywords: anak krakatau mount, tsunami, media dissemination, documentary, animation introduction being localized inside the geological phenomenon known as “the ring of fire”, indonesian islands are formed and molded by years of volcanic activities that are partially still active (figure: 1, map of indonesia with dots symbolizing volcanos). the recurring and abundance of volcanic activities in the region has created a history of various kinds of eruptions, all with their respective level of destruction and death. the sunda strait has witnessed many of mount krakatau’s eruptions, the largest one being the eruption of 1883 54 media dissemination “the threat of tsunami unleashed from the eruption which had caused a huge amount of destruction in the area (hantoro, 2006, simkin and fiske, 1983) not only due to tidal waves the eruption produced, but also by the ejection of volcanic debris into the atmosphere and the earthquakes following the explosion. the intensity of the tsunami is shown by the presence of large chunks of limestone coral reefs in places far from the place of origin (hantoro 1992, latief et al. 2002). also, the presence of a ship which was anchored at telukbetung had been pushed away 2.5 km into the upstream of kuripan river (simkin & fiske, 1983). some markings of the tsunami are also in form of sediment crusts of coral reefs which were found far away from the shoreline of anyer (latief et al., 2002) and in the bay area of lampung (hantoro, 1992). the tsunami has taken 36,000 casualties, a very large number when taking into consideration the year of occurence. the sunda strait region has been an important location even so today, it serves as a gate for sailing activities and a passage way to cross from the island of sumatra to java (hantoro, 2006). its status and its role has become even more important following the huge development leap in the end of 20th century, with an improvement of the quality of access to the surrounding area and the emergence of many economic activities such as industrial activities (chemical, metallurgy, energy, etc), transportation (merak, bakauheni, panjang, tarahan, etc), fishery (padang cermin, etc) and a military base (teluk ratai). the geographical location of the area is very strategic as it stands as the gate of sailing from the indian ocean and its close proximity to the center of government of the country (jakarta) and province (tanjung karang) (figure 2). surrounding this body of water, there are also conservation sites and a national park, which also is vital but threatened by natural disasters. aside from the importance of its status and its role, potential disaster also resides in the area in the form of a volcanic eruption and tsunamis caused by the eruption of mount anak krakatau. possibly, mount krakatau's eruption had also previously occured far in the past which is suspected as being the reason for the migration of archaic humans (hantoro 2003a). 55 journal of asean studies figure 1.1. : landsat 7 image of banten, sunda strait and mount krakatau note: presenting zones ranging from ports and industries in banten-merak and cilegon, residential and touristic areas from anyer to carita, cultivation sites from labuan to tanjung lesung, wells and conservation areas in ujung kulon and panaitan. when looking back at the danger of the krakatau eruption and the environmental development in sunda strait, the inhabitants residing in the strait-coastal area has to be aware of the tragedy that had occured in the past and have to be taught knowledge on how they, along with the government, should react in facing future catastrophies. one of the most important tasks that needs to be done is to give explanations, based on research results and analysis, concerning the krakatau volcano eruptions and the possible catastrophic threats that might happen in the future. other than that, people need to understand the signs leading to a possible disaster as well as what to do during such a life-threatening situation, such as, what kind of warning signal has to be implemented, how to manage the people in saving their lives and belongings, what kind of equipment and shelter must be provided and prepared during the rescue mission. as a mitigation, in the situation when an eruption have resulted in another threat such as the emergence of a tsunami wave, the community has to know what form of protection is needed to minimize the threat of the wave. this research is aimed at observing the information dissemination model with the goal of preparing the people for future threats of anak krakatau mountain and how it enables the people, along with the government, building facilities that is qualified to reduce the hazardous impact of volcanic eruptions and tsunamis. the socialization and dissemination of this knowledge are delivered in the form of a documentary movie which explains the natural phenomenon of eruptions and the steps that must be followed when such a catastrophy occurs. besides, the use of social media is also explored. one of the problems found during this research is finding the right method for calculating and evaluating the level of understanding of the population living around the location of anak krakatau mountain concerning how well they are prepared to face a tsunami. this research will be limited on determining the most 56 media dissemination “the threat of tsunami unleashed from the eruption appropriate dissemination media to deliver education and knowledge about tsunamis in the carita coastal area in banten province. the information consists of records on the past tsunami tragedy, the current condition of the source of disaster, the signs leading to the disaster and the required steps to be followed during the catastrophy. methodology this research began with a descriptive search that was conducted on march 2014 in the carita coastal area by spreading questionnaires and interviewing some sources. with random sampling technique, 100 questionnaires were circulated which was divided into three groups: students, workers and the general public. the results were analyzed using the anova analytic method permitting us to calculate the difference of opinions between the respondents. interviews were also conducted to sources who were directly affiliated to the subject, such as researchers in the field of disasters from the research center for geotechnology-lipi, the guarding officer of anak krakatau volcano observation from geological agency of the ministry of energy and mineral resources, the village head of pasauran carita and head of the regional disaster management agency of pandeglang area. during the shooting process in the field, there were few difficulties when taking the image of anak krakatau mountain, mainly the difficulty in obtaining an authorization from the guards at the location. anak krakatau mountain is located in high seas so a speedboat was needed to get to the location, and it was hard filming on a speedboat concidering the shakiness making the shot unsteady. during another part of the shooting, there were also good moments, such as: the company of a geotechnology lipi researcher who previously had done research on tsunamis, easing and helping find the location that shows traces of the past tsunami. the audience were very cooperative in facilitating the shooting process of their interview and also provided accurate information. during other production processes, namely during animation production, there were difficulties due to limited capabilities of the computers, thus making the process of rendering the animation longer. discussion this section consists of the analysis taken from the result of the questionnaire and the interviews, it presents a parameter of the level of understanding of the population concerning the disasters, which dissemination medium is more favored, and which kind of dissemination method has been used in the region. the result of the interviews varies considerably. because the interviewees were given a variety of questions and had the freedom to choose any answer that they would like, it is without saying that the interviewees had different opinions from one another regarding the subject which affected the results of the questionnaire. age, the level of education and the environment also have to be noted as factors that affects people's decisions. 57 journal of asean studies table 1. questionnaire results concerning the level of understanding of people living in carita beach parameter student worker/ employer public total knowledge of pas tevents 35 35 25 95 % knowledge of tsunamis. 35 35 30 100 % knowledge of the signs leading to a tsunami. 23 19 14 56 % knowledge of the steps that must be performed during a tsunami 23 21 11 55 % have seen/heard/read media disseminations about tsunamis 24 26 18 68 % from the above table, it can be observed that:  most respondents already know that a tsunami had happened in the area in the past: 95% of the population.  the amoint of people whom have knowledge of what a tsunami is: 100% of the population  the amount of people whom understood the signs marking an impending tsunami was not sufficent and unsatisfying:  56% of the population.  only 55% of the interviewed people knew which steps has to be followed during a tsunami.  68% of the interviewees knew about the dissemination medium, which can be concluded as being satisfying but still not being the most appropriate. table 2. dissemination mediums that are most preferred by the carita beach community dissemination medium students workers public total • radio 17 10 4 21 % • film (dvd) 15 13 17 57 % • poster 3 3 5 11 % • television 3 4 2 7 % • simulation 1 3 0 4 % from the research, the results have shown that:  the most prefered method of dissemination is through movies (dvd) with a percentage of 57%.  the second most prefered method is through the radio with a percentage of 21%.  the least liked mediums are posters at 11%, television at 7% and simulations at 4%. 58 media dissemination “the threat of tsunami unleashed from the eruption table 3. result from the interviews concerning dissemination medium sources declarations conclusions head of the village the overwhelimg amount of information concerning the hazard of a tsunami hitting carita beach had caused a decline in touristic activities, which by itself affected the inhabitants' economy. the dissemination was used inappropriately, it had affected the psychology of tourists. teacher from smk 3 pandeglang some simulations have been organized in the research location, which required the people to go towards the hill in hope for shelter, but one person had been bitten by a venomous snake and died a few hours later. inappropriately used, unsafe, there are many wild animals and steep sleeks which might cause death when people are not careful. two important information can be taken from result of the interview:  the dissemination of information on a large scale outside the research site (national scope) brings a negative impact to the economy, by knowing that such a threat exists, potential tourists are pushed away from visiting the region.  dissemination through simulation is unsafe, this can be proven by the death of an inhabitant who was bitten by a venomous snake whilst running towards the shelter.  based on those two informations, it can be concluded that information should only be given to the people who live in hazardeous areas and simulations should not be performed without the proper planning and equipments because of safety concerns. besides the three methods above, a comparison between other dissemination mediums having a potential to be used had been done and the results can be seen in the table below: tabel 4. comparison of some dissemination mediums media type written media (journal, poster, leaflet, booklet, company profile and policy briefing) advantage not durable, easily get wet/ripped, people will get bored when receiving too many information disadvantage not durable, easily get wet/ripped, people will get bored when receiving too many information analysis not recommended, because it will easily get damaged and is the contrary of our needs media type electronic media (documentary, radio, television, website, interactive cd ) advantage very informative because it can show images and sounds at once, making it visually appealing so that people will get pleased when watching it. 59 journal of asean studies disadvantage needs specific tools such as: radio, television, computer, dvd player, network, and electricity. analysis television and radio are not recommended because during a test in another research, the overwhelming amount of information had made the hazardous area unattractive to tourists cd is not a recommended medium, not all houses on the research site have the required tool to read it. documentaries are highly recommended, because it can be distributed directly to the audience who lived in the disaster area so that the audience can be monitored, and almost all houses have televisions and dvd players. media type scientific meetings (seminar, workshop, technology exhibitions and discussion group, counseling, technical training ) advantage a direct two-way communication can occur directly between the communicator and the receiver, other methods of dissemination can also used during the meeting. disadvantage requiring a special place / room for the meeting, need to manage the schedule to gather the sources and the audiences. analysis not recommended, because this media can only be done once, meanwhile we could never know when the tsunami might occur. the audience, the inhabitants, might not remember correctly if they are reminded only once. media type exhibition advantage very informative to display original products that needs to be presented. disadvantage there are difficulties when a large product needs to be displayed, for example if the location of the exhibition is far away, or if additional tools such as tables, cases etc are also needed to display the product. analysis not recommended, because there is no need to exhibit a product in for our research media type plot demonstration media / simulation advantage the audience can directly practice and understand the necessary steps when facing the disaster. disadvantage must be done by experts in the field whom knows the area very well. if not, there could be a high risk of injury. analysis not recommended, because this type of medium had been done in the research location and someone died in the shelter because of a venomous snake. the comparison of various dissemination media commonly used in conveying information results that documentary movie is the most preferred media. the table below shows the status and information concerning past studies done by researches who treats the subject of information dissemination: 60 media dissemination “the threat of tsunami unleashed from the eruption table 5. assessment of previous studies title study on the effectiveness of the information dissemination concerning the mitigation of the risk of disaster in a disasterprone region (studi efektifitas diseminasi informasi pengurangan resiko bencana didaerah rawan bencana) researcher arifianto.s. et al. media used sugged television as the most dominant medium the positive impact/excess the spread range of the information is much wider and can be delivered rapidly to reach many audiences in multiple areas, locally or abroad. the negative impact/shortage the delivered message can not be sent solely to a specific target population, therefore risking to cause panic amongst the people title disaster literacy among society in a disaster-origin region: case study of the marketing of social readiness towards disaster in padang, west sumatera (literasi bencana pada masyarakat rawan bencana: studi kasus pemasaran sosial siaga bencana di padang, sumatera barat) researcher dewi sad tanti, d.s. media used direct meeting in the form of an evacuation simulation. the positive impact/excess people's knowledge regarding the disaster have been enriched with important information and have become more aware. the negative impact/shortage during a real disastrous event, it will not be a surprise if the evacuation will not be as fast as when it was simulated. based on past experiences, when a tsunami occurs, many people will be in the situation where they are driving their private vehicles therefore causing a longer evacuation process. traffic jams and the presence of narrow streets will cause a bottleneck and make it harder for people to travel fastly. title disaster information and local culture: case study post-disaster reconstruction, bukit duri district flood, south jakarta (informasi bencana dan budaya lokal: kasus penanggulangan banjir di kelurahan bukit duri jakarta selatan) researcher arifianto, s. and mohan rifqo virhani. media used television the positive impact/excess wider spread on delivering information the negative impact/shortage mostly during the flood, people in disaster area will not be able to watch any television, due to the lack of power during the flood. title independent evacuation for the coastal inhabitants from tsunami threat: pre-tsunami (evakuasi mandiri bagi masyarakat pantai terhadap bahaya tsunami: pra-tsunami) researcher dyah rachmawati, et al. media used teaching module 61 journal of asean studies the positive impact/excess the thaught material can be more vast, more clear, more detaild and can be read multiple times, so that the chance to remember is bigger. the negative impact/shortage when the source module consists of many pages, the effort needed to completely understand the subject can make people go lazy and not read it. title dissemination of a tsunami threat through a sign system in the carita coastal area (diseminasi ancaman tsunami melalui sign system untuk kawasan pantai carita) researcher muhammad yudhi rezaldi media used sign system the positive impact/excess people can know towards which direction they need to go when the disaster occurs. the negative impact/shortage specific tools must be provided to re-paint the module, the medium has to be repaired annually from the analysis of the methods presented above, we can conclude that people's awareness of tsunamis is evident, but most people in the tourist area around carita beach do not understand the signs indicating the coming of a tsunami and have no knowledge on what to do during the disaster. therefore a proper dissemination media to provide such information are highly necessary. based on the results of this analysis, we produced a media that combined documentary movie and an animated movie, namely:  the of documentary will provide the viewers with a reconstruction sequence along with scientific explainations, which will provide an overview of the events that had occurred. it gives some information on the current situation of the subject and show predictions or more precisely teach how to predict future threats (fauzan, 2013).  the animation sequence used in the documentary combines 3d animation and 2d animation, with the type of computer-made/digital three dimensional animation done with a simplistic style. (djalle, purwantoro, dasmana, 2007) theoretically, the audio-visual medium, in our case in the form of a documentary, is considered as the most acceptable method for delivering the message. according to the research institute of computer technology research and development (ctr), people only remember 20% of what they see and 30% of what they hear, but one can capture up to 50% if they see and hear the information simultaneously (fred, 2001) movie making process the process of making the movie is divided into three stages that are conducted as follow: pre-production in this phase, we collected data from various sources concerning the subject (mount anak krakatau) as well as information about past events, we researched the current condition of anak krakatau from a variety of published sources, and seeked information from experts in the field of natural disasters. the retrieved data have then been used to make a storyline and story board which served as guidelines during film 62 media dissemination “the threat of tsunami unleashed from the eruption production, it was then followed by recording the narrations and sound effects. figure 2. the storyline of the documentary reporting the possible tsunami threat caused by the eruption of mount anak krakatau figure 3. the storyboard of the documentary reporting the possible tsunami threat caused by the eruption of mount anak krakatau 63 journal of asean studies production in the production phase, we collected visual data by filming at the research sites around carita beach, in the location of anak krakatau, and in some areas in the province of lampung. then, the process had to be done in a multimedia laboratoy and we needed to make two and three dimensional animations using the software 3ds max and adobe after effects. following that, the footages needed to be combined through editing, the dubbings needed to be made and the sound effects were inserted using the software final cut pro. figure 4. the process of creating an animation in 3ds max figure 5. the process of creating an animation in adobe after effects. post production the post-production process is the final process in the making of the film. in this process, the procedure was to first edit, compose and combine all audio and visual data, so that all of these elements will be combined into one single video file through the rendering process, using 64 media dissemination “the threat of tsunami unleashed from the eruption final cut pro, and then proceed using a software to turn the final product into a readable dvd file through a compressor software. and the last is to make the dvd's case design using adobe photoshop. figure 6. the process of editing using final cut pro figure 7. the process of burning a dvd using a compressor software media dissemination the chosen method of disseminating the documentary was to distribute the dvds/vcds to the disaster affected inhabitants or to various stakeholders including structural and functional officials in upt. center for information technology lipi, researchers in the field of natural disasters. geotechnology research center lipi, the national library and archives of banten province, banten tv, pasauran village offices, the center of volcanology and geological hazard mitigation, post observers of mount anak krakatau, pt. krakatau tour indonesia, sman 3 65 journal of asean studies pandeglang, regional disaster management agency, the world wildlife reading house cilegon. the movie, entitled "tsunami threat due to the eruption of mount anak krakatau" can also be seen on website of bit – lipi.1 conclusion by looking at background of past tsunami events, it is necessary to make an effective dissemination medium in order to inform similar threat of natural disaster that can occur at any time, hoping that people will have knowledge on the devastating disastrous events of the past, and it is considered necessary to know the signs leading to a tsunami, what procedure should be taken to save lives, which in turn can minimize the loss of life. to know what type of dissemination media is the most appropriate to be used to inform this problem, researchers distributed a number of questionnaires and had done many interviews. the result is that the respondents has a good understanding about tsunamis. however, there are many people who do not understand the signs of an impending tsunami and they also do not know very well steps to do if one day the tsunami occurs. the tragic incident of a villager's death caused from a snake bite, at the time of the simulation, has become a very strong reason for the need of a secure media to convey information, in which requiring a media that does not contain the above risk and other risks such as panic and falling when running. 1 http://multimedia.bit.lipi.go.id/index.php?opti on=com_hwdvideoshare&task=viewvideo&ite mid=&video_id=161 due to the spread of previous information in a large scale outside the research site (national scope) through various medias, brought a negative impact on the economy, since many people were informed of how hazardeous the location is to tsunamis, people will be afraid to visit the location, therefore losing potential tourists. the second reason is the belief that the most appropriate media will the audio-visual media. the documentary will be constitued of two sequences: a reconstruction sequence and a scientific explaination, where it will provide a reconstruction of past events , the current condition of mount anak krakatau, and what kind of prediction will come. this documentary will have an animated sequence which combines 3d animation and 2d animation, the animation type is three dimensional computer-animation / digital, with a simple style. the documentary is targeted towards the people who lives in coastal tourism areas of carita beach which consists of of workers, students, and the general public. this new dissemination media is expected to broaden the knowledge of the people in the coastal areas in carita beach, whilst raising public understanding, caringness and awareness to the tsunami disaster. suggestion the dissemination of information to the public regarding this disaster should be done properly and carefully so as to not cause panic and fear, because it can affect the psychological state and the safety of the community. since carita beach is a tourism http://multimedia.bit.lipi.go.id/index.php?option=com_hwdvideoshare&task=viewvideo&itemid=&video_id=161 http://multimedia.bit.lipi.go.id/index.php?option=com_hwdvideoshare&task=viewvideo&itemid=&video_id=161 http://multimedia.bit.lipi.go.id/index.php?option=com_hwdvideoshare&task=viewvideo&itemid=&video_id=161 66 media dissemination “the threat of tsunami unleashed from the eruption destination, organizing a massive dissemination of information stating that the area is hazardous and dengerous can make tourists be unappealed to visit the place, thus affecting the economic growth the people living in carita beach. acknowledgements the authors profusely thank to all parties and the cooperation of those who have helped us complete this research, including: 1. indonesian institute of sciences, which has financed this research. 2. mr. evandri m. eng. sc., as head of technical management unit for technology information lipi. 3. gonang may prime nugraha, as head of unit psit. in technical management unit for technology information – lipi. 4. all staff in upt. technology information lipi, which has supported the course of this study. 5. rival, from krakatau tour indonesia, which have been guiding our trips during field study. 6. marlino deni, from the center for volcanology and geological hazard mitigation. 7. mr. agus japar, as the village chief of pasauran which was the location where we had distributed all of our questionnaires. 8. mr. aip somahmud, as the head of bpbds pandeglang on the information provided at the time of the interview. 9. local government of pandeglang, for all the permissions that have been granted so that we can perform data collection and research location shooting. 10. ranger, the guard of mount anak krakatau natural reserve, for the opportunity so that we were authorized to take pictures at anak krakatau mountain. 11. other parties who have supported the completion of this study, whose names could not all be enumerated. references arifianto.s, et. al. 2009. studi efektifitas diseminasi informasi pengurangan resiko bencana didaerah rawan bencana. departermen komunikasi dan informatika. puslitbang aptel skdi. badan penelitian dan pengembangan sdm awaludin soheh a, kanti wilujeng walujo kw. 2014. efektifitas tabloid komunika sebagai media diseminasi informasi bagi pegawai puslitbang postel dan puslitbang aptel skdi badan litbang sdm depkominfo. universitas esa unggul. http://www.esaunggul.ac.id djalle zg, purwantoro e, dasmana d. 2007. “ the making of 3d animation movie using 3d studio max”. informatika. bandung fauzan, a.as. 2013. penulisan 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bencana dan budaya lokal (kasus penanggulangan banjir di kelurahan bukit duri jakarta selatan). hasil penelitian puslitbang aptel skdi balitbang sdm, hal. 1-30. jakarta. depkominfo. simkin, tom and fiske, richard s. 1983, krakatau 1883 eruption and its effects, smithsonian institution press, washington, d.c. tanti, dewi, sad,d.s. 2010. literasi bencana pada masyarakat rawan bencana (studi kasus pemasaran sosial siaga bencana di padang, sumatera barat). universitas mercu buana. program pasca sarjana. prodi magister ilmu komunikasi. yoganingrum a, maryati i, yudhi rezaldi m. 2012. kebutuhan dan media informasi pengelolaan air tawar masyarakat di kepulauan seribu. jurnal iptek-kom, vol. 14, no. 2, desember 2012 (151164) http://ijns.org/ http://www.ijdesign.org/ regional maritime cooperation in maintaining maritime security and stability: a test case for asean unity and centrality angel damayanti christian university of indonesia, indonesia abstract southeast and east asian regions have emerged as global strategic waters. yet, the seas in the regions remain vulnerable with overlapping claims on sea borders, piracy attacks, and other transnational challenges at sea. for these purposes, some major powers in the region, such as the u.s., china, and indonesia, have launched their respective strategies in securing the maritime areas for their interests. to harmonize these various interests, asean with its counterparts in the east asian region needs an aseanled, inclusive, and comprehensive regional maritime mechanism and strategic partnership between asean member states and its dialogue partners to maintain good order at sea. in november 2015, the east asian summit eventually launched a joint statement on enhancing regional maritime cooperation to justify the centrality of asean and to counter the failure of asean defence minister meeting. in such case, asean member states need to manage their disunity to minimize hindrances of the realization and implementation of the plan. this paper mainly elaborates the reasons why the region needs regional maritime cooperation and discusses challenges that asean has to deal with in order to implement the asean unity and centrality in promoting maritime cooperation and regional stability. to explain the maritime strategies of asean and its dialogue partners, this study uses qualitative methods and utilizes states’ documents as well as asean statements particularly on maritime issues. key words: asean, maritime security, maritime cooperation, regional stability journal of asean studies, vol. 5, no. 2 (2017), pp. 119-134 doi: 10.21512/jas.v5i2.1888 ©2017 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic 120 regional maritime cooperation in maintaining maritime security and stability introduction globalization depends on the free trade system that relies on the secure and free flow of goods on sea-based shipping. the seas are therefore essential and become symbol of globalization for goods to be distributed, sold, and consumed worldwide. moreover, international shipping underpins the prospect of further beneficial growth in economic and world trade. but to have that effect, it needs to be predictable, traceable, compliant with detailed pick and delivery schedules, stable, and secure (till, 2009). having said that, the emergence of southeast and east asian regions as the strategic center of maritime transport is also associated with an increasing numbers of both traditional and nontraditional threats, which particularly happen at sea (prabhakar, 2006). for this reason, some countries in the regions, such as china and indonesia, have published their respective initiatives to secure and maintain the stability of their sea territories. this is in addition to u.s. rebalancing strategy in asia-pacific launched in 2011, which is mainly aimed to secure the u.s. access in passing through the strait of malacca and south china sea (bradford, 2011; the white house, 2011; u.s. dod, 2012). to respond the u.s. strategy, in september 2013 chinese president xi jinping initially introduced the silk road economic belt concept, followed by the initiative to build a close and strategic cooperation between china and asean community, particularly in maritime cooperation (xi, 2014). this is important as china proposes the construction of a 21st century maritime silk road to promote regional interconnectivity and economic integration (xinhua, 2015). a year later, in front of ten asean member states and its counterparts – namely china, the u.s., japan, india, south korea, and australia – indonesian president joko widodo (jokowi) launched the idea of making indonesia as the global maritime fulcrum. jokowi’s doctrine is mainly derived from the idea that the geoeconomic and geo-political world is shifting from the west to the east and with the strategic position of indonesia, the role of indonesian seas will be important (widodo, 2015). to harmonize the abovementioned strategic maritime policies, this paper accordingly supports an asean-led, inclusive and comprehensive maritime cooperation between asean member states with its counterparts, mainly the u.s. and china, that has been initiated in november 2015 east asia summit in kuala lumpur, malaysia. “inclusive” means that this partnership should be open and give opportunities to all states in southeast and east asian regions to become strategic partners and enjoy mutual benefit in all seas and oceans in the region. whereas, “comprehensive” means that this maritime cooperation aims to resolve traditional threats related to sea management as well as to counter nontraditional challenges that mainly happen at sea, such as transnational organized crimes and natural disaster. such cooperative mechanism is vital as southeast and east asian countries mainly have common concerns to protect their seas and to enjoy benefits from them without harming other states’ interests. therefore, this paper also elaborates the role of asean, as the institution has become a primary driving force that is responsible to maintain peace, prosperity, security, and stability, particularly in southeast and east asian journal of asean studies 121 regions. however, the disunity amongst asean member states – as has happened in asean summit in phnom penh, july 2012 due to the issue of south china sea management and due to china’s economic and military support towards some asean members on one hand and the u.s. support on the other hand – is likely to hamper the initiative and the implementation of such maritime cooperation. therefore, asean needs to initially enhance the unity amongst its member states by fostering cooperation through regional mechanism and ensuring that cooperation on bilateral basis does no harm to other member states. to deeply understand the issues, this paper conducts qualitative methodology, particularly the case study approach, as it allows us to see certain phenomenon not in a single event but always linked to other phenomenon. the method often involves interaction effects among many structural and agent-based variables, path dependencies, and strategic interaction among large numbers of actors across multiple levels of analysis with private information and strong incentives to bluff or deceive other actors. (bennet & elman, 2006-2007; mahoney & goertz, 2006). therefore, to understand the logic behind certain maritime strategy of several states, this paper utilizes their white papers, their leaders’ speech, as well as other policies and analyzes their behaviors from those materials. this paper is divided into four parts: introduction, the significances of regional maritime cooperation, the role of asean and how the association unites its member states, and eventually conclusion with recommendations. the significances of regional maritime cooperation w. lawrence s. prabhakar (2006) confirms in his article “maritime strategic trends in the asia-pacific: issues and challenges” that the asia-pacific region is a globalized maritime environment. his idea implies that in the last decades asiapacific region has emerged as a global strategic maritime area. nevertheless, the region and its seas are also vulnerable from both traditional and non-traditional threats. this part accordingly explains at least three notions to confirm the significance of the region and its maritime area that accordingly calls the southeast and east asian states for an open and comprehensive collaboration on maritime management. first, the asia-pacific waters, covering the western part of pacific ocean specifically strait of malacca as well as the east and south china sea, have an abundant inventory of natural resources that is surely advantageous for the island countries. however, this situation is also vulnerable at the same time as a significant number of transnational organized crimes happen in the region, particularly at sea. second, the need to protect the maritime resources and the sea lines of communication (slocs) in the indo-pacific ocean, along with the increase of national economic prosperity, has encouraged some states to modernize their navies. however, this situation in turn provokes security dilemma1 and 1 charles w. kegley and e. wittkopf in their book world politics trend and transformation (2001) define security dilemma as “the central problem faced by all sovereign states in an anarchic global system in which a state’s arming for ostensibly defensive purposes provokes other states to arm in response, with the result that the national security of all 122 regional maritime cooperation in maintaining maritime security and stability creates instability in the region. eventually, there are common concerns amongst asia-pacific states on their national economic development as well as regional and global stability and security maintenance materialized in their maritime strategic policies. accordingly, asia-pacific states need a joint mechanism to arrange and harmonize their interests. with regards to the abundance of oil and gas in south china sea, there are some assumptions and estimation on the numbers of undiscovered oil and gas resources, confirming the richness of western part of pacific ocean. in 2010, for example, the u.s. geological survey (usgs) estimated that the south china sea might contain anywhere between 5 and 22 billion barrels of oil and between 70 and 290 trillion cubic feet of gas. the chinese national offshore oil company (cnooc) was more optimistic to estimate the potential resources in south china sea. using their own research project, in november 2012, they estimated that the area held around 125 billion barrels of oil and 500 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. moreover, in 2013 the u.s. energy information administration (eia) launched an estimation of approximately 11 billion barrels of oil reserves and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves in the area (u.s. eia, 2013). in addition to oil and gas reserves under the sea, the abundance of fish and other marine resources in the south china sea certainly benefits states that are located nearby the sea. in 2010, for example, china’s total aquatic production reached more than 60 million tons from its economic exclusive zone (eez). the declines as their armaments increase.” see also robert jervis (1976), perception and misperception in international politics, princeton university press. production significantly increased from 7.5 million tons in 1999, and 47.5 million tons in 2004 (fao fisheries & aquaculture, 2011). the number increases every year, as in 2015 chinese fisheries production reached 65.2 million tons and more than 14 million tons aquatic plants captured from its maritime areas (fao fisheries & aquaculture, 2017). from the table below, we can see the massive south and east china sea marine production that benefits the southeast and east asian countries. with its eez covering the strait of malacca and the southern part of south china sea, indonesia gained more than 10 million tons of fisheries and more than 11 million tons of aquatic plants in 2015. this captures made indonesia became the second biggest country enjoying the benefits from south china sea fisheries resources after china. vietnam also enjoyed the massive south china sea marine production as it gained more than 6 million tons of fisheries, both captured and aquaculture fisheries. the philippines gained nearly 3 million tons for fisheries and more than 1.5 million tons for aquatic plants, while thailand gained nearly 3 million tons of fisheries. the massive production of south china sea undoubtedly becomes an endowment for countries located nearby the waters. with a proper management, maritime countries will enjoy economic development from their waters. however, the abundance of marine production may trigger illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing and other transnational organized crimes threatening any island countries that lack control and are weak at protecting their waters and its marine resources. according to the indonesian ministry of maritime affairs and fisheries, indonesia journal of asean studies 123 lost about us$23 million per year due to illegal fishing (politik indonesia, 2015). in order to protect its marine production and perform deterrence from illegal fishing vessels, the current indonesian ministry for maritime affairs and fisheries under leadership of minister susi pudjiastuti has firmly arrested more than 35 vessels with chinese, vietnamese, and philippines flags by september 2015 (cnn indonesia, 2014). however, this robust policy has become a concern for the chinese, vietnamese, and the philippines governments and forced them to settle negotiation with the indonesian government accordingly. table 1. southeast and east asia fisheries and aquatic plants production, 2015 no countries fisheries (tons) aquatic plants (tons) capture aquaculture total capture aquaculture total 1 china 17,591,299 47,610,040 65,201,339 261,770 13,924,535 14,186,305 2 japan 3,460,168 703,915 4,164,083 93,300 300,300 393,600 3 south korea 1,648,993 479,360 2,128,353 7,826 1,197,129 1,204,955 4 north korea 220,000 64,150 284,150 489,000 489,000 5 indonesia 6,485,320 4,342,465 10,827,785 78,230 11,269,341 11,347,571 6 malaysia 1,491,974 246,205 1,738,179 260,760 260,760 7 philippines 2,151,502 781,798 2,933,300 367 1,566,361 1,566,728 8 vietnam 2,757,314 3,438,378 6,195,692 11,822 11,822 9 thailand 1,693,050 897,096 2,590,346 934,800 934,800 10 singapore 1,645 4,971 6,616 11 brunei 4,000 711 4,711 12 myanmar 1,953,510 997,306 2,950,816 2,324 2,324 13 cambodia 639,468 120,055 759,523 source: fao (2017), world fisheries and aquaculture production the second notion about the importance of asia-pacific maritime area is that the south china sea and the strait of malacca are not only important for their marine outcomes, but also for their strategic position in connecting states and for its slocs. this is to confirm that the south china sea, passing the strait of malacca, is significant for transportation and connectivity as well as trading system. stretching from singapore and the strait of malacca chokepoint in the southwest to the strait of taiwan in the northeast, the south china sea is one of the most important energy trade routes in the world. the united nations conference 124 regional maritime cooperation in maintaining maritime security and stability on trade and development (unctad) confirmed that in 2013 approximately 30% of the world’s sea-based trading (unctad, 2013) and nearly 60% of oil products and global liquefied natural gas (lng) traveled from the strait hormuz and strait of malacca to south china sea (u.s. eia, 2013). the report from u.s. eia (2013) also justified that more than 15 million barrels oil per day flowed from the persian gulf, through the strait of malacca and south china sea, to east asian countries as well as the u.s. in comparison, the world's most important chokepoint for maritime transit, the strait of hormuz between the persian gulf and arabian sea, had an oil flow of about 17 million barrels per day in 2011. the number of 15 million barrels per day significantly increased from the last two decades. in 1993, according to the center for naval analysis, about 7 million barrels per day of oil and petroleum products, which was equivalent to 20% of world seaborne oil trade, passed through the strait of malacca. moreover, the strait of malacca plays important role since it is the main entrance and the shortest sea route from the persian gulf to east asia. however, the globalized maritime area not only endows states with increase in economic development, but also triggers transnational organized crimes, which mainly happen at sea. thachuk and tangredi (2002) define transnational organized crimes as crime activities perpetrated by non-state actors that not only go beyond national borders but also have global impact. they distinguish transnational crime perpetrators into two types of non-state actors, namely terrorist groups and organized criminal groups. with regards to terrorist groups, their activities nowadays are more intensely carried out, publicly targeted, and globally directed. they also use the same methods conducted by organized crime groups to finance their organizations, such as drugs trafficking, arms smuggling, money laundering, human trafficking, and piracy. in the case of maritime asiapacific, terrorist attacks have become an issue since some southeast asian states have to deal with radical and terrorist groups, such as indonesia, thailand, and the philippines. in relation to piracy threats, as reported by the international chamber of commerce’s international maritime bureau (icc-imb), there were 576 pirate attacks in the strait of malacca, singaporean, indonesian, and malaysian coastal waters in 2004-2009 (icc-imb, 2004-2009), nearly 36% of all piracy attacks in all seas around the world. however, the icc-imb in 2011 reported that the number of piracy crimes in the strait of malacca, singapore, indonesian, and malaysian coastal waters had dropped into 240 attacks in 2007-2010 (icc-imb, 2007-2009). this might have happened because the littoral states – indonesia, malaysia, and singapore – had conducted joint patrols to protect the strait of malacca since july 2005. despite the joint patrols, the piracy numbers increased into 631 incidents in 2010-2015 (icc-imb, 2010-2015). the increasing number of pirate attacks off the coast of indonesia, strait of malacca, malaysia, and singapore strait confirms the need of asean littoral states to protect the security of their waters. to assure the free flow of goods and to safeguard the oil and petroleum supply, as well as to protect marine productions and sea territory, asia-pacific states continuously develop their naval power. along with the increase of journal of asean studies 125 economic prosperity, some states in the region are modernizing their military power and enhancing their military budget. as china’s 2015 defense white paper confirms that the threats for china’s maritime areas surely come from state and non-state actors, the chinese government plans to gradually shift its people's liberation army navy (plan)’s focus from “offshore waters defense” to the combination of “offshore waters defense” with “open seas protection”. as its economy has grown over the last decade, the chinese authority allows plan to build a combined, multi-functional, and efficient marine combat force structure. this is to conclude that plan will enhance its capabilities for strategic deterrence and counterattack, maritime maneuvers, joint operations at sea, comprehensive defense, and comprehensive support. however, plan modernization and an increase in china’s military spending with the justification of its security and defense have provoked similar reaction from the unhappy, threatened neighbors. the lack of navies’ arrangement coupled with their naval capacities in the region has also become another concern, as there is no mechanism to supervise the naval power development of asia-pacific states. regarding this, rousseau argues that the weak position of one’s military power increases the perception of threat that leads to security dilemma and military competition (ng, 2005). in turn, military competition, as noted by stephen walt (1987), may trigger military alliances as states’ response to threats and attempt to prevent stronger powers from dominating them. this situation accordingly intensifies the tension amongst asiapacific states. this is true as in the case of japan, vietnam, and the philippines that have conducted joint military exercises with the u.s. as they have problem with china in their overlapping claims on the east and south china sea. eventually, the importance of south china sea and the strait of malacca for sea-based trading system and slocs as well as the increasing number of transnational crimes endangering the economic prosperity in asia-pacific states have become common concerns mainly for asia-pacific states. this is not to mention the instability in the region due to arms dynamic. their common concerns are derived from the willingness to maintain their national economic development as well as regional security and stability. for this reason, major powers in asia-pacific and southeast asia such as the u.s., china, and indonesia have launched their strategies either to safeguard their water territories and interests or to guarantee their access through the waters. in front of the asia-pacific leaders during east asia summit in november 2011, u.s. president obama initially explained the u.s. rebalancing strategy in asia-pacific to secure and protect their vital interest in the region. to reflect his intention, the u.s. 2012 defense strategic guidance justifies the u.s. military to continue their leadership in promoting stability and security regionally and globally by building stronger partnership with capable allies. according to u.s. authorities, the aim of this partnership is to reassure that the presence of u.s. military personnel and capability in the region is to maintain peace and stability collaboratively, as well as to safeguard the access and the use of global commons through seas. the partnership is not only of the u.s. interest, but also of asia-pacific states’ interests (u.s. dod, 2012). 126 regional maritime cooperation in maintaining maritime security and stability this strategy continues under the trump administration. the u.s. remains focused on the growing importance of the region, particularly for its seas and the freedom of navigation operations. the american defense chief, secretary mattis outlines the u.s. effort to achieve a rebalance to the asia pacific region. some of the efforts are to strengthen alliances, encourages strong and responsible partners and strengthen u.s military capabilities in the region. those are in addition to less formal networked security cooperation or interconnected region, to include bilateral, trilateral and multilateral exchanges, exercises and arms transfers. (cronin, 2017) as a response to the u.s. initiative in the maritime asia-pacific, which partly is also performed by joint military operations, china has launched its counter-balance strategy. since chinese government is still locked in sea border disputes with japan and four of asean members – vietnam, the philippines, brunei darussalam, and malaysia – chinese president xi jinping firmly declared his disapproval of the involvement of external powers, mainly the u.s. in the 2014 conference on interaction and confidence-building measures in asia (cica), president xi jinping proposed a new “asian security concept” which argues that asian problems should be resolved by asian people and that asian security should be protected by asian people: “<it is for the people of asia to run the affairs of asia, solve the problems of asia and uphold the security of asia. the people of asia have the capability and wisdom to achieve peace and stability in the region through enhanced cooperation” (xi, 2014). previously, in september 2013, the chinese authorities also proposed a framework and cooperation mechanism to bring china, central asia, russia, and europe, as well as southeast asia together to build “silk road economic belt and the 21st century maritime silk road”. with regards to southeast asian countries, in front of indonesian parliament members in october 2013, president xi stated the chinese government’s initiative to finance infrastructure construction and promote regional interconnectivity and economic integration by establishing the asian infrastructure investment bank (aiib). this initiative is particularly focused on the china-asean maritime partnership, with the basis of mutual trust and goodneighborliness, win-win cooperation, togetherness, mutual understanding and friendship, openness, and inclusiveness (xi, 2013). similarly, the newly elected indonesian president joko widodo declared his intention to bring indonesia to become the global maritime fulcrum at his first speech before east asian leaders in november 2014 (the jakarta post, 2014). the fulcrum consists of five components, which are: (1) rebuilding the indonesia’s maritime culture, (2) maintaining and managing marine resources, (3) developing maritime infrastructure and connectivity, (4) enhancing maritime diplomacy, and (5) developing maritime defense forces. with the fact that indonesia lies strategically between the indian and pacific oceans passing the strait of malacca and south china sea, jokowi’s global maritime fulcrum doctrine shortly provoke china and the u.s. to approach indonesia. both countries are proposing comprehensive strategic partnership with indonesia particularly in maritime cooperation (the jakarta post, 2014). journal of asean studies 127 the u.s., china, indonesia, and other asean member states’ respective maritime strategies are likely to provoke mutual contention in the region. yet, their various policies also show their common concerns with regards to their maritime territories as well as regional security and stability. despite their different stances and capabilities regarding the issue of east and south china sea management, all countries in the region believe that cooperation is vital in maintaining regional as well as global peace, prosperity, security, and stability. the abundance of natural resources – including fisheries, oil, and gas reserves – coupled with the need to secure their slocs and sea trading system in asiapacific waters from both traditional and non-traditional threats have called these states for cooperative management on such common concerns. from their defense white papers, we can conclude that asean member states as well as the u.s. and china express their needs for a cooperative and comprehensive integrated action as well as a series of confidence-building measures and selfrestraint in achieving mutual interests. the role of asean and challenges asean, as one of regional associations in the southeast and east asia regions whose aim is to promote regional peace, prosperity, and stability, has a great opportunity to facilitate and accommodate its member states’ interests on one hand and external powers’ interest on the other hand in such collaborative way. although asean was initially established to enhance the economic, social, and cultural cooperation among its members as written in its 1967 bangkok declaration, security has greatly remained at the core of its existence (severino, 2006). indeed, former singaporean prime minister lee kuan yew also mentions in his memoirs that in its development, asean was banding together more for political objectives, stability, and security (lee, 2000). his statement is true as in the case of south china sea dispute. as a contending issue between china and four asean members – vietnam, the philippines, malaysia, and brunei darussalam – south china sea overlapping claims have threatened the regional peace and stability as well as the economic development. in the name of protection of sea territory and natural resources from both traditional and nontraditional threats, claimant states subsequently enhance their naval activities. moreover, the chinese government’s rejection against the decision of international tribunal regarding the case of south china sea arbitration brought by the philippines seemingly failed to resolve the problem on the legal basis. at this point, asean should play its central role in maintaining security and stability in the region. asean has actually put its effort to discuss the issue in many summits and dialogues. the first workshop initiated by indonesia was conducted in 1990 to manage potential conflict in the south china sea. afterwards, the issue of south china sea and its management has been discussed every year in asean leaders’ joint communiqués and chairmen’s statements. in 1992, asean as a united posture eventually succeeded to bring china to sign the declaration on the south china sea, and then followed by the 2002 declaration on the conduct of parties in the south china sea (doc). both agreements essentially called for a peaceful resolution of jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means without resorting to force, the exercise of self128 regional maritime cooperation in maintaining maritime security and stability restraint, possible cooperation in maritime safety, marine environmental protection, search and rescue operation, action against transnational crimes, and the application of the principles of the treaty of amity and cooperation as the basis for a code of conduct for the south china sea dispute. this was also to confirm that asean had become a primary driving force institution that was responsible to maintain peace, prosperity, security, and stability, particularly in southeast asia and asia-pacific region. with regard to its responsibilities in maintaining peace, stability, and security in the region, asean also has several mechanisms where all members may have dialogue and consultation on common political and security issues, as well as significantly contribute towards confidence building and preventive diplomacy. such mechanism is implemented in the asean regional forum (arf), asean defence ministers’ meeting (admm), and admm-plus australia, china, india, japan, new zealand, south korea, russia, and the u.s. as asean counterparts. they are complement to the asean maritime forum (amf) and expanded asean maritime forum (eamf). in these forums, asean member states and their counterparts conduct dialogues on defense and security issues, and the latter is particularly for maritime issues. such dialogues and security mechanisms are effective to build the confident between asean members and its counterparts. nevertheless, during the 2012 asean summit in cambodia the asean leaders, for the first time, failed to reach an agreement on how to manage the south china sea dispute. the debate continued as during the 2015 admm-plus forum, the asean counterparts including australia, china, india, japan, and the u.s. also failed to reach a declaration on the same issue (reuters, 2015). besides, a prolonged processed of south china sea code of conduct are of signals that the division amongst asean members regarding south china sea management remains problematic. the partnership of asean member states with different counterparts in asia-pacific as described in table 2 is very likely to exacerbate the disunity of asean. from the table below, we can see that almost all asean countries have made their respective bilateral and/or multilateral agreements on economic, defense, and maritime issues with various external partners such as the u.s., china, and japan. indonesia, malaysia, the philippines, singapore, and thailand for example have maritime cooperation and military exercise in the exercise rimpac with the u.s., australia, japan, korea, new zealand, india, canada, and the uk, without china and other asean member-states in it. in trade, investment, and economic, brunei darussalam, malaysia, singapore, and vietnam are in cooperation with australia, japan, and canada in trans-pacific partnership (tpp)-11, whereas myanmar, cambodia, indonesia, laos, philippines, and thailand prefer to join the regional comprehensive economic partnership (rcep) with china in the scheme. these partnerships contribute positively to asean countries’ economic development and security, but also provoke contention and competition at the same time due to clash of their and their partners’ interests. interestingly, the east asian summit (eas) in november 2015, couple weeks after the admm-plus, prevailed to launch a joint statement on enhancing regional maritime cooperation. this journal of asean studies 129 statement confirmed the centrality role of asean and asean-led mechanisms in maintaining the peace, stability, safety, and security in the region, particularly at its seas and oceans. this was also to confirm that both asean and major powers in asia-pacific needed to realize the establishment of regional maritime strategic partnership and cooperation, in which asean becomes the primary driving force. this regional maritime strategic partnership can be an initial step for south china sea dispute management. the regional maritime strategic partnership and cooperation launched in november 2015 mainly discussed on comprehensive issues focusing on safety of navigation and sea dispute management as a way for confidence buildings measures. in further steps, the forum should also harmonize the diverse interests and make into realization of the regional maritime cooperation including activities such as information sharing; technological cooperation; exchange of visits of related authorities; maritime connectivity and capacity building; infrastructure and equipment upgrading; seafarers’ training; marine-science research; marine environment protection; eco-tourism promotion; disaster relief; illegal, unreported, and unregulated (iuu) fishing countermeasures; illicit small arms; drugs trafficking; and people smuggling combat; as well as security at sea and ports. table 2. asean countries’ partnerships partnership asean countries asean counterparts area of cooperation rim of the pacific exercise (rimpac) indonesia, malaysia, philippines, singapore, and thailand the u.s., australia, japan, korea, new zealand, india, canada, chile, colombia, france, norway, peru, mexico, netherlands, tonga, and the u.k. maritime and military exercises trans-pacific partnership (tpp) 11 brunei darussalam, malaysia, singapore, and vietnam australia, canada, japan, new zealand, chile, mexico, and peru trade, investment, and economic regional comprehensive economic partnership (rcep) brunei darussalam, myanmar, cambodia, indonesia, laos, malaysia, philippines, singapore, thailand, and vietnam australia, china, india, japan, south korea, and new zealand. trade, investment, and economic asia-pacific economic cooperation (apec) brunei, indonesia, malaysia, philippines, singapore, thailand, and vietnam australia, canada, japan, south korea, new zealand, the u.s., china, mexico, papua new guinea, chile, peru, and russia economic, free trade agreement proposal east asian summit (eas) brunei, cambodia, indonesia, laos, malaysia, myanmar, philippines, singapore, thailand, and vietnam australia, china, india, japan, new zealand, russia, south korea, and the u.s. forum to discuss economic cooperation, energy, climate change, and internal asean issues. 130 regional maritime cooperation in maintaining maritime security and stability with such scope of cooperation, a regional maritime strategic partnership is important to enhance stability in the region. there are at least three reasons why asean member states need to realize this regional maritime partnership. first, it strengthens mutual trust amongst asean countries, as it will be a mechanism in which asean countries speak as one united actor. second, the partnership builds common perception between asean countries and its counterparts in asia-pacific, particularly with china regarding the south china sea management. eventually, with mutual trust and common concern between all parties, the partnership gradually reduces the tension in the region relating to south china sea issue and other maritime managements, as they will collaboratively resolve the problems, both traditional and nontraditional challenges. nevertheless, this regional maritime partnership can be a test case for asean unity and centrality. as a regional organization, asean’s main task is to accommodate its diverse member states’ interests and capabilities. moreover, as a unified actor in the region, asean needs to harmonize its member states’ interest with external powers’ interest. it is complicated for asean especially after experiencing its first years of asean community. in such case, asean member states need to build a common perception amongst them related to conflicting issues with a basis that they have common concern on the same issues. besides, as an organization, asean needs to ensure that its member states’ respective bilateral and/or multilateral cooperation do no harm to other asean member states’ interests. conclusion the importance and vulnerability of southeast and east asia region, coupled with its maritime security, has urged major powers in the region to launch their respective maritime and defense strategies which are important to promote national prosperity and security as well as regional stability. as a united actor in the region, asean should also play its role according to its responsibilities by looking at common concerns of its members and counterparts. with regards to the south china sea issue, asean has conducted some internal mechanisms to resolve the problem, yet it failed to achieve an agreement on the issue. however, external asean-led mechanisms can be utilized to resolve the sea dispute. to speak as one united actor, asean should perform its leadership and centrality in regional maritime partnership and cooperation, involving other pacific states and asean counterparts, mainly china, south korea, japan, australia, new zealand, and the u.s. by this, asean needs more confidence-building measures to build common perception with common concern amongst its member states and to ensure its member states get no harm from their respective bilateral and/or multilateral partnership with external powers. about the author the writer is lecturer and senior researcher at the center for security and foreign affairs studies, international relations program, faculty of social and political science, christian university of indonesia. journal of asean studies 131 references asean. 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(2015). chronology of china's belt and road initiative. retrieved on june 26, 2016 from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2 015-03/28/c_134105435.htm. http://www.asean-china-center.org/english/2013-10/03/c_133062675.htm http://www.asean-china-center.org/english/2013-10/03/c_133062675.htm http://www.asean-china-center.org/english/2013-10/03/c_133062675.htm http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1159951.shtml http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1159951.shtml http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-03/28/c_134105435.htm http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-03/28/c_134105435.htm journal of asean studies, vol. 7, no. 2 (2019), pp. 99-121 doi: https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v7i2.5787 ©2019 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic financing peace: special autonomy fund as a peace dividend in aceh, indonesia amalia sustikarini university of canterbury, new zealand abstract this paper discusses the peacebuilding process in aceh indonesia. southeast asia is one of the regions that has been plagued by severe ethno-nationalist strives due to its high level of diversity and the impact of colonialism. among several cases of ethno-nationalist struggles in this region, the separatist insurgency in aceh, indonesia has been regarded as the protracted conflict that has been successfully resolved and created durable peace. the helsinki peace agreement attempted to redress the economic grievances that were manifested in perceived inequality and the exploitation of aceh’s natural resources through the arrangement of special autonomy fund. this fund serves as a peace dividend that is expected to bring welfare and enhance economic development in aceh. the paper examines the role of special autonomy fund in accelerating economic development in aceh in the past ten years by utilizing the concept of the peace dividend and the model of fiscal-sharing. while this fund has been successfully increasing aceh, economic growth compared to the conflict era, it has not been optimally utilized to reduce poverty and inequality. due to the nature of peace in aceh as an elite-based peace, the peace dividend has contributed to the patronage politics particularly among the former combatants. key words: southeast asia insurgencies, peacebuilding, aceh, special autonomy fund, economic grievances, peace dividend introduction southeast asia is one of the regions that has long been plagued by separatist conflict. this type of conflict is described by weller (2005, pp. 4) as “among the most damaging and protracted to have bedeviled states and the international system since 1945”. reilly and graham (2004) argue that the weakness of asia-pacific countries towards internal insurgencies is caused by the vulnerable state structures which deal with identity-based conflict insurgencies. due to the impact of colonialism, many states in southeast asia and the south pacific are artificial creations of the twentieth century, incorporating diverse ethnicities, races or religious group without strong cohesion (reilly & graham, 2004). among several southeast asian countries, indonesia, thailand and 100 financing peace: special autonomy fund the philippines are the homes of the longest ethno-nationalist insurgencies. indonesia provides an appealing case study of ethno-nationalist insurgency as well as its successful resolution. aceh, the westernmost province of indonesia, is known for its long history of war, resistance, and rebellion. the longest postindependence insurgency in aceh commenced in the midst of increasing centralism of suharto’s new order government. in december 1976, tengku muhammad hasan di tiro or known as hasan tiro established aceh-sumatra national liberation front (asnlf) which was later renamed free aceh movement (gerakan aceh merdeka/gam). hasan tiro is the descendant of a prominent acehnese family and the grandson of teuku cik di tiro, an indonesia national hero during the struggle against dutch colonialism (schulze, 2004). grievances over center-periphery antagonism, economic-natural resources distribution, political participation and cultural acknowledgement fueled the mobilization organized by gam. the central government responded to this rebellion by launching a series of counterinsurgency operations that caused extensive casualties, widespread human right violations and heightened the scale of the conflict. many years later in 1998, suharto fell from power. this was followed by dramatic changes in the overall indonesian political landscape, including the way the government dealt with internal conflict. under president abdurrahman wahid and megawati sukarnoputri, two efforts towards a peaceful resolution in aceh were initiated under the facilitation of the henry dunant center. in may 2000, the government of indonesia and gam agreed to sign a cease-fire agreement, the humanitarian pause, followed by a cessation of hostilities agreement in december 2002. neither agreement lasted very long, owing to unsatisfied demands between gam and the government of indonesia regarding the issue of aceh’s independence. in december 2004, aceh was hit by a calamitous earthquake and tsunami which caused more fatalities. according to data from the international recovery platform, there were 16,389 people dead, and 532,898 displaced (international recovery platform, 2004). in the aftermath of the tsunami, a historic agreement between aceh rebel movement (gerakan aceh merdeka or gam) and the government of the republic of indonesia (goi) was signed in helsinki, finland on 15 august 2005. this peace agreement was mediated by martti ahtisaari, former president of finland, under the auspice of crisis management initiative (cmi). since the peace agreement was signed in 2005, peace in aceh has been maintained for 13 years, former combatants have secured seats in parliament and the executive branch of government. economic indicators have gradually improved, and development projects are robust. in the aftermath of conflict, the economic condition in aceh has gradually improved as shown in table 1. from journal of asean studies 101 conflict period in 2004-2005 to peacetime in 2006-2007, economic growth in aceh rocketed from 1.8 and 1.2 per cent to 7.7 and 7.4 per cent, respectively. negative growth in 2008 and 2009 indicated the impact of the depleting oil reserves in aceh coupled with the diminishing construction and rehabilitation sectors (bank indonesia, 2009). in 2015, the negative growth was instigated by the discontinuation of the operation of arun gas company that produces condensate and liquid natural gas (medan bisnis daily, 2016). table 1. aceh economic growth 20042017 year with oil and gas without oil and gas 2004 -9.6 1.8 2005 -10.1 1,2 2006 1.6 7.7 2007 -2.5 7.4 2008 -8,3 1.9 2009 -3.82 3.78 2010 2.79 5.49 2011 5.02 5.89 2012 5.21 6.09 2013 4.82 5.45 2014 2.71 4.02 2015 -0.72 4.34 2016 3.31 4.31 2017 4.19 4.14 source: bps (indonesia statistical bureau) table 2. aceh gdp per capita 2007-2017 year with oil and gas (in usd) without oil and gas (in usd) 2007 1.684,90 1.178,31 2008 1.705,60 1.601,07 2009 1.633,66 1.336,84 2010 1.760,97 1.468,62 2011 1.914,05 1.599,36 2012 2.034,72 1.714,83 2013 2.012,00 1.714.00 2014 2.193,63 1.971,61 2015 1.927,16 1.852,34 2016 2.024,33 1.961,90 2017 2.112,15 2.043,57 source: bps (indonesia statistical bureau) table 2 shows the gross domestic product per capita in aceh more than one decade after the peace settlement that reaches approximately around usd 2100 per year with oil and gas and usd 2000 without oil and gas in 2017. before peace, gdp per capita in aceh was recorded at usd 1090 with oil and gas in 2004 (world bank, 2006). while the aceh’s gdp is catching up due to the growth, in the same year in 2007 aceh was one of the poorest indonesian provinces ranked at sixth lowest among 33 provinces with 16,89% of those in aceh living below the poverty line of us$ 34/ months (bps). aceh peace process is considered as one of the most successful and durable peace processes in the world (djuli, 2018). the model of peace settlement in aceh has 102 financing peace: special autonomy fund inspired other countries in southeast asia that also experience separatist insurgencies such as the philippines and thailand. one primary aspect of the peace process in aceh that was partially followed by the philippines government to resolve the conflict in the mindanao, southern philippines is the economic settlement. since perceived inequality is one of the primary causes of conflict in aceh, the narrative about economic exploitation and unequal sharing of natural resources between the central government and the province of aceh has fueled grievances over the years. therefore, post-conflict peacebuilding in aceh is directed to addressing these grievances by redistributing the revenue from the national budget and natural resources through a national budget that aims to enhance aceh’s economic independence, supporting economic growth and social welfare. this arrangement is duplicated by the philippines government through the law of bangsamoro or bol. in bol, the bangsamoro autonomous region in muslim mindanao will receive annual block grant, the increasing share in revenue taxes and natural resources taxes and rehabilitation fund for ten years (marcelo, 2018). against this backdrop, this paper seeks to analyze the role of special autonomy fund as a peace dividend to address a (perceived) economic inequalities that fueled the conflict in aceh over thirty years. the paper argues that within ten years of the disbursement of special autonomy fund, this peace dividend has not yet yielded the expected result in alleviating economic deprivation in aceh. it occurs due to the lack of skill from the former combatants that dominate local government and the type of peace in aceh that tends to be an elite-based, exacerbated by the patron-client network that is sustained from the reconstruction period to peacetime. the special autonomy fund (saf) as peace dividend in aceh peace dividends are the crucial part of the peacebuilding process as stated by the 2009 report of the secretarygeneral on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict. the report stated, “that if countries can deliver early peace dividends, build confidence in the political process, and strengthen core national capacity early on, they can reduce the risk of relapse into conflict and substantially increase the chances for sustainable peace”. the term "peace dividend" has significantly different meanings at different levels of analysis. peace dividend is commonly understood as the reduction defense budget to increase the fund to finance non-defense spending such as education, health and poverty reduction. o’hearn (2000) classified the literature on peace dividends based on three major streams. the majority of studies on the peace dividend analyze the impact of the reduction of conflict such as cold war to the level of dividends accepted by the militarized regions. smaller literature examines the benefit of the military expenditure transfer to the non-defense journal of asean studies 103 purpose or to avoid the destruction of war. the minor literature on peace dividends analyses the effects of peace on peripheral regions or on communities that have been in conflict with regionally powerful states. these communities have been experiencing political marginalization and economic disenfranchisement that create a fertile ground for armed conflict. hence, peace dividends give these communities a promise of greater economic participation and development in terms of trade, investment and entrepreneurship. chan (1995) categorized peace dividends into the three steps: firstly, the reduction of military expenditure to generate nontrivial saving (resource dividend) and secondly by the promotion of greater production efficiency (product dividend). the last step is the direct transfer of defense saving to increase the budget for the social program and an indirect one by creating a healthier economy. the other form of the peace dividend is fiscal power sharing. fiscal sharing is focused on the politics of peace dividends to generate an equal share of fiscal resources by reducing the proportion of central government and allocating a bigger share to local government (aleman & treisman, 2005). the impact of fiscal decentralization on secessionist violence will depend on the true motives of those demanding secession. according to aleman and treisman (2005), there are three common motives for secession: autonomists, opportunities and local ethnic entrepreneurs. autonomists aim to win greater authority to build local entities within existing states. opportunists extort bigger shares of national wealth, while local ethnic entrepreneur demands independence to gain local support (aleman & treisman, 2005 pp. 176-177). therefore, the result of peace dividend to generate welfare to the community will depend on the leader of the separatist movement, whether it will be well utilized for the society or being manipulated for the leader’s benefit. the importance of fiscal sharing is acknowledged by scholars in the consociationalism school as it is argued by (lipjhart, 1973; 1993 pp. 188-189 as cited in aleman & treisman, 2005 pp. 177): “proportionality in the allocation of public funds is an essential element of successful power sharing arrangement among ethnic groups”. the central transfer to the most likely separatist region is also considered an effective strategy to prevent secession (roeder & rotschild, 2005). in addition to fiscal sharing, peace dividends could also be based on natural wealth sharing. onder & cordela (2016) state that natural oil revenue-sharing in post-conflict areas would generate various result. this scheme works in aceh because fiscal decentralization was part of the peace agreement between the government of the republic of indonesia and the free aceh movement in 2005. it did not work for colombia civil war resolution as 1991 fiscal reforms led to the appropriation of revenue by the rebel group to finance the movement. in iraq, the result is mixed. temporarily, oil revenue sharing between iraq and 104 financing peace: special autonomy fund kurdistan regional government might preserve iraq territorial sovereignty, but in the long run, it could strengthen the peshmerga fighters in their bid for independence (onder & cordela, 2016). the subject of fiscal politics as peace dividend is crucial in post-conflict peacebuilding especially in sub-national conflict since the central government tends to allocate a large number of funds to redress the imbalance of the distribution of natural wealth during the conflict. as it was mentioned earlier, the impact of the distribution of the peace dividend will depend on the motives of separatism. it may generate optimal welfare for the wider public and alleviate grievances or will end up benefiting certain groups of elites who belong to one ethnic group. thus, unless managed fairly, a peace dividend may contribute to the possibility of the repetition of internal colonialism, in which one group tends to exploit resources at the expense of the other. unlike the traditional literature of peace dividends that links the reduction of military spending to economic development, the concept of peace dividends in aceh is closer to fiscal and natural wealth sharing. fiscal and natural revenue sharing are the important aspects of aceh’s economic development as a mean to alleviate economic grievances that fueled the conflict. the imbalance of the past unfair distribution of aceh’s natural wealth is being alleviated by granting a large amount peace fund which is expected to accelerate economic development in aceh and can bring welfare to the acehnese people. aceh has received the special autonomy fund since 2001, but the amount was increased as a result of the peace settlement. peace dividend in aceh consists of the natural resource revenue sharing fund (dana bagi hasil sumber daya alam/dbh sda), in which aceh gains a bigger percentage (70 per cent) of oil and gas compared to other provinces. this fund is also called the “additional oil and gas profit sharing fund” in article 182 of loga (law on the governing of aceh). this provision is an effort to redress the grievance about the imbalance of the profit sharing from oil and gas which has been perceived by the majority of acehnese as center-periphery economic exploitation. figure 1 describes how loga regulates the utilization of the natural resources revenue sharing fund, with aceh’s government obtaining 55% from oil and 40% from gas. thirty per cent of this fund must be allocated to education, and 70 per cent is granted to intergovernmental sharing (islahudin, 2010 pp. 4). journal of asean studies 105 figure 1. allocation of additional revenue sharing from oil and gas for district/city government in aceh source: world bank (2008) the other component of the peace dividend is the additional two per cent share of the general allocation fund (dana alokasi umum/dau) for 15 years. it will then continue at one more per cent for five more years until 2027, as shown in figure 5.3. dau is the new system of indonesia’s inter-governmental transfer as defined in law no 25/1999 on decentralization (barr, resosudarmo, dermawan & mccarthy, 2006 pp. 65). according to article 1, law no 22/1999 about decentralization, “this fund is allocated from the national government budget according to a specified formula with the objective of equalizing the financial capacity across regions to fund their respective expenditure within the context of implementing decentralization”. the additional 2 per cent share is an effort to redress the imbalance of previous decades of the distribution natural resources, as the oil and gas in aceh is already in decline. to avoid a confusing word swap, these two schemes of peace dividend are called special autonomy fund (dana otonomi khusus-dana otsus). the utilization of the special autonomy fund is regulated in law of governing aceh (loga). it is aimed to finance the following development programs: 1. development and maintenance of infrastructure 2. economic empowerment of people 3. eradicating poverty 4. education 106 financing peace: special autonomy fund 5. social 6. health (law of governing aceh, article 183). figure 2. allocation of special autonomy fund into city/district source: world bank (2011) figure 3. aceh provincial and district’s revenues 1999-2008 source: the world bank (2011) journal of asean studies 107 from figure 3 we can see that the special autonomy fund had contributed significantly to aceh’s provincial and district’s revenue. aceh provincial and district revenue started to escalate and reached a peak in 2008 after the allocation of special autonomy fund. under governor irwandi’s administration, the committee was established to decide how to allocate oil special autonomy fund. the allocation was articulated in the government of aceh mid-term development plan period 2007-2011 and set out as follows: (1) strengthening of governance, political processes and the law (2) economic empowerment, employment opportunities and poverty reduction (3) development and maintenance of investments in infrastructure (4) development of education that is of high quality and accessible (5) increase in quality of health care services (6) development of religion, society and culture (7) disaster risk reduction and management. (hillman, 2011 pp. 537) among the five priorities, education and health were the priorities of governor irwandi. during the election campaign, irwandi promised to allocate a large proportion of the fund to these two sectors (hillman, 2011). irwandi’s policy echoes collier (2006) argument about the importance of inclusive social expenditures such as expansion in primary health care and education for growth in post-conflict settings that are often deteriorating during the prolonged conflict. in other words, there is a need to put greater emphasis on social inclusion and hold macroeconomic and long-term policy (hehn, 2011 pp. 294). the items in the planning were based on the stipulation in loga with some additions on disaster risk and governance, two important subjects for the development of aceh in post-conflict. this section will focus on the disbursement of aceh special autonomy fund in infrastructure, health, and education. infrastructure infrastructure is allotted the most significant share of the fund, with stark disparities in spending compared to other sectors such as economic development, education and health. according to the loga, infrastructure is one of the priorities to be financed by the special autonomy fund. between 2008 and 2010, infrastructure always received the biggest share of the fund. most of the fund for infrastructure, 58%, is spent on road and bridge construction and maintenance. allocation for irrigation is 11%, river conservation and flood control 9.8%, village infrastructure 8.7%, and housing 6.6% (world bank, 2011). however, from the survey conducted by the world bank (world bank, 2011) the level of satisfaction with infrastructure development is low compared to other sectors. the dissatisfaction occurred due to the poor quality of the construction and unfinished 108 financing peace: special autonomy fund projects. another shortcoming of the infrastructure in aceh is that most of the fund is allocated to small scale projects below idr 200 million (approximately us$ 20,000). based on presidential decree no 70/2012, the procurement of goods/construction works/others are set at the maximum of idr 200,000,000.00 (two hundred million rupiahs) that be implemented through the direct appointment. this regulation gives an opportunity to newly established and small contractor companies which only have the low skill to win projects, often through collusive practices that primarily occurred during post-conflict reconstruction. small-scale projects such as building paving blocks or fences will not have a significant impact on the broader community. borrowing the term used by muhammad syarif (jawa post, n.d) development in aceh is interest-based, not need-based. it is built to cater to political interests by creating patron-client networks rather than focusing on a longterm development strategy to create welfare and stimulate economic growth. education the importance of education in post-conflict development in aceh is manifested in the 30% allocation for education fund in additional revenue sharing from oil and gas and one of the sectors financed by special autonomy fund. until 2027, when special autonomy fund is phased out, aceh will receive idr 34, 7 trillion (usd 23 million) in education funding. one of the indicators of the progress of education is by measuring the human development index (hdi). aceh’s human development index (hdi) was quite good in the past. based on official statistics, in 1996 aceh’s hdi was 69.4 with it ranking 9th out of 26 indonesian provinces while during the 2004-2010 period, aceh’s hdi gave the province a rank of 17-18th of 33 provinces (barron, rahmant & nugroho, 2013). in 2016, aceh’s hdi was steadily progressing and in the relatively same level with the national index (cmi, 2017). figure 4. aceh human development index 2010-2016 source: cmi (2017) however, the vast amount for education in aceh has not been properly and strategically allocated for increasing the quality of education. as shown by figure 5, the biggest proportion of the special autonomy fund for the education sector was allocated to building classrooms and school fences, expenses that do not significantly contribute to the aceh’s educational excellence. as mentioned earlier, such minor journal of asean studies 109 construction projects are normally valued below idr 200 million. because government regulation does not require a tender process for the low-value project, the local government can employ direct appointment, a practice that is prone to patron-client network. figure 5. utilization of special autonomy fund in education sector based on the type of expenses 2012 (in percentage) source: acdp (2014) figure 6. the utilization of special autonomy fund in the education sector in aceh based on the value of the project 2013 (in percentage) source: acdp (2014) another landmark of the utilization of special autonomy fund in aceh is by the establishment of aceh scholarship commission, an ambitious tertiary education program that sends acehnese to study in prominent universities in indonesia or overseas. from its commencement in 2009 to 2013, this program has spent a total of idr 609 billion, sending 6031 scholarship recipients to pursue domestic or international postgraduate education (acdp, 2014). this program is not free of problems. lack of strategic analysis of scholarship has caused unemployability of the scholarship awardees upon their return in aceh (putri, 2018). most recipients aspired to work in the public sector, partly due to the stagnation of the aceh economy and lack of investment that leads to limited work opportunities. there is also a problem of misuse of scholarship funds by the recipient, which they spend it to non-educational expenses. health as one of the priority sectors in the allocation of special autonomy fund, health is an exemplary case in the utilization of peace dividends in aceh. in 2010, governor irwandi launched aceh health insurance (jaminan kesehatan aceh/jka), a provincial-level health insurance scheme for acehnese. this populist program has been praised as one of the achievements of aceh’s local government post-conflict. this insurance offers a simple process for people to access health service and facility. unlike national health insurance that is often 51 8 16 7 5 building and classroom laboratory school fence furniture classroom rehabilitation 59 33 6 2 <100 idr miliion 100 idr mo<500 idr mo 500 idr mo-1 billion 1billion-5billion 110 financing peace: special autonomy fund criticized of its layered referral system, bpjs (badan pengelola jaminan kesehatan/national health insurance or jkn/jaminan kesehatan nasional/national health insurance program), jka beneficiaries are only required to show their id card to access the health service in all hospitals in aceh. in 2010, jka had spent idr 241 billion or 15 per cent of the special autonomy fund. in 2011, it used 9.5 per cent of the special autonomy fund, and by 2017, idr 773 billion of the special autonomy fund had been disbursed to finance jka (putri, 2018). despite the compliment as one of a successful program of local government in aceh, jka under irwandi administration was severely criticized for its lack of means-testing. all acehnese, regardless of their economic status and income bracket, are eligible to access free health services through jka (cahyono, 2016). during zaini abdullah’s governorship, jka was under bpk’s (badan pemeriksa keuangan/ state audit agency) scrutiny due to idr 63 billion potential loss. it occurred during zaini abdullah’s governorship because aceh local government kept paying idr 63 billion to jka beneficiaries who failed to validate their id card (putri, 2018). in sum, from the three sectors of the allocated special autonomy fund, infrastructure, education and health, the fund is primarily disbursed to finance small scale projects and populist programs. infrastructure is dominated by low quality and small projects that cantered around gam elite and contractors, while health and education are mostly invested in directing assistance in the form of health insurance and scholarship. this pattern of fund disbursement could be understood from the necessity of former gam combatant to create legitimacy and maintain loyalty and trust from their beneficiaries through the patron-client network. however, as will be further elaborated in the next section, it leads to difficulty in generating performance legitimacy of the former combatant in post-conflict long term development. post conflict economic challenges: provincial poverty and inequality poverty alleviation and equal economic development among all districts and municipalities are paramount in postconflict-economic settlements, as the perceived inequality is the major contributing factor to the rebellion in aceh. however, ten years after from its first disbursement, special autonomy fund has yet to significantly contribute to poverty alleviation in aceh as demonstrated in the following figures. figure 7. comparison of poverty rate in aceh and national source: bps (indonesia statistical bureau) 15,2 29,83 28,37 19,14 18,2 16,66 0 10 20 30 40 2000 2002 2004 aceh national journal of asean studies 111 figure 8. comparison of poverty rate in aceh and national in post conflict period (2006-2018) source: bps (indonesia statistical bureau) figures 7 and 8 tell us about poverty, conflict and its aftermath. interestingly, in 2000 the national poverty rate was higher than aceh that might be caused by the residual impact of the asian financial crisis experienced by indonesia. poverty in aceh increased significantly in 2002 after indonesia stepped into the postauthoritarian era but placed aceh in security turmoil due to martial and civil emergency law. after the 2004 tsunami and the peace agreement, poverty rates in aceh began to demonstrate decreasing pattern even though the rate has been higher compared to steady declining pattern in the national average. however, if aceh is compared to other provinces in indonesia, its poverty rate has placed aceh as the sixth poorest province in indonesia in 2017, after special autonomy fund has been allocating for ten years since 2008 as shown in following figure 9. figure 9. ten provinces with highest poverty rate in indonesia 2017 source: databoks (2017) table 3 shows us a contradictory fact between the amount of provincial budget (anggaran pendapatan dan belanja daerah/apbd or apba in aceh) and the poverty level. with the highest provincial budget derived primarily from special autonomy fund, aceh scored as the poorest province on the island of sumatra. table 3. provincial budget and poverty rates source: acehtrend (2017) 112 financing peace: special autonomy fund in addition to the provincial poverty level, the other problem experienced by aceh in the post conflict is the inequality among the districts. the six districts with the relatively persistent rate of 20 per cent poverty rate are gayo lues, aceh singkil, bener meriah, pidie, pidie jaya and west aceh. the tree places with the lowest poverty level are all urban area with banda aceh is the only area with single-digit poverty rate and reached above the poverty line. three districts with persistently high poverty level, gayo lues, bener meriah and aceh singkil are resided by ethnically heterogeneous areas. economic inequality in these two districts is perceived as the trigger of the ala-abas partition movement. ala and abas are the movements which aspired to create separate province based on law no 22/1999 about decentralization that authorizes the creation of new districts, often referred to as pemekaran (blossoming). ala consists of aceh central highlands, the district of aceh tengah, aceh tenggara and aceh singkil; while abas is covering areas along aceh’s west coast, aceh jaya, aceh barat, nagan raya, aceh barat daya, simelue, and aceh selatan. aceh will only repeat history if the economic inequality that is a legacy from the conflict period is continued during the peacetime. during the conflict period, acehnese perceived that they were being colonialized by the central government due to economic marginalization and the exploitation of natural resources; in peace, the pattern has re-emerged. the gamdominated government could be seen as new “internal colonialism” especially by people from ethnically distinct areas that are politically disadvantaged and experienced persistent poverty during and after conflict. patronage politics and post-conflict economic resources in aceh as has been mentioned in the earlier section, the utilization of postconflict fund is characterized by a patronclient network. although the relationship between political elites and their political support networks is a central feature in any political network, it is particularly pronounced in a post-conflict setting (haass & ottmann, 2017). the government elites depend critically on their constituencies which provided necessary recruits and political and material support during conflict while during peace times, these constituencies form the electorate of the related political parties (haass & ottmann, 2017). haass and ottmann describe this feature as selective resource allocation in political patronage or “a politically motivated distribution of selected private benefits to relevant constituencies by political elites” (haass & ottmann, 2017 pp. 63). the resources can take the form of construction of public infrastructure and facilities, electrification and road and building management. according to aspinall (2009), there are three main sources of funds that gam actors have been able to tap: post-conflict journal of asean studies 113 "reintegration" funds, post-tsunami reconstruction funds, and the development budgets of provincial and district government. thus, it is essential to also look at the other two sources of fund that create this clientelist economy in the post conflict era in aceh. the patronage network had been started in the utilization of huge post-tsunami reconstruction fund. the former gam members entered this business as a material supplier or construction contractors through the structure of kpa (komite peralihan aceh/aceh transitional committee) as an organizational-based of gam mass’ membership (stange & patock, 2010). after winning seats in aceh’s politics, gam expanded their influences in the construction business as contractors through kpa network. since kpa is a civil organization, its members cannot be banned from joining in bids for construction works. however, due to the close connection with gam elites in government sectors, contractors from kpa knew how to place the right bid and also often won the contract (aspinall, 2009). it was helped by the presence of gam elite in brr, such as teuku kamaruzzaman, the former gam negotiator and the head of brr’s executive agency (aspinall, 2009). the leaders of kpa were usually awarded the major contract by the provincial government, the brr and national government. two examples were the national government project of a major bridge in lhokseumawe and brr project of the construction of metal frames for tsunami house in calang (aceh west coast), both are valued at approximately us$ 2, 2 million that was won by pulo gadeng company owned by muzakkir manaf (aspinall, 2009). the connection between the construction business and politics is not exclusive to aceh. the global corruption report with special focus on corruption in construction and post-conflict reconstruction (transparency international, 2005) provides global case studies of the nexus between politics and business in the construction industry from asia and africa including india, the philippines, lesotho, iraq and in the europe, italy and germany. however, the cases in post-conflict areas like aceh are more extreme because of the legacy of violent conflict (klinken & aspinall, 2011). gam members quickly turned into construction contracts, relying on influence, patronage, and coercion to influence business. the next post-conflict fund is channeled through the reintegration program. based on mou’s provision, a special provincial agency was established in february 2006 to manage the reintegration process, namely the board for the reintegration into society of former gam members, later shortened to the aceh-peace reintegration board or bra. the tasks of bra covered the implementation and monitoring of reintegration programs as well as coordination with related agencies and advisory role to the governor (governor decree no 330/145/2007). mou also regulates the responsibility for such 114 financing peace: special autonomy fund programs rested with the indonesian and aceh governments, not international donors. from 2005 to 2012, the government of indonesia through the ministry of social affairs has been transferring approximately idr 2 trillion (us$ 133 billion) for reintegration program through bra. the contribution to the reintegration program from provincial budget started in 2008, the first year of the allocation of the special autonomy fund to aceh. during the period of 2008 to 2015, the aceh provincial government has been disbursing approximately idr 700 billion rupiahs (us$ 46 million) for the reintegration program. generally, the type of assistance of the reintegration program in aceh could be classified into three major categories. the first category is cash allowances in the form of diyat (individual cash disbursement to former combatant households that had lost family members). the second category is the economic empowerment fund through the livelihood program assistance. the last type is in-kind assistance that comprises of housing settlement and farming land. after bra was officially dismissed by governor irwandi, in 2013 during zaini abdullah’s governorship, there was an attempt to maintain the existence of reintegration institution through the establishment of bp2a (badan penguatan perdamaian aceh/aceh peace strengthening board). the advocates of the establishment of bp2a based their argument on the unfinished reintegration programs such as land farming allocation, housing and cash allowance and urged by the mandate of the reintegration process in mou helsinki. on the contrary, the opponents opposed the establishment of bp2a or any other ad hoc reintegration institution, instead preferring to hand over reintegration process to related skpa (satuan kerja pelaksana aceh/aceh government work unit) for efficiency and transparency. skpa (or skpd in district level) is the provincial unit or regional office of national ministries. for example, the disbursement of cash allowance for conflict victims could be channeled through the regional office of social services and the allocation of land farming could be coordinated under the regional land agency. the preference of individual cash disbursement indicates the patron-client relationship in the reintegration program, as personal loyalty is easier to guarantee than through community-based loyalty. bra as an ad hoc institution is prone to be exploited by the ruling government as their political vehicle, especially in a political setting where the former combatants won the election and hold the political power. the reintegration fund for their fellow former combatants is easily manipulated or mismanaged to gain more control or political support as a cash disbursement program is a lucrative aspect in political competition. the third source of funding in aceh’s post conflict era is the ordinary development budget in the form of special autonomy fund. barron and clark note that "special autonomy boosted journal of asean studies 115 natural resource revenues kept within aceh by more than 150 times, from idr 26 billion (us$2.7 million) in 1999 (or 1.4 percent of total revenue) to idr 4 trillion (us$421 million) in 2004 (40 percent) (aspinall, 2014). the increase in regional budget, including the one received by aceh constitutes a huge injection of resources for predatory captures and patronage, particularly for gam members and the supporters who have moved into government as well as their business and political allies (aspinall, 2014). this patronage has taken form in direct budgetary transfers. in 2013, for example, the provincial budget includes grants of idr 127,5 billion (approximately us$ 125 million) to the aceh transitional agency (komite peralihan aceh) the organization representing former combatant (aspinall, 2014). in the subsequent years, the amount of grant gradually decreased to idr 80 million in 2014 and idr 61 billion in 2017. although the trends show the declining patters, the continuity of this grant indicates the entrenched patronage in the post-conflict era in aceh. it is important to note that the provincial budget receives the biggest share from the special autonomy fund, exceeding other income items such as local own-source revenue or additional revenue sharing from oil and gas. another striking feature in the utilization of the special autonomy fund in aceh is the disproportionate use of funds. the problem of a massive percentage of small value projects in infrastructure and education that is mentioned in the previous section is depicted in provincial and district/city data of the all priorities sectors of special autonomy fund as shown in figures 10 and 11. figure 10. the utilization of saf based on value of the project in provincial level 2014 source: bappeda aceh (2015, n.d) figure 11. the utilization of saf based on value of the project in district/city level 2014 source: bappeda aceh (2015, n.d) 61 19 19 1 < idr 500 million idr 500 million-idr 1 billion >idr 1 billion-5billion >5 billion 81 8 10 1 <idr500million 500million-1billion 1 billion-5 billion > idr % billion 116 financing peace: special autonomy fund small-value projects have been creating a problem for monitoring and evaluation programs. these projects are mostly implemented by direct appointment and could be executed without undergoing supervision and the monitoring system by lkpp (lembaga kebijakan pengadaan barang jasa pemerintah/ national public procurement agency). due to the domination of gam in local government as a result of their victory in local elections, these small projects could easily be awarded to fellow gam contractors and sustain the patronclient based economy. the most current case of the mismanagement of the special autonomy fund is the arrest of incumbent governor irwandi in july 2018 by kpk (korupsi pemberantasan korupsi/corruption eradication commission) due to allegation of taking illegal fee for development projects funded by special autonomy fund (diela, 2018). irwandi was accused to corrupt idr 500 million (usd 33,000), a relatively low amount compared to other corruption cases in indonesia. however, governor irwandi arrest is the first high profile corruption case in aceh after the peace agreement. the last case involving government official in aceh was in 2004 when the former governor of aceh, abdullah puteh was sentenced for 10 years due to marking up the price of the purchase of helicopter that caused idr 2 billion (usd 133,000) state financial loss. this “belated” kpk intervention could indicate the careful consideration of the national government to maintain the stability of the early phase of peace building in aceh, even though it cost a delayed good governance aspect. aspinall (2009) argues that gam members and supporters have instead mostly been reintegrated into aceh's political economy by way of predatory and clientelist patterns of economic behavior that seek to extract rents from the state. the reconstruction and reintegration funds had been utilized to create the patronage network in the postconflict era and this practice is sustained in peace time through the disbursement of special autonomy fund, that could indicate the long-term economic predatory behavior during the peace building phase in aceh. conclusion economic factors were the major grievances that triggered a rebellion in aceh. grievances over the inequalities of distribution of natural resources have been a powerful narrative in mobilizing discontent during gam insurgencies. the conditions have been worsened by the armed conflict, leaving aceh as one of poorest provinces in indonesia with low investment and high economic costs caused by illegal taxes by gam and poor infrastructure due to the damaging impact of the conflict. the primary effort from the central government to alleviate economic grievances in aceh was initiated in 2008, by a special autonomy fund as a development fund. the government of aceh channeled the fund according to the provisions in loga which gives the biggest share for infrastructure, education and health. infrastructure has been journal of asean studies 117 criticized for its low quality, the lengthy process, and the focus on small projects that gives insignificant impact on people’s welfare and economic development. while showing a positive impact, health and education sectors also suffer several shortcomings in the planning and implementation. the inequality of economic development within districts and municipalities in aceh is also becoming a concern. to some extent, infrastructure, health and education programs contributed to the short-term legitimacy of gam due to their populist character and the patron-client network. particularly on the small-scale project, these practices indicate the continuation and maintenance of patron-client economic network among gam circle that was initiated in the post-tsunami reconstruction industry and reintegration program. aceh’s first post-conflict administration demonstrated an ability to identify policy targets of the disbursement of the special autonomy fund but not an ability to formulate concrete strategies designed to meet those targets and a lack of capacity in implementation. another shortcoming is state capacity in translating development plans into comprehensive programs. they lack the long-term vision to channel the peace dividend into inclusive growth and investment projects which can stimulate future economic welfare and justice. it partially resulted from a lack of capacity building of the aceh local bureaucrats dominated by former gam members. various kinds of peace dividends in aceh had successfully integrated former combatants into postconflict economic development and peacebuilding at large, but the participation and integration will not be sufficient to maintain peace: there is also an urgent need of building and enhancing capacity. the economic settlement in postconflict peacebuilding in aceh is characterized by the establishment of an institution with patronage practices and limited participation in economic development. given the fact that grievance over economic inequality has been the main driver of insurgency in aceh, the incompetence of the new government in delivering services, stimulating inclusive growth and equal development among regions in aceh can potentially harm the durability of peace. about the author amalia sustikarini is a phd candidate at the department of political sciences, university of canterbury new zealand and the research associate at cbds, department of international relations binus university jakarta respectively. the author can be contacted at amalia.sustikarini@pg.canterbury.ac.nz references acdp. 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(2011). aceh public expenditure analysis: spending for reconstruction and poverty reduction. jakarta: world bank. journal of asean studies, vol. 8, no. 1 (2020), pp.81-93 doi: https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v8i1.6040 ©2020 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic building indonesia through asean economic community yunita permatasari international relations department faculty of social and political science, university of indonesia jl. margonda raya, depok, west java 16424, indonesia yunita.permatasari71@ui.ac.id received: 10th october 2019/ revised: 09th april 2020/ accepted: 11th may 2020 how to cite: permatasari, y. (2020). building indonesia through asean economic community. journal of asean studies, 8(1), 81-93, https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v8i1.6040 abstract as the interdependent global economy increased, asean responded with the creation of asean economic community (aec). the aec is expected to become the asean arena of learning regional economic integration before entering the global integration. indonesia, as the largest country in the region, should be a natural leader. however, the level of investment in indonesia was lost to singapore and several other asean countries, thus indonesia should see the potential of the aec and maximize it to benefit the strengthening of indonesia's strength. this research aimed to explain the aec background, the potentials and challenges of the aec, the aec 2015 and 2025 comparisons. using qualitative methods with inductive logical thinking, and constructivism as the analysis framework, the result shows that aec 2025 is believed to be the integration of the regional economy with a dynamic and sustainable process. thus, indonesia can strengthen its position in aec 2025, using a constructivism approach to reform indonesian identity into the structure. keywords: asean, economic community, indonesia introduction the association of southeast asian nations (asean) was formalized through the bangkok declaration, august 8th, 1967. asean as regionalism is socially constructed and politically contested (söderbaum, 2013). since its establishment, asean began to develop economic cooperation towards regional economic integration. this was marked by the common effective preferential tariff (cept) in 1992. cept was the forerunner to the formation of the asean free trade area (afta). however, the free trade area was only the first step towards economic integration. economic integration, according to balassa (1961), is https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v8i1.6040 82 build indonesia through aec divided into five stages. these stages include free trade area, customs union, common market, economic union, and total integration. to achieve regional economic integration, asean has made several agreements. there are five agreements made by asean for this (asean, 2018c). in 1995 the asean framework agreement on services (afas) was created which aims to create a free flow of trade in services in the region. in 2009 the asean trade in goods agreement (atiga) was created which aims to reduce trade barriers and deepen economic relations between asean member countries. in 2012 the asean comprehensive investment agreement (acia) was made, which became the main instrument in achieving a free and open investment regime. in 2012, the asean agreement on the movement of natural persons (aamnp) was formed, which aims to make immigration procedures uniform and transparent to natural persons. furthermore, asean made mutual recognition arrangements (mras) as an agreed framework for liberalizing trade in services and facilitating the mobility of skilled workers in asean, such as engineers in 2005, nurses in 2006, architects in 2007, surveyors in 2007, dentists in 2009, practitioners health in 2009, accountants in 2009, tourism in 2012. broadly speaking, the agreements aim to include: 1) facilitating the movement of goods, services, investment, capital and skills; 2) increase trade (goods services) and investment; 3) increasing and expanding the distribution and production network of the region; 4) increase transparency and predictions. to support the agreement, several other related agreements were made in the field of transportation such as asean framework agreement on the facilitation of foods in transit (afafgit), asean framework agreement on multimodal transport (afamt), and asean framework agreement on facilitation of inter-state transport (afafist) (asean, 2018b). in addition to making these agreements, asean also made agreements. in 2003, he signed the asean charter, which ratified it as a subject of international law. in that year, the asean community agreement was also signed. in the asean community, three asean pillars are developed, including asean political-security community (apsc), asean economic community (aec), asean sociocultural community (asc). in 2007 asean adopted one of these pillars, namely the 2015 aec blueprint and the asean vision 2020. therefore, since 2015 aec was officially formed in asean. since the formation of the aec in 2015, with a population of around 630 million, asean has had a gdp above the us $ 2.6 trillion. asean accounts for 7% of global gdp. in the same year, the aec blueprint 2025 and asean vision 2025 were adopted. through this framework of cooperation, it is expected that all asean member countries can further integrate and improve their economies. thus, through the aec asean and its member countries can become major players in the global market. journal of asean studies 83 literature review aec potential and challenges the international economic system is increasingly interdependent with globalization. in a very dynamic and increasingly uncertain international situation, the role of the region is greater (hettne & soderbaum, 1998). asean, as one of the regions that has great economic potential, is aware of playing an active role in the international economic system. asean seeks to maximize the benefits that can be drawn from the system. the system should be able to benefit the economic development of asean member countries and deepen the integration of the asean region. asean is located between two continents and two oceans. this makes asean a crossing of the international trade channel. geographically, asean is in a tropical climate that is very suitable for agricultural development. coupled with the vast ocean area, this area is very suitable for fisheries development. asean member countries also have different cultures as well as their own uniqueness so that the tourism sector is also very suitable to be developed. however, asean also has a history of integration failures that occurred up to three times. these projects include the southeast asia association (asa), the southeast asia treaty organization (seato), malaysia, philippines, indonesia (maphilindo). asean member countries have different historical and political differences. the border issue is still a dispute that has not been resolved by several asean member countries. asean also has the asean way principle which minimizes interventions to other countries, making it vulnerable to regional instability. asean member countries also have quite large differences in economic levels. the presence of the aec is one of the significant steps in maintaining regional stability and responding to the challenges of the developing international system. the challenges of globalization are increasingly increasing the mobility of goods, services, and factors of production. added to this is the challenge of interdependence that is increasingly binding on each other so that if one country is in crisis, other countries will be affected as well. in addition, the aec is at the same time a step by asean member countries to achieve economic improvement and equity. as such, the aec is very relevant to improving the asean economy so that it can play an active role in the global arena, as well as maintaining regional stability or reducing the potential for crisis. aec in ideational and implementation has potential and challenges. the aec was first proclaimed in 2003 on an ideational level. at the ideational level, the aec is the realization of the ultimate goal of regional economic integration. this realization is characterized by the free movement of goods, services, and investments, including facilitating the flow of capital and skills. these goals will be achieved through harmonizing trade and investment laws. as such, asean as a regulation-based organization will increasingly become stronger to be an attractive single investment destination. 84 build indonesia through aec at the implementation level, several policies were made to support the realization of the regulatory framework that had been made. the policies include: 1) asean investment website to increase investment; 2) asean single window to increase trade; 3) asean integrated food security (aifs) to encourage the development of sustainable food production, bearing in mind one of asean's advantages in agriculture; 4) building longterm infrastructure to develop capital markets and asean capital liberalization in achieving financial integration; 5) increasing the region's physical connectivity through the asean highway network, the singapore-kunming railway link, and the asean power grid. in addition, asean initiates ipr and consumer protection, promotion of tourism and publicprivate cooperation, as well as minimizing development differences in the region. as such, asean is believed to become one of the most competitive economic blocs in the world. in both levels, several challenges have arisen, which can limit the achievement of asean potential. the challenge from the ideational side is the implementation of policies and agreements that have been made. implementation is flexible according to the country's readiness due to the asean way principles. the next challenge is the impact of implementation itself which must be overcome, both for domestic and international conditions. domestic pressures include legal standardization, product standardization and efficiency, trade competition, equal treatment by domestic and foreign investors, losing competitiveness of the domestic industry from foreign industries. the impact of implementation from the international side is that several new threats arise. first, asean will become an economic bloc that increasingly divides the world. second, the ease of mobility of production factors is directly proportional to the ease of mobility of transnational threats. third, asean must create regulations to deal with transnational threats such as financial crises, human trafficking, terrorism, drug trafficking, and others. fourth, asean must adjust its agenda according to a sustainable global development agenda. fifth, asean must deal with the dominance of other powerful countries or regions in the international system. based on these potentials and challenges, asean can be better understood as developmental regionalism (nesadurai, 2003). that is because asean has an anomaly if it is called open regionalism or resistant regionalism as open regionalism asean should treat investors from countries in the region the same as investors from outside the region. however, asean imposed different treatment of investors. if it is called as resistant regionalism to globalization, asean has the ultimate goal of regional integration in the global market which is in sharp contrast to resistant regionalism. hence dealing with the aec are the potentials and challenges of asean as a developmental regionalism, especially in the economic sector. journal of asean studies 85 research method chronologically, this research includes how to prepare materials research, design of the study and research procedures (in the form of an algorithm, pseudocode or other). minimum research method consists of research type, type and source of data, data collection techniques, and data analysis techniques. qualitative methods with inductive logical thinking is adopted to this research. qualitative method is used to understand and describe (neuman, 2014) indonesia in asean economic community by emphasizing the words (creswell, 2009). this research uses secondary data from journals, books, official documents, and websites related to indonesia and asean economic community. data collection techniques is done through literature review looking up at various references to both scientific journals, books, and other relevant information sources. afterwards, the technique of analysis data is descriptive analysis using constructivism framework to interpret indonesia’s position in asean economic community. finally, validating data means by triangulation. this research uses constructivism as analysis framework. researcher believes in thr argument that interest based on identities (wendt, 1992) and material resources will be meaningful through the structure in which societies are embedded (wendt, 1995). this research reflects christian reus-smit (burchill et al., 2005) pointing out there are three arguments of constructivism. first, emphasizing the importance both of normative and material structures, on the role of identity in shaping political action and on the mutually constitutive relationship between agents and structures. second, understanding how nonmaterial structures condition actors identities is important because identities inform interests and, in turn, actions. third, contending that agents and structures are mutually constituted. based on arguments above, this research focuses on describe the role of identity for indonesia in dealing with aec. analysis comparison of aec 2015 and 2025 the 2015 aec blueprint document contains information on declarations, content, and strategies that are close with the annex (asean secretariat, 2008). in its declaration, it was emphasized that the aec as part of achieving the asean community in 2020 according to the bali concord ii declaration, october 7, 2003. the aec was also a pillar which was accelerated in 2015 in accordance with the asean summit, january 13, 2007. thus, the 2015 aec blueprint must be implemented by all asean member countries. aec blueprint will transform asean into a single market and production base, an increasingly competitive economic region, an area with equitable economic development, and a region that is fully integrated into the global economy. in its strategy, the aec regulates implementation whose progress must be reported regularly to the council of the asean economic community. 86 build indonesia through aec aec 2015 was set in singapore on november 20, 2007 in english. aec blueprint contains an introduction that explains the purpose of asean transformation according to the asean vision 2020. asean vision 2020, which was set in 1997. it aims to transform asean into a stable, prosperous, highly competitive region with equitable economic development, reducing poverty and socioeconomic differences as well as emphasizing the aec to support the achievement of the asean community 2020. it was coupled with the affirmation of the acceleration of the implementation of the 2015 aec as a form of strong commitment to achieving targets by accommodating the interests of asean member countries. the characteristics and elements of aec 2015 uphold the principle of openness, outward-looking, inclusive, market-driven economy that is consistent with multilateral regulations complete with effective compliance and implementation. the first step is to realize the aec by implementing the high-level task force (hltf) recommendations from asean economic integration. the aec is also developing different acceleration integrations in cambodia, lao pdr, myanmar and vietnam (clmv). in its implementation, aec is divided into four main characteristics. these characteristics include: 1) a single market and production base, 2) a highly competitive economic region, 3) a region of equitable economic development, and 4) a region fully integrated into the global economy. these characteristics are interrelated and reinforce one another. the first characteristic, the asean single market and production base consists of five main elements: 1) free flow of goods (elimination tariffs and non-barriers, roos, trade facilitation, customs integration, asean single window, standards and technical barriers to trade); 2) free flow of services; 3) free flow of investment; 4) freer flow of capital; and 5) free flow of skilled labor. in addition, the single market and production base also includes two important components, namely, the priority integration sectors, and food, agriculture and forestry. the second characteristic, asean, as a competitive economic region, consists of: 1) competition policy; 2) asean consumer protection; 3) intellectual property rights (ipr); 4) infrastructure development; 5) taxation and 6) e-commerce. being an equitable economic development is the third characteristic of asean, which consists of sme development and initiative for asean integration (iai). the fourth characteristic, asean integration into the global economy, consists of coherent approach towards external economic relations, enhanced participation in global supply networks. the aec 2025 blueprint (asean secretariat, 2015) is a replacement for the roadmap towards the asean community (2009-2015) which ends on december 31, 2015. this document explains the strategic implementation of the asean community in the next ten years. new elements are added to ensure that asean 2025 is relevant to face the challenges of the times. this document consists of the declaration, vision of the asean 2025 community, and the aec 2025. the kuala lumpur declaration, november 22, 2015, concerning asean 2025: moving forward together is a form of continued commitment after the 2015 asean community was formally formed. the vision of the asean community 2025 are known to be: 1) continuing the positive development of the 2009 asean community roadmap, 2) articulating aspirations and consolidating the community in journal of asean studies 87 realizing an asean that is based on regulations, 3) people-oriented and people-centered, and 4) building efforts to improve people's living standards in asean member countries according to the un 2030 agenda for sustainable development. aec 2025 is integrated and cohesive, competitive, innovative and dynamic. they have improved sectoral connectivity and cooperation. their society is more resilient, inclusive, oriented, and people-centered, integrated with the global economy. the aec 2025 blueprint consists of five interrelated and mutually reinforcing characteristics, namely: 1) a fully integrated economy consisting of the previous elements added to financial integration, financial inclusion, financial stability, facilitating the movement of skilled workers and visits of business actors, and increasing participation in global value chains; 2) asean which is competitive, innovative and dynamic consists of previous elements, added with: a) the effectiveness of the competition policy, b) productivity, innovation, research and development-driven growth, c) technology commercialization, d) good governance, e) effective, efficient, coherent and responsive regulations, and good regulatory practices, f) sustainable economic development, g) global megatrends and emerging trade related issues; 3) the enhanced connectivity and sectoral cooperation consisting of transportation elements, ict, e-commerce, energy, food, agriculture and forestry, tourism, health, mineral, science and technology; 4) a tough, inclusive and people-oriented asean that is people-centered and consisting of elements to strengthen msmes and the private sector, public-private partnership, reducing growth gaps, and stakeholder contributions in regional integration efforts; and 5) asean globally through ftas and comprehensive economic partnership (cep) agreements, such as with china, japan, the republic of korea, india, australia and new zealand—coupled with efforts to complete the regional comprehensive economic partnership (rcep) and asean-hong kong fta (ahkfta). the fta/cep has strengthened asean's position as an open and inclusive economic region and has become the basis for asean to maintain its centrality in global and regional involvement. asean member countries are also involved in the fta and cep with their respective strategic trading partners to complement the regional fta/cep. in its strategy, the aec 2025 regulates implementation whose progress must be reported periodically for no more than three years at the council of the asean economic community. based on these data, the two blueprints are not significantly different. the second blueprint is more comprehensive and complements the first blueprint. in the second blueprint, asean's coordination and work processes are better, more effective, and efficient by strengthening the community and asean institutional involvement at the national, regional and international level. the economic sector that is regulated is increasingly comprehensive and relevant to the current industrial revolution. assign the asean community council to fully and effectively implement the commitments contained in asean 2025, which are moving forward together, and submitting reports to the asean summit, in accordance with applicable procedures. realizing that asean is based on rules, oriented and people-centered with one vision, one identity and one community. 88 build indonesia through aec indonesia’s position in aec 2025 the implementation of the aec 2015 has been substantially achieved including eliminating tariffs and trade facilitation, the promotion of the liberalization of services trade, investment liberalization and facilitation, simplification and harmonization of the capital market regulatory framework, facilitate the movement of skilled workers, development of competition policy frameworks in the region, consumer protection and intellectual property rights; promoting connectivity, efforts to reduce development gaps, and strengthening asean relations with (external parties/stakeholders). nominally, asean gdp also increased by 1200 trillion us dollars in 2007, to 2400 trillion us dollars in 2015, to 2559 trillion us dollars in 2016, or 3.4% of total world gdp and 5.2% or 3.0 trillion us dollars in 2018 (asean secretariat, 2019b). thus, aec 2025 has a greater level of realization. since the aec 2015 was inaugurated, indonesia has not shown significant economic growth (asean, 2018a). indonesia has a population of 40.8% of the total of 650 million asean population in 2019 (asean secretariat, 2019c). although asean gdp has increased, indonesia's gdp has decreased, from 6.3% in 2007 to 5% in 2016. however, indonesia's gdp per capita has experienced an increase from 1,300 us dollars in 2007 to 3,600 us dollars in 2016 despite being far behind singapore and brunei darussalam. this was followed by a significant increase in food and transportation prices. in extra-asean investment, indonesia is under singapore and vietnam. however, in intra-asean investment, indonesia is the largest recipient of investment in the region. based on these data, indonesia's position in dealing with aec 2025 is quite good. indonesia can learn from the experience of aec 2015 to further improve its position in aec 2025 to potentially maximize its benefits. asean, as a regional group of countries, is often seen as a response to economic and cultural pressures from the globalization of market forces. therefore, asean eliminates obstacles to the movement of factors of production, but also remains protective of global urgency and protects cultural identity (molchanov, 2005). even so, regional integration was understood as a regional governance project by domestic actors and their coalition (jayasuriya, 2003). it is considered that indonesia must build identity to achieve its goals. state identity basically forms state preferences and actions (wendt, 1992). state identity is built within the international and domestic socio-political environment (katzenstein, 1996). identity is the interest to the state to construct it in the structure. how to construct identity can be through statements in various media both directly and indirectly, the formation of institutions, and others. thus, the phenomenon of international relations is the reality of social interaction through structures that give meaning to the material (adler, 1997). therefore, constructivism appears to discuss human awareness and its role in international life (ruggie, 1998). aec 2025 affects indonesia through cognitive dissonance, feedback effects and transnational persuasion. indonesia, then, participated in the aec 2025 for the achievement of indonesia's interests. thus, this policy is born from within indonesia itself for wanting to journal of asean studies 89 change its identity, not because of mere material impulse (sohn, 2008). indonesia defines aec 2025 by focusing on social roles that are of national importance (finnemore & sikkink, 2001). cooperation in international politics is difficult, but the international economic policy is needed to get optimal results from international markets (keohane, 1984). cooperation is considered possible on constructivism in the absence of great power which is replaced with the leadership of asean countries (acharya, 2014). it is believed that indonesia is able to strengthen its position in aec 2025 by using role of identity, which are: 1) the positive meaning of aec 2025, 2) indonesia has reconstructed it in structure through various media, and 3) it forms the role of indonesia and the aec 2025, which are mutually reinforcing. the positive meaning of aec is deepening the economic integration areas which focus on sustainable development in such good regulatory practice, and global value chains included emerging trade-related issues. the existing norms in asean economic integration are one of the important things emphasized in constructivism, which the role of identity can play in (burchill et al., 2005). by having aec as a positive structure, indonesia can form and play a constitutive relationship to increase indonesia's economic capacity. this region grows as the sixth-largest economy in the world, even the third most populous market in the world by almost 630 million people (asean secretariat, n.d.). based on oecd, asean percentage on real gdp growth 2020-2024 lower than in 2013-2017 (oecd, 2019). this situation has been experienced by all regions of the world influenced by the international recession from increasing tension of international trade competition. even so, luckily asean can bear up in lower gdp only 0.1%. it demonstrates a great asean resilience as a robust multilateralism in advancing regional development. furthermore, it started to develop new technology innovation and application as the fourth industrial revolution (asean secretariat, 2019a). unlike the region that is declining economic growth, indonesia has grown from the contribution of private consumption, government spending, agricultural production, and the service sector (oecd, 2019). on the contrary, indonesia’s condition on investment and trade slowly grow to be strong since largely supported by education and health, transportation, business services, and real estate (oecd, 2019). this condition is solved from the asean solutions for investment, services and trade (assist) (asean secretariat, 2019a), the finalization of asean trade in services agreement (atisa) and fourth protocol to amend the asean comprehensive investment agreement (acia) (asean secretariat, 2019b). moreover, there is also regional comprehensive economic partnership (rcep) committing on trade through free trade agreement (fta), services, investment, and movement of a natural person. in the end, indonesia's understanding of the asean structure has conditioned the establishment of indonesian identity in interacting within it. indonesia has also acted by seeking conducive interactions within these various structures (burchill et al., 2005) in increasing indonesia's investment and trade. thus, indonesia also constructs itself in these various media structures. this can be seen from indonesia's attitude as an active discussant and initiator within the framework of the asean initiative. asean is vital geostrategic importance to the world, trade valued 5.3 trillion us dollars, 15 million bpd of oil transportation, the fourth largest exporting region in the world 90 build indonesia through aec (asean secretariat, 2019c). moreover, lee hsien loong, singapore's prime minister predicted that asean become the fourth-largest economy in the world in 2030, led by usa, china, and the eu (asean secretariat, 2019c). based on this view, aec 2025 perform characteristics: 1) highly integrated and cohesive economy, 2) competitive, innovative, and dynamic asean, 3) enhanced connectivity and sectoral cooperation, 4) resilient, inclusive and people-oriented, people-centered asean, 5) global asean (asean secretariat, 2019b). the characteristics reflected in all asean commitments result in the raising level of fdi flow into asean from 123 billion us dollars to 137 billion us dollars in 2016-2017 (asean secretariat, 2019c). since 2017, digital economies rose as substantial investment in asean. it made significant development in e-commerce, financial technology, the development of data centers and ict infrastructure (asean secretariat, 2019c). thus, it makes wide-open opportunity for business of the industry and commercial sectors, such as financial services, telecoms and transportation, medical services and equipment, consumer goods, and automotive (asean secretariat, 2019c). indonesia should take the occasions by intensifying small-medium enterprises and welcoming start-up to nurture as a new competitive industry in consumer good and automotive, like vietnam that finally build their own automotive industry called vinfast in 2018 (reed, 2018). indonesia also must support digital economies environment in a conducive manner to nurture indonesian start-up and ensure 4ir in asean at a time. indonesia has rapidly become the digital nation by now since it has more than 100 million internet users (asean secretariat, 2019c). hence, indonesia both structured aec domestically and play actively in actualizes aec, which allows deepening and widening economy of asean member state, well said its reciprocal reinforcing. indonesia as an agent and aec as a mutually reinforcing structure are proof that the agent and structure are inseparable or formed together (burchill et al., 2005). this is illustrated in two ways: 1) indonesia has constructed itself in a number of mea media structures, including through the intensification of small and medium enterprises and startups, especially in developing an increasingly digital economy; and 2) the aec provides opportunities for its member countries as socially constructed structures so that they can encourage their respective economic improvements, both widening and deepening. the widening factors were powered by a free trade agreement with seven main trading partners, such as australia, new zealand, china, india, south korea, japan and hong kong, added with the comprehensive and progressive agreement for trans-pacific partnership (cptpp) that bring in canada, chile, mexico, peru (asean secretariat, 2019c). this factors are not only opportunities but also pressing regional and national actions that would rise synergy among asean member states (maria, urata, & intal jr, 2017). besides, the asean consuming class makes it the largest source of market growth in future (maria, urata, & intal jr, 2017) so aec become a means for increasing the economy of asean itself. journal of asean studies 91 conclusions aec 2025 is the integration of the regional economy with a dynamic and sustainable process. this happens because the economy along with the domestic and external environment continues to develop. indonesia can utilize this institution to improve its economy. the methods that can be used by indonesia, one of which is explained by constructivism. by positively interpreting aec 2025, indonesia is believed to create or establish identity which will be reconstructed into the structure. about the authors yunita permatasari is a teaching assistant in department of international relations, university of indonesia (2019); researcher in center of aerospace policy studies, national institute of aeronautics and space (2020); guest lecture in christian university of indonesia (2020). she has been a presenter at the asia-pacific research in social sciences and humanities (aprish) 2018, international postgraduate students conference (ipgsc) 2018, international astronautical congress (iac) 2019. references acharya, a. 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(2013). rethinking regions and regionalism. georgetown journal of international affairs, 14(2), 9-18. sohn, i. (2008). learning to co-operate: china’s multilateral approach to asian financial cooperation. the china quarterly, 194, 309–326. wendt, a. (1992). anarchy is what states make of it: the of power politics social construction wendt. international organization, 46(2), 391–425. wendt, a. (1995). constructing international politics. international security, 20(1), 71-81. editorial greetings from the journal of asean studies. we are very grateful to reach the fifth year of contributing to the southeast asian studies, both association of southeast asian nations (asean) as institution and also individual country in the region. with the publication of this volume 5 issue 1, 2017, we are pleased to stay on track in providing an academic venue for scholars, practitioners, diplomats, businessmen, and larger stakeholders of asean to contribute to the development of knowledge and debates pertaining to the southeast asian political, social, economic, and security issues. in this issue, there are six interesting manuscripts that consist of five articles and one research note. the first article is entitled, “the evolution of southeast asian regionalism: security, economic development, and foreign power support for regional initiatives, 1947-77” written by sue thompson from australian national university, australia. thompson discusses southeast asian regionalism by focusing on the aspect of economic development and security. she argues that the evolution of southeast asian regionalism was a combined effort of foreign power support for asian initiatives throughout the economic development with the aim to provide security during the political transformation of the region from the post-war period into the early years of asean and the aftermath of the war in vietnam. the second article is entitled, “redefining asean way: democratization and intergovernmental relations in southeast asia” written by m. faishal aminuddin and joko purnomo, both from university of brawijaya, indonesia. aminuddin and purnomo review inter-state relations in southeast asia countries and find that regional cooperation in the region has achieved limited political development. they provide an alternative type of political diplomacy by combining formal diplomacy actions done by state institution and informal diplomacy actions done by non-government actors. the third article is entitled, “the rohingya muslim in the land of pagoda” written by leni winarni from sebelas maret university, indonesia. winarni examines why the buddhist community in myanmar turns into religious violence against rohingya people in the state of rakhine. she uses historical perspective to analyze the ethnic-religion violence and finds that the conflict is either an indication of a weak state or failure state in managing diversity. the fourth article is entitled, “higher education integration in asean: asean university network case” written by teuku rezasyah, neneng konety, affabile rifawan, and wahyu wardhana from padjadjaran university, indonesia. rezasyah et al. discuss the role of asean university network (aun) in enhancing regional integration in the higher education sector in asean. lastly, the fifth article is entitled, “sub-national government and the problem of unequal development in asean economic integration: case of indonesia” written by agus suman, pantri muthriana erza killian, and ni komang desy arya pinatih. they elaborate the problem of increasing intra-national development gap due to regional integration by using indonesia as a case study. this issue ends with a research note entitled, “liberal world order in the age of disruptive politics: a southeast asian perspective” written by moch faisal karim from university of warwick, united kingdom. karim explores the notion of disruptive politics and the challenge it poses to the liberal world order. finally, the editor-in-chief would like to express highest appreciation for the authors who have submitted their manuscripts as response from our invitation and call for papers, as well as who have participated in the international conference on business, international relations, and diplomacy (icobird) at bina nusantara university whose papers are published in this issue. we also would like to thank the indonesian association for international relations (aihii) for continuing support of this joint publication with the centre for business and diplomatic studies (cbds) of the department of international relations of bina nusantara university. jakarta, 31 july 2017 prof. dr. tirta n. mursitama, ph.d. editor-in-chief journal of asean studies, vol. 2, no. 2 (2014), pp. 121-127 ©2014 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn2338-1353 electronic practice notes: indonesian economy leading to a political year and how foreign banks can play a role in development* kemal aziz stamboel foreign bank association of indonesia abstract recently, indonesia’s economy records very high and stable economic growth. the growth is above 6 percent. despite the world economic crisis, our economic growth is adequately resistant to turmoil from external crisis. the relatively high economic growth is mainly caused by high domestic demand, both from consumption and investment. the question is how foreign banks can play a role in development of indonesian economy? in this notes, i discuss several challenges posed by structural changes in indonesia as well as opportunities for foreign banks to play a role in indonesian financial development. keywords: economic growth, banking, investment, financial, development introduction recently, indonesia’s economy records 1very high and stable economic growth. the growth is above 6 percent. in 2012, global economy was engulfed in a crisis that even caused both china and india as two leaders of world’s economic growth to fall deeply with economic growth of 7.5 percent and 5.3 percent respectively. in the same year, indonesia still could maintain growth above 6.23 percent, ranking second highest in the world after china. this shows that in macroeconomic aggregate, our economic growth is adequately resistant to turmoil from external crisis. the relatively high economic growth is mainly caused by high domestic demand, both from consumption and investment. * this practice notes was previously presented as a keynote speech at the foreign bank association of indonesia general members’ meeting, april 24th, 2013. mckinsey recently published a report on indonesia titled “the archipelago economy: unleashing indonesia’s potential.” in the report, mckinsey predicted that in 2030 indonesia will be the seventh largest economy after china, the united states, india, japan, brazil and russia, taking over the position of germany and the united kingdom. mckinsey estimated that the rise of indonesia from today’s top sixteen to seventh rank in 2030 will be marked by the following variables: 1. there will be 135 million people as consumer group. today, the number is 45 million people. 2. 71 percent of urban dwellers will produce 86 percent of gdp. today, 53 percent of urban populations produce 75 percent of gdp. 3. there will be need for 113 million of skilled labors. today, there are 55 million of skilled labors. 4. there will be $1.8 trillion of market opportunities in consumers’ services, 122 indonesian economy leading to a political year and how foreign banks farming and fisheries, resources and education. today, there is $0.5 trillion. in 2013 indonesia’s economy is still projected to grow above 6 percent. the government estimates that our economy will grow 6.5 to 6.8 percent. bank indonesia projected the number a little below the estimates, which is 6.3 to 6.6 percent. the main cause is the continuing debt crisis in the european union that hasn’t showed significant improvement, delaying the rebound of global economy. our main trade partners, such as japan and the united states, haven’t received increase in demands. despite china showing revival, its growth is also still not too significant, approximately 8 percent. the good performance of indonesia’s economy doesn’t mean there is no problem within our economy. in our macro-economy, there are several pressures to our economic growth that requires attention. 1. first, the pressure on external balance. 2. second, the pressure on budget deficit. 3. third, the pressure on inflation. 4. fourth, the pressure on rupiah’s exchange rate. the first pressure on our economy that requires attention is the problem of external balance, which is the current account balance. in 2012, for the first time since 1961 we experienced a deficit in our current account, totaling us$24.2 billion, or 2.7 percent of our gdp. the number nearly touched the maximum deficit limit of 3 percent of gdp. this happened despite our current account still recorded a surplus of 0.2 percent of gdp in 2011. in the middle of 2012 most of the decrease came from the shrinking of non-oil and gas trade surplus. this was followed by the widening of oil deficit in recent months, peaking up to us$23 billion in 2012. the overall of outbalance of payments still recorded surplus thanks to inward foreign investments, in the forms of foreign direct investments (fdi) and foreign portfolio investments (fpi). we still need to maintain awareness on the high foreign investments, primarily on the potential of sudden capital reversal. in 2013, the condition of pressure on external balance still doesn’t show improvement. we can see this in january 2013, when our trade balance was still deficit of us$171 million. this deficit happened because our exports in january 2013 were only us$15.38 billion, while our imports were us$15.55 billion. the deficit of trade balance in january 2013 was mainly caused by the high deficit in the oil and gas sector: up to us$1.43 billion, with the deficit contribution from crude oil up to us$554.7 million and from oil fuel up to us$2.18 billion, while gas sector recorded surplus up to us$1.31 billion. exports of non-oil and gas in january 2013 recorded a surplus of us$1.25 billion. unfortunately, this surplus could not balance the high deficit from oil and gas sector. the second pressure on our economy is from the state budget. the realization of 2012 state budget deficit was rp146 trillion, or 1.8 percent of gdp. this deficit was lower than the target of 2012 state budget revision, which was 2.2 percent of gdp and reflects capital and goods expenditures that are lower than the estimates. capital expenditures in the last five years showed decreasing average trend. the spending that surpassed target was energy subsidy expenditures, which are higher than stipulated, up to 3.7 percent of gdp, or increasing by 3.4 percent, in 2011. the spending was nearly one third of total central government expenditures. in 2013, the government will continue to be careful on the fiscal by stipulating budget deficit of 1.7 percent of gdp. this deficit target is estimated to increase significantly if the international oil price increases, causing the 123 journal of asean studies subsidy allocation for oil fuel energy to also increase significantly. there are still challenges in the efforts to increase subsidy spending allocations and efficiency, although energy subsidy will keep weakening the adjustment of electricity tariff. oil fuel subsidy specifically has contributed to the pressure, not only in the budget but also in the recent trade balance. both two pressures cause indonesia to experience twin deficits, which are budget deficit and current account balance deficit. both deficits shall be kept not to exceed their maximum limits. the third pressure on our economy is the inflation problem. in 2013 our inflation experience serious pressure. in 2011 and 2012 our inflation was maintained low, while the contrary happens in 2013. the inflation for the period of january to march 2013 has reached 2.43 percent, far exceeding the inflation in the same period in 2012 and 2011, which are 0.88 percent and 0.7 percent respectively. the high inflation number is caused by the inflation turbulence of volatile food prices. meanwhile, the main inflation still can be maintained well. with high inflation trend in the first three months of 2013, it is difficult to achieve the 4.5 percent inflation as targeted by the government. it will be even more difficult if the government increase the fuel prices, which will press the administered prices inflation, causing the headline inflation to increase significantly. the fourth pressure on our economy is the movement of rupiah that is consistently weakening since the beginning until the end of 2012. rupiah’s position on december 30th, 2011, was on rp. 9,069 per us$. in the afternoon transaction on friday, december 28th, rupiah’s position was on rp. 9,679 per us$. the weakening of rupiah during 2012 had reached 6.7 percent. according to bloomberg data, rupiah’s weakest position was on december 26th, 2012, which was on rp. 9,799 per us$. compared to other asian currencies, rupiah was one of the worst performing regional currency in 2012. as comparison, south korean won managed to strengthen by 7.65 percent in 2012, philippines peso strengthened by 6.9 percent, singaporean dollar strengthened by 6 percent, taiwanese dollar strengthened by 4.2 percent, thai baht strengthened by 3.07 percent, and malaysian ringgit strengthened by 3.48 percent in the same period. in 2013 bank indonesia actively intervenes rupiah not to exceed the psychological limit of rp. 10,000 per us$. this will eventually impact our foreign exchange reserves. aside from the four macroeconomic variables, there is another pressure that we need to examine, which is political pressure. it is important to mutually understand that we are currently in a special year. some have called the years 2013 and 2014 as the political year. turmoil in politics is often associated with political instability. political instability is often associated with economic instability. will the political year give positive impact to indonesia’s economy, or on the contrary, negative impact to our economy? this is the question that we will collectively answer. to answer the question, i will use two approaches. first, pragmatic approach. second, institutional approach. my first approach is the pragmatic approach. political year will see increase in political activities. political activities will increase spending on political activities. from the spending or consumption side, this will benefit us very well. sectors related to political activities, such as telecommunication, media, transportation, printing industries et cetera, will experience significant increase. bank indonesia estimated that the total consumption related to political activities will reach rp44.1 trillion, while the government estimated it will reach rp. 58 trillion. my second approach is the institutional approach. political year will see increasing competition among political parties. study results of several survey institutions show 124 indonesian economy leading to a political year and how foreign banks that there is still no strong trend of who will be the strongest winner, both for legislative election and for executive or presidential election. the commission for election (kpu) has granted twelve political parties as election contenders. this condition causes the political map leading to 2014 to be very dynamic and difficult to predict. there are many surprises to come for the people. on the other hand, the institutional aspect of the political parties is increasingly questioned. the image and credibility of political parties are in a point of intersection, between rise and fall. the emergence of several independent candidates in some regional elections shows that there is a growing mistrust on political parties. even in some regional elections, the number of political parties supporting a candidate doesn’t determine the electability of the candidate. it was shown in the last gubernatorial election for dki jakarta. political instability is very possible to happen if political elites can’t achieve democracy consolidation for the sake of the interest of wider society. if political elites do maneuvers and take each others’ interest as hostages, the government will not be able to perform effectively and will leave bad precedents for the next government. despite that, learning from our experience, indonesia has conducted several elections for the legislatives and president. the results are here for us to see. the conditions were secure and the elections were conducted smoothly without social and political turmoil in grass-root society. aside from the four economic pressures and political pressures, it is highly probable that you as banking practitioners have questions about what you can do to participate in the development process so that you can be part of solution for the national economy. firstly, one thing that often becomes serious attention by the public related to the banking role is the optimization of the banking intermediation function. this is reflected on the low financial inclusion. the condition is seen in the low number of small and medium enterprises (smes) that can access funding, which is only 30 percent. the number of account ownership is still below 50 percent from the total of indonesia population. only 0.2 percent of domestic investors who enter capital market, while 30 percent are singaporean investors and 12.8 percent are malaysian investors. only 19.6 percent of indonesian people above 15 years of age have bank account, compared to 98.2 percent of singaporean, 72.7 percent of thai and 66.2 percent of malaysian. in southeast asia, indonesia’s percentage is only better than cambodia. in the context of financial inclusion, the banking sector is expected to be able to answer structural problems, such as poverty and income gap. the poverty rate in september 2012 was still on 11.6 percent, or approximately 28.6 million people. the gini ratio for indonesia in 2011 had reached 0.41, the highest number since 1999. in the period of 1999-2010, the gini ratio was only around 0.32 to 0.37. this signaled uneven development aspects. i have hopes that the banking sector can take its role in the effort to grant wider opportunity of financial access, especially to the poor. secondly, the banking efficiency. indonesia’s banking sector is one of the most profitable banking sectors in southeast asia. unfortunately, our banking sector is also one of the least efficient. this is seen from the operating expense to operating income (bopo) ratio and net interest margin (nim) that are still highest in southeast asia, which are 74.26 percent and 5.48 percent respectively. compare the numbers with the philippines’ 74 percent and 4.08 percent, thailand’s 54.3 percent and 2.48 percent, singapore’s 42 percent and 2 percent, and malaysia’s 40 percent and 2.27 percent. even according to bank indonesia, there are several banks with operating expense to 125 journal of asean studies operating income (bopo) ratio above 100 percent. still there are several banks, which in development, experience significant decrease in operating expense to operating income (bopo) ratio, especially state-owned banks. in the indonesia banking statistics published by bank indonesia in september 2012, the ratio of operating expense to operating income (bopo) ratio of stateowned banks had decreased from the average of 113.9 percent in january 2012 to 71.27 percent in september 2012. thirdly, our banking penetration is still very low (financial deepening). our loan-todeposit-ratio (ldr) is very high, that is around 84 percent, while the loan-to-gdpratio is very low, that is only 34 percent. this signals the lack of capital and funding factors in our banking sector. we need adequate investments to push our loan-togdp-ration in the penetration. aside from that, our banking sector also needs to prioritize the loan credits to productive sectors and minimize consumptive sectors. this is to ensure that not only the amount of credits that increases, but also the quality of the credits. fourthly, banks in indonesia need to optimize the management of the export revenue (dhe). bank indonesia recorded the number of export revenue (dhe) held in banks abroad up to us$22.3 billion during the period of january to october 2012. the value of export revenue (dhe) coming from domestic banks during october 2012 reached 85 percent or up to us$12 billion, while those coming from foreign banks reached 15 percent or up to us$2 billion. the percentage of export revenue (dhe) that is still held in banks abroad was 24.5 percent in 2009, 22.9 percent in 2010, 19.6 percent in 2011, and still decreasing to 15 percent in 2012. in total, export revenue (dhe) produced in the period of january to october 2012 reached us$129.4 billion, us$107.1 billion of which has come through domestic banks, while the remaining us$22.3 billion is still in banks abroad. fifthly, the optimization of liquidity excess. since the 1997/1998 crisis until now, the money market has been experiencing structural liquidity excess. starting from the fund for handling the banking crisis, the liquidity excess had continued to increase. the source has been the funding for state budget deficit, foreign capital inflow sterilization and payment of interest on bank liquidity in bank indonesia. to maintain the monetary stability, the liquidity excess has to be absorbed through monetary operation by the bank indonesia. the outstanding monetary operation by bank indonesia reached rp382 trillion in february 2013. however, the liquidity excess is still used in the money market and monetary sector only. this condition shall be used to flow the existing liquidity excess to the development of productive real sector that has direct implication on the welfare of the people. sixthly, the development of sharia banking industry. in general, the sharia banking industry in indonesia shows highly accelerating development above 40 percent per year in 2008 to 2012, while the average of national banking growth was only 16 percent per year. therefore, the sharia banking industry can be categorized as the fastest growing industries group. however, there are problems facing sharia banking industry, such as the fulfillment of human resources’ quantity and quality. high expansion of sharia banking is not followed by the provision of proper human resources. until now, the sharia banking industry needs 20,000 human resources. this is a challenge and also an opportunity. and how about the role of foreign banks in indonesia and the responses related to the regulations? in the 1997/1998 crisis, the banking industry in indonesia collapsed. this encouraged the government of indonesia to deregulate the banking sector. this came in two forms: 126 indonesian economy leading to a political year and how foreign banks 1. bank indonesia became independent. 2. the opportunity for foreign investors to have 99 percent of the ownership of banks in indonesia was opened. by the entrance of foreign investors, we expected national banking sector to strengthen since foreign investors were seen capable to increase the capital aspect of national banking, to conduct good corporate governance and risk management, and also to increase the quality of human resources in the banking sector. the expectation was fulfilled since the contribution of foreign banks positively satisfied the development of national banking in all respectful aspects. however, indonesia’s economy has been growing well. this also encouraged the active role of national banks to be increasingly better and to grow fast. liberalization of financial sector and economic integration caused national banks to start recognizing the importance to be active not only in domestic market but also in international market. this was the beginning of the emergence of the aspiration and will of the national bank to reassess the banking regulations in indonesia. the goal was so that the regulations give justice and fair competition between national banks and foreign banks, so that the banking industry will be healthy and mutually strengthening. there are several strategic issues emerging from recent banking regulations that may become important issues for national and foreign banks operating in indonesia. 1. firstly, the issue of reciprocal principle. 2. secondly, the issue of multiple licensing. 3. thirdly, the limitation of foreign ownership. 4. fourthly, the status of open company(pt) in branch offices of foreign banks. 5. fifthly, the minimum regulations for the position of director or commissioner. firstly, the issue of reciprocal principle. the principle can be understood because there were uneven regulations between domestic regulations in indonesia and foreign regulations. business efforts of banks in indonesia became very limited when they had to operate in several neighboring countries. this created barrier for national banks to move and develop their business. in this context, regulation diplomacy between regulators and industry needs to be conducted to create just and fair regulations between two countries. there needs to be efforts and steps of cooperation between the regulators and the banking industry, such as fair cross-border supervision that is equal between countries, so that the regulations are conducive for healthy competition climate in banking industry. application of reciprocal principle is also in the framework of strengthening the banking structure, industry and governance for the future. secondly, the issue of multiple licensing is important, not to limit but to encourage healthy foundations for the banking industry, so that the financial system will become stabile and can support the national economy as a whole. the foundations are strong capital aspects, prudent business expansion, good governance aspects and protection on consumers to the developing financial products. the single licensing practiced in indonesia is not good for the strengthening of the fundamental aspects of banking industry because it is too loose and doesn’t abide to the prudent principle. thirdly, the issue of limitation of foreign ownership and the obligation to change the legal body status to open company (pt) for branch offices of foreign banks, in my opinion, are not in the spirit of limiting and pressuring foreign banks. this 127 journal of asean studies limitation is in the context of prudential aspects of managing national banking. after all, when the stocks are mostly owned by foreign investors, there are bad potentials for indonesian banking. if one day a financial crisis happens, the potential for capital outflow is increasingly bigger. indeed, bank indonesia has issued regulations about capital equity maintenance asset (cema) that obliges minimum capital funding, but this regulation has to be supported by stronger legal rule equal to law (uu). this is important to assure the business and investment in indonesia is conducted smoothly without worries on the legal and formal aspects. it is of no doubt that the government, parliament and national banking industry still need the role of foreign banks. the magnitude of need for investment capitals in the banking sector cannot be fulfilled by the local investors. the limitation of stock ownership by the foreign investors cannot be applied. what can be regulated is to gradually decrease foreign ownership and to start opening the opportunities for local investors to balance the ongoing dominance of foreign investors’ ownership on the national banking stocks. fourthly, the obligation of branch offices of foreign banks to convert the legal status into open company (pt). it needs to be understood that the importance of an open company status is for protection, both to the foreign banks and also to overall national banking industry, from the contagion effect of the financial crisis of the mother company. aside from that, with the status of open company (pt), the principles of governance of the foreign banks will follow the law that has been specified in the law of open company (uu pt) and other related law with more binding. the capital funding and prudential aspects in management will also be strengthened with the status change. i can understand the objection from foreign banks, considering the change into open company (pt) is impossible to execute directly. it needs adjustments and periodization. after all, change of a branch to be a legal body as an open company (pt) will impact the operational funding of the foreign banks in the future. it needs proper regulations, time and execution. fifthly, the minimum requirement of a director or commissioner. i agree with the proposal from fbai that the requirement doesn’t need to include minimum ten years of experience. i tend to value competence, credibility and capacity more, or a meritbased system, as the references to the minimum requirement of a director or a commissioner. i have hopes that we can encourage the development of banking sector in indonesia and create healthier and more stabile financial system for the sake of better national economy. editorial greetings from the journal of asean (jas) studies. with the publication of this volume 5 issue 2, 2017, we are very grateful to stay on track in contributing to the southeast asian studies and providing an academic venue for scholars, practitioners, diplomats, businessmen, and larger stakeholders of the asean region. in this issue, there are five articles. the first two articles are on migrant and refugee issues. the first article is entitled, “forced migrants, media, and securitization: making sense of the changing representations of transit asylum seekers in indonesian print media” written by antony lee from kompas newspaper, indonesia. written from the perspective of a practitioner in the media business, the article is originally a summary of some parts of the author’s master thesis at lund university, sweden. the article aims to explain how and why the representations of transit forced migrants in indonesian major print media had significantly shifted during the arrivals of the indochinese refugees in 1975-1996 and in the period of the new generations of refugees from middle eastern and south asian countries in 1997-2013. the second article is entitled, “rethinking refugees as economically isolated: the rohingyas participation in informal economy in klang valley, malaysia” written by andika ab. wahab from national university of malaysia, malaysia. the author is also a practitioner on the refugee issue, currently a project leader of business and human rights at the forest trust (tft), kuala lumpur, malaysia. his article aims to analyze the relationship between the rohingya refugees participation in the informal economy and their livelihood activities in the malaysia. moving on from migrant and refugee issues, the third article is entitled, “regional maritime cooperation in maintaining maritime security and stability: a test case for asean unity and centrality” written by angel damayanti from christian university of indonesia. the article aims to elaborate the reasons why the region needs regional maritime cooperation and discusses challenges that asean has to deal with in order to implement the asean unity and centrality in promoting maritime cooperation and regional stability. the fourth article is entitled, “the effectiveness of de-radicalization program in southeast asia: does it work? the case of indonesia, malaysia, and singapore” written by yosua praditya suratman. the article aims to analyze the effectiveness of the de-radicalization program in southeast asia to propose some recommendations for indonesian government in strengthening and reshaping its de-radicalization policies. the last article is entitled, “explaining the fast-growing textile and garment industries (tgi) in vietnam (2000-2015)” written by sukmawani bela pertiwi from bina nusantara university, indonesia. the article aims to explain the fast-growing textile and garment industries (tgi) in vietnam from 2000 to 2015. finally, the editor-in-chief would like to express highest appreciation for the authors who have submitted their manuscripts as response from our invitation and call for papers. we also would like to thank the indonesian association for international relations (aihii) for continuing support of this joint publication with the centre for business and diplomatic studies (cbds) of the department of international relations of bina nusantara university. jakarta, 22 december 2017 prof. dr. tirta n. mursitama, ph.d. editor-in-chief journal of asean studies, vol. 9, no. 1 (2021), pp. 87-100 doi: https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v9i1.7380 issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic western centric research methods? exposing international practices catherine m. jones school of international relations, university of st andrews arts building, the scores, st andrews, fife, scotland, ky169ax cmj20@st-andrews.ac.uk received: 24th may 2021/ revised: 05th july 2021/ accepted: 06th july 2021 how to cite: jones, c. m. (2021). western centric research methods? exposing international practices. journal of asean studies, 9(1), 87-100, https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v9i1.7380 abstract data curated by humans reflects the biases and imperfections of humans (o’neil, 2017; 2016). for example, in autonomous weapons systems, the initial data entered produces algorithms from which weapons systems learn, and, as a result, the systems mirror and amplify existing biases in the data sets (o’neil, 2017). in political science and international relations, biases are also both inherent and amplified through the research approaches and methods adopted. they, too, are frequently hidden. a stark example of this is in the debate between area and disciplinary studies. although there is a growing recognition that area studies can make valuable contributions to the study of international relations and that there is a need to ‘decolonise’ the discipline (suzuki, 2021), the debate so far has not recognized the gulf of differences in research methods between these two approaches. this article argues that in the study of international relations and particularly regarding institutions, area studies approaches should be more frequently adopted. the limited use of these approaches not only hampers new research but also hides a colonial hangover. keywords: research methods, asean, international practices introduction according to cathy o’neil (2016; 2017) a leading data scientist, data curated by humans reflects the biases and imperfections of humans. for example, in autonomous weapons systems, the data entered produces algorithms from which weapons systems learn, and, as a result, the systems mirror and amplify existing biases in the datasets (unga, 2017). this is a striking example of the potential threat that data, the forms of data, and the imperfections of human choices could have on the development of weapons of destruction in the 21st century. 88 western centric research methods? yet despite the importance of these choices, they are often presented as ‘objective realities’; therefore, the effects of these data choices are hidden. in political science and international relations, biases are also inherent and subsequently amplified through the research approaches and methods adopted. they, too, are frequently hidden. although it has been noted that there may be a need to ‘internationalise’ international relations (ir) theory (for example, waever and tickner, 2009; special issue, 2011; special issue, 2013), and to liberate the curriculum,1 it has not been recognised that this process or endeavour could have implications for the research methods employed. this paper sits at the intersection of three debates in the broad field of international relations. the first is the western-non-western international relations debate regarding whether it is necessary to create a non-western international relations theory. the second is eurocentrism-comparative regionalism, wherein the debate concerns how to evaluate noneuropean union (eu) regions without having the eu as an implicit or explicit benchmark. the third is the dichotomy between area studies and disciplinary studies, where the debate concerns the nature and value of what is the subject of study and what questions it is important to ask. in all these debates, the discipline has periodically engaged in moments of self-reflection and considered whether philosophically it is necessary to reconsider the origins of the disciplinary approaches; whether it is useful to have national international relations theories (for example the chinese school of ir, or the indian school of ir); whether to explicitly ignore the eu as a regional body; or indeed whether it is necessary and useful to develop area expertise. in contributing to these debates, i argue that, fundamentally, it is necessary to move beyond the debates on ‘decolonising ir theory’ and instead identify that even in ‘decolonised theory’, the methods employed have been developed to identify western understandings of how ir is done. moreover, through processes all aimed at improving the quality of research – data transparency, the research excellence framework, phd completion rates, research funding – collectively produce a bias against the publication of some forms of research because of the types of data that they use. as a result, there is an unseen bias that privileges data that is more attuned to western ir approaches. this is the case even when scholars seek to decolonise ir, as there is a continuing bias that has been obscured but which imbues non-western theories with a western centric bias. it is therefore not possible to seek a new theory without a change in methods. in making this argument, the paper is divided into five sections. first, i outline why methods are important and unrecognised in this debate. second, i outline how this discussion connects to other debates within ir that reflect the problems of making ir more ‘international’. third, i focus on the area and disciplinary studies debate as an example of why methods are important. fourth, i outline why this is important and to whom, and who can benefit from this discussion. finally, i conclude with a central claim that, in decolonising, our thinking needs to extend to methods, and i offer a first step in moving forwards. journal of asean studies 89 why focus on methods? for the past two decades in the united kingdom (uk), there has been an increasing emphasis on the development of new research methods for social and political sciences. as reflected in this and other journals, as well as books and textbooks, a significant emphasis has emerged on the refinement and improvement of research methods, and the emergence of professional sections of existing publications focused on how to do research and deliver research methods in a teaching context.2 this has been reflected in the added emphasis on methodology in uk research council funding applications,3 the development and expansion of the level and range of research methods courses integrated into training syllabi, and in considering how to teach research methods across the sector in higher education. there are many benefits to these developments, especially in the diversification of the methodologies and methods that are credible for different forms of research, and a greater awareness and understanding of bias in research design and evaluation. for example, the expansion of quantitative methods in the uk through the q-step programs 4 and the incorporation of ethnographic studies, focus groups, and participant observation from cogent disciplines including sociology and psychology has enabled research into political and social phenomena that was not previously possible. a further advantage of these developments is the greater potential to verify data used and therefore ensure the robustness of arguments, policy recommendations, and research articles. thus, it has been recognised that research methods are at the forefront of political science research and enable cutting edge research in an active and dynamic environment. however, the selection of methods also has an often under-acknowledged role in replication of bias and the referencing of particular forms of knowledge. as indicated in the example of autonomous weapons systems, the type of data used has the potential to reproduce bias – in this case, biases are caused by the dominance of western approaches. particularly, approaches viewed as valid are underpinned by assumptions of western approaches to ir on ‘what is being looked for’; as such, they are imbued with western assumptions. for example, the assumption that solutions or ends are being sought, and that these processes produce documents, texts, and codified legal frameworks, ensures that researchers can follow a paper trail. although this is currently challenged as an accurate reflection of how institutions operate (see discussion below on international practices), it has set a standard for how institutions are evaluated that is derived from western experience. alternative approaches to the practice of ir – such as those found in east asia, particularly in the association of southeast asian nations (asean) – that do not conform to these basic assumptions are therefore more problematic to ‘make fit’ appropriate research methods and methodologies. these biases are then amplified by the need to publish in high-ranked journals – that are already overwhelmed with submissions – that tend to reflect disciplinary rather than area expertise.5 in looking at the rankings of international relations journals from 2016 according to the impact factors for top international relations journals, the top 10 journals are all journals of disciplinary studies. in the top 20, european union-focused journals (journal of common market studies, journal of european integration, living reviews in european governance, 90 western centric research methods? european union politics) all appear, but according to the parameters of the debate, these are not viewed as ‘area studies’ approaches as they take disciplinary approaches (lambert, 1990: 712). it is only at rank 22 that the chinese journal of international politics appears, as the first non-western journal with an area in the title, yet this journal still has a disciplinary focus.6 the issue of the limited dialogue between western and non-western academics and researchers in the discipline was tackled in the conference theme for millennium in 2010, (millenium, 2011; tickner, 2011: 607-618) and the problem at absence of the ‘international’ is engaged with in a cogent and comprehensive way in a series of works by ole waever and arlene tickner (2009; also see seng tang, 2009:12-13). to some degree, the dominance of the discipline in is not surprising, as the universal nature of the ir is a canonical truth for the dominant theories. however, there is scope to open the debate to include other voices. as a result, the discipline being created is increasingly divergent from both the needs of policy and the long-recognised needs to broaden research approaches to counter western centrism. ironically, this means that if we seek to create new theories or engage with new approaches, this must be done at the level of methods as well as at that of concepts and theories. in mitigating these negative effects, i propose that there is an emerging but unrecognised link between international practices literature in international relations and the approaches adopted by area experts and comparativists. in this disciplinary debate, the theoretical debate needs to be developed through empirical study (beuger and gadinger, 2015:458), although these scholars decry a lack of funding, access, and time to be able to produce such research. this type of research has been done for decades by area experts. by seeking to overcome the tendency to discredit each other’s approach, building bridges through exchanges of research methods contributes to developing a more comprehensive and multidiscipline research sector. the potential for this approach to produce outstanding research has been shown in the work of some scholars working on other regions, for example nicola pratt and dina rezk (2019) where they explore the muslin brotherhood through the lens of securitisation. this approach will not be easy. underpinning the divide are deep differences in ideology between the west and non-west. but this bridging approach may be more feasible, as a number of international and academic shifts are taking place. the first and most pronounced of these shifts is in the geopolitical balance moving in favour of east asia. examples of this shift are found in the uk the integrated review of foreign and defence policy, which highlighted a ‘tilt’ towards the indo-pacific (hmg, 2021), and the march 2021 us announcement that they are seeking to recommit to allies, including in the indo-pacific, such as through an expansion of cooperation with japan (us state, 2021). these large changes in foreign policy foci will necessitate a greater knowledge of the region, its institutions, and its states within western countries. gaining and deepening this understanding will require more flexibility (including in relation to assumptions of methods, knowledge, data, and ideology) on the part of western states and their scholars. the second major, albeit nascent, shift that is emerging is within academia itself. it is a shift towards recognising the value and necessity of interdisciplinary research. this is most clearly reflected in areas related to research on climate change and sustainability but is also journal of asean studies 91 evident in the processes that evaluate academic performance (for example, the uk research excellence framework [ref, 2021], which highlights the importance of interand multidisciplinary approaches) and funding awards for large projects. not new but more urgent; calls for new methods in international relations in his 2011 paper ‘dialogue and discovery’, amitav acharya made a compelling argument that “ir theory has been written and presented, and is still being written and presented, as if it springs almost entirely from an exclusively western heritage. only by uncovering the assumptions and power structures that obscure ir theory’s global heritage can we move from dissent to dialogue and then dialogue to discovery.” (acharya, 2011: 637, 630-1 and 633) the paper also indicated debates that can be extended or evolve further to try and recognise and overcome these limits – one aspect of which is to develop the links between area and disciplinary studies. rosemary foot and evelyn goh (2018) argue that the unique nature of east asian international interactions also calls for an evolution in research approaches. in particular, there is a need to engage and evaluate the processes of interactions rather than focusing on outcomes. in their article, the authors propose a new research framework and structure for analysis and make a call for new research methods to complement this new endeavour (foot and goh, 2018:2). as a result, in the ongoing debate there are several voices calling for greater dialogue, inclusion, and recognition of non-western approaches. these calls have produced a number of interesting avenues of discovery including projects on developing non-western ir theory, and integrating subaltern voices. however, unseen in this academic debate is the recognition that research methods in ir are founded on assumptions that diplomacy is paper-based, legalistic, and teleological. hence, despite significant positive moves towards the critical reflections of waever et al (2009), including the need to explore non-western approaches, and the emergence of new approaches to the study of international institutions in the form of the international practices debate, there is still further to go in terms of re-setting the building blocks of ir. the underpinning assumption of ir is that studies of institutions practice produces materials that can be referenced – this means that bureaucracies can provide researchers with libraries of official and unofficial documentation, a range of personnel to interview, and a set formula of types of meetings that can be observed. this assumption has formed the backbone of research on the eu and un, as well as several studies of southeast asia. for example, in the classic correspondence exchange between katsumata, smith and jones (2008) in relation to a previously published piece in international security, the debate is over the efficacy of the norms of asean and the (in)effective enforcement and compliance structures of asean. however, reading this in detail, at the heart of this debate there is also a disconnect between katasumata and jones and smith in terms of the evidence for each of their claims. however, for among a small but growing group of scholars, an argument has emerged that this assumption fails to reflect the actual practices within institutions but that the discipline is illequipped to overcome this methodological issue. however, in seeking to investigate processes 92 western centric research methods? rather than outcomes, area studies’ use and application of ethnographic research, interviews, and participant observation, alongside linguistic expertise and cultural understanding, presents a more comprehensive set of methods to understand and evaluate a process.7 importantly, this alternative approach should not be seen as being ‘soft’ nor as a lower standard of ir research. instead, these approaches should be championed as a part of the mainstream in a more inclusive or decolonised view of international relations. this problem in methods is compounded by the dominance of western institutions. despite the recognition by some eu and disciplinary scholars that their approaches have become the ‘benchmark’ for the emergence of regional institutions and that this may unfairly limit the research undertaken (warleigh-lack and van langenhove, 2010; 542), there is little recognition of this underpinning ‘benchmarking’. as the discipline and the profession move towards great enshrinement of the recognition of certain narrow forms of research products, there is a potential that area studies, despite a growing need in the wider political community, is under great endogenous pressure to conform to the approaches of the discipline. the two sides of the debate: identifying the importance of methods the area studies and disciplinary studies debate ebbs and flows in relation to both endogenous and exogenous pressures. during the cold war, the need to develop in-depth region expertise ensured that centres for area studies were supported to develop and thrive (johnson and ijiri, 2005). at the end of the cold war, however, area studies were seen to be in terminal decline (fukuyama, 2004), as globalisation boomed and diversity between states and regions were perceived to be reducing, so the dominance of disciplinary level approaches aimed at producing generalizable patterns of state behaviour came to the fore. this tension presents a stark example of the need to consider data bias. in this debate, discrepancies about data and how it is collected forms an almost unbridgeable chasm (bates, 1997; breslin, pye, 2001; katzenstein, 2001). area experts privilege the detailed knowledge of a geographically small area, seeking to develop expertise across a number of disciplines, including politics, culture, economics, and history. on the other hand, disciplinary scholars seek to draw conclusions that are relevant across geographical divides, enabling them to make generalisations and produce theories within a particular field, such as international relations or economics. the theories employed by disciplinary scholars, however, have been subject to debate over their universalism, leading to a debate about whether there is a need to develop more regionally-driven theories. however, in the debates on this process of putting the ‘international’ back into international relations, part of the debate remains untouched. theories tend to set the parameters for what is to be investigated, how it is to be done, and what type or form of data is relevant. at their bases, the two approaches ask different questions and therefore look for different things. in o’neil’s terms, they set different standards for success (2016:21). for example, ir scholars tend to focus on the outcomes of processes (foot and goh, 2018:2) and towards the teleology of events, whereas area studies scholars focus on processes as the outcome and therefore centre on connections between different disciplines (pye, 2001). as a journal of asean studies 93 result, they make different assumptions about what is being studied. in an asean context, a teleological approach can be problematic, as it is often noted that the states of southeast asia focus on processes and mechanisms that create dialogue and develop confidence building measures rather than those that find solutions for problems (asean, 1967).8 this can be seen in the frustrations around the south china sea disputes (asean, 2002)9 and the evaluations of the asean regional forum (for different perspectives and evaluations of the arf see: narine, 1997; goh 2004; haacke, 2009; katsumata, 2010; stubbs, 2014).as a result, as they are searching for different things, area and disciplinary studies also suggest different forms of data as being appropriate and/or required, and consequently produce different conclusions. in studying a process, the methods used need to reflect the ongoing and dynamic nature of interactions, whereas processes producing outcomes enable a view of the completed event that is no longer changing.10 despite the significance of data selection, this debate is not presented as a debate of research methods per se, but rather as a philosophical debate about the nature and value of research.11 one practical implication of this different approach is that exploring this different source of data will require a wider engagement with a multitude of research methods by scholars. although this might at first seem easy to address, the structure of academic progression, the focus on publications, and the emphasis on excellence in teaching make learning new methods increasingly challenging because of the time commitment required. one way to address this might be for conferences to have a greater emphasis on an expansive range of approaches that reinforce the importance of research workshops and training. some professional groups do have this built into their processes, for example the european consortium on political research (ecpr) holds methods schools in both the summer and winter, as well as short courses (ecpr, 2021). however, these courses can be expensive and are also held at times to suit the academic year in europe. that is not to take away from the significant contribution these courses make, but rather to highlight there is a need for more accessible study options. an important aspect of the area/disciplinary divide in methods is that context matters. the types of politics and socio-cultural engagement in southeast asia operate in different ways to the legalistic approach that is dominant in western states. what is being studied should affect the type of data that can be collected, and therefore the methods used to gather these materials. these differences in the data, collection and evaluation may then mean the conclusions cannot (and should not) be applied in other contexts. in some parts of western ir, this lack of generalisability can be seen as undermining the quality of the research. however, according to the argument of this paper, this lack of generalisability is in fact evidence of the appropriateness of the approach adopted.12 this article argues that in the study of international relations and particularly the study of institutions, area studies approaches should be more frequently adopted in order to address an outcome-oriented, and, therefore, western-centric bias. using a case study of asean, the paper demonstrates biases in the selection of datasets and in the type of data viewed as valid; biases which mirror and amplify the primacy of western approaches. in conjoining this work with an emerging approach to international practices in ir, this discussion also enables a 94 western centric research methods? meaningful consideration of the appropriateness of currently accepted forms of data even for the study of western institutions. at present, the limited use of these approaches not only hampers new research but also hides a colonial hangover. for who or what is this important? western institutions and international practices it is not the aim of this article to consider whether asean is relevant, but rather to highlight the fundamental work of selection of appropriate evidence based on western-centric expectations, in predetermining a conclusion to that question. the subsequent question that arises from this reflection is whether this is only an asean or east asian problem. an important aspect of the tensions between area and disciplinary studies is an assumption that a particular geographical area is exceptional – it demands to be studied in a particularly detailed and disciplinary busting manner because does not conform to generalisations. it is an intrinsic case. however, in the case of asean, the question emerges as to whether asean is an exception where the paper trail is inadequate to capture the reality of institutional practices. the problem of researching institutions and the inappropriateness of several methodologies has been noted in international practice literature. this development was a response to frustrations from the academic and diplomatic communities that the real world of diplomacy was not being accurately captured by ir texts (see: adler and pouliot, 2011; barnett and finnemore, 2004; navari 2010; neumann, 2012). as a result, the international practice approach was championed by a small group of scholars working on international institutions. the methods of choice for the study of international practices are ethnographic participant observation (beuger, 2014) coupled with elite interviewing (adler-nissen and pouliot, 2014: 897; pouliot and cornut, 2015: 308; pouliot, 2013: 48-9) within a process tracing approach. however, despite this new theoretical gold standard, it has proved almost impossible to achieve. limitations in terms of resources, time, and access, all combine to make it nearly impossible to undertake an ethnographic study of an international institution like asean while there exist several studies that conform to this gold standard, this perspective has only been applied to western institutions, and the connection to area studies approaches hasn’t been recognised. acknowledging this connection is important for both the extension of area studies and for the international practices turn in ir. according to christian bueger and frank gadinger (2015:458), the problems of international practices as an approach need to be resolved through empirical investigation rather than theorising alone. area studies offers both methods and empirical examples in order to achieve these investigations. this approach also ostensibly offers an approach to ‘decolonise’ research methods and address the particular challenges of researching east asia as well as bridging the gap between area and disciplinary experts. in essence, this approach involves treating the institution investigated as an ‘area’, and therefore subject to the research methods commonly associated journal of asean studies 95 with area studies. it acknowledges that institutions have their own culture and language, and that the sociology of the place may affect the outcomes, as well as how bureaucracies function. yet in applying this approach to this region and its diplomatic practices, there are four central challenges. first, access to meetings is even more difficult than in the case of ‘western’ institutions. second, the structure of the discipline and the developing trends of ir publications means that research based on these methods is only viewed as acceptable in area studies journals or in niche areas of european publications, ensuring that dialogue between scholars, particularly those in north america, is limited. third, managing researcher bias has yet to be addressed in a meaningful manner. fourth, as already noted in the literature on elite interviews, the interviewee may also seek to represent their own understanding of events, showing themselves or their institution in the best possible light – whether consciously or unconsciously (harvey, 2011; halperin and heath, 2017: 258-276; tansey, 2007: 766-768). conclusion adding to this difficulty is an issue that although several scholars have tried to overcome, challenge, consider. and critically evaluate the effects of imperialism in comparative and regional research, they have so far failed to consider that the research methods they apply in fact hamper this endeavour. hence, in order to expand this area of research, it is essential to consider the ontological assumptions made and the research methods used in developing new arguments regarding non-western regions. all of this is not to say that we should abandon standards or particular types of evidence, but rather that we should consider from where they are drawn and the implications they have upon the subject being researched. doing so,and considering the relationship between evidence and the assumptions being made, offers the opportunity to consider if the evidence we use affects the conclusions we draw and has an effect on the understanding of western institutions. there is therefore a need to decolonise research methods approaches in international relations, or at the very least acknowledge the base assumptions being made in their usage. whereas there have been debates on decolonising methods in other fields (in particular, the area of indigenous studies, see for example: smith, 2012; louis, 2007) to date the need to do this in ir has not been discussed, despite the emergence of some potentially cogent debates on whether there is a need to develop non-western ir theories and the need to ‘liberate’ the curriculum. in considering research methods, area research and international practices will inevitably cost more money and take longer. but perhaps methods and their consideration offer an opportunity to bridge the divide between area studies and ir. this will be difficult given the area studies and disciplinary traditions. as a result, perhaps the first steps are to begin an open conversation that a divide exists and first trace how it is being mitigated or accentuated in the sociology of the discipline. this may be effectively started by asking conference organisers to consider including a session to reflect on these issues or holding a methods ‘café’ or workshop to expand engagement with research methods; for journals to review the types of methods that 96 western centric research methods? are used in the articles that are accepted; and for funders to consider if there are ways to further support this type of research. about the authors catherine jones, is a lecturer at the university of st andrews, previously she was a post-doctoral research fellow at the university of warwick and received her phd from the university of reading. her research focuses on three areas of work: (1) agency of east asian states in international order, (2) the china-north korea relationship, (3) and the politics and development in southeast asia. she has published a monograph on china’s challenge to global norms (palgrave, 2019), an edited volume (with sarah teitt) on china-north korea relations (elgar, 2020), an edited journal (with garren mulloy) on east asia, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and peacekeeping (australian journal of international affairs, 2020) as well numerous journal articles and book chapters. references acharya, amitav. 2011. ‘dialogue and discovery: in search of international relations theories beyond the west’ millennium, 39(3), pp.619-637. adler, emmanuel, and victor pouliot (eds). 2011. international practices, cambridge university press: cambridge, uk adler-nissen, rebecca, and vincent pouliot. 2014. ‘power in practice: negotiating the international intervention in libya’ european journal of international relations, 20(4), pp.889-911 asean, 1967. the bangkok declaration, signed 8th august, 1967, available online http://asean.org/the-asean-declaration-bangkok-declaration-bangkok-8-august-1967/ last accessed 1st may 2018. asean, 2002. declaration on the code of conduct for parties in the south china sea, online http://asean.org/?static_post=declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-southchina-sea last accessed 1st may 2018. barnett, michael and martha finnemore. 2004. rules for the world: international organizations in global politics, cornell university press: ithaca, usa. bates, robert h., 1997. ‘area studies and the discipline: a useful controversy?’, political science and politics, 30(2), pp. 166-169. breslin, shaun, 2002. ir, area studies and ipe: rethinking the study of china’s international relations, csgr working paper, no. 94/02. http://asean.org/the-asean-declaration-bangkok-declaration-bangkok-8-august-1967/ http://asean.org/?static_post=declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea http://asean.org/?static_post=declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea journal of asean studies 97 bueger, chirstian. 2014. ‘pathways to practice: praxiography and international politics’ european political science review, 6(3), pp.383-406. bueger, christian, and frank gadinger. 2015. ‘the play of international practice’ international studies quarterly, 59, pp.449-460. collins, a. ‘forming a security community: lessons from asean’, international relations of the asia-pacific, (2007) 7(2) pp.203-225. ecpr. 2021. ‘about methods school’ ecpr, available https://ecpr.eu/events/eventtypedetails.aspx?eventtypeid=5c last accessed, 5 july, 2021. foot, rosemary, and evelyn goh. 2018. ‘international relations of east asia: a new research prospectus’ international studies review, online first, pp.1-26. fukuyama, francis 2004. ‘how academia failed the nation: the decline of regional studies’, http://www.campus-watch.org/article/id/1507 last accessed 24 may, 2021. goh, evelyn. 2004. ‘the asean regional forum in united states east asian strategy’, the pacific review, 17(1), pp. 47-69. haacke, jurgen. 2003. asean’s diplomatic and security culture: origins, development and prospects, london, routledge, pp. 16-51. haacke, jürgen. 2009. the asean regional forum: from dialogue to practical security cooperation? cambridge review of international affairs, 22 (3). pp. 427-449. halperin, sandra and oliver heath, 2017 political research: methods and practical skills, oxford university press: oxford. harvey, william s. 2011. ‘strategies for conducting elite interviews’ qualitative research, 11, pp.432-441. hmg, 2021. global britain in a competitive age: the integrated review of security, defence, development and foreign policy, last updated 2nd july 2021, available https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-theintegrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy/global-britainin-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-review-of-security-defence-development-andforeign-policy last accessed 4 july 2021. hollis, martin. 2008. the philosophy of social science: an introduction, cambridge university press: cambridge, uk johnson, chalmers and hidenori ijiri, 2005. ‘about area studies and japan: a dialogue between 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(3rd edn.) the structure of scientific revolutions, chicago university press: chicago. kuhonta, erik martinez, dan slater, and tuong vu (eds.) 2008. southeast asia in political science: theory, region and qualitative analysis, stanford university press: stanford, california. lambert, richard d. 1990. blurring the disciplinary boundaries: "area studies in the united states" the american behavioral scientist; 33(6) pp.712-732. louis, renee pualani, 2007. "can you hear us now? voices from the margin: using indigenous methodologies in geographic research" aboriginal policy research consortium international (aprci). paper 175 mccargo, duncan 2008. tearing apart the land: islam and legitimacy in southern thailand, cornell university press. narine, shaun. 1997. 'asean and the arf: the limits of the asean way', asian survey, 37(10) pp. 961-76. navari, cornelia. 2010. ‘the concept of practice in the english school’ european journal of international relations, 17(4), pp.611-630. neumann, iver. 2012. at home with the diplomats: inside a european foreign ministry, cornell university press: ithaca. null, wesley. 2011, curriculum: from theory to practice, rowman and littlefield. o’neil, cathy. 2016. weapons of math destruction, crown publishers. o’neil, cathy. 2017. ‘autonomous weapons systems: understanding bias in machine learning and artificial intelligence’ presentation comments at unga side event, 5th october, 2017, unhq new york, conference room 12. pouliot, vincent. 2013. ‘methodology: putting practice theory into practice’ in adler nilsson, rebecca (eds.) bourdieu in international relations: rethinking key concepts in ir routledge: abingdon. journal of asean studies 99 pouliot, vincent and jeremie cornut. 2015. ‘practice theory and the study of diplomacy: a research agenda’, cooperation and conflict, 50(3), pp.297-315 pratt, nicola and dina rezk. 2019. securitizing the muslim brotherhood: state violence and authoritarianism in egypt after the arab spring. security dialogue. 50(3) pp.239-256. pye, lucian w., 2001. ‘asia studies and the discipline’, ps: political science and politics, vol. 34, no. 4, december 2001, pp. 805-807. ref, 2021. interdisciplinary research, available https://www.ref.ac.uk/about/interdisciplinary-research/ last accessed 4 july, 2021. see seng tang. 2009, ‘southeast asia: theory and practice’ pp.12-133. smith, linda t. 2012. decolonising methodologies: research and indigenous peoples, 2nd edition, zed books, london. special issue of millennium, 2011. 39(3). special issue of european journal of international relations, 2013, 19(3). stubbs, richard. 2014. 'asean's leadership in east asian region-building: strength in weakness' the pacific review, 27(4) suzuki, shogo. english and the legacy of linguistic domination in ir. in: capan z.g., dos reis f., grasten m. (eds) the politics of translation in international relations. palgrave studies in international relations. palgrave macmillan, cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56886-3_9 tansey, oisín. 2007. ‘process tracing and elite interviewing: a case for non-probability sampling’ ps: political science and politics 40(4) pp.765-772. tickner, j. ann. 2011. ‘dealing with difference: problems and possibilities for dialogue in international relations’ millennium, 39(3) pp.607-618. unga. 2017. side event, ‘autonomous weapons systems: understanding bias in machine learning and artificial intelligence’ 5th october, unhq new york, conference room 12. us state. 2021. the united states and japan expand indo-pacific cooperation, media note published 16 march, 2021, available https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-andjapan-expand-indo-pacific-economic-cooperation/ last accessed, 4 july, 2021. waever, ole and arlene tickner (eds.) 2009. international relations scholarship around the world, routledge, london. warleigh-lack, alex and luk van langenhove. 2010. ‘introduction: rethinking eu studies: the contribution of comparative studies’ european integration, 32(6), pp.541-562. https://www.ref.ac.uk/about/interdisciplinary-research/ https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56886-3_9 https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-and-japan-expand-indo-pacific-economic-cooperation/ https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-and-japan-expand-indo-pacific-economic-cooperation/ 100 western centric research methods? 1 according to wesley null, a liberal curriculum “pursues the goal of liberating minds so that they can become more fully human, make rational judgements and provide civic leadership”, (null, 2011: 28). in uk universities this has come to be seen as providing a more diversity engagement with scholarship across difference races, ethnicities, socio-economic backgrounds, genders and nationalities. see for example, the ucl project on liberating the curriculum, information available https://www.ucl.ac.uk/teaching-learning/educationinitiatives/connected-curriculum/liberating-curriculum accessed, 21 may 2018; and the national union of students campaign liber8, available https://www.nusconnect.org.uk/campaigns/liber8-education/liberate-thecurriculum accessed 21 may2018. 2 see for example: ps: political science and politics; political studies review; politics; and european political science. 3 in 2004/5 the economic and social research council in the uk funded a research methods call, in the changes to post-doctoral funding for the future research leaders call there was also a section for skills development and training at the post-doctoral state. similarly, in the development of the esrc doctoral training centres scheme research methods were an essential element of applications from groups of universities. 4 in 2013 the nuffield foundation supported the creation of 15 quantitative methods centres around the uk, in order to create “a step-change in quantitative social science training”, support from this foundation total £19.5 million for an initial 5 year period has supported the development of new programmes of study, summer and winter schools, and routes to postgraduate study. see for example, nuffield foundation. 2018. ‘q-step centres and affiliates’ online at http://www.nuffieldfoundation.org/q-step-centres-and-affiliates accessed 21st february 2018; also nuffield foundation, 2018. aims and activities of the q-step centres’ document available to download from http://www.nuffieldfoundation.org/q-step-centres-and-affiliates accessed 21st february 2018 p.2. 5 this has also been noted as an issue for feminist studies whose methods often don’t conform to the expectations of the discipline and its ‘policemen’, (waever and tickner, 2009:21) 6 statistics are from scimago journal and country rank, international relations filter, accessed at http://www.scimagojr.com/journalrank.php?category=3320&type=j on 8th march 2018. google scholar analytics also has a top 20 journal ranking but this has even fewer eu journals accessed https://scholar.google.co.uk/citations?view_op=top_venues&hl=en&vq=soc_diplomacyinternationalrelations on 8th march 2018. 7 for a discussion of area studies methods in practice see: mccargo, 2008: xiv-xvi. in another edited collection interrogating southeast asian research see: kuhonta, slater, and vu, 2008. 8 see also, collins describes asean states behaviours as conforming to a regime and therefore a process rather than as an (outcome) community(collins, 2007: 206-212; similarly, jurgen haacke, has claimed that evaluations of asean’s effectiveness should be measured against its own objectives, and therefore its generation of a process rather than producing outcomes, (haacke, 2009; haacke, 2003: 16-51). similarly, catherine jones has argued that asean shelves or limits the nature of its interactions, so that solutions can be in the realm of other international actors, (jones, 2015) 9 in the south china sea, asean’s landmark ‘success’ was in the creation of a code of conduct rather than the production of a solution. hence is sought to initiate a process rather than determining an outcome. see: asean, 2002. declaration on the code of conduct for parties in the south china sea, online http://asean.org/?static_post=declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea last accessed 1st may 2018. 10 the difference between these two approaches is seen in the discussion in kuhn’s structure of scientific revolutions where he outlines that ‘revolutions’ or processes that are ongoing are difficult to identify and evaluate, as a result, we tend to only be able to identify that change has happened after it has been completed (kuhn, 1991). 11 in essence this debate directly engages with considerations of structure/action debates in social sciences (hollis, 2008: 5-12). https://www.ucl.ac.uk/teaching-learning/education-initiatives/connected-curriculum/liberating-curriculum https://www.ucl.ac.uk/teaching-learning/education-initiatives/connected-curriculum/liberating-curriculum https://www.nusconnect.org.uk/campaigns/liber8-education/liberate-the-curriculum%20accessed%2021%20may2018 https://www.nusconnect.org.uk/campaigns/liber8-education/liberate-the-curriculum%20accessed%2021%20may2018 http://www.nuffieldfoundation.org/q-step-centres-and-affiliates%20accessed%2021st%20february%202018 http://www.nuffieldfoundation.org/q-step-centres-and-affiliates%20accessed%2021st%20february%202018 http://www.nuffieldfoundation.org/q-step-centres-and-affiliates%20accessed%2021st%20february%202018 http://www.scimagojr.com/journalrank.php?category=3320&type=j https://scholar.google.co.uk/citations?view_op=top_venues&hl=en&vq=soc_diplomacyinternationalrelations http://asean.org/?static_post=declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea journal of asean studies 101 12 i thank the anonymous reviewer for this point. i am obliged that they took the time on the paper and saw a a way to develop the point and enhance the overall argument. journal of asean studies, vol. 1, no. 2 (2013), pp. 177–189 ©2013 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic asean migrants: a boon for taiwan’s aging populace hong-ming huang graduate institute of political economy, national cheng-kung university. jenn-jaw soong graduate institute of political economy, national cheng-kung university. abstract taiwan is home to a rapidly growing aging population as life expectancy rates increase and birth rates go down in this island. the government of taiwan opted to bring in migrant workers to care for the elderly following a shortage in adequate domestic manpower who were willing to take on the positions of caregivers for the elderly. in time, eldercare in taiwan switched hands: from the actual families of the elderly to migrant workers coming in from across the southeast asian region. questions have arisen in light of this development. is the government policy that allows for southeast asian migrants to care for the elderly in taiwan a good one, or a bad one? who benefits most from this deal: the elderly, their families or the migrant care workers? is providing care for the elderly in their own homes by just one caregiver the only option? and can such a policy help both ends: the elderly person who requires safer care, and the migrant care worker whose labor rights require full protection? this paper, drafted out following the review of relevant literature and the conducting of interviews by hong-ming huang and jenn-jaw soon, analyzes the political-economic aspects of this policy and offers certain recommendations and conclusions. one conclusion is the fact that southeast asian workers take better care of the elderly in taiwan when eldercare is provided through institutions, rather than if the care was provided by just one foreign caregiver engaged directly by families of the elderly. the positive effects of ‘institution-style’ workers are reflected in the work performance, life quality and management as well as labor rights protection. keywords: asean, migrant care workers, elderly policy, political economic. introduction the onset of a growing number of elderly individuals, who can be disabled, chronically ill or both, has boosted the demand for eldercare professionals on the island. the number of southeast asian migrant caregivers coming into taiwan increased to a little over 195,000 in 2011, up from 103,700 in 2001. the primary caregivers of the elderly in taiwan changed hands gradually in the course of a decade – from the families of the elderly folk to migrant workers from southeast asian 178 asean migrants in taiwan nations. the taiwanese population rose slightly from 22.405 million in 2001 to 23.174 million in 2011, while the number of households went up from 6.8 million in 2001 to 7.98 million in 2011. questions that have arisen from this include when exactly did southeast asians end up becoming the majority of the workforce that specifically deals with elderly care in taiwan, and what was the corresponding policy toward these care workers? observations from different work-fields show that migrant workers from southeast asia providing homecare did not only face problems in terms of skill or language, but also socio-cultural adaptation problems and with the protection of their labor rights. through media reports (wang, 2006, april 30), it was revealed that problems faced by migrant care workers included the lack of adequate eldercare experience, being forced to work overtime with measly wages and inadequate welfare. so, researchers linked to and advocates of migrant care agreed that policies on migrant care workers needed to be reviewed and that the caregivers should be given the necessary assistance to protect themselves. moreover, the workload of those caring for the elderly needed to be properly regulated to prevent possible abuse of their roles as caregivers. questions have also arisen on the issue of migrant workers coming from different cultural and religious backgrounds. for those migrant care workers (liu, xie, 2004) who follow islam, mahayana buddhism, theravada buddhism, catholicism or christianity, what kind of policy should taiwan’s government implement to protect their rights over freedom of religion and culture while continuing to work effectively, and protect their labor rights? what could make them be content to work for the elderly and also contribute in line with their expectations (luo, you, wu, 2004)? this paper, viewed from the point of political economic aspects, compared the problems faced by the caregivers who were directly engaged by families of the elderly (home-style) and those working for institutions or centers that would hire out the help to the families of the elderly (institution-style). the paper also looks into the implemented policy of the government toward migrant workers on the island to find out whether the policy deserves further examination and reflection, or encouragement. an aging populace and taiwanese families the average life expectancy rate in taiwan increases year after year. birth rates meanwhile are on the decline. both led taiwan’s government to pay close attention: the issue could no longer be neglected. it was effecting the market demand for eldercare in taiwan. divorce rates in the island had risen through the years and with that, so did the number of single-parent households (department of household registration, m.o.i., 2014). this chapter shall hopefully provide with further analysis on the aging populace in taiwan. the development of the aging society official records of the taiwanese government show that the average life expectancy rate of the taiwanese increase steadily. as shown in table 1, the average life expectancy of men in 1970 was 66.66 years old. every 10 years or so since, there has been an increase: 1980 [69.56 years]; 1990 [71.33 years]; 2000 [72.67 years] and 2009 [75.9 years]. according to the 2010 records of the council for economic planning and development, the average life expectancy of women in 1970 was 71.56 years old. since then, an increase was recorded every 10 journal of asean studies 179 years or so: 1980 [74.54 years]; 1990 [76.75 years]; 2000 [78.44 years] and 2009 [82.5 years]. because of declining birth rates, increased divorce rates and single-parent families, as well as the increase in average life expectancy rates, the issue of long-term care for the elderly became more important than ever before. issues linked to the environment of elderly living and elderly home-care must be faced seriously (chen, 2004). from the official birth population documentation in taiwan, the number of births was recorded at 422,740 people in 1961. the following recorded births were noted for the following years: 1971 [382,797 births]; 1981 [414,069 births]; 1991 [321,932 births]; 2001 [260,354 births]; 2011 [196,627 births]. then there are the documented rates of women of childbearing age steadily falling: 1951 [7.04]; 1991 [1.72]; 2002 [1.34] and 2009 [1.03]. the birth rates rapidly decline while the average life expectancy rate rises. taiwan’s societies may face a zero population growth and even a negative growth dilemma in the coming years to come. a changing market demand for eldercare as birth rates decline, the supply of eldercare professionals shall decrease in the future. additionally, the trend of an accelerated aging population shall continue. so, how has the taiwanese government strategized to deal with this matter? the world health organization (who) accepts the chronological age of 65 years as a definition of an 'elderly' or an older person, and an aging society as to mean that the proportion of the elderly population is noted to be over 7 percent of the society (li, 2012). from official documentation, the elderly population ratio stood at 3.64 percent in 1976, 4.41 percent in 1981, and continued to increase to 10.6 percent in 2009. this continuing spike has left taiwan to become one of the world’s countries with the fastest growing elderly population in the world. going by table 2, over 5.5 million people fell in the category of those aged between 0-14 years in 1990, and this gradually decreased to a little over 4.2 million people in that same category by 2008. meanwhile, over 1.26 million people fell in the category of those aged 65 years in 1990. the figure under this age category spiked to 2.05 million by 2008. the aging index stood at 22.96 percent in 1990, and rose to 61.5 percent in 2008. by the end of 2009, the elderly population reached nearly 2.23 million in taiwan. averagely every 7.55 persons of the labor force had to take care of an elderly person. in 2020, the data evaluated is estimated to reach a ratio of 6.73 caregivers: 1 elderly person. the predicted results may bring greater impact in the future on the society and the economy in taiwan. year 1970 1980 1990 1995 2000 2009 men 66.66 69.56 71.33 71.85 72.67 75.9 women 71.56 74.54 76.75 77.74 78.44 82.5 source：directorate general of budgeting, accounting and statistics, 2010 table 1 average lifespan of taiwan's population 180 asean migrants in taiwan the taiwanese interior ministry said the elderly living with their children amounted to 67.17 percent in 1993 and 38.53 percent in 2009 (survey report: series summary, 2013). in the report, the proportion of the elderly folk who are unable to conduct daily activities themselves stood at 18.81 percent in 2009, up from 12.67 percent in 2005. aging can lead to chronic illnesses, tissue degeneration, dementia, degradation of physical functions, disabilities, paralysis, organ dysfunctions, a bedridden condition and a possible reliance on respiratory ventilators. the elderly population rose dramatically through the years in taiwan and they needed long-term, daily care. aside from the above facts, there were lesser high-skilled and high-paying jobs available for the young population in taiwan. the young in taiwan went to mainland china or overseas for work. this worrying trend effected the manpower industry in the taiwanese care market, and how it would be more stretched and could worsen in the future (huang, 2001). although the government proposed a policy to protect the care network system, provide with adequate home care, establish nursing agencies to provide health care services, encourage community involvement and community voluntary care for the elderly, all of the above were not well-prepared. not to mention affording adequate education, training on nursing for the elderly, related subsidies and other policies linked to the elderly. there were few matters prepared for eldercare which were accomplished by the government (sung, 2003). at present time, taiwanese societies also needed to face the flight of the youth to foreign locations or to mainland china. as a result, foreign care workers arriving in taiwan, not surprisingly, received official and swift approval from the taiwanese government. southeast asian migrant workers in taiwan according to official taiwanese government records, migrant care workers who provided homecare for the elderly stood at 195,905 people, and those who provided care through institutions stood at table 2: the age structure of the elderly population in taiwan age structure age structure population(person) percent (%) year 0~14years 15~64 years 65 years total total of elderly aging index 1990 5,525,365 13,607,309 1,268,631 20,401,305 6.22 22.96 1995 5,076,083 14,650,294 1,631,054 21,357,431 7.64 32.13 2000 4,703,093 15,652,271 1,921,308 22,276,672 8.62 40.85 2008 4,259,049 16,294,530 2,057,639 22,611,218 9.10 61.50 source：taiwan ministry of the interior statistics report, 2010 (population: series summary, 2013) journal of asean studies 181 11,477 (liu, 2013). most of the caregivers from indonesia (foreign workers in productive industries and social welfare by various type, 2013), and the majority of the remainder come from southeast asian nations. the main purpose for hiring them was to provide care for the disabled elderly in taiwan. all the migrant care workers were asked to adapt to the characteristics and the needs of the elderly in taiwan in many fields. as the taiwanese interior ministry reported (elderly survey results summary analysis, 2005), the health-related problems faced by the elderly in taiwan were serious: 65.02 percent suffered from chronic or serious diseases; 55.16 percent suffered from circulatory system problems; and 82.81 percent had to visit the health clinic regularly. in terms of self-care ability for the elderly, 13 percent had difficulties in conducting daily activities, including getting a lift on their own (22.81 percent), going shopping (18.03 percent), out for a walk (14.46 percent). going by the above statistics, the employment of migrant care workers became the primary option for eldercare in taiwan. current observation of asean migrant care workers as of august 2010, according to official documentation, the foreign labor market amounted to 372,146 people in taiwan. by the end of 2012, there was an addition of 21,130 persons. in terms of nationalities: indonesians [40.77 percent]; vietnamese [21.18 percent] and filipinos (20.73 percent) were the majority in taiwan (cla vtc, 2010). all are from southeast asian nations. the number of foreign caregivers in taiwan jumped from 8,902 persons to 181,282 persons from 1995-end to 2010 (see figure 1). care of the elderly in taiwan was dependent on southeast asian migrant care workers on a day-to-day basis. in fact, it also reminded the taiwanese government to pay more attention to their ethnic and cultural differences of the migrant care workers, and the impacts of the relevant socio-cultural and political economic changes (wang, 2006). the four main countries where these migrant workers who cared for the elderly in taiwan indonesia, philippines, vietnam and thailand – may all be from southeast asia but they had very different languages, figure1 number of migrant care workers in taiwan source: council of labor affairs vtc, 2010. 182 asean migrants in taiwan as well as cultural and religious differences. due to these differences, one can conclude that some conflict will arise in relations between the care workers and the elderly in taiwan. these differences could affect the quality of their work, maintaining the health and even security of the elderly. challenges and adaptation what challenges will southeast asian care workers face in taiwan? communication problems, long working hours, sickness, inability to express clearly their needs, deteriorating physical condition, and putting the needs of bedridden patients above their own. they also need to overcome language problems with the elderly they are caring for, cultural differences and possibly live together with other family members of the elderly. adapting to these changes is no easy feat. these adaptations need to be made not only for the care workers, but also for the elderly, a great pressure which cannot be easily overcome. the 2007 labor policy (ou, 2013) told of the relevant provisions for migrant care workers in taiwan, and their employment were recorded by the family or social welfare institution that dealt with the patients, who were diagnosed with either mental illness, severe disability cases or paralysis. the main purpose of the labor policy was to introduce the migrant workers into the taiwanese workforce to make up for the deficiency in domestic supply, limit the kinds of industries and the quantity of foreign migrant workers coming into taiwan, extend to the source countries for migrant labor, and their employment should be categorized as below prioritizing domestic workforce. from the above policy, we could not find any clear-cut programmatic stages or plans within the policy for migrant care workers and the elderly. the ‘temporary hire’ of migrant care workers began in 1992. this paper used the scope of related conditions of the labor workforce to compare and analyze and to learn more about the content of the taiwanese policy on migrant care workers. exploring the migrant care workforce from different work fields the current workforce of migrant care workers can be divided into two categories: those who are directly engaged by the family of the elderly, referred to as homestyle workers, and those who are hired by companies, or institution-style workers. in 2013, there were 195,905 home-style workers and 11,477 institution-style workers (liu, 2013). the latter comprises of 5.5 percent of the elderly care migrant workforce while home-style workers make up the bulk – or close to 95 percent – of that particular workforce. the difference? those engaged by the family are directly in touch with the family members, their customs, religion and culture, and are forced to work anytime if necessary. those working for the elderly through an institution are recruited by companies, they work according to a set schedule, they undergo routine training and enjoy regular vacations. this means that more than 195,000 migrant care workers need to face cultural differences on their own, and they are the only ones whom the elderly patient can fully or wholly rely on. the taiwanese migrant care labor policy is supposedly something that was drafted out to focus on such an issue which involves – the migrant worker, the elderly person and family members of the person. policy expectations and the actual outcome the taiwanese government, in accordance to the priorities of the migrant journal of asean studies 183 labor policy, only allowed for limited industries and numbers of the foreign labor workforce to enter the island, in order to limit the number of foreign laborers coming in. care for the elderly in taiwan was apparently not a principal goal of the policy. however, foreign migrant workforce figures increased year upon year, something which is not in line with government expectations. the facts were this: southeast asian workers were the primary choice as the taiwanese families preferred them above all other options, if any. despite the cultural and language gaps between the migrant workers and the elderly people they were caring for, the rights of the migrant workers and the elderly taiwanese folk should be protected. two different ways of adaptation to life in taiwan unlike those migrant workers who are directly engaged by family members of the taiwanese elderly, things are different for those hired out by institutions. the institution acts as a buffer for the foreign migrants, and these migrants come from the same socio-cultural countries and share the same backgrounds, so they can communicate and train together. the institutions themselves will hold the relevant training workshops and conferences when necessary. the institutions also provide educational courses for rights and obligations, so that the migrant workers can conduct themselves effectively in their daily lives in taiwan, enjoy better abilities at working, know more about the protection of labor rights and face lesser problems adapting to life in taiwan (ye, 2004). they can also enjoy what they experience at home, for example, islamic foods and freely engaging in islamic prayer like djuhur, ‘asr and maghrib. in contrast, those carers who are directly engaged by family members of the elderly receive lesser opportunities at training, lesser opportunities to educate themselves in a structured manner on what can make their lives better in taiwan. they also face cultural conflicts head-on and daily life pressures. they may be able to afford some time to rest when family members of the elderly are present, but they must be awake and be of immediate assistance to the elderly when demanded to do so. often, their daily dietary needs are neglected. for example, indonesian migrant workers could be served with pork. unlike their counterparts who are out by institutions, they on the other hand, do not enjoy regular holidays or rest periods, and sometimes are unable to find time to meet friends from their own homeland and are forced to keep an eye on the elderly at all times. in the following paragraphs, the five related impacts of these two different categories – home and institution shall be explored. social and cultural impact in the ‘home-style’ category, foreign migrant workers need to face head-on, taiwanese family cultures, including different dietary preferences, religion and rituals, customs and languages. meanwhile, with the ‘institution-style’ category, foreign migrant workers enjoy the company of people from their own homeland who share the same cultural backgrounds, dietary preferences, religions, customs and most of all, the ability to communicate without problems. they are also not required to stand by the patient’s side 24 hours, seven days a week. they are far better-off than their ‘home-style’ counterparts. work performance in terms of work performance, homestyle workers need to be on-call 24-hours. 184 asean migrants in taiwan institution-style workers only work in accordance to 12-hour shifts, or just 8 hours a day. home-style workers also sometimes end up caring for the elderly person alone, and must be there to feed, bathe, medicate and care for the elderly person physically. sometimes, due to the burden, they require help from the family members of the elderly (liang, 2002). meanwhile, with institutionstyle workers, they can actually help each other because there are just more people there to do the varied sort of difficult tasks: giving shots, chest examinations, sputum suction, feeding and medicating them, changing their diapers and also affording other means of support (piper, 2004). these factors have provided with a more positive working environment to improve the quality, performance, security and help required by both the migrant workers and the elderly of taiwan they care for (cai, 2001). training and daily life management as pointed out by the statistics above, the elderly being cared for normally suffer from chronic or serious diseases, and are disabled. many suffer from circulatoryrelated diseases, and also suffer from the difficulty of being unable to care for themselves in daily life. it therefore becomes a necessity for the carers of the elderly to educate and train in basic healthcare and the provision of active assistance for the elderly. in the case of ‘home-style’ workers, more often than not, there is just one person doing the job. it is difficult for this person to attain education or training for that particular job. this is different with ‘institution-style’ workers where training and educational workshops are available and provided for them including essential training such as: respiratory tract care, care for wounds, dietary control, pipeline safety, accident prevention, and even going for clinical lectures (li, 2006). these courses can greatly improve the work of the carers and the safety and health of the elderly these carers are charged with. due to the fact that ‘home-style’ carers need to be there to watch out for the elderly patient at all times, the scheduling and quality of the carers’ life management is entirely dependent on the elderly patient and the patient’s family members. with ‘institution-style’ workers, they work fixed hours and enjoy holidays. their colleagues are from their same country as they come from, so they go to work with a better mood. they also receive training and leisure time for themselves. they have far better and more effective opportunities to securing a balanced life in taiwan. the elderly and their families for the elderly in taiwan and his or her family members, their ‘home-style’ carers are the people they fully depend on in terms of eldercare. the carers are also hugely dependent on the patient and the patient’s family members for living a decent life in taiwan. the conditions are not only restricted to the home, but these carers accompany the elderly and family members to the market, to dining outside of the home and are basically dependent on one another. with ‘institution-style’ carers, this is not the case. since they work in shifts, they spend lesser time with the elderly person they wait on and have lesser contact with family members of the elderly. with home-style carers, most live with the employer, assist with housework and help bring the children – if there are any in the house – to school (guo, 2003). these home-style carers are sometimes engaged not just to care for the elderly. the family members of the elderly ideally should gain the consent from the carer and it should all be in accordance to existing laws. this is sadly not always the case. journal of asean studies 185 protection of labor rights ‘home-style’ caregivers live in vulnerable conditions. when unpleasant incidents occur between the carer and the elderly or family members of the elderly, these caregivers face it alone. most of them do not have regular fixed rest periods and fixed working hours. they are at times deprived of holidays which they are legally entitled to. they are vulnerable and open to facing insults, or in extreme conditions, endure physical and even sexual abuse. the conditions are worse for ‘home-style’ workers: the more isolated they are with terrible communication problems, the more tragic the conditions could become for them (loveband, 2004). in contrast, ‘institution-style’ workers are able to support and help their colleagues. they face less controversy when it comes to labor rights protection. the institution-style workers receive far more reasonable and humane treatment as workers than home-style carers. migrant workers in taiwan political and economic issues as the lack of eldercare professionals exacerbates problems with taiwan’s rapidly aging population, taiwan’s government is still unable to bring about a policy that properly deals with issues linked to migrant care. taiwan’s government tried using the ‘barthel index’ to avoid criticism from the domestic labor workforce and activists (barthel provoke discontent, who is responsible, 2013). it was the government’s major policy southeast asian migrant care workers introduced into the homes of the taiwanese elderly. it was challenged from various ends because it was not well-prepared. by way of the political, economic and social viewpoints, this paper has attempted to reflect on the related advantages and disadvantages linked to the policy of elderly care in taiwan. political reflection it is the duty and responsibility of taiwan’s government to respond to public needs and social expectations through way of policy. the policy on migrant care for the elderly however was introduced reflexively, without a detailed, proper assessment. it brought on new problems. firstly, there should have been a proper evaluation conducted that the demand market for eldercare was truly increasing. secondly, the supply market was shrinking due to low birth rates in taiwan and therefore, looking for carers from outside of taiwan became a necessity (zeng, 2004). questions such as the kind of carers that are most suitable, and what should be the pre-recruitment procedures – on language, customs, professionalism criteria – should have been considered. thirdly, which option is most suitable: institution-style or home-style? and if it is the home-style carer who is preferred, will it not hurt the carer’s health and well-being in the long run? what measures should be taken to protect the carer’s labor and human rights? what are the rules and regulations on provision of training, education, and a thorough understanding of their rights and obligations? no matter what style is selected, there should be a provision on translation services, particularly in the emergency divisions of hospitals at any time. this is because carers from southeast asian nations might be the only ones bringing in the sick elderly patients in taiwan to hospitals at the time of need. economic reflection what arrangements are the most costeffective for eldercare in taiwan? we made a comparison of 20 elderly persons 186 asean migrants in taiwan receiving care from home-style carers and institution-style caregivers. with the homestyle carers, 20 care workers spent 24 hours a day with the elderly in 20 separate households. the institutions or centers only spared 9 to 12 carers. if the number of elderly people increased, the costs, including health supplies, food, drugs, and manpower could be lowered per unit. institutions were found that day to day, they worked to earn more profit (guo, 2003)1. whether in the cities or the countryside, all kinds of private nursing homes and special care centers too opened up more and more. meanwhile, as low birth rates continued through the years, only the southeast asian carers were the ones accompanying disabled elderly patients at home all day. most times both could not communicate with each other. as life expectancy rates increased, the shortage of the eldercare professionals worsened. differences between logical thinking and language barriers were clearly found between the elderly and the caregivers (zhou, fu, fu, cau, gao, qiu, zheng, xin, & xie, 2005). for the elderly being tended to by home-style carers, there were cases found where there was no peer group for the elderly to communicate with. this not only contributed to the degradation of the elderly person’s physical health, but also contributed to the worsening of working conditions and poor performance of the carer. in all, if we are to take the cost-profit principle and all the above factors into consideration, caring for the elderly through the assistance of ‘institution-style’ workers, rather than the ‘home-style’, is 1. guo, l. w. (2003). the efficiency and the plight of foreign care workers assigned in elderly care institution. community development quarterly, 104, 402-412. more economical, efficient, and better (ye, 2003). a sociocultural reflection the introduction of nearly 200,000 ‘home-style’ migrant care workers into taiwanese homes was arranged directly or indirectly by taiwan’s families by way of one migrant worker into one taiwanese household. the languages and cultural identities of the migrant workers were not considered a major issue, and this was another factor that caused care workers further depression in taiwan. if these 200,000 migrant care workers were instead hired out for eldercare in taiwan through 1,000 or 2000 institutions – instead of individual households – there would have been at least 100 migrant workers working together and supporting each other. these arrangements could have effectively reduced their adaptation pressures and fears of loneliness. the diversity of southeast asians, their colorful customs and cultures, could add some positive note to the lives of the elderly people. it could also help them reduce their daily working pressures. even though the institution-style carers spend less time with the elderly people and their families, they receive training for their work. it is a better and a safer workforce that the elderly face with institution-style workers because they are more organized, receive training and are more well-balanced (croissant, 2004). conclusion and recommendations even as nearly 95 percent of the foreign migrant workforce is categorized as the ‘home-style’ workforce, taiwan’s government pays scant attention to eldercare-related policy. this is particularly true when linked to the management and protection of southeast asian workers and journal of asean studies 187 the safe environment of the elderly folk in taiwan. the care problems of the taiwanese elderly folk worsen by the day. institution-style workers enjoy better work performance, training facilities and better life management. they also have their labor rights protected – unlike the home-style workers. it is frustrating that the taiwanese government is not striving to solve eldercare-related problems effectively. it is not seriously considering the provisions of training and education in order to better facilitate the needs of the elderly in taiwan. the government is also doing nothing in terms of labor rights protection of migrant care workers for the elderly and this is especially true for home-style carers. the taiwanese government seems to have completely ignored issues on cultural conflict, adaptation pressures and poor communication between the elderly and foreign caregivers. taking these observations into consideration, this paper strongly recommends the taiwanese government to actively work toward establishing and developing institutional migrant care centers, specifically for elderly care. for the current home-style migrant care workers, the government cannot proclaim indifference, and need to effectively address eldercare-related issues in taiwan (huang, 2005). owing to the different languages in the elderly care field, the government should anticipate problems in terms of language barriers, and provide for not just southeast asian language translators but also emergency support for them, in their own native languages. about the authors hong-ming huang is ph.d. candidate, graduate institute of political economy, national cheng-kung university. attending physician of emergency department of chiayi branch, taichung veterans general hospital. he can be contacted at sunshinekuang@hotmail.com jenn-jaw soong received ph.d in sociology, from the university of florida, usa. currently is a distinguished professor, department of political science and graduate institute of political economy, national cheng-kung university. references barthel provoke discontent, who is responsible. website. 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(2003). investigate the financial system of long-term care. the journal of long term care, 6(2), 1-11. zeng, y. f. (2004). nationalist politics and the foreign workers introduced. taiwanese journal of sociology, 32, 1-58. zhou, y. q., fu, k. q., fu, l. y., cai, y. s., gao, s. y., qiu, m. k., zheng, w. h., xin, b. l., xie, j. y. (2005). discuss the target principle, service customer, way to provide for the long-term care service delivery. taiwanese journal of social welfare, 4(2), 97-138. journal of asean studies, vol. 8, no. 2 (2020), pp. 173-190 doi: https://doi.org/ 10.21512/jas.v8i2.6483 issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic xi jinping, “china dream”, and chinese military diplomacy to asean lidya christin sinaga center for political studies, indonesian institute of sciences jl. jend. gatot subroto 10, jakarta, indonesia 12710 lidya.bosua@gmail.com received: 02nd june 2020/ revised: 08th october 2020/ accepted: 02nd november 2020 how to cite: sinaga, l. c. (2020). xi jinping, “china dream”, and chinese military diplomacy to asean. journal of asean studies, 8(2), 173-190. https://doi.org/ 10.21512/jas.v8i2.6483 abstract the rise of xi jinping has brought together the idea of the ‘china dream’ as a great revival of china. since the dream referred to the nationalism spirit of a ‘century of humiliation,’ it has made national security issues as the core of china’s diplomacy. while the national security-related foreign policy has enhanced the military's role in china’s foreign policy-making, it brings consequences for china’s tougher stance in protecting china’s national security. however, xi jinping’s notion of using military diplomacy has started uneasy relationships between china and some asean countries resulting in ‘ongoing negotiation without progress’ for the south china sea dispute. the research examines the impacts of the military’s growing role in china’s foreign policy under xi jinping to its military diplomacy in asean. the results show that xi jinping’s leadership and vision of the china dream, which uses military diplomacy as a key tool for advancing its whole diplomatic goals, has been seen as a sign of growing assertiveness. keywords: xi jinping, military, foreign policy-making, national security, military diplomacy, south china sea, asean introduction “xi’s foreign policy assertiveness as part of his unique leadership style highlights crucial pla role.” (ji, 2014a) the rise of xi jinping since 2012 has led to a transformation in china’s domestic and foreign policy. some discussions raised that china’s foreign policy under xi jinping is more assertive, proactive, and nationalistic than in the previous decades. some scholars argue that the change is a departure from previous china’s peaceful rise. the hallmark of xi jinping’s https://doi.org/xxxxxxx https://doi.org/xxxxxxx 174 xi jinping, “china dream” leadership is the china dream, which has been established since he first reigned. xi jinping refers to the dream as national rejuvenation. the way china pursues its dream, by implication, changes its diplomatic system. while the dream is not specific about the military’s revival, however, in the following days, the china dream was first emphasised on the idea of a strong military. accordingly, china’s foreign policy focuses on national security issues, which, in the end, provides a more influential role for the military to be involved in foreign policy-making. while china’s foreign policy is considered assertive under xi jinping, the strategy cannot be separated from xi’s domestic interest and relates closely to the development of china’s military diplomacy, which has grown since the end of the cold war. in light of these observations, the research explores the impacts of the military’s growing role in china’s foreign policy-making under xi jinping to its diplomacy with asean (association of south-east asian nations) countries. while this development relates closely to the development of china’s military diplomacy, asean is crucial to be seen as china’s military diplomacy puts southeast asia as its priority in asia. simultaneously, the south china sea dispute that puts asean and china on the same table is still ongoing and will not end. in light of the observation, the research elaborates on the impacts of xi jinping’s vision of the ‘strong army dream’ to asean countries with three critical sections. the essay first sketches out the rise of xi jinping and the idea of the strong army dream and how it contributes to the military’s role in china’s foreign policy-making. second, the research also substantively assesses the military’s more active role in china’s foreign policy-making under xi jinping. lastly, the impacts of the military’s growing role to china’s military diplomacy, especially to asean, will be explained further. literature review the rise of xi jinping and the strong army dream xi jinping was appointed as china’s communist party secretary-general in the eighteenth national congress on november 15, 2012 (“remarks on the occasion of meeting”, 2012). since the beginning of his administration, xi puts a hallmark on his new leadership by revealing the china dream/zhongguo meng. it includes four essential things, namely strong china (economic, political, diplomatic, scientific, and military), civilised china (equality and fairness, rich culture, high morals), harmonious china (friendship between social classes), and beautiful china (healthy environment and less pollution) (kuhn, 2013). xi refers to the dream as the nationalism spirit of china’s suffering in the ‘century of humiliation’ (miller, 2013) and china’s glory under party rule (“xi jinping and the chinese”, 2013). since then, the idea of the china dream has been repeated on several occasions, especially at the closing meeting of the national people’s congress on march 17, 2013, the inauguration of xi jinping as a president (xinhua, 2013). xi pledged to achieve the dream by taking the chinese way: “spreading the chinese spirit, which combines the spirit of the nation with patriotism as the core and the spirit of the time with reform and innovation as the core” (yinan, 2013). xi jinping confirmed the china dream idea as both the ‘national revival’ and journal of asean studies 175 china’s world power goal. however, this idea is not new as a book entitled “china dream: the great power thinking and strategic positioning of china in the post-american age”, published in 2010, calling for the awakening of the china’s military spirit (miller, 2013). another view suggests that xi’s china dream was a response to thomas friedman’s column in the times in 2012 entitled “china needs its own dream” which expecting “a new chinese dream that marries people’s expectations of prosperity with a more sustainable china” (“xi jinping and the chinese”, 2013). the china dream has been considered the great revival of china, not only in the domestic sphere but also in its external relations. as argued by cameron (2013), xi jinping’s insistence on ‘national revival’ sends a message that china resumes its place in the world. both the ‘national revival’ and china’s goal to be a world power are related. as argued by zicheng, levine and liu (2011), “there is a close connection between the rejuvenation of the chinese nation and china’s desire of world power. if china does not become a world power, the rejuvenation of the chinese nation will be incomplete. only when it becomes a world power can we say that the total rejuvenation of the chinese nation has been achieved.” therefore, in the central conference on work relating to foreign affairs, in november 2014, xi jinping proposed to advance multilateral diplomacy aiming to reform the international system and global governance and to increase the representation of china and other developing countries (“the central conference on work”, 2014). at this high-level meeting of the china communist party (ccp) on foreign relations, xi announced a new development in china’s foreign policy. he officially laid out his new shift in foreign policy, marking a transformation from deng xiaoping’s dictum of ‘keeping a low profile’ to an ‘active and creative’ strategy. xi jinping has put nationalism, patriotism, and pride at the centre of his leadership (shi and tweed, 2014). as argued by huang (2013), xi jinping realised that nationalism is a powerful notion in chinese society, particularly to secure the support of his nationalist constituency within the military (“xi jinping and the chinese”, 2013). military reform had been on the agenda for china’s rejuvenation since the ccp national congress in 2012. in december 2012, when xi jinping inspected naval installations in the guangzhou military region, he stressed a strong military to reach national rejuvenation (miller, 2013). this emphasis paved the way for the idea of a strong army dream. besides, robust compliance with the party’s orders is also required to be the ‘spirit of a strong army’ (“xi jinping and the chinese”, 2013). following this, in june 2013, the army confirmed that “the china dream is the strong army dream, the china dream leads the strong army dream, and the strong army dream supports the china dream” (“xi jinping – china dream”, n.d). while it remains to be seen, the strong army dream concept promises to be a guiding force in china’s military policy (miller, 2013). in 2015, for the first time in chinese history, china publicly revealed china’s military strategy white paper, a change from china’s national defence since 1998. the white paper is essential because it reveals the strategic shift for the people’s liberation army (pla). first, it outlines a strategy of ‘active defence’ and emphasises china’s commitment to ‘winning informationised local wars’ (kania, 2015). second, it emphasises the goal of becoming a 176 xi jinping, “china dream” maritime power and a more significant chinese naval presence farther from the people’s republic’s shores (gady, 2015). there are four main domains for china’s force development in the new white paper: cyberspace, outer space, nuclear forces, and finally, the oceans (chang, 2015). therefore, in december 2015, the pla’s general command, the pla rocket force, and the pla strategic support force were officially announced (liu hui, 2019). xi jinping’s china dream is not specific about the military’s revival. however, a national rejuvenation to regain the level of “prosperity and power enjoyed before the period of national humiliation… [which] requires effective government, a prosperous economy, a harmonious society, and a strong military” (miller, 2013). however, in the following days, the china dream was first emphasised on the idea of a ‘strong military.’ accordingly, china’s foreign policy gives more focus on national security issues in china’s foreign policy, which in the end, it provides a more influential role for the military to involve in the foreign policymaking. china established a national security commission (nsc), headed by xi jinping, premier li keqiang, and the chairman of national people’s congress, zhang dejiang (zhang, 2015). the new commission seems to solve the problem of fragmentation in china’s foreign policy-making. xi tries to make a breakthrough by putting himself at the centre of new leadership and leaving behind the ‘collective leadership’ style upheld since deng xiaoping (“the power of xi”, 2014). the rise of xi jinping can be considered as a turning point in china’s national securityrelated foreign policy. according to zheng and liu (2015), national security includes national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, people’s lives and property, the country’s political system, economic development, and social stability. as a result, xi jinping’s administration is being firm on territorial or sovereignty disputes. as the national securityrelated foreign policy becomes more important, the pla’s role in china’s foreign policymaking becomes more influential. the terminology of pla is unique since it does not necessarily refer to the chinese army, but the whole armed forces or military. initially, the pla consists of the ground forces, naval forces called people’s liberation army navy (plan), and air forces called people’s liberation army air force (plaaf). therefore, xi jinping’s emphasis on the strong army dream refers to the pla or military. as ji (2014a) argued, “the pla’s role in china’s foreign policy is integral and deep.” also, ji (2014b) mentions that the pla’s role in this policy-making is a key in understanding china’s diplomacy. the next section highlights the military’s more active role in china’s foreign policy-making under xi jinping. the role of military in china’s foreign policy under xi jinping china has dual tracks of decision-making system, the party and the state tracks. the party’s track is still higher than the state’s (jakobson and manuel, 2016). accordingly, the party is central to china’s foreign policy-making. the highest decision-making body, including foreign policy issues, is the politburo standing committee of the ccp (gore, 2013). as argued by jakobson and manuel (2016), “almost all members of the bodies charged with implementing any policies are first and foremost members of the cpc.” the elite group of the ccp only consists of seven members who emanate from the 25-member politburo. consequently, the journal of asean studies 177 ‘foreign ministry’ of the ccp, the so-called central international department (cid), is higher than the ministry of foreign affairs (gore, 2013). the role of the ministry of foreign affairs in china’s foreign policy-making is not determining, but it shares responsibility with the central military commission/cmc (ji, 2014a). since the party’s position is more dominant than the state, the role of the foreign affairs ministry in china is weaker than other countries in the world (jakobson and manuel, 2016). the ministry is responsible for foreign affairs in general and government-togovernment relations. however, as argued by gore (2013), “the main role of the ministry of foreign affairs is the implementation of policies made elsewhere,” not even as a coordination body which is still under the party or the so-called the ccp’s central foreign affairs leading small groups. therefore, gore (2013) depicted the foreign minister’s position as “way down the ccp’s pecking order.” while the civilians are responsible for daily diplomacy, the security or military-related foreign affairs are the military domain (ji, 2014b). the military has an autonomy that can influence foreign policy. the autonomy cannot be separated from its historical relationship with the communist party, particularly in the wartime, when the strength of the ccp primarily depended on the military power (song, 2008). therefore, as argued by jakobson and manuel (2016), “party leadership upholds a decision-making system that keeps the military at arm’s length from political decision making.” while the pla being subordinate to the party, it is ultimately an armed wing of the party, instead of the state, through which the party controls the use of force. consequently, the government cannot dictate the military since it has a much higher status than the foreign affairs ministry (gore, 2013). unsurprisingly, a foreign policy can be conducted without coordination with the foreign affairs ministry. there are three channels through which the military plays an integral part of china’s foreign policy-making: the central military commission (cmc), the politburo, and the leading small groups/lsgs (grieger, 2015). the cmc is a high-profile body under the party that aims to control the pla. the ccp secretary-general is also the cmc chairman. furthermore, as the cmc chairman, xi jinping represents the pla interests and foreign policy views in the politburo standing committee, since there is no military representative in the inner circle of the politburo (grieger, 2015). finally, there are leading small groups (lsgs) in china’s decision-making system that can be channelled as a vehicle for the pla to feed in the foreign policy process. however, the lsgs are only advisory in nature, with final decisions in the politburo standing committee. the existence of the lsgs is distinctive for china. these small groups cover any issues from the economics, the 2008 olympic games, the 2008 sichuan earthquake, and foreign affairs. the lsgs play essential roles in supporting the policy-making process. even it is more important than the ministries (huang, 2014). however, the lsgs have long played a role in china’s power structure since 1958, comprising the most powerful and influential leaders. xi jinping is one of the leaders that already involved in the lsgs. in mid-2012, he was a senior leader in the lsgs on maritime security, or the so-called protection of maritime rights (jakobson and manuel, 2016). 178 xi jinping, “china dream” when xi jinping was appointed as the ccp secretary-general in 2012, he introduced the new foreign policy team. xi is the first member of the politburo, along with premier li keqiang, zhang dejiang, yu zhengsheng, liu yunshan, wang qishan, and zhang gaoli. while li keqiang was a member of the standing committee of the political bureau of the seventeenth party central committee, the remaining people were members of the political bureau of the seventeenth party central committee (china.org.cn, november 16, 2012). while the party’s decision-making system is hierarchical, inevitably, xi has significant influence in the foreign policy process. xi then took over by leading the most influential lsgs, such as taiwan affairs and foreign affairs. since ‘the more powerful the head of lsgs, the more powerful the lsgs are seen to be,’ the involvement of xi in the foreign affairs lsgs makes lsgsthe most potent lsgs (jakobson and manuel, 2016). on the one hand, the establishment of the lsgs is generally accepted as a sign of major political shift. on the other hand, xi jinping’s decisions to establish and lead two new lsgs (comprehensive deepening of reform and national security committee) seem to confirm his strong determination to china’s foreign and national security policy. as argued by huang, xi is a very different leader from his predecessor, hu jintao, as “xi’s style is more like a strongman leader” (huang, 2013). however, xi’s emphasis on national security affairs cannot be separated from his desire to achieve the china dream. for the purpose, he will maintain a decisive role of the pla since it is an essential pillar of the ccp’s power. however, as explained before, foreign policy-making in china is shared between the civilians and the military. in fact, the primacy is still under the civilians (ji, 2014a). it cannot be separated from the ccp’s indoctrination of ‘absolute party control’ and pla subordination that manage civil-military relations over foreign affairs. the consensus between the pla and ccp to prioritise domestic matters and war avoidance has enabled the pla to deliberately support the civilians’ foreign policy at the strategic level. while the civilian-military concern on war avoidance under xi jinping remains unchanged, as argued by ji (2014a), xi tightens ‘proactive stance but a cautious exercise of hard power.’ consequently, china seems to move its defence strategy to war preparation. in april 2016, unsurprisingly, xi jinping entitled himself as a commander in chief of the joint battle command centre and, at the same time, urged to build a military command system that was ‘capable of winning wars’ (ramzy, 2016). as the military role in china’s national security-related foreign policy is growing, it impacts china’s foreign policy. first, the pla’s persuasion and full support for the change have convinced xi jinping to conduct a stricter approach to protect china’s national security. ji (2014a) argues that the pla functionally serves as the foundation and the tool of assertive foreign policy, a job assigned by the party. since xi jinping wants to define his leadership by reasserting and safeguarding maritime territorial disputes, particularly in the south china sea and east south china sea, they come as the core interests of china’s foreign policy. consequently, china had to change its national defensive security strategy from only land defence to land and sea defence (zheng and liu, 2015). for a long time, china projected its defence posture in the terrestrially-based strategy. according to ji (2014a), “the pla’s continental posture of defensive defence matches the civilians’ status quo-centred diplomacy journal of asean studies 179 with land neighbours.” previously, parts of the four general departments were responsible for managing the ground forces. however, now they were integrated into a new pla’s leading organ. the pla cut the number of its land-based army to less than 50 per cent of the armed forces, with the previous 18 group armies reorganised into 13 new ones (liu hui, 2019). figure 1. the new structure of the people’s liberation army source: https://news.cgtn.com/news/2019-12-25/graphics-reform-in-china-s-national-defense-and-armedforces-mgrxiewbzm/index.html therefore, since xi jinping tries to maintain its national security through maritime territorial disputes, xi jinping attempts to increase the navy’s role. as evidenced, xi jinping announced the initial idea of a strong army dream in naval installations in the guangzhou military region in 2012. consequently, the development has made china’s foreign policy to be firm to safeguard its maritime rights, while at the same time, it has transformed the pla navy into a ‘blue water navy’ that is actively involved in china’s active defence strategy (poulin, 2016). whether or not the incident can be seen in the context of the pla navy’s active defence strategy, it is crucial to consider chinese naval vessels conducted exercise by crossing indonesia’s sea lane of communication without prior notification in may 2016. the pla navy sailed from hainan island through the south china sea, crossed two indonesian archipelagic sea lanes (alur laut kepulauan indonesia), the karimata strait, the sunda, and lombok straits, the makassar strait, the pacific ocean near the eastern part of the philippines and back to hainan island (pattriardjawane, 2016). the pla navy violated the un convention on the law of the sea (unclos) 1982 in which china is a part of this convention, as already https://news.cgtn.com/news/2019-12-25/graphics-reform-in-china-s-national-defense-and-armed-forces-mgrxiewbzm/index.html https://news.cgtn.com/news/2019-12-25/graphics-reform-in-china-s-national-defense-and-armed-forces-mgrxiewbzm/index.html 180 xi jinping, “china dream” regulated that “… the requirement of continuous and expeditious transit does not preclude passage through the strait to enter, leave or return from a state bordering the strait, subject to the conditions of entry to that state” (article 38). second, the pla’s growing role in national security-related foreign policy-making has made china’s security strategy seem to be merely ‘tactical military decisions’ (ji, 2014a). as explained before, the civilians and military have shared responsibility in foreign policymaking, between public diplomacy and national security-related foreign affairs. however, as argued by ji (2014a), in discussing national security issues, “the pla officers are not less sensible and sensitive towards the crucial questions of war and peace and order of battle.” as shown by the case of the air defence identification zone (adiz) act in 2013, which pushed by the pla to xi jinping, the us has perceived it as china’s strategic change. as a result, the us deepened its involvement in the east south china sea conflict, and ultimately, it changes the security order in the region. several factors are contributing to the mismatch between the pla and civilians. first of all, the growing importance of the pla in xi jinping’s administration has made the pla’s officials do not perceive that informing their civilian counterparts about their foreign policy is such an obligation (ji, 2014a). as argued by gore (2013), “the military seldom consults diplomats on foreign policy issues, and the latter often hear about the military’s action afterward.” consequently, both actors cannot avoid themselves from the problem of lack of coordination, which in the end, the pla took decisions without approval from the civilians. furthermore, while the pla has closer ties with xi jinping by the growing importance of national security-related foreign policy, inevitably, the pla has a larger and more personal influence on xi jinping. towards this end, there is a possibility that china’s foreign policy is a matter of different interests between domestic actors, instead of china’s vague grand design (jakobson and manuel, 2016). while the pla has a significant role in shaping and implementing china’s foreign policy, the extent to which the idea of the strong army dream impacts china’s military diplomacy to its regional partner is crucial to be seen, especially to asean countries. as we know, china’s military diplomacy has put southeast asia as its priority in asia (allen, saunders, and chen, 2017). results and discussions the impacts on china’s military diplomacy: asean countries in the core at the end of the cold war, china has acknowledged military diplomacy as a critical component of its overall foreign relations. in a broad sense, china characterised military diplomacy as “external relationships pertaining to military and related affairs between countries and groups of countries, including military personnel exchange, military negotiations, arms control negotiations, military aid, military intelligence cooperation, military technology cooperation, international peacekeeping, military alliance activities, and so on.” (allen, saunders, and chen, 2017). china conducts its military diplomacy both in a bilateral journal of asean studies 181 and multilateral manner. however, as allen, saunders, and chen (2017) argued, most of china’s military diplomacy is bilateral, but the pla now participates in a range of multilateral meetings, conferences, exercises, and competitions. as an instrument of foreign policy, military diplomacy is conducted in a top-down manner and shared between the party and military. while the central committee of ccp dictates broad foreign policy goals, the cmc determines specific activities for various pla parts. this is related to the fact that china’s military diplomacy is subject to party and national diplomatic strategy and foreign policy (cai, 2016). according to cai (2016), military diplomacy as an official policy first emerged in the 1998 national defence white paper. in this document, it was stated, “china’s foreign military contacts are subordinate to and serve the modernization of national defence and the armed forces. china insists on dealing with its foreign military relations independently and engaging in military exchanges and cooperation based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence. in its contacts with foreign military circles, china has always advocated the principles of mutual respect, enhancing understanding, developing friendship, mutual benefit, and cooperation. china’s armed forces have been active in participating in multilateral military diplomatic activities to bring china’s armed forces’ positive role into full play in the sphere of international military affairs (national defence policy, 1998). since then, almost every two years, china regularly publishes its national defence policy. the exception was in 2012 when china postponed the publication due to internal leadership change. in 2013, under the new rule of xi jinping, china published its national defence policy with the title “the diversified employment of china’s armed forces.” this was the first time the national defence policy presented in specific issues as such. then, in 2015, china published a white paper specifically called china’s military strategy. this is the first white paper systematically expounded on china’s military missions and strategic tasks that have never appeared previously in the national defence policy. the 2015 china’s military strategy white paper stated that: the traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned, and great importance has to be attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests. it is necessary for china to develop a modern maritime military force structure commensurate with its national security and development interests, safeguard its national sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, protect the security of strategic slocs and overseas interests, and participate in international maritime cooperation, so as to provide strategic support for building itself into a maritime power (xinhua, 2015). the latest was in july 2019 when china issued china’s national defence in the new era. as stated, this national defence policy aims to sketch in detail the practice, purposes, and significance of china’s national defence and its efforts to build a strong military (erickson, 2019). however, the 2019 national defence policy has a different emphasis on the nature of defensive national defence policy. according to hui (2019), it stated that “china’s military role has shifted toward safeguarding china’s overseas interest and international peace. china’s 182 xi jinping, “china dream” military modernization is primary to safeguard its territory and sovereignty, dismissing the ‘china’s threat’ allegation. the white paper also acknowledged china’s need to protect its investment and citizens overseas in the new era” (erickson, 2019). this focus cannot be separated from xi jinping’s priority on securing his ambitious project under belt and road initiative. institute for national strategic studies in 2017 published a report entitled chinese military diplomacy, 2003-2016: trends and implications. by focusing on pla military diplomacy, this report shows that pla military diplomacy greatly emphasises on asia (41 per cent). from this percentage, southeast asia has the highest priority (22 per cent), followed by south asia (9 per cent), northeast asia (4.8 per cent), and central asia (5 per cent). the indicative is the pla’s strong emphasis on senior-level contact with europe and countries in asia, especially in the subregions of southeast and south asia. accordingly, this report also explained that pla’s increasing interactions with asia cannot be separated from the 2011 us rebalance strategy to asia and the rise of xi jinping to power in 2012. this statement is related to the 2015 china’s military strategy: “as the world economic and strategic centre of gravity is shifting ever more rapidly to the asia-pacific region, the us carries on its ‘rebalancing’ strategy and enhances its military presence and its military alliances in this region.” however, the more significant portion of china’s military diplomacy to southeast asia and south asia is not new. according to sachar (2004), a large number of military equipment of pakistan, bangladesh, sri lanka, and myanmar from china indicate the military diplomacy being pursued by china for balancing india. this was china’s attempts in the regional context to minimise india’s influence by arming its neighbours and establishing strong military ties with them. as a result, there are strong military relationships and growing dependence of these countries on china. thailand and myanmar are two asean countries that have a long story of military diplomacy with china, especially in terms of arms transfer in the mid-1980s (sachar, 2004). at that time, china was the only source of arms for some states that faced ussponsored sanctions, like myanmar. up to now, thailand still maintains china as its essential source of arms (storey, 2019). in 2019, thailand signed a contract with china state shipbuilding corporation (cssc) to build the amphibious vessel for the royal thai navy (“china to build landing”, 2019). undoubtedly, china’s military diplomacy grows with the development of china’s foreign policy. heydarian (2020) figured out three crucial phases of china’s foreign policy. the first phase was during the era of mao zedong, where china was involved in a protracted ideological war in the ‘surrounding environment’, especially in southeast asia. local communist movements relied on beijing’s material and political support during the cold war’s early phases. china under mao rejected the international order as an illegal construction of western capitalists while openly supporting the revolutionary movement in the ‘third world’. after the sino-soviet split in the 1960s, china launched a global struggle against the west (america) and the east (soviet union). this era made china face major powers and their regional allies, including japan and western-oriented regimes in the third world. cai (2016) asserted that china had exercised military exchanges with foreign defence forces in this early period of a new state. journal of asean studies 183 the second phase was after mao zedong’s death in 1976 and he was replaced by deng xiaoping. deng made high-level diplomatic visits to key countries in southeast asia, such as singapore, malaysia, thailand, and the united states. china then normalises relations with western countries and neighbouring countries, such as japan and asean member states. like mao, deng still saw china’s active participation in global organizations led by the west as a distraction or trap. in other words, deng only wanted to be involved with the outside world as long as it helped strengthen the country’s economic development. therefore, according to yasuhiro (2006), china at that time showed a negative response to security cooperation with southeast asian countries: “china with its ‘horizontal link’ tradition prefers bilateral diplomacy with small countries.” china just began targeting asean as a whole for dialogue around 1992 to 1993. yasuhiro (2006) explained, ‘horizontal link’ tradition dated back to the warring states period of the chinese dynasty. as described by the han-era historian sima qian, there was a ‘vertical link-horizontal link’ description. while the former described a policy taken by small countries to ally to oppose the great power, the latter destroyed the ‘vertical link’ by seeking treaties of alliance one after one. the ‘horizontal link’ won the war by using divide-and-conquer methods. the third phase was started by jiang zemin, who continued deng xiaoping’s leadership. in the early 1990s, there was a gradual change as a new form of the authoritarian regime in beijing, called a ‘party-state’ collective leadership. this happened after the tiananmen incident in 1989, which shook the foundation of the communist regime. china’s political system dramatically became plural, with the business class gradually entering the higher levels of the chinese communist party (ccp). in this phase, domestic industrialization triggers china to try building relations with other countries, especially for the source of raw materials, both to africa and latin america. besides, this period was also marked by the migration of millions of chinese citizens. as a consequence, china began to praise itself as a potential development model for the post-colonial world. china began to see itself as an emerging economic power with global interests. joshua ramo (2004) gave the name ‘beijing consensus’ as opposed to the world bank and the imf, which are part of the washington consensus. the beijing consensus is characterised by a non-ideological, selfless, pragmatic approach to global trade and investment. from jiang zemin to his successor hu jintao, china introduced the third phase of china’s foreign policy called the ‘charm offensive’. in this period, china was no longer passive and gradually playing a leading role in regional mechanisms (yasuhiro, 2006). china used the asean regional forum (arf) platform to host several regional meetings. since 2001, the frequency of defence ministers’ attendance increased, including the china–asean defence ministers’ meeting (admm) and admm–plus (allen, saunders, and chen, 2017). while admm is the highest defence consultative and cooperative mechanism in asean, admmplus is a platform for asean and its eight dialogue partners, namely australia, china, india, japan, new zealand, republic of korea, russian federation, and the united states, to strengthen security and defence cooperation for peace, stability, and development in the region (asean.org, n.d). 184 xi jinping, “china dream” however, cai (2016) underlined that defence diplomacy developed by admm-plus has a conceptual conflict with china’s military diplomacy. although china’s military diplomacy is still evolving, china’s military diplomacy can be defined as “the pursuit of foreign policy objectives under the guidance of china’s national grand strategy through the peaceful employment of military resources and capabilities to maintain national interests (both domestically and overseas), security, and development,” meanwhile, defence diplomacy is “a traditional security concept used for the realpolitik purposes of strengthening western allies against common enemies” (cai, 2016). the divergence of both concepts lies on, for china’s point of view represented by chinese diplomat qian qichen, that “in regard to foreign relations, any armed force to coordinate diplomatic actions cannot be called military diplomacy” (cai, 2016). under xi jinping, china’s scepticism goes hand in hand with some changes in china’s foreign policy. as stated before, china has a greater determination to protect its core interests (cameron, 2013). the china’s core national interests have driven the china’s foreign policy, with domestic political stability related to foreign policy. these core national interests include sovereignty, territorial integrity, and sustainable socio-economic development. the report of the 18th ccp congress of 2012, a guide for the next five years, emphasised the importance of protecting these interests and sovereign rights of china and of not surrendering to outside pressure. furthermore, china applies a more proactive and coordinated approach in foreign policy-making (zhang, 2015). there are two elements of this approach. first, china applies the ‘top-level design’ in foreign policy-making that has enabled a more centralised foreign policy process and a more efficient foreign policy implementation. for the first time since 1949, china held a working conference on peripheral diplomacy in october 2013. the conference involved the seven members of the standing committee of the politburo, provincial leaders, leading officials from various central government departments, military, foreign affairs, state security, financial institutions, and key state-owned enterprises. in this conference, xi urged all elements to take a more proactive approach in strengthening the relations with china’s neighbours. this working conference was held after xi jinping announced his vision on maritime silk road (msr). the revival of msr is the grand vision of china’s foreign policy with its peripheral eurasian neighbours (heydarian, 2020). according to heydarian (2020), while the best way to understand xi jinping’s bri vision’s strategic logic is to see the geography of chinese power, its peripheral eurasian neighbours are the primary key of the overall strategy. apart from this, china applies the ‘bottom-line thinking’, which sets the ‘red line’ for tolerated actions by other countries (zhang, 2015). consequently, china takes a tougher stance in its territorial disputes, especially in the south china sea and the east china sea disputes. for chinese scholars, china’s more assertive approach is, in part, the result of beijing’s previously more moderate position. as heydarian (2020) argued, in the context of the ‘charm offensive’, we can understand why china signed the declaration of code of conduct (doc) in 2002. the signing of the doc during hu jintao’s time was none other than being influenced by the chinese leadership at that time with the ‘charm offensive’ policy. hu jintao tried to journal of asean studies 185 establish good relations with countries in the region and has a new security approach, ‘peaceful development’. not only was the signing of the doc, but beijing also made maritime delimitation in the gulf of tonkin (2002) with vietnam, and in 2005 with the philippines and vietnam. therefore, enhancing the role of the pla under xi jinping, as explained above, undoubtedly gives impacts to asean as the south china sea dispute is still unresolved. the 18th ccp congress has reclassified the south china sea as a national core interest. simultaneously, there are several indications of china’s growing assertiveness in the south china sea under xi jinping. first, china actively conducts military exercises in the south china sea to strengthen its claims. china regularly sends patrol boats to the area and has even built military posts and airstrips on some islands. these moves heightened regional tensions, especially following china’s unilateral declaration of an air defence identification zone (adiz) in the east china sea. this action raised some worries that china would make a similar declaration regarding the south china sea (panda, 2014). second, china has carried out extensive land reclamation projects in the south china sea. however, article 121 of the 1982 un convention on the law of the sea (unclos) declares that any party cannot claim submerged features (such as shoals) and that “rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf” (united nations, n.d). china is now building new islands on five different reefs and is creating conditions to sustain human habitation to bolster its claims (tiezzi, 2014). in january 2014, massive land reclamation was done at johnson south reef (wingfield-hayes, 2014). additional land reclamation is also being done on woody island, duncan island, and drummon island, accompanied by infrastructure (lee, 2015). according to tiezzi (2014), johnson south reef will be the home to a new south china sea airbase. third, chinese vessels’ massive presence in malaysia’s, vietnam’s, and indonesia’s exclusive economic zone (eez). since 2014, china showed its intention to place the haiyang shiyou-981 oil rig at a location within vietnam’s eez. while this triggered massive antichinese protests in hanoi, after nearly two months, on july 16, 2014, the china national petroleum corp finally shut down the rig and moved it closer to hainan island in southern china. china’s presence in indonesia’s eez is showed by repeated encroachment to the waters of the natuna islands that has been continually resurfaced since 2009. chinese presence in the natuna sea has been continued until december 2019, when chinese fishing vessels and coast guard ships entered the northern waters of the natuna sea. the indonesian minister of foreign affairs, retno l.p. marsudi, on january 3, 2020, issued four points of indonesia's attitude regarding china's claims in the natuna sea, followed by the indonesian president’s joko widodo visit to the natuna sea. this presence even carried out during the coronavirus disease-19 (covid-19) global pandemic. in april 2020, a chinese government survey vessel, the haiyang dizhi 8, accompanied by a chinese coast guard vessel, entered malaysia’s eez and operated close to a drillship under contract to malaysian state oil company petronas (latiff and ananthalakshmi, 2020). 186 xi jinping, “china dream” fourth, china shows aggressive actions against other claimants’ fishing vessels. in march 2014, china blocked two civilian ships chartered by the philippines navy to send logistics to the philippines marine unit stationed on second thomas shoal. this disputed shoal in the spratly islands is located 200 km from kalayaan islands-western philippines and has been claimed as part of the philippines’ continental shelf. in 2016, there are three incidents in march, may, and june between indonesian patrol vessels and chinese fishermen vessels fishing in indonesia’s eez in the natuna islands. overall, xi jinping’s leadership and vision of the china dream focus on military diplomacy as a key tool for advancing its diplomatic goals. thus, we can argue that it has created at least two major impacts on asean. first, this development has led to a growing sense of assertiveness, especially in the south china sea, which is regarded as a national core interest. while growing assertiveness has caused uneasy relationships between china and some asean countries, china’s military diplomacy, which has a different approach with asean, has resulted in ‘ongoing negotiation without progress’ for south china sea dispute. second, although china continues to enhance its military diplomacy with neighbouring countries, xi jinping remains essentially unchanged from the ’horizontal link’ tradition. china’s preference for bilateral diplomacy can be seen as an indicator of a ‘great power mentality’ that opposes allying since it is regarded as a policy taken by a small country. meanwhile, ’horizontal link’ tradition prefers seeking treaties of alliance one by one with its opponent parties by using divide-and-conquer methods. therefore, up to now, china deliberately maintains various degrees of bilateral military diplomacy with several asean member states. conclusions the growing role of the military in china’s foreign policy has been enabled since xi jinping made a strategic shift by emphasizing national security-related foreign affairs. the emphasis on national security cannot be separated from his administration’s hallmark: the ‘china dream’, which emanates from the nationalism spirit of national rejuvenation. it is a tool for achieving the dream instead of reviving a strong army. however, the interests of xi jinping and the military intertwined with each other. xi jinping needs support for his leadership legitimacy from the military as the central pillar of the ccp’s power. conversely, the military, especially those who were unhappy with their perceived weakness of civilians’ foreign policy, seeks to play a more influential role in china’s foreign policy-making. while the growing role of military under xi jinping is more in domestic interests of both actors, it impacts the whole china’s foreign policy. first, the military persuasion and full support for the change have ensured xi jinping to conduct a stricter approach to protect china’s national security. second, the growing role of the military in national security-related foreign policy-making has made this policy seem to be merely tactical military decisions. while the assertiveness has become xi jinping’s foreign policy identification, he should carefully calculate this growing tendency unless it will only put china in a gravely negative geopolitical situation (ji, 2014a). journal of asean studies 187 overall, xi jinping’s leadership and vision of the china dream, which uses military diplomacy as a key tool for advancing its whole diplomatic goals, has been seen as a sign of growing assertiveness. in this regard, the south china sea dispute is regarded as a national core interest. while growing assertiveness has caused uneasy relationships between china and some asean countries, china’s military diplomacy, which has a different approach with asean, has resulted in ‘ongoing negotiation without progress’ for south china sea dispute. references allen, k., saunders, p. c., and chen, j. 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(2013, 18 march). china’s dream is xi’s vision. china daily. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013npc/2013-03/18/content_16315025.htm zhang, j. (2015). china's new foreign policy under xi jinping: towards ‘peaceful rise 2.0’? global change, peace & security, 27(1), 5-19. https://doi.org/10.1080/14781158.2015.993958 zheng, s. and liu, x. (2015, may). the pursuit of peaceful development: how china's foreign policy and its national security are connected. dissertation. halmstad university. zicheng, y., levine, s. i. and liu, g. (2011). inside china’s grand strategy. kentucky: the university press of kentucky. http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/kiyo/pdf/bulletin_e2006_2_matsuda.pdf http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/kiyo/pdf/bulletin_e2006_2_matsuda.pdf http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013npc/2013-03/18/content_16315025.htm https://doi.org/10.1080/14781158.2015.993958 “xi’s foreign policy assertiveness as part of his unique leadership style highlights crucial pla role.” (ji, 2014a) figure 1. the new structure of the people’s liberation army journal of asean studies, vol. 8, no. 1 (2020), pp.1-13 doi: https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v8i1.6435 ©2020 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic sectoral growth and income inequality in asean-5 countries: case of low-middle income economies dewa g. s. raeskyesa school of business and economics, universitas prasetiya mulya jln. bsd raya barat i, kavling edu i no. 1 bsd city, serpong tangerang, 15339, indonesia dewa.sidan@pmbs.ac.id / raeskyesa@gmail.com received: 08th may 2020/ revised: 15th july 2020/ accepted: 15th july 2020 how to cite: raeskyesa, d. g. s. (2020). sectoral growth and income inequality in asean-5 countries: case of low-middle income economies. journal of asean studies, 8(1), 1-13. https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v8i1.6435 abstract this paper aims to explore the relationship between growth in economic sectors, especially manufacturing, service, and agriculture, towards income inequality. furthermore, it utilizes panel data for low-middle income asean countries. the result shows that the share of agricultural sector in gdp has a significant and negative relationship with income inequality. in fact, the effect is robust for the incorporation of control variables. therefore, it underlines the importance of agricultural sector development for reducing inequality and also for fostering asean economic integration. keywords: asean, developing countries, economic development introduction low-middle income asean countries (indonesia, myanmar, vietnam, lao pdr, and philippines) have challenges during their economic growth process. as shown in figure 1.1, on average, when the growth increases, the trend in income inequality follows (see figure 1.1). in fact, between 2005 and 2017, several low-middle income countries such as indonesia, vietnam, and lao recorded an increase in gini ratio (asean, 2019). this situation has the possibility to decrease the quality of economic growth. in general, in addition to poverty and unemployment, inequality is an important indicator of economic development (seers, 1969). interestingly, this phenomenon is not always seen as negative, because it can be an incentive for working harder and taking more risks by generating innovation. according to forbes (2000), for a short period of time, a degree of income inequality is good for economic growth (forbes, 2000). however, when the trend keeps https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v8i1.6435 2 sectoral growth and income inequality in asean-5 increasing for a long period of time, then it jeopardizes the growth process and generates instability in the society (alesina and rodrik, 1994; perrson and tabellini, 1994; barron, jaffrey, and varshney 2004). figure 1 average gini and gdp growth in low-middle income asean member states (excl. cambodia) source: world development indicators, the world bank (author’s calculation) furthermore, as expressed by paus (2017), income inequality and economic productivity are important affairs to be addressed by low-middle income countries to avoid the middle income trap (mit). in fact, this phenomenon can damage productivity and innovation through a number of channels, such as unequal education, which can damage human capital accumulation process, and results in low productivity and decreased economic growth (paus, 2017). therefore, lack of education and health services combined with deficiency in redistributive policies, such as conditional cash transfer and tax reform have become major factors for increasing income inequality in emerging and low-middle income economies (brueckner, dabla-norris, and gradstein, 2014; dabla-norris, kochhar, suphaphiphat, ricka, tsounta, 2015; fournier and johansson, 2016; pratysto and panjaitan, 2019). however, the asean economy remains in a favourable condition, as the gross domestic product (gdp) experienced a positive trend from 2000 to 2018, which placed the asean group as the fifth largest economy in the world with us$3,0 trillion. when the gdp is decomposed by economic sector, during the period of 2005-2018, the service sector experienced a decent growth, with an increase from 46,6% in 2005 to 50,9% in 2018. therefore, the service sector was the leading in almost all asean countries. however, 0,00 5,00 10,00 15,00 20,00 25,00 30,00 35,00 40,00 45,00 0,00 1,00 2,00 3,00 4,00 5,00 6,00 7,00 8,00 9,00 g in i i nd ex g d p average gini and gdp growth in low-middle income asean member states (excl. cambodia) gdp growth rate gini index linear (gdp growth rate) linear (gini index ) journal of asean studies 3 agriculture remains a major field in the member states, which are classified as low-middle income countries, such as myanmar (24,6%), cambodia (16,3%), lao pdr (14,5%), vietnam (14,3%), indonesia (12,5%), and the philippines (8,1%) (asean secretariat, 2019). by conducting panel data analysis from the member states that are grouped as lowmiddle income countries, this study examines the relationship between income inequality. this was measured by the gini index and three economic sectors, namely manufacturing, service, and agriculture, which are indicated by their share of gdp. the results show that the agricultural sector has a significant and negative relationship with income inequality. in fact, the results are robust when the control variables are included. hence, it indicated that agriculture has been more inclusive compared to two others, which are manufacturing and services. therefore, it is important for the policy makers in these countries to focus on transforming the development of their agriculture, in order to generate inclusive growth. however, the study does not include cambodia due to a severe lack of data. the rest of the paper proceeds as follows. section 2 presents the literature analysis, which consists of studies development on economic growth and inequality. section 3 provides the econometrics method used for this study, while the result analysis is presented in section 4. lastly, the paper ends with the conclusion and policy implications in section 5. literature review in general, studies on the topic of income inequality have attracted great attention from policy makers and social scientists, especially in the political economy. for example, alesina and rodrik (1994) studied the relationship between politics and economic growth. the basic message from their study is that inequality in income and land distribution hinders economic growth. therefore, a redistributive policy is necessary (alesina and rodrik, 1994). however, barro (2000) found that this phenomenon has a small effect on its relationship with economic growth (barro, 2000). furthermore, according to forbes (2000), income inequality has a positive relationship with economic growth. lopez (2003) argued that macroeconomic indicators such as financial development, small-sized governments, and trade openness corresponded to increasing inequality levels. in addition, in the globalization context, several researches found a link between income inequality and foreign investment activities (feenstra and hanson, 2003; furceri and loungani, 2015). also, several researches devoted attention to the nexus between technology and inequality. ding et al. (2011) studied the impact of technology adoption in the agricultural sector, and found an increase of up to 15% in the income among farmers who adopted it. however, the impact on local income inequality is still low (ding, meriluoto, reed, tao, and wu, 2011). asongu et al. (2019) also contributed the analysis between inequality and technology using the education variable. their study showed that this phenomenon hinders access to technology utilization, and concluded that several thresholds in its measurements such as the gini and atkinson index should not be exceeded. this is important in order to maintain access to the internet and fixed broadband subscriptions. such access to ict is 4 sectoral growth and income inequality in asean-5 important in supporting the inclusive education of 42 countries in sub-saharan africa (asongu, orim, and nting, 2019). in addition, institution or government capacities also play an important role in shaping inequality, especially in developing countries as expressed by the unescap (2018), chong and gradstein (2004). in the context of asean countries, xu and islam (2019) stated the importance of increasing institutions’ capacity to tackle the inequality that exists within and across age cohorts among workers in thailand, which emerged within the economic community. moreover, institutions can exhibit such capacities through the form of social expenditures, such as education and health, as studied by fournier and johansson (2016). the study showed that social spending such as family benefits and subsidies can decrease inequality. furthermore, it was suggested that the government needs to encourage the completion of secondary education as it helps decrease inequality (fournier and johansson, 2016). these studies suggested a relationship between inequality and other aspects such as government, technology, and globalization. however, there are limited empirical research on the relationship between inequality and the economic sector, especially in low-middle income countries in the asean region. growth in different economic sectors especially amongst asean states is interesting to be studied. as mentioned previously, the agricultural sector plays a significant role among the members, which are classified as low-middle income countries. meanwhile, the sector not only plays an important role as an output supplier but also influences food security affairs (oecd & fao, 2017). moreover, this sector remains the largest employer in a number of asian countries, in which vietnam, thailand, and myanmar are included as asean members (briones and felipe, 2013). however, industrial and service sectors are becoming a key engine for economic growth. in fact, for asean countries, the expansion of the service sector has transformed it into a principal provider in terms of economic output and employment. this condition may affect the income elasticity of demand within the economy (namini, 2017; aldaba and pasadila, 2010). therefore, it raises a primary question: how do the economic sectors affect inequality in income, especially in low-middle income countries in the asean region? recently, namini and hudson (2018) studied the impact of growth in different economic sectors and monetary policy on income inequality in developing countries. their study concluded that the agricultural and industrial sectors have a significant and negative relationship with income inequality, whereas the growth of service sector has a positive effect. furthermore, they confirmed the existence of kuznet’s inverted “u” in the industrial and service sectors (namini and hudson, 2018). this result resonates with other studies such as imai (2016), who concluded that agricultural growth helps to lower income inequality both directly and indirectly in developing middle-income countries. meanwhile, country-specific studies such as gordón and resosudarmo (2018) concluded that the agricultural sector is inclusive in indonesia, as the share in gdp has a negative and significant relationship with inequality. whereas both the manufacturing and service shares of gdp have positive and journal of asean studies 5 significant effects. in fact, the effects are robust when the control variables are included. the study utilized panel data from 431 districts and cities in indonesia during the period of 20002010 (gordón and resosudarmo, 2018). in other countries like vietnam, agricultural activities play an important role in alleviating poverty and reducing inequality, especially in rural areas (cuong, 2010). this study aims to contribute to the current literature by exploring the relationship between three different economic sectors and income inequality, exclusively in low-middle income countries within the asean region. furthermore, this study incorporates other types of data from government spending as control variables that influence income inequality. research methods this study uses data from asean member states that belong to the group of lowmiddle income countries based on the world bank classification. these countries are indonesia, myanmar, vietnam, lao pdr, and the philippines. despite the fact that cambodia also belongs to this group, the country is not included in the analysis due to the lack of data in the gini index variable. the data were accessed from the world bank data portal, world development indicator, from 1998 to 2018, in which information collected on the gini index was used as a measurement, as well as a dependent variable. moreover, being a popular measurement, the index provides a convenient summary on degree of inequality measurement and simple illustration on the changes in equity at a given period over time (haughton and khandker, 2009; farris, 2010). furthermore, it satisfies one of the standards in inequality measurement which is ‘transfer principle’ (trapeznikova, 2019). this criterion is important when it comes to comparison in income distribution across countries. for the independent variables, this study uses economic sector contribution data on agriculture, forestry, and fishing value added (% of gdp); manufacturing value added (% of gdp); and services value added (% of gdp). the reasons for choosing these sectors are due to data availability and has been used frequently, as well as because the activity within the economic composition may affect income inequality level (montalvo and ravallion, 2010). moreover, understanding the composition of economic sectors would be beneficial for policy maker to identify the potential fields to be developed (riantika and utama, 2017). in addition, data for the control variables are based on total government expenditure on education (% of gdp), domestic health (% of gdp), final consumption (% of gdp), and total employment to population ratio 15+ (%) (modelled ilo estimate). based on the condition of the data, this study conducts the unbalanced panel data analysis. through this analysis, it manages to control individual heterogeneity and generates more reliable estimates from the dataset compared to other econometrics methods, such as time series and cross-section analysis (gujarati and porter, 2009). 6 sectoral growth and income inequality in asean-5 in most cases, the panel data model is grouped into three categories, which are pooled ols, fixed effect, and random effect model. meanwhile, the pooled data has persistent coefficient for both intercepts and slopes. it usually pools all of the data and runs an ordinary least square model (ols). this model can be specified as follows: 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝛽𝛽3𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑑𝑑𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (1) where giniit = gini index, manuit = share of manufacturing sector in gdp, servit= share of services sector in gdp, and agrifit = share of agriculture, forestry, and fishing sector in gdp, xit = control variables. following fournier and johansson (2016) and anderson et al. (2018), this study incorporated the government variables as a control because it is associated with inequality. in addition, other control variables such as employment-to-population ratio that measure condition of the labour market are also included in the analysis (gordón and resosudarmo, 2018). furthermore, because the pooled ols model cannot control the unobserved individual effects since the heterogeneity of the countries is under consideration, it might affect the measurement of the estimated parameters. therefore, in order to control for individual heterogeneity, this study used random effects model in which the difference across countries can be recorded within the model. by incorporating countries’ individual effects, the random model can be constructed from equation (2) as follows: 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝛽𝛽3𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑑𝑑𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (2) where 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a component of the random error term, which consists of between-country error (𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) and within-country error (𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) over time. meanwhile, the random-effects model explains that a country's error does not correlate with the explanatory variables. however, when a country’s error is correlated with the explanatory variables, then the study should use the fixed effect model to allow each country to have its own intercept. the fixed-effects model is specified as follows: 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝛽𝛽3𝑀𝑀𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑑𝑑𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (3) the hausman test was conducted to test for the possible existence of a correlation between a country's error and its explanatory variables. meanwhile, the null hypothesis for this test is that there is no correlation between individual countries’ error with its explanatory variable (i.e., random effect). when the hypothesis is being rejected, then it means the fixedeffects model is preferred. however, when the hypothesis is being accepted, then it prefers the random-effects model. this study also conducted the breusch-pagan lm test in order to choose the best between the random-effects and the ols model. by doing this, the study utilized a single error component model i.e., either fixed-effects, random-effects, or ols model. journal of asean studies 7 analysis based on the panel regression, the study found that the f and wald test are significant at the 1% level for both models. this means the independent variables in both models can explain the behaviour of the dependent variable (i.e., they do not reject the null hypothesis). moreover, based on the results from the hausman test, the fixed-effects model is statistically preferred over the random-effects model. furthermore, from the fixed-effects model, the study found that the services sector (serv) provided positive coefficient on income inequality, while manufacturing (manu) and agriculture, forestry, and fishing (agrif) have negative coefficient. however, only the last variable gives significant relationship with p-value equals to 0,03 or 5% level (see appendix, table a1). also, when the model is added by other control variables, there are changes that emerge. firstly, based on the hausman and breusch-pagan lm test, the ols model becomes the preferred choice. secondly, the robust option is added during the ols model with the aim to control heteroskedasticity. therefore, it showed where the three appointed sectors in the economy have negative coefficients towards income inequality. however, only agriculture, forestry, and fishing (agrif) that have significant level and p-value of 0,006 (1% level), showed greater significance than the previous model where the control variables were not included. moreover, the coefficient from the agricultural sector to income inequality remains the same at 0,096. in other words, a 1% increase in the agriculture share of gdp lowers inequality as measured by gini index up to 0,096 points (see appendix, table a2). as the finding emphasized the significance of the agricultural sector on inequality, there are both empirical and theoretical elements found in the literature that support this finding. therefore, the result of this study resonates with others such as namini and hudson (2018) who found that the agriculture sector has a greater impact compared to manufacturing in reducing income inequality in developing countries. furthermore, other asean countryspecific studies such as by gordón and resosudarmo (2018) and cuong (2010) concluded that the agricultural sector in indonesia and vietnam are associated with decreasing income inequality level within the country. finally, this result not only indicated that the agricultural sector is more inclusive than others but also supports the idea from menon (2012) regarding the importance of policy making in contributing to productivity in order to reduce inequality (menon, 2012). conclusion this study aims to explore the relationship between three economic sectors, namely manufacturing, services, and agriculture. furthermore, it employs an annual panel data analysis ranging from 1998-2018 in asean member countries classified as low-middle income countries. in the first step, the study applied the hausman test, whose results showed the fixedeffects model is preferred. also, it showed that the agricultural sector is significant at 5% level. 8 sectoral growth and income inequality in asean-5 furthermore, control variables were incorporated in the next analysis in which the ols model has been appointed with the robust option being added. the result showed an increase in significance in the agricultural sector on income inequality at 5% to 1% levels, with a coefficient that remains the same at 0,096. based on the results, it was concluded that the agricultural sector has been more inclusive than others, including manufacturing and services. therefore, it is suggested that this sector can be enhanced and become the focus of development agenda for the sample countries. furthermore, there are several policy implications drawn from this result. firstly, because an increase in agricultural share of gdp is significant for reducing income inequality, land reforms and improvements are necessary to increase productivity and opportunities for people to participate in this growth creation, especially in rural areas (world bank, 2003; menon, 2012). in addition, enhancing the sector is beneficial not only for reducing inequality and creating better growth, but also for the integration process in asean countries. the agricultural, forestry, and fishing sectors are among the most important components for asean countries’ single market and production, and they therefore foster the development of the asean economic community project (aec). they also improve the economic integration within the countries (pangestu, 2009). limitations & further research the limitation of this study is exclusively on income as inequality dimension and gini index for the measurement. this is subject to imperfections as economies with equivalent gini index may have dissimilar income distribution. in other words, the index does not explain what happens in the opposite tails, as it puts higher weight in the middle of the distribution. in context of inclusive growth policies, when one would like to understand what happens on the poorer one, it is suggested to use the palma ratio instead of the gini index for the measurement, and use consumption data as focal point (trapeznikova, 2019). moreover, using inequality in opportunities as other dimension for dependent variable is worth to be utilized for further research, for example, unequal access in education which may lead to human capital inequality is beneficial (castelló and doménech, 2002). in addition, it is beyond the scope of the study to analyse the relationship between subsectors from the three main economic sectors on income inequality. as the study’s result suggested the enhancement of agricultural, forestry, and fishing sector, it is important to note that the statistics may include commodities (sub-sectors) such as palm oil, which generates both positive and negative effect in terms of environmental and socio-economic aspects (kubitza et al., 2019). therefore, it should become a consideration in the policy making process. journal of asean studies 9 acknowledgements the author wishes to thank the editor, two anonymous referees, and albert hasudungan, ph.d for very helpful comments. about the authors dewa gede sidan raeskyesa is a full-time economics lecturer in the school of business and economics at universitas prasetiya mulya, indonesia. his research focus is international economics, development, and policy, with focus on asean region. the author holds a m.sc degree in international economics and public policy from johannes gutenberg universität mainz, and received a scholarship for advanced studies program in international economic policy research from kiel institute für weltwirtschaft (kiel institute for the 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(2019). what does asean economic community bring to older workers? examining inequality in old age in thailand’s fast-ageing society. journal of asean studies, 86-97. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/ https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators 12 sectoral growth and income inequality in asean-5 appendix table a1 panel data models: dependent variable (gini) independent variables fixed effect random effect manu -0,013 (-0,33) -0,003 (-0,09) serv 0,063 (1,01) -0,016 (-0,43) agrif -0,096* (-2,19) -0,184*** (-5,01) constant 11,270* (2,49)* 12,489*** (6,15) model summary 𝑆𝑆2 0,1643 0,2190 f-test 4,03** prob > f 0,004 wald test 28,32*** prob > chi2 0,000 hausman test 20,54*** countries included 5 5 total panel observations 105 105 note: significance level ***p<0,001, **p<0,01, and *p<0,05. the null hypothesis of the hausman test is that there is no correlation between individual countries’ error with its explanatory variable. values in parentheses are the t-value. table a2 panel data models: dependent variable (gini) independent variables ols manu -0,004 (-0,20) serv -0,029 (-0,97) agrif -0,096** (-2,82) goveduc 0,148 (1,82) journal of asean studies 13 govcons 0,069 (1,29) govheal 0,056 (1,30) empoptot -0,296* (-2,61) constant 29,048*** (3,60)*** model summary 𝑆𝑆2 0,331 f-test 8,92*** prob > f 0,0000 hausman test 9,66 breusch-pagan lm (prob > chibar2) 0,00 (1,0000) countries included 5 total panel observations 105 note: significance level ***p<0,001, **p<0,01, and *p<0,05. the null hypothesis of the hausman test is that there is no correlation between individual countries’ error with its explanatory variable. the null hypothesis of the breusch-pagan lm test is that variances across entities is zero. values in parentheses are the t-value. introduction literature review research methods analysis conclusion editorial greetings from the journal of asean studies. we are glad to reach the readers with the publication of this volume 4 issue 2, 2016. we are pleased to stay on track in contributing to the development of knowledge and debates pertaining to the political, social, economic, and security issues in southeast asia. in this issue, there are six interesting manuscripts that consist of four article, one practice note, and one book review. in this issue, we do not offer a specific line of theme as the topics brought into this issue greatly vary. the first article with this issue aims to analyze the economic integration in southeast asia. written by kiki verico, “the key factors of economic integration in southeast asia: case of indonesia, malaysia, and thailand” analyzes intra-regional trade and an economic community as two of the titular factors. the article observes intra-regional trade in three selected countries: indonesia, malaysia, and thailand; while it analyzes the economic community by focusing on indonesia as a case study. the article finds that free trade agreement is effective to increase intra-regional trade but not effective to attract investment, and that the private sector is ready for the economic community. the second article attempts to discuss asean-china relations. the article by wai ting titled, “increasing economic interdependence between china and asean and its implications” studies the problems and issues of china's relations with asean, which has achieved the establishment of asean economic community (aec) by 2015. the article considers the institutional framework of china-asean relations and addresses the implications of the increasing economic interdependence between the two. it also examines china's recent policy in developing ‚one belt, one road‛ and chinese relations with the u.s.-led transpacific partnership, as well as their implications to asean. the third article explores a different aspect of asean, namely its socio-cultural pillar. written by jerry indrawan, “asean socio-cultural community (ascc) in conflict prevention: the role of civil society organizations (csos)” argues that the obstacles faced by asean in the implementation of asean community can benefit from this pillar alongside the role of csos. the ascc can provide the means to involve csos in conflict prevention efforts, and csos can also take a significant role in peacebuilding efforts. therefore, it is important that asean states include csos as an integral part of conflict prevention. the fourth article takes a detour from southeast asia to explore events in the northeast. the article by ria putri santoso and anak agung banyu perwita titled, “the shift and continuity of japanese defense policy: revolutionary enough?” studies the shift in japanese defense policy during its past three prime ministers: naoto kan, yoshihiko noda, and shinzo abe. the article contends that in the face of north korea’s and china’s threats, the significant changes in japanese defense policy during abe’s administration are not particularly revolutionary, but are continuity from his predecessors despite opposing political backgrounds. the section of practice note consists of a manuscript on asean nuclear security. written by mutti anggitta, “asean’s role in shaping nuclear security future in the region” discusses the potential future of nuclear security in southeast asia by examining the roles of asean in establishing and maintaining regional cooperation on nuclear security. the recent ‘nuclear renaissance’ in southeast asia brings new security challenges in the region, and the manuscript offers insights into what steps that asean has already taken and what practices that asean can take in the near future to alleviate the challenges. lastly, this issue publishes our first section of book review titled, ““think globally, act locally:” the state transformation approach in governing borderless security threats.” written by by lidya christin sinaga, the review of shahar hameiri and lee jones’ 2015 book, governing borderless threats: non-traditional security and the politics of state transformation demonstrates how the authors propose new style of governance of the non-traditional security (nts) issues. the review praises the importance and relevance of the topic, but criticizes the generalization of their findings. nonetheless, the book is still credited to propose the state transformation approach as a new approach in the study of security governance in international relations. together with the publication of this issue, we welcome two newly joined international advisory board members of this journal. first, associate professor alfons palangkaraya from swinburne university of technology, australia, who has strong expertise in innovation, intellectual property rights, globalization, and firm performance. second, associate professor nanthakumar loganathan from the faculty of management, universiti teknologi malaysia, who has specialization in development economics, resource economics, and tourism economics. their addition will strengthen the position and direction of this journal. jakarta, 30 december 2016 prof. dr. tirta n. mursitama, ph.d. editor-in-chief journal of asean studies, vol. 10, no. 1 (2022), pp. 43−59 issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic received: 10th january 2021/ revised: 21st july 2022/ accepted: 22nd july 2022 enhancing social integration through intra-asean travel gabriella fardhiyanti1 and victor wee2 1,2faculty of social sciences & leisure management, taylor's university lakeside campus, 1, jalan taylors, 47500 subang jaya, selangor, malaysia gebriellafardhiyanti@sd.taylors.edu.my; victor.wee@taylors.edu.my how to cite: fardhiyanti, g & wee, v. (2022). enhancing social integration through intra-asean travel. journal of asean studies, 10(1), 43−59. https:/doi.org/10.21512/jas.v10i1.6929 abstract the asean economic community (aec) was established in 2015 with the goal of enhancing regional integration, including social integration, which has been linked to the asean populace's motivations for regional travel. this paper examines emerging intra-asean travel using esser's (2001) social integration dimension theory. to fully comprehend the vision of social integration and sustainable tourism development, continuous efforts must be made to develop, promote, and protect the member states' common interests through asean integration. this study aims to assess whether the social integration dimension connects individuals in preference to travelling within the asean region. a questionnaire survey of asean nationality passengers at malaysia's klia2 airport was used to collect the data. the study findings will present social integration arising from intra-asean travellers and the benefits of promoting tourism for economic stability in the region. keywords: social integration, asean economic community, intra-asean travel, regional tourism introduction the association of south-east asian nations (asean) was back in the spotlight in 2017 while marking its 50th anniversary. the members have taken steps to further develop this regional community in the upcoming years following the establishment of the asean community at the end of 2015 (permatasari, 2020). tay and zainul (2017) state that efforts are still being made to strengthen the asean community blueprint 2025. in order to achieve equitable economic growth in the region, the regional focus areas for economic integration mailto:gebriellafardhiyanti@sd.taylors.edu.my mailto:victor.wee@taylors.edu.my 44 enhancing social integration include a digital single market, financial integration, policy integration, and connectivity (jones, 2019). asean aims to make the region more integrated by focusing on the region's political stability, economic integration, and socio-cultural pillars. according to chirathivat, kunnamas, and welfens, (2020), the increasing number of integration projects in the global economy and the growth in the number of countries engaged in regional integration initiatives have shown that regional integration is a crucial catalyst of economic integration, globalisation, and multilateralism. the objective of social integration is to foster social and cultural development, but it is not as clearly defined as the economic objectives. this makes the accomplishments of asean social integration hard to assess (dosch, 2017), since social and cultural progress can be classified in many ways. asean strives to facilitate this development by developing a community identity through collaboration in education, tourism, and non-governmental organisations. many studies have discussed the impact of the open skies policy on enhancing economic integration. there is still a lack of studies regarding the impact of air transport on social integration (abeyratne, 2014). the asean community promotes efforts to forge a strong community identity that would exist within the unique characteristics of each member state. nevertheless, asean has not yet developed projects to achieve these objectives. regional cooperation in tourism and non-governmental organisations is quite limited, and intra-asean travel presents an opportunity for development. the establishment of the asean community led to the growth of intra-asean tourism due to the rise of intra-asean travellers among the asean populace, contributing to the growth of the economy in the region. in addition, increasing intra-asean tourism facilitates social and cultural progress. despite the significant contributions made by tourism in the area, the social integration aspect that influences the collaboration in tourism between asean countries has received little coverage in the literature. the research investigates the role of intra-asean travellers as catalysts for social integration. the research is considered important as it examines social integration arising from the growth of intra-asean travellers in the region. this topic has received little attention among researchers in the field of tourism. furthermore, southeast asia as a region has the potential to develop into a major tourist destination due to its diverse cultures, which attract international tourists and can also be used to draw tourists within the region. intra-asean travel deserves to be given great attention because of the similarities between the member states (oegroseno, 2013). the research reinforces our understanding of the issue by presenting empirical evidence describing the social integration conditions that promote intra-asean travel. the research shows that there is a relationship between cultural adaptations, positioning, interaction, and the growth of intra-asean travel. intra-asean travellers discover similarities in terms of language, culture, friendliness, and hospitality and actively absorbed knowledge and news about asean countries throughout their tour. additionally, the privilege of holding an asean passport enables individuals to travel freely within asean, which has increased their drive to travel more intra-regionally, enhancing the demand for more excellent connectivity. the research also finds that there is more social interaction within the asean region because people have friends, family, and relatives who live in other asean countries. overall, journal of asean studies 45 asean countries have developed a stronger familiarity with each other and a sense of belonging to the community over the past five years since the establishment of the asean economic community (aec). literature review esser’s social integration theory social integration refers to the inclusion of individuals in a system by creating relationships among individuals and their attitudes towards society. it results from the conscious and motivated interaction and cooperation of individuals and groups. social integration can be derived from the bonds of attraction and similar interests that unite its members. a social integration system consists of the shared interactions in a certain social structure that includes the conceptions of conflict and order. social integration is a practice of developing the values, interactions, and institutions necessary to attain the envisioned society. however, social integration can be seen from various perspectives (ferguson, 2008) and emphasises the dynamics of power, governance, structures, and values that allow leaders and the well-off to protect their exclusive roles. according to esser (2001), social integration focuses on integrating individual actors into the system. although closely associated, system integration and social integration are theoretically distinct and independent, allowing for separate studies (esser, 2001). in the asean context, system integration occurs through the interplay of 10 member states, whereas social integration occurs through interpersonal interactions. as seen in figure 1, the research focuses exclusively on the latter. esser (2001) identifiy the following four dimensions of social integration: cultural adaptation, positioning, interaction, and identification. figure 1. own adaptation, based on esser (2001) 46 enhancing social integration social integration can be conceived to foster principles, relationships, and structures that allow everyone to engage in economic and political social action on the basis of equality and opportunity, fairness, and decency. afterwards, the concept addressed the social integration practice of building systems that foster a community based on social and economic equality values. these four dimensions comprise the important characteristics of social integration. cultural adaptation, or acculturation, encompasses cultural knowledge and language competencies required for interaction and is part of the socialisation process in a society. interaction refers to the building and maintaining social relationships in daily life by individuals who share a mutual orientation. on the other hand, identification encompasses the emotional relationship between the actor and society, a subjective feeling of belonging as it concerns cognitive and emotional aspects. the feeling of belonging may develop in the integration process later, which can be developed due to participation and acceptance. on the subjective level, inclusion in a new society is indicated by feelings of belonging to and identification with groups, particularly on the national level. finally, positioning refers to the position in society and the rights gained with it by citizenship or economic position (esser, 2001). cultural adaptation cultural adaptation applies to individuals who acquire essential knowledge and special skills to behave and engage in an appropriate, informed, and effective manner. when it comes to cultural adaptation, specific language skills, societal values, and behaviour regulations are all important considerations (esser, 2001). acculturation is another term for cultural adaptation, which refers to the process of engaging with cultural change (mittelstädt & odag, 2015). among the most often adopted acculturation concept developed by berry (1997), cultural adaptation refers to the exchange of culture. one group assumes another group’s beliefs, practices, and rituals without sacrificing the characteristics of its own culture. his research reveals that individuals from diverse cultural backgrounds deal with two crucial issues: 1) the importance of cultural heritage preservation; and 2) the value of building relationships with mainstream culture. lakey (2003), in his review of berry's work, states the extent of the implication of four acculturation strategies: 1) integration, 2) separation, 3) assimilation, and 4) marginalisation. integration refers to individuals that appreciate both cultural preservation and intergroup relations. positioning positioning, as esser believes, is the essential dimension of integration. positioning can be described as the acquisition by an individual of a particular social position. the individual is, thereby, integrated into the existing social system and its functions. positioning may take place by granting certain rights to individuals, including the right to a nationality. it may also be linked to the recruitment of a job or the completion of education. positioning, therefore, takes place at the level of the market and follows the rules of supply and demand (stadler, 2016). positioning is part of the integration, initially proposed by slocum & langenhove (2003) journal of asean studies 47 (figure 2). the positioning concept is further introduced as an analytical framework that illustrates the meanings attributed to space and individuals identified within the space. interaction interaction refers to the building and maintaining social relationships in daily life by individuals who share a mutual orientation. interaction is ostensibly the third level of social integration. it is represented as a type of social activity in which people influence the knowledge and behaviour of one another (esser, 2001). according to stadler (2018), interaction applies to creating social contacts within the scope of the everyday environment. as in acculturation, prospects are essential to interaction, as is the willingness to embrace promising neighbourly approaches or relationships from both sides. sciortino (2010) developed the notion of assimilation, which derives from the spontaneous and unintended interaction processes in the social construct. identification identification, on the other hand, encompasses the emotional relationship between the actor and society, a subjective feeling of belonging. as it concerns both cognitive and emotional aspects, the sense of belonging may develop later in the integration process due to participation and acceptance. the identification process is defined as an individual’s association with the societies that are subject to the norms of those groups as a basis for comparing their behaviour. this process involves the identification of the group (burnazoglu, 2020). in addition, the identification dimension has transformed into a social identity model which explains social identities related to guests (e.g., migrants) and host communities, particularly those linked to the socio-cultural order, such as racial, gender, and class identities. the social identity model can consider heterogeneities whose impact is not represented by simple comparisons, and which generate disparities in integration consequences (duroy, 2011). assessing intra-asean travel the magnitude of intra-asean travellers is expected to increase as the asean economic community, launched in 2015, seeks a more integrated regional economic strategy and the mobility of travellers within the region. as asean member states enter this new social integration era from very different economic perspectives, the movement of travellers will enhance the integration of the asean populaces. the research examined a variety of characteristics perceived in the travel decision, and several variables emerged, such as: 1) affordability, 2) accessibility, 3) visa exemption for asean nationality, and 4) business and tourism activity. 48 enhancing social integration affordability transport affordability has been regarded as the ability to make transport movements (i.e. making basic movements to work and school). the ease of travel with affordable fares is offered to facilitate visits to other destinations and other essential trips without substantially confining the ability to undertake other important activities (carruthers, dick, & saurkar, 2005). the concept of "essential travel" remains vague as it relies significantly on exchange with further training. affordability is not an absolute term but reflects the relationship between the cost of the service and the consumer’s income. in this research, affordability refers to the cost associated with travelling between the regions. as a result, travellers consider having a pleasant vacation in any particular location based on their ability to pay (murthy, 2016). in conjunction with the growth of low-cost carriers (lccs) and national carriers in opening up new destinations, has greatly contributed to intense competition in the aviation industry. one of the main benefits of deregulation is that consumers have more affordable fares and a greater selection of choices (fedosova, 2016). as a result, the business sector has grown, and fares are becoming more cost-effective and affordable. accessibility accessibility entails the ease of achieving the intended purpose of travel or selection of travel objectives and the nature of the amenities that may be accessible. according to gwilliams (2017), accessibility is often influenced by the generalised cost of travel, such as time, money, and convenience. though it involves fulfilling particular travel criteria, accessibility is often critically dependent on the relative location of the desired destination set and the origin of the trip. thus, the accessibility indicator will be the average generalised costs associated with meeting a set of quality travel requirements. changes in the location of operations can increase accessibility in this conventional sense while reducing aggregate mobility. airlines industry play a major role in bringing people closer together through promoting connectivity and ensuring air travel are affordable for the passengers (akgüç, beblavý, & simonelli, 2018) nonetheless, accessibility is undoubtedly preferable to mobility as a transport planning objective since it is free from the adverse external effects of increased mobility (litman, 2013). improving accessibility can adversely affect productivity. adopting accessibility as a fundamental objective will lead to shorter trips that may facilitate reaching the destination by various forms of transportation. visa exemption for asean nationality visa exemption is a cornerstone of the establishment of the asean community, including the asean economic community (aec), the asean political and security community (apsc), and the asean social and cultural community (ascc). in 2015, all asean communities urged asean member states to strengthen and reform in all countries journal of asean studies 49 to ensure asean member states' commitment. moreover, to help the asean economic community, the liberalisation of goods, services, and labour is taking place. in addition, asean will establish an asean framework agreement on the visa exemption scheme. the visa exemption policy adopted by a country aims to increase the number of foreign tourist arrivals. as a result, countries with a high welfare level generally apply visa-free policies to countries whose welfare levels are considered equal—observing these developments, as one of the countries with tourist destinations that are in high demand by foreign tourists, indonesia has begun to implement visa-exemption policies. the main objective of this policy is to increase the enthusiasm of foreign tourists to visit indonesia so that it can be directly proportional to foreign exchange earnings in the tourism sector (dhesinta, 2017). the key objectives of the visa exemption for citizens of asean member states are to support and facilitate intra-asean acceleration and movements of people, particularly intra-asean travel. business and tourism activity according to chon and maier (2010), there are two purposes for travel: leisure and business. individuals who travel for pleasure and not for business, or those who are on vacation and want to share their experiences with their life partner, friends, and family members, are considered leisure travellers (smith & warbuton, 2012). in contrast, business travellers are individuals who travel for work in an irregular location—such as conferences and tradeshows, government business, and sales trips – and stay for a short time. meanwhile, rini (2020) argues that a strong and sustainable regional economy is produced when existing resources such as the community and the government effectively collaborate. the government, acting as a regulator, has a strategic role to play in seeking out numerous opportunities for businesses to actively engage in regional economic activities including intraasean businesses and travel. hakinson (2004) divide the tourist destination into business tourists and leisure tourists. however, the ease with which people may travel influences international business, and meetings, seminars, and events are the primary sources of business tourism. therefore, two indicators of trading activity must be considered for business tourists, such as: 1) the investment process made by an investor from a particular country in a specific asean country, and 2) bilateral trade among the member states. although the statistics do not find evidence that foreign direct investment (fdi) impacts travel intention among business tourists, they find convincing evidence of the trade balance growth (parikesit & magribi, 2004). 50 enhancing social integration figure 2. research framework method in this quantitative research, a questionnaire survey is conducted to find the social integration dimension that connects individuals’ preferences for travelling within the asean region. related secondary data is reviewed from the literature and previous research to verify the hypotheses. subsequently, in february 2020, the research is conducted using a face-to-face and online survey platform to collect data from asean nationality passengers at klia2 airport malaysia. through the stratified random sampling technique, a total of 356 samples are obtained. the research evaluates the distribution of the data across some demographic characteristics of the respondents. the respondents are asked to indicate their age, nationality, educational level, and preferred destination based on this study. the quantitative data from the questionnaire responses are summarised and presented clearly. the current research adopts sem (structural equation modelling) smartpls for statistical data analysis. the technique can model nomological networks by expressing theoretical concepts through constructs and connecting these constructs via a structural model to examine mediation relationships using regression analysis (benitez, 2019). construct validity and reliability confirmatory factor analysis (cfa) is used to determine the validity of esser's social integration dimension. it is found that the sets of items assessing the components had equal relative magnitudes (ozturk, 2010). in the confirmatory factor analysis, the covariance matrix iss analysed with the maximum likelihood estimation method. sharif and nia (2018) assert that the kaiser–meyer–olkin and bartlett's sphericity tests performed to analyse the determinants factor extraction were based on eigenvalues > 1, communalities > 0.3. hence, the second analysis for cfa based on model fit assessment is conducted using several model fit indexes, such as chi-square (χ2) test, chi-square/degree of freedom ratio < 5, goodness-offit index (gfi) > 0.90, comparative fit index (cfi) > 0.90, normed fit index (nfi) > 0.90, and standardised root mean square residual (srmr) < 0.09. journal of asean studies 51 results and discussions the majority of the participants are identified in the age range of 26 to 35 years old, consisting of 54% of the total respondents. concerning nationality, the majority of the respondents are nationals of the six asean founders. indonesians constituted the majority (29%), followed by malaysians (25%), bruneians (11%), thais (8.9%), singaporeans (8.4%), and filipinos (4%). as these six asean countries are high middle-income countries, there is a greater likelihood for their citizens to use air travel for holidays overseas. the remaining travellers, on the other hand, are nationals of clmv (cambodia, laos, myanmar, and vietnam) countries. regarding the education level, most of the respondents (51%) are graduates with a bachelor’s degree and are young (three-quarters are below 35 years) with tertiary education. data also indicates that 83% of the respondents preferred to travel within the asean region. table 1. discriminant validity ave ca id in intra-asean p cultural adaptation 0.575 0.758 identification 0.797 0.743 0.893 interaction 0.609 0.812 0.815 0.780 intra-asean 0.499 0.761 0.621 0.731 0.706 positioning 0.621 0.723 0.646 0.782 0.693 0.788 discriminant validity – fornell –larcker table 1 shows that the research extracts the ave and cross factor loading for all latent variables. all items have higher loadings on their corresponding constructs than the crossloadings on the other constructs in the model. the cross-loading results pertain to the social integration dimension item. all indicators loaded high on their constructs but low on other constructs. all items in the measurement models achieve discriminant validity as the constructs are distinctly different from one another. the ave for each construct factor exceeds the respective squared correlation between the factors, therefore providing discriminant validity evidence (fornell & larcker, 1981). table 2. enhancing social integration through intra-asean travel construct items factor loading (cfa) cronbach’s alfa rho_a cr ave esser’s social integration cultural adaptation 0.765 0.851 0.890 0.705 0.515 positioning 0.730 0.794 0.810 0.933 0.521 interaction 0.781 0.919 0.922 0.920 0.509 identification 0.720 0.754 0.841 0.676 0.505 intra-asean travel 0.701 0.706 0.704 0.703 0.501 52 enhancing social integration as indicated in table 2, the cfa results employing the dataset (n = 365) are used to corroborate and validate the factor structure determined by the efa. the factor loadings ranged from 0.701 to 0.781. the model is found to be a good fit, as evidenced by goodness-offit indices (χ2 (23) = 83.016, p < 0.05, χ2/df = 2.598, gfi = 0.840, cfi = 0.864, nfi = 0.850, srmr = 0.060, chi-square = 602.707. the cronbach’s alpha ranged from 0.706 to 0.919. the composite reliability, which ranges from 0.676 to 0.933, is found greater than 0.7, indicating the construct's high reliability. moreover, convergent validity is demonstrated as the ave range for all the constructs exceeded 0.500, and the cr value is greater than ave. table 3. summary hypothesis original sample sample mean stdev t statistic p values decision h1-cultural adaptation→intra-asean 0.444 0.442 0.068 6.571 0.109 accepted h2-positioning→ intraasean 0.214 0.213 0.065 3.287 0.092 accepted h3-interaction→ intraasean 0.231 0.233 0.088 2.631 0.082 accepted h4-identification→ intraasean -0.034 -0.034 0.072 0.041 0.637 rejected the standardised beta estimates, sample mean (m), standard deviation (stdev), t statistics (|o/stdev|), and probability value (p-value) for each construct in the research are tabulated in table 3. accordingly, h1 finds that there is a relationship between cultural adaptations and intra-asean travel. table 3 shows that the hypothesised path for h1 is positive and significant (β = 0.001, p < 0.109). thus, hypothesis h1 is supported. this occurs because cultural adaptation as a dimension of social integration is examined by intra-asean travellers' propensity to try local cuisine while visiting other asean countries. consistently, h2 discovers that there is a link between position dimension and intraasean travel. according to table 3, the relationship in h2 is positive and significant (= 0.001, p < 0.092). the relationship between positioning and intra-asean travel is depicted in this research, indicating that while travelling, asean travellers prefer to queue at the asean line in the airport (asean line for immigration checkpoints). additionally, the privilege of holding an asean passport enables individuals to travel freely within asean, which has increased their drive to travel more intra-regionally, enhancing the demand for more excellent connectivity. furthermore, h3 ostensibly indicates a positive and significant (β = 0.009, p < 0.082) relationship between interaction and intra-asean travel. the research finds that there is more social interaction within the asean region because people have friends, family, and relatives who live in other asean countries. they are also more willing to interact with the locals while visiting to make new friends from other countries. travelling within the asean region is more convenient since it is easier to communicate with people than travelling outside the region. lastly, h4 examines the association between identification and intra-asean journal of asean studies 53 travel, and table 3 indicates that h4 is negative and not statistically significant (β = 0.637, p < 0.01). asean countries have developed a stronger familiarity with each other and a sense of belonging to the community over the past five years since the establishment of the asean economic community (aec). this can be represented through collective spirit or national pride. figure 3. hypothesis result the majority of respondents in this research are between 26 and 35 years old, making up 54% of the total. the research shows that most intra-asean travellers are young adults, referred to as millennials. millennials are important in asean countries, where the populations have a high percentage of young people. the number of intra-asean travellers has shown substantive figures over the past five years, as they represent nearly 70% of international arrivals into malaysia. the remaining figures consist of travellers from other countries, such as china, india, australia, etc. the five major asean countries that contribute to arrivals in malaysian are: singapore, indonesia, thailand, brunei, and philippines. these countries have strong relations and share common objectives as a community. furthermore, this group of travellers travels for various reasons, including vacations, school, business, and visiting friends. backpacking is also a common option for young adults traveling within the region. mazumder, sultana, and al-mamun (2013) indicate that the asean region shares a significant geographical, cultural, historical, archaeological, and social bond. due to the convenience of air travel, southeast asia has the potential to become a fascinating destination for millennial travellers, which has made it a hotspot for cultural tourists in recent years. the data provides an exploratory account that links these four dimensions with asean passengers to examine their motives for travelling within the region. data shows that an exploration of passenger motives has improved understanding of the dimensions that influence their decision to travel, namely, cultural adaptation, positioning, and interaction. cultural adaptation or acculturation includes cultural knowledge and language competencies needed for interaction, which become a part of the socialization process into a society. it refers to the individual possessing essential language skills, cultural norms, and behaviour. cultural adaptation occurs when groups of people with different cultures contact 54 enhancing social integration each other for the long term, changing the culture of one or both groups. cultural adaptation as a dimension of social integration is used in the research to describe travellers' willingness to try local cuisine during their vacation to another asean country. the research finds that the people of the asean countries share a common language, culture, friendliness, and hospitality. the willingness of intra-asean travellers to try the local cuisine during their visit to the other asean country. they also actively sought information about the asean countries. hence, the growing interest of asean citizens in their region contributes to an increase in the frequency of flights between asean member states. nevertheless, positioning is the main aspect of integration since it shows how individuals tend to integrate themselves into an existing social system and its established functions. this dimension is closely linked to cultural adaptation. the link between position and cultural adaptation can be seen in the willingness to move to other asean countries due to the cultural and language similarity. furthermore, the relationship between positioning and intra-asean travellers demonstrates that while travelling within asean countries, travellers prefer queuing asean line at the airport if it is available (asean line for immigration checkpoints). it shows that positioning helps in the growth of airlines by opening more asean destinations to the secondary and tertiary cities and collaborating with the local airport to provide an asean line at the immigration checkpoints. additionally, the privileges associated with asean passport holders make it easier for them to travel across asean countries, encouraging them to travel more inside the asean region. interaction dimension describes the social conduct in which individuals engage in reciprocal actions and behaviour. it refers to the social contact and communication between two people. in other words, interaction is closely linked to cultural adaptation since interaction further depends on the competencies acquired through cultural adaptation. however, these cultural and language skills can only be attained and developed through interaction with other social system members. the results shows there is increased social interaction throughout the asean region due to people having friends, family, and relatives who live in different asean countries. they are also more willing to interact with the locals while visiting to make new friends from other countries. travelling within the asean region is more convenient than travelling outside the region since communication is more accessible. meanwhile, in terms of the relationship between the interaction dimension and the rise of intra-asean travel, the high level of air connectivity plays a significant role. it means that, as a result of the rise of lccs, numerous airlines have added new destinations to secondary and tertiary cities around asean while maintaining affordable fares that encourage people to travel more. identification is the emotional relationship between individuals and the social system. it encompasses the emotional relationship between the actor and society, a subjective feeling of belonging, and identification with cognitive and emotional aspects. the feeling of belonging may develop later in the integration process due to participation and acceptance. for example, the identification process can be expressed through collective spirit or national pride. the identification dimension demonstrates that people have gained a stronger familiarity with asean countries and a sense of belonging to the community over the last journal of asean studies 55 five years since the establishment of the asean economic community (aec). therefore, identification is about integration as a process of becoming a member of the collective structures at the ethnic, local, national, and regional levels. unfortunately, this identification is the only factor that does not contribute to the motivation to travel intra-asean, as those who travel intra-asean do not feel a sense of belonging to the region. unfortunately, this identification is the only dimension that has no bearing on social integration. the feelings of people traveling within asean are unaffected by their ties to the region. in addition, while economic integration is the top agenda for asean integration, serious consideration should also be given to the socio-cultural aspects of the integration initiatives, particularly improving people's mobility across the region, as strengthening people-to-people connectivity through intra-asean travel can act as a stepping stone to heightened awareness of regional integration and a growing sense of connectedness to the initiatives. it is linked to the social integration theory on individuals' desire to integrate into an existing system and become involved in the community to foster an asean-centric mindset among them. as a result, the situation is linked to integration theory, as asean should be more open to the experience and insights from neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism to build the theory of asean integration as a one community, socalled the asean way. conclusions and recommendation the findings contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the social integration dimensions, which esser (2001) divide into four: cultural integration, positioning, interaction, and identification. furthermore, the research provides an exploratory account that links the four dimensions with asean passengers to examine their motives to travel within the region. data shows that an exploration of passenger motives has improved our understanding of the dimensions that influence their decision to travel, namely cultural adaptation, positioning, and interaction. interestingly, identification has been noted to be of less influence. the finding may be explained by jones (2011), who reports that little attention has been made to determining the measures necessary to integrate individuals with varied cultural and ethnic identities into a broader regional identity or citizenship. onyusheva (2018) has found a lack of awareness among asean communities' communities. this occurs since the aec's benefits are underutilised due to cultural differences, non-tariff measures, internal competition, and a lack of awareness and understanding about the region or insufficient information. thus, it is reiterated that this research will enhance the understanding of social integration theory, with a special emphasis on asean, which can assist the community in addressing issues related to the identification. strategies might, therefore, be introduced to nurture the feeling of belonging among the asean community and forge a united asean identity. in this regard, the findings indicate that strengthening asean's social integration will contribute to the region's sense of belonging, which is shaped primarily by geographic and cultural proximity and facilitated by the region's ease of travel. asean should encourage 56 enhancing social integration their citizens to actively participate in tourism because most intra-asean travellers are mainly from singapore, indonesia, thailand, malaysia, philippines, and brunei. in contrast, the research finds a lack of clmv travellers. a joint promotion with a public-private partnership will be a good tourism promotion and development model. developing and improving tourism in a country is important as a well-maintained and organised tourism destination will increasingly attract domestic and foreign tourists. the performance of tourism must be regulated and controlled by the member states. it can help boost community development, generate stable incomes for communities, boost sustainable tourism development through social integration, share the feeling of belongingness, and the growth of travel within the region has undoubtedly stimulated its economic growth through the communities' participation in various sectors. eventually, this may lead to a complete understanding of asean citizenship. for asean to become a more people-centred organization, it needs to be less elitist, more accessible to everyone, and more aligned with the concerns and interests of the people of asean. this can be done by encouraging the shift from a state-centred to a people-centred asean. lastly, the research provides the contribution of aspects of quantitative methods using sem analysis in asean studies and international relations. the research is expected to contribute to the development of international relations, especially the study of integration in the asean region, with a quantitative approach, especially sem, since this type of effort must be increased to improve international relations analysis. future research is suggested to enhance esser’s social integration theory by providing more comprehensive perspectives on asean integration in other sectors such as tourism, education, and business. another factor to examine is the states’ interest in benefiting reciprocity from the integration plan. in addition, future research can also consider adding more sample sizes and broadening the location for data collection. multiple lccs in the region can also be investigated, followed by multiple international airports for data collection. lastly, another important recommendation is to conduct an extensive study on several asean countries to get more accurate information based on the involvement of more member states as it could generalise asean as a whole. acknowledgement the authors thank the anonymous reviewers and members of the editorial team for their constructive comments. the authors would also like to thank the asean tourism research association (atra) based at taylor’s university malaysia, for the scholarship. disclosure statement this manuscript has not been published and is not under consideration for publication elsewhere. the authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article. orcid gabriella fardhiyanti https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1411-5365 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1411-5365 journal of asean studies 57 references akgüç, m., beblavý, m. & simonelli, f. 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http://journal.binus.ac.id/index.php/jas/index editorial towards a more inclusive international relations greeting from the journal of asean studies! we are pleased to present you our latest edition which represents our continuous hard work to improve the journal to meet and maintain the international standard for academic publication. we are proud that we are consistent on choosing the unique, important, and interesting aspects of the region theoretically and practically that we believe will broaden your understanding and contribute to the accumulation of knowledge on the region. we, at the same time, are delighted that in this edition, we have wider coverage both in terms of disciplinary, scope of issues, and level of analysis. we have articles both from ir and non ir disciplines, we have conventional and non-conventional issues, and we have articles from inter-regionalism to domestic affairs from individual member states. this, however, represents the richness of the current dynamics and complex entanglement in the region which deserved a highlight. our first article is written by pawel mariusz pasierbiak entitled “causes, origins, and possible effects of the asean economic community (aec)”. this article was chosen as our first article as it represents the conventional issues on asean regionalism, that is, the problem of economic integration. written by european scholar, this article represents outsider’s perspective on asean integration. it is also interesting as it is critical towards the existing measurement used by regional actors to see the progress of asean integration – issue that was rarely, if never, raised in the existing literature. the author, instead, uses the european experience to set the parameter for a common market. of course, judging asean using european standard has been widely criticized, but the author has been clear in stating that it is only in the context of common market and under condition that if asean aims to go to that direction. apart from this debatable juncture of its economic integration, asean integration is clearly distinct from that of europe as it is driven quite influentially by bottom up or regionalization process. we are glad that we have oliver gill’s article in this edition as his article entitled “the higher education dimension in east asian regionalism: a two-tier analysis of international co-authorship patterns in the asean plus three” highlights the bottom up process of regional integration, and it focuses on education field which few have paid attention. regionalization of education, as many have noticed, has played important role in forging mobility and exchanges among states with less intra-regional, compared to extra regional trade, which is important for regional integration. it is even more important in the context of southeast asia which have many challenges for regional integration. as discussed by yanyan mochamad yani & verdinand robertua in their article entitled “environmental studies of english school: case study of forest fires in indonesia and transboundary haze in southeast asia,” non-conventional issues such as trandsboundary haze pollution has been a continuous challenge for the region as it often provokes tension between neighboring states. this has not mentioned the dynamics within state from each regional member. ratu ayu asih kusuma putri, in her article “political leadership in south korea’s developmental state: a historical revisit” uses the case of south korea to reflect indirectly the problem of developmental state which apparently many southeast asian states, including indonesia also adopts in certain period of its history. christopher ryan baquero maboloc with his article entitled “the radical politics of nation-states: the case of president rodrigo duterte,” on the other hand, highlights the problem of radical politics under president duterte in the philippines. while his article specifically discusses the case of the philippines, but radical politics as apparent in the rise of strong leader or also nationalistic and populist leader, is not unique to the country. in fact, it is a concerning phenomenon across the globe even though occur in different level and style. lastly, the article written by alberta natasia adji, diah ariani arimbi, adi setijowati, nur wulan, kukuh yudha karnanta on “confessing love to the nation: audrey yu jia hui’s works and identity reconstruction” discussed the unsettled classical problem of majority-minority relations using the case of the indonesia. the interesting point of their article is their approach to this ethnicity problem through reading on the literature work from the minority circle, an approach which is also rarely used in the existing literature. finally, given all the richness of the present articles in this volume, the editors believe it is part of our efforts toward a more inclusive international relations. we would like to express highest appreciation for the authors for their valuable contribution to the journal. last but not least, we also would like to thank the indonesian association for international relations (aihii) for the continuous support for the journal and for our institution. jakarta, 31 august 2018 prof. dr. tirta n. mursitama, ph.d. editor-in-chief journal of asean studies, vol. 8, no. 1 (2020), pp.61-80 doi: https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v8i1.6171 ©2020 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic assessing the expectations and limitations of aseaneu counter-terrorism cooperation ali a. wibisono1 and aisha r. kusumasomantri2 1,2 department of international relations, faculty of social and political sciences, universitas indonesia nusantara building 2, floor #2, depok 16424, indonesia 1 ali.abdullah61@ui.ac.id, 2 aisha.somantri@ui.ac.id received: 19th december 2019/ revised: 17th april 2020/ accepted: 12th june 2020 how to cite: wibisono, a. a. and kusumasomantri, a. r. (2020). assessing the expectations and limitations of asean-eu counter-terrorism cooperation. journal of asean studies, 8(1), 61-80, https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v8i1.6171 abstract this research examines the inter-regional security cooperation between asean and the eu with a specific focus on counterterrorism. the research methods are based on a comparison of regional counterterrorism governance between the two regions and a close reading of plan of actions for the enhancement of asean-eu relations documents from 2007 to 2018. the results show that ct cooperation is about facilitating a more comprehensive security governance cooperation where european standards and experience are transferred to southeast asia for purposes of regional security and diplomatic relations. in addition, this research also shows that eu-asean ct cooperation has not been geared specifically to combat radicalism, or as part of a counter violent extremism program; rather, the interregional cooperation has mainly focused on building a common normative framework in responding to terrorism within the corridor of democracy and preempting the terrorist networks from exploiting connectivity networks. finally, implementation of security and political cooperation between the eu and asean tend to rely on the existing extra-regional dialogue fora within asean as well as direct engagement between the eu and third parties comprising each of the asean states. keywords: regional securitization, functionalism, inter-regionalism, counterterrorism, asean, eu https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v8i1.6171 62 eu-asean counter-terrorism cooperation introduction international cooperation in counterterrorism (ct) is an increasingly important subject of international security studies. the changing nature of terrorism takes place as terrorist networks acquire a capacity to create propaganda and attacks with global impacts with cheaper budgets (goldman, 2011). ideologies that drive violence extremism in one corner of the globe may become the driver of acts of terrorism in another (klein, 2006). ideological drive that originally mobilizes puritan sunni muslims against shia in syria and iraq could serve as the ideological driver for terrorist cells in countries where sunni-shia friction is almost unknown such as indonesia (chalmers, 2017). in addition to a more global-orientation in ideological affiliation, today’s terrorism-financing is increasingly cross-border in nature. it has long been the case for organizations like isis to acquire a network of charity donations in indonesia, for example, that provide the organization with a capability to provide social support for its sympathizers as well as operational capital (arianti et al., 2019). the introduction of electronic wiring of money, social media and chat applications, and digital currencies expanded the transnational traffic of terrorism financing even further, depending on the need of the organizations (carroll & windle, 2018). recruitment and operations of terrorist activities have also taken place in a cross-border manner as foreign terrorist organizations have become capable of maintaining local contacts to transfer funds internationally and replenish their manpower with volunteering foreign terrorist fighters. asean-eu's ct cooperation is part of the ongoing interregional dialogue that has been undertaken since the late 1990's in the effort of the two regions to respond to critical challenges to human and national security due to globalization. documents of interregional engagements between the eu and asean from the late 1990s have already shown an agreement that globalization brought new challenges, and, in that respect, more multilateral cooperation is needed. issues of terrorism, transnational crime (with emphasis on trafficking of illegal drugs), wmd proliferation, environmental degradation, and natural disasters were identified in the late 1990's by both asean and the eu as common threats or challenges. against this background, ct cooperation between association of southeast asian nations (asean) and european union (eu) – initiated by the eu has taken place since 2003 and continued to take place at the time of writing. plan of actions for the cooperation has been renewed every five years, and both the eu and asean never seem to degrade their prioritization towards the cooperative mechanism (hwee, 2017). this research argues that observation of eu-asean allows one to understand how two regions that are entirely different in their regional governance continue their security cooperation due to different objectives of the respective regions. as an eu’s initiative, ct cooperation with asean as an institution and with member-states serves the purposes of intraregional security as well as maintaining diplomatic proximity in the face of geopolitical tension. this research finds that the interregional ct cooperation between the eu and asean utilizes the existing institutional framework for extra-regional cooperation within asean, rather than creating a new institutional mechanism. thus, the interregional engagements of the two regions not only nurtures ct cooperation but also strengthens multilateral institutions that have been formed by asean countries, rather than imposes a new institution. secondly, this journal of asean studies 63 research finds that the nature of ct cooperation between asean and the eu does not touch on the need for capacity-building in deradicalization. this may well due to differing identity issues of the respective regions that give birth to the problem of radicalism in the first place. in furthermore, both the eu and asean have been limited in their respective regional governances of ct by the supremacy of national ct policies. the eu externalizes ct towards outside their region to help strengthen its ct role and maintain europe’s international presence southeast asia and global ct governance. at the same time, asean pursues a cooperative engagement in ct for purposes of sustainable capacity-building in the future. this research explores the theoretical framework explaining the required fundamentals for sustainable inter-regional cooperation on the security sector, and analyses individually the regional governance of ct in the eu and asean. in addition, this research dwells on the details of the plans of actions concluded by asean and the eu on matters pertaining to ct and resulting cooperative mechanisms between the two regions. this research might as well provide conclusion on the entire eu-asean ct cooperation as an eu-initiated, nonhierarchical, asymmetric yet mutually beneficial cooperative mechanism. theoretical framework the growing literature on interregional relations suggest that the functions performed by existing interregional relations have the potential of establishing a critical component for an emerging, both horizontally and vertically differentiated, and multi-layered global "governance architecture" (rüland, 2014). however, the optimism towards this direction is guarded by the decreasing expectations that interregional relationship could drive the growth of collective identity-building given that regions are in their cultural or identitarian blocs, leading to cultural barriers in interregional cooperation (santini, lucarelli & pinfari, 2014). in this regard, interregional cooperation is realistically evaluated not in terms of ideational convergence but rather in terms of values in the management of common concerns, including forced migration, transnational organized crime, and mitigation of climate change consequences. how does inter-regional cooperation possible to take place? first, two regions may consolidate some level of security cooperation when each of these regions is consolidated under a regional organization or governance. without some level of regional governance, values and interests for each region will be difficult to recognize for an extra-regional actor. a presence of regional governance also determines the level of impact that can be expected; there is a need for the regions in question to acquire security governance of their own in order for them to engage productively in interregional security cooperation. what logically follows from the presence of regional governance is that there must be some degree of institutionalization of governance over the issue of security under cooperation. to be sure, it is not the suggestion here that two engaging regions must have their norms and institutionalization level symmetrical; rather, issues under cooperation must be part of security agenda in both regions and that the need for a stronger regional response is present in both regions. (emmers, greener & thomas, 2006). 64 eu-asean counter-terrorism cooperation secondly, for two regions to engage productively, a similar actorness characteristics must be agreed upon by the two regions; whether the interregional engagement is geared towards balancing, institution-building, agenda-setting (of new themes or agendas of cooperation) and/or collective-identity building (thayer, 2007). the consensus for either one of the choices helps identify opportunities and challenges that interregional engagements create for different actors in different sectors of cooperation. finally, some symmetry in the threat perception towards the same issue would help establish more robust security cooperation between two or more regional governances. securitization of the issue under cooperation should have already taken place, although the impact may differ between regions. as the cooperating regions already categorize the issue as security, i.e. pertinent to the survival of the region, there is a construction of common perception and treatment of the issue as security threat. the regional governances thus recognize the need to produce a certain policy-measure based on a collectively-endorsed urgency to treat a particular issue with an extraordinary measure(s) (stritzel, 2007). this means that different regions securitizing the issue may well come up with different measures and policy preferences. what matters is for both regions to formulate cooperative mechanisms to ensure sustainable dialogue and cooperation on the issue. the next theoretical question would be: how should one assess the accomplishment of interregional cooperation? the deepening of interregional engagements is indicated by crossregional norm-convergence, generating 'division of labor' among participants in global security governance (acharya, 2003). processes of norm-convergence and division of labor in interregional cooperation supplement identity-building process as member regions identify themselves with common framework in responding to issues (soriano, 2019). norm convergence process is the product of the work of stakeholders of security governance on multiple levels (national, sub-regional, regional, trans-regional and interregional) in improving coordination to cope with or overcome issues of global security agenda (kirchner and dominguez, 2014). in explaining to what extent interregionalism establishes security governance that in turn reframes security cooperation requires one to analyze how actors at national, regional, cross-regional and global levels shape the processes that supplement identity-building process of regionalism through the creation of norm convergence across regions the latter’s activities include building consensus on the nature and sources of security problems, formulating plans of actions and policies to ameliorate security problems, engaging in actual management of these problems, and evaluation of the performance of security practitioners (afoaku, 2012; ehrhart, hegemann and kahl, 2014; he, 2019). research method the research is a qualitative exploratory study that examines the characteristics of asean and eu counter-terrorism cooperation from the gathered secondary data. this secondary data includes the plan of action documents between the european union and asean produced from 2007 to 2018 as references to find out the scope of cooperation and journal of asean studies 65 various documents from open sources to explain the five areas of cooperation, namely intelligence, law enforcement, justice, borders and transport, and financing of terrorism. websites of asean.org and eucyberdirect.eu are particularly utilized to gather documents on asean-eu plan of action. the analysis involves a scrutiny of keywords that are relevant to ct, including “security and political cooperation”, “non-traditional security”, “transnational crime” and “enforcement mechanisms”. the plan of action documents are descriptive and prescriptive in nature, containing commonly agreed framework in eu’s relations with third parties and list of policies that both the eu and asean are cooperating. the plan of action documents are then compared with the regional counter-terrorism governance of the eu and asean to measure the congruency of counter-terrorism cooperation schemes from the respective regions. the analysis of plan of action documents is complemented with other public available sources, including data and reports published by aseanapol, europol, and un’s security council counterterrorism committee. the theoretical framework in this research is a result of a distillation of main insights of the literature on eu’s engagements in southeast asia, eu’s, and asean’s regional counterterrorism governance. they also provide additional data on the scope and depth of operational aspects of counter-terrorism cooperation. these texts also provide the categorization of counter-terrorism cooperation, including police cooperation, judicial cooperation, intelligence cooperation, migration and border management, and cooperation in combating terrorist financing. analysis institutionalization of ct governance in asean and the eu the similarity between europe and southeast asia’s threat perceptions has driven both regions to establish inter-regional cooperation. nevertheless, the regional securitizations in both regions have resulted in different outcomes. europe’s perception of terrorism, which is mainly formed by the wake of 9/11, has compromised the region’s inclusivity towards people of different backgrounds, including migrants who reside in europe. on the other hand, for southeast asia, the issue of terrorism threatens the credibility of the region as a stable and safe environment for investments, trades and global transportation routes for goods and services. for the eu, any form of regional governance must take shape as a governing entity that makes decisions on behalf of all member states. meanwhile, asean seeks to build a normative architecture that gradually brings member-states’ to have an internationally recognizable form of ct policy. regional ct governance in asean asean’s intra-regional cooperation in ct is a largely post-9/11 phenomenon, and it has so far comprised of mutual understanding and capacity-building efforts. the first formal 66 eu-asean counter-terrorism cooperation emergence of terrorism issue in asean is represented by the 1997 declaration on transnational crime, which treated terrorism as transnational crime instead of extraordinary crime or defence issue and publicized member-states general commitment to cooperate in responding to transnational crime rather than terrorism specifically. this declaration was then followed by two additions in 1998, which are the asean plan of action to combat transnational crime and the manila declaration on the prevention and control of transnational crime (gunaratna, 2017). taken together, these documents do not represent any kind of regional decisions, rules, or particular initiatives. they are rather limited to a “collective acknowledgement of terrorism as a transnational phenomenon.” (borelli, 2017). this conception of terrorism changed after the first bali bombings on october 2002; the latter is another watershed event specific to the region as the tragic terrorist attack turned asean’s titular leader indonesia from a critical voice against american-led global war on terrorism to an integral part of world’s ct agenda. after the 9/11, asean member-states re-framed the definition of terrorism acts, particularly ones that came from an islamic background—in which many transnational crimes were reclassified into terrorism (singh, 2009). to create right-based ct that still adheres to states’ security policy, asean countries need legitimacy and capacity building to provide objective feedbacks on their practices. currently, the priority for asean member-states is to retain their independence and non-interference norms in formulating their ct policies (sukma, 2012) compared to the eu, asean’s institutional building on ct is more complacent; specifically, it is not engineered to perform an enforcement mechanism of agreements and initiatives. asean aims, at least initially, to produce a common framework of action in the conduct of ct cooperation (tan & nasu, 2016).. this common framework is embodied in the asean convention on counter-terrorism (acct), which was produced in 2007 but came into force in 2011 after six member states ratified it. the acct was finally ratified by all members in 2013. the length with which the acct undertook to achieve full ratification testifies to the gradual character of enforcement mechanism and the tradition of asean to implement regional initiatives at a pace comfortable to all member-states (emmers, 2009). by implication, harmonization of national ct agendas is nearly absent on the regional level as national governments’ ct policies follow their priorities in terms of national stability and combating dissidents (gunaratna, 2017). the road to the 2007 acct was paved with several regional conventions aimed at gradually shaping the normative architecture of regional response to terrorism. the first one was the asean declaration on joint action to counter terrorism (adjact) in 2001. adjact signifies the region's response to terrorism as an abhorred method of pursuing political objectives, thus responding to the perception of southeast asian muslims that global war on terrorism was a camouflaged war on islam. it also took ownership of terrorism as an issue that had significant ramifications for the region, despite the fact that global war on terror was an american-led agenda. in addition, the declaration put united nations multilateral framework and extra-regional cooperation as primary references in the conduct of international ct. journal of asean studies 67 following the 2002 bali bombings, asean pursued a number of joint declarations with external dialogue partners, including the u.s., the eu, australia, india, russia, japan, the republic of korea, new zealand, pakistan and canada. with the people's republic of china, ct becomes a part of larger cooperation on non-traditional security which is embodied and renewed periodically in joint declaration of asean and china on cooperation in the field of non-traditional security issues (wibisono, 2017). in addition, intra-mural cooperation between member-states with sponsorship from extra-regional actors – particularly the u.s. and australia – also characterized ct cooperation in the region. another asean-led initiative on ct that paved the groundwork to the adoption of acct in 2007 was the treaty on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters (mlat), adopted on 29 november 2004. mlat was aimed at institutionalizing regional efforts at legal assistance and criminal investigation and prosecution. the 2007 acct, as stipulated under article ix(1), mandates the member states – when they see it appropriate – to conduct national legislation to ensure that offences covered in the convention’s article ii are no longer justifiable, either politically, philosophically, ideologically, racially, ethnically, religiously, or other means of interpretations, “especially when it is intended to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act” (asean, 2007). this provision excludes the consideration of motivation, but at the same time includes the consideration of the intent of an act (to intimidate a population, etc.), thereby preventing the politicization of investigation and trials, which would hamper an effort to uncover the whole terrorist network. acct is a legally-binding instrument that facilitates ct cooperation of member-states in terms of information-sharing and capacity-building, as well as a wider scope of prosecution, prevention and suppression of terrorism. further regulations of ct are embodied in the 2009 comprehensive plan of action on counter-terrorism, meant to provide substance to the 2007 acct. the action plan outlines an adherence to relevant un security council resolutions, a mechanism for intelligence exchange, tracking and interdiction of suspected terrorists, and addressing the root causes of terrorism. capacity-building is another achievement that asean-centred extra-regional cooperation managed to accomplish in regard to ct. a number of joint-training and tabletop exercises are conducted not just for ct capacity building but also humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts between militaries (zimmerman, 2014). the asean regional forum (arf) has notably established inter-sessional support group for the issues of maritime security (disaster relief), humanitarian assistance, transnational crime, and terrorism. meanwhile, the asean defence ministerial meeting (admm) plus has organized table-top exercise and ct exercise in 2012 and 2013 respectively. as a result of the promulgation of the 2007 acct and its plan of action, the national responses of member-states to terrorism are complemented with provisions that strengthen their capacity to respond to transnational characters of terrorism. acct provisions are important in alleviating the limits of national frameworks of ct, which are based on national experiences in dealing insurgencies and national subversive movements in respective member states. 68 eu-asean counter-terrorism cooperation regional ct in the eu the eu’s ct cooperation with external parties signified by eu’s aspiration to disseminate their internal security governance. the eu also realized that its internal security is indivisible from the external security dimension since the nature of terrorism has been increasingly transnational in the last decades, particularly due to how non-state actors are involved in planning a domestic attack. eu’s concern on this matter appear in “a strategy for external dimension of jha: global freedom, security and justice,” a document published in 2005. the document also mentions the 2002 bali bomb tragedy as a reference to boost the cooperation between the eu and southeast asia (cross, 2017). ct regionalism in eu was driven by the madrid terrorist attack in 2004, in which the accident resulted in the formation of eu ct council. the ctc is under the direct supervision of the eu high representative for foreign and security policy rather than the justice of home-affairs, the institution that formulated the eu’s ct criminal justice-oriented approach. such placement specifies that ctc is designed as the key to conduct eu’s extraregional security cooperation. intra-mural role of the ctc is in cajoling member states to make sure a timely implementation of eu-level ct agreements. however, it can be said that member-states’ authorities and independence in pursuing their own national agendas in ct are maintained. this is the case because the ctc cannot force member-states into taking particular actions, it has no independent budget, no authority to propose legislation or to chair meetings with justice, interior or foreign ministers to set up eu’s ct agenda (kaunert, 2009). not to mention the ct sector is already crowded with existing eu and non-eu structures and agencies. the relation between ctc and eu member states is not determinative, instead, it is consultative in nature. the main purpose of ctc is to conduct assessment on member states’ compliance to the eu’s counter terrorism action plan. even though there is no hierarchy between ctc and eu member states, collaborations between parties still take place (ragazzi & walmsley, 2018). as stipulated by mackenzie et al. (2013), ctc’s tasks comprise of coordination of ct work (including multiple working groups and working parties) with justice and home affairs, an overview of relevant eu instruments for ct, effective executions of council decisions, oversight of the implementation of eu ct strategy and its report to the council, sustaining communication between the eu and third countries, and active role maintenance of ct as a whole (mackenzie et al., 2013). the last two tasks mentioned comprise of roles that the ctc plays in regard to eu’s ct cooperation with third countries. in regards of the second function, ctc has been actively promoting political dialogue on the issue of ct in international level and endorsing numerous initiatives, both practically and technically. even though ctc does not have the capacity to ratified agreement or initiate project with third countries, the ctc ensures the eu’s active role in combating terrorism through a broad range of activities. for example, in terms of practical actions, in 2011 the eu cts conduct a discussion on ct with russia and india on ct. on the same year, it is also involved in other multilateral journal of asean studies 69 forums such as asia-europe meetings (asem) and un conference in riyadh. this fact signifies that the eu ctc has increasingly become a major actor in publicizing eu ct practices in international stages. therefore, although the extent eu’s ct cooperation with some of these third countries is still limited, it appears that the third countries’ authority have acknowledged the significance of the eu ctc and are willing to interact with ctc on a regular basis. the recognition by third countries become one of the reasons on why ctc is an important part of the eu external ct. the eu has been attempting to externalize its ct policy in order to reduce the risk of foreign-perpetrated domestic terrorism. the assumption behind this strategy is to prevent the danger of terrorism to reach the eu citizens by strengthening the competency of third countries in dealing with terrorism (argomaniz, bures & kaunert, 2015). based on this objective, the eu’s extra-regional ct is driven by its needs to build external governance, specifically by transferring eu’s standard and capacity in ct to third countries and international institutions (brattberg & rhinard, 2012). simply put, the eu achieved security through governance transfer rather than the use of deterrence and alliance. eu’s externalization—or transfer of standards and capacity—however, cannot be conducted in a hierarchical manner. this is also applied to ct arrangements that are implemented under justice and home affairs (jha); in which jha only plays a coordinating role since the issue’s locus is located within the jurisdiction of member countries. in the wake of isis in 2011, the eu’s response to terrorism was to strengthen its regional boundaries and establish itself as a manager of cooperation in ct with the extraregional entities (cross, 2017). the eu was striving to address conflicts that resulted from the increasing level of radicalization and the rise of far-right political movements. however, the threat posed by isis is unlike that posed by al-qaeda in the wake of 9/11 due to the co-existing challenge of nationalist backlash and a wave of migration from syria and iraq. this occurs because blaming the migrants for terrorism is contradictive with eu's values of openness and inclusion, and the eu needs to divert the solution and public attention towards responding to terrorism as part of externally oriented and foreign policy matter, away from internal causes of the terrorism threat. in addition to securing its own populace, the eu’s ct cooperation can also be perceived as part of the region’s maintenance of presence in southeast asia through non-traditional security cooperation. europe and southeast asia shared a similar conception of non-traditional security (nts) in which terrorism is part of its issues (martel, 2016). for example, aseaneu plan of action 2018-2022 stipulated the plans for cooperation between asean and european union to combat terrorism under the heading of “combating terrorism, transnational crimes, and addressing other non-traditional security (nts) issues.” non-traditional security issues comprise of security issues that are usually posed by non-state actors and requires responses that are beyond mere use of force; non-traditional security is associated with the provision of security through use of force, justice reform, development of human resources and infrastructure (wibisono, 2017). there are two reasons why terrorism is categorized as part of nts agenda in europe-southeast asia ct cooperation. first, for both europe and southeast asia nts represents the security concept that perceives insecurities and risks as stemming 70 eu-asean counter-terrorism cooperation from social, economic and justice matters; such security conceptualization fits within southeast asia’s preference for national and regional resilience and europe’s preference for security cooperation instead of alliance-building. secondly, europe and southeast asia both required “a low-key rhetorical framing of force projection which also taps into sensitive security areas” which the nts concept provided (maier-knapp, 2015). by placing terrorism under the rubric of nts, asean and the eu conducted ct not just for the purpose of tackling the issue but also to expand their interaction along with political and security parameters (dosch & maier-knapp, 2017). the employment of nts by the eu and its member states is meant to facilitate closer engagement with asean as there is an enduring reliance of southeast asian states on the european market. on the other hand, some authors have highlighted the need for the eu to maintain close attention to geopolitical tensions in the asia pacific; therefore, the eu seeks to utilize existing defense and economic diplomacy processes where asean sits at their centers. enhanced regulatory community-building processes allow southeast asian countries in attracting external partners on political matters of the region such as the asean regional forum (arf), the asean defense ministerial meeting plus (admm+) and the asia europe meeting (asem) (maier-knapp, 2015). because of the need to centralize diplomacy with the presence of the use of force as capacitybuilding, confidence-building and deterrence, asean and eu's ct cooperation utilized the multilateral fora that have so far facilitated asean and extra-regional powers to discuss pertinent security issues. functionalist analysis of eu-asean ct cooperation before the initiation of ct cooperation or any form of security dialogue, the eu and asean has long maintained a dialogue forum since its first formalization in 1977. recognition for a shared commitment has been presented to achieve regional integration as means to improve regional stability and prosperity, as well as responding to global challenges. however, the long-term visions and the commitment to achieve common goals and objectives are not formally inscribed until 2007 with the nuremberg declaration on enhanced partnership, and formal diplomatic relations need to wait until after the adoption of asean charter in 2008. the eu finally began to deploy a diplomatic mission to members of asean in 2015. the eu-asean relationship has been at the centre of interregionalism studies; studies of interregional cooperation have suggested that eu's effort at increasing their presence in international scenes is pursued by engaging with southeast asia both politically and economically while balancing when possible to burgeoning influence of the united states and china in the region. the eu also attempted to build the mirror-image of its governance principles in the region. on the other hand, asean also has grown into an increasingly relevant organization although its "actorness" often comes into question. nevertheless, it is believed that asean adheres to norms of respect to sovereignty of member states and noninterference, which do not always align with the way regional governance is conducted in the eu. journal of asean studies 71 the observation on ct governance in the eu and asean on the previous section notes that both regional governances lack a capability to exert determinative role over their respective members’ ct policies. the issue of terrorism is governed tightly by national governments, but both the eu and asean are tasked with maintaining an international profile by their member states. for the eu, this international profile is part of securing its own region through strengthening the capacity of third countries; while for asean, an international stage is important to signify their principles of multilateralism in ct cooperation as well as capacity building purposes. during the first half of the 2000s, asean-eu interregional forums extended their attempts since 1997 to respond security challenges emerging from globalization concerning human security, transnational organized crime, and terrorism. the volume of interregional forums on security governance somewhat decreased during this period due to southeast asia's recuperation from the 1997 financial crisis, but only to increase to a higher level compared to 1997 during the second half of the 2000s. in particular, the first half of 2000s saw the inauguration of formal ct cooperation agreements between asean and the eu, which started with the joint declaration to combat terrorism in 2003. it embodied the intention for a sharing of experiences and good practices between intelligence and law-enforcement agencies of the regions. the declaration also affirmed asean and the eu's long-time commitment to abide by the rulings of the united nations by referring to terrorism definition stipulated in un security council resolution 1373 and acknowledging the centrality of the un charter, the norms of international law and respect for human rights and humanitarian law (european union, 2003). the substance of the joint declaration is further elaborated in the eu’s asean strategy paper which presented six priority strategies for eu’s engagement with asean, including support for stability and ct policies in southeast asia, poverty reduction, eu-asean economic relations and respect for human rights, democracy and good governance, and mainstreaming the role of the eu’s justice and home affairs (mattheis & wunderlich, 2017). the way in which ct cooperation is accompanied by other aspects of human security and good governance affirms the principle of comprehensive security that both regions adhere to security should be approached from a pluralist point of view incorporating political, social, economic and human dimensions (kim, 1999). during the second half of 2000s, the agenda of ct cooperation continues to exist among the expanding issues of comprehensive security as the latter broadens to include new categories such as communicable diseases and pandemics, sea piracy and cyber security. the concept of non-traditional security also began to enter eu-asean security dialogue's lexicon. nontraditional security also appeared in other security governance involving asean, including asean political and security community, asean regional forum, asean plus three (with south korea, japan and china) and east asia summit. it can be suggested here that the inclusion of non-traditional security concept in eu-asean security dialogue forums is due to the congruence of adherence to comprehensive security between epistemic community and governments in asean and the eu, because other interregional dialogues involving asean states and the eu do not incorporate non-traditional security. 72 eu-asean counter-terrorism cooperation the implication of non-traditional security inclusion to ct cooperation appears in the plan of action (poa) for the “enhancement of asean-eu relations and cooperation between 2007-2012” where ct cooperation–with emphasis on addressing terrorist financing– is stipulated as part of political and security cooperation, together with cooperation on addressing the trafficking in persons, drugs, small arms and light weapons, and money laundering. similarly, the 2013-2017 poa also placed ct cooperation together with human rights crisis mitigation, civilian crisis management, and illegal drug trafficking suppression. while none of the joint activities agreed upon in the 2007-2012 and 2013-2017 poas shows specific policy measures, both plans of actions show a strong drive to establish crossregional frame of security governance. this latter aspect also comes into prominence as asean charter which established asean community entered into effect in 2008 and asean-china free trade area formation also began taking place (koh, manalo & woon, 2009). maintaining itself as a formidable partner in a newly established asean community within the limits of un-approved frameworks, the eu made sure that wordings of the poa supported southeast asia’s regionalism as well as normative resonance with the eu. this partly explains the comprehensiveness of the 2007-2012 poa which details the eu's strategic priorities in political and security, socio-cultural, economic, energy security and climate change and development cooperation. ct cooperation falls under the sub-heading of "traditional and non-traditional issues" within political and security cooperation (asean, 2013). at the same time, eu-asean interregionalism is further institutionalized in the “nuremberg declaration on an eu-asean enhanced partnership” in march 2007. eu-asean ct cooperation also contributed to southeast asian states’ ownership of their terrorism problems through the utilization of centres based in member-states’ capital city to conduct the mandate of cooperation. this is shown by the 2013-2017 asean-eu poa which designates international law enforcement academy (ilea) in bangkok, the south east asia regional centre for counter-terrorism (searcct) in kuala lumpur, and jakarta centre for law enforcement cooperation (jclec) as units that receive the eu’s ct support in judicial capacity building and anti-money laundering operation. highly relevant with the need to conduct effective ct, the 2013-2017 poa also initiated comprehensive border management program where the eu supports asean member states’ border management. regular policy dialogue on ct is stipulated to be conducted through asean-eu senior officials meeting (som) and asean-eu joint cooperation committee (jcc), while asean secretariat assists in reviewing the progress of implementation of the results of this dialogue. asean regional forum also serves as a hub for formulation of workplan that implements the 2013-2017 poa in 2014, it issued the arf work plan on counter-terrorism and transnational crime (asean regional forum, 2017) focusing on priority areas of cyber security, illicit drugs suppression, mitigation of the use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (cbrn) by subversive actors, counter-radicalization or alternative narratives against extremist ideologies; anti-terrorism financing; and involuntary trafficking of persons. arf also supported wider non-traditional security exercises that serve both capacity building as well as trust building among participating states, including multilateral tabletop or field exercises, voluntary training courses, capacity-building workshops, and arf pilot projects journal of asean studies 73 (zimmerman, 2014). arf workplan takes the asean-ct cooperation closer to the counter violent-extremism (cve) aspect of ct as it aims to empower participants in sabotaging terrorists’ attempts at exploiting connectivity network and freedom of information to propagate their views (asean regional forum, 2017). a specific section dedicated for combatting terrorism finally appeared in the most recent plan of action of eu-asean interregional cooperation for the period of 2018-2022. the 2018-2022 poa explicitly mentioned the concept of violent extremism as it drives euasean ct cooperation to implement the acct and asean comprehensive plan of action on counter-terrorism in countering terrorism and preventing violent extremism, encourages sharing of best practices between europol and aseanapol in addressing cve works. one particular issue of concern is responding to the phenomenon of foreign (terrorist) fighters joining islamic state in syria and iraq (isis) or daesh, particularly their return to their homelands. both epistemic community and governments in the eu has recognized the complexity of responding to an entanglement between migration and terrorism in the midst of a strong nationalist wave that leans towards anti-immigrant voices. on the other hand, they also have learnt that southeast asian states still lack the capacity to conduct deradicalization and social reintegration of foreign fighters (bos, van ginkel and mehra, 2018). our reading of the 2007-2013 and 2013-2017 poa’s suggest that the eu’s approach in conducting ct engagement with asean focuses on establishing solid diplomatic relations, instead of actively solving terrorism problems in southeast asia—such as radicalizations in southeast asia communities, existence of extremist groups and terrorist organizations, as well as terrorism financing. to tackle those issues, the eu would need to conduct a more interventionist approach that might reduce the efficacy of trust-building process with the southeast asian nations who seriously take the “non-interference” principle. additionally, terms used in the two poas are “non-binding,” which enables sincere political dialogue to occur rather than resolution of a certain issue on terrorism. it also appears that up until today, there is yet a permanently institutionalized platform that allows the eu and asean to discuss the issue of ct. while the ct policy discussion between the eu and asean have not yet strongly institutionalized, the three poas from their cooperation has provided a mechanism for cooperation in certain areas, such as law enforcement and border management. in law enforcement, for example, this research has analysed several eu-asean documents that address the collaboration between the police and law enforcement agencies, including europol, aseanpol, and other provision of support for asean law enforcement agencies. europol usually takes the role of leadership in the cooperation between the eu and third countries, even though the organization does not have a broad legitimation in handling ct in the eu. the europol, nevertheless, remains having the authority to find cooperation with third countries or international institution that deemed to be strategic partners in ct or organized crime. in terms of law enforcement sector, however, the eu-asean cooperation lacks in regulating network that established by binding legal agreements. as a result, any exchange of information—both personal, non-personal, and technical—are conducted without any strategic 74 eu-asean counter-terrorism cooperation or operational agreement. meanwhile, the three existing poas state to encourage the development of relations between asean and eu law enforcement agencies in terms of sharing experiences and best practices in combating terrorism and other transnational crimes. the documents also urge both regions’ law enforcers to support further cooperation between ct institutions in the eu and asean. indonesia is one of the countries in asean that conducted cooperation with the eu in the provision of police capacity building in ct. the eu assists indonesia to establish jclec, which provides the indonesian police trainings and educations about organized crimes, including money laundering and terrorism. the eu provides indonesia with funding to formulate the courses and syllabus, hire teachers and trainers, as well as conduct various networking activities between the eu, indonesia, and brunei darussalam law enforcement agencies. while the cooperation between the eu and indonesia grows, the eu, however, does not consider conducting a similar bilateral cooperation with thailand, since the local security institution of thailand allegedly committed human rights violation. conversely, the eu member states also engage in a cooperation with southeast asia in the issue of ct. the eu member states also provide experts for ct trainings, seminars, and workshop for the searcct. france, for example, ran a workshop on the relations between cybercrime and terrorism, money laundering, and counteracting terrorism funding; italy conducted a seminar on falsifying documents and illegal immigration, while the uk held aviation security seminars. in terms of the justice sector, the eu and asean cooperation centred on the issue of judicial assistance for extradition request. previously, eurojust has ratified agreements that allow liaison magistrates from outside eu countries to be delivered to their headquarter in the hague and the other way around. however, the eurojust did not conduct any agreement with asean or its member countries. this is due to major differences between the eu’s standards to conduct cooperation and southeast asian countries’ justice systems. it is almost impossible to make a direct cooperation with any southeast asian countries due to several reasons: 1) the eu has a very strict data protection regulations while southeast asian countries have almost none, 2) some southeast asian countries, have not fulfilled the perquisite to establish a judicial collaboration with the european union. for example, malaysia have not signed the international convention against torture, 3) some legislations in southeast asian countries contradicts the right-based approach of ct that is practiced by the eu. this can be seen on how up until 2011, singapore and malaysia issued ct legislations that allow indefinite detention of ct suspects, and 4) almost all countries in southeast asia—except for cambodia and the philippines—still implement death penalty for heavy crimes such as terrorism, drug trafficking, and treason. indonesia in particular explicitly uses death penalty as a deterrence towards potential collaborators of terrorist networks. therefore, the cooperation of eurojust in southeast asia is still limited and has only been established contact points with singapore and thailand. while exchange of intelligence is highly encouraged between the eu-asean ct cooperation, the three poas do not mention any intelligence cooperation in it. additionally, journal of asean studies 75 there is no mention of intelligence cooperation with asean nor its member states in the eu country strategy. the only cooperation between european and southeast asian institutions that includes the point of intelligence was that between the eu and indonesia in 2009. the cooperation stated that the exchange of information on terrorist groups and its affiliates network in the framework of international and national law. however, the cooperation does not show any indication of inter-agency cooperation. cooperation that is explicitly mentioned in the three poas is on border and transportation. the border and transportation cooperation between the eu and asean revolve around information sharing and technology that is relevant to border management and document security. the cooperation is implemented through comprehensive border management program up to 2017, in which the eu provides capacity building for asean member states to develop an effective border management system. in addition to that, the eu also sponsored a pilot project by interpol in vietnam and cambodia. throughout 2009 to 2012, project procured modern equipment in 16 border points for a more effective border management between the two countries. the equipment allows both vietnam and cambodia authority to access the interpol database which contains the latest information, therefore facilitating a stronger international cooperation. up until today, this type of pilot project between the eu and asean countries is still the only one. alike to the border cooperation management that is implemented by interpol, the euasean cooperation on handling terrorism financing also took place under the financial action task force (fatf). since its inception in 1989, its main mandate is to tackle money laundering. however, the 9/11 played a significant role in the establishment international standards that allows a more affective protocol to handle money laundering. moreover, the ftaf also plays the role in monitoring the compliance of countries—which previously failed to comply to ftaf international regulations on money laundering—to their standard through annual reports. countries that are considered as non-cooperative in global effort to fight money laundering and terrorist financing are called non-cooperative countries and territories (nccts). the nccts are categorized into two groups: the first one is high-risk noncooperative states, or countries that refuse to comply with ftaf standards. the second one are countries that are cooperative with fatf but still need some improvement in its national regulations, particularly in the area of anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing (ctf). some of asean member countries fall into the second category, such as indonesia, thailand, myanmar, and vietnam, whereas the philippines, brunei, and cambodia have been gradually improving the implementation of international regulations even though they are yet to comply to aml and ctf regulations in southeast asia. up to this point, however, there are only two countries that conducted collaborative projects with the eu to overcome the problem of financing terrorism activities. additionally, anti-terrorism clauses are introduced by the eu in all partnership and cooperation agreements (pcas). the pcas has since signed by asean countries (indonesia in 2009, philippines and vietnam in 2010). the anti-terrorism clauses in the pcas are directly refer to vital aspects of the eu’s policy preferences; for example, close cooperation with interpol, joint trainings and sharing best practices with third countries. the eu, furthermore, 76 eu-asean counter-terrorism cooperation add a human rights clause, which became a reference to uphold the human rights values in the fight against terrorism. consequently, the eu-asean cooperation on ct do not target a specific terrorist individual and, or, organizations, but rather focus on the security and justice sector policies in southeast asian states. through horizontal networks, capitalized by the eu, the cooperation allows eu to conduct policy transfers which based on its skills and experiences. the cooperation seems likely to gradually strengthen, as the signing of pcas with major asean players has strengthened the reciprocal influence of eu to asean. conclusion the eu and asean ct cooperation has not been pursued to target designated terrorist individuals or cells. it has rather been initiated by the eu to export their knowledge, experience and standards of terrorist prosecution and prevention to southeast asia. the eu chose to abide by asean’s approach of regional ct policy as a complement to national policies, which results in a non-hierarchical nature of the transfer of experience and standards of ct policies. in the process, both the eu and asean have obtained benefits from their ct cooperation. first, the eu achieves its objectives of transferring – and thereby facilitating capacity-building – of third countries (extra-regional states) ct, which secures its own regional security. this objective has so far been partially fulfilled due to the asymmetrical nature of security and justice governance in the eu and asean. this is particularly the case on issues that are strongly governed by national governance, such as the implementation of death penalty and the governance of intelligence agencies. in addition, the impact of eu-asean ct cooperation also lacks impact when asean member-states have yet to exert control over the governance of particular issues, such combating terrorism-financing, where effective control of the state over financial transactions has not been able to curb terrorism-financing. overall, the eu sustains ct cooperation with asean because of three main reasons. first, there has been a build-up of common security conception between the eu and asean since the late 1990’s through interregional response to emerging threats and risks due to the acceleration of globalization. in this regard, notions of comprehensive security and later on non-traditional security frame the two regions’ approach towards security issues, including terrorism. second, the eu finds terrorism as a suitable issue to frame its presence in one of southeast asia’s strategic security areas; europe finds that terrorism serves as an issue of common ground for its security cooperation approach – instead of alliance building – and southeast asia’s pursuit for regional resilience. the plans of actions between asean and the eu are mostly implemented through bilateral cooperation between the eu and members of asean, indicating the differentiation of actorness between asean and member states: asean performs as a forum for cooperation framework formulation and member-states – together with the eu – as resource allocators and executing agencies. in such fashion, asean member-states are capable of choosing the field journal of asean studies 77 of cooperation that best suits their needs and limitation in regard to fighting terrorism. in addition, the eu-asean ct cooperation also incorporates un security council resolution to shape its future accomplishments. although stopping short of targeting of terrorism, the euasean ct cooperation strengthens the capacity of asean member states’ conduct of pursuit and prosecution of terrorist suspects. in addition, eu’s prioritization of border and cyberspace management also drives southeast asian states to prioritize the avoidance of terrorists’ exploitation of digital information network and national borders. further research is required to examine the extent to which eu’s security governance is diffused, localized, and/or debated in asean and its member states and vice-versa. in addition, local non-state actors are also highly active in both regions in conducting peace activism, deradicalization and social re-integration of former terrorists and combatants; it would be interesting to measure the extent to which they shape interregional ct cooperation between eu and asean. about the authors ali abdullah wibisono is a lecturer and vice director of the graduate programme at the department of international relations, universitas indonesia. he obtained his ph.d. (2015) and ma (2008) from university of nottingham, and bachelor’s degree (2005) from universitas indonesia. aisha r. kusumasomantri is a lecturer at the department of international relations, universitas indonesia. she obtained her undergraduate degree from universitas indonesia and postgraduate degree from university of glasgow. her research currently focuses on strategic studies, particularly on the issues of terrorism and insurgency references acharya, a. (2003). democratisation and the prospects for participatory regionalism in southeast asia. third world quarterly, 24(2), 375–390. doi: 10.1080/0143659032000074646. afoaku, o. g. (2012). global security governance in the 21st century. https://online.oneill.indiana.edu/doc/syllabi/v550%20-%20gg.pdf argomaniz, j., bures, o. and kaunert, c. 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(2014). security cooperation in the indo-pacific: non-traditional security as a catalyst. journal of the indian ocean region, 10(2), 150–165. 1 higher education integration in asean higher education integration in asean: asean university network case1 teuku rezasyah padjadjaran university, indonesia neneng konety padjadjaran university, indonesia affabile rifawan padjadjaran university, indonesia wahyu wardhana padjadjaran university, indonesia abstract higher education has an important role in the region’s economic growth, with talents and ideas developing in the process. asean university network (aun) is the institution that facilitates cooperation among asean universities and beyond. this research attempts to describe the role of aun in enhancing regional integration in the higher education sector in asean. this research uses qualitative method to get depth information and the bigger picture in the governance of aun’s role and mechanism in regional integration of higher education system. the results of this research showed that aun helped enhancing regional cooperation. key words: aun, regional integration, higher education, association of southeast asian nations (asean). 1 this article was originally presented in the fifth international conference on business, international relations, and diplomacy (icobird 2016) at bina nusantara university. journal of asean studies, vol. 5, no. 1 (2017), pp. 51-59 doi: 10.21512/jas.v5i1.962 ©2017 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic 52 higher education integration in asean introduction education is one of the sectors that have a crucial role in regional integration. it is a backbone for development and regional integration, as it has been proved, in western africa, which helped to further regional integration (guannu, 2010). this research argued that such experience is also relevant in asean. asean integration process has shown its greater importance following the establishment of asean economic community (aec) in late december 2015. the integration process consists four pillars of economic integration; single market and production base, competitive economic region, equitable economic development, and integration of the global economy (asean secretariat, 2015). this integration has proceeded with a new phase after asean charter in 2008. with the new phase of integration in the economic sector, hopefully, it will begin to advance in integration and boost development in a region. in asean today, only eight occupations received mutual recognition agreements among asean countries (fukunaga, 2015). therefore, there is a demand to produce more capable skilled labor to increase or maintain its education sector quality and contribute to regional integration with an equal and fair standard. the regional integration process in eu countries could be a set of an example of regional integration in the education sector for asean. in europe, the bologna process helped to support the modernization of education and training and helped to better integrate the countries inside eu (papatsiba, 2006). it shapes european values and knowledge that form european identity also increase competitiveness and capability of human resources. the cooperation in the education sector in southeast asian level particularly higher education has been established since 1956. mustajarvi and bouchon (2014) explained it narratively with the first establishment of the association of southeast asian institutions of higher learning (asaihl) in 1956, followed with the southeast asia ministers of education organization (seameo) in 1965 (mustajarvi & bouchon, 2014). thirty years later, the asean university network (aun) was established in 1995. mustajarvi and bouchon also described the comparison later compared the higher education integration in europe and asean. the pattern of higher education integration in asean more likely suitable with neo-functionalist approach and accompanied with legal formal and political initiatives. research question and methodology the fact is asean has not yet fulfilled the complete integration among stakeholders of higher education. although the stakeholders such as policy makers and institutions have established the regional organization, in the process, has not involved all universities in asean, or at least the state universities. the purpose of this research is to highlight the regional integration of asean in higher education sector. it uses the theory of regional interdependence for regional integration. this theory is originated from interdependence theory which developed as a critique of realist theory in the 1970s and emphasized nonstate actor in international relations (wilkinson, 2010). the term of regional interdependence is more familiar with economic development in a region. the journal of asean studies, vol. 5, no. 1 (2017), pp. 51-59 doi: 10.21512/jas.v5i1.4155 ©2017 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic journal of asean studies 53 non-state actor has bigger role in regional integration and economic prosperity. the questions that arise in this article are: 1. how is the quality of the higher education sector in asean countries? 2. how can aun contribute in regional integration in the higher education sector? the method of this research uses descriptive analytical method, and get data incorporate primary data coming from asean secretariat, and secondary sources coming from academic journals dealing with the development of aun. this research is divided into two parts. the first part is to describe the overview of higher education in asean countries. each of asean countries will be described in this part. the second part is to discuss regional integration process of higher education sector in asean particularly aun and analyze how aun contribute for regional integration of the higher education sector. the overview condition of higher education in asean countries nowadays, with the introduction of aec in 2015, asean tried strongly to narrow the gap among asean countries, proved with the growth of the higher education system in asean. here is the brief overview of higher education in asean countries. philippines there are 2,060 higher education institutions until 2008 in philippines (ichefap, 2011). most of them are satellite campus. the political structure of higher education governance in philippines has put the main policy maker in one institution that is the commission on higher education (ched) which was established in 1994. it is an autonomous institution that has authority on higher education policy in philippines. the unique thing about the higher education system in the philippines is that the quality assurance or accreditation based on an internal request and then to be accredited by the external auditor and the higher education institution pays the accredited agents. the regional cooperation of the higher education institution in philippines is very extensive but mostly only located in five best universities in philippines. indonesia indonesia has 3,000s higher education institution until 2013, and the majority is college type campus (moeliodihardjo, 2014). recently, in 2014, the new administration has established a new ministry dealing only with research and advance education, with its own budget. before that, the higher education was put merely under the directorate general level, under the ministry of education and culture. today, the higher education in indonesia has begun to show greater trends to conduct extensive international networks. in terms of regional cooperation, every university has its own policy with so many association and organization but in this part, only aun that been described. malaysia with 600 higher education institutions in 2011, malaysia has proved itself to become an advanced institution of higher education sector in southeast asia (arokiasamy, 2011). public institutions in this country received massive support from the government, and later developed 54 higher education integration in asean themselves to becoming international reputed universities. earlier on, malaysia operated a system called national higher education strategic plan (nhesp). in 2014, nhesp was in phase 2, with the merging of two ministries, focusing on internationalization, to become a hub for international higher education. the existing activities in internationalization among others are international mobility program, international service learning, and international cooperation in education and training, and boosting and trust to malaysia partners (knight, 2013). singapore with only six universities, singapore has the best higher education institution in asean (ministry of education of singapore, 2015). two of them are nanyang technological university and national university of singapore is the major reputed global university and even the best in asia. the ministry of education is the major policy maker of higher education institution in singapore. the country has successfully utilized its long national stability and economic growth, and successfully integrated and centralized all areas of education. the universities in singapore have also maintained enormous cooperation with world class universities such as harvard, cambridge, and made themselves the global hub of education in southeast asia. thailand thailand had 645 higher education institutions in 2000 (kirtikara, 2001). the ministry of education holds the authority in running the education system. following the second 15-year long range plan on higher education and the 11th higher education development plan, the country conducted an internationalization of thailand higher education system and paid attention to the use of english as the medium of communication. brunei darussalam brunei currently has 18 higher learning institutions (ministry of education of brunei darussalam, 2015). the public institutions are predominantly in brunei and administered by the ministry of education of brunei, aiming to educate its citizens. most of brunei citizen are studying in tertiary education abroad and prefer to choose advance education in advance apec. in internationalizing its higher learning institutions, brunei provided scholarships for foreigner to study in brunei’s universities. vietnam vietnam is developing countries with rapid growth in the economy and needs progressive advancement in the higher education sector to support its economic growth. there are 498 institutions of higher education in vietnam (nguyễn & vũ, 2015). the main administrator of higher education sector in vietnam is the department of higher education under the authority of ministry of education and training. vietnam is improving and restructuring its internal quality. laos laos began its commitment to developing its higher education in the early 1990s (ogawa, 2008). previously, the government focused on improving the primary education sector. until 1995, the country had only 10 public higher education institutions. today, it has grown to 91, including the rapid number of private institutions (lie, kaur, & sirat, 2014). the rapid development of private journal of asean studies 55 institution was driven by decree of government that allows private institutions to be established. the ministry of education holds the power to govern higher education sector in laos. the focus of laos is the internal quality improvement within the late development of higher education sector. considering the need to support international student mobility, the ministry of education continued to send the local students overseas to study, aiming to come back to the country to improve the quality of education in laos. however, laos also accepted international student from abroad. myanmar the transition from the military regime to a more democratic regime in 2011 helped to reform the higher education system in myanmar, with government launched a comprehensive review of the education system in 2014 (win, 2015). that review aimed as a foundation for the betterment of higher education sector in myanmar. nationally, there are 164 of higher education institution in myanmar, with 96 institutions located in mandalay and yangon (mccord, simon, & weil, 2013). the main authority in ruling higher education sector is the ministry of education, visioning international cooperation for myanmar higher education system mainly focusing on aid preferably coming from overseas to improve the local education quality. at the same time, myanmar also sends the local student abroad to transfer the knowledge and practice in myanmar’s education. cambodia soon after the end of the khmer regime in 2009, the new government in cambodia began to improve the qualities of the local 134 educational institutions (kitamura et al., 2016). the ministry of education holds main authority in ruling the higher education, focusing on the improvement and enhancement of its internal quality. specific attention had been given to, in reaching young generation to participate in tertiary education. like laos and myanmar, cambodia also preferred to attract foreign sources to develop its higher education system. the role of aun in integration of higher education in asean in november 1995, aun was established. following the development in 1997 to 1999, the membership of aun was expanded in line with the increasing member of asean. today, aun incorporates 30 universities (aun secretariat, 2016) (table 1). aun establishment was based on the ambitions of the leaders of asean and the asean sub-committee on education (ascoe) in establishing asean universities. but the idea failed due to constraints of cost, location, and leadership. therefore, in 1994 asean initiated began initiated ideas leading to the establishment of networks between universities in asean so that cooperation in the field of education can be improved. in 2000, the aun secretariat set up in bangkok, thailand (beerkens, 2004). while most of aun member are public universities, only two universities are private, namely de la salle university and ateneo de manila university. 56 higher education integration in asean table 1. aun members in asean mandalay university university of brunei darussalam ateneo de manila university royal university of phnom penh de la salle university royal university of law and economics university of the philippines airlangga university nanyang technological university gadjah mada university national university of singapore university of indonesia singapore management university bandung institute of technology burapha university national university of laos chiang mai university national university of malaysia chulalongkorn university university of malaya mahidol university universiti putra malaysia prince of songkla university university of science, malaysia vietnam national university, hanoi universiti utara malaysia vietnam national university, ho chi minh city yangon institute of economics can tho university university of yangon the objective of aun is the wish for the establishment and strengthening solidarity networks between universities in asean. so far, the cooperation involved the exchange of staffs and students respectively to increase the skills, knowledge, and ability of human resources (hr) at each university (aun secretariat, 2016). aun also managed to establish cooperation with universities outside asean such as eu, japan, south korea and china and invited them as an observer in meetings of the aun. for example, in the fields of geology, aun and cooperation between universities in japan conducted research on the potential development of geology in the area. research and development of products successfully developed in this collaboration. based on research conducted by koichiro watanabe et al, shows the aun and japanese cooperation schemes initiated through south east asia engineering education development network (seed-net) helped to strengthen the japan-asean summit in 1997 and the asean+3 summit (watanabe et al, 2006). this brings considerable benefits in utilizing geological potential in southeast asia, as well as exchange of students and staff. another example in social sciences issues, aun has the positive impact on its member by the enhancement of the southeast asian human rights studies network (seahrn). it involves other universities which are not aun member. learning from the ideas of thomas friedman which highlighted the greater importance of globalization following the year 2000, it can be asserted that the increasing development of aun, run in tandem with the asean’s path by establishing the what so called the asean community in 2015 (friedman, 2005). journal of asean studies 57 in fact, aun continued to highlight the importance of human resources, manifested in the completion and innovation. in the process, universities inside asean had begun to better interact, with experts and academics working together to improve the education qualities in various countries inside asean at the same time (ratanukul, 2009). at the level of regional cooperation and the establishment of aun is also attractive because it can improve the relationship between asean countries. education has been utilized as a tool of foreign policy, with member benefitting from permitting their universities to better interact with their partners inside asean. in addition, education is a part of people to people diplomacy by doing international mobility student. nowadays, there are 12 programs of scholarship that available for aun member and will increase along with the capacity enhancement of aun member (aun secretariat, 2016). in line with the findings of josef t. yap, universities inside asean had benefitted from the exchange of people, transnational education, information exchange, regulatory reform, and development cooperation. in this research, yap mentions that the aun and asean quality assurance network had played an important role in furthering the importance of asean (yap, 2012). even though the ideas of quality of assurance and accreditation is yet to come, but integration processes inside asean tend to work along this direction. even though, aun alone currently covers only 30 universities from thousands of universities in southeast asia. there are still a lot of universities inside asean that have the potential, to take advantage of this scheme. in the membership issue, it is not easy to integrate quickly in adding the new member. such difficulties can be overcome if every member of aun play a role in practicing aun mechanisms, and share their expertise to their fellow partners at the national level. aun enhancement in seahrn could be the good model for collaboration beyond aun member in asean. in the same way, aun can share its best practices in supporting the local governments inside asean’s provinces to better deal with globalization issues, such as finding the best ways to achieve all targets stipulated in the sustainable development goals (sdgs). by doing this, aun’s role will further strengthens asean’s path towards achieving all goals stipulated in the asean community 2015 and raise the reputation of its members at the global level. conclusion aun has a network which runs in line with the ideas of asean community. in addition, aun has a capacity to improve the quality of education and universities in asean, especially changing the mind of universities which are outside the top 400 universities in the world. acknowledging there is a big gap on one hand between universities in singapore and malaysia, and universities in cambodia, laos, and myanmar. on the other hand, it is advisable that aun to better focusing on strengthening the internal cooperation using all frameworks inside asean. there is a lot of potential of aun to contribute in the regional interdependence of asean. by doing this, aun will help to narrow the current gap already exist, which will in the long run help to increase the sense of belonging and 58 higher education integration in asean sense of identity as an internal part of asean. about the authors teuku rezasyah is a lecturer at department of international relations, faculty of social and political sciences, padjadjaran university. he can be contacted by e-mail reyzasyach@yahoo.com. neneng konety is a lecturer at department of international relations, faculty of social and political sciences, padjadjaran university. she can be contacted by e-mail konetyas@yahoo.com. affabile rifawan is a lecturer at department of international relations, faculty of social and political sciences, padjadjaran university. he can be contacted by e-mail a.rifawan@unpad.ac.id. wahyu wardhana is a nonpermanent lecturer and researcher at department of international relations, faculty of social and political sciences, padjadjaran university. he can be contacted by e-mail wahyu_w016@yahoo.com. references arokiasamy, a. r. a. 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(2010). international relations. new york: sterling publishing company, inc. win, p. p. t. (2015). an overview of higher education reform in myanmar. international conference on burma/myanmar studies burma/myanmar in transition: connectivity, changes and challenges. yap, j. t. (2012). regional cooperation in education: issues for developing countries in the asia-pacific. pids discussion paper no. 2012-15. http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0023/002305/230503e.pdf http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0023/002305/230503e.pdf https://www.britishcouncil.in/sites/default/files/indonesian_higher_education_system.pdf https://www.britishcouncil.in/sites/default/files/indonesian_higher_education_system.pdf https://www.britishcouncil.in/sites/default/files/indonesian_higher_education_system.pdf http://gse.buffalo.edu/org/inthigheredfinance/files/country_profiles/asia/philippines.pdf http://gse.buffalo.edu/org/inthigheredfinance/files/country_profiles/asia/philippines.pdf http://gse.buffalo.edu/org/inthigheredfinance/files/country_profiles/asia/philippines.pdf journal of asean studies, vol. 9, no. 2 (2021), pp. 219-239 doi: https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v9i2.7318 issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic what’s wrong with us? an analysis of indonesian president joko widodo’s public speeches from 2017 to 2018 adam tyson1* and stanislaus apresian2 1,2 school of politics and international studies, faculty of social sciences, university of leeds, united kingdom a.d.tyson@leeds.ac.uk; ptsra@leeds.ac.uk received: 28th april 2021/ revised: 22nd september 2021/ accepted: 01st october 2021 how to cite: tyson, a. & apresian, s. (2021). what’s wrong with us? an analysis of indonesian president joko widodo’s public speeches from 2017 to 2018. journal of asean studies, 9(2), 219-239. https:/doi.org/10.21512/jas.v9i2.7318 abstract the research examines the rhetorical style and political priorities in indonesian president joko widodo’s public speeches during his first term in office. content analysis is used to investigate a purposive sample of 66 presidential speeches from may 2017 to may 2018. in addition, the research identifies the similarity of words to understand the selective appraisal of indonesia’s progress based on president jokowi’s utterances. in one contentious oration on may 18th, 2017, delivered to government officials, the president bluntly asked ‘what’s wrong with us’? the question presupposes that something is wrong in indonesian politics, and is narrowcast to an audience of government officials, some of whom are implicated in the developmental shortcomings, administrative inefficiencies, and social conflicts that persist in indonesia today. the president’s strategic message implies that indonesia’s economic development unduly lags regional competitors; disinformation and hate speech create social divisions and political distortions; and there is a significant digital and technological divide in the country. the research result shows that the president’s passion extends beyond bureaucratic reform and into contentious political topics, where selective attempts at disruptive truth-telling are made. keywords: presidential speechmaking; political rhetoric; truth-telling; indonesia; jokowi mailto:a.d.tyson@leeds.ac.uk mailto:ptsra@leeds.ac.uk 220 what’s wrong with us? introduction in the aftermath of the 1997 asian financial crisis indonesia’s longstanding, president suharto resigned, and the country underwent a rapid transition to democracy. there have been four direct presidential elections since 2004. joko widodo, the current indonesian president, was elected in 2014 and again for a second term in 2019, winning a repeat contest against prabowo subianto with 55,3% of the popular vote. the research examines the rhetorical style and political priorities in indonesian president joko widodo’s public speeches from may 2017 to may 2018. the president’s strategic messaging is often concerned with economic development, disinformation and hate speech, and the digital and technological divide in the country. the analysis shows that the president’s conservative political outlook extends beyond bureaucratic reform and into contentious political topics, where selective attempts at disruptive truth-telling are made. in one contentious speech delivered on may 18th, 2017, the president bluntly asked ‘what’s wrong with us’ (apa yang salah dengan kita)? the question presupposes that something is wrong in indonesian politics, and is narrowcast to an audience of government officials, some of whom are implicated in the developmental shortcomings, administrative inefficiencies, and social conflicts in indonesia today. the research argues that this unconventional word choice is explained by context, given that a number of political crises were playing out in may 2017, and strategy, as the president seeks to push his selective reform agenda while maintaining his image as a hardworking, modest but ambitious leader focusing primarily on the national interest. content analysis is used to scrutinize a purposive sample of 66 presidential speeches over a one-year period from may 18th, 2017 to may 17th, 2018. evidence from jokowi’s first term in office suggests the president lacks a ‘compelling political narrative’ and has a vaguely formulated economic agenda (tomsa, 2017). by analysing the content of presidential speeches, the research finds that the ‘what’s wrong with us’ repertoire had been used repeatedly in the context of national development problems that persist through both presidential terms. the president appears to have strong views about what seems to hold indonesia back, and why the country underperforms in certain sectors. pessimism and optimism are interwoven in presidential speeches about national development and government performance, invoking callahan’s (2010) usage of the term pessoptimist in the chinese context. indonesia achieved a solid gdp growth rate of 5,07% in 2017, and attracted much needed investment in infrastructure under jokowi, although there are persistent problems such as budget inefficiencies and underperforming state agencies.1 the research does not attempt to measure the effect of presidential rhetoric on audiences. instead, the content and central themes of a selection of presidential speeches from 2017 and 2018 are examined to gain insight into jokowi’s rhetorical style, as well as his public views on indonesian society and the performance of his administration. journal of asean studies 221 presidential speechmaking as leader of the world’s third largest democracy by population, president jokowi’s political speeches and rhetorical patterns have been regularly scrutinized in the media and by academics. in the age of social media, the character of public discourse is changing in complex ways (ott, 2017), but the presidential speeches published by the cabinet secretariat in indonesia remain to be important public records and communication artefacts. technical studies of jokowi’s speeches focus on the general lack of coherence in his sentence structure that can be rectified through the use of images and graphs (madkur, 2018); the president’s preference for casual and plain language and his culturally javanese style (madkur, 2018; siddiq et al., 2021); and his frequent use of positive connotations (nurpadillah, 2017). it is essential to explore the reasons of jokowi using such rhetorical patterns in the context of his changing political agenda. this research reveals another side of jokowi as a pessoptimist leader that has been generally overlooked by scholars such as bland (2020), who writes the first english-language biography of jokowi. bland (2020) describes jokowi as a leader full of contradictions, one who is reluctant to follow advice, is a pragmatist rather than an idealist, driven by action, not ideas, a businessman obsessed with small details but with good political instincts. as an ethnically javanese leader, jokowi is not always straightforward when delivering his political messages, adding another layer of ambiguity to his political character (sumarsono, 2016). during the 2014 presidential campaign, hatherell (2014) finds that jokowi deployed a performative kinerja repertoire, appealing to voters by highlighting qualities of hard work and effectiveness. this so-called kinerja repertoire can be found in jokowi’s speeches and gestures, underpinning his developmental priorities, infrastructure agenda and focus on administrative efficiency, a gambit that can backfire if indonesia underperforms in certain sectors. hatherell (2014) identifies jokowi’s repertoires of representation during his first presidential election campaign. however, further analysis of how jokowi deals with indonesia’s underperformance is needed. it is well-established that political leaders can manipulate their popularity ratings through drama and spectacle, including strategic speechmaking, with variable effects on policy agendas (cohen, 1995). the theatrical and declaratory elements of presidential speeches can be used as a governance tool or bully pulpit to inspire or mobilize, to comfort or condemn (shaw, 2017). president jokowi is known as a man of many contradictions (bland, 2020) who deploys multiple repertoires of representation for political gain (hatherell, 2014). after a shaky start to his first term as president in 2014, jokowi consolidated power in 2016 and enjoyed a surge in popularity (warburton, 2016). the president is a pragmatist from central java province with a background in the furniture trade and a developmental agenda premised on efficiency, productivity, and infrastructure. jokowi’s speechmaking is often described as wooden and colourless apart from topics concerning bureaucratic streamlining and reform (warburton, 2016). his campaign team and image consultants attempt to put his lack of charisma down to modesty (tyson & purnomo, 2017). the analysis on jokowi’s speech rhetoric in 2017-2018 indicates that his passion extends beyond infrastructure and 222 what’s wrong with us? bureaucracy into contentious political topics, where he makes selective attempts at ‘disruptive truth-telling’ (dey & mason, 2018). jokowi’s indirect communication style echoes the javanese tendency to avoid directly offending people. this indirect communication style is influenced by javanese characteristics such as sopan santun or politeness, rasa rikuh or bashfulness, and empan papan as a form of conflict avoidance (susetyo, widiyatmadi, & sudiantara, 2014). sumarsono (2016) reinforces the view that javanese leaders are usually not straightforward and try to avoid direct communication if it offends other people. considering this cultural trait, it makes sense that jokowi engages in a form of disruptive truth-telling through speeches, making indirect, or vaguely attributable criticisms. as a pragmatic nationalist preoccupied with indonesia’s economic performance and material advancement, the president’s speeches often allude to the superior performance of indonesia’s regional economic competitors such as china, malaysia, and south korea. as jokowi contemplates the end of his second term in 2024 (fealy, 2020), with the covid-19 pandemic threatening his economic agenda and political legacy, the themes of his speeches from 2017-2018 remain being critical importance. methodology the research utilizes content analysis to examine jokowi’s speeches, and generates quantitative data from written, spoken, and visual materials (brancati, 2018). speech transcripts and written materials are accessed through the indonesian cabinet secretariat website. in constructing the quantitative data from speech transcripts, the researchers count certain words and phrases related to the may 18th speech, such as ‘what’s wrong with us’, and identify the similarity of words to understand the selective appraisal of indonesia’s progress based on jokowi’s utterances. the research also investigates the president’s rhetorical patterns by comparing his unpublished may 18th speech with a sample of 66 presidential speeches addressing similar themes retrieved from the cabinet secretariat website over a one-year period from may 2017 to may 2018. a total of 165 speeches are reviewed, from which 66 are purposively selected because they address key national challenges related to economic development, media and technology, and social divisions. content analysis of presidential speeches reveals jokowi’s pessoptimist view of politics and governance. this method helps establish speechmaking patterns and themes related to the may 18th, speech. jokowi’s disruptive, rhetorical may 2017 ‘what’s wrong with us’ speech is unavailable on the cabinet secretariat’s website, where official transcripts of presidential speeches are published.2 jokowi’s may 18th speech is retrieved from youtube and focus on the contents of the particular speech since it is unpublished, candid, and critical. moreover, it is due to the timing and symbolic importance of the speech.3 in 2017 indonesia’s corruption eradication commission (komisi pemberantasan korupsi/kpk) was investigating a largescale graft case that involved setya novanto, then speaker of the house, as well as other powerful public figures. the house of representatives exceeded its parliamentary powers by journal of asean studies 223 holding inquiries into the kpk’s general mandate and interfering in specific investigations, placing the president in the middle of a complex power struggle. at the same time, islamist groups secured a controversial legal victory. basuki tjahaja purnama, former governor of jakarta and close political ally of jokowi, was found guilty of blasphemy and crashed out of the jakarta gubernatorial electoral contest (tyson, 2021). as rival candidate, anies baswedan was sworn in as jakarta’s new governor in october 2017. basuki tjahaja purnama was serving the first months of his two-year jail term in mako brimob prison. president jokowi twice asks ‘what’s wrong with us’ in his may 18th speech. the formulation, along with related terms such as apa yang salah, apa yang keliru, ini keliru, and ini ada yang keliru, appear in 19 speeches between may 2017 and may 2018. this pattern suggests that the president is keen to involve broader audiences in the debate about national and sectoral progress in indonesia. by using the term ‘us’ (kita), jokowi seeks to share the burden of some of indonesia’s developmental failures and perhaps distance himself from these failures. nvivo software is used to calculate that the pronouns ‘we’ and ‘us’ appear 2411 times in jokowi’s speeches, while the word ‘saya’ or ‘i’ as the singular form of the first-person point of view appears 1575 times. ‘we’ implies a collective identity or general group membership, but can have different meanings in various contexts. politicians can use ‘we’ in their speeches to achieve different effects, for instance: 1) to build institutional identity; to construct a dichotomy between ‘us’ and ‘them’; 2) to deflect the attention of the audience away from particular issues; or 3) to invoke a general collective response related to a specific issue (bramley, 2001). after counting the relevant words and identifying similarities to measure the speech transcripts using nvivo, the data is validated before moving on to data analysis process. for instance, ‘wrong’ appears frequently but may not be related to the ‘what’s wrong with us’ narrative. redundant words are eliminated from the data analysis process. all speeches are translated from indonesian to english. political background to the may 18th speech in 2014, jokowi narrowly defeated prabowo subianto in a presidential race which involved 12 national parties (aspinall & mietzner, 2014). a competitive multi-party democracy has taken root in indonesia, a muslim-majority country of more than 270 million people, along with robust independent institutions such as the constitutional court and the corruption eradication commission (kpk). jokowi’s presidential victory in 2014 was significant due to his reputation as a hard-working reformist and relative political outsider who promised to fight corruption, improve the economy, and enhance the quality of governance and the bureaucracy (tyson & purnomo, 2017). a furniture tradesman turned politician from central java, the president campaigned on a platform combining pro-poor policies with technocratic populism (mietzner, 2017). jokowi earned his reputation as a technocratic reformist during his time as mayor of surakarta city from 2005–2012, and then as governor of jakarta from 2012–2014. economic policy under the jokowi administration has attracted investment and infrastructure projects, although there is pushback from some protectionist state sectors and trade unions as opposed to deregulation (ray & ing, 2016). 224 what’s wrong with us? on may 18th, 2017, when delivering his ‘what’s wrong with us’ speech at the presidential palace, jokowi insisted that the deputy head of the kpk, alexander marwata, be seated in the front row, which is usually reserved for ministers. he stated, “before i begin this speech, i would like to ask for one more chair. i see the leader of the kpk. mr. alex, please come forward. the kpk is very important, do not place him at the back, he should be seated in front.” at the time of jokowi’s address, some members of parliament had set up a special committee to inquire into the operations of the independent corruption eradication commission (kpk), which was a formative challenge to one of the institutional pillars of indonesia’s post-1998 democratic system (hiariej, 2017). the kpk uncovered a multimillion-dollar scandal related to the national e-identification program (e-ktp), in which former house speaker setya novanto and some parliamentarians were financially implicated. in 2018, setya novanto was sentenced to 15 years in prison for his role in the e-identification card graft case. another issue highlighted in the may 18th speech was the mass rallies triggered by the blasphemy case of basuki tjahaja purnama, the former governor of jakarta (tyson, 2021). the spread of disinformation and hate speech is a grave concern for the president. there were seven mass rallies related to the blasphemy case in jakarta from 14 october 2016 to 5 may 2017 (agustin, 2017). jokowi laments the upsurge in ‘unproductive’ demonstrations linked to slander and blasphemy, where ‘we’ channel negative thinking and suudzon (an arabic loanword meaning prejudice) towards others. on december 2nd, 2016 hundreds of thousands of protestors converged in central jakarta to demand the arrest of governor basuki tjahaja purnama, who in may 2017 was convicted of blasphemy under article 156a of the criminal code. religious organizations and the conservative council of indonesian islamic scholars issued legal opinions (fatwa) denouncing the governor and mobilizing protests. the purnama blasphemy case is symptomatic of the wider political struggles that indonesia had to deal with during the president’s first term. jokowi is known for running media savvy political campaigns, successfully projecting the image of a clean and humble candidate (tapsell, 2015). however, since he took office in 2014, he has encountered smear campaigns, hoaxes, and rumours that aim to harm his credibility and stoke fears of sectarianism and religious strife. jokowi has been branded a communist and a bad muslim (tyson & purnomo, 2017), while the president’s disinterest in the human rights agenda and appointments of oligarchs and army generals to his cabinet cast doubt on his reformist credentials (fealy, 2020). transcending the somewhat dull and repetitive presidential speeches about bureaucratic streamlining and reform (warburton, 2016), the content analysis of jokowi’s speeches in 2017-2018 shows that the president has a passion for contentious topics, selectively engaging in what dey and mason (2018) term disruptive truth-telling about complex topics in politics, business, and technology. contentious politics there are many similarities between jokowi’s rhetoric in his unpublished may 18th speech about social division caused by hate speech and subsequent speeches delivered journal of asean studies 225 between may 2017 and may 2018. this pattern shows that social division is considered by jokowi to be one of the problems stunting the country’s progress. jokowi refers to ‘fitnah’ or smear four times, ‘hujat’ or blasphemy three times, ‘menyalahkan’ or blame four times, and ‘menjelekkan’ or vilify 14 times. the tone of the rhetoric is often pessimistic and includes forms of disruptive truth-telling by mentioning, for instance, that indonesia wastes a lot of energy and national budget to provide crowd control for protests (setkab 3 june 2017). indonesia’s national motto is unity in diversity (bhinneka tunggal ika), and the president often claims to believe that cultural diversity should be regarded as a point of national pride. in speeches about religious inclusivity, for instance, the president claims that many foreign leaders have respect for indonesia’s pluralism and diversity, although jokowi acknowledges that there are unresolved ethnic and religious tensions since the country’s declaration of independence in 1945 (setkab 23 may 2017). jokowi claims that these are politically motivated tensions actively exploited by groups to serve their interests and warns of the destabilizing effect of disinformation. during a june 2017 pancasila day commemoration, where indonesia’s five founding principles4 are celebrated, jokowi asserted that one of the main challenges to national unity and integrity is the dissemination of fake news and hoaxes (setkab june 1st, 2017). left unchecked, the spread of disinformation increases the risk of radicalism, intolerance, and discrimination becoming normalized in indonesia, which directly contradicts the spirit of pancasila. while holding a press conference in june 2017 at muhammadiyah university malang, the president remarked upon the country’s relative instability. the government and the police are facing public demonstrations provoked by the spread of fake news and hate speech (setkab june 3rd, 2017). jokowi addressed widespread rumours about the re-emergence of the indonesian communist party, repeatedly asking rhetorical questions such as ‘where are they [the communists]’, and ‘how are they still around’? he added that the communists ‘were dismissed when i was three years old [in 1965]’ and he could have gone further by stating that there are basically no communists left in indonesia. it is possible that president raised this issue in response to growing accusations that he is a communist sympathizer. the reproduction of communist imaginaries is a puzzling phenomenon in indonesia today (wadipalapa, 2020), given that the 1965 purge of the communist party and all affiliated organizations marked the definitive end of communism as a movement and ideology. while marking the 60th anniversary of padjadjaran university in bandung, the president urged students to use their critical thinking capabilities to help foster an intellectual society that gives rise to beneficial innovations and public goods (setkab september 11th, 2017). jokowi stated that rigid curriculums should not prevent students from thinking outside the box, as it has been the norm in the past for students to be restricted to their specialized area of study. echoing his appeal to the teachers’ union in july, padjadjaran students who actively use social media were urged to combat the dissemination of fake news. indonesia has a relatively high degree of online freedom, so users need to take responsibility for the prevention of fake news and hoaxes that undermine national unity by creating an atmosphere of uncertainty, mistrust, and intolerance (setkab september 11th, 2017). on september 14th, 2017, jokowi officiated the opening of the national library service facility building in 226 what’s wrong with us? jakarta, which is touted as the tallest library in the world. the president took the opportunity to discuss the general reading habits of indonesians, stating that people spend too much time browsing social media content, while neglecting books and other reading materials in general (setkab september 14th, 2017). ever the pessoptimist, jokowi referred to social media’s paradoxical tendency toward destructive innovation, where the ease of access to information contrasts with the tendency of indonesian users to eschew facts and broadcast their biased views without proper evidence or academic research. at the closing ceremony of the 2017 national university leaders conference in bali, the president spoke proudly of indonesia as a large, diverse, and tolerant nation (setkab september 26th, 2017). in the recent past, however, there have been inter-ethnic conflicts throughout the nation (duncan, 2005), and jokowi places heavy emphasis on the observance of the pancasila ideology as a great unifier. one current challenge is the dissemination of provocative content through social media by competing interest groups that is changing public discourse. much of this content is deemed anti-pancasila and, according to the president, risks inflaming mass sentiments of hatred and intolerance. jokowi stated that innovation in the digital age should produce positive development outcomes, as opposed to the ‘destructive innovation’ that occurs when social media is used as a tool of hatred and division (setkab september 26th, 2017). the same message was reiterated by jokowi on national teachers day, which was celebrated in conjunction with the 72nd anniversary of the indonesian teachers association held in bekasi (setkab december 2nd, 2017). while attending the quranic interpretation council summit in his hometown surakarta, jokowi encouraged islamic leaders and scholars (kyai, ulama) to be agents of national unity (setkab september 17th, 2017). radical interpretations of the quran contribute to social and political instability in the post-1998 democratic era. jokowi praises the solidarity that indonesians hold for muslims who are suffering in other parts of the world; however, he hopes that the same level of solidarity can be shared between countrymen and women. for example, in september 2017 the president hosted a gathering of 38 islamic figureheads at the independence palace in jakarta (setkab september 13th, 2017). his speech focused on the humanitarian aid his government sent to the 370.000 or so rohingya refugees in bangladesh. jokowi urged key religious figures to use their position and social status to spread positive messages, to help foster national unity without antagonizing their followers or indeed the government of myanmar. this engagement with religious leaders took place in the same week that the centre for strategic and international studies released a poll showing a 68,3% approval rating for jokowi, so he was working from a position of strength (csis, 2017). one assumes that jokowi’s relative silence on the controversy in xinjiang, china’s muslim majority province, relates to the growing trade, investment, and economic interdependence of indonesia and china. in addition to recruiting conservative cleric ma’ruf amin ahead of the 2019 elections, jokowi has been building networks with mass islamic organizations such as the modernist conservative muhammadiyah and the pluralist interpretivist nahdlatul ulama. in september 2017, the president addressed a scout camp organized by the nu-associated ma’arif educational institute, speaking to youths about the persistent challenges indonesia faces as a journal of asean studies 227 nation, such as the dissemination of fake news, slander, and hate speech (setkab september 18th, 2017). jokowi encouraged the scouts to actively combat these threats, as well as to participate in constructive and positive activities such as scout contests that challenge their creativity, physical fitness, and intelligence. in the province of east nusa tenggara jokowi officiated the launch of the raknamo dam that was completed in early 2018 by the ministry of public works and public housing at a cost of some 760 billion rupiah. during his short stay, the president gave a public lecture at muhammadiyah university kupang, where he reflected on the virtues of diversity and pluralism (setkab january 8th, 2018). sharing stories of his meeting with afghan president ashraf ghani, jokowi recalled how his counterpart marvelled at indonesia’s diversity, the hundreds of different ethnic groups that peacefully co-exist. jokowi the pragmatic pessoptimist used this opportunity to warn students against complacency, as the country’s fragile peace is put at risk by the spread of hate speech and online provocation. beginning with the interjection waduh to express his disappointment, the president stated that people use social media to attack, reproach, accuse, and vilify one another, which is not a true reflection of indonesian culture or tradition.5 the interrelated themes of national diversity (legitimized by pancasila), the responsible use of new technologies, the spirit of innovation, integrity, and hard work feature prominently in all of the presidential speeches are reviewed in this research. judging from jokowi’s rhetoric, however, he is still fighting an uphill battle and will continue to face resistance to change from within his government and bureaucracy. business climate: why indonesia underperforms economic performance is president jokowi’s primary political concern and policy agenda. he had to showcase steady economic growth to make the kinerja repertoire work for him to secure re-election in the 2019 presidential contest. he used the ‘what’s wrong with us’ and ‘tertinggal’ or left behind rhetoric on many occasions to push government officials in improving economic performance. as a pragmatic, conservative culturally javanese leader concerned mainly with indonesia’s economic growth and regional standing, there is a pattern of disruptive, pessimistic truth-telling in some of the president’s speeches about the performance of indonesia’s regional economic competitors such as china, malaysia, and south korea. jokowi referred indonesia as being tertinggal (left behind) relative to china (sometimes called tiongkok) 24 times in speeches, to malaysia and south korea 18 times respectively, to vietnam and singapore 12 times respectively, to india 11 times, thailand 10 times, the philippines 6 times, and cambodia and laos 3 times respectively. accentuating indonesia’s economic shortcomings is a politically risky strategy, although jokowi attempts to shape the narrative by presenting indonesia’s development problem as a collective problem. by asking ‘what’s wrong with us,’ jokowi invites the audience to share responsibility for and reflect on the causal factors for indonesia’s relative underperformance. the term tertinggal usually follows monoton or monotonous and rutinitas or routine, indicating that there is an entrenched problem with the bureaucratic working ethos. as a president whose branding includes the kinerja or performance repertoire, jokowi is pushing 228 what’s wrong with us? government officials to improve efficiency and effectiveness, in what has been a relatively lethargic public administrative system. indonesia’s 2017 gdp growth rate of 5,1% is a good achievement, although the president consistently calls for improvements across the public sector. despite a sound macroeconomic performance in jokowi’s first presidential term, indonesia faces currency depreciation and the challenge of bureaucratic stultification (mcleod & rosdaniah, 2018), and the economy has suffered greatly as a result of covid-19. throughout 2017 and 2018 jokowi highlighted government inefficiencies and made specific reference to several underperforming agencies, warning that indonesia will fall further behind competitors if substantive changes are not made. in his may 18th ‘what’s wrong with us’ speech, the president cites budget inefficiency, maladministration, and a political culture of negativity as hindrances to indonesia’s development. based on comparisons with china, malaysia, and south korea, the president laments that indonesia’s development is less impressive than regional competitors. for instance, jokowi compares the achievements of the navy shipyard company (penataran angkatan laut/pt pal), an indonesian state-owned enterprise in shipbuilding established in 1972, with the achievements of south korean state-owned shipbuilders established in 1973. the president concludes that the sector in indonesia is stagnating, whereas korean companies have built globally competitive submarines. with reference to infrastructure and transport, the president stated, “…in the past [1970s], our toll road [jagorawi] was a role model for other countries. but in 40 years we could only build 780 kilometres. china used to learn from us in the past, [but] they have built 280,000 kilometres”.6 the critique of shipbuilding and transport infrastructure is a rhetorical form of disruptive truth-telling to pressure government officials to work harder and more efficiently. indonesia’s relative malaise is contrasted with sectoral competitors who appear to be more adept at shaping and responding to technological change. jokowi refers to major breakthroughs such as the internet, robotics, and artificial intelligence that are shaping the world around us and laments the fact that indonesia, a youthful and populous country, is not a leading innovator. in his speech, the president praises elon musk (spacex, tesla) as a key global trendsetter, and suggests that indonesia is falling behind since so much of the nation’s energy is misdirected, with constant public demonstrations and political gridlock. jokowi implores all ministries to improve the management of their budgets and to control spending so key performance targets can be met. ever the pessoptimist, jokowi questions why economic change moves so slowly. he points out that the nation resembles an athlete that is in good health, with low cholesterol, normal blood pressure, a healthy heart and lungs, and yet is still unable to run fast enough to win races (setkab january 5th, 2018). the analogy was repeated a few weeks later at the annual meeting of the financial services industry held in the ritz-carlton south jakarta (setkab january 18th, 2018). jokowi referred to indonesia as a lumbering athlete at an investment meeting held at the state palace in jakarta (setkab january 23rd, 2018). journal of asean studies 229 at a ministry of education and culture meeting in depok, jokowi raised the issue of bureaucratic competence and called for greater efforts to improve human resources across the country (setkab february 6th, 2018). in addition, the country’s poor performance relative to regional competitors is thought to stem from inefficient business licensing procedures, budget irregularities, uncoordinated local regulations, delayed infrastructure projects, and a general lack of innovation, among other factors. the president never seems tired of reminding his staff that the country has fallen behind malaysia, the philippines, and india in terms of foreign direct investment (setkab january 23rd, 2018). jokowi argues that attracting foreign investment, for example through china’s belt and road initiative, will improve indonesia’s infrastructure projects and help ensure long-term national prosperity (setkab may 22nd, 2017). investor confidence is damaged, however, by indonesia’s unprofessional bureaucracy, particularly the irregularities that delay or complicate the issuance of business permits. economic problems are exacerbated by dysfunctional agencies and bureaucracies that deliver inaccurate forecasts such as rate of inflation estimates (setkab december 6th, 2017). during a speech at the indonesian stock exchange, jokowi emphasized that vital investment opportunities are lost due to poor administration and a lack of professionalism (setkab august 31st, 2017). according to the president, indonesia needs an entire building dedicated to business permit processing to help attract investors, as well as to crackdown on bribery and mark-ups in government projects that deplete national budgets. the president expects every organization involved in government projects be more transparent in calculation for their expenditure, and that state-owned enterprises crackdown on unscrupulous and unprofessional practices such as nepotism, embezzlement, and subsidy mark-ups (setkab august 31st, 2017). inter-departmental tensions and power struggles also perpetuate inefficiency, according to the president (setkab october 24th, 2017). as a result, many of the president’s speeches show that jokowi is attempting to boost his image as a technocratic populist determined to clean up the political establishment, although there are deeply embedded conflicts of interest that undermine these efforts.7 shortly after his inauguration, president jokowi announced a flagship foreign policy called the global maritime axis (poros maritim dunia) that set out five principles to restore pride in the nation’s archipelagic tradition (nainggolan, 2015). for indonesia to be a serious maritime power, the navy needs investment and strategic direction. jokowi is working within a framework established by former president susilo bambang yudhoyono known as the minimum essential force that includes plans for naval modernization (shekhar & liow, 2014). naval procurement under this framework is necessary but contentious. jokowi’s may 18th 2017 critique on pt pal, indonesia’s national shipbuilding company, was repeated the following month when he compared the inefficiencies of pt pal to the south korean shipbuilding and engineering corp (now daewoo, dsme). found one year after pt pal, dsme has vastly outperformed its indonesian competitor (setkab june 3rd, 2017).8 dsme went private in 2000, and is now regarded as a world leading shipbuilding and offshore company. the korean company is currently under contract to supply three dsme1400 class submarines to the indonesian navy, at a cost of some us$1.1 billion (jung, 2017). 230 what’s wrong with us? reflecting on his experience at the 2017 g20 summit in hamburg, where indonesia pledged to improve its tax administration system, jokowi told the city mayors and regents association at a conference in malang that indonesia still lags the other g20 members in terms of technology, economics, and infrastructure (setkab july 20th, 2017). the audience reportedly fell silent as the president listed their shortcomings, but this did not discourage jokowi, who went on to say that indonesians should not resist change and should not be satisfied with the monotony of the status quo. rapid technological developments in the g20 nations should inspire the creativity, innovation, and entrepreneurial spirit of the indonesian people, which the country needs to survive (setkab july 20th, 2017). blessed with natural beauty, diversity, and youthful energy, the indonesian archipelago should be the top tourist destination in southeast asia, although this honour belongs to neighbouring malaysia (setkab october 24th, 2017). indonesia should be a world leader in coffee production, although it lags brazil, vietnam, and colombia (setkab october 1st, 2017). addressing a ministry of trade function in jakarta, the president reiterated indonesia’s poor standing relative to export economies such as thailand, malaysia, and vietnam, and warned that if the country does not shake off its inefficient routines it will be overtaken by cambodia and laos (setkab january 31st, 2018). jokowi’s tone is pessimistic in this quote, but then shifts to an optimistic statement about indonesia being the only association of southeast asian nations (asean) member in the g20 in the same speech. as jokowi told a gathering of diplomats at the ministry of foreign affairs, indonesia is a great country that should not feel inferior despite so often having a marginal presence at trade exhibitions in the global south (bangladesh being one expo cited regularly by jokowi), and so often being outperformed by regional rivals in terms of exports (setkab february 12th, 2018). during a cabinet meeting in may 2017, jokowi suggested that the mudik (annual return) that marks the end of ramadan for indonesia’s muslims presents a real logistical challenge. each year millions of indonesians return to their hometowns and villages, and the relative success of the mudik is a marker of just how far the government has achieved its goals in terms of infrastructure planning and building (setkab may 29th, 2017). another recurring test of the country’s infrastructure and bureaucratic responsiveness is natural disaster management. when mount sinabung erupted in 2017, the president called for swift action to prevent a humanitarian crisis in north sumatra, stating that inefficiencies and procrastination had, in the past, delayed the distribution of aid (setkab october 2nd, 2017). in terms of government spending more generally, jokowi is very vocal about financial irregularities such as massive budget allocations disappearing, and he uses the mismanagement of the mass rapid transit jakarta project as a general indicator of indonesia’s slow infrastructure development (setkab may 23rd, 2017). the unscrupulous handling of state budgets is endemic compared to neighbouring singapore and malaysia, according to the president, and indonesia is falling further behind vietnam and thailand in terms of development. journal of asean studies 231 the digital and technological divide the third theme in jokowi’s speeches is the concern with the digital and technological divide. this is a common theme amongst asean nations, for instance the highly publicised thailand 4.0 model launched by the thai government in 2017. in the speeches, jokowi refers to social media 27 times, mobile internet 20 times, artificial intelligence 16 times, tesla 10 times, and elon musk’s controversial (and possibly failed) hyperloop concept 10 times. those words are mentioned to explain that the world is changing rapidly. if indonesia does not catch up with other countries in the region, it will be left behind. the president also warned that social media platforms are really two sides of the same coin. new media and technology might bring positive effects such as expanding the digital market and improving education; however they are also used to spread hate speech and incite violence and terrorism. jokowi spoke at the opening ceremony of the 2017 indonesia business and development expo in jakarta. the theme of the expo was the new economy in the digital age, and the importance of technological innovation as a driver of national development was stressed by the president (setkab september 20th, 2017). as in his unpublished speech in may 18th, 2017, jokowi singled out elon musk as a role model and pioneer. the recent leap in e-commerce in the new digital age means that indonesian society has become more technologically dependent, with tech usage driven by the desire for convenience. jokowi encouraged indonesians to embrace this future, but at the same time to avoid negative, potentially incriminating media content online, as anything uploaded to the internet stays on the internet (setkab september 20th, 2017). he added that such a heavy reliance on technology is changing work ethics and consumption habits. jokowi put emphasis that this could be a threat to entrepreneurs’ business, for instance, small businesses that do not adopt e-commerce practices often struggle to compete and face bankruptcy. adding further nuance to the topic, recent research finds that indonesia is still far from closing the digital divide, as feature phones with basic internet services are used predominantly by older and less educated people, whereas younger smartphone users have faster and more sophisticated levels of information acquisition due to their access to advanced internet services (puspitasari & ishii, 2016). in july 2017, the president addressed members of the indonesian teachers union in central java. the importance of technological progress was the core message, but the president also warned of the negative effects of social media (setkab july 22nd, 2017). jokowi’s pessoptimist view on social media combines praise for the speed of connectivity and innovation with reservations about the spread of hate speech, intolerance, and immoral content. indeed, recent research points to the role social media plays in the ‘rise of tribal nationalism in indonesia’ (lim, 2017). at a social sciences forum in solo baru, one of the propositions was that indonesians have grown too attached to mobile phones. the president stated that the nation’s use of smartphones and social media platforms can be a force for good, although it can equally cause dissociative disorders and allow the dissemination of negative content (setkab august 9th, 2017). new technologies and smartphones are changing public discourses and the political landscape of the nation. technology changes the 232 what’s wrong with us? way many people live, often creating positive outcomes and innovations, although public sector adaptation of technology is lagging, and has yet to improve efficiency (setkab august 9th, 2017). the president encourages indonesian academies and education institutes to conduct new research on the effects of technological changes on society. attending the launch of a start-up conference called indonesia digital byte at the ritz-carlton in jakarta, the president reiterated that the country has stagnated and needed to base its development plans on value-adding innovation and new technologies (setkab september 28th, 2017). in addition to indonesia’s relative stagnation and dependency on imports, jokowi warned that the misuse of new technologies and social media causes instability and ‘destructive innovation’. analysis of indonesia’s digital ecosystem suggests that online commerce accounts for at least us$8 billion in consumer spending, with around 15% of the adult population shopping online (das et al., 2018). to meet growth targets indonesia must overcome challenges such as logistical bottlenecks, talent gaps, and inconsistencies in infrastructure and shipping standards, while encouraging cashless transactions and getting more businesses online (das et al., 2018). according to the president, there is an urgent need to address the issue of technological advancement for all government departments, in particular the directorate general of taxation. inefficiencies and capacity issues within the bureaucracy continue to result in inaccurate tax statistics and data (setkab june 20th, 2017). bureaucratic inertia and the prevalence of bribery causes delays in the issuance of licenses and permits, which undercuts business and causes reputational damage (setkab july 27th, 2017; setkab august 20th, 2017). the same concerns were raised during a session at the people’s consultative assembly (majelis permusyawaratan rakyat/mpr) on the eve of indonesia’s independence celebrations. jokowi identified radicalism, corruption, and economic inequality as the major threats facing the nation (setkab august 16th, 2017). it is true that indonesia needs less red tape and more innovation, as well as greater equality of opportunity, although a critique published the same day by forbes suggests that jokowi’s basic diagnosis – the need for greater wealth distribution – is misguided (worstall, 2017). in terms of technology utilization to support economic activities, indonesia seems to have fallen behind when compared to other countries in the region. muhammad nasir, the minister of research, technology and higher education, revealed that indonesia’s research and development (r&d) budget in 2015 comprised only 0,2% of gdp, behind south korea (4,3%), singapore (3,2%), and malaysia (1,1%) (utomo, 2016). this comparison raises an important question about how indonesia regards the role of technological research and development in the advancement of its economy. according to ministry of trade data, most of indonesia’s top ten commodities are resource and labour-intensive industries, such as textiles, natural rubber, palm oil, timber, footwear, shrimp, cacao, and coffee (“produk unggulan indonesia”, n.d.). only two out of the ten commodities, namely electronic appliances and automotive vehicles, are considered technology-based and capital-intensive industries. the dominant commodities for both categories are electronic and vehicle components, rather than the finished electronic appliances and vehicles (“produk ungglan indonesia”, n.d.). indonesia’s export commodities are in stark contrast with the export journal of asean studies 233 commodities of the newly industrialized countries (nics). in china and south korea, the top export commodities are technology-based sophisticated goods, for example cars, passenger and cargo ships, computers, telephones, and broadcasting equipment. according to world bank figures from 2015, indonesia’s high-technology exports (us$4,4 billion) lag south korea, malaysia, and vietnam (each surpassing us$30 billion) (“high-technology exports, n.d.). the comparison with vietnam is particularly revealing. as a fellow developing country in southeast asia with prominent labour-intensive and resource-intensive industries, vietnam managed to earn almost nine times more (us$38,7 billion) than indonesia from hightechnology exports in 2015 (“high-technology exports”, n.d.). to increase indonesia’s competitiveness in capital-intensive industries, jokowi once played a formative role in promoting a student-built car brand called esemka. when jokowi was the mayor of surakarta in 2012, he supported the local automotive industry by choosing esemka as his official vehicle, however the popularity of esemka has since declined. jokowi acknowledged that, while it is government’s duty to support production of esemka cars, especially in passing certification and emission testing, it is up to the companies to design, manufacture, and market a successful indigenous automobile brand (sani, 2018). the current trappings of indonesia’s political economy dictate that the country focuses on labour-intensive and resource-intensive commodities with relatively low added value. for now, it may be the correct decision to keep fostering indonesia’s comparative advantage in these sectors, although indonesia needs to compete with regional middle powers such as vietnam that offers attractive low-cost production for investors and companies while gaining a lot from agricultural products and low-cost industries such as shoes and garments. in the long term, indonesia expects to follow the developmental path taken by nics such as south korea, utilizing innovation and technology to fuel their economic rise. south korea went from being one of the poorest countries in the 1960s to one of the world’s largest and most dynamic economies due to its gradual shift from an agrarian economy to an urbanized, high-tech economy with a highly skilled workforce (kyung-sup, 2016). indonesia announced its global maritime axis policy and the president offers sober assessments of the country’s competitive position, though jokowi is torn between factions driving domestic political crises such as the kpk conflict and purnama blasphemy trial. indonesia’s shipbuilders are unable to complete with the likes of daewoo, which supplies the indonesian navy. therefore, while the government wishes to harness the potential of new information and communication technologies, it struggles to mitigate threats that arise from icts such as the spread of political hoaxes, disinformation, and religious incitement. conclusions the research sheds light on a significant unpublished speech made by president joko widodo on may 18th, 2017, that reveals patterns of disruptive truth-telling on a selective and strategic basis. the twofold argument is that the president’s unconventional word choice is explained: 1) by context, with several political crises playing out simultaneously in may 2017; and 2) by political strategy, as president jokowi advances his ambitious reform agenda 234 what’s wrong with us? while attempting to maintain his branding as a humble but ambitious leader dedicated to indonesia’s strategic national interests. considering the covid-19 crisis, the themes that emerge in the analysis should remain front and centre of the presidential agenda and continue to set the tone for the remainder of jokowi’s second term that runs until 2024. in 2017, indonesia was deeply divided by the politicized and contentious blasphemy charges against former governor basuki tjahaja purnama, institutional power struggles between the corruption eradication commission, the house of representatives, and the police, relative economic underperformance, and a stark digital divide. president jokowi is not a transformational leader or charismatic orator. rather, he seeks to use the power of his office to persuade and influence opinion, to pragmatically steer the country in what he believes to be the right direction. economic growth, infrastructure, and bureaucratic efficiency are among the president’s top priorities. the research does not measure the effect of presidential rhetoric on audiences. rather, it analyses a sample of presidential speeches to gain insight into jokowi’s rhetorical style as well as his nuanced views on indonesian society. one notable pattern in his speeches is the tendency for jokowi to downplay his own agency in the events he highlights. considering jokowi’s re-election in may 2019, it is likely that the ‘infrastructure president’ will continue to pursue his economic development agenda, ramping up the rhetoric and accusations while strategically distancing himself from project delays and political conflicts. one of the most significant differences between jokowi’s first and second terms is the salience of indonesia’s foreign relations with china. during the 2019 election, the repeat challenger prabowo subianto ran a nationalist campaign and used china baiting and bashing to considerable effect, winning over many provincial constituencies outside java. prabowo accused the president of selling indonesia out and of currying favour with their formidable east asian neighbour. for instance, there is indonesia’s seemingly weak bargaining position as a recipient country in china’s belt and road initiative, as well as the contentious reclamation of the north coast of jakarta, the development of the meikarta luxury apartment and business complex in bekasi, the rapid train jakarta-bandung project, and the presence of chinese mining companies in sulawesi and kalimantan. the research investigates 66 presidential speeches and found that pessimistic and optimistic statements crossover in jokowi’s speeches, sometimes even appearing together in the same contradictory sentence. ‘what’s wrong with us’ is a rhetorical device used on occasion by the president to justify his pessoptimist statements about indonesia’s economic or technological underperformance relative to regional competitors. the speech pattern is designed to provoke audiences to review their performances and ask hard questions about their achievements. as a pragmatic detail-oriented leader with sharp political instincts (bland, 2020), jokowi may be using an indirect communication style in keeping with his javanese cultural manner and worldview, avoiding direct confrontation but still striving for a strategic and somewhat risky form of disruptive truth-telling that could backfire politically or pay long-term dividends. journal of asean studies 235 notes 1 according to world bank figures, indonesian gdp was 5.18% in 2018, 5.02% in 2019, and then plummeted as a result of the covid-19 pandemic. 2 there were 16 presidential speeches recorded by the cabinet secretary in may 2017. official transcripts of presidential speeches are available online at http://setkab.go.id/category/transkrip-pidato/. all references to jokowi’s speeches obtained from the cabinet secretary website will be abbreviated and dated. for example, if it was on record, our reference to jokowi’s ‘what’s wrong with us’ speech from 18 may 2017 would be cited as: (setkab may 18th, 2017). 3 the full video of president jokowi’s may 18th 2017 speech is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r7aatyiulmm 4 pancasila consists of five principles: belief in one supreme being (god), humanitarianism, national unity, consultation and consensus (governance), and social justice. 5 the full quotation from 8 january 2018 reads as follows: waduh, kalau coba lihat di media sosial itu, saling menyerang, saling mencela, saling menyalahkan, saling menjelekkkan. saya kira hal-hal seperti itu bukan budaya indonesia, bukan tradisi demokrasi di indonesia. 6 the 60-kilometre jakarta-bogor-ciawi (jagorawi) toll road was built in 1978. indonesia’s toll road authority has signed at least 24 toll road concessions, but construction proceeds very slowly because of financial complications, budgetary constraints, and the complexity of land acquisitions (sihombing et al., 2018). jokowi repeated a number of these claims about indonesia’s relative underperformance in a speech to national land agency officials in jakarta (setkab january 10th, 2018). 7 for the april 2019 general election jokowi’s main catch-all campaign slogan was ‘clean, with the people, and proven contribution’ (bersih, merakyat, dan kerja nyata). 8 for further analysis of korean conglomerates (jaebol) such as daewoo, see rhee (2005). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r7aatyiulmm 236 what’s wrong with us? about the authors adam tyson (corresponding author) is associate professor of southeast asian politics at the school of politics and international studies, university of leeds. he has published widely on contentious issues in contemporary indonesian politics, with recent work on blasphemy trials and the environmental consequences of palm oil production. email a.d.tyson@leeds.ac.uk orcid 0000-0002-4458-6870 stanislaus risadi apresian is a phd candidate in the school of politics and international studies, university of leeds; an assistant professor at the department of international relations, parahyangan catholic university; and an awardee of the indonesia endowment fund for education (lpdp) scholarship. his phd thesis critically examines patterns of climate change adaptation, with evidence from indonesia. email ptsra@leeds.ac.uk orcid 0000-0001-9291-8334 acknowledgment we wish to thank giasinta livia for her assistance with this project. giasinta is a communication support specialist at un women. references agustin, d. 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https://sains.kompas.com/read/2016/09/15/20481681/dana.riset.jadi.0.2.persen.pdb.tetapi.cuma.karena.perubahan.rumus.penghitungan https://koran.tempo.co/read/opini/458303/opini-fabrikasi-ingatan-enam-lima-oleh-rendy-pahrun-wadipalapa https://koran.tempo.co/read/opini/458303/opini-fabrikasi-ingatan-enam-lima-oleh-rendy-pahrun-wadipalapa https://doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2016.1249262 https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2017/08/16/jokowi-widodo-is-in-error-here-its-more-development-indonesia-needs-not-equality-of-poverty/#48064e054e80 https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2017/08/16/jokowi-widodo-is-in-error-here-its-more-development-indonesia-needs-not-equality-of-poverty/#48064e054e80 vol 5, no 1 (2017) 10 suman, pinatih, & killian sub-national government.split-and-merged journal of asean studies 61 sub-national government and the problem of unequal development in asean economic integration: case of indonesia1 agus suman university of brawijaya, indonesia pantri muthriana erza killian university of brawijaya, indonesia ni komang desy arya pinatih university of brawijaya, indonesia abstract economic integration, as a prevalent phenomenon in contemporary international relations, brings with it several problems including in the practice of development. krapohl & fink (2013) argue that regional integration can follow three different developmental paths which are intra-regional interdependence, extra-regional dependence and intra-regional asymmetries and hence regional integration can in fact reinforce current situations rather than changing it. with regards to this, asean is following the second path, creating a reliance on external actors and thus requiring member states to be highly competitive in the global level. however, this strategy ignores an important element, the intra-national development gap, since asean is mostly focused in overcoming the intra-regional gap. this paper therefore seeks to elaborate the problem of increasing intra-national development gap due to regional integration by using indonesia as a case study. the findings show that regional integration in indonesia can in fact widen the national development gap due to three main reasons. first, asean integration is highly top-down in nature, thus limiting the role of indonesia’s sub-national governments (sngs) and private actors in the process; second, differing capacity of indonesia’s sub-national governments to engage in ir provides higher opportunities for some while creating hindrances for others and lastly, the high transactional cost of intra-national economic activities in indonesia causes the benefits of economic integration to be highly concentrated in one area. therefore, there needs to be a larger role for sngs in regional integration particularly in the most underprivileged area of indonesia. key words: asean, indonesia, development gap, sub-national government 1 this article was originally presented in the fourth international conference on business, international relations, and diplomacy (icobird 2015) at bina nusantara university. journal of asean studies, vol. 5, no. 1 (2017), pp. 60-67 doi: 10.21512/jas.v5i1.2060 ©2017 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic journal of asean studies 61 introduction for most countries, regional integration is no longer a choice but a necessity. the need to be included in the global economy and obtain the benefits of a freer market have forced countries to engage in multiple trade arrangements. as of april 2015, a total of 612 regional trade agreements have been reported to world trade organization, with 406 agreements being in force (wto, 2015). of these 406 agreements, there are at least 13 arrangements which are formed based on regional integration or regionalism. by far, european union (eu) is the most advanced regional integration while association of southeast asian nations (asean) is the most successful and longenduring regional integration outside of the western world (beeson, 2013). asean member countries themselves are highly diverse in terms of economic growth and political conditions. its member countries include wealthy states such as singapore and democratic countries like indonesia, but also incorporate poor countries such as cambodia and authoritarian states like myanmar. in terms of economic growth, intra-asean trade has a moderate growth, with an average growth of 7.62 per cent from 2007 up to 2013 (asean statistical yearbook, 2014). this number is relatively low compared to other areas such as europe and southern america. at the end of 2015, asean will enter a higher level of economic integration which includes free flow of labor, investment and capital, commonly known as asean economic community. under this scheme, one of the main goal or pillar is to achieve an ‘equitable economic development’ which focuses on minimizing development gap between member countries. however, aside from development gap among member countries, asean is also facing development gap within their own countries, such as the case of indonesia. indonesia is an archipelagic country with a relatively modest infrastructure quality and a high level of inequality. indonesia has one of the fastest growing inequality rate (gini index) in east and southeast asia, rising from 0.32 in 1999 to 0.41 in 2012 (world bank, 2014a). indonesia’s inequality is not only evident in the fact that indonesia’s richest population has enjoyed a 20 per cent higher growth in their income and consumption since 2003, but also a disparity in regional development progress where eastern indonesia lags in other areas (world bank, 2014). according to the head of indonesia’s autonomy watch or kppod, sofjan wanandi, only 10 per cent of indonesian cities experienced an improvement in their economic performance ever since indonesia’s implementation of a decentralization policy in 2001 (antique, 2009). based on this background, this paper seeks to explain asean regional integration and its effect on development, particularly on intra-national inequality, by using indonesia as the case study. this paper argues that when regional integration is implemented in a country with high level of economic inequalities, its benefits will be diminished since regionalism will in fact widen the development gap, as in the case of indonesia. furthermore, the nature of the integration, whether it is a top-down or bottom-up integration, also determines the effect of regionalism on development, since it can lead to a concentration of power and rulemaking capacity at the central government. this paper will be 62 sub-national government and the problem of … divided into three parts where part one will review existing studies of regionalism and sub-national government while part two and three will discuss regional integration in indonesia and highlight the role of sub-national government in this process. theorizing economic integration and regionalism economic integration is the removal of barriers to trade, payment and mobility from the factors of production, or in other words, is an effort to unite the economies of two or more countries through a series of joint policies (carbaugh, 2010). basically, the idea of economic integration dates back to liberal economists such as adam smith and david ricardo who believe that nonrestricted economic activities will give the most efficient outcome for all countries. economic integration will create static efficiency gains and dynamic efficiency gains (balaam & dillman, 2011). static efficiency gains occur because economic integration will lead to specialization among member countries and market expansion, resulting in the economies of scale (balaam & dillman, 2011). aside from static efficiency gains, economic integration will also bring dynamic efficiency gains because in the long run, economic integration will stimulate innovation and make industries much more efficient and competitive (balaam & dillman, 2011). although, economic gain was often considered the primary motive for regional integration, newer theories of regionalism focus less on highlighting only the economic gains. in general, theories of regionalism can be classified into 2 eras or waves of theorizing, the classical theories and the new waves or new regionalism approach (nra). classical theories which range from 1960s to 1980s focus mostly on the debate between the intergovernmental and supranational approach, which highlights the difference between regionalism as an inter-state project and regionalism as a project to create institutions above the state (supranational). theories under this heading include classic theories of functionalism, neofunctionalism, federalism, confederalism and liberal intergovernmentalism. newer theories of regionalism emerge in the late 1980s and early 1990s following the shift and inclusion of non-material or ideational factors in the analysis. one important theory under the new regionalism approach is multilevel governance (mlg) in which the article uses as its basis. marks (1996) defines mlg as a policy-making or decision-making process which involves not only the state as the exclusive actor but also other actors at various levels, namely at the supranational, national and sub-national levels. under mlg, each level should have the authority to create and implement policies and in several cases, to even refuse in implementing decisions that higher levels of authority impose. multilevel governance was originally developed in the european union where the tendency to result in overlapping governance among multiple levels of government is high since many countries uses a decentralized system of government. mlg tries to avoid this problem by offering an alternative form of power sharing between multiple levels of governance and reduces the chances of overlapping. multilevel governance sees regionalism as a process of governance and policy making that involve multiple actors at multiple levels (supranational, national and sub-national), employing both vertical and horizontal relationship journal of asean studies 63 (gavin, 2005). horizontal relationship means that the process involves multiple actors at the same level while vertical relationship involves different levels of governance (gibson, 2011). in this sense, mlg expands the classic definition of rulemaking (in terms of regional integration) by government to include various actors at multiple levels. regionalism and development in asean countries in their 2007 report, united nations conference on trade and development (unctad) stated that developing countries have started to use regionalism as one of their development strategies since it is viewed as a collaborative effort that countries do to engage in development. however, countries are also in a dilemma on choosing to fully integrate themselves to the global economy or still trying to retain their economic sovereignty. hence, countries are struggling to balance their domestic interests, regional agreements and international demands through multilateral cooperation (abugattas, 2004). with regards to asean, relatively low socio-economic conditions by member countries has caused development to be one of the priority issues in asean. table 1. human development index (hdi) of asean member countries (1985-2013) source: asean statistical yearbook (2014) in average, there has been an increase in the human development condition of asean member countries from the year of 1985 up to 2013, with lao pdr obtaining the lowest hdi (0.569) and singapore has the highest (0.901). the difference between singapore and lao pdr is around 0.4 which shows quite a high level of human development inequality. in addition to that, the domestic inequality also shows a similar picture. 64 sub-national government and the problem of … on average, from 1990-2013 almost all asean countries have the experience of an increase in their gini coefficient, with indonesia showing the steadiest upward trend. this shows that despite the implementation of asean free trade area in 1994, domestic inequality remains a large problem in southeast asia. in terms of intra-asean trade itself, asean still trade largely with external countries (non-asean states) with a ratio of around 1:3, in both exports and imports (asean statistical yearbook, 2014). table 2. gini coefficient of asean member countries (1990-2013) source: asean statistical yearbook (2014) regionalism and sub-national government: case of indonesia in terms of the formation of regionalism, asean is considered as highly state-centric in nature. asean secretariat (asec) only acts as the facilitator for member states’ activities. asec is also understaff and has no executive or legislative power (wunderlich, 2012). furthermore, asean member countries deliberately avoid creating a strong supranational institution, making asean secretariat highly underpowered (hill & menon, 2010). in contrast to eu which is highly supranational, asean limits rulemaking ability and involvement of other sectors other than the central government. in supranationalism, regionalism is usually a result of complex interactions between different actors at various political levels. supranational institutions can also be a medium for society to advance their own interests with less government involvement. a study by guido & kamarulnizam (2011) shows that although indonesian public generally supports the asean community, they lack the knowledge regarding its process and policymaking which means that the process excludes them greatly. however, this is not to say that asean’s intergovernmental is less favorable that eu’s supranationalism since asean offers flexibility that eu does not always have. all in all, although state-centric regionalism is not necessarily bad, it can generally reduce the public’s awareness journal of asean studies 65 and involvement in the overall process, particularly those who are marginalized. aside from asean’s characteristics, indonesia also faces a problem in provincial disparity at various economic sectors, such as trade and investment. in terms of foreign trade, data shows that indonesia has average export growth of 1.59 per cent in non-oil and non-gas sector (ministry of trade, republic of indonesia, 2015). however, 18 provinces (out of 32 provinces) records a lower growth rate than the average rate as well as 17 provinces experiencing a decline in export growth (indonesian ministry of trade, 2015). in terms of investment, foreign investments are also mostly dominated in java area particularly in dki jakarta, west java and banten (bps-statistics indonesia, 2015). one exception is for east kalimantan province that records a high amount of foreign investment. this disparity attributes to the fact that indonesia has a large gap in terms of conducting international trade and attracting investment. not all provincial or city government are equipped with the ability to create, promote, communicate or engage in foreign activities due their limited human resources. this in turn creates limitation for them to reap the benefits of freer trade and investment flows. this situation is also worsened by the high transactional cost between provinces in indonesia. the high cost of domestic trade is one element that can reduce indonesia’s competitiveness at the global level (asia foundation, 2008). it is reported that indonesia’s cost of transporting goods is around usd 0.34 per kilometer which is higher than asia’s average cost at usd 0.22 per kilometer (asia foundation, 2008). this high logistics cost results in a price difference of 20-100 per cent between western and eastern indonesia. for example, a sack of cement can cost 10 times more in eastern indonesia than it is in the western area (pambudy, 2011). under this condition, competitiveness will also vary greatly between provinces in indonesia since provinces which have access to international ports will be more competitive. tanjung priok port in jakarta (indonesia’s capital) currently accounts for two-thirds of indonesia’s international trade (world bank, 2014b) meaning that only one-third of indonesia’s international trade is done outside of the capital city. this shows that international trade is still highly concentrated in the wealthiest area. conclusion based on the discussion, it can be viewed that despite the implementation of decentralization, problem of inequality in indonesia still exists (as is shown by gini index). with regards to economic integration in southeast asia, positive effects of asean economic integration to reduce intra-state inequality is still not present. the implementation of asean free trade area in 1994 does not translate to reduced inequality and on the contrary, increases inequality. for indonesia, the biggest problem is the high discrepancy between provinces and the limited capacity of provincial and city government. with limited capacity to engage in productive international relations, these cities and provinces may lose their opportunity to benefit from the economic integration under asean’s scheme. about the authors agus suman is a lecturer at department of international relations, 66 sub-national government and the problem of … faculty of political and social sciences, university of brawijaya. pantri muthriana erza killian is a lecturer at department of international relations, faculty of political and social sciences, university of brawijaya. ni komang desy arya pinatih is a lecturer at department of international relations, faculty of political and social sciences, university of brawijaya. references antique, p., & rini, e. s. 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http://www.worldbank.org/in/news/feature/2014/02/19/moving-cargo-faster-in-indonesia-main-sea-port http://www.worldbank.org/in/news/feature/2014/02/19/moving-cargo-faster-in-indonesia-main-sea-port http://www.worldbank.org/in/news/feature/2014/02/19/moving-cargo-faster-in-indonesia-main-sea-port http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/indonesia/brief/reducing-inequality-in-indonesia http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/indonesia/brief/reducing-inequality-in-indonesia http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/indonesia/brief/reducing-inequality-in-indonesia http://rtais.wto.org/ui/publicallrtalist.aspx http://rtais.wto.org/ui/publicallrtalist.aspx journal of asean studies, vol. 2, no. 2 (2014), pp. 62-79 ©2014 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn2338-1353 electronic the political economy of industrial development in thailand shangmao chen fo guang university, taiwan abstract since the 1990s, governments around the world have emphasized the core concepts of globalization. many governments initiated a series of political policies regarding liberalization and privatization in response to the inevitable phenomenon. in southeast asia, thailand participated in the development as well by reconstructing its financial system to allow greater foreign capital for investments. unfortunately, the importance of prudential regulations was underestimated, and the neglect thereafter caused the asian financial crisis which initially occurred in thailand on the second of june, 1997. the thai government received 17.2 billion us dollars from the international monetary fund (imf) to stabilize its domestic situation and implemented structural reform to minimize losses from the crisis. meanwhile, different voices regarding the policies for globalization were expressed. these opinions mainly referred to regionalization/ regionalism and localization/ localism. this study discusses how the thai state transformed under globalization from three industries: the telecommunication industry, the automobile industry, and the cultural creative industry. this article observes that thailand turned to take regionalization and localization into consideration, which in turn demanded the state to increase domestic autonomy and capacity. the findings also suggest that cooperation with other governments in the region to accelerate economic recovery from the crisis was inevitable. however, political instability and close state-business relations continue to make the future of thailand uncertain. keywords: thailand, regionalization, localization, industrial development introduction the asian financial crisis in 1997 not only caused severe damages to the thai economy, the event also caused prime minister chavalit yongchaiyudh (new aspiration party) to step down from office and the succession of chuan leekpai (democrat party) as leader of the government. once in office, chuan carried out globalization and liberalization policies and accepted great assistance from the imf, world bank and 63 63 journal of asean studies other international organizations, in the hope of leading the thai people out of the shadow of financial crisis with speed. however, such unconditional liberalization policy generated significant repercussions from the thai people. it was under such condition that telecommunication tycoon thaksin shinawatra grasped the heart of the thailand people and established the thai rak thai party in 1998. in the 2001 general election, thaksin’s policy appeal to nationalist and populist sentiments enabled him to defeat the democrat party and become the twenty-third pm of thailand. not only did thaksin implement many populist policies after entering office, under the suggestion of renowned business strategist michael porter and others, thaksin selected five industries as his key policy focus: tourism, fashion, food, software and automobile (ketels 2003; porter 2003). the fashion, food and software industries are closely related with the cultural creative industry. the cultural creative and automobile industries thus became important windows for thailand to respond to the globalization crisis through regionalization and localization. based on the examples of the telecommunication, the automobile and the cultural creative industry, this paper seeks to analyze the changing role of the thai state under globalization. this paper argues that after thailand’s confrontation with the globalization crisis, the country turned to emphasize regionalization and localization. through economic cooperation and integration with other countries in the region, and improvement in the state’s institutional autonomy and capacity, the thai government brought related industries onto the path of economic recovery. however, thailand’s political instability in recent years and corrupt state-business relations continue to make the future of thailand uncertain. the structure of this paper is as follows: section one is the introduction; section two introduces the changing role of the thai state, including regionalization, localization and statebusiness relations; section three provides a brief introduction of thailand’s automobile, cultural creative and telecommunication industries; section four uses the automobile industry to explain thailand’s regionalization strategy; section five uses the cultural creative industry to explain how thailand responds to globalization through localization; section six explains how thailand exploits state-business relations to buffer its telecommunication industry and the negative impacts of political instability on related industries; section seven is the conclusion. changing role of the state 64 the political economy of industrial development in thailand after the publication of bringing the state back in in 1989, the state became the focus of political and economic research (evans, rueschemeyer & skocpol, 1985). at the same time, the wave of globalization began to emerge and caused great impact on the state. the zero-sum framework of thinking of academics regarding the relationship between globalization and the state began to change. the academia began to emphasize the “enabling face of globalization”, which includes: (1) the increasing sense of economic insecurity, which demands the government to provide social security; (2) increased competition among states, which demands the government to provide more mechanisms for the creation of industries; (3) intensified competition among key industries, which demands the government to respond with new policies, strengthen supervision mechanisms and carry out structural reforms (weiss 2003, pp.15-18). in order to break away from the zerosum framework of thinking regarding globalization, when analyzing the phenomenon so called “globalization”, we must emphasize the research approach of domestic institution. the challenges of globalization and economic liberalization do not deny the importance of domestic institution. rather, deyo(1996, p.136) argues that we must place more importance on the regulatory capacity and organization structure of domestic institution because they can increase the state capacity against globalization. it is easy to see that globalization has caused local companies to face severe competition and influenced state capacity in many ways. state capacity is therefore the variable that best explains the differences among industries of different states in a globalized age (evans 1997). the emergence of regionalization in the fifth wto ministerial meeting of the doha round held in cancun in 2003, as a result of the inability to reach consensus and ensuing deadlock regarding the issue of agriculture, many states turned to the negotiation of regional trade agreements (rtas). regionalism has become a very important concept of the international system today (dent 2008, p.6). regionalism can be divided into two categories: open regionalism and closed regionalism. open regionalism emphasizes the relationship between the state and the global market and regards regionalization as a complementary stage that supports state participation in the process of globalization. the regionalizing process can be considered as meso-globalization or a transitional phase before globalization. in short, regionalization should not be seen as contradictory to globalization (munakata 2005, p.16). open regionalism can be further divided into two branches: neoliberal regionalism and the fdi model. the fdi model 65 65 journal of asean studies emphasizes the importance of foreign direct investment for regionalization. closed regionalism focuses on the relationship between the state and society and places importance on distributional or social justice and other non-economic values. this category of regionalism considers the regionalizing process as an oppositional force against globalization. legitimacy is an important basis for decision makers when accessing regionalism. closed regionalism is also divided into two branches: developmental regionalism and the resistance model. developmental regionalism places emphasis on the importance of domestic capital (nesadurai 2003a, 2003b). under the influence of globalization, transnational corporations grew on a massive scale and entered into developing economies. southeast asia became the main target of transnational corporations. in order to counter the negative impacts of globalization, east asian countries adopted regional cooperation (munakata 2005, p.38). thailand adopted the response of closed regionalism but does not shut out globalization completely. developmental regionalism best explains the condition of thailand. the response of localization in thailand, the debate between globalization and localization has existed for a long time, especially after the asian financial crisis (hamilton-hart 1999). after the asian financial crisis, chuan accepted the suggestions of imf and carried out privatization, liberalization and other reforms. however, these reforms did not realize without negative consequences. many of thailand’s important companies fell into foreign ownership, which generated great discontent among the thai population. in the birthday speech in 1997, the king pointed out the importance of the sufficiency economy based on the individual, the family and the state. he pointed out that by carrying out sufficiency, not only can the country reduce the influences of both the domestic and international market, thailand could also decide on whether to connect with the world or not, and not be forced into the international market and free trade by globalization (hamilton-hart 1999, 2000; hewison 2000). the call for sufficiency garnered great support in less developed rural areas in thailand’s northern and northeastern regions. as a result, chuan was forced to step down from office in 2001 and hand over power to the chiang mai born thaksin. keeping in mind the discontent imf reform policies have generated in the past, thaksin shifted the tone of his economic policy from market liberalization and 66 the political economy of industrial development in thailand globalization to an emphasis on localization (hewison 2000), a policy later known as “thakinomics.” thaksin’s main argument was dual-track: the first track emphasizes the influence of fdi on thailand’s economic development; the second track emphasizes the importance of the domestic market. such local based policy thinking effectively improved the capacity and autonomy of the thai government while the economy quickly recovered. populist localization became an effective weapon against globalization. the example of thailand suggests that the thai government and the state’s role were indeed affected by the negative impacts of globalization, which indirectly led to the eventual outburst of the 1997 financial crisis. yet after the crisis, the government and the role of the state began to undergo change. the thai government adopted a more active response towards globalization. by guiding the development of the automobile and cultural creative industries and integrating the forces of regionalization and localization, the thai government successfully overcame the challenges of globalization. besides the response of regionalization and localization, thaksin also exploited traditional state-business relations to support specific industries and facilitate thailand’s economic recovery. state-business relations in the thaksin era thaksin, born on july 26, 1949 in chiang mai, is a fourth generation chinese immigrant. the second and third generation ancestors of the thaksin family engaged in the textile industry in the chiang mai area as early as 1932, hence it is little wonder that thaksin inherited the business acumen of his family. after receiving his doctorate in criminal justice at sam houston state university in texas in 1979, thaksin returned to thailand and became a police officer. thaksin started a small computer dealership and used his father-in-law’s connections in the thai police force to expand his business effectively in the early eighties. after achieving business success through connections in the police force, thaksin gained a deep understanding of the importance of statebusiness relations. on july 14, 1998, thaksin established the thai rak thai party. it was the first time in thailand’s political history that such an influential corporate figure enters into politics. thaksin entered the 2001 general election and announced his ambition to rule the country -thailand officially entered the thaksin era. thaksin’s victory in the election not only symbolized the re-emergence of business interests, the new leader’s business background and his corporate relations also changed the essence of state-business relations completely, moving thailand from money politics in the period of 67 67 journal of asean studies democratization to “big money politics” (baker 2005, p.130). thailand’s new leader was able to maintain close relations with both international and domestic capital. thaksin’s rule reflects the importance of the network between the state and business. however, close statebusiness relations generated popular discontent and repulse in the end and sparked thailand’s first military coup since 1992. the political economy of industries in thailand the automobile industry import substitution period (1961-1971) before the 1960s, thailand imported all its automobiles (niyomsilpa 2008). in order to develop its own automobile industry, the thai government passed the industrial promotion act in 1960 (doner 1987, p.415). the ipa provided incentive for investment and in the same year the ipa was introduced, several automobile assembly plants obtained licenses. in 1961, the first automobile assembly plant in thailand, anglo thai motor, was officially established. in the first year of implementation of the ipa, 310 passenger cars and 215 trucks assembled (poapongsakorn & techakanont 2008, p.203; terdudomtham 1997, p.3). however, thailand’s import substitution policy in this period was unsuccessful. the increase in automobile import caused acute trade deficit. the thai government was forced to change its policy and adopt a more rigid stance against foreign investment. in 1972, thailand passed related laws to limit the influence of foreign capital on the thai economy (kesavatana 1989, p.107-112). 1. protectionism period (1971-1991) in 1971, the thai government established the automobile industry development committee (aidc) under the ministry of industry, in the hope of facilitating the growth of the automobile industry through state assistance. accordingly, the thai government announced a series of policies geared towards the automobile industry. by 1975, all assembled parts should reach 25% of local content ratio, which means that at least 25% of all parts used should be made in thailand. in 1978, the thai government further adopted a more protectionist policy. however, protectionism increased production cost and decreased the quality of the automobile in thailand. the high price of automobile greatly affected the sale of vehicles in thailand and even drove away foreign corporations such as gm holden and chrysler/dodge from the country (lim & fong 1991, p.153-154), planting the seed for the next round of reforms. liberalization period (1991-1997) 68 the political economy of industrial development in thailand after the military coup in february 1991, anand panyarachun succeeded as thailand’s eighteenth prime minister. the new administration decided to liberalize thailand’s automobile industry in order to lower the domestic sale price of the automobile and increase the sector’s competitiveness in the world (higashi 1995). the first step the anand administration undertook was to lift the import ban on complete-built-unit (cbu) in april 1991 and lower both the tariffs for cbu and complete-knock-down (ckd) in july of the same year. in this period, thailand’s industrial policy in terms of the automobile basically corresponds to the development of globalization. the automobile industry began to be internationalized in this period. however, thailand’s policy autonomy was relatively low and measures and policies corresponding to the new development remained insufficient. in addition, the thailand government relaxed the threshold on foreign shareholding in the same period, which caused most of the country’s automobile plants to fall into foreign ownership, particularly japanese ownership, at the end of the 1990s (fuangkajonsak 2006). the policy change greatly affected thailand’s national interest and generated serious problems in 1997. post-crisis period (1997present) the asian financial crisis had a major impact on thailand’s automobile industry. thailand’s automobile market shrunk 40% while car sales plummeted from 561,523 in 1996 to 349,033 in 1997. by 1998, the sale figure for automobiles reached only 140,402, achieving only 1/4 of the sale figure in 1996. in order to resuscitate the dying automobile industry, the thai government undertook a series of liberalization policies. the government reinforced cooperation between the state and the private sector to promote the development of the automobile industry and improve its global competitiveness (thailand automobile institute 2006). the automobile industry began to show signs of life again thanks to appropriate state policies and thailand’s activeness in entering economic cooperation in east asia. the cultural creative industry bangkok fashion city (bfc) under the planning off the ministry of industry, the bfc integrated the six biggest private corporations in thailand and seeks to transform bangkok into a regional hub for fashion by 2007 and an international hub for fashion by 2012, through the joint corporation of the state and private sector. bfc can be regarded as a very important cultural creative industrial policy that is quite successful in the thaksin governmant. with the promotion of fashion in bangkok, thailand’s design industry exceeded 300 billion baht in export while fashion textile export exceeded 130 billion baht, grossing 69 69 journal of asean studies 20% growth per annum. the entire plan was to be carried out from 2003 to 2007. however, with thaksin’s resignation on september 19, 2006 following a military coup, the bfc proposal came to an end, as the succeeding military government did not put forth its support. thailand creative and design center (tcdc) thaksin once expressed that “creativity can create job opportunities and increase income; although creativity and economics seem like two different things, we can combine the two concepts.” under the thinking of “creative economics,” the thai government established the tcdc on september 2, 2003 and the center went into work on november 14, 2005. beside the goal of providing professionals with the latest information in the industry, tcdc aimed to provide average citizens with creativity and design related knowledge. accordingly, tcdc was established on the six floor of the emporium shopping center in the heart of bangkok (tcdc 2009). even though the tcdc was established with government support, the fact does not diminish its effect of closing the gap between the design industry and average citizens, bringing the concept of design into the heart of the thai people. based on its success, the tcdc stepped out of bangkok and established “mini tcdcs” in other regions of the country, spreading the concept of creativity across thailand. one tambon, one product (otop) the idea of otop came from the japanese concept of “one village one product” (ovop), an idea proposed by oita governor hiramatsu marihiko in 1979. thailand’s otop concept originated from thaksin’s plan to stimulate rural and urban economy in 2001. the thai government allocated one million baht to 45,000 tambons across the country, in hopes of helping them develop products of local characteristic and move away from poverty. when the otop project began in 2001, the project grossed only 215 million baht in sales income. by 2003, otop sales reached 33 billion baht, with the figure rising to 46 billion baht in 2004 and 50 billion baht in 2005. small and medium enterprises (smes) that participated in otop reached 35,179, evidence of the project’s success. unfortunately, like the bfc, the otop project terminated after thaksin’s resignation, as it also failed to garner the support of the succeeding government. the telecommunication industry thailand’s rapid economic development since the 1980s caused a corresponding growth in demand for telecommunication facilities in the country. as thailand’s two state corporations, the telephone organization 70 the political economy of industrial development in thailand of thailand (tot) and the communication authority of thailand (cat), could not satisfy increasing demand, the telecommunication industry began to face difficulties in the late 1980s. the thai government was forced to consider serious reform in the telecommunication industry. in this context, the government sought the help of the private sector to provide better telecommunication service and combined such help with the country’s second wave of privatization in 1984. since the late eighties, thailand initiated the first phase of telecommunication reforms and opened up the sector to private participation through the scheme of build-transfer-operate (bto). telecommunication reform phase i (late 1980s 1997) thailand’s rapid economic growth since the 1980s greatly boosted the demand for telecommunication service in the country. as a result, chaticahi choonhaven undertook the task of sector reform once he entered office. under the support of tot and cat, the chaticahi administration issued more than 22 telecommunication licenses, including four special concessions for fixed-line telephone and mobile phone. however, the process of issuing licenses and concessions was hampered by huge controversies (mccargo and pathmanand 2005, p.27). telecommunication reform phase ii (1997present) after liberalization of the telecommunication industry, the tot and cat played both the role of player and referee. at a time when the establishment of the national telecommunication commission (ntc) was under planning, privatization of the tot and cat became the main issue of concern in the second phase of reform. thaksin’s original plan was to have both tot and cat corporatize first before merging and undergoing privatization (pathmanand and baker 2008). according to the telecommunications master plan passed in 1997, privatization of tot and cat should be completed before october 2000. however, the privatization process was severely delayed and only the first step of tot and cat corporatization was completed before thaksin was thrown out of office. the succeeding government became busy attending to political instability and did not prioritize the privatization of tot and cat. it is expected that tot and cat privatization still have a long way to go. the response of regionalization the role of east asian countries after the 1985 plaza accord, the japanese yen appreciated sharply, rising from 236 yen per dollar to 125 yen per dollar. the sharp rise of the yen caused 71 71 journal of asean studies japanese manufacturers to move out of the country in search of new investment grounds. thailand became the top choice for foreign investment by japan’s automobile companies. with time, the phenomenon of japanese growing dominance over the automobile industry in thailand became apparent (busser 2008). on the other hand, thai government support for the automobile industry was another important reason for japanese investment in the country (takayasu and mori 2004). in 2004, japan became the top importer and second largest exporter of thailand while thailand was japan’s tenth biggest importer and sixth biggest exporter (moea 2006). as the development of globalization stagnated, many countries in the asiapacific began to move towards regionalization and the pursuit of free trade agreements (ftas). thailand and japan have long maintained a close economic relationship. the japanthailand economic partnership agreement (jtepa) signed in 2005 clearly pointed out that japan would support thailand as the “detroit of asia” through joint cooperation in the automobile industry. furthermore, the jetpa also mentions the plan for joint establishment of the automotive human resources development institute (ahrdi), a concept that aims to improve the international competitiveness of the thai automobile industry through human resource development. as the above discussion suggests, it is clear that the jetpa will improve the trade relationship between japan and thailand, especially the real interest of the automobile industry in both countries. regional economic integration tariff reduction under regional economic integration provides major benefits for the economic development of thailand. by 2003, thailand’s average tariff rate had fallen to 4.64% (puntasen, lewnanonchai, & rattanawarinchai 2008). the development of thailand’s automobile industry is significantly related to free trade agreements with countries such as japan, china, south korea, australia, new zealand and india. at the same time, other southeast asian countries served as big export markets for thai automobile. the export of automobile related products in thailand has always remained as the country’s second largest exported good. in 2009, automobile exports reached 11.1 billion usd, accounting for 7.29% of total export. in 2010, as a result of thailand’s economic recovery, automobile exports increased to 17.7 billion usd, accounting for 9.07% of total export. on the other hand, besides the mentioning of bilateral cooperation in the automobile industry in the jetpa, tariff reduction of automobile related goods is also contained in free trade agreements 72 the political economy of industrial development in thailand between thailand and australia, india, and new zealand. beginning from january 2005, australia reduced or eliminated tariffs on passenger and commercial vehicles, as well as trucks. tariff on related vehicle parts was reduced from 42% to 20% and completely eliminated by january 2010. in short, fta between thailand and australia generated a complementary, rather than a zero-sum, relationship (chaksirinont 2005, p.40-44). in september 2006, india agreed to reduce tariff on thai automobile parts as well. finally, beginning january 2010 as well, new zealand reduced or removed tariffs on passenger and commercial vehicles, trucks and related vehicle parts produced in thailand (office of industrial economics 2006, p.19). the automobile industry can be regarded as the biggest benefactor of regional integration. the response of localization the role of government effective development of the cultural creative industry demands various government policy and institutional support, which can be discussed on three levels: policy, production, and marketing. first, in terms of policy, thailand’s cultural creative policies are largely defined by the national economic and social development board (nesdb), the ministry of culture (moc), the ministry of science and technology (most) and the ministry of education (moe). besides official ministries and departments, the prime minister’s policy direction has important influence on the cultural creative industry as well. second, in terms of the production, the process can be further divided into four sections: (1) finance: financial assistance to businesses and individuals is jointly undertaken by the ministry of finance (mof), the board of investment (boi) and the office of small and medium enterprises promotion (osmep). (2) knowledge and technology: research and development of the cultural creative industry is undertaken by the national science and technology development agency (nstda), the thailand research fund (trf) and the software industry promotion agency (sipa), as well as other research institutes and universities. these agencies seek to increase the production and added valued of cultural creative products. (3) quality management and standard control: the quality and standard of cultural creative production is monitored by the food and drug administration (fda), the international organization for standardization (iso) and the tourism authority of thailand (tat). (4) human resource: the training and development of artisans and cultural creative talent is performed by the community development department 73 73 journal of asean studies (cdd), the department of intellectual property (dip) and universities and colleges in the country. finally, in terms of marketing, the ministry of foreign affairs (mofa), the department of export promotion (dep), the department of business development (dbd) and the thai tribal crafts organization are responsible for the worldwide promotion of thai cultural creative products and services. the above description suggests that in terms of the cultural creative industry, the main role of the thai government is to carry out policies that aim at development of the industry (termpittayapaisith 2007). the importance of economic development after the succession of abhisit vejjaji as pm in 2008, thailand pushed forward various projects aimed at promotion of the cultural creative industry. august 31, 2009 marked the official takeoff of the “creative thailand” project. on september 10, thailand established the national creative economy policy committee (ncepc) with pm abhisit leading the committee and advisor to the pm office, apirak kosayothin, serving as consultant to the committee. building on the tide of actions towards development of the cultural creative industry, the thai government announced that 2010 will be the “creative economy year” of thailand, an action that demonstrates the incumbent government’s commitment towards the promotion of thai culture. at the inaugural ncepc meeting on october 7, 2009, abhisit expressed his aspiration for thailand to become the hub for creative economics in southeast asia. in addition, he also expressed his ambition for a major increase from twelve to twenty percent in creative economy as a proportion of gdp. in order to accomplish the above goals, the thai government integrated creative economic policies into its national economic recovery programs, the thai khem khaeng and the tenth national economic and social development plan (nesdp) (inside thailand 2009). abhisit also pushed for inclusion of the concept of creative economy into the eleventh nesdp (2012-2016), in hopes of establishing a cultural creative economy in thailand and greatly boosting the significance of the cultural creative industry as a driving force of gdp by 2012. the tenth nesdp is hinged on the guiding principle of sufficiency. under the principle, the nedsp aims to achieve three main goals: people centered development model; a balance between economic, social and environmental capital; and the establishment of a happy and green society. in order to meet the above goals, the thai government hopes 74 the political economy of industrial development in thailand to increase the influence of its knowledge based economy through the reorganization of different sectors. the agricultural, manufacturing and service sectors now all emphasize the concept of creativity. political instability and state-business relations the impact of political instability thaksin’s leadership style and personal business relations gave rise to strong popular discontent in the country. thailand fell into political instability since the second half of 2005. after more than a year of political distress, on september 19, 2006, the thai military staged the first military coup in the country since 1992 and dismissed thaksin (montesano 2007). supporters of thaksin formed the united front of democracy against dictatorship (udd) and expressed their discontent against the military government. the udd and the people’s alliance for democracy (pad), led by sondi limthongkul, subsequently initiated massive protests against the government. it is clear that the military coup did not solve the political distress of thailand, but rather deepened the country’s political division. since 2005, seven candidates succeeded as prime minister of thailand: thaksin shinawatra, surayud chulanont, samak sundaravej, somchai wongsawat, abhisit vejjajiva, yingluck shinawatra, and prayuth chan-o-cha. many serious conflicts broke out during this period of frequent successions. in november 2007, the so called “yellow shirts” occupied suvarnabhumi and don muang airport and was determined to force somchai out of office. in april 2009, the “red shirts” blocked the asean summit meeting in pattaya. on march 12, 2010, the red shirts launched a million people march on the streets of bangkok and occupied the ratchaprasong area for more than two months. the thai security forces responded with two massive crackdowns on april 10 and may 16-19, causing the more than 90 deaths and 1,800 casualties. in 2011, pm abhist decided to dissolve the parliament and hold an election. the puea thai party led by thaksin’s younger sister yingluck triumphed in the election and yingluck succeeded as the pm of thailand. after two years in office, in 2013, yingluck proposed an amnesty bill. the bill was opposed by former deputy prime minister suthep thaugsuban, who would establish the people’s democratic reform committee (pdrc) and generate instability by initiating large scale demonstrations on the streets of bangkok. in the end, on may 22, 2014, the thai military once again staged a coup and took over executive and legislative powers of the state. the military expects to initiate one to two years of reform before carrying out popular elections and returning the state to the thai people. 75 75 journal of asean studies frequent overturn of the thai regime has an impact on the sustainable development of the cultural creative industry. although thaksin’s bfc project was not without controversies, the project contributed to the development of thailand’s cultural creative industry. thaksin’s exit from office and the military government’s succession ended the project and caused developments in the fashion industry to grind to a sudden halt. similarly, the otop project achieved some appealing results but was forced to change its name after the end of thaksin’s office, which generated a succession problem of thailand’s cultural creative policy. furthermore, political distress in 2009 also had a severe impact on thailand’s movie industry. in 2008, as many as 526 foreign film production teams worked in thailand and generated an estimated income of 2 billion baht. however, in 2009, as a result of political chaos in thailand, despite the slight drop in foreign teams working in thailand to 496, the income declined significantly to 0.8 billion baht, which severely crippled the development of the thai movie industry (thailand investment review 2010). the movie industry is a good example of the impact of politics on the cultural creative industry in thailand. the impact of state-business relations in an interview in 1997, jasmine group founder adisai bodharamik pointed out that in thailand, business depends on connections (pananond 1999). on the other hand, ucom president boonchai benjarongkul also expressed that connections is always the most important factor (niyomsilpa 2000, p.76). thailand’s main telecommunication groups also hold similar view and try hard to maintain various connections including state agencies, political figures and the military. in the past, nearly all of the management level personnel in thailand’s state enterprises consisted of political patronage or reward. moreover, as a result of the instability of thai politics, the government’s short terms caused constant changes on the management level in state enterprises, which further affected corporate performance significantly. in short, excessive political intervention exists in thailand’s telecommunication industry, which severely hampers sector reform (thailand development research institute 2002). after thaksin’s entry into office, thailand’s telecommunication industry underwent change and key figures from major conglomerates joined the thaksin administration, including the chairman of cp group, dhanin chearavanont, who served as advisor to the ministry of finance, and jasmine group founder, 76 the political economy of industrial development in thailand adisai bodharamik, who served as the first minister of commerce (kritsophon 2002, p.47). on the other hand, the thai government formed a special task force that aimed to realize the country’s promise to liberalize the telecommunication industry under the wto. the task force introduced a proposal that sought to balance competition in the telecommunication industry. the proposal was strongly opposed by an incumbent member of parliament, who is also a close friend of thaksin, and failed to come to light. it is generally believed that opposition was to ensure the dominant advantage of advanced info service (ais) at the time. it is clear that thaksin exploited his connections in both the state and business communities to extract personal interests. thaksin played an important role before and after sector reforms, whether in the license granting period, after the financial crisis or during his office. however, it is undeniable that state-business collaboration curtailed the national strategy to use the telecommunication industry for economic recovery. conclusion since suffering from the asian financial crisis in 1997, successive governments in thailand all deemed economic development and recovery as a state priority. at the same time, discussions of regionalization and localization appeared, and thailand hoped to respond to globalization through the dual strategies of regionalization and localization. although thailand’s dual strategies succeeded in helping the automobile and cultural creative industries respond to the challenges of globalization, political instability beginning in the second half of 2005 and thaksin’s personal connections damaged part of the cultural creative industry and caused reforms in the telecommunication industry to fail completely. however, the most important factors in the future are thaksin and the current political situation. thaksin played an important role not only in the telecommunication industry, but also all the industries in thailand. if thaksin return to thailand will definitely affect the development of various industries. meanwhile, the attitude of military government toward industrial development also determines the future of thai political economy. about author shangmao chen is an associate professor at department of public affairs, fo guang university, taiwan. his research interests include thai politics, thai industrial development, and east asian economic integration. he can be reached at smchen@mail.fgu.edu.tw 77 77 journal of asean studies references baker, c 2005, 'pluto-populism: thaksin and popular politics', in p. warr (ed), thailand beyond the crisis, routledge curzon, london, pp. 107-137. busser, r 2008, " 'detroit of the east'? industrial upgrading, japanese car producers and the development of the automotive industry in thailand", asia pacific 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economy: bringing domestic institutions back in, cambridge university press, cambridge, pp. 1-34. journal of asean studies, vol. 8, no. 2 (2020), pp. 191-211 doi: https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v8i2.6617 issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic assessment of business environment of women involved in micro, small, and medium enterprises (msmes) in the philippines: a comparative study with select asean countries myrtle faye laberinto solina faculty of management and development studies university of the philippines open university/graduate student los baños, laguna 4031 myrtlefaye_solina@yahoo.com received: 09th august 2020/ revised: 29th august 2020/ accepted: 17th november 2020 how to cite: solina, m. f. l. (2020). assessment of business environment of women involved in micro, small, and medium enterprises (msmes) in the philippines: a comparative study with select asean countries. journal of asean studies, 8(2), 191-211. https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v8i2.6617 abstract the united nations conference on trade and development in 2017 states that women are deemed important part of a trade. they take part in a wide range of activities in the industry produce products, commerce of goods across borders, run and own trading firms, and make up a large part of the workforce in exportoriented businesses. nevertheless, women's potential and skills in trade is still too often held back by the many constraints. hence, the research endeavours to describe the current demographics, roles, and experiences of women involved in msmes, provide information on the current policies programs and services and how these are comparable and contrasting, not to mention recommend measures to address the impeding factors in the philippines to be compared with singapore and myanmar using available secondary information. through surveys and purposive sampling, the research results show that women’s participation in economic activity, in particular in msmes, is primarily affected by conditions that catalyze engagements. keywords: asean, msmes, women, business environment, philippines introduction the asean coordinating committee on micro, small, and medium enterprises (accmsme) in 2020 states that small and medium enterprises are key drivers and contributors 192 assessment of business environment to economic growth, account for 88,8% to 99,9% of all establishments, and generate between 51,7% and 97,2% of total employment. as such, the region would give new emphasis on assisting and promoting micro, small and medium enterprises (msmes) in its economic integration through a more structured and targeted msme program (asean secretariat, 2015a). the program will be put in place to enhance msme competitiveness, resilience, and to enable significant benefits from asean integration through various measures. it may start with promotion of productivity, use of technology, and adaption of innovation. it is also essential to increase access to finance by developing and enhancing current framework, strengthening traditional infrastructure, enhancing policy environment and measures that foster alternative and non-traditional financing. besides, it can be done by enhancing market access and internationalization through the development of support schemes and integration into the global supply chains, e.g., promotion of collaboration with multinational corporations (mncs) and large enterprises, foster the use of e-commerce, and boost strategies to promote exports through export clinics, advisory services and rules of origin (roo) utilization. lastly, it occurs essential to enhance msme policy and regulatory environment that supports intraand intergovernmental cooperation and coordination mechanism through the involvement of msmes in the decision-making process. it is all to enable better representation of msme interests, extend assistance to microenterprises in the informal sector and their integration, and streamline processes involved in obtaining permits and business registrations to enable less costly and faster business formation (asean secretariat, 2015a). true to its overarching message, the region also recognizes the critical role of women in entrepreneurship. as such, realization of these principles requires the active engagement of all asean member states (ams), sectoral bodies under the three pillars of asean, and stakeholders including civil society, academia, media, and private sectors (asean secretariat, 2015b). furthermore, asean secretariat (2015a) states that promotion of entrepreneurship and social capital development by creating a more conducive environment for entrepreneurship. some of the ways to realize this is through the asean online academy and enhancing social capital development for msmes, with particular focus on youth and women are among its priorities (asean secretariat, 2015b). women are deemed important part of a trade. they take part in a wide range of activities in the industry produce products, commerce of goods across borders, run and own trading firms, and make up a large part of the workforce in export-oriented businesses. nevertheless, women's potential and skills in trade is still too often held back by the many constraints (“women must play a bigger”, 2017). sen (2001) has identified seven varieties of disparities between genders: (1) mortality inequality; (2) natality inequality; (3) basic-facility inequality; (4) special-opportunity inequality; (5) professional inequality; (6) ownership inequality; and (7) household inequality. mortality inequality directly tackles life and death, with women being observed to have high mortality rates than men on communities with documented gender-biased as compared to communities with little or no gender bias. natality inequality is the preference for boys over girls, which is a characteristic of patriarchal societies. basic-facility inequality, as the name suggests, are biases that involved basic needs such as equal opportunity to attend school and journal of asean studies 193 social functions. special-opportunity inequality covers privileges such as access to higher education, training, and professional work, among others. professional inequality covers those that pertain to promotion in work and occupation. ownership inequality relates to biases in property ownership, which is identified to affect not only the voice of women in the society but also make it harder for women to enter and flourish in commercial, economic, and even in some social functions. household inequality directly tackles the unequal distribution of household roles and responsibilities, which in some societies, is to take for granted that men will naturally work outside the home. in contrast, women could do so only if they could combine such work with various inescapable and unequally shared household duties. given these scenarios, the research explores the business environment for filipino women involved in the micro, small and medium enterprises. it draws a comparison with select asean countries, namely singapore and myanmar, using the available published resources. specifically, the research aspires to determine the following: 1. who are the women involved in the msmes? 2. what are the current policies, programs, and services designed for women in msmes? 3. what are the constraints and opportunities to enhance women’s participation in msmes? literature review it has been noted that trade has become the lens through which development is perceived, rather than the other way around (çağatay, 2005). gonzalez and grown (2015) conclude that women –as entrepreneurs, heads of households, and consumers, among other roles– are crucial to ending poverty and boosting global prosperity. in short, women are crucial to success in international trade. likewise, adrianzen (2006) writes karl marx taught that anyone who knows something of history knows that the great social changes are impossible without the feminist ferment. he believes that social progress could be measured precisely by the social position of women. on the other hand, to lenin, the participation of women is more much urgent and essential to the revolution in which the experience of all the liberation movements proves that the success of the revolution rests on the degree in which women are involved. in this case, the revolution is women’s participation in trade (adrianzen, 2006). singapore is ranked eighth on a list of cities worldwide for its ability to attract and foster the growth of women-owned firms. the research looks at the cities based on the impact of local policies, programs, and characteristics, along with national laws and customs, affecting the level of women-owned firms. the research ranks the cities across five critical aspects: capital, technology, talent, culture, and markets (woo, 2017). 194 assessment of business environment holzman and roberts-robbins (2019) note that women entrepreneurs face specific barriers when dealing with bureaucracy– therefore particularly salient in bureaucratic myanmar. these challenges may arise from lower educational attainment, literacy levels, and underrepresentation of women in senior positions, e.g., legislators, senior officials, and managers, which an entrepreneur may contend with when formalizing and developing her business. while myanmar has a women-focused entrepreneur association and a tech startup sector seeking to encourage young female entrepreneurs, specifically women-focused acceleration programs are absent, in traditional sectors in particular, that seek to address entrepreneurship in a context tailored to specific challenges encountered by women and existing small businesses (totten, lwin & van roosmalen, 2019). asia pacific foundation of canada (2018) finds that women entrepreneurs comprise 70% of total respondents with 39% founders and 31% non-founders. it is noted that the philippines consistently ranks within the top 10 in the world for gender parity in political and business leaders and as a regional leader around gender parity in entrepreneurship, with women, recently overtaking men entering the entrepreneurial space. the research further notes that men are significantly more likely to be looking for modest (52%) to high (18%) revenue growth for their companies than women are. in contrast, women are more likely to be inclined to no growth (22%) or lower growth (18%). existing structural barriers for women entrepreneurs and women-led msmes may influence how they interpret and articulate their ideas and ambitions of growth; frequently cited barriers include access to financing, security issues, social support and familial constraints, and lack of access to technology and relevant skills training. studies show that gender equality has a positive impact on economic growth. however, research that explores the effects of economic growth on gender equality is less consistent. only 8% of survey respondents are aiming for high revenue growth. mostly younger male respondents (under 35 years old) and male respondents tend to be more ambitious than their counterparts are. figure 1 presents the conceptual framework that the research has adopted serving as a guide in the conduct of the research and its structure. journal of asean studies 195 figure 1 conceptual framework research methods the selection of countries is based on their extent of integrating gender equality principles into their msme policies, programs, and services. specifically, those with some good practices and on the other extreme those lagging are chosen as target groups. the similarities and differences among these countries are identified and explored in the research. the research collects and analyses secondary quantitative and qualitative data. it uses an online (internet) survey. primary data are gathered through purposive sampling using the available list of msmes requested from the department of trade and industry (dti). the said list has 573 msmes, but only 5% is able to answer the questionnaire. the survey is conducted within one month from march 18, 2020 to april 18, 2020 at a time the world is experiencing a pandemic due to coronavirus disease (covid-19). analysis asean business environment for women the asean small and medium-sized enterprises (sme) policy index 2018: boosting competitiveness and inclusive growth presents an analysis of the progress of the asean identification of the following for women involved in msmes in the philippines: • role in the operation of the business • decision-making participation in the business • msme classification • business structure of msmes • industry involved in • number of employees • percentage of women employees • awareness of business policies • awareness of business programs and services • availment of business programs and services • people or institutions who helped women in business • assistance extended gathering and interpretation of the following for the women involved in msmes in the philippines: • impressions on philippine business policies for women • impressions on philippine business programs and services for women • main challenges/barriers in business participation of women in the philippines • resolution on main challenges/barriers in business participation of women in the philippines • outlook of women in business in terms of business revenue of the philippines in the next five years assessment of business environment of women involved in the msmes in the philippines in comparison with select asean countries desk research on asean members states’ initiatives in integrating gender equality principles into their msme policies, programs, and services selection of countries with some good practices and those lagging for comparison to the philippines establishment data gathering and analysis predictor variables outcome variables output survey 196 assessment of business environment member states (ams) in terms of achieving the objectives of the asean strategic action plan for sme development 2016-2025. the sme policy index serves as a benchmarking tool for assessing sme policy frameworks in emerging economies and monitor progress in policy implementation using indicators over time. the index was developed in 2006 by the organisation for economic cooperation and development (oecd) in collaboration with the european commission, the european bank for reconstruction and development (ebrd), and the european training foundation (etf) since sme has been recognized as a vital part of economic development across the globe (oecd grs southeast europe division and eurasia division, 2014). based on table 1 that shows score on inclusive entrepreneurship for women, the philippines is rated the highest with 4,90 on the scale of 1 to 6, with 6 being the highest, while myanmar is rated the least with 1,82. table 1. comparative sme policy index score on inclusive entrepreneurship for women para-meters brn khm idn lao mya mmr phl sgp tha vnm med std. planning and design 2,00 4,42 3,74 2,91 3,82 2,25 6,00 4,25 3,08 3,49 3,62 1,10 implementation 2,19 2,55 3,34 2,66 5,10 1,86 4,44 4,66 2,61 2,27 2,63 1,10 monitoring and evaluation 1,83 1,83 1,83 1,28 2,93 1,00 4,04 3,77 1,55 1,55 1,83 1,00 total subdimension score 2,05 3,06 3,18 2,47 4,22 1,82 4,90 4,34 2,56 2,55 2,81 0,99 note: scores are on a scale of 1 to 6, with 6 being the highest. source: oecd, asean sme policy index 2018 furthermore, the asean sme policy index 2018 notes that among the ams, the philippines and vietnam are the only countries with sme strategy documents with specific strategies for women entrepreneurs. in singapore, there is no particular strategy for women entrepreneurs as barriers have been assessed to be very low (oecd, 2018). singapore: smes the heart of economy in 2018, the singapore department of statistics presented that smes form 99% of the total enterprises and generate almost 69% of total employment in singapore. indeed, smes are the heart of singapore’s economy (table 2 and table 3). journal of asean studies 197 table 2. 2018 estimates by enterprise classification in singapore source: singapore department of statistics, m600981topline estimates for all enterprises and smes, annual 2018 table 3. 2018 estimates by ownership for all enterprises in singapore variables count enterprises count, total (thousand) 263,9 enterprises count, total local (thousand) 217,6 enterprises count, total foreign (thousand) 46,3 employment of enterprises, total (million) 3,5 employment of enterprises, total local (million) 2,4 employment of enterprises, total foreign (million) 1,1 source: singapore department of statistics, m601511topline estimates by ownership for all enterprises, annual 2018 enterprise singapore is the lead government agency supporting enterprise development. they focus on building capabilities, innovation, and internalization of committed companies. enterprise singapore is a fusion of previously two separate entities: international enterprise (ie) singapore and standards, and productivity and innovation board (spring) singapore, which merged on april 1, 2018 (enterprise singapore, 2019). enterprise singapore offers a wide range of assistance for msmes. among them, financial assistance, market access, and talent assistance are the most popular, as seen in table 4. table 4. popular assistance under enterprise singapore area assistance financial assistance double tax deduction for internationalisation (dtdi) market readiness assistance (mra) grant enterprise development grant international marketing activities programme (imap) companies planning to expand overseas can benefit from the double tax deduction scheme for internationalisation small and medium enterprises (smes) will receive an international boost with the market readiness assistance (mra) grant to help the enterprise development grant (edg) helps singapore companies grow and transform. this grant supports projects that help companies participating in imap approved activities will receive a support of up to 50% or 70% of eligible core variables count enterprises count, total (thousand) 263,9 enterprises count, smes (thousand) 262,6 enterprises count, non-smes (thousand) 1,3 employment of enterprises, total (million) 3,5 employment of enterprises, smes (million) 2,5 employment of enterprises, non-smes (million) 1 198 assessment of business environment area assistance (dtdi), with a 200% tax deduction on eligible expenses for international market expansion and investment development activities. take their business overseas. enterprises upgrade their business, innovate or venture overseas, under three pillars: core capabilities, innovation and productivity, and market access. expenses (depending on which country the event is held in) – including exhibition rental space, booth construction, publicity, and fair or mission consultancy costs. market access free trade agreement (fta) portal plug & play network find a simpler way to do business internationally with singapore's network of 20 ftas. speed up the entry into overseas markets with key information like specific trade regulations, import procedures, detailed competitor analysis, and customized market research reports tailored to enterprise products and services. talent assistance overseas market workshop china ready programme professional conversion programme (pcp) international trading international trading track (itt@smu) the overseas market workshop helps individuals build regional market understanding through knowledge sharing by local and foreign practitioners, business owners, and market experts. these in-market programs help participants gain firsthand knowledge of china's business environment, including market insights, culture, and financial systems. the international trading pcp aims to develop singaporeans with deep skills in trading fundamentals for international job roles in middle office functions. itt@smu develops talent at both the undergrad and graduate levels for companies in the commodity trading sector. source: enterprise singapore, 2019 the mastercard index of women entrepreneurs (miwe) 2018 lists singapore as the fifth best country with the most robust supporting conditions and opportunities for women to thrive as entrepreneurs. the index ranks the countries based on three components. the first one is the level of women’s advancement outcomes, which include degree of preference against women as workforce participants, political and business leaders, and their financial strength and entrepreneurial inclination). secondly, it is their knowledge assets and financial access including degree of access to a basic financial facility, advanced knowledge assets, and support for smes of women. the last one is supporting entrepreneurial factors, which involves overall perceptions on the ease on conducting business locally, quality of local governance, women’s understanding of safety levels and cultural knowledge of women’s household financial influence. the index uses 12 indicators and 25 sub-indicators to assess how 57 countries across the asia pacific, middle east & africa, north america, latin journal of asean studies 199 america, and europe, which constitutes 78,6% of the world’s female labor force, differ in terms of their level on the three components mentioned earlier. moreover, women in singapore topped the rankings at 90,9% in terms of knowledge assets and financial access. singapore also offers one of the most conducive conditions to encourage women business ownership, such as ease of doing business and cultural opinions of women as entrepreneurs. however, the report also shows that the rank of singapore dropped from the third place in 2017 as its overall score fell from 71,2 to 69,2 in 2018, recording a 3% decrease. the research points out that the singapore’s rank drop is attributed to the decline in the proportion of female entrepreneurs compared to males, which is 61,9% in 2017 and 48,3 percent in 2018. the report also cites that only 27% of business owners are women, which put singapore to 14th place—a drop from its 2017 rank at 12th place. the index also notes that singaporean women entrepreneurs have also not progressed much as their rankings in the advancement outcomes component fell eight spots to 39th with a score of 49,4 (-6%). the research mentions reasons such as the less healthy representation of women business owners and low entrepreneurial activity rate as the reasons for the decline (mastercard, 2019). myanmar: smes are the backbone of the economy oecd (2013) reports that there are about 126,237 formally registered enterprises in myanmar, which constitutes 99,4% of the total businesses (see table 5) table 5. number of establishments per classification in myanmar establishments number percentage small and medium enterprises 126.237 99,4% large enterprises 721 0,6% total 126.958 100% it is furtherly noted that the relatively low number of smes is due to: (1) weak entrepreneurship culture; (2) a lack of incentives to enter the formal sector; (3) a remaining influence of the centrally planned economic system; and (4) the important role of state-owned enterprises in the market myanmar (oecd, 2013). the statement of economic policy of the union of myanmar, which was released on 29th july 2016, underscores the government’s focus on its people and desire to achieve inclusive and continuous development. the 12-point economic policy endeavors to establish an economic framework that supports national reconciliation, based on the fair distribution, mobilization, and allocation of sustainable natural resources across the states and regions. the government’s 12point economic policy targets explicitly support for smes, aiming to improve access to credit and financial services. the economic policy also intends to address challenges in doing business in the country. supportively, the ministry of industry (moi) aims to draft a new sme development strategy, which will focus on infrastructure development, technology transfer, and soft lending programs. with the government and 200 assessment of business environment international lenders working together in recent years to boost credit, safeguarding a reliable source of affordable loans to small businesses will be critical for long-term policy goals. the current sme development policy in force was drafted in 2015 and envisioned to stimulate the development of smes across all sectors, which are competitive and innovative. these sectors are perceived to enhance income generation and contribute to socio-economic development. furthermore, the key priority areas of the 2015 sme development policy are (1) human resource, (2) technology development and innovation, (3) financial resource, (4) infrastructure development, (5) market access, (6) appropriate taxation and procedures, and (7) conducive business environment (doca of myanmar, 2015). oecd (2018) reports that myanmar does not currently have a working strategy for sme development in place. instead, the 2015 sme development policy serves as a general policy for sme development, which marked an improvement from the 2014 assessment. it is furtherly noted that there are very little monitoring and evaluation of policies and programs for smes (oecd, 2018). the myanmar sme development agency, which was established in april 2012, provides support assistance for msmes through trade fairs and competitions, awarding the national msmes award, technology transfer, business matching and exhibitions, capacity building, financial access, smes registration, and advisory and consulting service (myanmar sme development agency, 2020). the framework for economic and social reform (fesr) and the comprehensive national development plan (2012-2015) has developed in collaboration with senior officials of various ministries and departments of the government from may to october 2012. this is in line with president u thein sein’s announcement of the second stage of reforms after politically liberalizing measures has been introduced. the fesr has laid out policy priorities for the government in the next three years while outlining key parameters of the reform process that will enable myanmar to become a modern, developed, and democratic nation by 2030. specifically, for women, the fesr mentions the following: (1) embracing worker’s rights and social protection ensuring rights-based, inclusive and systemic policy development, with due attention given to alleviating poverty and addressing inequities, social exclusion, and emergencies; (2) prevention of violence against women and trafficking in persons; (3) promotion of gender equality and women empowerment; and (4) improvement of maternal health (mdri-cesd, 2012). the ministry of social welfare, relief and resettlement launched the national strategic plan on the advancement of women (2013-2022) in 2013. the ten-year national strategic plan covers the key areas that affect women’s lives and present practical ways to address the issues that myanmar women are experiencing. the plan is based on the 12 priority areas outlined in the beijing platform for action and the principles of the convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women (cedaw) to which myanmar became a signatory in 1997. the 12 priority areas covered are: (1) women and livelihoods, (2) women, education, and training, (3) women and health, (4) violence against women, (5) women and emergencies, (6) women and the economy, (7) women and decision-making, journal of asean studies 201 (8) institutional mechanisms for the advancement of women, (9) women and human rights, (10) women and the media, (11) women and the environment, and (12) the girl child. focusing on priority number 1 and 6, women and livelihoods and women and the economy, the plan aims to cultivate enabling systems, structures, and practices that improve women’s livelihoods and reduce poverty and to strengthen mechanism, framework, and practices to uphold fairness and equal rights for women concerning employment credit, resources, assets and economic benefits (moswrr, 2012). the international labor organization (ilo) (2014) on its national assessment of women’s entrepreneurship development in myanmar notes that although the government of myanmar publishes some official data on msmes, it does not contain sex-disaggregated data on the percentage of enterprises owned by women. on the other hand, the data on selfemployment from the 2014 population and housing census reveals that 37,7 % of employed women are self-employed, in contrast with 47,3% of employed men. it shows that there are an estimated 3,3 million self-employed women and 6,4 million men in myanmar, and men are almost twice as likely to be self-employed. women in myanmar comprises the estimated 34% of own-account self-employed persons (excluding employees) in the country, but only 25,6 % of employers. the ilo notes that this might entail that women hurdle more challenges in developing their microenterprises into smalland medium-sized enterprises, and in producing more jobs (ilo, 2014). philippine msmes as economic drivers the philippine statistics authority (psa) in 2018 recorded a total of 1.003.111 establishments in 2018 of which 998.342 or 99,52% are msmes. microenterprises account for 88,45% (887.272), small enterprises for 10,58% (106.175), and medium enterprise for 0,49 % (4.895). on the other hand, large enterprises account for only 0,48% (4.769) of the total establishments, as seen in figure 2. figure 2. 2018 number of establishments per classification in the philippines source: philippine statistics authority (psa), number of establishments by section and employment groupings (msmes), philippines: 2018 le large 0,48% medium 0,49% small 10,58% micro 88,45% msmes 99,52% large medium small micro 202 assessment of business environment in figure 3, it can been that although large companies constitute the least number of establishments, they employs 37% of the total workforce of enterprises. microenterprises comprise 29% of the employment, small enterprises with 27%, and medium enterprises with 7% (psa, 2018). figure 3. 2018 employment per establishment classification in the philippines source: philippine statistics authority (psa), total employment by section and employment groupings (msmes), philippines: 2018 le in the philippines, the bureau of small and medium enterprises (bsmed) of the department of trade and industry (dti) acts as the secretariat of the micro, small and medium enterprise development (msmed) council, as stipulated on republic act (ra) no. 6977, or the magna carta for msmes. bsmed develops and implements programs and projects that address the specific needs of msmes. these programs and projects cover the areas of technology development and transfer, financing, marketing, and training. the bmsmed is also mandated to promote and develop msmes in the country and is also tasked to assess and proposed policies and strategies geared towards the advancement of msmes in the areas of entrepreneurship development, institutional strengthening, and productivity improvement. according to msmed plan 2017-2022, government policies and programs for msmes encompass the following four outcome areas such as business environment, productivity and efficiency, market access, and access to finance. business environment refers to a dynamic practice and culture of governance that fosters the establishment, development, sustainability, and competitiveness of socially responsible and environment-friendly msmes. supportively, the outcome area on the policy side are: 1) republic act (ra) no. 9501: magna carta for micro, small and medium enterprises; 2) ra no. 6977, as amended by ra no. 8289; 3) ra no. 9178: barangay micro business enterprises (bmbes) act of 2002; 4) ra 10644: go negosyo act; 5) ra 10679: youth entrepreneurship act; 6) ra no. 9485: anti-red tape act; 7) dti-dilg joint memorandum circular no. 1 series of 2011: guidelines in implementing the standards in journal of asean studies 203 processing business permits and licenses in all cities and municipalities; and 8) dti-dilg joint memorandum circular no.1 series of 2016: revised standards in processing business permits and licenses in all cities and municipalities. on january 24, 1991, the philippines passed ra no. 6977: an act to promote, develop and assist small and medium scale enterprises through the creation of a small and medium enterprise development (smed) council, and the rationalization of government assistance programs and agencies concerned with the development. ra no. 6777 is also known as the magna carta for small enterprises. the act recognizes that smes have the potential for more employment generation and economic growth and, therefore, can contribute to a self-sufficient industrial foundation for the country. ra no. 6777 has been declared the policy of the state to promote, support, strengthen, and encourage the growth and development of smes in all productive sectors of the economy, particularly rural or agri-based enterprises. the law was amended on may 6, 1997 as ra no. 8289: an act to strengthen the promotion and development of, and assistance to small and medium scale enterprises (smes). the law was further amended on may 23, 2008 as ra 9501: an act to promote entrepreneurship by strengthening development and assistance programs to micro, small and medium scale enterprises (msmes), otherwise known as the magna carta for msmes. according to the declaration of the policy, the law recognizes that msmes have the potential for more employment generation and economic growth and thus can help provide a self-sufficient industrial foundation for the country. hence it has been declared as the policy of the state to assist, promote, strengthen, and foster the growth and development of msmes in all productive sectors of the economy to include rural or agri-based enterprises. given this, the state shall recognize the specific needs of the msmes, and the particular needs of the msmes and shall undertake to promote entrepreneurship, support entrepreneurs, encourage the establishments of msmes and ensure their sustainability and growth to attain countryside industrialization. ra no. 9178: an act to promote the establishment of barangay micro business enterprises (bmbes), otherwise known as the barangay micro business enterprises (bmbes) act of 2002 was signed into law on november 13, 2002. the law was declared as a policy to hasten the country’s economic development by boosting the establishment and growth of barangay microenterprises, which effectively serve as an avenue for the development of filipino entrepreneurial talents. the law endeavors to integrate those in the informal sector with the mainstream economy through the rationalization of bureaucratic limitations, the active intervention of the government, especially at the local or grassroots level, and the granting of incentives, benefits, and assistance to generate much-needed employment and alleviate poverty. ra no. 9178 classifies bmbe as any business enterprise engaged in production, processing, or manufacturing of products, which includes agro-processing, as well as trading and services. bmbe has a total asset of not more than php 3 millions, which consists of those that arise from loans but not the land on which the plant and equipment are located. ra no. 9178 excludes in the services provided by anyone who is licensed by the government after having passed a licensure examination, in connection with the exercise of one’s profession (e.g., accountant, lawyer, doctor, etc.). the department of finance’s (dof’s) department 204 assessment of business environment order (do) no. 17-04 states that an enterprise could only qualify to register as a bmbe if it is not a branch, subsidiary, division or office of a large enterprise and its policies and business operations are not managed by large enterprises or by persons who are neither owners nor employees of the enterprise (i.e., franchises). ra no. 9178 primarily aims to integrate micro-enterprises in the informal sector into the mainstream of the economy. reinforcing active participation of bmbes in the economy would mean more jobs and livelihood, and a better quality of life for filipinos. furthermore, under ra no. 9178, bmbes are qualified for income tax exemption from income arising from the operations of the enterprise. exclusion from the coverage of the minimum wage law with employees assures to receive the same social security and health care benefits as other employees in any other enterprise classification, priority to a special credit window set up specifically for the financing needs of bmbes, and technology transfer, production, management training, and marketing assistance programs for bmbe beneficiaries. ra no. 10644: an act promoting job generation and inclusive growth through the development of micro, small and medium enterprises, known as the go negosyo act was signed into law on july 15 2014. it is to promote national development, encourage inclusive growth, and reduce poverty by encouraging the establishment of micro, small and medium enterprises (msmes) that facilitate local job creation, production and trade in the country. the law aims for: 1) the establishment of negosyo centers in all provinces, cities, and municipalities nationwide; 2) msmes development fund and bmbe fund supported the establishment of a start-up fund; 3) transfer of technology, training related to production and management, and marketing assistance for smes; 4) a unified and simplified business registration through automatic approval of business permits and licenses that were declined for any reason within 15 days; and 5) reconfiguration of the msme development council and its additional functions. ra no. 10679: an act promoting entrepreneurship and financial education among filipino youth, known as the youth entrepreneurship act was signed into law on august 27, 2015 to promote the enduring development of young filipinos with aptitude and skill in the field of finance and entrepreneurship. ra no. 10679 encourages and endeavor to hone the youths’ skills through education and specialized training programs. given this, the state is directed to establish, maintain, and support a complete, adequate, and integrated system of education and training to boost the entrepreneurial spirit among youth as well as boost and foster the growth of young entrepreneurs nationwide. the law endeavors to integrate entrepreneurship into the philippines' secondary and tertiary education curricula, facilitate grants for both the teaching and the practice of entrepreneurship, and develop a national youth entrepreneurship program to provide support to young entrepreneurs. the philippines has various programs and services to support msmes. these are reflected in the msmed plan 2017-2022. the programs and services are divided into productivity and efficiency, market access, and access to finance. journal of asean studies 205 results of the survey conducted with women involved in micro, small, and medium enterprises (msmes) in the philippines women-led msmes usually deal with challenges such as social and cultural norms, gender stereotypes, lack of access to decision-making, unequal access to resources, lack of access to education or training, which significantly constrain business opportunities. not to mention they encounter problems like limited access to finance, information and communication technology (ict) and a lack of market information, as well as burdensome regulations and administrative procedures (unescap, 2017). focusing on the philippines, respondents are all part of the c-level executives of companies, if not the owners. they also participate in decision-making for the companies. the participation of women in the workforce pool is also comparable with that of men. these are good indications of the attitude of the philippines in terms of women's participation in leadership. respondents shows a high desire to contribute economically through business as most of the respondents are driven by the aspiration to provide livelihood or employment, to fill the gap in the market, as well as to support and provide for the needs of their families. engaging in business has been their avenue for a sense of achievement and to support advocacy for the industry. respondents convey fulfillment in doing business in the philippines. however, they also express a need to streamline governmental requirements and procedures and services and the need for government incentives to support businesses led by women, among others. although the majority believe that they feel empowered to engage in economic activity in the philippines, it remains difficult for a woman to enter into a business. this is primarily because they consider the programs and services need to be more accessible for them. not to mention there is still a constant struggle to prove themselves in terms of their capabilities to run a business as compared to their male counterpart. as for policies and programs supporting women in terms of business, the majority of them are not aware of any. for those who are aware, they believe that these policies and programs are in place to empower them, prevent discrimination in all forms, protect them from abuse, and help them access wider opportunities, improve their business, among others. however, others deem that programs and services for women need improvements. most of them also do not avail of any programs and services for women. respondents consider a lack of financial support or resources as their primary barriers to engaging in the business. they also mention that in spite of empowerment to run a business, there are still instances when they feel discriminated against. slow government transactions are also one of the bottlenecks. for those dealing with food manufacturing, they mention hurdles with transactions at the food and drug administration (fda). gaining various certifications to gain credibility such as halal and good manufacturing practices (gmp), among others, is also mentioned particularly that it also entails operational cost from them. furthermore, women also feel the pressure in balancing running a business and family rearing. 206 assessment of business environment despite challenges, respondents have optimistic views of the future in so far as their businesses are concerned, which is attributed to anticipation of more business opportunities, an expectation of a better operational organization, development and release of innovative products which answer the demand in the market, impact of technological advancement, and heightened collaboration between private and government entities. on the other hand, some respondents also convey anxiety on the impact of the global health crisis brought about by covid-19 on the overall health of economy and business. conclusions the research presents that women’s participation in economic activity, in particular in msmes, is primarily affected by conditions that can catalyze engagements. table 6 summarizes the various aspects of business environment that cover the degree of women’s participation, policies, programs, and services for women in singapore, myanmar, and the philippines. table 6 comparative table for the business environment studied for singapore, myanmar, and the philippines1 metrics singapore myanmar philippines profile of women in msmes 27% are owners 25.5% are employers 56% are owners policies for women in msmes no specific policies for women but existing policies are supportive of women's business ownership. follows the 2015 sme development policy with (1) human resource, (2) technology development and innovation, (3) financial resource, (4) infrastructure development, (5) market access, (6) appropriate taxation and procedures, and (7) conducive business environment as key priority areas ra 9710: magna carta of women programs and services for women in msmes handled by enterprise singapore, which encompasses assistance such as financial assistance, market access, and talent assistance for all msmes. no specific assistance for women. led by the myanmar sme development agency, which provides capacity building, technology promotion, market promotion, and business matching, among others. no specific programs and services for women. various programs and services to support msmes are reflected in the msmed plan 20172022. there are programs specific to women such as great women project and spark! philippines (2020). 1 information for singapore and myanmar was based on available secondary sources while for the philippines was based on both primary (survey) and secondary sources. journal of asean studies 207 singapore is said to have a conducive environment for women to engage in business. however, only less than one-third of business owners are women. this can be attributed to other considerations such as their societal responsibilities and motivation, among others, which can also be explored in future studies. myanmar government lacks sex-disaggregated data for business owners, but according to their ministry of immigration and population, there are only 25,6% of employers. it can be gleaned from this situation that women encounter challenges in growing their businesses and, therefore, to create jobs. the current sme development policy, programs, and services should be reviewed to make these more relevant to the current needs of the msmes and, more importantly of women entrepreneurs and would-be entrepreneurs. therefore, laying out a framework for monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of the current policies, programs, and services is deemed a must. on the other hand, the majority of filipino women entrepreneurs feel that they are empowered to run a business in the philippines. however, challenges still affect the management and performance of the business. based on the results of the survey, recommendations on the business environment for women engaged in msmes in the philippines are provided: 1. aggressive and in-depth information dissemination campaign on policies, programs, and services to be able to reach a broader population of women and to ensure understanding of these elements. 2. teaching men and women alike to champion pro-women policies in any organization. organizational policies need to reflect gender equality as well, which would reflect from recruitment to compensation. the management needs to ensure that policies, processes, procedures, and decisions are structured with due diligence and devoid of overt and covert biases. 3. streamlining and mainstreaming government policies, programs, and services for women following the beijing declaration and platform for action in 1995, 2030 agenda for sustainable development, and cedaw. about the author the author, myrtle faye laberinto solina, was born on march 13, 1988 in pangil, laguna, philippines. she took up bachelor of science in agriculture major in agricultural extension from the university of the philippines los baños (uplb) and graduated with a master’s degree in asean studies at the university of the philippines open university (upou). she is currently affiliated with the export marketing bureau (emb) of the department of trade and industry (dti) in the philippines. 208 assessment of business environment references adrianzen, c. 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(2017, july 18). singapore 8th best city for women entrepreneurs. sgsme. www.sgsme.sg/news/singapore-8th-best-city-women-entrepreneurs http://www.smefinanceforum.org/sites/default/files/blogs/ctg-countryreport-myanmar-final.pdf http://www.smefinanceforum.org/sites/default/files/blogs/ctg-countryreport-myanmar-final.pdf http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/escap-fwe-asean-full_0.pdf https://unctad.org/news/women-must-play-bigger-role-trade https://unctad.org/news/women-must-play-bigger-role-trade http://www.sgsme.sg/news/singapore-8th-best-city-women-entrepreneurs journal of asean studies, vol. 4, no. 1 (2016), pp. 34-60 ©2016 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic the political economy of the automobile industry in asean: a cross-country comparison1 wan-ping tai cheng shiu university, taiwan abstract the automobile industry plays a leading role in a country’s industrialization. various countries have used different methods to identify a model of industrial development. for developing countries, establishing the automobile industry is crucial for promoting industrialization. after southeast asian countries had achieved independent, their automobile industries underwent establishment and development stages. the domestic and overseas competitiveness of the automobile industries in asean have received global attention. how can the industrial development of thailand, indonesia, malaysia, and the philippines be understood? researchers have proposed various views regarding the industrial development of these four asean countries. we researched the political economy of these countries to understand the development of their automobile industries. thailand’s automobile industry was successfully developed because of the government’s crucial role in implementing a coordinated market economy and national system of innovation. in indonesia, government–business relations hampered the government’s efforts to meet society and market needs, thereby limiting the country’s industrialization. malaysia must learn how to coordinate its industries with a market economy through liberalization and coordination. the philippines has positioned its automobile industry on manufacturing automotive parts because of the country’s limited industrialization. theoretically, following the 1997 asian financial crisis, these asean countries have adopted market economy-oriented policies; however, because of the historical context of political economy, the development of their automobile industries has varied. under the context of globalization, the economic systems of various countries have exhibited low convergence. in this study, we show that embedded liberalism is the preferred interpretation in asean automobile industry development. in other words, researchers should look beyond convergence theory and consider the political economy characteristics of various countries. accordingly, further comparative research must be conducted to clarify the differences in the economic systems and policies in asean studies. keywords: political economy, asean, automobile industry, globalization, embedded liberalism 1 original paper was presented at 2015 consortium for southeast asian studies in asia, tokyo university, 2015/12. the study also belongs to a part of author`s minister of science and technology project (most 102-2410-h-230 -003 -my2). journal of asean studies 35 introduction automobile industries play a leading role in a country’s industrialization. countries such as thailand, malaysia, indonesia, and the philippines have adopted various strategies in attempting to identify a model of industrial development, establish their automobile industry, and promote industrialization. after southeast asian countries had become independent, their automobile industries underwent establishment and development stages. in the twenty-first century, the domestic and overseas competitiveness of the automobile industries in association of southeast asian nations (asean) have received global attention. according to table 1, regarding the foreign trade of asean countries between 2000 to 2010, vehicle exports and imports have increased by 47.4% and 12.4%, respectively. in addition, domestic trade in asean countries has grown rapidly; from 2000 to 2010, the vehicle exports and imports increased by 77% and 94%, respectively. trade growth has stimulated the development of various industries in these countries. in particular, in the asean economic community (aec), tariff reduction has driven the prospective development of automobile industries in this region. table 1 value of vehicle imports and export in thailand, malaysia, indonesia, and the philippines (2000, 2005 and2010) unit: us$1 million 2000 2005 2010 growth rate% domestic trade exports 1.06 4.88 9.22 77.0 imports 0.80 3.98 8.33 94.1 foreign trade exports 3.33 9.10 19.1 3 47.4 imports 9.55 14.0 2 21.3 6 12.4 data source: statistical data sets of organisation internationale des constructeurs d’automobiles (oica) and world trade organization (wto) about vehicle imports and exports, http://stat.wto.org/statisticalprogram/wsdbs tatprogramtechnotes.aspx?language=e(2015/9/1) 36 the political economy of the automobile industry the question is which of these asean countries has achieved the strongest automobile industry performance. tables 2 and 3 show the performance of automobile businesses in four asean countries for the 1990 to 2010 period. the tables show that thailand, with japan as a foreign investor, has demonstrated the strongest performance in trade and production among these four asean countries. although malaysia’s trade transactions have been less than thailand’s and indonesia’s, malaysia is the only country among these four countries to own a local automobile brand. indonesia intends to follow thailand’s model of liberalizing automobile businesses; in addition, indonesia has attempted to establish its national brand. regardless of production or trade imports and exports, indonesia’s automobile industry is weaker than that of thailand and malaysia. the philippines does not have a clear goal for industrial development, and its production and trade volumes are less than those of the other three countries are. table 2 value of automobile manufacturing and vehicle imports and exports in thailand, malaysia, indonesia, and the philippines (1990–2010) unit: us$1 million trade growth rate (%) trade value 1990 1995 2000 2010 1990-2000 2000-10 1990-95 1995-2010 thailand exports 0.11 0.49 2.42 18.7 210 67.3 69.1 247.8 imports 2.65 5.18 2.08 8.54 -2.2 31.1 19.1 4.3 malaysia exports 0.12 0.28 0.31 1.33 15.8 32.9 26.7 25 imports 1.31 2.79 1.83 5.76 4 21.5 22.6 7.1 indonesia exports 0.02 0.13 0.37 2.55 175 58.9 110 124.1 imports 1.52 3.14 1.87 5.56 2.3 45.6 21.3 5.1 the philippines exports 0.02 0.22 0.58 1.82 280 21.3 200 48.5 imports 0.54 1.54 0.97 2.57 8 16.5 37 4.5 source: statistical data sets of oica and wto about vehicle imports and exports, http://stat.wto.org/statisticalprogram/wsdbstatprogramtechnotes.aspx?language=e(2015/9/1) journal of asean studies 37 table 3 production and manufacturing in thailand, malaysia, indonesia, and the philippines (1980–1995 and 1995–2010) unit: us$1 million year growth rate (%) 1980 1995 2010 2014 1980-95 1995-2010 2010-2014 malaysia sales 9,762 285,792 605,156 666,465 12.9 7.4 30.5 production 104,227 288,338 567,715 596,600 11.8 6.4 14.37 thailand sales 89,201 547,758 800,357 881,832 34.3 3.1 40.53 production 73,985 525,680 1,644,513 1,880,007 40.7 14.2 117.16 indonesia sales 212,000 384,000 764,710 1,208,019 6.6 220.55 production 174,700 388,000 702,508 1,298,523 8.1 5.4 296.52 the philippines sales 70,000 128,162 170,216 296,492 2.2 62.82 production 41,900 127,016 65,625 13.5 -3.2 source: richard f. doner and p. wad, ‚financial crises and automotive industry development in southeast asia‛, journal of contemporary asia, vol. 44, no. 4(2014), p. 668. because of the automobile industry in guiding economic development and industrialization, these four asean countries hope that developing their automobile industries can facilitate industrial development; however, differences in the political and economic history, as well as the development of industry in these four countries, have led to varying results. how can the development of the automobile industries in these four asean countries be understood? do such developments have political and economic implications? previous studies have considered the industrial development of asean countries as a whole. researchers who advocate neoclassical economics consider that national industry typically develop according to their comparative advantage; also, market competition should be encouraged, and economic rationality should be adopted to optimize resources allocation (balassa 1982; bhagwati 1988, pp. 25-27). scholar has even proposed a slogan‛ the end of history‛ (fukuyama 1992). however, neoclassical economics has fueled much discussion (chu 2001, 67). some researchers have indicated that slow economic development is related to market and international factors; economic development in developing countries has not been based on the principles of a free market (zysman 1995, pp. 1-3; doherty 1995, pp. 1-3; jomo 2007, pp. 461-508). for example, regarding the concept of developmental state proposed by japan, johnson considered that the rapid development of east asian countries after world war ii was related to these countries’ strenuous efforts to improve 38 the political economy of the automobile industry their economy (johnson 1982; kumon 1972, pp. 109-141; rosovsky 1972, pp. 109-141). in addition to the theory of developmental state, dependency theory and dependency development theory(doner 1991; jenkins 1991, pp. 625-645), structure theory(crouch 1986; robison 1992; robison 1986), institutional theory(chang 1994), and government–business relations(laothamatas 1992; maclntyre 1991; haggared 1998, pp. 78-104) differ substantially from neoclassical economics (these are referred to as the development school of economics hereafter). since the 2000s, international systems have developed a division of labor system in global production and manufacturing; consequently, developing countries have faced problems with industrial liberalization and protection removal(wade 2003, pp. 621-644). these theoretical debates have overlooked the specific historical conditions and issues about global industrial innovation (hill 2004, pp. 354-394). in addition, the development model for east asian countries does not necessarily suit southeast asian countries (jomo 2007a; jomo 2000b; stiglitz and yusof 2001). in reality, since the 1997 asian financial crisis, the political and economic environments of southeast asian countries have changed substantially. the aforementioned theoretical debates are mostly focused on the pre-financial crisis period and do not provide a comprehensive comparison. these theoretical limitations should be viewed from a different research perspective. in the present paper, the long-term strategies of malaysia, thailand, indonesia, and the philippines in developing their automobile industries are analyzed and summarized. first, the political and economic characteristics of each country are analyzed from the perspective of the development of each country’s automobile industry specifically between 1960 and 1997 (when the asian financial crisis occurred). this period is referred to as the period of globalization (doner and wad 2014, pp. 664-687).2 second, how the automobile industries in these four asean countries adapted to globalization is discussed. finally, we offer a conclusion by our analysis. the political economy background of the automobile industry in asean: the state, government–business relations and foreign investment 1. the state a. malaysia malaysia appears to be a successful case that follows the development school of economics. after an incident of political violence on may 13, 1969, which occurred following the 1969 election, the state led by malays adopted a new economic policy promoting industrialization as a 2 the beginning of globalization typically refers to the year of 1994 when wto was founded. in this study, the 1997 financial crisis was used as a cutoff point because of the following considerations: (a) the financial crisis forced various countries to adjust their industrial policies. (b) after the financial crisis, asean countries began to transform their political and economic structures. (c) after the financial crisis, the asean announced the 1999 hanoi declaration in declaring that asean countries would intensively integrate the region and accelerate trade liberalization. journal of asean studies 39 characteristic of malaysia’s industrial development. the new economic policy not only changed the political and economic structure of malaysia during its early independence period but also depoliticized the economic structure through legalized economic development (tan 1992,pp. 208-305). the government implemented an economic policy to enable national power to influence various social classes; the malay government regulated economic development to maintain its ruling power ( ho 1988). in the 1990s, malaysia’s longest-serving prime minister, mahathir bin mohamad, promoted heavy industrialization to stimulate the national economy. mohamad assisted the heavy industries corporation of malaysia in developing and implementing national heavy industrial projects and the industrial master plan (imp) to stimulate domestic automobile production. mohamad intended to improve the situation in which most businesses were owned by chinese capitalists. through industrial adjustment (i.e., the plan to manufacture domestic vehicles), malaysia’s social structure was reorganized; the automobile industry was transformed from a parts assembler to an exporter of domestic vehicles. since then, the automobile industry was considered as malaysia’s most strategic industry, which was crucial for achieving the 2020 target of establishing a national car brand in malaysia. under the new political-economy structure, malaysia created the only national car brand (i.e., proton; perusahaan otomotif) in asean countries. through the creation of a national brand, proton covered approximately 45% of the domestic market. in 1997, proton acquired british lotus cars. before this, a second domestic car company, perodua, was founded in october 1992 and received considerable national support. this company created a large-scale vehicle parts market. in the 1990 period, proton cars had 350 suppliers, had invested myr4.6 billion, and employed 30,000 people.3 malaysia continued to protect the automobile industry but did not consider whether the industry was adequately self-reliant. in addition, related manufacturers relied heavily on the government and required national protection because domestic cars did not incline to minimize their costs. woo-cumings argued that industries that rely on national protection and do not seek industrial transformation are indicative of crony capitalism; moreover, countries that provide national protection to certain industries are not in an east asian developmental state (woo-cumings 1999, pp. 1-31). b. indonesia among the four asean countries discussed in this paper, indonesia was the first to develop its automobile industry. in 1929, general motors founded the first assembly factory in java. indonesia had a large domestic market and excellent advantages over industrial development. when indonesia achieved independence, the country’s first president, sukarno, implemented nationalization and localization (pribumi) 3 ‚how is the automobile industry in malaysia?‛ in china automobile news, june 3, 2002, the third section 40 the political economy of the automobile industry policies on the basis of economic nationalism and confiscated enterprises originally owned by former colonists (soong 1996, pp. 279-282). after national vehicle indonesia service company was founded, the automobile industry became crucial for promoting economic nationalism and establishing an aboriginal capital. during the new order period after 1965, the automobile industry alternated between protectionism and the free market; no complete industrial plan was developed. as malaysia developed its plan for promoting domestic automobiles, indonesia began to promote a similar plan in 1994 because of economic nationalism. in contrast to malaysia, indonesia’s plan was not aimed at heavily industrializing indonesia, but to justify the corruptive behavior of the suharto family. various wto member countries complained about the domestic automobile plan; in addition, because of a proviso for assistance from the international monetary fund (imf) following the 1997 asian financial crisis, indonesia’s automobile market became an open market. regarding malaysia’s government-led industrial development, some researchers have analyzed the government’s determination to develop an industry on the basis of the will to develop, and malaysia and indonesia plans to promote their domestic vehicle markets have been compared from this perspective. the goal of malaysia’s automobile industry was clear: to develop a national brand through national protection in order to establish national confidence, which served as a basis for formulating industrial and trade policies. for example, import permits, tariff protections, and national investment were promoted to encourage industrial development (tai 2008,53-76). enterprises were supported with national resources, thereby facilitating developing international brands (chu 2011, p. 248). malaysia endeavored to develop its national brand; however, suharto’s slogan ‚developing a national economy‛ was aimed at benefiting suharto’s personal interests. during the new order period, automobile policies in indonesia alternated between open a market economy and nationalism. this is why the foundation of the automobile industry in indonesia was not as solid as that in malaysia. d. the philippines in the 1950s, the philippines were an economic power in asia and had a large domestic market, which served as an excellent foundation for industrial development. on july 4, 1946, the philippines achieved independence from the united states. the roxas, quirino, magasaysay, garcia, macapagal, and marcos (who became the president in 1965) administrations had adopted an import substitution strategy to protect national industries, enhance the industrialization level, and reduce import dependency. because of this strategy, the philippines’ economy was the fastest growing in southeast asia, and its industries developed successfully in the early period of independence.4 4 in east asia, the level if industrialization in the philippines in 1950 was second only to japan. journal of asean studies 41 the philippines began to develop its automobile industry in 1960; subsequently, the country continued to implement new policies. in the 1980s, local automobile businesses closed down because of foreign exchange crisis when happening in 1983. at the end of the marcos era, the government could not control the used vehicle imports, which had a negative influence on local automobile businesses. in brief, the philippines did not take issues related to the automobile industry seriously, and local automobile businesses became uncompetitive because of the import substitution strategy. although local automobile businesses strived for success, the industry exhibited slow growth because of the limited size of the domestic automobile market and overproduction. the sales volume of used vehicles was more than twice that of new vehicles. accordingly, multinational companies were discouraged from investing in establishing factories in the philippines (xu 2012).5 the philippines appears to have missed its opportunity to develop an automobile industry. when other southeast asian countries actively promoted an export orientation for their automobile industries in the 1980s, local capitalists in the philippines controlled the economy and the import substitution strategy, which researchers have referred to as ‚booty capitalism,‛ limited the country’s industrial transformation (hutchcroft 1998). 5 ford motor company closed down its factories in the philippines at the end of 2012. ford motor company indicated that its factories closed down because of no supply for automobile parts and no cluster effect. because of the limitations of a local capitalistic structure, the philippines were unsuccessful in implementing its proposed industrial policies. d. thailand similar to the philippines, thailand was a weak country with a strong sense of community (doner 1988, p. 1561). although the thai government was a military-led government, the government did not have strong control in leading its industries because of frequent coups. in 1980, prem tinsulanonda gained support from the military and civilians and became the country’s prime minister, and thailand’s political situation was relatively stable for the next eight years. in 1988, chatichai choonhave, a scholar, became the prime minister and led thailand in transforming a war-torn region into a commercial market (bunbongkarn 1996, p. 27). at the end of the cold war, like other countries, thailand considered economic development crucial and formulated economic development strategies. after the country had democratized, businesses began sending representatives to political parties, the parliament, and the cabinet, and these lobbyists became involved in political decision making. in contrast to suharto in indonesia, mohamad in malaysia, and marcos in the philippines, thailand’s political leaders did not have highly centralized leadership structure (doner 1988,p. 1561). because of this special structure, thailand’s industrial policies were oriented toward liberal corporatism (laothamatas 1992). the government of thailand continued to influence the country’s 42 the political economy of the automobile industry domestic automobile industry. latin american countries relied on foreign investment to develop their economy; accordingly, many businesses were forced to merge with or were acquired by multinational companies (amsden 2003). in thailand, local capitalists were responsible for production and learning; consequently, were counter to the prediction of dependency theory. as indicated by doner, although thailand’s industrial policies were effective in attracting foreign investment and supported the connection between multinational companies and local capitalists in the 1980s, the government maintained its independence and assisted with the communication between local capitalists and multinational companies to expand the market and improve technology (doner 1988, p. 1561). the private sector played a crucial role in thailand’s industrialization, with the government acting as a facilitator (ikemto 1992, p. 172). 2. government–business relations a. malaysia government–business relations in malaysia and indonesia influenced the development of their automobile industries. in malaysia, such relationships mainly benefited specific ethnic and racial groups. according to the new economic policies implemented by the mohammad administration, protecting the automobile industry was imperative to protect the interests of various ethnic groups.6 regarding the 6 before proton was founded, japan-based car manufacturing groups and chinese people had majority control over the automobile assembly industry; malays sold ownership structure of proton, most shareholders were malay business groups.7 to protect their interests, the social benefits of the domestic car plan were considered more crucial than the profits gained by businesses. therefore, although the management of domestic car businesses was unsatisfactory, the government continued to assist domestic car manufacturers. automobile businesses in malaysia were notorious for the approved-permit system. in malaysia, all vehicle imports required an approved permit. this system was implemented to protect assembly factories in malaysia and to enable malay enterprises to import and sell vehicles. holding an approved permit was equivalent to having a quota of vehicle imports; accordingly, an approved permit meant a profitable privilege. malaysia sin chew daily reported on enterprises that had obtained an approved permit through their favorable relations with the government.8 the protective industrial cars only for downstream businesses. however, after the domestic car plan was developed, the structure of share ownership changed. regardless of the new economic policy or national heavy industrial plan, automobile businesses and related automobile parts businesses were required to meet national requirements and to encourage malays to invest. 7 for information on the ownership structure of proton, please refer to ‚a political and economic analysis of rent-seeking theory and the automobile industry in malaysia‛ by dai, w. p., published in chinese association of political science in september 2007 at the department of public policy and management, i-shou university, kaohsiung. 8 malaysia sin chew daily listed ten enterprises that held an approved permit in 2005. journal of asean studies 43 policy became one of political favoritism related to the allocation of profits. b. indonesia the relationship between each former president in indonesia and businesses influenced the development of its automobile industry. since the 1950s, the national automobile assembly factory led by the government was highly powerful; the person in charge was called the king of cars and maintained a close relationship with sukarno. the main job of all automobile manufacturers was to obtain distribution rights for import vehicle licenses(chalmerd 1994, 17); capitalists were relatively unconcerned about production technology(hansen 1971, 57-58). to protect corporate interests, most companies established favorable relations with suharto. many companies with excellent government– business relations cooperated with japan and had their products included in the government’s protection list (chalmer 1994, pp. 25). in brief, the industrial policy related to the reduction plan appeared to facilitate the development of local automobile businesses; however, this policy was the ruler’s excuse to develop government– business relations (chalmer 1994, 25). another example was that suharto proposed the pioneer program in 1996. according to this program, the government could grant the status of ‚pioneer‛ to local companies whose capital, equipment, and technology achieved a certain standard; in addition, http://www.sinchew-i.com/special/aplist/ind ex.phtml?sec=723&artid=200507190274(2007 /3/31) these companies were exempted from consumption taxes and import tariffs. however, this program was revealed to be protecting a company owned by tommy suharto, the son of president suharto. the industrial structure was determined by government–business relations and thus could not be improved. researchers have considered indonesia’s automobile industry an unindustrialized industry(aswicahyono 2000, pp. 209-241). c. thailand in thailand, government–business relations were crucial (chen 2008). however, government–business relations had no influence on the automobile industry. the reason is that chinese businesspersons in thailand did not pay much attention to industries related to automobile manufacturing.9 d. the philippines former leaders of the philippines announced plans to develop the country’s automobile industry; however, their attempts were unsuccessful. other east asian countries had adopted an import substitution strategy to protect their manufacturing industries, as well as export discipline to force the manufacturing industry to sell domestic products and increase its international competitiveness (studwell 2014). the philippines should have followed other east asian countries in capitalizing on the opportunity to transform the import substitution strategy into an 9 chia tai group in thailand did not cooperate with faw-volkswagen automotive co. ltd in shanghai, china, in producing mg cars (a british brand) in thailand until 2014. 44 the political economy of the automobile industry export-orientation strategy. however, local capitalists in the philippines (e.g., landlords, urban elites, and chinese businesspeople) focused on the import substitution strategy and had no intention of transforming their focus from agricultural production to industrial manufacturing; the government lacked the capital to lead heavy industrialization. such political and business structures hindered industrial progress in the philippines. 3. foreign investment a. malaysia to manufacture cars, the heavy industry group in malaysia chose to cooperate with mitsubishi motors and limited other foreign investment. however, in the late 1990s, the automobile industry in malaysia began to decline (wade 2003,p. 8) because it did not cooperate with foreign investors or be linked with international businesses. although the tan chong group cooperated with foreign investors to assemble nissan and renault cars, the government controlled the development of the automobile industry. rosli and kari found that under national protection, local manufacturers and automobile parts businesses had no opportunity to communicate with international assembly factories, resulting in automobile businesses in malaysia becoming uncompetitive(rosli and kari 2008,103-118). b. indonesia during the new order period, japanese automotive mncs(multinational enterprises) injected capital into local businesses (i.e., chinese businesses) to evade policy controls and operate in indonesia. the astra group leveraged its relations with suharto to obtain a license under the guise of promoting local business. however, the assembly factory was a joint venture of astra group and toyota(chalmers 1996, 31; audet and vangrasstek 1997,pp. 220-221). japanese automobile manufacturers cooperated with local automobile manufacturers to expand the overseas market, which is why japanese mncs continued to monopolize indonesia’s automobile industry.10 c. thailand thailand is willing to cooperate with mncs and is an example of development-by-invitation. thailand’s automobile industry began developing at the later stage of the development of the asean automobile industry. however, thailand was not under pressure to remove a colonial economy. when the plaza accord in 1985 forced the japanese yen to appreciate against the us dollar, japanese automakers were forced to move overseas to minimize production costs; thailand became the first investment choice for japanese mncs (rasiah 1999; lim 2006,p. 8). through cooperation with foreign investment, a specialized supply chain system formed in thailand’s domestic automobile manufacturing industry. researchers have argued that this be why thailand became the hub of southeast asia’s automobile manufacturing industry(kohpaiboon 2007,p. 8). because of large investment 10 for information on how local funds and foreign capital were jointly used to acquire the government’s protection during this period, please refer to chalmers (1996). journal of asean studies 45 projects, the manufacturing growth rate in thailand between 1990 and 1994 was ranked highest in the world (fujita 1998, p. 154). despite the 1997 asian financial crisis, thailand did not limit the level of foreign investment. conversely, the 1999 foreign business act promoted foreign investment and allowed foreign investors to hold 100% of shares in subsidiary companies in thailand. in addition, foreign investors were encouraged to purchase factories on the verge of bankruptcy. this approach solved the overcapacity problem caused by the shrinking domestic market through increasing exports. in addition, liberalization measures allowed foreign investors to gain profits rapidly; accordingly, foreign investors were very willing to enter thailand’s market. d. the philippines among the four asean countries, the philippines were the least active in utilizing foreign investment. during the marcos era, the philippines attempted to use foreign resources to develop its national economy and borrow funds from the world bank and asian development bank. in the 1980s, the philippines founded the board of investment to attract foreign investment. however, the purpose of foreign investors was mainly to finance domestic capitalists rather than facilitate industrialization through what dependency theory refers to as a triple alliance. marcos often purchased and nationalized large enterprises in the name of national development, which was a deterrent to foreign investment. at the end of marcos’ presidency, the import substitution policy remained in effect; in addition, the united states dominated the market; accordingly, because of a lack of funds, the philippines had to loan funds from other countries (bello, guzman and malig 2004). the philippines was under considerable pressure because the country accumulated a large amount of foreign debt and was, therefore, unable to invest in basic industries. when the philippines’ foreign debt became high, japan relocated its automobile industry to thailand. compared with thailand, the political situation in the philippines was more unstable, and the economic market exhibited slower growth. adjustment and transformation of asean automobile industry under the global framework in 1990, asean countries were confronted with globalization and regional integration. because mncs encouraged cross-border investment and world trade had grown substantially, the industrial structure in various countries changed considerably. cooperation among automobile businesses was an essential item in the asean industrial cooperation scheme. when the aec was formed in 2015, international automobile manufacturers restructured their businesses globally. determining how to develop industries in various countries has been a considerable challenge. the question is how did these four asean countries systematically adjust their markets worldwide? (1) malaysia among the four asean countries, malaysia’s automobile industry was the most protected (wad and govindaraju 46 the political economy of the automobile industry 2011,pp 152-171).11 the success of the automobile industry in malaysia at the early stage was largely due to the protection policy. resistance to industrial liberalization had a strong influence on industrial liberalization. malaysia proposed the malaysian scenario and temporarily excluded automobile assembly and vehicle imports from common effective preferential tariffs (cept) without removing tariff protection mechanisms. malaysia continued to leverage an excise duty and therefore violated the asean free trade agreement.12 using approved permits to restrain automotive imports is considered a violation of free trade. the facilitator of industrialization in malaysia, datuk seri mahathir bin mohamad, who was a consultant for proton, followed economic nationalism and refused to cancel the approved-permit system. 13 to confront liberalization, the development of malaysia’s automobile industry was focused on political considerations instead of economic benefits (doner and wad 2014,pp. 11 wad described the automobile industry in malaysia as an unwilling liberalizer (wad and govindaraju 2011). 12 in 2007, negotiations between the united states and malaysia regarding ftas and auto tariffs were a crucial subject. us automobile manufacturers hoped to manufacture cars in malaysia. malaysia imposed a 10% import duty and 80%–200% excise duty on cars imported from non-asean countries. the united states hoped that malaysia would cancel these types of taxes. 13 http://www.sinchew-i.com/special/aplist/i ndex.phtml?sec=723&artid=200510142558 （2006/11/20） 681-682). 14 the protection policy facilitated developing the automobile industry and promoting resource centralization, but failed to promote innovation in malaysia’s domestic automobile industry. high costs and the small scale of businesses resulted in inefficient resource allocation. industrial survival and preventing foreign cars from dominating domestic markets were driven by political and economic interests; consequently, reforms could only be achieved at a slow pace. (2) indonesia after the 1997 financial crisis, the imf required all interventionist industrial policies to be discontinued before it would provide economic assistance(nag, banerjee and chatterjee 2007, p. 26 and p. 41). accordingly, recent industrial developments have been focused on market liberalization. in 1999, indonesia proposed the 1999 automotive policy package, signed the trade and investment-related guidelines, and incorporated the automobile industry in the inclusion list of asean free trade agreement to reduce tariffs on vehicle imports. in 2002, the cept was imposed, and vehicle import tariffs were lowered to less than 5%. among the asean countries, indonesia’s market was liberalized the most rapidly. because of market liberalization and domestic demand, manufacturers from various countries worldwide entered indonesia’s automotive market, creating 14 certain researchers have considered that, compared with thailand, malaysia has abundant natural resources to back national income, protect malays’ interests, and withstand the financial pressure to a higher degree. journal of asean studies 47 an inflow of foreign investment. since 2013, the automobile industry has attracted a large amount of foreign investment, accounting for 25% of all foreign investment in indonesia.15 despite the high domestic demand and increasing foreign investment, knowledge and production technologies in automobile manufacturing were outdated(banerjee and chatterjee 2007, 26). mncs were focused on exploiting the domestic market rather than developing a regional research and development (r&d) center. japanese mncs factories controlled automotive parts production and local companies only provided automotive parts according to contracts. critical automotive parts were typically imported, rendering industrial development stagnant. compared with in thailand, the performance of indonesia’s automobile industry was unsatisfactory and failed to meet the standards of the international market. consequently, the automobile industry in indonesia was completely knocked down and lacked international competitiveness (soejachmoen 2011,pp. 41-42). (3) thailand the financial crisis crippled thailand’s automobile industry, resulting in an abrupt drop in market demand, and the government of thailand chose to continue with its liberation policy. after the 1997 financial crisis, thailand allowed foreign investors to hold 100% of shares 15 refer to indonesia investment coordinating board (bkpm) website of indonesia’s national bureau of statistics, http://www7.bkpm.go.id/(2014/11/28) of subsidiary companies in thailand. major multinational companies gradually selected thailand as their automobile production base. they adopted several industrial strategies. first, in 1998, one 5-year economic development plan was formulated with the objective of transforming thailand’s automobile industry into the automobile manufacturing center of asia and using domestic supply chains to enhance the benefit of automobiles.16 second, during the 1997 financial crisis, many of thailand’s automobile parts factories were on the verge of bankruptcy. the 1999 foreign business act promoted foreign investment, allowed foreign investors to hold 100% of shares of subsidiary companies in thailand, and motivated foreign companies to acquire factories facing bankruptcy. third, multinational companies with sole proprietorship were founded. 17 fourth, the domestic manufacturing system was specialized, with foreign investors controlling assembly companies and local capitalists supplying parts (office of industrial economics 2006, p. 19). also, according to the free trade agreement among thailand, australia, new zealand, and india, taxes on automotive parts were reduced; automotive parts 16 ‚master plan for thai automotive industry,‛ refer to http://www.oie.go.th/policy7/mplan/auto/ mp_ex_auto_en.pdf。(2010/08/01) 17 to join the wto, thailand had to sign the agreement on trade-related investment measures (trims). according to the trims, the automotive market should cancel the origin requirements and allow a 5-year grace period for developing countries. according to this timeframe, thailand began to relax its origin requirements in 1997 and lifted them in 2000. 48 the political economy of the automobile industry were included in the negotiation list for the bilateral free trade agreement between thailand and china.18 in 2008, thailand proposed the vision 2020 solution, which included the automobile industry in the investment promotion program for the five major industries, to attract foreign investors. (4) the philippines because of the financial crisis, domestic consumer markets in the philippines began to decline, automobile assembly factories began to downsize, and the automobile manufacturing industry entered a slump. in 2002, the government proposed the motor vehicle development program to reduce taxes and attract investment, hoping to promote philippine brand vehicles (trade union congress of the philippine 2014). subsequently, president benigno simeon aquino iii proposed the philippine manufacturing industry roadmap, which was aimed at industrializing the automobile industry, and called his goals ‚vision 2022‛ in an attempt to solve the problem of filipinos seeking job opportunities overseas by providing job opportunities in the domestic manufacturing industry. a lack of foreign investment hindered industry localization. when international automobile manufacturers restructured their global deployment of businesses, the automobile industry in the philippines was marginalized because of manufacturers establishing their factories in emerging countries 18 ‚master plan for thai automotive industry,‛ refer to http://www.oie.go.th/policy7/mplan/auto/ mp_ex_auto_en.pdf(2015/08/01) and entering markets in various countries through their huge factory capacity, cost advantage, and trade liberalization. accordingly, imported cars became cheaper than domestic cars, thereby reducing domestic industrial competitiveness. 19 in response to the integration of regional economy, multinational companies concentrated their production bases in thailand and closed down their factories in the philippines. only ford motor company attempted to establish an automobile manufacturing center in the philippines; however, they eventually closed down their production line. the philippines failed under the framework of free trade. (5) investment strategies of mncs in asean according to asean brochures published by the japan automobile manufacturers association (jama), thailand was the first choice for japan to transfer its technology and to develop human resource training programs. in recent years, indonesia has also attracted human resource training plans but lacked technology transfer. in 19 philippine automotive competitiveness council compared the costs of vehicles manufactured in thailand and the philippines: the assembly costs in the philippines (16%) were higher than those in thailand (13%); 49% and 23% of automotive parts were produced in thailand and the philippines, respectively; the production costs in thailand was lower than those in the philippines by 14%. refer to pacci, ‚expectations and aspirations of the philippine automotive manufacturing industry‛, http://pacci.ph/expectations-and-aspirations -of-the-philippine-automotive-manufacturin g-industry/(2014/2/20) journal of asean studies 49 malaysia, certain foreign manufacturers have transferred their technology to local manufacturers because of malaysia’s independent development strategy. japanese mncs did not transfer their technology or develop human resource training plans in the philippines (table 5). table 5 japanese mncs technology transfer and human resource training programs in the automobile industry of asean countries (post-2005) technology transfer manpower training 2005  toyota: thailand 2006  nissan: all asean countries 2007  honda: the philippines  nissan: thailand  honda: malaysia 2008  mitsubishi: malaysia  nissan: indonesia, malaysia, singapore  fuji heavy industry: singapore 2009  toyota: thailand 2010  isuzu: thailand  nissan: indonesia 2012  daihatsu: indonesia  daihatsu: indonesia 2013  daihatsu: malaysia  honda: all asean countries  mitsubishi: the philippines  suzuki: indonesia  toyota: the philippines  toyota: thailand 2014  mitsubishi: thailand  mitsubishi: the philippines  toyota: indonesia source: asean brochures published by the jama, refer to http://www.jama-english.jp/asia/publications/index.html (2015/9/10) according to table 6, between 2010 and 2014, investment events in the region mainly occurred in thailand and indonesia. indonesia accepted both factory investment and technology investment, and hence its domestic market attracted japanese mncs. comparatively, the philippines were disadvantaged. table 6 major investments by japanese mncs in asean countries (2010–2014) unit: the number of cases thailand malaysia indonesia the philippines factory investment 4 3 5 * technology investment * * 2 * source: asean brochures published by the jama, refer to http://www.jama-english.jp/asia/publications/index.html (2015/9/10) according to table 7, japan invested mostly in thailand and indonesia than others. in addition, most of japan’s new investments were in indonesia. however, thailand had a larger workforce compared with indonesia. japan invested more in automotive parts factories in thailand than in indonesia. furthermore, thailand did not have strict rules for 50 the political economy of the automobile industry setting up franchises, which is why japanese mncs were willing to establish r&d centers in thailand. malaysia followed protectionism and restricted franchises operated by foreign investors. the philippines attracted only a small amount of foreign investment, and its industry was small; after 1997, the philippines had almost stopped developing the automotive industry. therefore, thailand attracted most japanese investors, and indonesia displayed potential for developing its automobile industry. table 7 japanese investments in asean automobile industries unit: number of companies source: driving growth towards the future 2015 published by jama, refer to http://www.jama-english.jp/asia/publications/pamphlets/hand_in_hand_2015.pdf（2015/9/1） during the sukarno period, the assets of foreign investors were confiscated, and industrial policies were frequently changed; accordingly, foreign investors were indecisive in investment injection. although indonesia’s automobile industry appears promising and may even be superior to that in thailand, the level of technology in indonesia lags that in thailand and malaysia (soejachmoen 2011, p. 19). rethink industry development theory dimaggio and walter indicated that because of the uncertainty in global competition, convergence among organizations increases spontaneously(dimaggio and walter 1983, 147-160). the question is whether this view can be applied to the automobile industry in the four asean countries examined in this paper. theoretically, the motivation of east asian countries to industrialize came from their industrial development under their national crises following world war ii. the east asian countries formed an alliance with foreign investors and entered international markets; in addition, east asian countries promoted their industrial policies and upgraded their industries (chu 2000). compared with east asian countries, thailand, indonesia, item manufactur ing and sale part s r& d the number of investme nt events holdin g more than 50% of shares the number of employe es investmen ts after 1997 characteristi cs thailand 14 8 3 25 17 87,174 7 foreign investors had dominance malaysia 13 1 1 15 4 24,767 5 limited dominance indonesia 18 6 1 25 10 54,336 13 concentrate d after 1997 the philippine s 9 4 0 13 6 7,529 1 almost no new plan journal of asean studies 51 malaysia, and the philippines were in a challenging situation, both politically and economically. the question is whether a new development theory for emerging countries can be constructed under the framework of globalization and on the basis of the experiences of these four asean countries in developing their automobile industries according to the neoclassical economics and development school. first, according to neoclassical economics, developing countries identify their suitable products under the market mechanism of international specialization; the role of a country has become insignificant. neither developed nor developing countries have been withdrawn from intense global competition. under the framework of globalization, industrial development can be categorized as a liberal market economy or coordinated market economy orientation. for liberal market economies, market mechanisms are crucial, and the government does not intervene to solve market problems; for a coordinated market economy, government offices utilize various relations and networks to solve market problems (soskice 1999, 101-134). theoretically, coordinated market economies satisfy the requirements of industrial development in emerging countries because developed countries rely on mncs to participate in global industrial specialization; in developing countries, the government plays a crucial role in industrial development. (chu 2000) researchers have referred to government-led economic development in developing countries and the reform of technological capabilities as national systems of innovation (chang and kozul 1994, 859-91; nelson 1993). the reason for the success of thailand’s automobile industry is the government’s role as a coordinator and system innovator. relative to thailand, malaysia, which adopted the protectionist approach, must develop a coordinated market economy between liberalization and coordination. second, in the era of globalization, social systems of production are crucial. industrial development is more than simply an economic activity—it also requires certain social conditions; in other words, social specialization is crucial for industrial development (hollingsworth and boyer 1997). ruggie proposed ‚embedded liberalism‛ and indicated that in the era of globalization, governments must be connected with society and markets to become an industry facilitator (ruggie 1982, pp. 379-415). dorner also indicated that in developing countries, stagnation of industrial innovation has been due to the influence of power and interests (doner, hicken and ritchie 2009, pp. 152). this view can explain the following phenomenon: indonesia had a large domestic market and attracted considerable foreign investment in its automobile industry; however, government–business relations rendered indonesia’s government unable to connect with society and markets. conversely, society and markets in thailand exerted distinct functions on the automobile industry. therefore, to transform indonesia’s automobile industry adjusting political and business structures is more crucial than formulating industrial policies. third, in the environment of globalization, mncs in developed countries possess advanced technology. if developing countries do not 52 the political economy of the automobile industry participate in the international market, they will not learn from more advanced markets. in addition, developing countries should not ignore the new technological nationalism. mncs operating in developed countries play a critical role in facilitating market globalization. this is why thailand is a successful example; however, thailand has only positioned itself in the industrial-specialization system; the country’s automobile industry has neither established a domestic brand nor changed its position in the production system. thailand is only a follower and thus continues to differ from developed countries. because thailand was never colonized, automotive businesses in thailand are satisfied with current industrial developments. under the new technological nationalism, malaysia and indonesia may experience difficulties in developing domestic brands and revitalizing their national economies. the philippines, which did not adopt economic nationalism, practically positioned itself in the automotive parts market.20 fourth, doner recently indicated that in the era of industrial revolution, the industrial transformation in developing countries depended on the desire of political leaders to promote innovation and related institutions and the structure of political arrangements (doner, hicken and ritchie 2009, pp. 151-171). in discussing asean, doner indicated that domestic political economy (particularly the political 20 regarding asean automotive parts trade, the philippines was the only country that had a trade surplus. account of variation and domestic political pressures) determine the system and influence long-term strategies for developing automobile industries (doner and wad 2014, pp. 664-687). according to the present study, ‚the role of the state‛, ‚government–business relations‛, and ‚foreign investment‛ influenced the transformation of the automobile industry in these four asean countries during the era of before globalization. malaysia was limited by national protectionism, industrial specialization in indonesia was influenced by the political and business structure, and the philippines had to face the transfer of foreign investment; these limitations involved the political and economic interests of domestic initiators. this view accords with embedded liberalism proposed by ruggie. under the context of globalization, liberalized market economies are a common feature. however, economic development is typically embedded in the historical context of various countries, and the responses of a country promote industrial activity suitable for the political and economic system of the country (streeck and thelen 2005). in other words, various industrial systems have been constructed according to different political and economic systems; some industrial systems have succeeded whereas others have failed. finally, we discussed the ideal: the influence of the political economy on industrial intuition, as well as the influence of industrial institution on industrial activity. although thailand’s automobile industry is a successful case, it has only comparative advantages but cannot become a natural path or journal of asean studies 53 transformation paradigm for other developing countries to imitate. in the international environment, different countries have their adjustment methods; thus, economic systems vary among countries. thailand’s automobile industry has not achieved the washington consensus and has not been liberalized completely. malaysia has adopted a state intervention strategy according to the development school of economics; however, this strategy was not a panacea for policy development. developing countries have difficulties in identifying best practices regarding policy. conclusion in the late 1990s, the financial crisis and globalization had a substantial influenced on thailand, indonesia, malaysia, and the philippines. in this study, we compared the automobile industries of these four asean countries and found that their automobile industries feature the following characteristics. (1) thailand was the most willing to cooperate with foreign investors for industrial specialization, and its industrial goal was clearest; political and business factors had no influence on its industrial development; its export demand was greater than domestic; in addition, thailand gained most benefits under globalization in the aec. (2) malaysia considered the automobile industry as a national industry; however, because of domestic political and economic structures, malaysia emphasized the importance of national interests instead of market development. the powerful government that led industrial developments did not pay adequate attention to globalization and aec regional integration. (3) previously, indonesia’s automobile industry was the exclusive domain of state leaders; indonesia lacked a favorable industrial foundation, automotive parts industry, and clear development goals, and its market was prematurely liberalized. in recent years, foreign investors have favored indonesia’s domestic market; accordingly, similar to thailand; indonesia has liberalized its market. the automobile industry in indonesia appeared to be thriving, and indonesia intended to establish national car brands; however, because of domestic political economy structures, the country’s production technology required improvement and industrial supply chains needed to be established. (4) although the philippines intended to develop its automobile industry, the country was limited by long-term import substitution and had no clear industrial goals. therefore, the philippines was unsuccessful in developing its automobile 54 the political economy of the automobile industry industry. in addition, regional integration forced foreign assembly factories to withdraw from the philippines; consequently, the philippines became an import market. in recent years, the philippines have become exporters of automotive parts, and favorable outcomes have been reported. table 8 the political economy and the automobile industries in asean industrial features political economy characteristics the role of the state government-business relations the role of foreign investors globalization and adjustment thailand asia’s detroit; export demand was greater than domestic demand lack of a powerful government liberalization and adjustment unapparent in the automobile industry motivating job specialization gradual participation malaysia the only domestic brand ethnic politics leading the industry ethnic preference selective cooperation delayed participation indonesia the domestic market was valued. the interests of powerful leaders led political and economic development no consistency relations and licenses nontechnical specialization forced to participate (imf conditions) the philippines specialized in automotive parts long-term import substitution no clear goals hindering industrialization withdrawal from the market gradual participation table 8 summarizes the characteristics in the four asean countries. globalization resulted in similar economic developments in many countries; however, industrial developments have varied among countries. industrial developments have been influenced by the political economy characteristics of various countries. despite various political economy considerations and difficulties, these four asean countries continue to develop their automobile industries. when conducting this research, we found that researchers should look beyond convergence theory or ‚learning from someone.‛ (hall and soskice 2001, 36-44) as indicated by the renowned economist jános kornai, ‚transformation‛ does not mean that the economic system changes from a controlled economy to a market economy; various economic systems can be explained by comparing these economic systems. in other words, the characteristics of economic systems can be understood through comparing the attributes of different systems(kornai 1998). in the present comparison case, the political economy system determined the industrial development of asean countries. in other words, researchers should look beyond convergence theory journal of asean studies 55 and consider the political economy characteristics of different countries. through comparative research, researchers can clarify the differences in systems and policies among various countries, which is why we conducted this comparative study about author dr. wan-ping tai is currently an associate professor and director of foreign affairs at cheng shiu university, kaohsiung taiwan (r.o.c.). he obtained his bachelor degree in public administration and policy at the national taipei university, and the social science of master degree and doctor of philosophy in asia pacific political economy studies at the national sun yat-sen university.his primary area of study includes the following but not limited to: southeast asian studies, asia pacific studies, indonesia studies, and taiwan’s trade and economics. he can be contacted at wanping.tai@gmail.com reference amsden, alice h. 2003, the rise of “the rest” challenges to the west from late-industrializing economies, london: oxford university press. aswicahyono, haryo. 2000, ‚how not to industrialize? 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the world trade organization and the shrinking of development space,‛ review of international political economy, no. 4, pp. 621-644. xu, j. h., 2012, ‚ford motor company closed down its factories in the philippines at the end of 2012 to restructure regional units‛. in http://news.cnyes.com/content/ 20120627/kfl0p0jwiav1m.sht ml(2012/12/13) zysman, john and eileen doherty. 1995. the evolving role of the state in asian industrialization, brie work paper 84. audet, d. and c. vangrasstek. 1997. ‘market access issues in the automobile sector, ’market access issues in the automobile sector, oecd proceedings, paris: oecd. macintyre, andrew j. 1991. business and politics in indonesia, australia: allen & unwin. fukuyama, franci. 1992. the end of history and the last man, new york: free press. journal of asean studies, vol. 9, no. 2 (2021), pp. 117-137 doi: https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v9i2.7506 issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic ‘fake news’ in asean: legislative responses robert brian smith1, mark perry2, and nucharee nuchkoom smith3* 1,2school of law, university of new england, australia 3walailak university, thailand *corresponding author r.b.smith@unswalumni.com; mperry21@une.edu.au; pulom88@hotmail.com received: 28th june 2021/ revised: 10th september 2021/ accepted: 10th september 2021 how to cite: smith, r. b., perry, m., & smith, n. n. (2021). ‘fake news’ in asean: legislative responses. journal of asean studies, 9(2), 117-137. https:/doi.org/10.21512/jas.v9i2.7506 abstract the research is a legal review based on the documentary research concept by comparing the development of legislative responses to fake news spread in southeast asia. anti-fake news legislation focuses on the transmission of information by electronic means than print media. the analysis is carried out for each of the member states by including a clause-by-clause examination of the legislation and subsequent cases addressing legal issues associated with the laws. several common factors should be addressed to provide a fairer and more transparent approach, including developing a clear-cut definition of fake news. two key elements should be met in the definition of spreading of fake news: it should be the intentional spreading of misinformation or disinformation by design. the research suggests it would be better to develop anti-fake news legislation as either a standalone statute or a specific amendment to existing legislation than include fake news in omnibus legislation. except in the most serious cases, creating, publishing, or distributing fake news illegality should be reduced from a criminal offence to an administrative offence, where the police issue a fine. given the documented publishing and spreading of disinformation by state actors, their servants and agents, there should be an explicit “fake news” offence associated with the action of such persons. keywords: asean, defamation, disinformation, fake news, hate speech, hoax news, legislation, misinformation, social media mailto:robert@aecconsultants.asia mailto:mperry21@une.edu.au 118 ‘fake news’ in asean: legislative introduction a recent paper research in science argues that the rise of fake news shows the “erosion of long-standing institutional bulwarks against misinformation in the internet age”, with the concern of being global (lazer et al., 2018). in response to the impact of fake news in their member states, the association of southeast asian nations (asean) signed a joint declaration on the framework to minimise the harmful effects of fake news. this research describes the diverse systems of government and legal systems of the asean members as they may have a bearing on the governmental response with anti-fake news legislation and how it is used to prosecute offenders. after addressing the issue of fake news as a modern internet attenuated issue, the research analyses the various approaches taken in the legislative responses to fake news as introduced by asean members. in some cases, the legislation is fake news specific, whilst in other cases, it is part of a more general cybercrime law or amendment to the existing legal code. the key focus will be on the scope of the legislation, particularly the varying definitions of fake news, the control of the promulgation of fake news by state actors, the penalties attached to the violation of the new laws, and commentary in the media. the focus of anti-fake news legislation is material that is processed through electronic systems, which does not cover print media. the joint declaration on the framework to minimise the harmful effects of fake news, as its name suggests, is a framework only. as stated in its preamble, the parties acknowledge that online and social media improve information access and facilitate communication. they recognise that the propagation of fake news is a challenge that needed to be addressed to allow social media to be a reliable source of information and a safe space for all users. to assist this process, they agree to share best practices to educate citizens on the dangers of fake news. under the founding philosophy of asean, the countermeasures must respect national sovereignty, and be implemented nationally according to the requirements of the individual asean member states. key articles of the agreement include: 1) improve digital literacy (item 3 and 4); 2) strengthen national capacity to detect and respond to fake news (item 5); 3) encourage stakeholders to build on the existing industry anti-fake news norms and guides (item 6), and 4) share best practices and experience (item 7). the declaration, however, does not propose a definition of fake news. there is no agreed definition of fake news. at its most basic, in the post-trump current covid-19 era, “truth” and “facts” have become the victims of political identities where the view of your opponents becomes “fake” news (tong et al., 2020). wang (2020) has identified a series of words similar to “fake news”, namely “news satire, yellow journalism, junk news, pseudo-news, hoax news, propaganda news, advertorial, fake information, false information, misinformation, disinformation, rumour, mal-information, post-truth, and alternative fact”. to assist the identification of “fake news”, molina et al. (2021) develop a detailed taxonomy. they consider that misinformation is essentially the spreading of incorrect information. disinformation, on the other hand, is the spreading of incorrect messages to harm others journal of asean studies 119 deliberately. it occurs that the terms “disinformation” and “mal-information” are used interchangeably. a more utilitarian matrix that has gained traction has been developed by wardle (2017). the matrix has been adopted by the australian communications and media authority (acma) in developing their position paper on the development to guide the industry as they develop their codes on the management of online misinformation and news quality in australia (“online misinformation and news”, 2020). wardle’s “fake news” matrix consists of seven types of misinformation and disinformation (wardle, 2017): a) satire or parody — no intention to cause harm but with potential to fool; b) misleading content — misleading use of information to frame an issue or individual; c) imposter content — where genuine sources are impersonated; d) fabricated content — content is 100% false and designed to deceive and harm; e) false connection — headlines, visuals, or captions do not support the content; f) false context — genuine content is shared with false contextual information; and g) manipulated content — genuine information or imagery is manipulated to deceive. smith and perry (2021) propose a modification of wardle’s (2017) matrix in their suggestion to define the crime of spreading fake news. they recommend that satire or parody are not a crime. they furtherly recommend that spreading of “fake news” can only be an offence if it is deliberate. in some jurisdictions, the definition of defamation is so broad that it can also be used to prosecute those who post or transmit what the authorities consider to be fake news. for instance, s. 326 of the thai criminal code states: “whoever imputes anything to the other person before a third person in a manner likely to impair the reputation of such other person or to expose such other person to be hated or scorned is said to commit defamation and shall be punished with imprisonment not exceeding one year or fined not exceeding twenty thousand baht, or both (italics added).” such legislation can be significantly effective in silencing critics when a juristic person can initiate a case of criminal “defamation” against an individual. the use of defamation legislation and lèse-majesté laws to silence critics is discussed by smith and perry (2020). however, the research focus on legislative responses to fake news, and not further consider defamation legislation. research methods the research is a legal review based on the documentary research concept. it compares and contrasts the development of legislative responses to the spread of fake news in southeast asia. analysis of the legislation in a multi-language region such as asean faces two immediate challenges. complications may occur when it comes to translating laws from one language to another since language constructs are attached to each of its culture and 120 ‘fake news’ in asean: legislative understanding, which is explained in studies discussing the thai laws (smith & perry, 2020). moreover, court decisions are often unavailable, and researchers have to depend on “english language secondary sources such as news services and newspapers and their reporting of government press conferences, police press conferences, and court decisions”. the research analysis includes a clause-by-clause examination of the legislation and subsequent cases addressing legal issues associated with the laws. the analysis is carried out for each of the member states. states of emergency concerning the covid-19 pandemic have only been discussed where they impose additional constraints on spreading fake news to those of the primary legislation. in most cases, english versions of the laws and judgments are available in english. in brunei darussalam, malaysia, the philippines, and singapore, english is the official language of the law. in other jurisdictions, the english translations are considered unofficial despite being prepared within the government, so the national language version takes precedence. legislative responses to fake news some asean jurisdictions have fake-news specific legislation or cybercrime legislation, and others adapt their existing legislation. in addition, defamation laws, both criminal and civil, are sometimes misused to silence critics who have been accused of spreading “fake news”. when citing the specific legislation, the research uses the word that has been in the relevant translation. brunei darussalam spreading fake news is covered by the public order act. there are two offences: (a) spreading false reports or false statements ‘likely to cause public alarm or despondency’ (s. 34); (b) publishing or giving any person information known to be false ‘and which tends to give rise to apprehension for the safety of any person or property’ (s. 35(1)). in this case, where it is proved that the person published or gave false information, the onus is on the person charged to prove that they do not know such information is false (s. 35(2)). cambodia a draft of cybercrime law has been under discussion for several years (sovuthy, 2019). if the draft is adopted, offences under the law will include: 1) publishing contents deemed to hinder sovereignty and integrity of cambodia ("draft cybercrime law," art. 28(1)); 2) publications deemed to incite or instigate the general population to anarchism (art. 28(2)); 3) publications deemed to generate insecurity, instability or political cohesiveness (art. 28(3)); or 4) publications “deemed to be non-factual which slanders or undermined the integrity of any governmental agencies, ministries, not limited to departments, federal or local levels” (art. 28(4)). in the meantime, prosecutions against posting fake news have been undertaken under journal of asean studies 121 the criminal code. with the increasing impact of the covid-19 pandemic, the parliament approves a law on emergency management which further strengthens criminal sanctions against posting fake news once a state of emergency has been declared ("law on emergencies," art. 5). false information is covered by art. 425 of the criminal code and is used to prosecute those who communicate or disclose false information, and is punishable by imprisonment and a fine. as seen from the english translation, the use of this section is problematic: [t]he communication or disclosure of any false information with a view to inducing a belief that a destruction, defacement or damage dangerous to other persons will be carried out shall be punishable by imprisonment from one to two years and a fine . . . between late january and april 2020, and before the law on the state of emergency had been enacted, there were 30 documented cases of arbitrary arrests under art. 494 and art. 495 on incitement to commit offences or to disturb social security (human rights watch, 2020) using the same methods of offending as for defamation and insult ("cambodian criminal code," 2009 art. 305 & art. 307). in this case, the penalty is more severe, which includes imprisonment and a fine where the incitement has been ineffective (art. 495). if the incitement is ‘to discriminate, to be malicious, or be violent against a person or a group because of their membership or nonmembership of a particular ethnicity, nationality, race or religion’ and has been ineffective, a longer prison term and a higher level of fine applies (art. 496). it is claimed that the legislation is being used to crack down on opposition supporters and critics whilst the population is distracted by the covid-19 pandemic (“cambodia: covid-19 spurs”, 2020; “cambodia: state of emergency bill”, 2020). the law on emergencies is much more explicit, which takes precedence over any law that contradicts it. it includes “bans or limits on distributing or broadcasting information that can cause public panic or turmoil, damage to national security, or confusion about the situation under the state of emergency’ (art. 5). the penalty for intentionally failing to respect such measures is imprisonment and a fine (art. 8). a much heavier penalty applies if it causes public turmoil (art. 8). a state of emergency may last no longer than three months, and may be extended by a further royal decree (art.3). in this case, the state of emergency is specific to the covid-19 pandemic. indonesia indonesia has enacted the law on electronic information and transactions as amended in 2016 and government regulation on trading through electronic systems. in summary, the relevant offences under art. 27 of the act are to knowingly and without authority distribute and/or transmit and/or cause to be accessible electronic content which offends against propriety (art. 27(1)), and/or affronts [sic] or defames (art. 27(3)), and/or extorts and/or threatens’ (art. 122 ‘fake news’ in asean: legislative 27(4)). there is no clarification as to what constitutes an offence against propriety or what constitutes the offence of affronting. it is left open to the courts to decide. hate speech is the subject of article 27(2) of the amended electronic information and transactions law. despite the apparent widespread backlash at the time of enactment of the law (tapsell, 2019), only one application for review was lodged with the constitutional court ("judicial review of law no. 11 of 2008,"). the review concerned article 31(4), which provides for further provisions or procedures for interception of electronic information by law enforcement officials to be regulated by government regulation. the court found this to be unconstitutional (s. 5). under the gr 80 2019, platform service providers are not held responsible for negative content if they are only conduits of information, only store the data/information, or act as a search engine (art. 22(3)-(4)). article 207 of the criminal code is problematic (gomez & ramcharan, 2020). it is an offence for a person with deliberate intent to insult ‘in public, orally or in writing an authority or public body set up in indonesia’ (art. 207). this article could easily be applied to anyone who makes a false claim against a public authority. kusumawardhani (2020) review the application of electronic information and transactions law during the 2019 election. she finds no substantial public support for eliminating the law. changes are suggested, such as amending the law to focus on actual hate speech rather than cracking down on constructive criticism of corrupt officials. she considers that the constitutional court should review the law and void aspects liable to misuse. sawitri and wiratmaja (2019) consider that the difference between truth and falsehood, and between information and disinformation must be defined and included in the law. they suggest that there should be a “specific penal code for the producer and circulator of hoaxes.” further, al-fatih and aditya (2019) argues that article 28(2) of the law does not provide an explanation of the three elements that must be met, as seen in the statement: the spreading of fake news is intentional, without right, and causes hatred and hostility. they argue that many judges ignore the element of intent deliberately. regardless of the origins of the fake news and conspiracy theories, they have ‘clearly reduced trust between indonesian citizens of different political, cultural, and religious affiliations, and between the government and its constituency’ (hui, 2018). lao pdr publication and spreading of fake news are regulated by the law on resistance and prevention of cybercrime. the official english translation of the law states that it is an offence to enter into a computer system. moreover, offences includes: 1) words that are slanderous, insulting or impolite; 2) data that are violent in character, false, cheating or untrue; 3) data which impacts national security, peace, social orderliness, culture, and tradition; and 4) data that persuades, exhorts, or encourages resistance to the government or solidarity (art. 13). platform service providers and their users are subject to the decree on internet information management with the users responsible “for the content and information that are journal of asean studies 123 developed, exchanged, sent, or forwarded through the website, online social media, or other forms on the internet”. during the first quarter of 2020, the government was taking action against fake news under the law on media and the cybercrime law. malaysia the communications and multimedia act regulates, amongst other actions, the transmission of false information (s. 233). the act was complemented by the anti-fake news act of 2018. the latter act was subsequently repealed in 2019 after a change of government (“malaysia parliament scraps law”, 2019). as the communications and multimedia act was not repealed, it is still in force and used to prosecute purveyors of fake news (“content sharing on social”, 2019). it is an offence to transmit a comment which is false with the intention to “annoy, abuse, threaten or harass another person” (s. 233(1)-(2)). there is no definition as to what constitutes false information. based on its consideration of section 233 of the act, the courts have set a three-part test that must be met in full for a successful prosecution: 1) did the accused make the communication through a network facility?; was the communication “obscene, indecent, false, menacing or offensive?”; 3) was the communication intended “to annoy, abuse, threaten or harass another person” ("rutinin suhaimin v pp," para. 10)? on 12 march 2021, the emergency (essential powers) (no. 2) ordinance entered into operation. the ordinance addressed the spreading of fake news concerning covid-19. fake news “includes any news, information, data and reports, which is or are wholly or partly false relating to covid-19 or the proclamation of emergency, whether in the forms of features, visuals or audio recordings or in any other form capable of suggesting words or ideas” (s. 2). the ordinance has extra-territorial application regardless of the nationality or citizenship (s. 3(1)) provided it concerns malaysia or “the person affected by the commission of the offence is a malaysian citizen” (s. 3(2)). in summary, the offences under the ordinance include: 1) creating, offering and publishing fake news, including a publication containing fake news (s. 4); 2) providing financial assistance to those committing an offence under section 4 (s. 5); and 3) failing to remove a publication containing fake news (s. 6). comparing the ordinance with the repealed anti-fake news act shows that the only difference is the addition of the phrase “relating to covid-19 or the proclamation of emergency” to the definition of fake news. it does not, however, include examples as were included in the repealed act. myanmar the fragility of democracy became apparent on 1 february 2021 when the tatmadaw (myanmar defence forces) arrested civilian leaders of the national and regional/state legislatures and declared a one-year state of emergency (“myanmar: military coup kills”, 2021). 124 ‘fake news’ in asean: legislative myanmar’s overall anti-cybercrime legislation is relatively rudimentary and largely dependent on its telecommunications law of 2013. the offences are: ‘[e]xtorting, coercing, restraining wrongfully, defaming, disturbing, causing undue influence or threatening to any person by using any telecommunications network’ (art. 66(d)), and ‘communications, reception, transmission, distribution, or conveyance of incorrect information with dishonesty or participation’ (art. 68(a)). the provisions have been criticised for being exceedingly broad and lacking legal certainty as they are “near-infinite in scope and hinge upon highly subjective terms that are open to a broad range of interpretation” (“myanmar: telecommunications law”, 2017). two further laws are used to prosecute offences, including criminal defamation and arguably posters of fake news (“myanmar: briefing paper”, 2015). the electronic transaction law specifies the offence of “creating, modifying, or altering of information or distributing of information created, modified or altered by electronic technology to be detrimental to the interest of or to lower the dignity of any organization or any person” (s. 34(d)). it is considered a truly loose and imprecise definition. the role of social media in civil unrest in myanmar incited by both the tatmadaw and extremist buddhist organizations is well-documented but denied by the various protagonists (ibrahim, 2018; irving, 2018; wade, 2017). this is particularly the case of the continuing persecution of muslims in rakhine state, as reported by the independent international factfinding mission on myanmar (“report of the detailed findings”, 2018). the mission had “no doubt” that the prevalence of hate speech, including that on facebook “significantly contributed to increased tension and a climate in which individuals and groups may become more receptive to incitement and calls for violence” (para. 1354). myanmar is unique amongst its asean peers in that there is significant evidence that fake news is used by the tatmadaw as a weapon against its enemies using facebook as its medium (douek, 2018; gleicher, 2020; mozur, 2018; stecklow, 2018). a new york times investigation found that the tatmadaw was turning facebook “into a tool for ethnic cleansing, according to former military officials, researchers, and civil officials in the country” (mozur, 2018). in 2018 facebook removed a large number of facebook and instagram accounts belonging to tatmadaw for coordinated inauthentic behaviour (gleicher, 2018). the sites were removed based on the behaviour of the actors due to false identity than on the contents of the posts. on 1 february 2021, following the coup d'état, the tatmadaw quickly recognized that its opponents could also use the power of social media and blocked facebook, at least temporarily (potkin, 2021). after the action failed to deter protests, other social media platforms were blocked, and following widespread protests on 6 february, the entire internet was shut down (“myanmar protesters take”, 2021). philippines it has been widely reported that the philippines national police (caliwan, 2020), especially during the covid-19 crisis, are charging persons suspected of propagating fake news under s 4(c)4 of the cybercrime prevention act and art.154 of the revised penal code. article 154(4)(1) of the revised penal code states that it is a crime for a person “to publish or journal of asean studies 125 cause to be published as news any false news which may endanger the public order, or cause damage to the interest or credit of the state”. the cybercrime prevention act refers explicitly to online libel as a crime under the revised penal code (s. 4(c)(4)). the provisions of the act concerning libel complement the provisions in the code. with limited exceptions, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious even if it is true (art. 354). finally, libel can be committed by “writings or other means” (art.355). the offence of libel in the act can be “committed through a computer or any other similar means which may be devised in the future” (s. 4(c)(4)). penalties are one degree higher than provided for in the revised penal code ‘as amended, or special laws’ (s. 6). no statute of limitations was included in the cybercrime prevention act. the department of justice has determined (buan, 2019) that the cybercrime prevention act is a special law and therefore subject to the provisions of a 1926 act. this results in a statute of limitations of 12 years ("act to establish periods of prescription for violations," 1926 s. 1(d)). the provisions of the act were appealed to the supreme court ("disni et al. v secretariat of justice," 2014). the court ruled that s 4(c)(4) is valid and constitutional in relation to the original author of the post but not for those who only receive the post and react to it (para. 48 declaration 1). the offence of aiding and abetting under (s. 4(c)(4) and s. 4(c)(3)) was found to be void and unconstitutional (para. 48 declaration 2). furthermore, charging an offender under s 4(c)(4) of the act as well as section 353 of the revised penal code violates the proscription against double jeopardy, and was therefore void and unconstitutional (para. 48-49). singapore in january 2018, the singapore government tabled a green paper in parliament recommending that a select committee be appointed to consider options to address the problem of online falsehoods (ministry of communications and information and the ministry of law, 2018, para. 83-85). the committee was specifically asked to address how singapore could “prevent and control online falsehoods”, including guiding principles and specific measures such as legislation (para. 84(d)). the committee recommended that the approach should include nurturing an informed public, reinforcing social adhesion and trust, disrupting online falsehoods, and dealing with threats to national security and sovereignty (select committee, 2018, para. 540). the government responded with the protection from online falsehoods and manipulation act 2019 (pofma). three important concepts are underpinning the act, namely: s 2(2)(a) a statement of fact is a statement which a reasonable person seeing, hearing or otherwise perceiving it would consider to be a representation of fact; and s 2(2)(b) a statement is false if it is false or misleading, whether wholly or in part, and whether on its own or in the context in which it appears (s. 2(2)). s 2(3)[a] person has editorial control over an online location if the person is able to decide one or both of the following: 126 ‘fake news’ in asean: legislative (a) whether any statement may be included or excluded on the online location; (b) where to place any statement on the online location (s. 2(3)). the purpose of the act is to prevent communications of false statements (s. 5(a)); suppress the operations of repeat offenders (s. 5(b)); detect, control and safeguard against coordinated actions and misuse of online accounts and bots (s. 5(c)); and enhance disclosure of paid political content (s. 5(d)). the law also covers providers of services that are used for communication of false statements of fact, whether in or outside singapore (s. 9). penalties for contravening the act are heavy fines and/or imprisonment for individuals. for judicial persons, the maximum fine is at least ten times higher than for a natural person (ss. 7-9). any minister may instruct the competent authority to issue directives dealing with the communication of false statements of fact (pt. 3) and internet intermediaries (pt. 4). action can be taken against declared online locations which contravene the act by posting at least three false statements within the previous six months (pt. 5). the regulations name the prescribed internet intermediaries (s. 3); prescribed holders of press permits, broadcasting licenses, and telecommunications licenses (s. 4); and digital advertising intermediaries (s. 5) who are subject to the reporting provisions of the act and are obliged to abide by associated codes of practice. an appeal under the penalty provisions of the act is by way of a “rehearing” ("protection from online falsehoods and manipulation rules," s. 5(1)). jayakumar, ang, and anwar (2021) note that major social media platforms had reservations but would abide by the law. one group of objections saw pofma as threatening civil liberties, particularly freedom of speech. the second group interpreted the law as giving the minister the power to determine what is false. jayakumar, ang, and anwar point out that this was not the case as the decisions can be challenged in court. howe (2019) argues, however, that there were issues in relation to the appeals provision under s 17 of the act. she considers that uncertainty “lies with s. 17(5)(b), on whether ‘the subject statement is not a statement of fact, or is a true statement of fact” (howe, 2019). whilst an expedited appeals process significantly reduces the costs to the applicant in bringing a case to court, the applicant still deals with the costs of an appeal. in the result of the appeal failing, the applicant will have to meet the costs of the respondent unless it is a serious question of constitutional law, in which case costs may not apply. as of 19 august 2020, there had been one appeal only that provides the basis of jurisprudence for future cases and is discussed below ("singapore democratic party v attorneygeneral,"). in brief, the minister had found that the singapore democratic party had posted misinformation on three occasions. furthermore, control directives were issued. a request to the minister to cancel the directives was rejected (para. 2-7). the judge found that the assertion that there was a rising proportion of persons getting retrenched was a factual statement because no supporting data was cited or referenced (para. 27-32). he also found that the burden of proof to show that the statements subject to the declarations arise and whether they are true or false rested with the respondent (i.e. the attorney-general) (para. 44), and the standard of proof is on the balance of probabilities (para. 49). hyperlinking to a previous article may, depending on the journal of asean studies 127 circumstances, constitute re-publication of the main article (para. 51-56). the act “necessitates an objective approach based on the wording of the material in question” (para. 128). as of 1 july 2020, the act had been used 55 times (meyer, 2020). according to data reported by meyer, the bulk of the orders under the act aim at “political-oriented nongovernmental forces”, with less than 12% being ordinary social network users. most of these posts (around 85%) cover criticism of the government, whilst the orders against social media posts were to tackle modest inaccuracies. during the nine-day june/july 2020 election campaign, won by the governing people’s action party, with 83 of the 93 seats and 61,23% of the total vote (ge2020, 2020), there were six referrals under the act (jaipragas, 2020). while the opposition parties had varying opinions of the act's impact on their campaigns, there was one significant action resulting from the act. google decided in december 2019 that it would not accept political advertising regulated by the political advertisements code (baker, 2019). thailand thailand regulates fake news under the computer crime act, as amended, and the criminal code. the relevant section under computer crime act (no. 2) states that it is an offence to ⁠bring into a computer system data “which is false, in such a manner likely to cause damage to the maintenance of national security, public safety, national economic security, or infrastructure for the common good of the nation, or to cause panic amongst the public” (s. 14 (1)(2)). it is also an offence to forward “computer data, with the knowledge that it is the computer data that is false” (s. 14 (2)). there is no definition in either the act or its amendment as to what constitutes data which are false. the application of the act is discussed in detail by anansaringkarn and neo (2021) and smith and perry (2020). these articles also contain descriptions of several cases of the application of the computer crime act and associated laws by thai authorities. vietnam law 24 on cybersecurity law is wide-ranging in its application. there are a number of articles in the law that can be used to prosecute those who are considered to be communicating fake news. the law also included prosections for those violating the principles of cybersecurity, including ‘ensuring the interest of the state and the lawful rights and interest of agencies, organizations, and individuals’ (art.4(1)), and ‘[l]eadership by the vietnamese communist party and uniform administration by the state’ (art.4(2)). strictly prohibited conduct under the law includes: 1) undertaking activities to cause people to oppose the state; 2) distorting history and denying revolutionary achievements; and 3) providing false information causing confusion or harm (art. 8(1)(b) to (d)). depending on the seriousness of the breach, it could lead to an administrative offence or criminal prosecution and compensation (art. 9). in addition, the false, misleading, or violating information must be removed (art. 10(3)). 128 ‘fake news’ in asean: legislative analysis there is a wide range of political structures in asean member states. the next task is to ascertain whether their legislation is as diverse. the information is summarized in table 1. as the legislation is often broad in coverage with relatively ill-defined offences, it is sometimes difficult to determine the actual scope of the law. in that case, some cells in the table is filled with a “?”. table 1. comparison of fake news legislation across asean b ru ne i d ar us sa la m c am bo di a in do ne si a l ao p d r m al ay si a m ya nm ar p hi lip pi ne s si ng ap or e t ha ila nd v ie tn am system of government absolute monarchy  communist state   parliamentary democracy     presidential democracy    legal system civil code      common law      legislative approach to fake news fake news specific legislation  definition of fake news in legislation  cybercrime/telecommunications legislation          criminal offence          administrative offence  safe-harbour provision for platform service providers  platform service providers specifically liable for content       broad definitions of offences open to wide interpretation          prescribed fake news offences spreading false information likely to cause confusion, public harm, or panic           publishing or giving false information causing concern about safety of a person or property           inciting to commit offences or disturb social cohesion or damage to national security           publishing or spreading information believing it to be true is a defence  ? ? ?   ?  ? * fake-news specific legislation is in place either in a standalone document or explicitly included in other legislation. source: the authors. journal of asean studies 129 legislative approach to fake news essentially there have been two approaches to fake news. in all cases bar of singapore, the jurisdictions have enacted cybercrime laws or have enacted or amended omnibus telecommunications legislation. the potential issue associated with adopting omnibus legislation is that it becomes quite complex as it tries to cover a plethora of issues and offences. neither the system of government nor the legal system appears to have impacted the type of legislation used to prosecute publishers or distributors of fake news. criminal or administrative offence in nine jurisdictions, spreading fake news is a criminal offence that can be punished by fines and/or imprisonment. vietnam is the exception, although it has rigorous laws, the offences are treated as an administrative offence with police issuing a fine. there is a significant advantage in the vietnamese approach that administrative fines are issued by the police and paid without the need for a court attendance, saving time, and costs for both parties. in reality, the focus should be on removing the potentially dangerous fake news with legal action as a secondary consideration. in addition, there should be a lower threshold for the application of criminal sanctions. liability of platform service providers one pressing issue associated with publishing and distributing “fake news” is the level of responsibility placed on the social media platform providers. currently, they are primarily protected under safe harbour provisions. one of the most prominent examples of a safe harbour provision is the so-called section 230 of chapter 47 of the u.s. code, which deals with the protection for private blocking and screening of offensive material. there is an interesting dichotomy in the united states with the trump republicans wanting it repealed so that action can be taken against the platforms removing content and the democrats wanting it repealed so that the platforms are responsible for “fake news” posted on their sites (siripurapu, 2020). indonesia is the only jurisdiction where safe harbour provisions explicitly apply. four jurisdictions: cambodia, lao pdr, philippines, and singapore, explicitly mandate that platform providers are liable for the content on their platforms. the remainder has legislation that empowers the government with authority to order platform providers to remove content that is contrary to the law. all major social media platforms have their own standards for users to post on their platforms. the user must accept them before using the platform. whether or not those are actually read or understood, especially when the mother language is not english, is questionable. it is highly likely that very few users are actually cognizant of the requirements (“community standards”, 2020; “the twitter rules”, 2021). 130 ‘fake news’ in asean: legislative prescribed fake news offences in singapore there is an explicit definition of fake news. this means that the police and prosecutors in the other jurisdictions have broad discretion in “defining” the offence and prosecuting offenders. the emphasis should be on the prompt removal of fake news than on charging offenders. of particular concern is those who inadvertently publish or share information that they thought was true. there is an issue with the definition of “believing something to be true”. it can be overcome by setting a series of tests that must be met before such defence is accepted. the test could include questions such as: 1) did the accused see something first-hand and misinterpreted it?; 2) did the person do any fact-checking before the information was published?; and 3) is the offence trivial and was not meant to cause offence? in the four former british colonies or protectorates (brunei, malaysia, myanmar, and singapore), publishing or spreading information believing it to be true is a defence. in the other jurisdictions, it is unclear. except for singapore, no jurisdiction has attempted to regulate serious acts of misinformation or disinformation specifically published and spread by political parties. none of the jurisdictions has addressed the possible role of state actors in publishing and spreading misinformation or disinformation as a weapon to promote civil dissension against, for instance, minorities in the case of the tatmadaw in myanmar. it is considered that state actors should be held to higher account, especially in cases where they use fake news to promote communal unrest. more severe penalties should apply than in other cases. comparison between asean declaration and legislation of asean member states the key articles of the agreement include: 1) improve digital literacy; 2) strengthen national capacity to detect and respond to fake news; 3) encourage stakeholders to build on the existing industry anti-fake news norms and guides; and 4) share best practices and experience. the legislation of the member states address these factors in many practices. in improving digital literacy, none of the state parties addressed this issue in their legislative response to fake news. in strengthening national capacity to detect and respond to fake news, each set of legislation has addressed the response, i.e. criminal sanctions and removal of offending material. the specific legislation does not include strengthened capacity to detect fake news. meanwhile, most parties have adapted cybercrime or telecommunications than specific fake news legislation. the latter is covered by other legislative instruments and is outside the scope of the research. to encourage stakeholders to build anti-fake news norms and guides, the legislation of each state party addresses this by defining the legislative framework through which fake news offences will be prosecuted rather than providing a positive guide as to how stakeholders should operate. journal of asean studies 131 regarding best practices and experience, only the philippines has included a section on international cooperation in their legislation (s. 22). undoubtedly it is because they are the only asean member state that is a party to the convention on cybercrime. the varying approaches taken by the asean member states is not unexpected. two of the overriding principles of asean, as stated in its charter, are: non-interference in the internal affairs of the other members (charter of the association of southeast asian nations, 2007 art. 2(e)) and the right for every member to be free from external interference, subversion, and coercion (art. 2(f)). conclusions from the overview of the legislative tools used by asean member states to act against publishers and spreaders of misinformation and disinformation, it is clear that there are a number of common factors that should be addressed to provide a fairer and more transparent approach, namely: 1) develop a concise definition as to what constitutes fake news; 2) develop anti-fake news legislation as either a standalone statute or as a specific amendment to existing legislation; 3) explicitly legislating that publishing or spreading information believing it to be true is a defence; 4) except in the most serious cases, downgrade the offence from a criminal to an administrative offence where the police issue a fine; 5) explicitly create the offence under the relevant fake news legislation of publishing and spreading of disinformation by state actors, their servants or agents. such an approach will lead to a more transparent system focused on protecting the community from the malicious impacts of fake news. about the authors dr. robert brian smith, graduated with a bsc in 1969 and, since that time, has undertaken postgraduate studies in education, engineering and law. he holds a phd in engineering, recently completed a mphil in law investigating fake news in asean and is currently a phd candidate in law at the university of new england, australia. since april 2012 he has been a full-time international development consultant working in southeast and south asia. he has been a team leader in bangladesh, india, myanmar, nepal, sri lanka and has spent shorter periods on projects in cambodia, indonesia, the philippines, thailand, and timor leste. this has given him unique insights into the development needs of least developed and developing economies. prof. mark perry, has been professor, faculty of law, university of new england, armidale, australia, since 2012, and emeritus professor of computer science and law at the university of western ontario. he is an academic leader, legal professional and computer scientist with strong governance, management, coordination, and negotiation skills. member of the academic board of the university of new england from 2013-2021, and council member and chair of board for three years. he is an experienced author, presenter, and speaker of over 200 publications in both law and technology, advisor to governments, as well as expert opinions on law and technology. 132 ‘fake news’ in asean: legislative dr. nucharee nuchkoom smith, graduated with degrees in law and political science in thailand. she graduated with a master of international trade and commerce law and a phd in international trade law in australia. nucharee is an assistant professor in international law at walailak university, thailand. from 1997 to 2011, she was an academic/legal officer to the standing committee on foreign affairs of the house of representatives, thailand. this occurred during one of the most turbulent periods in thai parliamentary history. her current research interests focus on international trade law. references al-fatih, s. & aditya, z. f. 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(2021). the role of financial structure, business drive, business environment on decision to use an external auditor on smes: evidence from asean countries. journal of asean studies, 9(2), 159-180. https:/doi.org/ 10.21512/jas.v9i2.7070 abstract the research examined the role of financial structure, business drive, and business environment that resulted in external audit service adoption in small and mediumsized enterprises (smes) within asean countries. source of data were from the 2015 and 2016 world bank enterprise survey. the research discovers that external audit service adoption is significantly influenced by financial structure, business motivation, and business environment. additionally, we take into account a number of control variables, including sales, ownership structure, industry sector, and country of origin. the findings indicate a significant positive correlation between sales, ownership structure (partnership vs. sole proprietorship), and external audit adoption for smes. from a country-of-origin perspective, it is concluded that audit adoption is significantly higher in malaysia and the philippines than in vietnam. however, audit adoption in indonesia is significantly lower than in vietnam, both in terms of awareness and implementation. other points of interest can be seen in the interaction regression between countries, which indicates the degree of complexity associated with audit adoption when country of origin is taken into account. one significant policy implication is that smes can leverage external auditor services to support their growth and, in turn, the economy of the corresponding country. keywords: external auditor, smes, financial structure, business drive, business environment mailto:1jonathan043@binus.ac.id mailto:2moch.areifianto@binus.edu mailto:3rindangw@binus.edu 160 the role of financial introduction prior to any decision making for the company, several considerations are the defining factors. this involves company decision’s when contracting external auditor service. in the case of a public company, an external auditor is a mandatory requirement in order to fulfill company responsibility to their shareholders. however, this is not the case with small and medium-sized enterprises (smes). a lot of smes decided to not use external auditor service. one of the main reasons being cost consideration, small to non-existent volume of stakeholders. there are no requirements for smes in indonesia to use an external auditor. in malaysia, kamarudin & abidin (2012) concluded that smes in malaysia believe they are required to have audited financial statements due to regulatory requirements, rather than the audit's value and associated benefits. however, anuar, devi, and meng (2012) shares different opinion. they explain that smes in malaysia mainly opt-in auditing to compensate their lack of tangible (professional/qualified accountants) and intangible (accounting and business expertise) resources. elkhatib and kamel (2013) conclude that the primary function of auditing is to review material changes in accounting policies and practices. however, smes are unlikely to prioritize the inclusion of external audit services in their business processes if they are not required to. more research on the cost consideration, a study has been conducted in a survey back in 2013 by the financial executive research foundation (ferf) on 255 u.s. entities (listed companies, closed companies, and nonprofits) reporting external audit fees with a median of 0,07% of annual revenue. auditing can be prohibitively expensive for very small businesses, the median is 1,05%, a maximum of 3,09% of annual income. these external auditors services vary greatly, some of the factoring points include firm’s experience, audit quality, and also services offered. these considerations, in turn helped establish the industry title of “the big 4 auditor” which held precedence in terms of audit quality, on global scale. as a matter of fact, accredited external auditors are a common occurrence for businesses, including small and medium-sized enterprises (smes). additionally, according to peel and bridge (1999), smes have as one of their strategic objectives "reducing business costs." this practice encourages smes to prioritize allocating existing funds to meet specific business needs. additionally, there appears to be an underestimation of auditing risk; additionally, technological advancements have the potential to reduce auditing costs. as a result, small entities with comparable audit capabilities may benefit from more comprehensive auditing. businesses without external auditor aid and knowledge might miss on several key growth opportunity. subsequently, if the same scenario is applied to a country where smes constitute the majority of the economy, the result will be a negative gross domestic product (gdp). as a result, the discussion of why some smes choose to hire an external auditor is considered an interesting subject. due to the critical role that smes play in the economies of the majority of countries worldwide, it is widely accepted that smes are significant contributors to global employment and gdp (coetzee & buys, 2017). however, the debate journal of asean studies 161 over the factors affecting a company's willingness to use external audit services voluntarily continues. the main interest upon this discussion is to analyze the role of company’s financial structure, company’s business driver strategy and company’s business environment that resulted in usage of external audit services for smes in asean. the research on such cases is fairly limited, especially for asean region. thus, research suggests that some smes have favorable opinions on the audit function and its value for the company. the research will be purposefully cover several area, so it could be referred to for: 1) scientific purpose since it contributes to the existing literature on smes and audits, particularly issues in the audit market. specifically, the contribution will take form as a research conducted in asean, with its multidimensional variables (financial structure, business drive and business environment). there are presumably no research that specifically discuss the relationship between business drive and business environment towards the decision to use external auditor; 2) practical purpose for business since it provides practical insights on the use of an external audit that will contribute to business success. this research will support asean-based smes when they decide to adopt audit in their business process; 3) regulator as it provides insights to help audit regulators improve audit-related regulations effectively. the research focuses on smes in selected countries within southeast asia countries, such as indonesia, malaysia, philippines, thailand, and vietnam from world bank enterprise survey in 2015-2016. it is considered necessary since different countries also imbue their businesses with distinctive components. additionally, the countries selected from southeast asia are tiger cub economies, which refers to southeast asia's developing economies. the term cub indicates that the countries are in their infant stages, indubitably, the smes in these countries can also contribute to the country's economic morphogenesis. with such a broad scope, the research aims to ascertain the factors that influence sme decision-making regarding the use of an external audit service, particularly in the asean region. therefore, the research question is developed: what role does a company's financial structure, business motivations, and business environment play in small and medium-sized businesses in asean deciding to adopt external audits? literature review apart from the absence of obligation for financial report audit on sme, cost consideration and such, an audit is also proven to be beneficial for the business process of a company. the role of external auditors for companies is often inseparable from the stakeholders’ need to obtain assurance for the account reported within the financial statements. financial report is proven to have an indirect effect on business decisions made by business owners, as stated in the statement of financial accounting standards psak no. 1. the presentation clarifies financial statements to provide key information regarding the financial positions, performance, and changes in the financial positions of companies. this information is commonly used by a large number of users in economic decision-making, 162 the role of financial especially for users who collect earnings from the business. the assurance required for financial reports is commonly considered within several factors in mind. the factors are differences between the parties carrying out accounting activities with business actors, the insufficient ability of business actors to analyze financial reports, and the need for external parties to guarantee the financial statements credibility themselves. other audit function for business, especially smes is further explored by hien, abbott, and huyen (2016) concluding that independent auditor service have a positive influence on credit access in vietnamese smes. furthermore, some smes are willing to accommodate higher bills to contract globally qualified auditor firms. a similar case has been studied further by louis (2005) who tries to look for independent variables as to why a small company seeks for the big 4 services. he concludes that these firms offer much superior services. hay (2020) also mentions this about the value of auditing with regard on audits of smaller, unlisted companies and audits of voluntary organizations, such clubs or charities, are also an area that is not extensively researched. other implication such as agency conflict within corporate and non-optimal fund source might be accessed by the company. carey, simnett, and tanewski (2000) and vanstraelen and schelleman (2017) go over independent factors that triggers voluntary internal and external audit within a family business. the results of the study shows that agency conflict, size, complexity, level of debt, and financial condition of the company are the key factors that family business considers prior to adopting voluntary audit. the research uses three major variables as independent variables to determine whether to hire an external auditor. this might begin with considering the structure. when it comes to running a business, growth is unavoidable. however, the company's development and expansion will require additional funding. there are many financing options for companies to fulfill their business expansion plans, one of which is through bank loans or other financing options. according to hermas and tahavainen (2002), firms attempt to minimize the financing costs by opting first to the internal finance before turning to external. if external financing is required, the firm will issue next external debt and lastly external equity. however, smes often face difficulty accessing credit from banks or third parties. this claim is supported by schiffer and weder (2001) arguing that smes frequently experience roadblock when trying to access credit. in general, banks or other third parties assess the quality of the company through the information in the financial statements. caneghem and campenhout (2010) discover that both types of information are frequently used as leverage. additionally, these findings support the view that firms cannot access external financing due to a lack of qualified information. naturally, when discussing financial statement quality, it cannot be seperated from the report's content. furthermore, on greek manufacturing smes, voulgaris, asteriou, and agiomigianakis (2000) argues that as return on total assets and net profit margin, it is believed to have the strongest effect on all types of debt but negatively correlated with external financing. it is believed that the quality and content of financial statements also need to be accurate. thus, smes turn to institutions who have the capability to produce a qualified financial report. journal of asean studies 163 the use of an external auditor as an institution that can provide assurance to financial statements can certainly be one of the company's main considerations to obtain a good corporate financial structure. palazuelos, crespo, and corte (2017) conduct a research involving 471 bank officers to drew conclusions based on the opinions from bank loan officers in spain, where they discover a positive relationship between audited smes, the perception that the accounting information has a direct on loan officers' willingness to grant them credit. therefore, even though there is no obligation for smes to audit their financial statements, the use of an external auditor can support smes to have better quality financial reports, so the company can have better quality financial structure. therefore, the research classifies financial structure into three categories, namely: 1) owners loan or line of credit, 2) overdraft, and 3) working capital. hypothesis 1 (h1): there is a positive relationship between financial structure and smes decision to use external audit. secondly, business drive or business model design is often associated with innovation. most of the enterprises, especially smes have little knowledge and awareness about the critical importance of business model innovation (marolt et al., 2016). marolt et al. (2016) conclude that the external opportunity is the main driver that solidify smes’ decision to innovate their business model. external opportunity is described as changes in key technologies, which might illustrate that companies often innovate to support business drive strategy or simply because they follow the trends. according to kesting and günzel-jensen (2015), business model sophistication affects all businesses, but particularly new ventures and small and medium-sized enterprises. on the basis of the preceding discussion, it is argued that startups should be constantly on the lookout for sophisticated opportunities when developing a business model for their market offering. there are numerous ways for businesses to grow while focusing on technology development that supports their business model innovation. however, the use of an external auditor can be considered as one of the factors affecting the company's decision when designing the business drive strategy. irmawan, hudaib, and haniffa (2013), supported by hay (2020), define an external auditor or independent auditor as an assurance for financial information reports produced by companies and bottom line helps increase the confidence in the capital market and improve the company’s market value. in addition, wallace (2004) argues that the use of auditor services also ensures investors that management has high credibility in presenting financial information. this credibility comes from the aspect of technical precision. the business drive strategy carried out by the company while using external auditors can certainly be seen in terms of the credibility of the auditors and the quality of the audited financial statements, so that external parties can assess the company as a credible entity. the audit quality often ties back to the predicate big 4 auditors which might also add value to the company when a company presents audited financial reports. therefore, the research classifies business drives in smes into four categories, namely: 1) top management experiences, 2) foreign licensed software, 3) own website, and 4) using e-mail. the research considers smes with the aforementioned facilities are businesses 164 the role of financial driven by a business strategy. therefore, the research identifies whether companies that have an overview of business drives also include external audit as a support of the business drive strategy. in the case of smes, the use of these audits is very different from that of their larger counterparts. it is assumed that no research has been done on the relationship between business drive and external auditing. hypothesis 2 (h2): there is a positive relationship between business drive and smes’ decision to use external audit. the third is business environment. while running a business, the decision to choose the business environment is considered important since certain business environment can support business activities. schiffer and weder (2001) conclude that smaller firms face significantly more problems than larger firms in terms of financing, taxes and regulations, inflation, corruption and street crime. there are eight business environments that affect company size, including: 1) taxes and regulations, 2) instability policy, 3) inflation, 4) exchange rates, 5) the judiciary, 6) corruption, 7) street crime, 8) organized and anticompetitive practice (schiffer & weder, 2001). bad business environment is thought to have a detrimental effect on the business. additionally, the world bank states that business environment factors can have an effect on the development of smes (schiffer & weder, 2001). a study on bad business environment impact on business development could be seen in a research by olawale and smit (2010) which conclude that crime and bad macroeconomic environments have positive and significant correlations with non-accessible debt financing to new smes. the research analyzes the relationship between an inadequate business environment and a company's decision to use an external auditor based on the foregoing discussion. it is assumed that owners have the consideration to hire external auditors voluntarily, in the same manner a bad business environment that requires owners to hire external audits to avoid bad perspectives from external parties (banks, other financial institutions) which cause difficulties for companies to access bank loans. business owners also consider an external auditor to be even more important if the company's business activities are revolving around a bad business environment. the research classifies the business environment in smes into two categories, namely: 1) budget for security; 2) losses as a result of theft, robbery, and vandalism. there has not been a research that discusses the relationship between business environment and the use of external audit. hypothesis 3 (h3): there is a positive relationship between a better business environment and smes decision to use external audit. research methods as an ordered logistic function, the research models the relationship between the dependent variable audit: journal of asean studies 165 (1) in which the cut-off the latent variable for category j of dependent variable ∗ is given by (2) (3) where y is ordinal scaled dependent variable (audit). x is the vector of variable of interest regressors and v is the vector of control regressors. the latent variable subsequently converted to probability belongs to category j through a logistic function. the research has 16 regression models to covering a substantial portion of rich information provided in the data set. from that point, various items in the questionnaire are combined into three key metrics: 1) a measure of company’s financial structure (finstru), 2) a measure of company’s business drive strategy (busdrive), and 3) a measure of company’s business environment (busenv). the research determines the value by analyzing the relationship between costs and benefits of the audit that hopefully will bring advantages to the company. in analyzing the factors affecting smes' decision to use external audits, the research reviews several variables that might affect a company's decision, whose codes are provided in table 1. a. financial structure it is a multidimensional variable that measures the extent of financial reliance on an outer source. the calculation for this variable is the sum of (a). line of credit facility, (b). overdraft facility and (c). 1-retained earnings (k3a). we will treat qualitative answers (yes/no) as an ordinal scale, in which yes=1 and no=0. for numeric variables, we transform the variables using the s function. b. business drive it is a multidimensional variable to measure the extent of smes business driver factor. the calculation for this variable consists of the sum value from these variables (a). top management experience (b7), (b). usage of foreign license office software (e6), (c). own website (c22b), and (d). use email (c22a). we treat this variable through qualitative means (yes/no) or as an ordinal scale, in which yes=1 and no=0. for numeric variables, we will transform using the s function. c. business environment it is a multidimensional variable to measure the smes business environment. it is calculated by summarizing the answers to questions of (a). pay for security (i1), (b) experience losses as a result of theft, robbery, vandalism or arson (i3). we measure these questions through qualitative answers (yes/no) or as an ordinal scale, in which yes=1 and no=0. for numeric variables, we transform using the s function. several control variable are calculated using: 1) country dummy, which will be used to set some boundaries within research that is being conducted in the country of interest, done due to the difference between each country policy that endorse audited financial reports; 2) company sales value that will be convert into usd currency, by using sales as a control 166 the role of financial variable, the research aims to set the sales performance to determine company size; 3) business sector, moving forward this variable will cascade each sector into specific clusters, this is necessary to check if specific business sectors are interested to adopt audit into their business process. lastly, the ownership structure in a company definitely influences the decisionmaking. in this case, the decision to use an external auditor is expected to be voluntary or due to external pressure that requires the company to hire an external audit. research by anuar et al. (2012) in malaysia finds a positive association between different modes of ownership structure and smes opting for voluntary audits. however, in canada, senkow et al. (2001) do not find a significant relationship between managerial ownership and voluntary audits. therefore, the research considers the level of complexity of the ownership structure that influences the decision to hire external auditors voluntarily. this is also supported by collis (2009) and desender et al. (2009), who find that the ownership structure has a significant influence on the relationship between the demand for external audit and executive board characteristics. however, collis (2009) adds that demand for voluntary audit by small companies is a result of demand from shareholders and the bank/lenders (agency factors), but the demand from shareholders is predicted to be the more powerful of the two. this research also determines whether the higher level of complexity in ownership of a company is considered to be high. there are various types of ownership that have different levels of complexity, and these types of ownership is considered to vary greatly. the reserach considers more complex ownership structure leads to higher company's desire to use an external auditor service voluntarily. the research tests the feasibility of the regression results using the hosmer-lemeshow test & pseudo r2 test. the hosmer-lemeshow test is a goodness of fit test for logistic regression. a goodness of fit test can describe how well the data fits the model. appropriate is defined as the absence of a significant difference between the model and its observed value. additionally, we used the pseudo r square to determine the independent variable's ability to explain the dependent variable. the results demonstrate the independent variable's ability to adequately explain the dependent variable in percentage units. the remainder denotes an extraneous factor that exists outside the model and contributes to the explanation of the dependent variable. the basic model is extended to include company’s domicile (c_id, c_my, c_ph, c_vi, and c_th), classification based on company’s ownership structure, and also classification based on company business sector (bsecs_ma, bsecs_os, bsecs_rs). in addition to the assumption test on the final model, the research conducts robustness checks throughout the variables of interest (finstru, busdrive, and busenv). this is to determine whether each of these variables has an effect on the estimated results. explaining chronological research includes how to prepare materials research, design of the study and research procedures. minimum research method consists of research type, type and source of data, data collection techniques, and data analysis techniques. journal of asean studies 167 table 1. description of variables variables no proxy description wb es questionnaire source code question dependent variable 1 audit the use of external auditor k21 in fiscal year [insert last complete fiscal year], did this establishment have its annual financial statements checked and certified by an external auditor? variable of interest 1 finstru financial structure k8 at this time, does this establishment have a line of credit or a loan from a financial institution? k7 at this time, does this establishment have an overdraft facility? k3a internal funds or retained earnings; over fiscal year [insert last complete fiscal year], please estimate the proportion of this establishment’s working capital, that is the funds available for dayto-day operations, that was financed from each of the following sources? 2 busdrive business drive b7 how many years of experience working in this sector does the top manager have? e6 does this establishment at present use technology licensed from a foreign-owned company, excluding office software? c22a at the present time, does this establishment use emails to communicate with clients or suppliers? c22b at the present time, does this establishment have its own website? 3 busenv business environment i1 in fiscal year [insert last complete fiscal year], did this establishment pay for security, for example equipment, personnel, or professional security services? i3 in fiscal year [insert last complete fiscal year], did this establishment experience losses as a result of theft, robbery, vandalism or arson on this establishment’s premises? control variable 1 sales sales amount in usd d2 in fiscal year [insert last complete fiscal year], what were this establishment’s total annual sales for all products and services? 2 c_id country indonesia a1 country c_my country malaysia c_ph country phillipines c_th country thailand c_vi country vietnam 3 bsecs_ma business sector manufacture a0 business sector bsecs_rs business sector retail service bsecs_os business sector other service 168 the role of financial source : world bank enterprise survey https://www.enterprisesurveys.org/en/enterprisesurveys results and discussions descriptive statistics table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables utilized within this research. audit will hold a minimum value of 0 and maximum on 1. this categorization is required because this research conducted on an ordinal scale with qualitative answers (yes=1/no=1). if audit acquired a standard deviation value of 0,477 (above mean value), this implies audit possesses high data variation. sales have a minimum value of 2,556 and max value of 9,597. within this variable, we convert sales value from native regional currency into usd, afterwards, the monetary value converted using a log algorithm. next, for finstru and busdrive, the minimum maximum value acquired are: 0,078; 2,687; 0,176; 3,986 both scored standard deviation value of 0., and 0,887 respectively (under mean value) which indicate that finstru & busdrive have data variation level that is lower than the mean value. finstru & busdrive is calculated with a simple sum of answers to questions within the respective proxy. inside finstru & busdrive proxy also presents several numeric variables that will later be transformed using s function. numeric variables in finstru being mentioned illustrates retained earning percentages. on the other hand, busdrive symbolize top management experience measured in years of experience they currently have. lastly, busenv with minimum value of 0 and maximum value of 2. the value is operated using simple sum operation of the ordinal scale of the particular variable. busenv held standard deviation value of 0,608 (above mean) which indicates high data variance. table 2. descriptive statistics of variables variable obs mean std. dev. min max audit 3813 0,351 0,477 0 1 sales 3813 5,334 0,833 2,556 9,597 finstru 3813 1,017 0,624 0,078 2,687 busdrive 3813 1,568 0,887 0,176 3,986 busenv 3813 0,478 0,608 0 2 4 ownst_sp ownership structure sole proprietorship b1 what is this firm’s current legal status? ownst_ps ownership structure partnership. the combination of partner business category (private or public), due to limited respondent in some observed country https://www.enterprisesurveys.org/en/enterprisesurveys journal of asean studies 169 it starts with 3,940 observations and then exclude null-valued responses. after filtering out the foregoing observations, 3,813 observations will be analyzed. the lower part is number of cases in each category of dependent and explanatory variables, as seen in table 3. table 3. cases of categorical variables indonesia malaysia phillipines thailand vietnam total audit 119 294 636 140 152 non-audit 810 395 177 563 527 responses 929 689 813 703 679 3813 bsecs_ma 722 372 602 469 426 bsec_os 110 173 104 128 204 bsec_rs 97 144 107 106 49 929 689 813 703 679 3813 ownst_ps 266 464 514 438 282 ownst_sp 663 225 299 265 397 929 689 813 703 679 3813 table 4. pearson’s correlation table audit sales finstru busdrive busenv audit 1,000 sales 0,195 1,000 finstru 0,066 0,239 1,000 busdrive 0,211 0,398 0,197 1,000 busenv 0,253 0,249 0,105 0,311 1,000 table 4 summarizes a simple correlation (pearson's correlation) between the variables of interest used in the research. afterward, we use kendall's tau to test the relationship between variables on an ordinal scale, according to cleff (2019). additionally, the research examines the relationship between control variables. thus, it is concluded that there is no significant correlation between control variable and each independent variable, and that each independent variable exists independently of the others. baseline regression first, the research performs ordered logistic regression and supported by regression using a linear probability model and probit model. as table 5 illustrates, for the 3rd model, pseudo r2 shows the value of 0,239. this indicates that the independent variable could account for 23,9% of the dependent variable, but the model of significance is to be considered 170 the role of financial when practicing the logistic model. furthermore, the correctly classified percentage scores on 77,76%, which describes the proportion of the subject is considered to be well-classified. the research also finds strong empirical support for the variable of interest: 1) financial structure (finstru), 2) business drive (busdrive), and 3) business environment (busnev). to add to this formula, three different models are applied, the level of significance for each variable of interest showed equal value. busdrive & busenv is statistically significant at the 1% level. however, finstru is statistically significant at the 5% level. for busdrive variable, the findings comes to support the theoretical hypothesis of wallace (2014) explaining that external auditor service is crucial in serving highly credible financial statement. since external audit adoption is still fairly new in these test samples, when corporate is willing to spend a higher budget to afford public accountant service, this decision is believed to have a positive impact on the business drive strategy. business environment (busenv) describes a bad business environment and shows positive correlation with external audit adoption. this findings supports the world bank’s statement that the business environment holds high impact upon smes growth, this is why companies that operate in a bad business environment could leverage external auditor service adoption to ensure sustainability of its business operation (schiffer & weder, 2001). financial structure (finstru) also supports the research on a company's financial structure to eventually contract external audit services. if a company's financial structure also consists of external sources, audit adoption is believed to be an essential content within the financial statement. the motion also supports the research by palazuelos et al. (2017) that information within financial structure also has an impact on loan officers' willingness to grant them business loans. regression results portray sales significant position, this illustrates audit adoption has a significant impact on sales for each company. the higher sales value of the company, the more complex internal business process become. elkhatib & kamel (2013) support that external audit role is pivotal for accounting policies and practices review. thus, the research conclude the sales variable to be included in the company decision to contract an external auditor. next, the research looks further on the country, and makes vietnam as a benchmark. explicitly, audit adoption is significantly higher in malaysia and the philippines than in vietnam. when compared to vietnam, however, audit adoption is significantly lower in indonesia, both in terms of awareness and implementation. this deduction requires further study into the subject, the initial hypothesis suggests that the culture and history of a country affect companies' tendency to adopt audit within the country border. next, the business sector variable is analyzed with the manufacturing sector as benchmark shows no significant relationship between audit adoption in other retail or service sectors. lastly, based on company ownership structure, the research will consider sole proprietorship as the benchmark in this dummy variable. the research combines private, public and partnership-based company ownership due to limited samples on private and public corporate in some of the observed countries. the data shows that partnership (ownst_ps) has a significant impact on audit adoption when compared to sole proprietorship. this finding aligns with collins (2009) who states that demand for voluntary journal of asean studies 171 audit by a small company is influenced heavily by shareholders compared to its external counterparts. in summary, when a company is co-owned by several individuals, the company will ultimately utilize external auditor service. table 5. baseline regression no variables model 1 model 2 model 3 lpm probit logit 1 sales 0,040*** 0,150*** 0,260*** (0,009) (0,032) (0,056) 2 c_id -0,003 -0,112 -0,165 (0,021) (0,080) (0,143) 3 c_my 0,245*** 0,731*** 1,236*** (0,022) (0,077) (0,132) 4 c_ph 0,569*** 1,630*** 2,712*** (0,021) (0,076) (0,133) 5 c_th 0,034 0,123 0,185 (0,022) (0,080) (0,141) 6 bsec_os 0,018 0,071 0,133 (0,017) (0,060) (0,104) 7 bsec_rs 0,010 0,051 0,106 (0,019) (0,070) (0,122) 8 ownst_ps -0,042*** -0,142*** -0,237*** (0,014) (0,052) (0,090) 9 finstru 0,031*** 0,092** 0,154** (0,011) (0,038) (0,065) 10 busdrive 0,047*** 0,166*** 0,291*** (0,008) (0,030) (0,052) 11 busenv 0,078*** 0,252*** 0,429*** (0,011) (0,041) (0,070) constant -0,162*** -2,147*** -3,675*** (0.049) (0.178) (0.311) observations 3813 3813 3813 standard errors in parentheses *** p<0,01; ** p<0,05; * p<0,1 pseudo r2 0,239 0,239 lr chi2 1183,66 1182,30 f 145 r2 0,296 % correctly classified 64,99% 77,81% 77,76% elaborate regression furthermore, the results of additional regression is reported by performing elaborate regression between the control variable dummy and the variable of interest sequentially to see the interaction of each variable of interest with the dummy variable. as shown in table 6, the research performs a regression to see the interaction of the dummy variable with our three variables of interest. each model shows interaction between control variables with the 172 the role of financial respective variable of interest. table 6 presents the estimated coefficients and p-values in parentheses. the results also shows promising results for indonesian region compared to vietnam. indonesia shows significant hesitation towards audit adoption. as indicated by the interaction values for the relevant variables, indonesia had values of 0,636; 1,150; and 0,802. in contrast to vietnam, indonesia demonstrated consistent stand-alone results on the finstru variable, which is non-audit adopting. however, when the interaction of the three variables is considered, indonesia demonstrates a significantly higher rate of audit adoption than vietnam. in aggregate, indonesia, malaysia, and the philippines have a statistically significant level of audit adoption of 1%, according to finstru, busdrive, and busenv compared to the benchmark country, vietnam. the statistical significance used is: * at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level respectively. table 6. extended model regression result, country dummies no variables model 4 model 5 model 6 finstru busdrive busenv 1 sales 0,230*** 0,182*** 0,200*** (0,054) (0,055) (0,055) 2 finstru 0,027 0,150** 0,134** (0,163) (0,066) (0,067) 3 busdrive 0,259*** -0,293** 0,274*** (0,051) (0,135) (0,051) 4 busenv 0,424*** 0,427*** 0,221 (0,070) (0,070) (0,147) 5 c_my 1,220*** 0,085 0,976*** (0,252) (0,308) (0,172) 6 c_ph 2,333*** 0,886*** 2,539*** (0,272) (0,334) (0,188) 7 c_th 0,046 0,166 0,106 (0,274) (0,327) (0,176) 8 c_id -0,847*** -2,187*** -0,644*** (0,287) (0,333) (0,201) 9 1.c_my#vir -0,028 0,559*** 0,277 (0,190) (0,160) (0,190) 10 1.c_ph#vir 0,320 0,980*** 0,112 (0,256) (0,180) (0,204) 11 1.c_th#vir 0,065 -0,101 -0,296 (0,216) (0,173) (0,260) 12 1.c_id#vir 0,636*** 1,150*** 0,802*** (0,234) (0,169) (0,235) constant -3,359*** -2,173*** -3,190*** (0,353) (0,387) (0,324) observations 3,813 3,813 3,813 standard errors in parentheses *** p<0,01; ** p<0,05; * p<0,1 pseudo r2 0,239 0,257 0,241 lr chi2 1186,10 1273,27 1191,89 % correctly classified 77,68% 78,18% 77,71% journal of asean studies 173 table 7 reports the results of additional regressions with the business sector dummy. it is seen that the impact of business sector retail service and other service does not have significant impact on audit adoption compared to manufacturing companies. this supports the results from previous baseline regression based on complexity within the interaction presented. the table presents estimated coefficients and p-values in parentheses. the statistical significance used is: * at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level respectively. table 7. extended model regression result, business sector dummies no variables model 7 model 8 model 9 finstru busdrive busenv 1 sales 0,289*** 0,286*** 0,288*** (0,047) (0,047) (0,047) 2 finstru -0,063 0,004 0,001 (0,071) (0,057) (0,057) 3 busdrive 0,296*** 0,302*** 0,290*** (0,045) (0,051) (0,045) 4 busenv 0,672*** 0,670*** 0,649*** (0,060) (0,060) (0,074) 5 bsec_os -0,102 0,276 0,015 (0,174) (0,217) (0,122) 6 bsec_rs -0,134 -0,004 0,051 (0,201) (0,228) (0,142) 7 1.bsec_os#vir 0,065 -0,180 -0,088 (0,138) (0,115) (0,145) 8 1.bsec_rs#vir 0,344** 0,149 0,327* (0,166) (0,131) (0,179) constant -2,953*** -3,016*** -2,994*** (0,245) (0,246) (0,242) observations 3813 3813 3813 standard errors in parentheses *** p<0,01; ** p<0,05; * p<0,1 pseudo r2 0,074 0,074 0,074 lr chi2 368,72 368,76 368,75 % correctly classified 68,37% 68,19% 68,27% finally, table 8 summarizes additional regression results that contribute to the creation of the dummy ownership structure. when we consider the business sector as a whole, there is no discernible difference between baseline and elaborated regression. the estimated coefficients and p-values are presented in parentheses. the statistical significance are: * at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level respectively. 174 the role of financial table 8. extended model regression result, ownership structure dummies robustness check table 9 reports regression robustness check for proxy: finstru, busdrive dan busenv. robustness check is conducted by inserting variables of interest in sequential manner. each regression (shown on the first row of each table) is processed by using the logit regression model. this report serves an estimated coefficient with enclosed p-value. in practice, level of significance statistic used are: * on 10% error level, ** on 5% error level, *** on 1% error level consecutively. through sequential regression upon variable of interest, the regression model could be deemed as robust. this claim is based on the relative magnitude and level of significance for each variable shown consistent results even when the variable of interest is being input in sequential manners. even though each variable of interest is submitted in a sequential manner, pseudo r2, lr chi or correctly classified percentage does not show significant results, so it is concluded that each variable of interest is independent of each other. no variables model 10 model 11 model 12 finstru busdrive busenv 1 sales 0,275*** 0,272*** 0,273*** (0,048) (0,048) (0,048) 2 finstru 0,080 -0,002 -0,001 (0,091) (0,057) (0,057) 3 busdrive 0,277*** 0,285*** 0,279*** (0,045) (0,064) (0,045) 4 busenv 0,662*** 0,665*** 0,630*** (0,060) (0,060) (0,093) 5 ownst_ps 0,233* 0,121 0,063 (0,141) (0,161) (0,099) 6 1.ownst_ps#vi r -0,134 -0,015 0,060 (0,116) (0,085) (0,120) constant -3,014*** -2,933*** -2,914*** (0,254) (0,247) (0,242) observations 3813 3813 3813 standard errors in parentheses *** p<0,01, ** p<0,05, * p<0,1 pseudo r2 0,073 0,073 0,073 lr chi2 362,67 361,36 361,56 % correctly classified 68.06% 68.37% 68.53% journal of asean studies 175 table 9. robustness check – sequential no variables model 3 model 14 model 15 model 16 logit logit logit logit 1 sales 0,260*** 0,285*** 0,332*** 0,277*** (0,056) (0,055) (0,054) (0,055) 2 c_id -0,165 -0,167 -0,284** -0,238* (0,143) (0,143) (0,142) (0,142) 3 c_my 1,236*** 1,281*** 1,173*** 1,171*** (0,132) (0,131) (0,131) (0,130) 4 c_ph 2,712*** 2,687*** 2,668*** 2,725*** (0,133) (0,133) (0,133) (0,132) 5 c_th 0,185 0,204 0,186 0,010 (0,141) (0,141) (0,141) (0,137) 6 bsec_os 0,133 0,127 0,114 0,128 (0,104) (0,104) (0,104) (0,104) 7 bsec_rs 0,106 0,101 0,046 0,109 (0,122) (0,122) (0,121) (0,121) 8 ownst_ps -0,237*** -0,235*** -0,184** -0,175** (0,090) (0,089) (0,089) (0,089) 9 finstru 0,154** 0,184*** 0,183*** (0,065) (0,065) (0,065) 10 busdrive 0,291*** 0,301*** 0,352*** (0,052) (0,052) (0,051) 11 busenv 0,429*** 0,441*** 0,506*** (0,070) (0,070) (0,069) constant -3,675*** -3,681*** -3,627*** -3,656*** (0,311) (0,312) (0,311) (0,309) observations 3813 3813 3813 3813 standard errors in parentheses *** p<0,01; ** p<0,05; * p<0,1 pseudo r2 0,239 0,238 0,232 0,231 lr chi2 1182,30 1176,81 1151,26 1144,95 % correctly classified 77,76% 78,05% 78,15% 77,00% conclusions the purpose of this research is to ascertain the factors that influence smes' decision to adopt audit. specifically, the research aims to examine how the identified variables of interest (financial structure, business motivation, and business environment) influence the decision to adopt external auditing by asean smes, additional research is conducted to incorporate several control variables into the analysis, including sales, country, business sector, and ownership structure. the initial model is largely supported by adequate specification and bolstered by robustness tests. as a straightforward application on audit adoption, the research uses the ordinal logistic regression. upon testing and reviewing variables and data, it is found that audit have positive correlation with financial structure, business drive, and business environment. this 176 the role of financial indicates three of our predetermined variables have contribution on audit adoption decision, especially for smes. as for the control variables, there seems to be no significant correlation between the business sector of a company with the tendency to adopt audit as part of smes business processes. for the ownership structure, there is a significant negative correlation between this variable with external audit decisions for smes companies. however, the research discovers a significant positive correlation between audit adoption and sales in the case of audits. this implies that a higher sales value may influence an sme's decision to adopt audit. this could happen since businesses with a higher sales value also have a higher earnings value, implying that their business processes are more complex. this results in a significant amount of audit adoption within the observation scope. in addition, according to country of origin research, there is a significant positive correlation to adopt audit in the country of malaysia, philippines as opposed to thailand and vietnam. in indonesia, awareness of audit adoption is relatively insignificant compared to the other variables examined in the research. additionally, the research discovers that there is no significant differences between baseline regressions of each control variable and the respective variable of interest; bsecs and ownstruc. distinction is found through a complex regression analysis based on country of origin. for example, previously on baseline regression, indonesia showed low adoption rate when observed with variable of interest. now, it comes up with showing different results. the result indicates a significant positive relationship between external audit adoption in indonesia with three of our predetermined variables of interest. this could indicate that, when viewed through the lens of the country of origin, external audit adoption is a complicated process. as a matter of fact, additional research is required to examine the business motivations and business environment factors that influence a business entity's decision to adopt audit. additionally, it would increase smes’ awareness of the business benefits of audit adoption. this variable may also provide a different angle for a business considering external auditor services, apart from the cost and potential profit associated with that decision. correspondingly, there is room for additional research on ownership structure and sales variables as this research does not examine those variables due to resource constraints. it is hoped that by the end of this research, the variable of interest will be a factor in business owners' decision to hire external auditors. particularly in indonesia, these findings may encourage businesses to consider cost-benefit analysis, as business drive has had a significant impact on the adoption of external auditing. as for business environment, it is expected that businesses operating in unfavorable business environments will consider utilizing external audit to help them improve their business processes. the research serves as a literature review on auditing for scientific purposes and lays the groundwork for future research. in terms of the regulatory body, this research, particularly the financial structure proxy, can be used as supporting literature for any auditor-related regulator who has an impact on smes, particularly those who will use smes ownership structure as a criterion for journal of asean studies 177 regulation. as a proxy for business drive, it is expected that the research provides a new perspective on the use of external auditors and contributes to the growth of small and medium-sized businesses by advocating for a more transparent application of audit fees. this would educate businesses about the detailed impact of service costs on each business line. lastly, regulatory bodies could make use of the business environment proxy to enrich the auditing process for smes in unfavorable business environments. in the long run, regulators could also offer incentive and support toward smes to adopt external auditor service adoption. with numerous accomplishments, it is hoped that external auditor services will be widely adopted to boost growth and ultimately benefit the economies of developing countries. furthermore, regulators could also offer incentive and support toward smes to adopt external auditor service adoption. with many success test cases, external auditor services is expected to be widely adopted to boost growth and ultimately benefit the economies of developing countries. due to resource limitation, further research is required upon multidimensional components and variables for better clarity on key factors that result in smes adoption of audit in a more specific manner. about the authors jonathan is a master of accounting student at bina nusantara university majoring in accounting. currently he is building a career in an internet service providers business in indonesia as a general ledger analyst. his passion for audit science made him interested in doing research on audit science. moch. doddy ariefianto (doddy) has been a permanent lecturer at the master of accounting study program, bina nusantara university since august 2019. he graduated for masters and doctoral degrees in economics in 2005 and 2010 from the university of indonesia. doddy's research interests are banking, financial markets, corporate finance, international finance and financial regulation. his scientific articles have been published in reputable international and national publications such as economic systems, research in business and finance, borsa istanbul review, economic bulletin, international journal of economic and management, bulletin of monetary economics and banking, indonesian capital market review, ventura and journal of finance banking. the book that has been published is econometrics: the essence and application using eviews (erlangga, 2012). rindang widuri, is an assistant professor, and head of master of accounting program at bina nusantara university, jakarta, indonesia. she earned b.sc and master degrees in accounting information systems from bina nusantara university, and ph.d in accounting from rmit university, australia. her primary area of expertise is the adoption of technology in financial reporting and accounting education. she has awarded several research grants from international (australia awards) and national institutions (directorate of higher education, ministry of national education, indonesia). 178 the role of financial references anuar, e, devi, s, & meng, 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(2000). financial development and financial structures of industrial smes: the case of greece. european research studies, 3(3-4), 95-110. journal of asean studies, vol. 10, no. 1 (2022), pp. 81−105 issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic received: 15th september 2021/ revised: 22nd june 2022/ accepted: 22nd june 2022 far from home: profile of pro-is deportees’ mobility throughout 2016-2020 and prevention strategy of indonesian government andi raihanah ashar1 and curie maharani2 1,2international relations department, faculty of humanities, bina nusantara university, jakarta, indonesia 11480 curie@binus.ac.id; aandiraihanah@gmail.com how to cite: ashar, andi raihanah & curie maharani (2022). far from home: profile of pro-is deportees’ mobility throughout 2016-2020 and prevention strategy of indonesian government. journal of asean studies, 10(1), 81−105. https:/doi.org/10.21512/jas.v10i1.7732 abstract transnational terrorism has been a worldwide challenge, especially after the declaration of islamic state (is) that was based in syria and iraq in 2014. by 2017, most foreign terrorist fighters (ftfs) from southeast asia were indonesian nationals, of almost 700 individuals. the actual number might be higher as some departed to syria and other destination countries, like afghanistan, the philippines, and india, undetected. the research aimed to examine how pro-is terrorists exploit loopholes in border and immigration control to join is abroad and the shortcoming in indonesian government strategy to counter their mobility. the novelty of the research rested on its use of supreme court’s record of 38 pro-is deportees to build a dataset of their profile and travel history from 2016 to 2020. profile of individual deportee was categorized into demography, affiliation, and funding. travel history was mapped in accordance with the point of departure in indonesia, transit country, final destination, and location where the arrest took placewhich then led to deportation. the research finds that indonesia needs improvement in human resources, law enforcement, immigration management, border control, as well as cross-border cooperation. keywords: terrorist mobility, terrorist mobility strategy, the islamic state (is), departure, immigration mailto:curie@binus.ac.id mailto:aandiraihanah@gmail.com 82 far from home introduction following the call of islamic states’ (is) so-called “caliphate” abu bakr al-baghdadi’s for all muslims to immigrate (hijrah 1 ) to the caliphate state in late june 2014, waves of departure of pro-is fighters came from all over the world. such movement is dubbed as ‘terrorist mobility,’ which ginsburg (2006) defines as “the ability to move people across borders and within nations without being detected by hostile authorities.” around 27,000 to 30,000 foreign terrorist fighters (ftfs) from 86 countries have travelled to syria or iraq, 75% of whom are from 12 countries, including indonesia (longo, 2017). the cross-border terrorist threat became a worldwide challenge that exposes the weaknesses in border and immigration control. for members and sympathizers of terrorist groups in indonesia, cross-border mobility or migration is nothing new. solahudin, fealy, and mcrae (2017) mention that from 1985 to 1992, 192 recruits of darul islam (di) migrated to join military training in the border area between pakistan and afghanistan. upon returning, they played a vital role in several indonesian notable terror attacks, such as the first and second bali bombing, the jw marriot hotel attack, and the australian embassy bombing. another group like jemaah islamiyah (ji) sent fighters to train at hudaibiyah camp in mindanao between 1995 and 1999; later on three out of the 144 mindanao graduates–noordin m. top, dr. azhari hussein, and ali fauzi– became the mastermind behind several terror attacks (solahudin et al., 2017). the number of indonesians responding to the appeal of the is leader is particularly concerning. national counterterrorism agency (badan nasional penanggulangan terorisme/bnpt) estimated about 514 indonesians have joined is in syria and iraq by 2014 (taufiqurrohman, 2015), other estimations mentioned 980 people by 2017 (longo, 2017) and 689 people by 2020 (“pemerintah tidak berencana”, 2020). furthermore, according to the institute for policy analysis of conflict (2018), indonesian nationals who were caught and deported from transit countries before arriving at the country of destination, or “deportees”, increased from 171 in 2016 to 226 people in 2017. the institute for policy analysis of conflict also records that as of mid-2018, more than 500 people were deported for attempting to cross into syria from turkey to join is. the actual number might be higher due to the availability of other routes and the possibility of some returning undetected. those numbers reflect is’ success in promoting the narrative of migration as a manifestation of the caliphate that will emerge before almalhamah qubra or the islamic armageddon, although part of its attraction includes worldly incentives – such as allowance, health care, free education, and housing facilities for professionals to take part in running the is territory as administrators, accountants, teachers, doctors, engineers, or religious experts (institute for policy analysis of conflict, 2018). path of cross-border mobility of indonesian extremists further diversified following the expansion of is activities. in 2015, is decided to expand to the khorasan region, an area historically part of iran, central asia, afghanistan, and pakistan (center for strategic and international studies, 2018). while the number of indonesians that joined is-khorasan is unknown, there is the case of muhammad aulia, a travel facilitator for eleven people, who journal of asean studies 83 was deported from bangkok before joining is-khorasan via thailand and iran (briantika, 2019). between 2016 and 2018 around 40 indonesian extremists attempted to cross the border following southeast asian pro-is fighters’ pledge via the internet to support the mindanao fight in the philippines, nine of them were later deported (arianti & azman, 2019). under president joko widodo's administration, bnpt tried to improve its deradicalization and rehabilitation program for deported terrorist suspects and returnees through interagency collaboration, especially after the ratification of law no. 5/2018 on terrorism. however, national strategy or specific regulation to counter terrorist mobility remains absent. while there is plethora of literatures on terrorists who travel from indonesia (nuraniyah, 2015; kibtiah, 2016; anindya, 2019; timur & yani, 2019), none touched upon the issue of mobility strategy. to fill the gap in academic literature and policy-making formulation, the research aims to investigate the limitations of the indonesian government in preventing pro-is deportees in 2016-2020. in doing so, the research will first describe the profile of indonesian pro-is deportees and their exploitation of the border and immigration system, and then assess the government's capability and its obstacles to effective counter of terrorist mobility strategy (tms). although terrorists who travel outside their country are interchangeably labeled as either “deportee,” “returnee,” or “foreign terrorist fighters (ftfs),” there is no consensus on the definition of the terms. united nations security council (unsc) resolution 2178 defines ftfs as individuals who travel to a state other than their origin to perpetrate, plan or prepare, or participate in terrorist acts. they could be the providers or receivers of terrorist training. whereas the indonesian government defines “returnees” as nationals who managed to cross into syria or iraq and voluntarily returned (laelani, 2018). institute for policy analysis of conflict (2018) differentiates both terms from “deportees,” defined as individuals who tried to reach hijrah destination but got caught before arriving. when it comes to which category carries higher security risks, arguably, a returnee with military experience would be a bigger risk than a deportee with no combat experiences. however, frustrated deportees could also pose a significant danger compared to noncombatant returnees. they could carry out terror attacks at home because the continuous illusion of is collides with reality that hijrah is no longer a feasible option. the research will focus on indonesian deportees because of their potential risks. literature review migration as a security issue touches upon a range of matters directly affecting migration policy, including border integrity, national security, and citizenship (international organization for migration, 2010). a compromised border integrity and immigration system becomes the weak point that terrorist groups exploit in today’s borderless world. citrawan and nadilla (2019) argue that immigration policy intersects with terrorist activities. hence, countermeasures to terrorist mobility should include optimization of intelligence gathering, pre-inspection of travel documents and immigration permits, and border checks. however, 84 far from home further literature that touches upon this particular subject, such as dismantling illicit markets that provide travel documents, arresting terrorist travel facilitators, and cooperating with countries of choice to hijrah, are hardly found. ginsburg (2006) argues that understanding the elements of terrorist mobility is essential since it helps to exploit terrorists’ needs to remain mobile and cross borders. terrorist mobility comprises three elements: (a) management of travel function, (b) exit routes and transportation practices, and (c) entry and residence tactics. firstly, management of terrorist travel functions requires an understanding of the actor who arranges the travel, either a travel facilitator or an illicit travel organization, and the actor who provides the illicit travel documents (the illegal market exists and has supported many terrorists attempting to cut corners to avoid detection by the authorities). secondly, understanding key jumping-off points and checkpoints and preferred choices of practices require information on means of purchasing a certain passage and whether terrorists are trained in particular kinds of transportation ranging from small boats to airplanes. thirdly, there are two approaches to exploit the border and immigration control: 1) to make illegal use of legal channels and 2) to utilize illegal ones. legal channels are used illegally when a terrorist passes through any of the legal checkpoints nations and their immigration systems by using tourist visas and residence permits. whereas the use of illegal channels refers to any discreet travel outside immigration control and border ports of entry, i.e., the use of boat or land crossing in remote places to enter illegal routes. these elements will be used to analyze indonesian deportees’ travel history and planning to hijrah. the research borrows ginsburg’s (2006) argument that a national and global terrorist mobility strategy (tms) is essential as it serves three broad purposes, which are defensive, offensive, and deterrent. a defensive operation is to secure travel, immigration, and transportation channels at borders against undetected terrorist movements. the offensive measure is to exploit the vulnerability of border and immigration systems exposed by terrorists’ need to disrupt their network. combined, an effective defensive and offensive countermeasure will deter or raise the risk for the terrorist movement. a deterrent, offensive, and defensive countermeasures can be set within a single terrorist mobility framework. ginsburg emphasizes seven elements that would identify the roles of government institutions and agencies in every terrorist mobility phase, as seen in table 1. these elements will be used as the benchmark to evaluate the existing indonesian strategy pertaining to terrorist mobility. since indonesia does not have a single framework or an established expert group that focuses on responding to this problem, some countermeasures overlap. hence, the tms is simplified into three indicators. first, immigration and border control, including understanding terrorist mobility knowledge while modernizing the border and immigration system for effective management. second, crime control by arresting criminal travel networks, including travel facilitators and illegal document providers. lastly, cross-border cooperation to help identify and track terrorists on the move. journal of asean studies 85 table 1. elements of terrorist mobility strategy (tms) no. element description indicator 1 foundation: terrorist mobility knowledge a basic guideline or report for top officials and front-line managers on terrorist mobility trends and detection methods. immigration and border control 2 border and immigration management: securing legal entry channels securing legal channels from terrorists and other threats through a “smart borders” policy that relies on modernized infrastructure to make use of foreign and domestic intelligence about terrorists, as well as on risk management tools. 3 perimeter control: denying access through illegal channels control over infiltration by terrorists through illegal entry channels that avoids screening by crossing surreptitiously away from a port of entry. 4 targeting: terrorists who act as travel facilitators strategy against terrorists who facilitate travel for groups, cells, and networks. crime control 5 crime control: attacking illicit travel network disrupt illegal market that provides travel services, including criminal exploitation of law-abiding travel agencies. 6 domestic security: constraining terrorist mobility a strategy to protect against or exploit terrorist use of public and private systems to move around including the immigration system with its regulation of employers, which confers legal status and verifies identity, and the public and private transportation systems. 7 global awareness: tracking terrorists en route strengthen the ability to identify and track any individual or small group of terrorists on the move. cross-border cooperation source: ginsburg (2006) research methods the research employs a qualitative methodology to understand indonesia’s pro-is jihadists movement and how counterterrorism strategy intersects with border security and immigration reform. the analysis captures terrorist movement trends within the period from 2016 to 2020. the originality of the analysis comes from a dataset of mostly primary sources constructed from the supreme court’s record of 38 pro-is deportees’ convictions. selection of documents are based on several keywords: “putusan”, “kejahatan terhadap keamanan negara”, “teroris”, and “deportasi”. in addition, data of two pro-is deportees, rullie rian zeke and ulfah handayani saleh, were collected from media coverage and official statements by the 86 far from home philippines authorities.2 in total, the dataset collects 40 profiles of the arrested for terrorismrelated charges or successfully launched a terror attack from 2016 to 2020. whereas to examine the indonesian government’s strategy in countering terrorist mobility, the research depends on both primary data, i.e. court documents and government regulations, and secondary sources. two datasets are built to analyze personal data and travel history. personal data contains birth location, age, gender, domicile, profession, and education. travel history includes departure, transit, arrival, arrest, and deportation, as well as detailed information regarding the amount and source of funds. the terrorist mobility trends are then compared with the indonesian government strategy in order to assess the gap in the implementation. furthermore, the analysis is supported a report by the indonesian ministry of law and human rights’ research and development agency (badan penelitian dan pengembangan hukum dan ham/balitbang ham), and media coverage. the research has two limitations that could be addressed for future research. first, the authors have contacted governmental institutions and agencies for interviews but received no welcoming response. second, although the authors have collected all deportees’ data from the supreme court, it is possible that the digital archive is not complete. challenges are found in obtaining equally complete information from each verdict. analysis profile of deportees: demography, affiliation, funding prior to this research, the first and only attempt to profile indonesian deportees was conducted by the institute for policy analysis of conflict (ipac) in 2018. the think tank collects data from 92 indonesian deportees from january to april 2017 from the university of indonesia’s center for the study of terrorism and social conflict. their finding covers country of deportation, demography (origin, sex, education, age group), and sentiment towards is (supportive to is or another group). around 89% were deported from turkey while the rest were deported from hong kong, singapore, and japan. the basic data shows that 56% of the adults were women and 44% were men, while 76% travel with their families. moreover, on education, 43% were high school graduates, 30% had tertiary education whereas the remaining deportees only reached junior high school or lower. more than half of the deportees originated from java, which most of these areas correlate with the strongholds of terrorist group jamaah ansharut daulah (jad). only eight percent of deportees supported non-is groups. based on this profile, ipac argued that deportees mainly were middle-class and paid their own travel expenses. the research finds both similarities and differences in the profiling of indonesian deportees with that of ipac. among similarities are transit hub countries, deportees’ origin, and education background, while the differences are related to financial aspects, including deportees’ financial state, source of funds, and each destination’s travel expenses. around 67% deportees were arrested in turkey, followed by thailand (16%), the philippines (9%), journal of asean studies 87 hong kong (2%), and sri lanka (2%). it is important to note that these numbers include terrorists who were deported not only once but also twice and even three times. in terms of profile, a high number of deportees were from areas deemed vulnerable to terrorism-related activity: west java (25%), aceh (20%), dki jakarta (10%), lampung (10%), and central java (7%). although the supreme court documents lacked personal background information, the data show that 27% of deportees do not hold a bachelor’s degree or higher – high school graduates or lower are more probable. ten people, or 25% of the deportees, has a bachelor’s degree, and one person has a master’s degree. while men outnumbered women by 7 to 1, the latter may hold critical roles from funding hijrah expenses to the executor of suicide bombing. as example, meilani indria dewi used to sell islamic clothing for muslim women online to fund her trip to syria and join isis, and arti alifah aviandari rahardjo, was responsible for purchasing flight tickets and visa applications for herself and family.3 contrary to ipac report, the research argues that profession as well as income might not necessarily determine the preparedness of an individual for hijrah, as other means of funding are available such as support and loan (figure 1). by profession, 67% of the deportees work in informal sectors, while the rest were private employees, civil servants (aparat sipil negara/asn). and unemployed. in parallel, some deportees were radicalized during their time as migrant workers abroad as in the case of ika puspita sari who was deported from hong kong in 2016. their suspicious activities related to terrorism became the reason behind their deportation back to indonesia. half of the deportees were self-funded, around 57%, by most likely selling existing properties for funding. around 19% of the case was partly aided by others and 2,3% was fully funded. aided individuals mostly received financial help from their travel facilitators, fellow sympathizers, or other cell group members. for instance, fathu yahya hasan received an additional us$ 701 from ibrahim, his travel facilitator, to go to syria after collecting us$ 1,402. while uzair cholid received us$ 70,090 from his brother ziad cholid who is also a pro-is sympathizer. fathu yahya’s second attempt to hijrah was fully funded by his travel facilitator, mr. joko. angga irawan, who was deported in 2014 from turkey, received loans for us$ 8,271 from central java regional development bank. therefore, contrary to ipac, the research finds that many deportees are partly or even fully aided by others. figure 1. source of fund for hijrah. source: authors, from supreme court verdicts 88 far from home while most deportees are caught in turkey, there are many destination choices for hijrah. the travel routes map, as seen in figure 2, shows travelers who transit through turkey by air legally would likely to cross into syria. other routes that serve as a pair of transit point and destination are: 1) iran to afghanistan, 2) manila to mindanao in the philippines, and 3) new delhi to jammu kashmir in india. in parallel, taking the sea route from indonesia is also an option to enter mindanao, the philippines, illegally. as the most favorable choice to enter syria, turkey’s border area with syria is deemed a strategic transit hub for foreign fighters joining is. this hijrah highway starts from istanbul in the west of turkey towards gaziantep, sanliurfa, and kilis. in fact, the country has welcomed and accepted refugees and migrants from syria, taking the same route as foreign fighters who attempt to cross the border and vice versa (yayla, 2019). in the past few years, iran is deemed as the new transit hub choice to various hijrah destinations since the departure of indonesian pro-is terrorists in 2019. furthermore, cheaper option of destinations from indonesia is india and the philippines. not only is it more affordable than syria, but the philippines is also a closer destination from indonesia (figure 3). figure 2. map of travel routes taken by indonesian pro-is deportees to turkey. source: authors, from supreme court verdicts journal of asean studies 89 figure 3. map of alternative travel routes taken by indonesian pro-is deportees to iran. source: authors, from supreme court verdicts the amount of funds collected seems to affect a terrorist’s choice of destination. the total cost of hijrah for each person in turkey could reach rp 50 to 100 million (us$ 3,482 to us$ 6,963). there is also the additional fee of us$500 per person for smuggling into syria. in 2018, uzair cholid and arti alifah prepared rp 1.05 billion (us$ 73,164) to cover travel expenses and buy an apartment in turkey with the help of arpiet mahfuz fitri kemora. the next year, a group led by muhamad aulia attempted to travel to afghanistan by taking the thailand-iran route, where each member prepared between rp 20 to 150 million (us$ 1,392 to us$ 10,443). in other cases, those who travelled to india and transited in sri lanka like farid ramadhan, as well as those who travel to the philippines like agistya agriyana and muhammad ghufron damanhuri, prepared rp 20-50 million (us$ 1,392 to us$ 3,480) each. how terrorists exploit the border and immigration control a traveler requires travel documents and immigration permits to be able to depart. based on law no. 16/2011 on immigration article 24 and regulation of the minister of law and human rights no. 30/2016 on immigration intelligence, immigration permits encompass travel documents, visa, entry, and exit proof. immigration control starts from applying for a passport and visa application, followed by pre-inspections of these travel documents at the immigration checkpoint. 90 far from home not all deportees require to apply for new passports since many of them have had applied before for pilgrimage trip to mecca. those without passports would go through legal or illegal channels, as in the case of wahyu deddy saputra, who managed to apply for another passport despite being deported from turkey before. after his passport application was rejected, wahyu requested assistance from a friend, jannah, who had access to the data center, to secure a new passport. another example, uzair cholid managed to obtain a new identity card (ic) under the name husein ali asegaf with the help of his brother. he was then able to apply for a new passport with his new ic through a middleman without further background checks and other proper documentation check and other proper documentation.4 travel facilitators have a vital role as a travel planner, including but not limited to deciding travel routes, acting as a middleman with travel hosts in the destination country, as well as arranging tickets and visas. recruitments are mostly done through social media and chat applications such as telegram, whatsapp, facebook and instagram, which are also used to communicate with prospective mujahideen. more than half of the facilitators travelled together with their travel group and mostly acted as amir, as in the case of muhammad aulia and ahmad supriyanto. the ones not travelling would likely be part of criminal networks, either in indonesia or abroad. these deportees knew how to identify and exploit exit points with the least security control as well as having the capability to infiltrate immigration systems without detection during document validation and interview at several checkpoints. in indonesia there are five ports of departure in total: 1) jakarta’s soekarno-hatta international airport in tangerang as the favorite choice, 2) kualanamu international airport in deli serdang, north sumatra, 3) juanda international airport in sidoarjo, 4) i gusti ngurah rai international airport in bali, or 5) tunon taka seaport in nunukan, north kalimantan. muhammad aulia decided to depart from kualanamu international airport to avoid detection from authorities while triyono took the sea route from tanon taka port and crossed into zamboanga via malaysia acting as a merchant. deportees were also able to exploit stealth travel beyond immigration control. cici, the daughter of 2019 jolo church bombing perpetrators, evidently took her family to enter the philippines through illegal channels from keningau, malaysia with the help of two indonesian facilitators (latief, 2019). the philippines authority claimed that cici and her family took the sea route to enter mindanao, were held up in lampinigan island for a few days and then sailed to jolo by pump boat (institute for policy analysis of conflict, 2019). in between the legal and illegal ways, there are also the grey areas used by these terrorists. examples include the use of tourist visas and residence permits. arpiet mahfuz and his family used an ikamet to prevent the authorities from detecting terrorist-related activities while extending their stay in turkey. ikamet is a residence permit for foreigners who want to stay longer in turkey – up to six months. after acquiring the residence permit, arpiet bought an apartment in sogutlucesme, istanbul and he even managed to return to indonesia and travel back to turkey undetected. journal of asean studies 91 counter to terrorist mobility strategy: obstacles to effective implementation there have been efforts by the indonesian government to counter the terrorist mobility of the mentioned profiled militants. in 2016 the police prevented two families comprising ten people from tangerang, a suburb of jakarta and singkawang (in west kalimantan) from departing soekarno-hatta airport, suspecting that they will join is in syria (tristiawati, 2016). again in 2019, detachment 88 (densus 88) captured hari kuncoro in the same airport when he was about to depart to syria, using iran as a transit point (rico, 2019). nevertheless, terrorist mobility issues have not been effectively addressed. table 2 shows the institutional arrangements in countering terrorist mobility in indonesia, based on the existing regulations such as law no. 16/2011 on immigration and regulation of the minister of law and human rights no. 44/2015 on entry and exit procedures at immigration checkpoints. accordingly, efforts to combat terrorist mobility can be divided into immigration and border control, crime control, and cross-border cooperation. table 2. institutional arrangements for countering terrorist mobility factor variable indicator institution limitation immigration and border control detection method for immigration officers guideline the immigration and bnpt absence of technical guideline; lack of integrated and accessible information systems; institutional culture; poor infrastructure condition of immigration checkpoints at borders travel document application simkim the immigration, dukcapil, bnp2tki, ministry of religious affairs, national police, and interpol interpol's i24/7 system document validity during inspection at checkpoints simkim, bcm bcm interpol's i24/7 system aseanapol chain (e-ads) crime control dismantle illicit market for travel documents investigation and intelligence exchange national police, the immigration, ministry of foreign affairs, ministry of internal affairs, bais, bnpt, ppatk, ministry of foreign affairs, bin, special detachment 88, ministry of national development lack of coordination and cooperation between critical entities during investigation arrest travel facilitator 92 far from home planning, and unodc crossborder cooperation bilateral and multilateral cooperation information and intelligence exchange the immigration, polri, bnpt, and ministry of defence the need to expand cooperation with new transit hub countries immigration and border control for passport application examination, rahmanto et al. (2020) describes that officers use the immigration management information system (sistem informasi manajemen keimigrasian/simkim), already integrated with several systems from different stakeholders, such as the population and civil registration agency (dukcapil), the national board for the placement and protection of indonesian overseas workers (bnp2tki), and documents from ministry of religious affairs. if all required documents are complete, the holder will proceed to the interview session. however, if the documents are invalid, the immigration officer will deny the passport or visa application. during the interview session, the officer observes the applicant's facial expression, body gestures, and behavior. if the applicant's intention is suspicious, officers could coordinate with the directorate of intelligence or directorate of investigation and enforcement. both directorates coordinate for document verification using simkim which has been integrated with interpol's i-24/7 system. in addition, officers could also observe by visiting the applicant's residence for a more convincing decision. if the applicants are students, officers could verify by contacting their sponsors or institutions that granted them scholarships (rahmanto et al., 2020). similar to inspections during passport application, rahmanto et al. (2020) explains that an immigration officer examines a traveler’s documents at checkpoints with the support of data and information available in the simkim that controls all application systems at every immigration office, points of entry and exit, immigration detention centers, and representatives’ offices abroad. the inspection reveals an individual’s profile, travel history, or whether the document is stolen or manipulated to falsify travel. moreover, an interview session will follow to detect false personas (putra & arifin, 2020). effective law compliance and enforcement could be achieved if immigration checkpoints are information-rich environments that continuously improve biometric screening systems and provide denied visa or admission information and a watchlist. to improve clearance systems, putra and arifin (2020) explain that simkim has been integrated with the border control management (bcm) system since 2010. the bmc system includes visa and residence permit system, departure ban and entry ban data (enhanced cekal system or ecs), passenger’s movement system (pms/apk), passport application (spri/eoffice), detention center application system, and immigration and enforcement system (nyidakim). this integration of systems allows law enforcement agencies to detect travelers connected or engaged with transnational criminal activities, including terrorism. the journal of asean studies 93 prevention list also includes names of individuals who are in the national police’s wanted list (dpo) (citrawan & nadilla, 2019). bcm is also synchronized with interpol's i-24/7 system and aseanapol chain (eads) at regional and international levels. based on the state police regulations no. 5 in 2011 on the use of the interpol network (i-24/7) and aseanapol chain (e-ads) in indonesia article 1 clause 2, interpol's global police communications system works nonstop, used for information exchange between member states of the icpo-interpol. the state police regulation also explains that electronic aseanapol database system (e-ads) is a database system based on the agreement of the asean chief of police for criminal intelligence exchange between member states. these databases include but are not limited to personal and biometric data, interpol notices, stolen or lost travel and identity documents (sltd), criminal records, criminal syndicate, and modus operandi. cooperation between immigration and ncb-interpol indonesia started postmarawi siege. from 2017 to 2018, the interpol borders management task force (ibmtf) with ncb-interpol indonesia and the directorate general of immigration conducted border control operations at several immigration checkpoints across indonesia, malaysia, and the philippines to anticipate a wave of pro-is fighters leaving and entering the country (divisi hubungan internasional polri, 2018a). the operation focused on the southern region of the philippines: tarakan, north kalimantan; balikpapan, east kalimantan; north sulawesi; and west nusa tenggara. using the mobile interpol network database (mind), immigration officers could counter and detect foreign terrorist fighters' mobility. in the field, immigration officers acknowledge four critical challenges: 1) lack of fiber optic network along with bad weather conditions and lack of real-time data; 2) uneven facilities and infrastructure development at immigration offices in remote areas, such as immigration office class ii tahuna, north sulawesi; 3) lack of access to data and profiling terrorist; and 4) lack of capacity building measures on counter-terrorist mobility for front line officers (rahmanto et al., 2020). for example, simkim ver. 1 and ver. 2 could be used to check applicants' passport details. however, only the directorate general has access to the database. meanwhile, at the border checkpoints, existing infrastructure realities hamper immigration officers to get real-time information, especially in remote areas. no border checks are using bcm with international standards. most border posts use portable bcm without the ability to provide the real-time information. the immigration office in tanjung perak uses an offline portable bcm, which could only be synchronized once every one to two days. besides tanjung perak, immigration offices in west kalimantan do not use fiber-optic networks and only rely on satellite communication. in fact, due to geographical conditions, immigration offices in remote areas are less likely to be monitored, allowing further immigration violations. furthermore, without having a guideline to detect terrorist suspects during an interview, immigration officers could only rely on their intuition and suspicious signs from facial expressions, body gestures, and behavior. this further shows that the lead agency on counterterrorism, bnpt, has not optimized its role–according to governmental regulation no. 77/2019 on terrorism prevention and the provision of compensation, restitution and 94 far from home assistance to witness and victims–in coordinating, integrating, and evaluating analysis involving multiple agents to produce such information and intelligence as a terrorist detection method. another problem that should not be ignored is the government's plan to integrate bcm with interpol's i-24/7 system in every departure point across the country by 2020 (divisi hubungan internasional polri, 2018b). at first, integration of the two systems was launched back in 2017 at soekarno-hatta international airport and i gusti ngurah rai international airport. in 2018, representatives from the national police (polri) and directorate general of immigration signed the standard of procedure (sop) on alert for interpol's i-24/7 system integration with bcm. however, there has not been any update or media coverage on this matter. in addition to lack of infrastructure modernization, as argued before, it would be difficult to expect an even installation across the archipelago by 2020. an equal development is required as other international airports and small seaports are also vulnerable to terrorist mobility. crime control: in-country identification and tracking rejecting an issuance of passport or visa application is not enough as government needs to attack the illicit market of terrorist mobility support to constrain terrorist mobility at the pre-travel phase, most predominantly travel document providers and terrorist travel facilitators. they are relatively easier to find since these illicit businesses focus more on money than ideology. arresting a single travel facilitator would not guarantee the rise of future unknown successors, but it could slow down operations (ginsburg, 2006). although there has not been any law and regulation that specifically target the disruption of the travel facilitator network, there are laws against individuals as illegal documents providers. law no. 16/2011 on immigration clearly states the consequences for immigration officers who attempt any violation that threatens the security of the immigration system. firstly, an immigration officer or other appointed officials who knowingly and unlawfully provide travel documents or give or extend immigration documents to a person they know is not entitled will face imprisonment for up to seven years. moreover, if officers allow an individual to commit an immigration-related crime, they will face a maximum of five years of imprisonment. there are also legal actions related to the information system: immigration officers or other officials who deliberately leak confidential immigration data to unauthorized parties will face imprisonment for up to five years. as a matter of fact, if they intentionally and unlawfully do not input data into the immigration management information system, they will be in six months of prison time. clues from the arrested travel facilitator could be traced back to the document provider and vice versa. the government should prioritize the arrests of terrorists travel facilitators due to the following reasons. first, their arrest could disrupt the day-to-day functioning of the terrorist network. second, terrorist facilitators could be the source of contacts providing clues for tracking other members of the terrorist network (ginsburg, 2006). travel facilitators who also travel with a particular group are likely to get arrested. on the other hand, the facilitators who journal of asean studies 95 do not travel remain free. their arrest would provide law enforcement with a huge advantage in tracking other previously undetected terrorist network members. as the primary counterterrorism investigative authority, rahmanto et al. (2020) argue that polri is responsible for arresting these illicit travel service providers. effective law enforcement would also need intelligence exchange with vital and relevant ministries and agencies about the latest terrorist mobility trends, potential terror attacks, and identification of terrorist networks. the ministry of foreign affairs formed several task forces, including the group responsible for the list of suspected terrorists and terrorist organizations (daftar terduga teroris dan organisasi teroris/dttot) from the united nations security council (unsc) – such as the financial transaction reports and analysis center (pusat pelaporan dan analisis transaksi keuangan/ppatk), ministry of foreign affairs, bnpt, state intelligence agency (badan intelijen negara/bin), densus 88 and directorate general of immigration. their meeting discusses the individual profile of a suspected terrorist, which then requires approval from the central jakarta district court before adding it to the information immigration system (“anti pencucian uang”, n.d.). using the dttot might be a challenge as the immigration needs real-time information as all the indonesian deportees who were detected abroad are not on the list in the first place. at polri, a man-to-man program focuses on coordinating law enforcement and other agencies to observe suspected terrorists. the investigation result would be used for the next coordinated meeting. the ministry of foreign affairs also conducted training with the support of the united nations office on drugs and crime (unodc) and coordinated with the ministry of national development planning based on the priority of each institution and agency. meanwhile, trainings conducted by ppatk focus on analysis and detection methods of terrorism funding. after collecting raw intelligence, analysis is needed either for investigation or policymaking. however, issues such as sectoral ego and lack of analysts are undermining efforts to counter terrorist mobility. despite training on intelligence by ministry of internal affairs that involved polri and armed forces as well as analysts provided by bnpt, data and information exchange is impossible if sectoral egos persist within institutions and agencies (rahmanto et al., 2020). in this regard, other entities that should have helped law enforcement could not optimize their role as front-line officers to detect terrorism-related activities. head of class i immigration office at soekarno-hatta international airport stressed the fact that they are dealing with a lack of data integration with bin, the armed forces’ strategic intelligence agency (bais), interpol, densus 88, and the immigration office itself, which is vital to prevent the issuing of passport (citrawan & nadilla, 2019). cross-border cooperation when terrorists exit or enter official access points, they will take measures to conceal themselves from the detection of both the indonesian and transit country authorities. they could either take a route beyond border and immigration control, choose transit countries with visa-free access, or apply for a residence permit at the country of destination. the latter 96 far from home is a worldwide challenge for counter-terrorism policy considering territorial borders between conflicting states are arguably the least patrolled; thus, making them a promising transit zones (ginsburg, 2006). our dataset shows numerous countries have been deemed as new transit hubs, which require cross-border cooperation with indonesia (figure 4). in order to travel to four destination countries, namely turkey, iran, the philippines and india, individuals can take routes through 10 transit countries, which are thailand, hong kong, united arab emirates, malaysia, singapore, italy, oman, brunei darussalam, sri lanka, and qatar. figure 4. indonesian pro-is deportees’ travel history from departure points to arrest location. source: authors, from supreme court decisions indonesia has been actively involved in both bilateral and multilateral initiatives for information exchange and capacity-building efforts for effective immigration management, including with visa-free access countries, such as brunei, malaysia, singapore, and thailand (visaindex, 2022). for example, in 2016 the directorate general of immigration opened a meeting singapore’s immigration checkpoints authority (ica) to plan the strengthening of respective borders from ftfs mobility (“10th bilateral meeting”, 2016). moreover, in 2016 the 20th asean directors general of immigration department and heads of consular affairs divisions of ministries of foreign affairs (dgicm) agreed to adopt three recommendations from the indonesian delegation: a framework called the asean heads of major immigration checkpoints forum (amicf), the establishment of ad-hoc working groups on asean common visa, and a joint statement for regional cooperation on prevention of ftfs movement (“usulan indonesia disetujui”, 2016). furthermore, on july journal of asean studies 97 6, 2018, the three supplementary activities between asean directors-general of immigration departments, heads of consular affairs divisions of the ministries of foreign affairs (dgicm) and australia was held in mataram, west nusa tenggara, to discuss and strengthen immigration cooperation. the event was attended by ten asean countries and australia, addressing among others intelligence exchange and countermeasures towards ftfs between dgicm member states and australia (“tingkatkan kerjasama keimigrasian”, 2018). finally, on november 5, 2019, the indonesian directorate general of immigration and immigration department of malaysia participated in the indonesia-malaysia immigration consultation focusing on border control and management, mobility at the entry and exit points, migrant workers protection, stay permit for families, joint training, and capacity building efforts (susilo, 2019). another multilateral initiative is the plan of action (poa) of european union to asean (eu-asean) interregional cooperation. from 2013 to 2017, one of the implementations of poa is the comprehensive border management program, which enables the eu to provide capacity building for asean member states to develop an effective border management system (wibisono & kusumasomantri, 2020). as for cooperation with the destination country, indonesia has established contact with turkey since 2017. the turkish national police (tnp) held a meeting polri and the head of bnpt to discuss counterterrorism efforts, including how to address ftfs who used turkey as an entry and exit point to syria. tnp has assigned analysts and researchers in 33 locations across turkey to monitor and detect potential terrorists; as of 2017, divisi hubungan internasional polri (2017) reported that tnp has monitored 17,000 and interviewed 10,000 people. the turkish government has also deported 4,000 people back to their original countries. both countries’ police have agreed to strengthen cooperation in information and intelligence exchange to counter transnational crime. in assuring border control from stealth travelers, increasing enforcement (physical barriers and detection measures) and joint operation with neighboring countries are considered not enough. the asean our eyes (aoe) was adopted during the 5th asean defense ministers meeting (admm) in 2018 (ryacudu, 2018). it serves as a critical regional platform that facilitates strategic intelligence exchange with an integrated database, joint training and operation, and capacity-building measures. unfortunately, the case of jolo church bombing in the southern philippines in 2019 shows that intelligence exchange has not gone far enough. after the attack, the philippines authorities claimed that the perpetrators were an indonesian couple who received help from the islamic state. the indonesian government denied the claim and decided to deploy its officials for verification (“indonesian couple with ties”, 2019). since ulfah handayani saleh and her children entered the philippines illegally from sabah to jolo, there were no entrance records, which hampered the investigation. it took the indonesian government six months to clarify that the suicide bombers were indeed indonesian nationals, after arresting two other suspected terrorists from the jad network – novendri and yoya. the case study shows that state members of asean, including indonesia and the philippines, should improve coordination in intelligence exchange to optimize the existing regional initiative against cross-border terrorist threats. 98 far from home postscript the fall of is in 2017 after losing 95% of its territory did not lessen the importance of the counter-terrorist mobility strategy (ctms) (glenn, 2019), and neither did the surge of the covid-19 pandemic. the pandemic did cease most illegal travel to terrorist destinations and therefore reduced the number of potential targets globally (basit, 2020), but this was temporary. is’ influence might have been abating in the middle east, but they remain to have supporters who continue carrying out violence in indonesia (abuza & satria, 2020). two years into the pandemic, the world starts to reconnect as international commercial aviation gradually returns to the pre-pandemic condition (counter-terrorism committee executive directorate (cted) un security council, 2021). the most recent development shows that after the coup in afghanistan, is supporters in indonesia believe the taliban is now “the near enemy” – while western countries, including the us, as “the far enemy” of is-khorasan (arianti & rahmah, 2021). while it is too early to conclude whether afghanistan will be the next hotspot for hijrah, anticipating a post-pandemic resurgence of terrorist cross-border mobility threat necessitates better screening and border management measures. the indonesian government issued president regulation no. 7/2021 on national action plan (nap) for preventing and countering violent extremism (pcev) that leads to terrorism 2020-2024, which led to the establishment of the joint secretariat of the nap on pcev in march 2021 (bnpt, 2021c). the plan has three pillars: (a) prevention; (b) law enforcement, witness, and victim protection, and strengthening of the national legislative framework; (c) international partnership and cooperation. the first pillar aims to provide and integrate a system of data management that includes profiles and studies that analyze networks, vulnerable areas, trends, and evaluation of previous cases. the second pillar focuses on increasing the institutional capacity of law enforcement to optimize the deterrence effect through coordination and information exchange between relevant actors. finally, the third pillar enhances international cooperation between relevant countries and communities. there are eight ministries and eight institutions or agencies involved in implementing the action plan.4 besides forming a joint secretariat, bnpt also created working groups and mechanisms to coordinate, monitor, and evaluate the nap on pcev (bnpt, 2021a). although bnpt claimed that the agency had implemented most of the strategies from each pillar, the details have never been disclosed. it is also important to note that the first report of the nap on pcev was produced recently during the 2021 annual meeting (bnpt, 2021b). thus, it is too early to assess the implementation, let alone its impact on tms. on the asean level, assessing the implementation of terrorism-related initiatives such as aoe remains difficult due to its confidentiality status. as of january 2022, aoe had conducted six working groups to discuss the implementation of the standard operating procedures of asean our eyes (aoe sop), update on the mechanism and facility of each member states' our eyes command center (oecc) and asean direct communication infrastructure, and exchange information on the regional and global level on terrorism threat (association of southeast asian nations, 2021). the sop was adopted in 2020 during the 14th journal of asean studies 99 admm and was finalized during the 6th aoe working group in early 2022. real implementation of the initiative would contribute to the strengthening of asean cooperation on managing the transborder terrorist issues. conclusions and recommendations the research has produced two main analyses from a novel dataset on pro-is deportees. first, profession and income are not the determining factor of hijrah as individuals, who wish to do so, could seek, or get funding through support and loan through travel facilitators. there are four choices of the transit and destination country, namely turkey to syria, iran to afghanistan, manila to mindanao in the philippines, and new delhi to jammu kashmir in india, which precondition different levels of financial capability. although turkey to syria routes was the favorite among deportees, manila to mindanao routes proved to be the most economical choice for hijrah. second, the migration pattern of pro-is deportees confirmed the vulnerabilities of the immigration system and border control along with weak law enforcement to constrain those wishing to join the is abroad. travel facilitators have a vital role in exploiting the system. they were responsible for travel arrangements: 1) choosing exit-entry points, 2) acting as the middleman with illegal document providers, and 3) playing the host in the destination country. these individuals have the capability to infiltrate the immigration system without getting detected starting from the first process of the journey, which is passport applications. the deportees are also aware of the exit points with the least security control to conceal their false persona during document validation. on the other hand, deportees also utilize illegal channels to cross the border, such as sea routes to enter the southern philippines. an effective ctms should be able to constrain terrorists' movement through coordination, law, and diplomacy at both domestic and international levels. nevertheless, the implementation of current countermeasures has shown that indonesia needs to improve its deterrent and offensive strategies. all obstacles to effective implementation of ctms by the indonesian government highlight the need for detection method guidelines for immigration officers, travel facilitator arrestment and its illegal market, clearance system and infrastructure improvement at borders, as well as intelligence cooperation optimization. 100 far from home about the authors andi raihanah ashar is an alumnus from department of international relations, bina nusantara university, and a research analyst focusing on counterterrorism (ct) strategy and maritime security at semar sentinel pte ltd. curie maharani is a faculty member with departement of international relations, bina nusantara university. references abuza, z. & satria, a. 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(2019). turkish isis and aq foreign fighters: reconciling the numbers and perception of the terrorism threat. studies in conflict and terrorism, 44(12), 1125-1147. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610x.2019.1628613 10th bilateral meeting on immigration cooperation. (2016). kantor wilayah jawa timurkementerian hukum dan ham republik indonesia. https://jatim.kemenkumham.go.id/ pusat-informasi/artikel/2230-10th-bilateral-meeting-on-immigration-cooperation https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610x.2019.1628613 https://jatim.kemenkumham.go.id/pusat-informasi/artikel/2230-10th-bilateral-meeting-on-immigration-cooperation https://jatim.kemenkumham.go.id/pusat-informasi/artikel/2230-10th-bilateral-meeting-on-immigration-cooperation journal of asean studies 105 1 the islamic state (is) has exploited the term hijrah to attract foreign muslim followers and join the fight in syria and iraq. the concept of hijrah itself traditionally refers to prophet muhammad’s migration in 622 ce from mecca to medina as muslims were unable to practice islam (uberman & shay, 2016). 2 the indonesian couple were the perpetrators of jolo church bombing in southern philippines that killed 23 people and wounded 95 others back in early 2019 (institute for policy analysis of conflict, 2019). 3 ulfah handayani saleh was deported from turkey in 2016 and was the suicide bomber of the 2019 jolo church bombing in southern philippines. 4 according to the directorate general of immigration (n.d.) website, the required documentations to apply a passport are a valid identity card, family card (kk), and birth certificate, marriage book, diploma, or baptismal certificate. 5 the eight institutions/agencies are bnpt, polri, ppatk, indonesian institute of sciences (lipi), statistics indonesia (bps), national cyber and crypto agency (bssn), witness and victim protection agency (lpsk), national commission on violence against women (komnas perempuan), and attorney general. and the other eight ministries are ministry of home affairs, ministry of foreign affairs, ministry of religious affairs, ministry of law and human rights, state intelligence agency (bin), ministry of social affairs, and ministry of women empowerment and child protection. journal of asean studies, vol. 2, no. 2 (2014), pp. 49-61 ©2014 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn2338-1353 electronic the determinants of new product performance in malaysian industry oon fok-yew universiti utara malaysia, malaysia abstract the literature on new product development is growing but malaysia manufacturing industry often lacks these discussions. therefore, this paper focuses on linking the determinants of an effective product development process and new product performance within manufacturing companies across industries in malaysia that have certain level of new product development activities taking in their organization. further, the paper organises the burgeoning new product development literature into four main determinants: customer orientation, cross-functional team, new product development team proficiency and management support. the selection of determinants to the theoretical framework is adjusting for manufacturing industry origins in previous written research material. the literature review focuses on the product development process and builds the framework of conceptual model detailing the initialization and implementation stage in the product development process. two theoretical perspectives have guided the conceptual framework which is the resource-based view and organizational theories. the proposal is to give an increased understanding of the changed new product process in malaysian industry and its implication on activities concerning organisation and management of the new product development process. this framework reflects a growing interest in extending new product development paradigms to emerging in asean countries, thus contributing to a wider body of knowledge. keywords: new product development, new product performance, malaysian industry. introduction the field of new product development (npd) is widely researched in a variety of organizations such as universities, consulting firms, manufacturing companies and universityindustry collaboration. it is located in a wide range of disciplines, including technology management, engineering, business policy and marketing. much of that research has specifically focused on discovering what organizational, strategic and process-related factors characterize successful new product developments. organisation and management of the product development process have been an issue in both academia and industry for over three decades but often lacking discussion by the process industry (chroneer & laurell-stenlund, 2006). new product development is critical to the growth and survival of modern corporations. hence, the quest for factors that underlie success has become a popular research direction in recent decades. however, despite our gains in knowledge and experience, the commercial rate of success of new products is still low. according to mat and jantan (2009), between 33 per cent 50 the determinants of new product performance in malaysian performance and 60 per cent of all new products fail to generate an economic return after reached the market place. indeed, npd is a complex and sizable activity whose outcome remains largely unpredictable. most of the studies have cantered on new product development conducted in the united states, canada, western europe, japan, taiwan, korea and china (zirger & maidique, 1990; li & atuahenegima, 1998; song & parry, 1997a; song & xie, 2000; im et al. 2003; ernst, hoyer & rubsaamen, 2010). seems that a little study of npd have been conducted in association of southeast asian nations (asean), particularly in malaysia context (mat & jantan, 2009; shalabi & rundquist, 2009). the propose concept was motivated by the fact that malaysia’s economy diversified and transformed itself from agriculture-based to manufacturingbased. manufacturing sector is the leading sector in malaysia, contributing significantly to the overall country's output (67 per cent), gdp (24.9 per cent) and employment (28.9 per cent) in 2012. moreover, the value added of the manufacturing sector expanded by 4.8 per cent (mida, 2012). malaysia now is changing its emphasis from purely manufacturing towards higher valueadded products and activities including research and development (r&d), design and prototyping, logistics, and marketing. in comparative with asean neighbouring countries, the development of the automotive industry in malaysia has been inferior to thailand (tai & ku, 2013). however, malaysia firms in the electronics industry exhibit a higher degree of innovation than their counterparts such as singapore and thailand (berger & diez, 2006; shalabi & rundquist, 2009). furthermore, the growing of foreign investment will encourage new product innovations. foreign direct investments (fdi) also serves to bring new technology, knowledge or innovative processes to a country and to accelerate a country’s integration into global economy. therefore, malaysia was the third largest recipient in fdi flows among asean countries in 2011 after singapore and indonesia. fdi inflows to singapore registered a strong growth of usd64 billion in 2011, indonesia was usd18.9 billion and malaysia was recorded at usd11.9 billion. indeed, asean countries required to manufacturer new products and to enter new markets to achieve sustained rapid economic growth. in order to support and stimulate the malaysian industrialization process, the government, in the early 1980s established the standards and industrial research institute of malaysia (sirim) and the national productivity centre (npc). sirim and npc were given the responsibility to test and validate products for quality maintenance and to help improve productivity. the role of sirim was later expanded towards enhancing malaysia’s international competitiveness through partnerships in industrial technology and quality. in achieving this, industrial research became a major component of sirim’s establishment. this paper focuses on linking the determinants of an effective product development process and new product performance within manufacturing companies across industries in malaysia that have certain level of new product development activities taking in their organization. the present conceptual model is proposed based on gaps revealed in the previous literature. new product performance (npp) oliver, dostaler and dewberry (2004) suggest that npd performance 51 journal of asean studies should be valued upon external and internal quality, cost, lead time, schedule following and product profits. cooper and kleinscmidt (2007) revealed that npd productivity is actually in decline. the past figures show that overall sales from new product a generally applied measure of npd performance has fallen from 32.6 per cent of total company sales in the mid 1990s to 28 per cent in 2004. with r&d investment remaining relatively constant at about 2.8 per cent of sales, the result is a 14 per cent drop in r&d output per spending in less than a decade. majority of success or failure studies tend to treat new product performance as a single dimension, usually, financial performance. in the typical study, new product projects are either classified as “success” or failures”. however, numerous research works have examined the outcomes of npp specific in new product market performance and timeliness of development (li & atuahene-gima, 1998), profitability and cycle time reduction (cooper and kleinschmidt, 1995), new product creativity and development speed (ganesan, malter and rindfleisch, 2005), reduce time and cost in npd process (meybodi, 2005), speed to market and market performance (barczak, sultan & hultink, 2007), degree of product innovation and market performance (yalcinkaya, calantone & griffith, 2007). therefore, the market performance, creativity, time and cost are suggested as to measure npp in present research. the relation between determinants-npd process and npp an extensive study of determinants, new product development process relates with new product performance is by im et al. (2003). they proposed a literature-based model of determinants, including the stages of new product work, which describes the determinants' influences on one another and on npp. the authors tested the model empirically using a survey of nearly 300 managers involved in innovation initiatives in korea and japan. the authors learned that the determinants of npp are interrelated and that the new product development process itself is central, namely the stages of initiation and implementation. these two stages directly determine npp, though initiation appears to be more important. the stages are strengthened by factors such as customer orientation, cross-functional integration, and new product team proficiency; however, the effects are not uniform. although the model and hypotheses are largely supported, however, the authors found a few differences between the countries. therefore, the determinants can be parsimoniously grouped as strategic, organizational, market environment and npd process which influences npp. to avoid a diffused focus, this study proposed a limited number of strategic, organizational, and process factors to examine. present study chose customer orientation as a strategic factor, crossfunctional integration, team proficiency and management support as organizational determinants, and the initiation and implementation stages as process drivers. the outcomes of npp to be measured included the market performance, creativity, time and cost. customer orientation strategy customer orientation is further conceptualized as a firm's understanding of its own customers, which enables it to provide superior value (narver & slater, 1990; mohd mokhtar, 2013). one avenue to provide value is the creation and launch of products that address market 52 the determinants of new product performance in malaysian performance needs. without such a strategic focus, firms may develop products because of an internal technological drive or in reaction to competitors' activities. this may result in sporadic successful innovations but consistently ignoring customer preferences is detrimental to firm performance in the long run. therefore, they suggested that customer orientation contributes to superior product and market innovation. in prior research, im et al. (2003) quoted customer orientation aids the initiation stage by directing product developers toward external users, seeking their input to hone new product ideas. customers' insights or problem-solving activities often result in new product concept. thus, a customer-oriented firm is more likely to provide innovative ideas in the initiation stage of npd. although developers should avoid following customer feedback blindly, especially for radical innovations, the astute application of feedback rather than isolated laboratory endeavours can improve the chances for product success. similarly, we expect customer orientation to enhance the npd implementation process. at this phase, customer orientation directs firms toward monitoring the changing needs of potential buyers, making any necessary adjustments in product design, gauging likely buyer responses to the product through market and product tests, and conceiving and executing marketinformed launch plans. di benedetto's (1999) study on new product launches concluded that information generated in the initiation stage is critical throughout the npd process, but the information becomes more valid and reliable as the project moves toward commercialization. tripathi, guin and de’s (2012) recent study, the primary factor for getting a new product accepted by consumer is customer need orientation. under present construct, customer orientation is the ability and will to identify, analyze, understand, and answer user needs. the preceding discussion implies the following proposition: proposition 1: higher customer orientation is associated with (1a) better initiation and (b) better implementation. cross-functional team a 1995 survey of us firms found that over 84 per cent of more innovative product development projects used crossfunctional teams (griffin, 1997). crossfunctional new product teams are thought to facilitate the product development and marketing process because they solve an information-processing problem. that is, they bring together people from different disciplines and functions that have pertinent expertise about the proposed innovation problem. recent study by mohd zaki and othman (2013), they suggested different background of team members was vital to ensure high new product development performance. cross-functional refers to the process in which marketing and r&d functions communicate and cooperate. as proposed by functional integration theory (li, 1999; song and dyer, 1995), close interfacing improves the prospect of new product acceptance in the market, whereas lack of integration increases the degree of mismatch between market needs and what is developed. specifically, a close marketing-r&d interface allows a firm to realize its technological capability more efficiently than the competition through identifying innovative product features desired by the market which leading to new product advantage. interfacing also affects product market performance because it enables a firm to increase its acceptance rates for new 53 journal of asean studies products by reducing the customer's cognitive and behavioural resistance to product introduction. given its importance for npd, the marketing-r&d interface has received considerable attention in the literature. many terms have been used to describe the bridging of distinct groups. we adopted im et al. (2003) definition of cross-functional integration as effective unity of effort by r&d, manufacturing, and marketing in npd. prior studies often examined exclusively the interface between r&d and marketing, but all three functions are increasingly recognized as critical to npd. for this construct, we used a three-item measure adapted from im et al. (2003), which examined relationships among r&d, marketing, and manufacturing. thus, we posit the following proposition: preposition 2: greater cross-functional integration is associated with (a) better initiation and (b) better implementation. npd team proficiency one of the first studies that acknowledged the role of proficiency was cooper's (1979) project newprod, which surveyed several hundred canadian firms to identify keys to success. the highest discriminator after product uniqueness and superiority is marketing knowledge and proficiency. firms that have a sound understanding of customers, including their price sensitivities, and that apply this expertise throughout the npd process are high performers. the next most important discriminator is technological and production synergy and proficiency. sivasubramaniam, liebowitz and lackman (2012) reviewed 38 studies related to new product development team performance. in that meta-analysis, team ability was one of the determinants to npd performance. furthermore, they identified cognitive ability predicts team performance and teams experience improves speed to market. the results reinforce the team ability has a positive impact on npd outcomes. thus, they suggested npd team members should be selected for their cognitive ability and prior experience with npd teams. according to im et al. (2003), both initiation and implementation should benefit from greater new product team proficiency, though the types of competencies that are drawn on differ. during the initiation stage, it is important for a team to identify market and technological opportunities adroitly and to conceive of new product concepts to fill those gaps. in addition, the ability to forecast sales or to estimate the size of a market is necessary. initiation can be hampered by a host of problems tied to proficiency, including inadequate market assessment, over specification of manufacturing tolerances, and the continual change of product features and requirements (khurana and rosenthal, 1998). during implementation stage, manufacturing staff should be able to determine configurations for production and cost implications, r&d should fulfil the product concept, and marketing personnel should provide accurate assessments of customer and competitor responses along with strong marketingmix designs to introduce the product. quality problems from poor manufacturing or design can force companies to withdraw products or postpone market rollouts, thereby raising launch costs and threatening first-mover advantages. therefore, the team should acquire technical skills, marketing knowledge and team efficiency in the group responsible 54 the determinants of new product performance in malaysian performance for npd process. in view of this, we offer the following statement of proposition: preposition 3: higher new product team proficiency is associated with (a) better initiation and (b) better implementation. management support the early studies suggested that the management support have direct effect on npd process. zirger and maidique (1990) find that management support is one of the critical components affecting the successful launch of a high technology product in us industry. song and parry (1996) explore the links between new product success and senior management support in japanese firms. another study carried out by ovens (2006), he found that most respondents indicated senior management’s attitudes towards npd programmes are crucial. in his study, 42 per cent of the respondents of the respondents claimed that major reason for product development delays were due to company management’s attitudes which included low priority given to npd programmes, unrealistic expectations, short-term vision, lack of strategic thinking, risk averseness, and the inability to learn from past failures. overall findings, senior company management helped surmount rather than create obstacles for this project. for example, senior company management frequently made encouraging versus discouraging remarks during team meetings. team members also received help from senior company management if they asked. suwannaporn and speece (2010) discovered that their respondents perceived a support from top management is most critical factor cause the success in the npd success. this was followed by a number of variable with roughly similar levels of perceived important, many of which related to strategy and planning. in respondents’ perceptions, they considered top management support to be most critical cause for success in the npd process. however, no prior study the management supports effect on npd process stages. therefore, we posit below proposition. preposition 4: higher management support is associated with (a) better initiation and (b) better implementation. npd process research often suggests that formal npd processes increase the success rate of npd projects in a firm. however, many firms still do not use a formal npd process even though the effectiveness of product development processes has been well-proven (rundquist & chibba, 2004; shalabi & rundquist, 2009). there are various npd models explaining the factors affecting npd process. the generally used model constitutes eight steps. these steps are idea generation, idea screening, concept development and testing, marketing strategy, business analysis, product development, test marketing and commercialization (kotler & keller, 2006). the new product development process is defined as those activities that occur from idea through to launch in a typical new product project (kleinschmidt, 1994). another definition by park (2010), product development process is a transformation of technology into new product based on customer needs, organization strategy, and the internal and external environment. in addition, new product development is a continuous process starting from idea generation and strategic evaluation of the new product, feasibility study, planning, 55 journal of asean studies implementation and validation, and then to product realization and performance feedback. loch (2000) studied 90 high-tech companies in europe and suggested that a customer-oriented new product development project with completed designed process and assessment, crossfunctional integration, high-rank supervisors’ support and powerful execution would be the success factors for companies. according to sivakumar and nakata (2003), the two key phases in this process are “initiation”, which includes idea generation, screening, and concept testing, and “implementation”, which covers product design, test marketing, and market introduction. these two stages are also referred to as the “front end” and “back end” by zaltman, duncan, and holbeck (1973), and are essentially distinguished by the first focusing on conceptualizing the product and the latter fulfilling that concept. shalabi and rundquist (2009) also found that the use of npd-process in malaysian firms seems to be as young as ten years (refer to figure 1). out of the entire 72 samples of their study, 41.7 per cent of the firms do not use formal processes and 58.3 per cent use formal processes (refer to table 1). however, the automotive firms are more likely to use formal npd processes with up to 70 per cent compared to 46.2 per cent of the chemical industries. therefore, two key phases are more appreciate to adopt in malaysia industry. thus, we posit that initiation influences implementation. preposition 5: better initiation is associated with better implementation. figure 1. the time when malaysian firms started using formal npd-processes source: shalabi and rundquist (2009) 56 the determinants of new product performance in malaysian performance table 1. the use of formal/informal npd documentation for respective industry industry formal / informal total do not have npd documentation have formal npd documentation number of firms per cent (%) automotive 30 70 40 100 chemical 53.9 46.1 26 100 electronics 66.7 33.3 6 100 entire sample 41.7 58.3 72 100 source: shalabi and rundquist (2009) influence of npd processes on npp on the basis of the literature, we also posit that npd process stages determine npp. past studies found that npp is higher (1) when "the developing organization is proficient in marketing and commits a significant amount of its resources to selling and promoting the product" and (2) when "the r&d process is well planned and executed." it has also been determined that the proficiency of npd processes (including screening, market research, development, test market, and market launch) significantly enhances npp (cooper, 1979; song & parry, 1997a). the connection between npd and new product outcomes also has been found specific in new product market performance and timeliness of development (li & atuahene-gima, 1998), profitability and cycle time reduction (cooper and kleinschmidt, 1995), new product creativity and development speed (ganesan et al., 2005), reduce time and cost in npd process (meybodi, 2005), speed to market and market performance (barczak, sultan & hultink, 2007), degree of product innovation and market performance (yalcinkaya, calantone & griffith, 2007). therefore, the market performance, creativity, time and cost are suggested as the npd outcomes in present conceptual framework. we posit a direct influence of implementation on npp. preposition 6: stronger npp is associated with (a) better initiation and (b) better implementation. theoretical framework and theoretical underpinnings by referring to the empirical review, the present study develops a theoretical framework that focus on strategic and organizational antecedents namely, customer orientation, crossfunctional integration, npd team proficiency and management support are essential in enhancing npd process from initial stage to implement stage, which will eventually improve npd outcomes. the proposed theoretical framework is shown in figure 2. 57 journal of asean studies figure 2. theoretical framework of the determinants of new product performance in this study, two theoretical perspectives have guided the theoretical framework. the first is the resource-based view. it suggests the resource and capabilities based views of firms, which are key theories in the strategic marketing and organizational management literature (barney, 1991; abu bakar & ahmad, 2010a). a company's customer orientation, adroitness in carrying out npd tasks in teams, and management of information flows across functional departments are resources brought to bear on the innovation endeavour. the greater these resources are in focus, intensity, and quality, the more ably the firm executes initiation and implementation of the npd process. consistently strong execution leads to a strategic capability, differentiating a firm's performance from others and leading to competitive advantage. in other words, routinely performing initiation and implementation well leads to innovations that generate higher sales, market shares, and profits over those of the competition. all of this points to an important avenue for firms to obtain a sustainable competitive advantage. the second is the organizational theory, which argue that npd depends on the resources available (organizational factors) and on the overall direction provided (strategic orientation) in the firm. if the process of developing and launching the product goes well, npp is likely to be high. but this process is effective only insofar as the proper organizational tools and means are provided, along with a clear strategic vision and motivating purpose (im et. al., 2003).thus, the present propose framework was undertaken to relate resource-base view and organizational theory to the firm’s new product performance. conclusion success in product development is a critical management issue for the modern firm, especially those in technology driven industries. clearer understanding of the factors that drive product outcome can help a firm focus 58 the determinants of new product performance in malaysian performance valuable r&d resources, better utilize resources dedicated to the product delivery process and increase the market demand for a firm's new products. as npd is a vital and risky process due to the hundreds of millions it can cost in case of a failure, its determinants should be carefully analyzed. and although the factors affecting npd are important as a group, the scrutiny of individual dimensions would provide a better understanding for the success of npd. moreover, determination of the dimensions which are critical for the success can provide useful insights and suggestions for management into the screening decision. due to the uniqueness of this proposal on malaysian manufacturing firms as the first and only study, the obtained finding on the status of npd in malaysia can be used as reference to the managers in malaysia. the best practices for the new npd process, from idea generation phase through the product launch phase. implication and future research the proposed framework has several managerial implications. foremost are managerial implications that the interrelated model of strategic, organizational, and process determinants is a useful description and guide for strengthening npp to the future researcher. in particular, the customer orientation, cross-functional integration, new product team proficiency and management support emphasize four critical areas that can be manipulated for better npd results. firms can focus their efforts on improving these dimensions rather than attempting to work on tens of variables simultaneously. dimensions that are weak will require more immediate attention. a second implication is that npd process factors are crucial. how well a firm engages in initiation and implementation largely determines the fate of new products. the predictive approach indicates that initiation is particularly important because of its cascading effect into the subsequent phase. thus, companies should be especially diligent about conducting marketing research, opportunity identification, concept generation, and idea screening. a final managerial implication is the need to observe distinctions in npd by country. although this model is conceive to describe malaysia context, but it does not represent the entire asean counties due to historic, economic, and cultural differences. further research should examine the model in more asean countries, particularly ones that are more geographically and culturally distinct. at the same time, this framework reflects a growing interest in extending npd paradigms to emerging in developing country contexts, and therefore it contributes to extant knowledge. about author oon fok-yew is currently a doctoral postgraduate student at the universiti utara malaysia. he obtained a degree in master of business administration from the university technology malaysia. prior to this, he received his bachelor of management (honours) from multimedia university malaysia. he can be contacted at oonfokyew@gmail.com. references abu bakar, l. and ahmad, h. 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(1990). a model of new product development: an empirical test. management science, 36(7), 867-883. journal of asean studies, vol. 8, no. 2 (2020), pp. 147-172 doi: https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v8i2.6596 issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic regionalism under challenge: ideas and joko widodo’s foreign policy towards asean, 2014-2019 mohamad rosyidin1*; shary charlotte h. pattipeilohy2 1,2department of international relations, universitas diponegoro 1mohamadrosyidin@lecturer.undip.ac.id; 2charlotte_pattipeilohy@ymail.com received: 27th july 2020/ revised: 21st october 2020/ accepted: 13th november 2020 how to cite: rosyidin, m. and pattipeilohy, s. c. h. (2020). regionalism under challenge: ideas and joko widodo’s foreign policy towards asean, 2014-2019. journal of asean studies, 8(2), 147-172. https:/doi.org/10.21512/jas.v8i2.6596 abstract indonesia’s foreign policy under joko widodo ‘jokowi’ has significantly shifted compared with his predecessor’s era, especially regarding policies on regionalism. while former president susilo bambang yudhoyono emphasises multilateralism with a particular focus on asean, jokowi’s administration tends to overlook asean as a multilateral organization. the research investigates the causal root of the tendency by using the concept of ideas in foreign policy. the results argue that the diminished role of indonesia in asean, especially during the first term of jokowi’s presidency, is strongly influenced by causal beliefs held by indonesian political elites and presidential advisors. despite varying from one individual to another, these ideas have similar characteristics in proposing that indonesia should expand its concentric circle beyond asean, arguing that asean is intrinsically weak and thus can no longer accommodate indonesian aspirations. this idea acts as a road map that defines indonesia’s national interests amid international politics dynamics in the 21st century. keywords: indonesia’s foreign policy, joko widodo, asean, causal beliefs, road map introduction the association of southeast asian nations (asean) plays a strategic role in indonesia’s foreign policy. as a regional power, indonesia regards asean as a ‘cornerstone’ of its foreign policy. during suharto’s new order period (1967-1998), asean had helped project indonesia’s image as a peace-loving country with a moderate and developmental perspective (anwar, 1994). importantly, asean supports political and economic stability in 148 regionalism under challenge southeast asia; thus, stability, security, and prosperity in the region will directly impact indonesia (luhulima, 2013). for indonesia, asean is one instrument through which it can achieve its national interests among other multilateral bodies – primarily the united nations – as well as bilateral relations and, if necessary, unilateral self-help (weatherbee, 2013). indonesia’s foreign policy approach has been ‘the regionalist approach to globalism’. indonesia sees asean as the basis of legitimacy to achieve status as a global player (acharya, 2014). asean is also becoming indonesia’s platform to enhance its desired status as a significant power while implementing middle power diplomacy (tan in roberts et al., 2015). in short, asean matters to indonesia. however, asean’s central role has been somewhat diminished since joko widodo ‘jokowi’ was elected as the president of indonesia in 2014. asean is no longer attractive from the indonesian government’s perspective because of its ‘global maritime fulcrum’ doctrine, a new indonesia’s foreign policy agenda under jokowi that takes a ‘look west policy’ by embracing countries in the indian ocean and africa (syailendra, 2015). to some extent, jokowi’s foreign policy characteristics are like those of philippines president rodrigo duterte. experts from institute of southeast asian studies (iseas) argue that jokowi’s foreign policy tends to be nationalistic, unilateral, emphasises the domestic agenda, and pays less attention to asean, including being impatient with asean processes and protocols (cook, 2016). while official indonesian statements stress the importance of asean in indonesia’s foreign policy, it appears that indonesia’s commitment to asean is mere rhetoric. even though asean remains a strategic partner for indonesia, especially in terms of trade and investment, asean is no longer seen as crucial for indonesia’s pursuit of national interests. for example, on the south china sea issue, jokowi tends to overlook asean, instead choosing a unilateralist approach to protect indonesia’s sovereignty in the natuna sea from the chinese expansion. in this case, jokowi seems to have lost interest in using asean as an instrument of diplomacy (connelly, 2016), and his commitment to asean on the issue is considerably passive (weatherbee, 2016). there is existing literature on the issue of asean’s role in jokowi’s foreign policy. most scholars of international relations rely on realist analysis to explain this trend. shekhar (2015) suggests that this tendency reflects the ‘realist turn’ in contemporary indonesia’s foreign policy. he further says that jokowi’s foreign policy fits well with the basic premise of realism that tends to be sceptical of multilateral fora and international organizations such as asean. this argument is supported by some australian observers who argue that jokowi is more concerned with bilateral approaches rather than multilateral ones (poole, 2015; willis, 2017). similarly, arif (2015) argues that jokowi’s foreign policy represents a pragmatic and realist approach. consequently, indonesia does not see asean as an essential institution. those works of literature have provided a foundation for further arguments on asean regionalism challenges under jokowi’s foreign policy. it is noteworthy to mention three factors of jokowi’s foreign policy shift from the previous government on asean’s issue. first, jokowi faces a different social and political situation from the previous administration in which jokowi seeks to defend his legitimacy from the various political forces around him. second, jokowi’s personal background is different from the previous president and affects his journal of asean studies 149 perspective on the international environment. third, jokowi’s foreign political orientation places domestic development as a priority issue, even if it does not ignore asean’s central role (umar, 2016). unfortunately, existing literature has not given a satisfactory answer to why jokowi downplays the importance of asean. realist arguments seem convincing at first glance; the pragmatic character of jokowi’s foreign policy emphasises bilateralism rather than multilateralism. however, realists neglect the fact that indonesia still recognises the importance of multilateral forums. as dinarto (2017) points out, although indonesia neglects asean, it is essential to consider other multilateral fora such as the indian ocean rim association (iora). through iora, indonesia expects it can support jokowi’s domestic infrastructure policies and strengthen the agenda of the ‘global maritime fulcrum’. if realist logic is right, indonesia should entirely ignore multilateral fora, as they serve merely as a ‘talking shop’. this is a downfall of a realist perspective on the issue and is a compelling reason for the research to enrich analysis with a constructivist perspective. the changing dynamic of indonesia’s foreign policy towards asean is useful to test foreign policy change theory. hermann (1990) mentions four factors behind foreign policy changes: individual leaders, bureaucracy, domestic politics, and international pressure. these, in turn, determine changes in the decision-making processes resulting in foreign policy changes. holsti (cited in gustavsson, 1999) mentions many factors such as external, domestic, historical, and cultural factors, coupled with other factors such as perceptions, personalities, elitist attitudes, and policy-making processes. carlsnaes (1993) describes the agent-structure framework, in which foreign policy changes are the result of an action-reaction cycle between agents and structures. these theories apply at three levels of analysis: individuals, domestic, and international. although the domestic level covers the decision-making process, it does not consider the group’s role in shaping elite perceptions and attitudes in setting foreign policy. in other words, the existing theories are weak in explaining the dynamics of foreign policy at the domestic level. the research shows the role of individuals and groups, especially in the inner circle of government, on leaders’ perceptions and attitudes that drive foreign policy changes. using ideas and foreign policy framework, the research argues that indonesia’s foreign policy towards asean under jokowi is strongly affected by his foreign policy advisers’ causal belief. these ideas influence how jokowi positions indonesia at the regional level, arguing that indonesia no longer needs asean as a concentric circle of foreign policy. indonesia should instead expand its concentric circle beyond asean because asean can no longer accommodate indonesian aspirations as an emerging power in asia. the research focuses on the first term of jokowi’s presidency for two reasons. first, the design of jokowi’s foreign policy was strongly influenced by his closest advisers during his presidency’s early days. since jokowi has little personal interest in foreign policy, international relations played a significant role in formulating his foreign policy agenda. second, asean has been neglected in jokowi’s foreign policy as he champions a bilateral over multilateral approach in the pursuit of national interests. 150 regionalism under challenge the research is organised in three sections. the first section sketches the theoretical framework as an instrument of analysis. using the framework proposed by goldstein and keohane (1993), ideas play a crucial role in policy-making. understanding the foreign policy of a country requires us to understand the ideas held by policymakers and other people involved in foreign policy decision making. the second section discusses continuity and change under jokowi’s foreign policy towards asean. it highlights the characteristics of jokowi’s foreign policy, especially the idea of the ‘global maritime fulcrum’, and addresses indonesia’s role in asean with particular attention to multilateralism. the third section elaborates the critical argument by discussing the research findings on the impact of ideas on jokowi’s approach to asean. the empirical findings then lead to the conclusion and policy recommendations in the last section. theoretical framework ideas and foreign policy conventional analysis of states’ behaviour has been dominated by a decision-making approach, focusing on the policy’s complexity. however, as hudson (2014) argues, foreign policy analysis (fpa) should focus on “… decisions taken by human decision-makers regarding or having known consequences for entities external to their nation-state.” decisionmaking theory was first developed in post-world war ii, pioneered by snyder, brucks, and sapin (in rosenau, 1961). they maintain that “[e]mphasis on action suggests process analysis, i.e., the passage of time plus continuous changes in relationships – including the conditions underlying change and its consequences.” graham allison made the most notable contribution of decision-making theory in his essence of decision: explaining cuban missile crisis. he revised the analysis from the rational model that emphasises the personality of decisionmakers. instead, he proposed two additional approaches: the bureaucratic and organizational models (allison, 1971). like snyder, brucks, and sapin, allison focuses on the process that underlies state policy development. however, foreign policy is not reducible to decisions since enacting policy differs from policy-making. in other words, foreign policy is state action, while decision-making is the process by which a policy is made. hill (2003), for example, defines foreign policy as “... the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations” [emphasis added]. talking about foreign policy is talking about state behaviour. foreign policy deals with the policy choices that the state takes in certain situations, whereas decision-making is formulating policy options (neack, 2008). mintz and derouen (2010) mention four critical features of the decision-making process: identifying problems, finding alternatives, selecting alternatives, and executing alternatives. the research focuses on policy, not decision-making. then, how can we explain states’ policy? various theoretical lenses can help us answer this question. while realism stresses material dimensions, constructivism focuses on ideas since ideas give meaning to the material elements (wendt, 1999). some liberalists share the same assumptions as constructivists journal of asean studies 151 concerning the role of ideas in international relations. goldstein and keohane (1993) put nonmaterial elements in a rationalist perspective to explain states’ behaviour. although the actors – in this case, the state – behave rationally, the role of ideas cannot be neglected (goldstein & keohane, 1993). in contrast to the constructivist premise that ideas shape interests and policy, rationalists believe that ideas play a role as an instrument of national interest. in other words, ideas help decision-makers to get what they want. ideas can be defined as “beliefs held by individuals” (goldstein & keohane, 1993). yet, the term has been equated and used interchangeably with similar terms such as ‘belief’, ‘ideology’, ‘theory’, ‘model’, ‘school of thought’, or even ‘intellectual idiosyncrasy’ (kitchen, 2010). we use weber’s definition of ideas as the source of ‘world images’ that generate interests. weber states, “not ideas, but the material and ideal interests, directly govern men’s conduct. yet very frequently the ‘world images’ that have been created by ‘ideas’ have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest” (cited in eastwood, 2005). put it another way, weber pointed out the role of ideas in shaping how people perceive the world in which they are embedded. this perception then determines people’s interest which in turn generate actions. legro (2005) differentiates between level, type, and content of ideas. ideas can be differentiated on three levels: namely, a reflection of individual leaders, the property of states, or a summation of individual ideas. ideas also can be defined as ‘identity’, ‘interest’, ‘ethics’, ‘images’, or ‘instrumentality’. as mentioned earlier, ideas are an instrument to achieve specific goals. finally, ideas can explain various topics, for instance, systemic vs. national (levels of analysis), economic vs. foreign policy (issues), or regional vs. global (scope). the role of ideas in foreign policy change has been intensively discussed in international relations scholarship. employing a cause-effect mechanism adopted by the positivist approach, scholars argue that ideas can cause policy change. however, since social sciences are indeterminate, ideas are “only one of many probable and partial causes of policies” (yee, 1996). many empirical research have shown the causal linkage between ideas and foreign policy. for example, flibbert (2006) argues that the us decision to go to war in iraq was influenced by the ideas of a handful of policy intellectuals that shaped and defined us interests, particularly in the post-9/11 national security structure. hook (2008) argues that the program changes in us foreign aid policy in 2002 was influenced by ideas on international development, which granted the president to embed the ideas in a new foreign policy program. thorun (2008) analyses russian foreign policy thinking since the end of the cold war and argued that from 1992 to 1994, liberal collective ideas shaped foreign policy, while from 1994 to 2000, geopolitical realist ideas replaced liberal ideas. another example comes from ipek (2013), who argues that ideas adopted by the justice and development party (akp) in turkey affect turkey’s foreign policy in development issues under the program of the turkish international cooperation and development agency (tika). similarly, chacko (2018) has shown that “india’s approach to intervention has been shaped by its domestic state project that is grounded in the foundational ideas of economic self-reliance, accountable governance, and non-imperial internationalism.” these empirical analyses suggest that ideas matter in explaining foreign policy change. 152 regionalism under challenge there are three types of ideas: worldview, principled belief, and causal belief. worldview is defined as “... symbolism of a culture and deeply affecting modes of thought and discourse” (goldstein & keohane, 1993). in other words, a worldview can be interpreted as a person’s paradigm or way of thinking about the reality of the world. religion and culture are examples of worldviews that have a significant influence on the actions of the state. as sandal and fox (2013) argue, religion affects international relations in two ways: through affecting the belief system or policy-making perspective and accommodating most religion’s adherents in society. meanwhile, culture acts as a weltanchauung or worldview that creates an identity in shaping the pattern of relationships, whether conflict or cooperation (huntington, 2002). unlike how worldview defines an ontological reality, moral belief contains normative ideas of behaviour. it defines what is ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, ‘good’ and ‘bad’, ‘appropriate’ and ‘inappropriate’, and so on. one example is the use of chemical and nuclear weapons that are considered ‘taboo’ in conflict after world war ii (price, 1995; tannenwald, 2005). another example is the international committee of the red cross (icrc) role in establishing the norms of war; any action that is considered to be a violation of the principle of humanity (finnemore, 1996). the third type of idea is the causal belief, which is “beliefs about cause-effect relationships which derive authority from the shared consensus of recognised elites” (goldstein & keohane, 1993). campbell (2002) categorised this type of idea as a programmatic idea, that is, “the idea implicitly or explicitly contains the prescriptions of how government should behave amid an incomprehensible situation” (campbell, 1998; campbell in nedergaard & campbell, 2008). it generally relates to scientific knowledge created and disseminated by scientists or experts in a particular field. this scientific knowledge explains a phenomenon and has an impact on policy choices. for example, disarmament cooperation between the us and the soviet union in the 1970s resulted from american defence experts (adler, 1992). international cooperation on the chlorofluorocarbon (cfc) ban was also a product of the academic research of environmental experts (hass, 1992). causal beliefs contain prescriptions for policymakers and derive from the thinking of experts skilled in specific fields. in the process of policy-making, political elites are often facing situations they do not understand. moreover, international dynamics are rapid and difficult to predict. in that condition, the elites have a hard time understanding what is going on and what they should do in response. therefore, they need input from experts to help understand the situation and solve the problems faced. one characteristic of causal belief is that it is part of a public debate (campbell, 2002). in other words, this idea is not hidden from public attention behind the scenes but instead explicitly stated in public, although not necessarily by political elites themselves. these ideas explicitly appear in writing in the form of papers, policy briefs, and memos (campbell, 1998, p. 386) and opinion papers in the mass media and election campaign texts. the public recognises that this idea has emerged as a solution to solve the problems. these three types of ideas affect foreign policy through several mechanisms: becoming roadmaps, becoming focal points, and being institutionalised. ideas act as roadmaps when journal of asean studies 153 policymakers face complex situations that require clarity. when policymakers do not know for sure the consequences of their policy, ideas can provide indications of the impact of a policy (goldstein & keohane, 1993). meanwhile, ideas also serve as a ‘glue’ when countries face difficulty reaching agreements over certain forms of cooperation. for example, martin (1992) investigates economic sanctions against argentina during the falkland war and indicates that the european union (eu) could facilitate inter-state cooperation even amidst conflicting interests among them. finally, ideas affect policy through formal institutional instruments. once an idea is institutionalised, it automatically has the power to influence policy. for example, the japanese and german constitutions regulate the prohibition of military force except for self-defence equipment, so the existence of the law affects the foreign policy of both countries not to send troops abroad (berger in katzenstein, 1996). figure 1. the impact of ideas on foreign policy source: goldstein & keohane (1993). the research chooses to focus on causal belief and its effects through roadmaps. causal belief is considerably more appropriate to explain president jokowi’s foreign policy towards asean since he has insufficient experience with international relations that would allow him to ask for help from his closest advisers in the field of international relations. the mastermind’s existence is vital in understanding the design and orientation of indonesia’s foreign policy under jokowi. although jokowi’s idiosyncratic factor (personality) plays a significant role, the idea ‘behind the scenes’ is much more decisive. results and discussions asean’s role in jokowi’s foreign policy since its establishment in 1967, asean has become the cornerstone of indonesia’s foreign policy. this means that asean plays a central role in pursuing indonesia’s national interests in the international sphere. during the suharto era, indonesian elites strongly believed that asean mattered for regional stability since, without regional stability, indonesia could not focus on its economic development. this was one reason why indonesia decided to play a significant role in asean at the time (suryadinata, 1998). furthermore, asean was also 154 regionalism under challenge crucial for indonesia in helping the country restore and preserve its international and regional credibility, maintain regional harmony and order, buffer against external attack, and facilitate international cooperation (anwar, 2005). since then, asean has been the first concentric circle in indonesia’s geopolitical strategy. after all, indonesia is located within southeast asia, so its emphasis on asean makes historical and geographical sense. asean enables indonesia to promote its ‘free and active’ principle by “developing ‘regional solutions to regional problems’ position” (acharya, 2014). as emmers (2014) suggests, indonesia’s leadership role in asean “has historically been central to indonesia’s foreign policy.” asean is also essential as indonesia’s foreign policy has always been constrained by asean because it influences how policymakers formulate foreign policies. thus, indonesia may seek to increase its global role, but it must be anchored on a regional footing (natalegawa, 2018). however, current indonesia’s foreign policy tends to overlook asean. jokowi’s government seems uninterested in playing an active role in asean. this is not to say that indonesia will leave asean. instead, jokowi’s foreign policy pays more attention to bilateralism rather than multilateralism. as a result, asean as a multilateral institution has no significant impact on jokowi’s foreign policy. the most prominent feature of jokowi’s foreign policy is prioritising domestic affairs rather than active engagement in international politics. during the 2014 presidential election campaign, jokowi stated the following vision and mission explicitly: “we will enhance the global role through middle-power diplomacy that places indonesia as a regional power with selective global engagement, giving priority to issues directly related to interests of the nation and indonesian people” (widodo & kalla, 2014). the phrase “enhance the global role” seems contradictory to jokowi’s commitment to prioritise domestic issues. however, the statement implies that indonesia’s increased global role can only be pursued by strengthening domestic structures. this seems to be in line with the opinions of some indonesian foreign policy experts. rizal sukma, an architect of jokowi’s foreign policy, pointed out that indonesia’s aspiration to become a global player is plagued by the complexity of domestic problems (sukma in reid, 2012). this means that to play an important role in the international sphere, indonesia must first restructure in the internal sphere (anwar, 2013). this idea was consistent with indonesia’s foreign policy orientation during the new order era when suharto said before parliament on august 16, 1969, that indonesia “... would only be able to play an effective role if we had great national power” (leifer, 1989). thus, we can see the similarity between suharto and jokowi regarding their concern with inward-looking foreign policy. meanwhile, the phrase “selective global engagement” refers to prioritising the state’s foreign policy in the pursuit of national interests. it does not mean that this term focuses on ‘domestic-centric’ foreign policy orientation. instead, indonesia would play at international fora only if it would bring benefits for the indonesian people. there are at least four characteristics of jokowi’s foreign policy (rosyidin, 2017a). first, the revival of nationalism ideology. in indonesian domestic political contestation, nationalism is often associated with the ideology held by the indonesian democratic party of journal of asean studies 155 struggle (pdip), which became the political vehicle behind jokowi’s road to power. pdip has a nationalist view that is visible in the 2019-2024 statutes and bylaws of the indonesian democratic party of struggle, which states that pdip is a “tool of struggle to shape and build a national character based on pancasila june 1, 1945.” pancasila is based on socio-economy, socio-democracy, and cultural divinity dimensions, which reflects the spirit of nationalism, where indonesian society/nation (socio) is the primary goal of democracy, economy, cultural divinity, and other aspects of the state” (”anggaran dasar dan anggaran rumah”, 2019). jokowi implements the nationalist principles held by pdip in an effort to protect indonesian sovereignty from foreign threats. this is evident in indonesia’s aggressive attitude in sinking foreign illegal fishing boats and jokowi’s gunboat diplomacy in responding to china’s aggressive expansion in the south china sea, including in indonesia’s natuna sea (see, for example, rosyidin, 2016b). while maintaining its position as a non-claimant state in the south china sea dispute, indonesia asserts that its core interests are twofold: to promote peace and stability in the region and protect its maritime sovereignty over the natuna islands. since the natuna islands belong to indonesia under the united nations convention on the law of the sea (unclos), indonesia’s assertiveness towards china in the area should be regarded as a form of self-defence against foreign aggression. second, there is a tendency to circumscribe the concentric circle of indonesia’s foreign involvement. unlike the previous era during which indonesia was brought to the global stage, jokowi’s administration confines itself to the indopacific region, primarily focusing on indonesia’s involvement in iora. third, there is the belief that national power rests on domestic capabilities. jokowi’s diplomacy focuses on improving domestic economic capability. this is also in contrast to the yudhoyono era, which viewed the actualisation of national roles on the global stage determines a status as a global player (rosyidin & andika, 2017). fourth, the formulation of national interest is reduced to material interests. jokowi’s foreign policy pursues three primary objectives: economic prosperity (wealth), defence posture (power), and state sovereignty (security). concerning the second characteristic of indonesia’s involvement in the indo-pacific region, it is interesting to be associated with the ‘global maritime fulcrum’ doctrine. this idea is closely related to the country’s identity as an archipelagic country, explicitly expressed in the 2014 jokowi-jk vision-mission. rizal sukma arguably coins the idea that the doctrine is a vision representing “…a great call to return to indonesia’s identity or national identity as an archipelagic country” (sukma, 2014). in his speech at the 25th asean summit in nay pyi taw, myanmar, on november 13, 2014, jokowi outlined five main pillars of the global maritime fulcrum doctrine: maritime culture, food sovereignty at sea, sea tolls, maritime cooperation, and maritime defence (setiawan, 2014). from an international relations perspective, maritime cooperation is the only pillar closely related to indonesia’s foreign policy. this reflects the country’s focus on domestic issues that emphasise on minimising global roles that may complicate indonesia’s path to becoming a global power (rosyidin, 2014). one of indonesia’s most successful forms of international maritime cooperation is indonesia’s active involvement in iora. indonesia even became the chairman of iora for the period 2015-2017. nevertheless, indonesia’s role in iora has not been optimal because instead of using the multilateral forum as an instrument of 156 regionalism under challenge strengthening status and reputation, jokowi’s administration perceives it solely as a means to facilitate bilateral meetings (rosyidin, 2016a). jokowi’s administration often expresses rhetoric regarding indonesia’s commitment to asean. in 2015, foreign minister retno marsudi said, “asean remains an indonesia’s foreign policy priority. ... indonesia will continue to play an active role in the achievement of the asean community and prepare the asean community’s vision post-2015” (“asean tetap prioritas politik”, 2015). in her annual speech in 2017, retno again expresses the commitment that “asean remains a pillar of indonesia’s foreign policy” (marsudi, 2017a). these statements clearly express indonesia’s commitment to continue its active role as a regional power and one of asean’s founding fathers. yet, indonesia’s strong commitment to asean is not supported by empirical evidence; it is merely lip service from a high-ranking member of the indonesian political elite. some observers are sceptical of jokowi’s foreign policy regarding asean. the former member of the house of representatives, tantowi yahya, argues that jokowi sees asean only through profit logic. in his view, indonesia will remain involved in various asean meetings but is more selective by considering the profit that will be obtained by indonesia (yahya, 2015b). others argue that indonesia has turned away from asean because it lacks a clear vision of the prospects of the asean community and indonesia’s leadership in the region (heiduk, 2016). thus, it can be argued that indonesia under jokowi has lost the spirit of regionalism as shown by previous governments, especially during the yudhoyono leadership, when indonesian diplomacy in asean was considered incredibly successful (yahya, 2015a). although jokowi does not seem enthusiastic about asean, indonesia’s participation in asean meetings remains high, at least at the annual asean summit. the asean summit in nay pyi taw, myanmar, 2014, was the first high-level asean forum jokowi attended. it was at this forum that jokowi announced the ‘global maritime fulcrum’ doctrine. in his speech, jokowi said that indonesia was prepared to become a mediator to solve the south china sea problems between china, japan, and asean countries. on this issue, jokowi did not consider indonesia one of the parties directly involved in the conflict. instead of using asean as an important instrument of conflict resolution, jokowi took the opposite view and placed indonesia as a main actor of mediation: i need to say that indonesia is not in the disputing parties there. we just want to encourage that the code of conduct can be implemented, and obviously the finalization ... we need peace and stability in the asia-pacific region ... so we support the code of conduct in the south china sea, and also dialogue china (prc)-japan as well as china (prc)-asean (setiawan, 2015). jokowi mentioned the issue of the south china sea by “... calling for all parties to refrain [from further conflict], implement the declaration of conduct (doc) and speed up the code of conduct (coc) agreement” (taw, 2014a). however, it was no more than a normative statement. there were no diplomatic efforts to promote peaceful settlements in the south china sea. indonesia remained passive and had so far only reacted when events concern its journal of asean studies 157 sovereignty, such as the natuna incident in june 2016, when indonesia’s naval force shot chinese fishing boats due to the violation of indonesia’s eez in the natuna. another indonesian involvement in asean is to initiate the asean foreign ministers meeting (amm) on the maintenance of peace, security, and stability in the region at the 49th asean foreign ministers meeting, july 24-25, 2016 in vientiane, laos. the six points of agreement were reached: first, ensuring that asean and the surrounding area are peaceful, stable, and secure; secondly, fostering mutually beneficial relationships to maintain peace, security, stability, and prosperity with nations in the region and the global community; third, upholding the charter of the united nations, the asean charter, and the treaty of amity and cooperation (tac), as well as zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality (zopfan) and other declarations as norms of interstate relations and cooperation; fourth, reaffirming the asean agreement at the 49th asean ministerial foreign ministers meeting; fifth, promoting selfrestraint and activities that can trigger tensions in the region, and sixth, enhancing asean’s unity, solidarity and centrality and calling on others to respect asean’s norms and principles (asean, 2016). as foreign minister retno suggested, the agreement reached by asean members reflects that they still maintain mutual trust (salim, 2016). indonesia also initiated the asean senior official meeting (som) in bali, december 8-9, 2016. the meeting discussed the relationship between the major powers and their impact on southeast asia, including in the south china sea and the issue of free trade in asia-pacific. the delegates agreed that asean should enhance its role at regional and global levels, particularly to strengthen the asean economic community (aec), accelerate the regional comprehensive economic partnership (rcep) negotiations, and encourage the implementation of people-centred and people-oriented asean (“som asean bahas tantangan”, 2016). at the asean summit in the philippines, november 9-14, 2017, the indonesian government encouraged asean to move forward rapidly, responsively, and openly. retno marsudi states, “it must be admitted that asean has created a stable, peaceful, prosperous ecosystem. however, the challenges ahead are getting more complicated. asean must be faster, progressive, and open to respond to various challenges. we want asean to be a responsive community” (kompas, 2017). for indonesia, asean’s most significant challenges are security and the economy. the two are intimately connected; the economy will not grow without stability, and the stability will not be established without economic prosperity. indonesia urges asean countries to increase cooperation to maintain the region’s stability so that, in turn, the region can sustain economic growth. indonesia has previously given the example of how the humanitarian crises in rakhine and marawi have threatened the region’s stability. indonesia is actively pursuing a settlement in both cases by sending humanitarian aid to the rohingya people, asking myanmar’s government to stop violence, and arranging trilateral cooperation with malaysia and the philippines to deal with terrorism and extremism in marawi. despite its active participation in various regional meetings, indonesia’s role in asean has been minimal since jokowi became president. indonesian involvement is limited to 158 regionalism under challenge participation in multilateral meetings, either as initiators, hosts, or participants. despite these meetings’ success in producing mutual agreement, indonesia has not been able to co-opt asean as a regional power. indonesia’s role in maintaining regional peace and security remains beyond the asean framework, using bilateral and trilateral mechanisms as described above. as we will see in the following section, indonesia’s negligence of asean is not only caused by jokowi’s scepticism towards the regional institution but also his preference for the bilateral approach as the primary character of indonesia’s foreign policy. it is noteworthy that the lack of indonesia’s prominent role in asean does not necessarily mean asean does not bring benefits for indonesia. as with his predecessors, jokowi maintains that asean is vital for indonesia’s interests. for jokowi, asean plays a role as an instrument of bilateral cooperation between indonesia and its strategic partners. the triumph of bilateralism over multilateralism has become jokowi’s principle in conducting foreign relations. indonesia’s participation in asean fora, especially high-level fora or summits, is nothing more than business as usual. indonesia does participate but does not play a significant role. behind the meeting, jokowi strives to establish cooperation to produce agreements in various fields with indonesia’s strategic partners on a bilateral basis. this, in jokowi’s perspective, gives more tangible benefits than multilateral diplomacy efforts that function primarily as ‘talking shops’. at jokowi’s first asean summit in myanmar, jokowi held several bilateral meetings with the host (president thein sein), un secretary-general ban ki-moon, indian prime minister narendra modi, and prime minister of new zealand john key. the bilateral meeting with thein sein discussed investment, the cooperation of transportation, the financial cooperation, especially in the banking sector, and the dispatch of experts in construction from indonesia (“bertemu thein sein”, 2014). with ban ki-moon, jokowi expressed indonesia’s full support for palestinian independence and expected the un’s role to be more real and concrete (taw, 2014b). the bilateral meeting with india discussed opportunities for investment cooperation in coal mining and defence, while in the bilateral meeting with new zealand, jokowi offered cooperation on development programs and investment in geothermal power plants. jokowi seemed enthusiastic about holding bilateral meetings with partner countries to achieve indonesia’s interests. this bilateral approach was repeated by jokowi at the 27th asean summit in malaysia, on november 20-22, 2015. during the meeting, jokowi held bilateral meetings with delegates from vietnam, japan, and the un. during the meeting, jokowi and vietnamese prime minister nguyen tan dung agreed to increase cooperation in trade and investment, while his meeting with japanese prime minister shinzo abe resulted in an agreement to boost investment and infrastructure cooperation. jokowi promised to invite 1,000 prominent figures and japanese businessmen to indonesia. meanwhile, at the 28th asean summit in laos, jokowi held a bilateral meeting with australian prime minister malcolm turnbull. the two leaders agreed on trade cooperation, especially beef imports and cattle breeding, counterterrorism cooperation, and maritime cooperation, especially enhancing maritime security and prosperity within the iora’s framework. jokowi also conducted bilateral efforts at the asean summit in manila, the philippines, in november 2017. jokowi met abe again to journal of asean studies 159 discuss plans for the 60th anniversary of diplomatic ties between the two countries. besides, japan and indonesia agreed on infrastructure development cooperation regarding the project for mass rapid transit (mrt) in jakarta (“jokowi bertemu pm abe jelang ktt asean di manila”, 2017). during the 33rd asean summit in singapore in 2018, jokowi also held several bilateral meetings with russian president vladimir putin, chile’s president michelle bachelet, japan prime minister shinzo abe, and australian prime minister scott morrison. while at the 35th asean summit in thailand, there were five bilateral meetings request from several countries: new zealand, australia, india, japan, and the un secretary-general. aside from being a facilitator of bilateral cooperation, asean also plays an important role in indonesia’s interests, especially in the economic sector. asean is widely regarded as a regional economic powerhouse. the total gdp of asean (us$2.4 trillion) is larger than india (us$1.8 trillion), australia (us$1.5 trillion), south korea (us$1.2 trillion), and taiwan (us$485 billion), but less than china (us$8.9 trillion) and japan (us$5 trillion) (rosyidin, 2017a). according to retno marsudi, asean provides a ‘welfare ecosystem’ for its member countries because intra-asean trade is the largest compared to trade with countries outside asean. moreover, intra-asean investment is also large, with 40 per cent of the investment is invested in indonesia and over 720 indonesian companies operating in other asean countries (marsudi, 2017b). in line with the vision of economic integration within the asean economic community framework, indonesia will utilise the momentum to export its superior products. jokowi said that indonesia should seize the opportunity, “we only need to keep being smart, do not wait, all must be seized, must be improved regulation, our competitiveness” (“presiden jokowi: mea harus”, 2015). to conclude, the importance of asean for indonesia lies in its role as an instrument of bilateral cooperation and welfare ecosystem to pursue indonesia’s economic goals. this is not to say that indonesia does not see other interests from asean. following the vision of the asean community, the political-security and socio-cultural pillars are also seen as necessary in addition to the economic pillars. rosyidin (2017b) argues that aside from its function as a regional economic powerhouse, indonesia needs asean because it plays the role of power broker in interstate conflicts and a security stabiliser in southeast asia and the asia-pacific. in other words, for indonesia, asean’s presence becomes vital because it facilitates economic cooperation between its member states and acts as a ‘regional conductor’ (yates, 2016). in this case, asean “has played a prominent part in negotiating and managing the order in southeast asia and the asia-pacific” (yates, 2019). however, for indonesia under president jokowi, the economic pillar of the asean community appears to be indonesia’s priority, perhaps because it is most likely to be achieved rather than the other two pillars. the political-security pillar, for example, faces the constraint of the south china sea issue that divides asean. moreover, the political-security pillar has been viewed as a prerequisite for the creation of asean prosperity. in other words, asean will not be able to create a conducive climate to productive economies without robust security architecture. indonesia will continue striving to promote stability in the region, as repeatedly said by both jokowi and foreign minister retno. however, regarding jokowi’s priority in the economic sector, asean’s existence will be viewed deeper through the lens of cost and benefit. 160 regionalism under challenge ideas and jokowi’s foreign policy towards asean foreign policy is a domain in which the state will use any material and non-material resources to gain its national interest. rosyidin (2016a) sees indonesia’s foreign policy under jokowi as an implementation of realpolitik. this idea came from henry kissinger’s realpolitik concept that foreign policy could not be separated from its national interest and power (kissinger, 1994). however, indonesia’s national interest continually changes since it depends on the newly elected leaders’ beliefs. jokowi’s election in 2014 has led to significant political changes in indonesia’s foreign policy. jokowi’s sudden rise to power represents a new political advancement model in indonesia. unlike his six predecessors, jokowi did not come to the presidency through the military or political party systems. jokowi’s rise began in 2005 when fellow business leaders recruited the successful entrepreneur to run for mayor of his hometown of surakarta (connelly, 2014). unlike yudhoyono’s foreign policy that was characterised by an outward-looking orientation, jokowi espoused a ‘pro-people’ approach. the three main guiding principles of his approach are maintaining the country’s sovereignty, enhancing citizen’s protection, and improving the country’s economic diplomacy. these principles represent jokowi’s domestic prioritization over global affairs. as mentioned earlier, the domestication of foreign policy affects how indonesia perceives its regional environment, including asean. the decreasing importance of asean in indonesia’s foreign policy was seen by see seng tan (personal communication, september 27, 2017) to respond to both internal and external factors. first, asean is no longer the main cornerstone of indonesia’s foreign policy as other international institutions will give a more prominent effect to transcend its regional power. indonesia’s inclusion in the g20 is seen as a reflection of indonesia’s competency to enhance its role as a global player: [it is] true [that] while asean continues to be identified as the ‘cornerstone’ of indonesia’s foreign policy, the domestic discourse on asean since jw [joko widodo] became president has been that of asean being but “one of the cornerstones” of indonesia fp [foreign policy] – a commonly heard refrain from indonesian academics as well as, in some cases, officials speaking in their private capacities. furthermore, the jw administration sees indonesia’s inclusion in the g20 as a reflection of indonesia’s rising prominence as a global player, one whose global aspirations transcend the regional cum institutional limits of asean (see seng tan, personal communication, september 27, 2017). second, jokowi’s negligence of asean is also influenced by the belief that this institution lacks power in managing regional conflicts among members. asean’s limited role and global players in the region make asean’s power as a regional institution is highly questionable. many member countries’ selfish behaviour is undermining asean unity and indirectly harassing indonesia’s role as a founding father. since the early 2000s, jakarta was frustrated by the constrained relations of cambodia, laos, myanmar, and vietnam (clmv journal of asean studies 161 members). to resolve the conflict between cambodia and thailand over the preah vihear temple area, indonesia became a mediator. however, the conflict, which began in 2008, has proved difficult to resolve under the asean charter. both countries showed resistance to any solutions: and while [then-foreign minister] pak marty [natalegawa] played a key leadership role to cobble together the 6-point principles in the wake of asean’s failure to deliver a joint communique at phnom penh in july 2012, the issue also hinted at the growing sense of indonesian discontent over the lack of commitment to asean among particular member states (see seng tan, personal communication, september 27, 2017). later, even the newest asean member, cambodia, demonstrated its opposition against asean in the 2016 south china sea maritime dispute, leading to the first deadlocked meeting since 2012. china’s long history of cooperation with cambodia has resulted in leveraging its power against vietnamese influence in the region. the third is the diminishing importance of asean regional territorial. ahmad rizky m. umar (personal communication, september 27, 2017) argues that the establishment of belt and road initiatives as china’s foreign policy project in may 2017 responds to asean stagnation in the negotiation over the south china sea and regional comprehensive economic partnership. the belt and road initiatives will soon diminish the ’territorial logic’ of asean that was socially constructed by a similar historical and political background with other asean member states. soon, asean regionalism will be replaced by more complex regional infrastructure and industrial cooperation outside the region. the increasing importance of chinese power in asean has forced indonesia to shift its strategy by pursuing bilateral partnerships with china and japan, leapfrogging asean. the strengthening of political power is undoubtedly seen through indonesia’s foreign policy under jokowi. even though indonesia tends to prefer a defensive strategy, it is now seen as more assertive and more precise in actualising its objectives towards other countries. this realpolitik approach is inspired by jokowi’s ‘mastermind’, which consists of indonesian experts since jokowi himself has no prior experience in international politics and foreign policy (rosyidin, 2016b). jokowi is new to the practice of international diplomacy; he did not come to the presidency with any strong views about indonesia’s place in the world or any passion for the subject. jokowi sees himself primarily as a domestic reformer, not an international statesman. moreover, indeed, the domestic reforms that he has advocated in the areas of infrastructure and the fight against corruption, if executed, would enable economic growth that would allow indonesia to play a more significant role in world affairs (connelly, 2014). in response to the rapidly changing world, it is becoming more apparent that jokowi wishes to involve intellectuals in policy-making. the emergence of a new generation of scholars makes it possible for individuals outside government bureaucracy to be involved in policy discussions. among indonesian scholars, rizal sukma is arguably the most influential figure in shaping contemporary indonesia’s foreign policy. before appointed as the ambassador for the 162 regionalism under challenge united kingdom, sukma was an executive director of the centre for strategic and international studies (csis), one of the most influential intellectuals thinktanks on indonesia’s foreign policy. sukma was jokowi’s closest foreign policy aide, along with andi widjajanto (a former defence scholar at universitas indonesia); both held important roles during jokowi’s 2014 presidential campaign. rizal sukma described indonesia’s long-term strategy towards the us and china as hedging against uncertainty to ensure indonesia’s national interests and bilateral relations with both superpowers. in sukma’s perspective, indonesia should maintain an equal relationship with china and the united states because, as a nonaligned country, indonesia has no military alliance with china nor the us (singh & cook, 2017). see seng tan (personal communication, september 27, 2017) agrees that sukma is one of the most influential advisors on indonesia’s foreign policy under joko widodo, due to his idea of ‘post-asean foreign policy’ discourse. this idea had appeared in sukma’s op-ed in the jakarta post in 2009 when he argued that indonesia should not be ashamed by the cynical views of other countries regarding its domestic weakness. he continued, it is enough for indonesia to imprison itself in the ‘golden cage’ of asean for more than 40 years. … indonesia, therefore, needs to begin formulating a postasean foreign policy. asean should no longer be treated as the only cornerstone of indonesia’s foreign policy. for indonesia, asean should constitute only one of the available platforms through which we can attain and fulfil our national interests (sukma, 2009a). sukma (2009b) has suggested several policy recommendations in implementing the idea of ‘post-asean foreign policy’. first, indonesia should implement a ‘true’ ‘bebas-aktif’ (free but active) principle of foreign policy by refusing to follow the wishes of any state or international organization, including asean, if those wishes were to jeopardise indonesia’s national interests. in other words, indonesia should demonstrate a degree of autonomy vis a vis asean. second, the concept of concentric circles needs revision. instead of asean, the first concentric circle should be g20. according to sukma, strategic necessity, functionality, values, and identity are crucial factors in defining areas in which indonesia could play significant roles. third, indonesia needs to balance multilateralism with bilateralism. bilateral relations should be implemented without using asean. instead, indonesia should improve direct bilateral relations with several asean member states, especially malaysia, singapore, philippine, and thailand. fourth, indonesia should expand its geopolitical influence in asia-pacific. indonesia should take part in shaping the emerging regional architecture. fifth, indonesia should help asean to become a better organization. thus, the idea of ‘post-asean foreign policy’ does not necessarily mean abandoning asean. however, not all agree that rizal sukma is the main influential actor behind indonesia’s foreign policy. jokowi receives significant input from many parties and individuals on various topics, including foreign policy. foreign minister retno marsudi is also highly influential. retno was appointed as an indonesian ambassador to norway and iceland in 2005, the netherlands in 2012, and has also served as general director of europe and america in the indonesian ministry of foreign relations, overseeing indonesia’s relations with 82 countries journal of asean studies 163 in europe and america. her career in the european/western countries affects the way she puts less emphasis on asean (see seng tan, personal communication, september 27, 2017). although retno often praises asean as a robust institution in the region, she tends to treat it as an actor that should adapt to international politics’ dynamics in the 21st century. during the first gathering of asean foreign ministers in 2018, retno urged asean to further strengthen regional architecture in the indo-pacific region. for retno, indo-pacific has become a strategic region for global economic development and peace (“govt proposes strengthening regional”, 2018). this proposal is in line with jokowi’s agenda to enlarge indonesia’s concentric circle to the indo-pacific region. in her 2018 annual speech, retno asserts that indonesia would continue to support the indian ocean as a zone of peace and build a sense of regionalism in the region (marsudi, 2018). jokowi might not be as dominant as his predecessors in foreign-policy formulations, but that is for a good cause. the group of intellectual advisers around him consists of top analysts and scholars of international relations. jokowi plays his part by letting these intellectuals to provide an academically sound and objective assessment of the country’s national interests and the changing strategic environment in which those interests will be pursued. aside from rizal sukma, andi widjajanto helped gradually shift the orientation of indonesia’s foreign policy from the previous government. andi finished his career as a cabinet secretary after only ten months. nevertheless, he was the one who greatly contributed to the formation of jokowi’s foreign policy. he has even been called “the man behind jokowi” (sukoyo, 2014). andi is a realist thinker who strongly believes that military muscle power is the most critical element in pursuing national interests. as a scholar, he has research interests in military affairs and strategic studies. in accordance with realist assumptions, andi presupposes that balance of power should become the fundamental principle in preserving national interests in an anarchic international system. in anticipating china’s rise, for example, he suggests that indonesia should play a balancing role between significant powers in the region. in doing so, indonesia should build strong military capability as an internal balancing strategy (widjajanto, 2013). as a firm believer in realism, andi maintains state-centrism as a moral principle in which the state must be strong above all international actors. consequently, non-state actors, including international organizations, are insignificant. although andi never formulated an explicit argument on asean, jokowi’s foreign policy’s realist character is greatly influenced by andi’s perspective on international relations. indonesia’s conception of national interest is also shaped by jokowi’s closest adviser on national security, general (ret.) luhut panjaitan. luhut was a special forces (kopassus) commander during the new order period and developed particular expertise in counterterrorism, becoming the first leader of elite counter-terrorism unit detachment 81 in the 1980s. after suharto’s fall, luhut briefly served as an ambassador to singapore and as the minister of trade and industry under president abdurrahman wahid. luhut’s relationship with jokowi goes back further than jokowi’s other advisers on foreign affairs and national security. when jokowi declared his electoral victory in front of the proklamasi statue in 2014, luhut stood beside him. luhut will almost certainly remain influential with jokowi, regardless of his 164 regionalism under challenge official role as a cabinet ministry or otherwise. luhut’s appointment in the cabinet was crucial for jokowi “to help him consolidate power” (syailendra, 2016). even though luhut and andi widjajanto have different professional backgrounds, they share similar thoughts on foreign policy. as a former military officer, luhut upholds statecentrism as a guiding principle for indonesia’s foreign relations. during the world economic forum in davos, switzerland, in january 2017, luhut has been interviewed about indonesia’s role in the south china sea. he states that the us and eu should not push indonesia to resolve this problem under the asean mechanism because the positions and interests of many other asean member states are quite different from indonesia’s. he argued asean as a group has no single position on the issue of the south china sea. therefore, indonesia needs to maintain its relationship with the great powers, china and russia, to maintain peaceful solutions in the south china sea (jakarta globe, 2017). conclusions indonesia’s foreign policy under jokowi has shown a significant change from its predecessors, especially compared to the yudhoyono government. with regards to asean, jokowi lacks the interest to project indonesia’s national interests in the region. instead, jokowi directs indonesia’s efforts towards the indian ocean rim association (iora), considered more relevant to jokowi’s ‘global maritime fulcrum’ doctrine. furthermore, jokowi pays more attention to bilateral relationships than the multilateral ones when participating in various asean summits. this reflects his commitment to putting economic and investment cooperation as the principal goals of indonesia’s international relations. despite official statements that asean remains important as a ‘cornerstone’ for indonesia’s foreign policy, there is little evidence to support that claim. empirically, indonesia under jokowi is undoubtedly looking past asean. it is shown that jokowi no longer perceives asean as an integral component of indonesia’s foreign policy. instead, the participation of indonesia in asean is simply a continuation of business as usual. jokowi’s closest advisors, particularly those who have realist and domestic-centric perspectives, play a crucial role that supports jokowi’s personal lack of foreign policy interest. in terms of policy approach, jokowi’s foreign policy stresses bilateralism over multilateralism. as a result, as a multilateral institution, asean has lost its significance in indonesia’s pursuit of national interests. the research has also demonstrated that ideas play a crucial role in shaping jokowi’s foreign policy towards asean. using the typology proposed by goldstein and keohane in their seminal works, it is argued that causal belief – that is, ideas brought by jokowi’s closest advisers – significantly affect how indonesia perceives and behaves towards asean. the idea of ‘post-asean foreign policy’ proposed by rizal sukma, an architect of jokowi’s foreign policy, has significantly impacted jokowi’s preferences. the research contributes to theories of foreign policy change. as stated in the introduction, existing theories on foreign policy change have focused on levels of analysis in journal of asean studies 165 searching for the source of change. although hermann (1990) and holsti (in gustavsson, 1999) have mentioned the importance of domestic factors as an independent variable to explain foreign policy change, they have not been gone further to elaborate on each factor. specifically, they did not consider the political elite and public intellectuals’ advisors who influence the state’s foreign behaviour. therefore, the research confirms existing explanations that emphasise the impact of individuals on leaders in directing foreign policy transformation. this argument can be applied in various case studies. however, it would be particularly useful to explain the foreign policy change of states led by leaders without strong knowledge and international relations experience. in such case studies, foreign policy is individual and ideadriven rather than leader-driven. the findings provide policy-relevant knowledge for policymakers. first, the jokowi’s administration should not perceive asean solely as an instrument for bilateral cooperation. suppose the government recognises asean as indonesia’s cornerstone. in that case, jokowi’s administration should act accordingly by engaging asean in various multilateral fora to deal with severe problems in the region and playing an active role as a regional power and primus inter pares within the asean framework. second, jokowi should encourage academics and experts from domestic institutions to enrich foreign policy debates. it would benefit the government in foreign policy-making because they would have abundant input. to achieve this objective, the government should enhance close relationships with academics by conducting seminars, conferences, symposia, and other knowledge-sharing activities. they should welcome any ideas expressed by individuals who have a strong knowledge of foreign policy and international relations. about the authors mohamad rosyidin is an assistant professor at the department of international relations universitas diponegoro. he holds ba from universitas jember and ma from universitas gadjah mada. his research interests include indonesia’s foreign policy, constructivism in international relations, culture and foreign policy, security in southeast asia, and non-western international relations theory. shary charlotte henriette, s.ip, m.a is a lecturer at the department of international relations, fisip, universitas diponegoro, with a scientific concentration of peace studies, international conflict resolution, and gender studies. she graduated from bachelor of international relations, parahyangan catholic university in 2009, and continued her masters on department of international relations, gadjah mada university in 2011. the author is also active in a number of organizations that aim to create and maintain interfaith peace in indonesia. e-mail: sharycharlotte@lecturer.undip.ac.id 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http://thediplomat.com/2017/03/indonesias-choice-not-the-indian-ocean-but-bilateralism/ http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/06/01/has-jokowi-put-asean-sidelines.html https://nasional.sindonews.com/read/1008585/18/cara-jokowi-melihat-asean-1433384504 https://nasional.sindonews.com/read/1008585/18/cara-jokowi-melihat-asean-1433384504 https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2016.1264458 https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2016.1264458 https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300001673 journal of asean studies, vol. 6, no. 1 (2018), pp. 82-96 https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v6i1.4927 ©2018 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic the radical politics of nation-states: the case of president rodrigo duterte christopher ryan maboloc ateneo de davao university, philippines abstract the advent of terrorism in the midst of political conflict requires an understanding of local context and history. anti-establishment leaders like president rodrigo duterte expose the limits of liberalism. by applying the critical distinction between “politics” and the “political,” we can imagine an alternative framework in our desire to unravel the narrative of duterte’s communitarian style. disruption is not simply meant to put into question the status quo. the goal of progressive leadership is to transform society in ways that will improve the difficult lives of the people. while the president’s critics say that he is authoritarian, it will be argued that radical means are needed to overcome the failures of philippine democracy. key words: radical democracy, president duterte, terrorism, disruptive politics introduction is president rodrigo duterte’s radicalism a sign of the imminent end to elitist politics in philippine society? vicente rafael (2016) believes that the philippine president belongs to “an older world of authoritarianism that draws on fascist discourse and revolutionary martyrdom to do away with any constraints.” the historian thinks that duterte is angry at his detractors, especially those from the west, because the president “feels that such critics, by speaking out, are themselves violating his rights as the sovereign embodiment of the people – rights that include the right to violate the rights of some in order to protect the lives of others” (rafael, 2016). rafael appears to be saying that a leader who oppresses the powerless cannot be the liberator of his people. but duterte is a living paradox. though some sectors in philippine society chastise him, duterte remains extremely popular because filipinos have faith in the idea that the present occupant of malacañang possesses the important leadership attributes that previous presidents lacked. without argument, philippine society is witnessing a progressive approach to governance that the country has never seen before. rodrigo duterte, the 16th president of the philippines, was born in maasin, leyte on march 28, 1945. he finished his elementary at sta. ana elementary school, in davao city. the son of a former governor of the undivided davao province, duterte went to holy cross college of digos (now cor jesu college) to complete his secondary education, after journal of asean studies 83 having been expelled from the ateneo de davao university for misconduct. he graduated with a degree in political science in 1968 at the lyceum of the philippines and a bachelor of laws in 1972 from san beda college. he passed the bar exam in the same year. karl gaspar, a prominent anthropologist from mindanao, was a schoolmate of duterte in high school. gaspar was incarcerated during martial law. both met again some years after their graduation when duterte was assigned as the prosecutor in the case filed against him by the marcos regime. during an interview, gaspar said: “i did not vote for him…when he won, i was hoping you know that change would come. i was a bit optimistic regarding how he could function as president and truly proud that we have somebody from davao, from mindanao who finally made it as the president of the republic of the philippines” (basallajes and dejito, 2018). but gaspar was disappointed when duterte allowed the burial of marcos in the libingan ng mga bayani. he is still hopeful, however, that the president will fulfill his promise to end corruption, bring peace to mindanao, and embrace a truly independent foreign policy (basallajes and dejito, 2018). this study problematizes the style of leadership of duterte. it will be argued that the linear approach to nation-building will not work given the reality of political discord in nation-states. but this inquiry also examines the role of solidarity in the attempt of charismatic leaders to reverse the fortunes of people. duterte thinks that his radical means are necessary to alter the destiny of the filipino people. but more than anything else, the non-traditional ways of his governance reflect the antiestablishment sentiment that now grips the order of things in the world. to achieve its modest goal of explaining the meaning of duterte’s radical approach, this study employs critical analysis in philosophy as a research methodology. philosophy does not have a singular approach. the search for the truth depends on the rigor of critical thinking. but it is nonetheless concerned with profound questions. while philosophical thought abstracts from the real world, it also seeks answers to those questions that have implications to human life. while philosophical reflection is not a prominent way of doing research in philippine studies, it is helpful if people understand their self-identity. to elaborate this issue, the research firstly discusses the advent of terrorism and shows how the same is bred in nation-states like the philippines. it begins with the marawi crisis since how duterte has quelled the rebellion is suggestive of his strong leadership. second, the meaning of radical politics in nation-states is considered under which the paper explores whether duterte’s style of leadership fits the description. third, while the progressive approach of the current philippine president is seen as disruptive, the paper argues that it is crucial in transforming philippine politics. fourth, this study examines the root cause 84 the radical politics of nation-states of the bangsamoro problem and argues that duterte’s radical leadership is crucial in addressing the historical injustices done against muslim filipinos. finally, the paper reveals a gap in personalistic politics and proposes that strengthening basic institutions is paramount in achieving the ends of social justice. the marawi crisis and the advent of terror on may 23, 2017, a terrorist organization called dawlah islamiyah, locally known as the maute group, raised the isis flag in marawi city, a bustling urban center in western mindanao, 506 miles away from manila. on the same day, while on an official state visit to russia, president duterte declared martial law on the whole island of mindanao. the maute group had one aim – to establish the first islamic caliphate in this part of southeast asia. led by two brothers, omar and abdullah maute, the group made an alliance with another terror organization – the abu sayyaf group (asg). five months after quelling the violent siege in marawi, the armed forces of the philippines reported that 802 militants, 160 government forces, and 47 civilians have been killed (fonbuena, 2017). duterte’s leadership was critical in ending the rebellion. the president visited marawi during combat to boost the morale of soldiers on the ground. no philippine president in more than half a century has done the same. the abu sayyaf group is infamous for the sipadan hostage crisis. the notorious terrorist organization was organized by a mujahideen, abdurajak janjalani. its links to al qaeda can be traced to the fact that janjalani fought alongside osama bin laden against the russians during the 1979 soviet invasion of afghanistan. it was reported that the terrorist received six million dollars from bin laden to establish the abu sayyaf group (asg). the militant organization, which bombed the superferry 14 passenger vessel in the philippines in 2004, killing 116 people in the process, follows the wahhabi doctrine of sunni islam. the asg has attracted young muslim filipinos, mostly from the provinces of basilan and sulu. before the us 9/11 attacks, bin laden was consolidating power as the great leader of al-qaeda (bergen, 2011). he inspired his disciples who often described the experience with the terrorist as a spiritual awakening. peter bergen (2011) wrote that the first encounters with bin laden by his followers were found to be awe-inspiring and felt with god-like reverence. though born with an enormous fortune, being the son of a rich saudi contractor, bin laden gave up a life of luxury. he was viewed as an extraordinarily charismatic man (bergen, 2011). the terrorist was not just the titular head of the al qaeda organization – he was the symbol for jihad or holy war against the enemies of islam (bergen, 2011). extremist groups showcase their war as the struggle against what they claim as us hegemony in the world. terrorist leaders persuade their young journal of asean studies 85 recruits to wear suicide vests by presenting to them a type of an unjust socio-political order in which us imperial interests allegedly undermine the rights of muslims. but terrorists have no ideology to speak of. they sow fear and only intend to disrupt normal civilian life. nick fotion (2004, pp.46) thinks that “there are, of course, degrees of innocence and guilt; but terrorists who choose all their victims in a random or near-random fashion cannot help but victimize people who are innocent of any political wrongdoing.” the random killing of innocent civilians is the conceptual trait of terrorism (fotion, 2004). walter laqueur (1987, pp.143) believes that “terrorists…assume that the slaughter of innocents would sow panic, give them publicity and help to destabilize the state and society.” the above point is the standard explanation. however, our task is to examine the reality of terror further in the tension between modern liberalism and the communitarian nature of politics in nation-states. this is indicative that at the heart of modern liberalism “is the problem of peaceful co-existence among people with different conceptions of the good” (mouffe, 2009, pp.2). francis fukuyama (1992) thinks of liberalism as the finality of history since authoritarian regimes have been collapsing. however, societies are marching into new forms of political enmity. the most contentious issue confronting modern democracy is the question of cultural hegemony. the oppression of millions has taken a radical turn. the political dichotomy between the bourgeois and the proletariat is no longer the greatest threat to the global order. samuel huntington (1996, pp.33) explains that “at a more general level, conflicts between rich and poor are unlikely because, except in some special circumstances, poor countries lack the political unity, economic power, or the military capability to challenge rich countries.” the poverty of peoples is the least of the west’s concern. the war of cultures is the dragon that will slay modern day liberalism. in various parts of the world, a form of non-traditional state-building is unfolding. after the us invasion of iraq and afghanistan, the latter established liberal institutions along tribal lines that are constantly challenged by a crippling extremist insurgency (schaeffer, 2016). liberals did not anticipate the rise of radical states. progressive movements came into the picture to challenge the central tenets and the universal appeal of liberal values. iraq to this day is still marred by lawless violence, a consequence of a failed western experiment that insists on a brand of democracy that the iraqi people find alien to their own way of life. the political struggles in the second half of the past century have become the stress test for marxist theory. the idea of hegemony points beyond its marxist interpretation. history cannot be dissolved as some of form a totality (laclau and mouffe, 2001). in fact, the homogenous way of understanding the 86 the radical politics of nation-states struggles in the peripheries of society should be rejected. our historical situation says that we have to look beyond the grandeur of liberal concepts. modern society and capitalism are in such a quandary that the rich-versus-poor divide is no longer sufficient to understand the complexities of modern day politics. we need to underscore the relevance of culture and history to unveil the solid reasons behind the emergence of progressive styles of governance in the world that appear to eschew established political norms. the radical politics of nation-states chantal mouffe’s the return of the political is an important work in which she explains the distinction between politics and the political. for her, politics is concerned with structures and institutions while the political refers to the reality of conflicts in socio-political relations. radical democracy does not presuppose any moral position but rightly distinguishes the political from the moral. mouffe thinks that conflict is the unavoidable characteristic of the political. in this sense, agonistic politics is grounded in the belief that society is not a uniform set of identities. while citizens desire to achieve the common good through a shared vision, the reality is that there are hierarchical differences in the polity. deliberative democracy suggests that human reason should be operative and foundational in the conduct of the affairs of the state. consensus is viewed as the basis for the possibility of harmony in society. but the idea of social harmony is ironical since it is the dominant majority that often imposes its will. this implies the permanence of dissension or disagreement (mouffe, 1995). the powerful sees as a necessary birthing pain the sacrifice of the people to achieve a certain form of socio-political order. but the idea of a consensus is no more than a cover up for the protection of the selfserving interests of the elite. for instance, indigenous peoples (ip) in the philippines have been displaced and many are forced out of their ancestral homes due to extractive mining activities (ty, 2010). mouffe (1995) thinks that modern liberalism failed to recognize the value of the political. social cooperation for liberals is rooted in a neutral starting point. but the vision of a well-ordered society is no more than a theoretical innovation. liberals seem to suggest that conflicts can be done away with through a negotiating process (mouffe, 1995). however, mouffe (1993) says that any well-ordered society does not leave enough space for disagreement. in contrast, there is a need to imagine conflict as a condition for establishing pluralism in society (mouffe, 1993). radical democracy embodies the politics of nation-states. tom nairn and paul james (2005) explain that ethnonationalism emanates from small-town narratives. the tension in nation states necessitates leaders to act as martyrs for the people. macario sakay is a primary example (ochosa, 2005). the colonial journal of asean studies 87 government had labeled him a bandit. the reality was that the revolutionary simply continued the fight against the americans. the story of miguel malvar, for instance, reveals that an interesting trait of heroes is that as a leader they have acted like a father-figure whose main task was to protect the people (ochosa, 2005). in such a context, local folks find the soul of their community by way of blood ties. given a unique culture, history, and belief system, a nation-state is bound to form its own conception of the good. thus, the politics of nation-states defies a common logic (mouffe, 1995). for example, a leader like duterte would demand that no foreign country should interfere in his decisions. it is for this reason that he is perceived as unconventional. duterte’s unprecedented pivot to china and his open admiration of the kind of leader that vladimir putin is do not mean that he wants to be influenced by those two world figures. rather, his move is an act of defiance from the established global order. the prevailing international human rights regime, which is liberal in scope and practice, appears to have no impact on duterte’s frame of mind. duterte’s radicalism translates to divisive policy decisions. but duterte, it can be argued, does not oppose the universal concept of human rights, although he thinks that protecting the lives of the people is on top of his agenda. duterte has not categorically said that he wants to do away with due process. what he has suggested during his speeches was that the police have the right to defend themselves if there is a threat to their lives in their pursuit of criminals. but the mystique in duterte’s style of leadership indicate how he has effectively captured the imagination of the majority of the filipino people. duterte is paradoxical because while he is accused of violating human rights, people continue to believe in his cause of protecting the public from hardened criminals. although he curses prominent personalities, including pope francis, the predominantly catholic country has not wavered in their support for duterte’s tough approach to politics and governance. duterte has plenty of critics who point out the controversial appointments of some personalities to official posts, but the president popularity has not waned because he has also instantly fired public officials who are allegedly involved in corruption. he is accused of machismo, but he remains endeared to women in his sorties because of his ability to charm his way into the hearts and minds of the masses. modern politics cannot be dictated by absolute norms. modern democracy cannot be limited to rational discourse (mouffe, 1995). modern societies recognize the right of the people to express dissent against the government. the crowd in street protests are considered as part of informal democratic interactions. politics goes beyond parliamentary deliberations. alan finlayson (2009, pp.13) says that while modern democracy reveals the 88 the radical politics of nation-states “accommodation of various identities and interests,” the reality is that “radical democracy emphasizes how these are permanently contested in ways that transform them.” reynaldo silvestre (2016) says that, “mr. duterte is radical because, as empirically defined, he opposes the established political structure, wholly or partly.” laclau and mouffe (1985) argue that radical democracy is dependent on difference-politics. the filipino people agonize from the inequalities in the sociopolitical and economic structures of the country. many do not see hope. his supporters think that only duterte can defy the powers-that-be stationed in the capital. silvestre (2016) says that it is duterte who “opposes a unitary and highly centralized political structure that had crafted myopic public policies.” silvestre (2016) points out that the radicalism of duterte is “a deliberate and persistent thrust toward a qualitative change in the socio-political status quo.” disruptive politics and personalistic leadership duterte has been criticized for targeting human rights, freedom of the press, and the catholic church. the president appears to be obliterating his opposition. sen. leila de lima, a vocal critic, is in jail. supreme court chief justice ma. lourdes sereno, an appointee of the past administration, was booted out from office in a quo warranto case. indeed, duterte’s brand of politics is perceived as nothing short of being disruptive. the philippine president disdains protocols and veers away from the established traditions of the office. mustafa dikec (2017) says that disruptive politics is not only for the sake of disruption. disruption is necessary in the attempt to question the status quo. duterte’s presidential campaign capitalized on the failures of the aquino government. by exacerbating the suffering of the people during typhoon yolanda due to his impersonal approach, president aquino just showed proof of his inept and weak leadership. in contrast, as one of the earliest to go to tacloban city, duterte presented himself as the hope of the people. duterte was seen as a caring father figure. this highlighted the incompetence of the former administration. such complemented the feelings of disillusionment in the minds of many filipinos. in fact, duterte’s personalistic leadership has become a legend to many who idolize him. what is the source of the duterte legend? first, his popularity may be anchored in his boldness in addressing the problem of criminality. he has threatened drug personalities in public when he was mayor. duterte views the world using lenses that have an impact in the mindset of the people. for him, the duty of a leader remains singular – to protect public order. the ethical way, it appears, is not part of his political equation. for the majority who knows the troubles of philippine democracy, it is the political will of a leader that matters. president aquino lacked courage. in a journal of asean studies 89 country that is wanting in discipline, duterte succeeded in presenting himself as the true champion of law and order. second, the development of davao city reflects the huge confidence of the public in duterte. between 1980 and 1986, the city was a picture of chaos and a violent insurgency. duterte changed this situation when he became mayor. duterte promised that he can also achieve the same result for the whole country. deterring criminals is one of the instruments that the president thinks will bring discipline and public order. davao’s story is not a miracle. it is a product of strong leadership and the kind of discipline that duterte inculcated in the local population. duterte’s governance centered only on one thing – his peace and order campaign. but while this is the case, davao has since achieved real progress and development. for duterte, the job of a politician is not to be a preacher. religious critics say that duterte is terrorizing the poor. the catholic church’s opposition to his “war on drugs” is grounded on the claim that many of the victims of summary executions belong to the poor. according to fr. daniel franklin pilario (2017, pp.160), “the only cries we hear are the wailing of mothers, widows, and children as they see the bodies of their beloved now bloodied and lifeless.” fr. pilario is expressing the pain felt by the victims of summary executions, most of whom lived in poor neighborhoods. extra-judicial killings are wrong, but the victims remain voiceless because they are stricken with the fear of more violence. the poor, fr. pilario (2017) continues, “painfully suffers in silence.” still, the president has remained unperturbed. he even vowed to pursue a relentless campaign against illegal drugs. in another front, duterte is also waging war against the country’s oligarchs. it seems to be the case that the traditional elite in the capital are shocked by the unpredictability of duterte. the president has challenged prominent individuals. he has forced big time tax evaders like mighty corporation to settle its obligation amounting to thirty billion pesos, the biggest tax settlement ever in the country’s history. hence, the trust and confidence of the filipino people in duterte remain high because they think that he delivers on his promises. the problem is that the critics of the president express things without realizing that their judgments appear to be impositions of standards that are bred in the west. such is ignorant of the history and context that local folks share. moralizing the political is tantamount to painting a homogenous world order that is overly dependent on western rationalizations. it disregards the reality that such external standards also preclude people from determining the importance of their communal values. while ideals and universal values are good on paper, the reality on the ground is different given the context of culture and history that people are situated in. in the politics of nation-states, it is critical to see how local folks have 90 the radical politics of nation-states interacted with their own leaders. the social bond is stronger. the relation between the leader and his constituents is beyond the formality of public discourse. for example, duterte deals directly with ordinary people, goes to the wakes of fallen soldiers, and uses a language that the common tao (human person) can understand. western-bred politicians are impersonal. but local politics is always personal. the people’s deep sense of belonging naturally arises from the solidarity within one’s group. this type of unity often ignites the drive that characterizes the quest for selfdetermination. there is resistance to the licentious approach of duterte. however, local context is important to demonstrate duterte’s disruptive style. millions of filipinos have long been repressed by an old order that continues to ignore the plight of the poor. it is not just the rising middle class that pushed duterte’s prominence to a higher level prior to the national elections. rather, it is the failure of the second aquino administration to recognize the just demands of ordinary filipinos that paved the way for all the troubles that we find in contemporary philippine politics. the unique feature of politics in nation-states, including the traditions and cultures in which societies are embedded, encourages people to believe that democracy should embrace difference. this is the only way for philippine society to escape the totalizing gaze of an oppressive political order that is rooted in its colonial history. decentering politics necessitates the collapse of the present political terrain. as a leader, duterte is unafraid of the repercussions of his decisions to his future in office. this type of aggressiveness renders the judgment that the president is in fact sincere in his desire to change the course of the nation’s fate. filipinos trust the president because they have been fed up by a rotten system that only caters to the elite but has deprived the ordinary citizen the opportunity to enjoy one’s entitlements and socio-economic rights. tracing the root of the bangsamoro problem the rebellion in the bangsamoro must be differentiated from the philippine revolution. in fact, according to orlino ochosa, the revolution against spain “was national and democratic in form but not in outlook since the leadership was predominantly middle-class tagalog” (ochosa 2005, pp.11). the unity in early philippine society was an alien thing. but it was not the filipinos who caused this social fragmentation. the spaniards imposed their “divide and conquer” rule to serve their selfish colonial goals. the “magdalo” and “magdiwang” faction of the katipunan was a clear example, with the ilustrado emilio aguinaldo ordering the execution of andres bonifacio, the founder of the katipunan, who was a masa (common folk). the americans instituted a patronage system that created the division between national and provincial elites. as journal of asean studies 91 a result, the centralized government that americans instituted guaranteed the domination of the tagalogs in manila. this created not only the rich-versus-poor or elite-versus-masses dichotomy, but also a profound christian-muslim divide. for salah jubair (2007, pp.9) the truth was that the “philippine government refuses to solve the problem in muslim mindanao to the satisfaction of the moros because most of the implementers do not have sympathy for the moros.” the series of events that led to the outbreak of the war in mindanao all started with the 1968 jabidah massacre (gloria, 2014). in the island of corregidor, a group of young muslim military trainees in the armed forces of the philippines were executed by their comrades after protesting the non-payment of their monthly allowance. recruited by then president marcos for a clandestine plan to infiltrate sabah, the murders ignited the political feelings of muslim filipinos. despite the reality of being neglected by manila, filipino muslims had no prior interest in politics. for jubair (2007), many muslim filipinos in mindanao carry profound grievances against the government. he says that “when the very survival of the moros was threatened by this ‘ethnic cleansing’ they were forced to react, organize and fight back to survive, which later shaped into a revolutionary struggle with ideology, political and military machinery.” (jubair, 2007, pp.10). abhoud shed lingga (2015) says that muslim leaders think that mindanao should have been excluded from the treaty of paris because the spaniards have never subjugated the island. renato constantino (1974) explains that the isolation of muslim mindanao allowed it to preserve its local culture and religion. he also points out that “throughout the spanish occupation, the muslims were not considered part of the developing society and was treated a foreign territory” (constantino, 1974, pp.6). francisco lara jr. (2015) writes that before the spanish colonizers arrived in the country and attempted to conquer mindanao, the region has already been under the control of muslim sultanates. the political and social division in mindanao is rooted in the exclusion of the bangsamoro. muslim filipinos resent their poverty (rasul, 2007). the muslim filipinos have persisted in their struggle for political freedom (lara, 2015). past administrations have failed to find a lasting solution to the bangsamoro problem. the subjugation of muslim filipinos continues because the majority benefits from the socio-economic divide. in this sense, the unity in the bangsamoro has become so elusive, “even if that unity is meant to refer only to unity in overarching purpose, not organizational structure” (ferrer, 2015, pp.126). the rural south in the country often yields a sad picture of a mansion that is surrounded by shanties whose occupants live in dire or abject misery. such has become the image of the economic and political backwardness of the bangsamoro for decades. millions have remained poor due to the 92 the radical politics of nation-states malevolence of social and political domination (maboloc, 2017). for the people in manila, the bangsamoro is nothing but a breeding ground for terrorist organizations like the asg. wataru kusaka (2017) says that the president’s strong appeal among muslims is evidenced by his timely call to recognize the rights of muslims as the original inhabitants of mindanao. the economic injustices committed against muslims is apparent in view of the inability of the national government to allocate enough resources for the basic services of the people. in this regard, the struggle for recognition is a question of how a historical wrong can be corrected by means of radical leadership. recognizing the rights of muslim filipinos means that the state must enact laws that support their welfare – sufficient income, enough food, and decent shelter. discrimination silences the capacity of human beings to expand their freedoms and live the kind of life they value. the prejudice against muslim filipinos means that the youth in basilan and maguindanao have lesser chances or nothing to attain a life that is truly worth living. being hopeless, some young muslims are forced to take up arms to rebel against the government or join extremist groups. duterte hopes to reform the old social dynamics in a radical way by spending his political capital exorcising the evil spirit of a colonial past. the root of the bangsamoro problem, thus, is historical injustice. the bangsamoro organic law, which has been approved recently, is meant to rectify the mistakes of the past. it sets aside a block grant of 100 billion pesos. the law is anchored on the concept of wealth sharing and self-rule. duterte is determined to give muslim mindanao their genuine autonomy, including the power to control and exploit the natural resources in the territory. shariah courts will also be recognized, giving muslim filipinos the right to pursue the administration of their own justice system, subject to limits set in the philippine constitution. strong leader, weak institutions duterte inherited a position that was hungry for someone with the bravery to determine the destiny of a people weakened by regional divide, hopelessness, and confusion. the president thus emerged as a strong leader who is afraid of nothing. nations that are former colonies often suffer from the stigma of an extractive economic system that has impoverished the lives of the people. the philippines falls fittingly into that description. given this, in the minds of many, someone who has the will to do what is necessary to dismantle systemic injustices is the kind of leader that people need. but the problem of philippine democracy is not just a question of leadership. for the longest time, filipinos have been deprived of their sense of identity, having been subjected to colonial rule. the vast majority do not control their future. the oligarchs and political elite define for the people the meaning of their journal of asean studies 93 existence. a poor child born in the province is forced to think that human poverty is a no more than a curse. the lack of inclusiveness in the domain of the public sphere means that people are powerless. the point is that focusing on duterte’s personality glosses over the real issue that the filipino people has to face – their lack of unity. of course, a society should be able to determine how it can benefit from the political will of a leader. duterte has a huge appeal because the philippines as a country needs discipline. this lack of discipline may be partly blamed on colonial history. but if the country must inoculate its future generations from the ignominy of the past, then it must pursue institutional reforms collectively. strong leaders appear to be necessary because institutions are weak and undemocratic. when dysfunction is entrenched in the bureaucracy, the inefficiency of the government system is no more than a reflection of the pervasiveness of structural inequalities. it is of course wrong to say that duterte’s alleged lack of decorum has no impact in the moral lives of the people. but any analysis must move beyond duterte’s persona. political commitments can be shattered by some contingent interests anytime. the primary duty of citizens is to strengthen the basic structure if as a society they so desire to serve the ends of justice. conclusion let us draw some conclusions. the first has something to do with terrorism and its relation to politics. terrorism has arrived upon philippine shores in part due to the muslim insurgency. but if the filipino people were to confront it, then beyond the need for strong leadership which duterte has shown in his resolve to quell the maute rebellion, it is necessary to uproot the consciousness of the people from the desire for homogeneity. following the analysis of mouffe, a universal moral order will only bring more problems. the second has something to do with the meaning of democracy. democratic institutions are never perfect. duterte is seen as the kind of leader that filipinos need. the context of postcolonial politics in the country is important. for duterte, the protection of the public is what the common good is all about. the problem, in this regard, is not the vitriolic language of the president. while the country is a communitarian society, it can be argued that institutional mechanisms to political reform must remain relevant. the third suggests that people cannot overestimate the value of consensus and it is wrong to underestimate the reality of conflict and antagonism. radical democracy insists that people must be emancipated from the dictates of cultural hegemony, which is the original intent of laclau and mouffe. the western point of view cannot and must not dictate how local folks are to 94 the radical politics of nation-states determine the political values that they embrace. these are intangible things that people share by reason of history and blood ties. radical politics, in this way, is historically rooted. the fourth concerns the struggles of the bangsamoro. duterte is in an opportune time to be able to advance the interest of mindanao and finally liberate it from the claws of manila’s imperial rule. the domination of the muslims by the christian majority is obvious. massive poverty plagues the people in the bangsamoro. the historical context of mindanao cannot be put aside. mindanao was not subjugated by foreign rulers. duterte knows that such plays a crucial role in understanding the importance and purpose of his radical leadership. lastly, weak leaders, as shown by the failures of president aquino, are disastrous for any society. charismatic leaders have firm commitments to a cause. the antagonistic nature of politics may be disruptive by nature, but such is necessary to achieve concrete changes in the lives of the people. the radical means of duterte appear to be non-negotiable. but the bigger challenge lies in the fact that to sustain meaningful transformations under the present administration, institutional reforms should be seriously pursued. about the author dr. christopher ryan maboloc is an associate professor of philosophy at the ateneo de davao university, philippines. he holds a doctorate degree in philosophy, maxima cum laude, from the university of san carlos, cebu city. he obtained his master’s in applied ethics from linkoping university in sweden and the norwegian university of science and technology. he was trained in democracy and governance at the konrad adenauer stiftung (kas) in bonn and berlin, germany. acknowledgment this article is supported by the university research council of the ateneo de davao university. the author wishes to thank fr. joel tabora, sj, university president and dr. lourdesita sobrevegachan, chair of urc. references basallajes, m. and dejito, j. 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(2017). “praying bodies, dying bodies: a reflection on the nazareno and the sto. nino.” philippine sociological review volume 65: 155-161. rafael, v. (2016, november 12). duterte, war maker. philippine daily inquirer, opinion, a12. retrieved from http://opinion.inquirer.net/99 159/duterte-war-maker schaeffer, r. (2016). understanding globalization. lanham: rowman and littlefield. silvestre, r. (2016, october 1). duterte’s radicalism. philippine daily inquirer, opinion, a12. retrieved from http://opinion.inquirer.net/97 803/dutertes-radicalism. taylor, g. (2010). the new political sociology. london: palgrave macmillan. ty, r. (2010). indigenous peoples in the philippines: a continuing struggle. retrieved from https://www.hurights.or.jp/archive s/focus/section2/2010/12/indigenou s-peoples-in-the-philippines-conti nuing-struggle.html the rohingya muslim in the land of pagoda leni winarni sebelas maret university, indonesia abstract regarding southeast asia as a multi-ethnic region, this paper attempts to examine about why buddhist community turns into religious violence against rohingya people in the state of rakhine (formerly known as arakan). through understanding the triggers of conflicts, this paper applies historical perspective to analyze why ethnic-religious conflict occur nowadays between buddhist and rohingya muslim in myanmar. this paper also discusses how history has influenced the construction of the government’s policy under a military regime to exclude rohingya. however, the ethno-religious conflict is either an indication of a weak state or failure state in managing diversity. key words: ethnic-religion violence, muslim rohingya, buddhist rakhine, state’s role introduction the challenges that newly independent state faces in the post-colonial period are not only on how to manage diversity but also how to maintain the stability of a nation-state based on nationalism. southeast asia is the portrayal of the “melting pot” with its mixed ethnic identity and religious diversity among them. it is the place where most of its unification is an agreement resulting after the colonial states left at the end of world war ii. meanwhile, the mixed community has also caused another problem, which revolves around minority and majority. rather than examining the problem of diversity, this paper will focus on explaining why the rohingya muslim and rakhine buddhist often involve in these conflicts compared to other ethnic groups in myanmar throughout its historical perspective. throughout history, the conflict between rohingya muslim in the north and rakhine buddhist in the south of rakhine state are much influenced by their relationship in the past. although it is classic, the history has created a pattern of a conflict which is accumulated in the society and has constructed their perspectives about the others. moreover, this can also be used to analyze why the government leads the primordialist issue as a reason to maintain stability within the state. thus, history is one main factor to construct the ethnic-religious conflict in myanmar today. even though, aung san suu kyi’s national league for democracy (nld) won the elections in 2015 and her victory is a way to democracy, but in the case of the rohingya, the task will not be easy. journal of asean studies, vol. 5, no. 1 (2017), pp. 37-50 doi: 10.21512/jas.v5i1.1812 ©2017 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic 38 the rohingya muslim in the land of pagoda rohingya muslim in the land of pagodas many centuries ago, hinduism is the most dominant religion in the rakhine kingdom and buddhism took its place in the 500 bce. after around 710 ce, islam reached the state (saw, 2011; sakinada, 2005). according to minahan (2012) in the book entitled ethnic groups of south asia and the pacific: an encyclopedia, islam’s arrival has embraced many of the former buddhist, hindu, and animist population. when bengal was under muslim rule in 1213, muslim’s influence was greatly developed in arakan (minahan, 2012) one the other hand, bamars or burmans disposed the king of arakan in 1404. during the same period, buddhism became the most influential and ascertained religion which can be seen in the later period of rakhine kings who were all buddhists (gibson, james, & falvey, 2016). another fact of rakhine state is that for many centuries there has been relations made between the muslims in bengal and the kingdom of arakan. when arakan was independent in the 15th and 16th century, this region was ruled by both buddhists and muslims (ursula, 2014). according to minahan (2012), rohingya was also known as ruainggas, that is part of indo-aryan ethnic group. he stated that there are other rohingya communities spreading out in saudi arabia, pakistan, thailand, malaysia, europe, north america, united arab emirates, australia, and new zealand. that is approximately 3.5 million of rohingya people and about 800,000 has lived in the rakhine state (minahan, 2012). he also explained that rohingya speaks an indo-aryan language which refers to bengali or known as chittagonian language that southeastern bangladesh uses and in the religion aspect, most of rohingya has muslimssunni. in his book, minahan also stated that according to bamar historian “…the term ‘rohingya’ did not appear until the 1950s when it was coined by bengali muslim migrants who had settled in the rakhine region during the colonial period…” (minahan, 2012). on the contrary, another literature claims that the rohingya community has settled in that region for a long period before it was under the british colonial rule. the historical background of arakan seems close to the conflict. in 1785, burman soldiers have attacked arakan brutally resulting to the destruction of mosques, libraries, and cultural institutions (jonassohn & björnson, 1998). the burman monarchy attempts to clean up those who were considered as “the other” or has non-burmese origins. in the efforts to appall the memories of burmese brutality, the rohingya community welcomed the british in arakan and it was during the colonial rule that they received political rights and economic autonomy. in 1937, the british separated arakan from the indian empire which causes the rohingya community’s regress into its previous situation; living in fear and insecurity. in 1942, the japanese forces have reached rakhine and made that area as a front line until the end of the second world war. during 1942-43, both muslims and rakhines were attacking each other mostly due to their different alliances; most muslim communities were pro-british, and rakhines were supporting the japanese. with shellacking from both parties, muslim communities fled to the north where they were a majority, and rakhine moved to the south (yegar, 1972, in asia report no. 26, international crisis group (icg), 2014). this is reasonable in seeing why the largest muslim groups were settled in the rakhine state. in 1945, british journal of asean studies 39 awarded the rohingya community a civilian administration in arakan because of their loyalty. two years later in 1948, arakan state was integrated into burma according to the 1948 treaty and burma granted its independence from britain (jonassohn & björnson, 1998). although many evidences and historical reports prove that the rohingya community is a native in that region, but burma (now myanmar) as well as the burmese kingdom still perceived them as foreigners or newcomers. therefore, for the muslims living as a minority in the buddhists’ land is difficult for rohingya. the poor relationship between muslims and buddhists did not only happens today, but it has a heavy historical relation that result to the burmese’s reluctance to coexist with the rohingya muslims since centuries ago. today the rakhine state, like other states of myanmar, is a diverse region. the rakhine buddhist is the largest group amongst the total population which is approximately 60 per cent of the 3.2 million. the muslim communities, including rohingya, are at least 30 per cent while the rest population is chin (who are buddhist, christian or animist), and other small minorities including the kaman (also muslim), mro, khami, dainet and maramagyi who have reached 10 per cent (international crisis group (icg), 2014). in fact, the data of rohingya population could not be accurately mentioned; it is because there are discrepancies of numbers from different sources. moreover, there are communities unregistered as citizens because they are unrecognized by the regime under the 1982 citizenship law. the military regime rejects arakan muslims (rohingya) from their recognition as citizens, even though they have been settling in the land of arakan since 1823 (bayefsky, 2005). the rohingya community was not only stateless but also endures military pressure; including highly restrictive policies. this situation is compounded by the fact that the military regime is the one to facilitate the movement against rohingya (dittmer, 2010). the goal of that movement is to reduce rohingya’s population, hence, there is no accurate documentation estimating the number of muslim population in the rakhine state. meanwhile in 1982, there was about 56 per cent of the total population inhabitant in the district (yegar, 2002). it is possible that the rohingya community has the highest population at that time. a decade later in 1994, burmese muslim was estimated to be 3 per cent out of the total population of 45 million, but muslim claimed that their number of population is around 7 million or 13 per cent out of the total population (veen, 2005). according to the data, the muslim population shows a small number in myanmar, but the data of icg in 2014 or other sources stated that rohingya muslims were the second largest group in the state of rakhine; even though the number was under 50 per cent of the population. however, this imbalance number of population causes insecurity and fear to emerge. violence against rohingya: problem with ethnicity or religiosity? the violence against minority refers to “uncertainty” (appadurai, 2006). the problem “came out” when they are among us and the boundaries are unclear between “them” and “us.” likewise, the minority group who has identified themselves as different, the majority needs them to determine what they call as “we.” according to appadurai (2006), the majority needs the “other” to define their own identity. he also argues that the 40 the rohingya muslim in the land of pagoda majority recognizes the minority group as an “impure” element in the national body. meaning, they destroy an opportunity for self-definition in “understanding their own identity” (sen, 2010). in fact, the concept of “we” as the majority’s argument poses as a difficult boundary to accept the “others.” in the case of rohingya, the burma kingdom for many centuries ago and myanmar state today have continuously oppressed them because they are different. they are regarded as not a part of myanmar nationality. rohingya is perceived as different because they were pro-british in the second world war and they have a different religious identity with the majorities of myanmar. rohingya was closely associated with bengali, but on contrary, they are clearly different from bengali; physically and politically. when it is believed in 1990 that in accordance with the ending of cold war, the world would return to a new hope of peacefulness and a more democratic world order, but the fact is showing the pathologies in the nationhood purification. myanmar, since their political isolationism under the military’s rule in 1962, is closed from outside world. there is not much information acknowledged by the international community regarding myanmar’s situation. there is no clear and obvious information on how rohingya people becomes the object of perpetrator and the subject to brutal violence from the majorities. for example, in 1991-2, the army has arranged about 250,000 rohingya communities to flee to bangladesh, and they were repatriated without “given citizenship” by the state (dittmer, 2010). in addition, the data reported by rianne ten veen and the islamic human rights commission states that in 1991, rohingya muslims were targeted as object of abuse. while, the data has also shown that in 1994, at least 110,000 karen and mon people (some of myanmar’s ethnicities) as other minority groups in myanmar fled to thailand during the intense offensive act by the military of rakhine (burma project, n.d.). muslim rohingya might not be the only minority group that is targeted in the violence. however, compared to the other groups, the issue of rohingya muslims is more complicated. meanwhile, according to the 2009 human right watch report, in 1995, the bangladesh government has forced most of rohingya muslims to go back to the border with the un supporting this repatriation process. then, the government granted them a temporary registration card (trc), which gave them the limited freedom of movement and employment in the western part of arakan. the violence for anti-muslim also occurred in 1996 in shan state and yangon. in 1997, slorc initiated an anti-muslim riot in mandalay as well as other cities and the government is reported to be involved in the riot (veen, 2005). the issue of antimuslim violence has since been happening in 2001 as well as in sitwe which results to many muslims and buddhists killed and injured. since that time, the government decided for travel restriction on muslims in the conflict area, particularly those who do travel between sitwe and other towns. in these cases, there were no information on whether muslim-rohingya has been involved in the conflict or not. however, the issue of anti-muslim (non-rohingya) has also spreads out to the other muslim communities. the data from amnesty international reported that karen muslim community has also been victimized. a refugee from muslim karen woman from hpa’an township kayen state, said that journal of asean studies 41 her village was destroyed by the soldiers in april 2004 including their mosque. until in 2012, the conflict occurred between rakhine buddhists and rohingya muslims in rakhine finally spreads out in international media, harvesting mass attention from the world. the trigger of this conflict is the rape and murder of a buddhist woman by rohingya muslims which leads into violence and riot in the same year. the data report shows that dozens of people were killed, a hundred houses burned, and 75,000 people, mostly rohingya, displaced (caballero-anthony, 2016). the conflict between muslim rohingya and buddhist rakhine also spreads out of the rakhine state. in march 2013, violence occurred in meiktila, mandalay region and 43 people were killed in this accidence. while in may 2013, a boarding school and a mosque were set on fire in lashio, shan state (fuller, 2013). according to the data, extremist buddhist groups known as 969 were suspected to initiate the anti-muslim violence. this report is also written by caballero (2016), but according to her, 40 people were killed because of these riots. she explained that a commotion in a gold shop in meiktila, central myanmar has lead the violence between buddhist and muslims. she also explicated that based on the un claim and a bbc news report, in january 2014, more than 40 rohingya men, women, and children were killed in rakhine state after an issue that a rohingya muslim killed a rakhine police. seeing these cases, we can see how violence can be easily followed by another violence; even the reason behind the incident was unclear. the boundaries of conflict become unclear then, whether it is communal conflict between rohingya and rakhine or rohingya muslims and rakhine buddhists. besides being muslim, the physical appearance of rohingya is very distinct from the descendant of mongoloid. it seems to simplify the reason, “they are not like us; we cannot accept them” (hurd, 2015). the communal violence between muslim rohingya and buddhist rakhine was not only an issue in the islamic world, but also in international level. it leads into strong international critic over military government of myanmar neglecting the conflict in rakhine state. however, the violence against rohingya muslim by the state is showing how state has significant rule in perceiving rohingya as “the other.” thus, the discrimination was not only in, law, economic, or education, but also political and humanity right. when buddhists turn to violence the historical explanation describes that arakan state, for centuries, has been an area for territory struggle and symbol of power, respectively amongst portugal, britain and japanese. the rakhine buddhist and muslim, including rohingya are claiming each other that arakan is their own land, whether that is “the land of muslims” or “the land of buddhists.” in terms of political phenomenon, there are two major factors in ethno-religious conflicts which are ethnicity and territory (harris, 2009). in her book, erika harris (2009) explained that homeland is a crucial place for the people: “in the case of homeland, the appeal is that, in the first place, it belongs to people whose name it carries; what happens to others who may not have another homeland or who even think of it as their own is as secondary consideration, if a consideration of 42 the rohingya muslim in the land of pagoda ethno-national movements at all… there is no potential for conflict anywhere without disputed territory, as there is no peace without territorial settlements. homelands are spaces where national narratives are made, to which past struggles and dreams of the future belong. all homeland are “lands of hope and glory” but also, space of the nightmare of ethnic violence take place….” nevertheless, the conflict in rakhine state is not only about the clash of two ethnicities, but also identity, which harris did not include it as an element of analysis. the identity could not be separated from homeland nor ethnicity. it can be seen from the palestine conflict between palestinian and israeli who fights and claims that palestine is their homeland. for rohingya people or the rakhine buddhist, rakhine state is the place where their ancestor lived in and they are emotionally engaged with. arakan is the place where they find the memories of their identity. although the oppressed government compels them to leave the land, they are returning with the consequence of being stateless. it is because they have no other place nor choice for both to stay and survive. historical homeland conflict also has its root when u nu regime fulfilled their promise to give autonomy in arakan and mon in 1962. however, the mujahidin in that time continue demanding its legal separation from burma (azizah in yusuf, 2013). in the same year also, burmese army did coup d’état against u nu regime, and burma was under military junta. in 1989, the government changed the name of arakan to rakhine. thus, when someone mentions “arakanese muslims,” it refers to muslim minorities that has already disappeared. it seems that the nomenclature of rakhine was designed for rakhine people or known as “the buddhist land.” there are three core points contesting in this conflict; ethnicity, territory, and identity, which are all related to the historical background. these points are the main elements of why conflict happens in the world, particularly in rakhine. according to jack snyder (2000), there are two kinds of nationalities in the world: ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism. ethnic nationalism is based on the primordial sentiments such as ethnicity, culture, or religion. while, civic nationalism is based on national sentiments that overcome the distinction of ethnicity, religion, race, and social class within the society. today, in the globalization era, the ethnic nationalism, which based on primordialism sentiment is being abandoned gradually, especially in the west. in contrary, the countries that faced diversity problems like myanmar, the common structure of a conflict is constructed by the dominant power to marginalize the minorities with great oppression. the question then is why the buddhist community turns to violent measures against rohingya muslims. firstly, it should be noted that religious violence can occur in all religions (hansclever & rittberger, 2000; seul, 1999; bartels, n.d.). jeffrey seul in his journal argued that the escalation of intergroup or inter-ethnicity conflict cannot be solely seen as identity competition, even economic and politics factors also play important roles in the conflict (seul, 1999). by adopting connor’s idea about nationalism which refers to “us-them” (seul, 1999), seul explains that connor’s argument was based on a single cultural marker, including religion which can be journal of asean studies 43 the root or reference for national identity construction. this argument could be examined in the context of myanmar in which buddhism was constructed as their national identity. in the other hand, rohingya community is not reflected as a part of the mongolian nation. thus, there must be a logical argument to explain how intergroup conflicts in rakhine occur. seul as well as samuel huntington are using the primordialist perspective. huntington believes that the next pattern of conflict after the cold war pattern was not only dominated by ideological or economical aspects, but it will involve religion-fed cultural “fault lines” (ventura, 2014). the following statement is huntington’s most cited passage in the clash of civilization: “it is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. the great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be culture” (huntington, 1993). according to the primordialists (samuel huntington, gilles kepel, jeffrey seul, and bassam tibi), they argue that the most important factor in the twenty-first century conflicts is the nations in civilization (hasenclever & rittberger, 2000). in their book, hasenclever and rittberger are also attempting to outline the three approaches to analyze the impact of faith and politics, before it can be used to measure the conflict. in the instrumentalist perspective, socio-economic are the basic of conflict and religion is only a spurious correlation in terms of intergroup conflict. the instrumentalists believe that most of religious conflicts start from unequal growth between economic, social, political and nations (hasenclever & rittberger, 2000). otherwise, in the constructivist perspective, religion is an intervening variable. marco ventura (2014) mentions about the constructivist approach in his book in the following term: “…ethnic identity is as fluid, changeable, and often actively contested. from such perspective, most of the emphasis of the analysis is on the strategic aim of collectivity framing ethnic membership and boundaries in a given manner than on individual motives to endorse a given ethnic affiliation. consequently, elite and mass interests are not assumed to converge, nor are the interests of different ethnic group assumed to be intrinsically divergent: ethnic conflict and violence can serve elite interests beyond ethnic boundaries and can contradict the interests of the masses on all sides.” this approach also described about how the elite plays a significant role in intergroup conflicts. related to the rohingya case, the elite army plays a role to mobilize the violence through recognizing that rohingya people are the “impure” community in the state. here, the regime saw the issue of impurity as an opportunity to reduce population. indeed, buddhist-muslim violence is nothing new in myanmar, especially in rakhine (kingsbury, 2015). it can be seen from the government statement when other entities ask of the solution for refugee camps or deportation. president thein sein emphasizes that rohingya people were unacceptable in myanmar. his comments in radio free asia (2013), states that they take responsibility for their own ethnics and because rohingya were not authentically their ethnic, it was 44 the rohingya muslim in the land of pagoda impossible to endure them legally (caballero-anthony, 2015). there are two approaches to understand the buddhist in how they are involved in the violence; that are primordialists and constructivist perspective. but this hypothesis has also been influenced from the history of relationships between buddhist and rohingya just as how burmese-buddha has ruled for centuries imposing the rohingya. aside from the historical background, cultural reasons also play an important role. if cultural reasons cause the construction of “us and them,” which is very clear to differentiate rohingya muslim and rakhine buddhist, then it is indeed an important factor that depicts and influences the course of history for rohingya people in myanmar continuously. the buddhist practices its religion as a burmese religion for centuries so that it has a strong influence in the burmese culture. although the government changed the name of burma into myanmar, the identity was already embraced by the whole nation. since there is an imbalance between majority and minority, the buddhist culture becomes a reflection of their basic culture. they feel insecure and fearful that the minority will change the buddhist culture. on the other hand, according to the historical background in during the british colonial, rohingya muslims owns legal administration since they were loyal to the british colony. they have an opportunity in economic, social status, and education. they have a position in the government and this continues in the u nu regime until coup d’état by the junta military in 1962. historically, they came to arakan as traders and soldiers, most are notably from arab, mongol, turkish, portuguese, and bengali. when arakan was bengal’s feudatory in the 15th century, rohingya converted to islam and developed their own distinct culture and art (jonassohn & björnson, 1998). the rohingya community has the skills needed to develop their own economic ability or thorough education but because they are “stateless,” they do not have the opportunity and are powerless. on the other hand, the rakhine buddhist already has an opportunity to restore their socio-economic because they have obtained official citizenship. however, when rakhine buddhists opted violence, it seems that they are defending their nationalism, but unfortunately rohingya could not do the same way, because they have either no state or “nationalism.” an overview: islam in myanmar muslim in myanmar was not dominated by the ethnic of rohingya, there some ethnics involved as well. however, the antagonistic relationship between rohingya muslim and buddhist rakhine has never been in peace. serial conflicts record that ethnical conflict between burmese with buddhists as a majority and other immigrant, such as indians, does happen. sub-ethnics such as mon and karen, as mentioned previously, have also become victims in the burmese conflict, and many among of them are muslims. it is significant since buddhists in myanmar has not been in the conflict with other muslim community with chinese descendant –chinese muslim that comes from yunan, a border area between china and myanmar in the west. most of them come to burma as traders, breeders and refugees in the post-panthay revolution (1856-1873). under the manchu government in myanmar, this chinese muslims then are well-known as panthay journal of asean studies 45 or hui in the chinese language. according to naw lily kadoe in her writing entitled ulama, state, and politics in myanmar, as cited in yegar (1972), this tribe easily assimilates with the local community and is be able to keep their identity as muslims. on the other hand, the arrival of indians under the british government had caused an increasing number of muslim population in myanmar. previously, the muslim population in this state is small, passive and loyal to the king of burma. yet, the coming of indian immigrants have doubled the population and with the increasing number of mosque and school based on islamic education constructions (yegar, 1972). the scale of ethnical conflict between indian muslims and burmese buddhists increases in the post-world war i, that is in the 1930 and 1938 which happens due to the fight for jobs in rangoon (yangon) (kadou, 2015). analyzing conflict in myanmar is not an easy task, but serial historical factors with violence over muslim rohingya is showing that ethical conflict is not new, it was rooted on their historical relationship. through short explanation, we can analyze what buddhists’ relationship with the muslim minority in myanmar looks like. however, it cannot be generally concluded that the buddhist-muslim relationship in myanmar is worse because, in several cases, anti-muslim sentiment happens in rakhine due the ethnicity of rohingya, and the conflict has also happened outside rakhine. there are some hypotheses that can be drawn by looking at this problem; first is that conflicts happening between buddhist rakhine and muslim rohingya is motivated through economic-politic and social variables. second, is that the conflict between the two had created bigger religious conflicts crossing ethnicity. it had happened due to fear over wide distribution of muslim power and the possibility of a scrapped buddhist position, which still needs to be proved. third is that conflict over buddhist rakhine and muslim rohingya is considered completely as an ethnical conflict, but it has much to do with a religion. for the example, their rejection over rohingya without mentioning islam as the religious attribute. fourth is the limited information of conflict regarding the relationship between buddhist burmese and ethnic hui (panthay) as minority. meaning the closeness between rakhine and hui could be viewed as ethnical intimacy, both of which came from mongoloid race. yet, it could be also interpreted that the ethnic of hui could adopt the local culture better compared with bengali muslim (rohingya) and indians. path for harmony although it is not easy and there is still no win-win solution acquired between buddhist rakhine and muslim rohingya, many efforts had already been shown to reconcile the parties. indeed, this issue had grabbed international attention, either from the muslim countries or non-muslim countries. international respond over the conflicts in myanmar, especially in the northern rakhine state is a movement for global humanitarian crisis. since the crisis happened in the 2012, 57 counties affiliated in the organization of islam cooperation (oic) condemned genocide over rohingya muslim in myanmar, as what happened in the summit meeting in mecca, augusts 2012 (kadoe, 2015). in the other side, myanmar government invited the state representatives and un to see the actual reality that is happening in the rakhine 46 the rohingya muslim in the land of pagoda state. indeed, this decision also emerges a serial of protests especially from buddhists in several areas of conflicts, such as yanggon, meiktila, lashio in the northern shan state. a couple years before in 2011, adli abdullah, the leader of the international concern group on rohingya (icgr) in malaysia, hoped that the rohingya issue could be discussed in the asean summit while several parliaments from southeast asian countries still intensively conducted the dialogue to solve the issue of rohingya. they urge asean to include this issue as the main agenda of the asean summit in malaysia on 26-27 april 2015. however, this effort still has an obstacle, because myanmar considers the issue of rohingya as a domestic matter and asean has no right to interfere this issue. even if there are many rohingya refugees residing in asean countries, particularly in indonesia, malaysia, and thailand. later, on 20th of may 2015, the foreign ministers of three asean countries, indonesia, malaysia, and thailand conducts a meeting in kuala lumpur to discuss joint solutions and the resolving of regional issues (indonesian ministry of foreign affairs, 2015). this meeting also aims to find a comprehensive solution involving the country of origin, transit, and goals through the principle of burden sharing and shared responsibility. this is necessary to prevent the issue of irregular migrants for it not to evolve into a humanitarian crisis in southeast asia. furthermore, in the meeting with the ministry of external affair of asean in yangon december 2016, the minister from malaysia, anifah aman, demands for full humanitarian access in the conflict area. it made malaysia as the asean country that initiates involvement into the issue. indeed, malaysia also reports to give emergency support for rohingya muslim refugees in february 2017. it is recorded that since the humanitarian crisis happened in 2012, many rohingya refugees have been escaping to southern malaysia. likewise, malaysia and indonesia as the largest muslim populations in asia have also been supporting the refugees in the same way. recently, refugees of rohingya community receives accommodation and hospitality in aceh before they depart to australia to gain asylum. indonesia is also the only state allowed by the myanmar government to enter the rakhine region to provide humanitarian assistance to rohingya refugees when the crisis still occurred. the indonesian government through the ministry for external affairs has been doing diplomacy in resolving conflict as well as giving humanitarian aids for rohingya muslims. thus, international demand for harmony cannot be wellachieved without internal effort from myanmar government per se. the wining of national league for democracy (nld), pioneered by aung san suu kyi in the general election 2015 had previously seen as bringing a hope for religious freedom and sectarian conflict. in contrary, wining does not give a significant contribution to religion harmony. indeed, aung san suu kyi intents to limit international intervene for resolving the problem of rohingya muslim and buddhist rakhine. furthermore, the appointment of htin kyaw in the parliament (2016) gives no significant changes due to his loyalty towards aung san suu kyi. thus, the harmony is located on the government’s ability in handling militaristic regime. at least, the president from civil society could be a new hope for journal of asean studies 47 myanmar after many years of militaristic controlling regime. while, international sympathy over this case is still going on. in the prior december 2016, there are fourteen countries, among them are austria, belgium, canada, denmark, finland, france, greece, ireland, the netherlands, poland, spain, sweden, turkey, and the united states. these countries imposed myanmar government in allowing them to give aids for rohingya muslims (the new york times, 2016). it is related to the un report portraying the increasing number of humanitarian crisis in that area. however, the amount of aid especially in food is still limited. there are 20,000 people from 150,000 refugees who got food. this tragedy was reported by pierre péron, a spokesperson of un for coordination of humanitarian affairs. basically, the problem of rohingya muslim is not an easy task to be solved, it is due to historical complexity that has been happening for a long while. in other words, a conflict between rohingya muslim and buddhist rakhine is not merely a temporary response; it is rooted happened many years, across generation and remaining into the present. conclusion it is believed that rohingya is a legacy from british colonial policies that are trapped in a misfortunate situation. historically, rohingya were leaving their ancestors to migrate into rakhine state during the british colonial period and was called by most non-rohingya people as bengali muslim. the official view of the myanmar government is that all rohingya people are illegal immigrants from bengal (present day bangladesh) and the government does not address muslim migration under british rule (gibson, 2016). otherwise, according to historian and it is mostly believed by rohingya people, they argued that their ancestors were not only coming from east bengal, but also from different muslim countries. they were not coming to rakhine state during the british colonial period but over hundred years earlier before. rohingya people has heavily rooted in rakhine, the definition of rohingya people identity seems difficult to be explained. hence, the rohingya people itself as an ethnic identity is still debatable. the conflict in rakhine based on the primordialists and constructivist perspectives also could be explained based on historical context which states that for centuries the burma kingdom did invade rohingya to get arakan. after arakan was a part of burma kingdom, this land since then belongs to them. in the 17th century, when arakan was under the british rule, rohingya was protected until the britain colony left the country in 1948. post-british rule, the muslims’ peacefulness in arakan changes into conflict with the buddhists. indeed, since 1962, the junta military has oppressed rohingya muslims and played a significant role in the movement to expel rohingya from the myanmar state. the case of rohingya currently has found a new stage and it is a concerned as an issue related to humanitarian disaster in southeast asia. this issue becomes more complex because the conflict involves not only ethnic-religious, but also economic, social and political aspects. however, the conflict between the buddhist and rohingya community is very complicated and its resolution is not easy. the international communities are continuing their efforts to negotiate with junta military to give more accesses to rohingya and to know about what happened in rakhine as a part of humanitarian activities. 48 the rohingya muslim in the land of pagoda about the author leni winarni is a lecturer in international relations and researcher in center of asean studies, sebelas maret university, surakarta. currently, she is a ph.d. candidate of inter-religious studies (irs) in gadjah mada university. her key interests are politics and religion, islamic studies, history, conflict resolution, and russia and east european studies. references ahmed, i. 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(2006). buddhism and violence. lumbini international research institute, 2, 213-242. the higher education dimension journal of asean studies, vol. 6, no. 1 (2018), pp. 24-44 https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v6i1.3963 ©2018 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic the higher education dimension in east asian regionalism: a two-tier analysis of international co-authorship patterns in the asean plus three oliver gill university college london abstract the aun and asean+3 unet have both sought to promote the development of a distinct higher education research community within southeast asia and east asia, respectively. the purpose of this paper is two-fold. firstly, it aims to assess the success of these organisations in delivering against this aim, reviewed against inter-regional comparators. secondly, the paper undertakes an assessment of which countries (if any) might be predominant in driving this agenda forward, at the intra-regional level. in both levels of the investigation, a statistical analysis of changes in international co-authorship patterns across time is utilised as the means of assessing the question at hand. in accordance with the paper’s core hypotheses, the findings indicate broad fulfilment of the aun and asean+3 unet’s objectives, although it seems that efforts directed at building an east asian research community have been comparatively more successful than those directed specifically at southeast asia. it is also found that, in a relative sense, south korea is acting as a principal locus for higher educational regionalisation. the paper concludes by considering the implications of the analysis for east asian higher education regionalism, with the contention being that the establishment of the aforementioned research communities provides a robust basis for the development of more formal integrative measures. key words: international co-authorship, higher education regionalism, higher education regionalisation, asean university network (aun), asean+3 university network (asean+3 unet), southeast asian ministers of education organisation (seameo) introduction recent developments in the global system of higher education have seen a significant increase in the degree of crossborder interaction, such that ‘[c]ooperation, international exchange and integration among institutions of higher education have become the new norm’ (feuer & hornidge, 2015, p.327). this international dimension in higher education manifests itself in many forms, noteworthy amongst which is a growing emphasis on higher education regionalism. this paper focusses on the evolution of collaborative networks within east asia in the form of the association of southeast asian nations (asean) plus three (asean+3) grouping of nations. the purpose is to journal of asean studies 25 assess the progress of higher education regionalism in east asia, with an emphasis on the question of whether the stated aim of developing a definable research community among asean+3 member states is being realised and, if so, which countries are driving this agenda forward. in doing so, the ambition is to fill an identifiable gap in the literature; not only has asean education been an ‘under-researched topic’ (zeng, adams & gibbs 2013, p.324) but, additionally, the extant research tends to focus on an analysis of regional initiatives at the intergovernmental level, whilst being notably sparse in relation to whether these initiatives are having the desired integrative effect at the level of individual institutions. indeed, as noted by vögtle and martens: ‘the mere fact that these initiatives have been launched does not provide evidence that reform efforts are actually under way’ (2014, p.256) and it is therefore pertinent to assess whether this is, in fact, the case. this paper’s research is based on a statistical analysis of international coauthorship patterns with respect to scholarly literature, assessed across time. the literature review defines the concept of higher education regionalism and the regionalisation that underpins it, with a particular focus on how these concepts have been promoted in the context of asean+3. therefrom, the outcome of interest is derived. the methodology establishes the two-tier (inter-regional and intra-regional) statistical process and associated controls that will be utilised to assess the statistical significance of east asian co-authorship patterns. finally, a review of the literature pertaining to east asian higher education regionalism is undertaken, which grounds hypotheses that a research community should be detectable within the data and that this is likely to be driven by two competitive dynamics (malaysia vs. singapore / china vs. japan). in the analysis, the data is analysed, and the results is interpreted, with reference to the hypotheses. the conclusion reviews the analytic output and expands on its implications for east asian higher education regionalism. literature review to understand the significance of this paper’s outcome of interest, it is necessary to make a distinction between the concepts of regionalism and regionalisation. regionalism refers to ‘those processes of regionally based co-operation and co-ordination that are self-consciously driven consequences of political activities’ (beeson, 2003, p.252). regionalism is, then, “top-down”, macro-level regional integration, as conceived and led at an intergovernmental level. in the higher education context, regionalism manifests itself in the form of formal agencies, agreements and collaborative programmes that target the harmonisation and integration of otherwise nationallybounded systems. in contrast, higher education regionalisation is ‘the process of building closer collaboration and alignment among higher education actors and systems within a defined area or framework called a region’ (knight, 2012, p.19). thus, although regionalisation has 26 the higher education dimension broadly the same integrative ends as regionalism, it is distinguished from the latter concept by virtue of its being characterised by micro-level, “bottom-up” drivers. higher education regionalisation is, then, a process led by individual institutions (e.g. universities) partnering with other such institutions, located in different countries within the region in question. the most significant example of higher education regionalism at present is the bologna process, founded by way of the 1999 bologna declaration, to which 48 countries in the “wider” european area are presently signatories. the core goal was establishing a european higher education area (ehea) by 2010, so as to ‘increase the employment prospects and geographical mobility of european citizens; and enhance the reputation of european higher education globally’ (campanini, 2015, p.741) through the harmonisation of the previously diverse systems of higher education. inter-system compatibility was to be built on six outcomes: easily readable and comparable degrees; a two-cycle system; credit transferability; student and staff mobility; cooperation in quality assurance; and a european dimension in higher education (eurydice, 2009). the ehea was realised in 2010, marking the successful fulfilment of the core objective of the bologna process. while the attribution to a “bologna effect” is disputed by some (huisman, adelman, hsieh, shams & wilkins, 2012), the implementation of the bologna “model” has been accompanied by an increase in the absolute number and percentage of non-ehea students within the total ehea student population from 1.6% to 2.6% between 1999 and 2007 (westerheijden, beerkens, cremonini, huisman, kehm, kovač, lažetić, mccoshan, muzuraityte, souto otero, de weert, witte & yağci, 2010, p.67), giving rise to the perception that it has increased the competitiveness of european higher education within the global marketplace (chao jr., 2011). consequently, ‘the european harmonisation process is widely regarded as “the model” for other regions, which learn from the european harmonisation experience and adjust “the model” to suit their own regions’ (yavaprabhas, 2014, p.81). of particular relevance to this paper are the bologna-inspired attempts to establish higher education regionalism in east asia, which have largely centred on asean. originally founded in 1967 between indonesia, malaysia, singapore, thailand and the philippines, the initial purpose of asean was ‘to promote regional peace and economic growth’ (mustajarvi & bouchon, 2014, p.219), against the backdrop of a recent colonial experience and the growth of communism in the region. since that point, both the membership and scope of asean has broadened, to the extent that it is now ‘often viewed as one of the most successful regional organisations in the developing world’ (savage, 2011, p.219). in membership terms, asean has been augmented through the addition of brunei in 1984; vietnam in 1995; myanmar and journal of asean studies 27 laos in 1997; and cambodia in 1999, giving it a total membership of 10 southeast asian nations. notable expansions in the scope of asean include the 2003 asean concord ii, which aims to establish a formal, tri-pillared ‘asean community’, as well the adoption of the asean charter in 2007, which served to provide the necessary legal and institutional framework to underpin asean as a legal entity (rattanasevee, 2014). in terms of higher education regionalism, the key development has been the formation of the asean university network (aun). the aun was created in 1995, incorporating leading universities from each of the asean’s member states and growing in line with the growth of asean itself, now comprising 30 such member institutions. the aun provides a policy interface between asean and the higher education sector and, together with the southeast asian ministers of education organisation (seameo), has led on the development of initiatives targeted at the harmonisation of higher education in the region, ‘based on the four pillars of student-faculty communication, collaborative research, information sharing and asean research promotion’ (sugimura, 2012a, p.89). the aun’s key achievements include the creation of asean university networkquality assurance (aun-qa) in 1998, aimed at harmonisation through raising the level of higher education in the region as a whole (umemiya, 2008), and the asean credit transfer system (acts) in 2010, which supports regional student mobility. alongside the work of the aun, seameo’s regional centre for higher education and development (rihed) has promoted the principle of establishing a southeast asian higher education common space, making explicit reference to the bologna model as being ‘the way of the future’ (seameo rihed, 2009, p.12). in tandem, asean has also expanded its reach through the creation of asean+3, which (in addition to the asean core membership) incorporates the northeast asian nations of china, japan and south korea. asean+3 emerged out of the 1997 asean summit, spurred by the need to find a collective resolution to the asian financial crisis. since this point, the remit of asean+3 has expanded and the annual summit which serves as its core ‘has developed as a comprehensive forum to discuss economic, political and security issues in the region’ (hidetaka 2005: 212). critically, this expansion in remit has extended into higher education, marked by the formation of the asean+3 university network (asean+3 unet) in 2009, closely allied with and composed in a similar fashion to the aun. although, as outlined above, the aun and asean+3 unet have concerned themselves with activities to forge higher education regionalism, relative to the successes of bologna, ‘[r]egional quality assurance, mutual recognition and harmonisation of higher education systems have not been adequately addressed’ (chao jr., 2014, p.560). it is understood that a key reason 28 the higher education dimension for the relative lack of progress is the historically disjointed nature of the higher education community in the region and, consequently, both organisations have sought to develop what knight (2013) has referred to as the “functional” underpinnings of regionalism. that is, both organisations have seen the need to build the capacity for regionalism by nurturing micro-level regionalisation, as evident in policy documentation, which seeks to promote: ‘asean regional research projects… undertaken jointly by scientists/scholars of more than one member state’ (aun, 2017). ‘professional interactions and create research clusters among asean+3 universities’ (asean+3 unet, 2009). these policies are both directed at the development of a distinct research community within the region in question and confirm the view that ‘regionalisation in east asia is in progress in accordance with regionalism fostered by national governments’ (sugimura, 2012b, p.62). the relative success of these organisations in developing research communities represents our outcome of interest. for the purposes of this paper, we shall measure the relative achievement of these goals in terms of the count of international coauthorships of publications, between academics from different nations. it should be acknowledged that ‘this mode of counting is only one among several possible measures of collaboration, and that… collaboration may lead to a number of outcomes of which the co-authored paper is only one’ (wagner, park & leydesdorff, 2015, p.3). as such, there are limitations to this analysis that will be explored further in the conclusion. nevertheless, the availability of a uniform dataset over time and its directly quantifiable nature make this ‘the most tangible indicator’ (jung, 2012, p.237) and therefore the one most commonly applied to measuring international scholarly collaboration, as well as higher education collaboration in general. methodology the scopus database was used to collate the data on international collaborations. scopus is the largest abstract and citation database of peerreviewed literature, covering over 22,000 journals, across a broad range of disciplines. searches for multi-authored papers were conducted, with each being restricted to a particular “pairing” of asean+3 states and a specific year within the range of interest. an author’s home nation was based on the ‘affiliation country’ recorded within the database. the number of ‘document results’ produced by this method was taken as the number of collaborations for the given country pairing in the year in question. a document with three or more authors from distinct nations would therefore be counted more than once within the overall dataset. as we are seeking to measure the extent of collaboration, the extra weighting provided to such articles is not problematic. these searches were performed for each year in the 1985-2015 journal of asean studies 29 range, to provide a comparable amount of data ‘before’ and ‘after’ the creation of the aun. as there has been persistent general growth in international coauthorships across the time considered (wagner et al. 2015), the presence of such growth among asean+3 nations since the formation of the aun/asean+3 unet would not, in itself, necessarily be indicative of an “asean effect”. consequently, the analysis sought to determine whether there had been a change in the co-authorship growth rate among these countries before and after a specified year (i.e. piecewise regression). a statistically significant increase in the growth rate after the relevant driver had been initiated would, it is contended, provide evidence of its having an effect on the regionalisation process. for the aunspecific analysis, it was determined that the effect should be measured from the first year after the establishment of the permanent secretariat in 2000. this also allowed for the fact that the last of the asean states was incorporated in 1999. for the asean+3 unet-specific analysis, the effect was measured after the establishment of the body itself, in 2009. the end date of the analysis was set at 2015. the start date was set at 1985 for the aun-specific analysis, so as to provide a balanced ‘before’ and ‘after’ dataset. as it was noted that there was a significant overall growth in collaborations since 2001, it was determined that better fitted regression coefficients for the asean+3 unet-specific ‘before’ growth rates could be derived by setting the start date at 2001, thereby broadly balancing the datasets in the process. the division of the analysis is summarised in figure 1. figure 1. growth rate pivots test area agent before after asean aun 1985-2000 20012015 asean+3 asean+3 unet 2001-2009 20102015 the analysis was conducted over two tiers; inter-regional (tier 1) and intraregional (tier 2). the purpose of the first tier was to consider the primary question of the paper, specifically, whether regionalism was driving the creation of a research community within east asia, within asean, measured in terms of coauthorships amongst the 10 ‘core’ asean nations, and/or asean+3, measured in terms of co-authorships amongst the asean bloc and the asean+3 bloc (discounting collaborations within the blocs themselves). although the performance of a t-test on the ‘after’ relative to the ‘before’ coefficient would determine whether there had been a statistically significant increase in the growth of collaborations, this would be insufficient to evidence an asean effect, since extraneous factors could have influenced such an increase. in particular, since 2001 there has been a ‘dramatic increase in… internationally co-authored papers… facilitated by the diffusion of internet and email’ (iammarino & archibugi, 2005, p.38), which would 30 the higher education dimension directly inflate the aun ‘after’ coefficient. it was decided to mitigate for such factors by analysing the ratio coefficient increase for two control cases and then applying this ratio to the ‘before’ coefficient of the test case, in order to provide a new hypothetical ‘after’ coefficient (the baseline for the null hypothesis), against which the actual ‘after’ coefficient could be tested for statistical significance. the model formulae for this calculation are provided in appendix 1. the control cases selected were the collaborations for the test area (i.e. the asean or asean+3 bloc) with the united states and ‘other asian’ nations. the united states was selected as the first control owing to its being the predominant actor in international collaborations generally, accounting for almost 40% of all internationally coauthored papers within the national science board’s science & engineering indicators 2016, and therefore representing a reliable ‘base’ control. the second control was added to account for potential confounding factors associated with other higher education regionalism drivers in the wider asian area. particularly noteworthy is the brisbane communiqué, signed by ministers of education from 27 asia-pacific countries in 2006. in addition to setting out “bologna-like principles” (rich, 2010), the communiqué also sought ‘the development of strong research links, teacher exchanges and partnerships’ (apem, 2006). as the majority of asean+3 nations signed the communiqué, any rise in collaborations between these countries could potentially be attributed to this process, rather than specifically east asian regionalism. to account for this, india and taiwan were selected to form the second control of ‘other asian’ nations. of those countries that have been significant international collaborators, defined in the science and engineering indicators 2016 as countries involved with >1% of the total amount of international collaborations, india and taiwan are the only countries outside of asean+3 that are both likely subjects of wider asian regionalism and signatories to the brisbane communiqué, making them ideally suited to this control. on the assumption that the above research evidenced the formation of an east asian research community, the purpose of the tier 2 analysis was to assess whether there were any countries within the region that were contributing in an above average manner. in order to assess this, the above methodology was directly transposed. the collaboration growth rate for a given country represented the test case and the total intra-regional collaboration growth rate the control, thereby testing whether the increase in growth rate for a given country was significantly above/below the regional average. although current research does not directly address the question of whether a research community is materialising in east asia, there is pertinent literature upon which hypotheses can be based. a point commonly noted is that east asia is marked by ‘immense variation… in national size and wealth, education journal of asean studies 31 resources, tertiary participation, research outputs and global connectedness’ (marginson, 2011, p.589). this diversity in higher education capacity could feasibly be an impediment to building broad collaborative networks, especially when considered alongside the fact that membership of the aun (and the asean+3 unet) is restricted to the “top” universities in each country, making it “somewhat self-limiting” (hawkins, 2012, p.102) in this regard. in terms of coauthorship patterns specifically, a key influencing factor ‘is the location of graduate study; young researchers who have studied in another country are likely to co-author with their former professors’ (cummings, 2014, p.48). considering that international student mobility from the east asia region has historically been directed towards the west and, in particular, the united states (chan, 2012; yonezawa, horta & osawa, 2016), it could be expected for this to translate into coauthorship dependence on western institutions, thereby suppressing the development of a research community within east asia. however, to consider the matter purely in absolute terms would be misguided. since we are concerned with the relative growth of co-authorship patterns, it may be that intra-east asian collaborative networks are gaining ground, against a background of sustained western hegemony. in this respect, it is noteworthy that asean has ‘helped to build a sense of common purpose and identity’ (stubbs, 2002, p.453) within east asia (particularly southeast asia). this is manifesting itself in attitudinal change at the level of higher education institutions, with a number of researchers having detected ‘a distinct reorientation away from traditional centres of dominance to intra-regional collaborative networks’ (kuroda & passarelli, 2009, p.12). for example, in a review of the responses of 124 leading east asian universities to the 2009 jica-ri survey, kuroda, yuki & kang (2010, p.31) reported that ‘high priority [is] placed by…[these universities] on building partnerships with other universities in the same region’. particularly significant was the fact that southeast asian institutions’ second most preferred partner region for cross-border higher education activities had historically been western europe (after southeast asia itself) but projected that this would shift to northeast asia in future. this provides a direct indication of forecast (positive) trends with respect to asean+3 higher education collaboration for the ‘after’ period within this paper’s analysis. this is supported by student mobility data (unesco, 2010), with the growth rate in east asian intra-regional flows significantly outstripping those directed outside of the region. this preferential shift is particularly in evidence within southeast asia, where eight of the ten countries now have another asean state within their “top five” student destinations. for cambodia and laos, other southeast asian nations now represent the “top” international student destination (thailand and vietnam, respectively). in line with the aforementioned link between student mobility and co-authorship patterns, this 32 the higher education dimension preferential shift could potentially support the development of a research community in east asia. on the basis of the above, it is reasonable to hypothesise that, although collaboration with the west may still predominate in international coauthorship patterns, we should expect to see the development of a research community within east asia, the relative growth in which should significantly exceed inter-regional comparators. the tier 1 hypotheses are defined as follows: h1a: the ‘after’ coefficient for intra-asean co-authorship will be significantly greater (at the 5% significance level or better) than the hypothetical ‘after’ coefficient produced by both control cases. h1b: the ‘after’ coefficient for ‘plus three’asean co-authorship will be significantly greater than the hypothetical ‘after’ coefficient produced by both control cases. should the development of an east asian research community be confirmed, it is contended that this will likely have been disproportionately driven by the competitive dynamic between certain key countries to become regional “hubs” of education. at base, this competition is rooted ‘in the acquisition battle for international students’ (sugimura, 2012b, p.48), within which other east asian states represent the most accessible market. however, it is also understood that the purposeful positioning of these states at the centre of regionally integrated higher education markets is a means of strengthening their ‘soft power’ in the region (mok, 2011; yang, 2012). understood in this sense, it is clear that it necessitates the forging of a regional network, within which the hub’s influence is anchored. this, in turn, requires the development of greater international links between the hub’s universities and others within the region, thereby providing a fecund setting for international coauthorship. within southeast asia, the consensus is that malaysia and singapore have been the two states that have most openly strived to become regional hubs of education (clark, 2012; mok, 2011; yap, 2012). the strategy in both countries has been to partner with high-ranked universities abroad to develop transnational degree programmes, bringing a ‘branded’ offer to the region. such was the motivation behind the singapore’s global schoolhouse initiative (2002), as well as being a fundamental element of malaysia’s national higher education strategic plan 2020, published in 2007. within northeast asia, there is a parallel competitive dynamic between china and japan for influence within asean+3. this ‘sino-japanese rivalry’ extends into higher education, with china having sought to bolster the competitiveness of its offer through intensive funding of its leading universities under project 211 and project 985 (li & chen, 2011) and augment its ‘soft power’ in the region, via the proliferation of confucian institutes in asean member states (yang, 2012). for its part, japan has sought ‘to balance china’s efforts by stepping up its… cooperative profile in the region’ (hund, 2003, p.411). bringing this together, it is journal of asean studies 33 hypothesised that these competitive dynamics will have provided a locus for the development of the wider research community and that, as such, the countries in question will demonstrate a significantly greater increase in international co-authorship growth rate than the relevant regional average: h2a: the ‘after’ coefficient for malaysiaasean (and singapore-asean) coauthorship will be significantly greater than the hypothetical ‘after’ coefficient produced by the intra-asean benchmark. h2b: the ‘after’ coefficient for china-asean (and japan-asean) co-authorship will be significantly greater than the hypothetical ‘after’ coefficient produced by the ‘plus three’asean benchmark analysis the results of this process are presented in accordance with the two-tier methodology1. (i) tier 1: inter-regional for southeast asia, the number of international co-authorships between asean states were totalled for each year 1985-2015 and set alongside coauthorships between asean states and: (i) the united states; and (ii) ‘other asian’ nations. a piecewise regression was undertaken, with the growth rate coefficients calculated for two (‘before’ and ‘after’) time periods, using spss v.22. 1 the summary dataset upon which this paper’s analysis was based is available on request. the coefficients are presented in table 1a, alongside the ratio coefficient increase (r) and associated hypothetical ‘after’ coefficients (𝐵1 0) for asean-us and asean-asia (i.e. the two controls). to explain the application of the methodology, ‘r’ is calculated by dividing the relevant control’s 2001-2015 coefficient by its 19852000 coefficient. ′𝐵1 0′ is then produced by multiplying the 1985-2000 intra-asean coefficient by the ‘r’ statistic for the relevant control. therefore, ′𝐵1 0′ represents a test statistic, measuring the number of co-authorships that would be expected if the intra-asean case had experienced the same level of relative collaborative growth as the two controls, between the two periods. the formulae underpinning the calculation of all test statistics are contained in appendix 1. the coefficients were used to perform a one-sided t-test on the null hypothesis (𝐻0: 𝐵1 = 𝐵1 0), where 𝐵1 is the intra-asean 2001-2015 coefficient and 𝐵1 0 was tested for both controls. as shown in table 1a, the actual ‘after’ coefficient (214.46) is greater than produced by both the controls (94.79 for asean-us / 205.79 for asean-asia). however, the t-tests evidence that this difference is not statistically significant with respect to the asean-asia case, due to the marginal difference between the coefficients, when factoring in the relatively large standard errors. thus, in this instance, the t-value of the test (0.187) is below the critical tstatistic for the 5% significance level, at 54 degrees of freedom (1.674). on this basis, the t-test ‘fails to reject’ 𝐻0 (i.e. the hypothesis that intra-asean 34 the higher education dimension collaborative growth is not significantly greater than would be predicted by the asean-asia control). that said, in the asean-us case, the difference is shown to be statistically significant at the 0.1% significance level, providing substantial grounds for differentiation in this respect. thus, there is some evidence for an asean effect bolstering international coauthorship growth and, therefore, for the hypothesis that a research community is being developed specifically in southeast asia (h1a). the east asian dataset was produced by totalling international coauthorships between the northeast asian nations and: (i) asean states; (ii) the united states; and (iii) ‘other asian’ nations, for the period 2001-2015. the piecewise regression and coefficient calculation were of the same form as the above methodology, except for the distinction in ‘pivot’ date, as shown in table 1b. t-tests were performed in parallel with the southeast asian case. the actual coefficient was statistically significantly greater than that produced by both control cases, providing strong evidence in favour of the hypothesis that asean+3 is supporting the development of a research community in east asia as a whole (h1b). (ii) tier 2: intra-regional for southeast asia, the growth in the number of co-authorships for individual asean nations (with other asean nations) was benchmarked against the growth rate in the intraasean total. table 1a. asean international co-authorship coefficients2 co-authorship relationship 1985-2000 2001-2015 ratio (r) null hypothesis baseline (𝑩𝟏 𝟎) t-test result intra-asean 13.00 (1.81) 214.46 (13.04) n/a n/a n/a asean-us 66.29 (7.45) 483.34 (19.50) 7.29 (0.87) 94.79 (17.40) reject h₀ @ 0.1% sig. asean-asia 16.17 (2.33) 255.95 (20.52) 15.83 (2.61) 205.79 (44.45) fail to reject h₀ table 1b. ‘plus three’ international co-authorship coefficients co-authorship relationship 2001-2009 2010-2015 ratio (r) null hypothesis baseline (𝑩𝟏 𝟎) t-test result plus three-asean 527.43 (15.38) 1223.00 (42.75) n/a n/a n/a plus threeus 2729.65 (113.90) 5034.89 (94.03) 1.84 (0.08) 972.86 (52.76) reject h₀ @ 0.1% sig. plus three-asia 426.42 (12.81) 809.06 (20.18) 1.90 (0.07) 1000.72 (48.77) reject h₀ @ 0.5% sig. 2 standard errors shown in brackets. journal of asean studies 35 coefficients were calculated in a parallel fashion to the tier 1a analysis, on the basis of the ‘tier 2’ model formulae contained in appendix 1. thus, this involved the application of the intra-asean coefficient ratio (r) to the ‘before’ coefficient (19852000) for each country (producing 𝐵1 0) and using this hypothetical baseline to test the relative collaborative growth represented by the actual ‘after’ coefficient (2001-2015). the results are shown in table 2a. table 2a: intra-asean international co-authorship coefficients co-authorship relationship 1985-2000 2001-2015 ratio (r) null hypothesis baseline (𝑩𝟏 𝟎) t-test result intra asean 13.00 (1.81) 214.46 (13.04) 16.50 (2.51) n/a n/a brunei asean 0.54 (0.11) 6.93 (1.31) n/a 8.83 (2.31) fail to reject h₀ cambodiaasean 0.36 (0.10) 15.09 (1.13) n/a 5.89 (1.86) reject h₀ @ 0.1% sig. indonesiaasean 3.37 (0.49) 76.31 (5.96) n/a 55.66 (11.66) fail to reject h₀ laos asean 0.46 (0.13) 10.15 (0.98) n/a 7.57 (2.41) fail to reject h₀ malaysiaasean 5.19 (0.68) 114.59 (7.27) n/a 85.59 (17.20) fail to reject h₀ myanmarasean 0.33 (0.10) 6.82 (0.99) n/a 5.36 (1.81) fail to reject h₀ philippinesasean 3.25 (0.55) 31.37 (1.83) n/a 53.68 (12.20) fail to reject h₀ singaporeasean 4.29 (0.63) 61.95 (3.54) n/a 70.84 (14.95) fail to reject h₀ thailandasean 5.94 (0.86) 71.63 (4.74) n/a 97.94 (20.57) fail to reject h₀ vietnam asean 2.28 (0.42) 34.09 (2.58) n/a 37.55 (8.94) fail to reject h₀ there is an even split between those countries with above average growth rate increase (cambodia, indonesia, laos, malaysia and myanmar) and those below this measure (brunei, the philippines, singapore, thailand and vietnam). there are no clear patterns in this split, in terms of the scale/capacity of the higher education systems involved. moreover, the t-tests3 show that the difference between the actual and hypothetical coefficients is only 3 two-sided t-tests were performed for the second-tier analysis, since the test coefficients could be expected to be both above and below the benchmark. 36 the higher education dimension statistically significant for cambodia. as cambodia’s absolute contribution to total regional co-authorships is comparatively small, this does not provide a robust basis for claims with respect to its driving collaboration in the region. the evidence contradicts the hypothesis that southeast asian collaboration is being driven by the competitive dynamic between malaysia and singapore (h2a), especially as the latter’s coefficient (in the 2001-2015 period) is smaller than both indonesia and thailand’s, by absolute measure. for east asia, the growth in coauthorships for each ‘plus three’ nation (with asean nations) was benchmarked against the equivalent growth rate for the plus three-asean total. the coefficient calculation paralleled the tier 2a analysis, with the plus three-asean coefficient ratio (r) acting as the basis for calculating the hypothetical baseline (𝐵1 0), as shown in table 2b. table 2b: ‘plus three’-asean international co-authorship coefficients co-authorship relationship 2001-2009 2010-2015 ratio (r) null hypothesis baseline (𝑩𝟏 𝟎) t-test result plus three-asean 527.43 (15.38) 1223.00 (42.75) 2.32 (0.11) n/a n/a china-asean 254.03 (9.50) 673.97 (46.67) n/a 589.04 (34.70) fail to reject h₀ japan-asean 196.13 (6.35) 307.48 (17.63) n/a 454.79 (25.40) reject h₀ @ 0.1% sig. south korea-asean 77.27 (5.19) 241.54 (10.49) n/a 179.17 (14.54) reject h₀ @ 1% sig. the actual ‘after’ coefficients for china and south korea are above their hypothetical benchmark, whilst japan’s is below. of these results, the japanese and south korean cases are statistically significant. thus, at 22 degrees of freedom, the t-value of the test for south korea (3.479) is the only one to exceed the critical t-statistics, doing sufficiently well to pass at the 1% significance level (2.819). otherwise expressed, south korea has outperformed its regional partners in terms of ‘relative collaborative growth’ (i.e. the growth rate coefficient ratio between the two time periods analysed). japan, on the other hand, is shown to have relative collaborative growth that is significantly lower than the plus threeasean benchmark, passing the relevant t-test at the 0.1% significance level. taken together, this evidence effectively discounts the hypothesis that the competitive dynamic between china and japan has driven the development of the east asian research community (h2b). rather, it seems that there is a case for arguing that south korea has had the critical effect in this respect, to the extent that its regionally-relevant collaborative research growth is moving it close to displacing japan from a previously secure journal of asean studies 37 second position, even in absolute terms (i.e. 241.54 vs. 307.48). this is not to discount the role of china, which has retained and augmented its status as the principal agent of east asian research growth (its 2010-2015 coefficient being significantly greater than its comparators, at 673.97), although this is perhaps to be expected, owing to its capacity. (iii) overarching comparative analysis it is now possible to draw the fourpart analysis together and consider what it tells us as a whole. it seems clear that there is strong evidence in favour of the tier 1 hypotheses, but that we should discount the framing of intra-regional interactions indicated by the tier 2 hypotheses. nonetheless, the fact that the tier 1 results are not statistically significant in the case of intra-asean relations, relative to the asean-asia control, merits further exploration. in this respect, the evidence indicates that the form of higher education regionalisation that is being developed between the ‘plus three’ and core asean nations is, comparatively speaking, stronger than that which has evolved solely within southeast asia. perhaps counterintuitively, then, it would seem that, since the respective commencement of integrative efforts, institutions within the ‘plus three’ have placed a stronger emphasis on collaboration with southeast asian institutions (and vice-versa) than this latter grouping has placed on collaboration with each other. in light of this, it is worth reappraising the idea that co-authorship patterns are (in part) being driven by a competitive dynamic. indeed, it should be acknowledged that, owing to its greater capacity, northeast asia is the dominant partner in asean+3 higher education relations. this relative strength in higher education capacity has its basis in the fact that ‘higher education and research are central to the global strategies of these nations’ (marginson, 2011, p.596). this national-level policy-drive is evident in the aforementioned project 211 and project 985 in china, as well as the 1998 brain korea 21 program (aimed at nurturing globally competitive research universities) and japan’s 2009 global 30 project (focused on actively promoting the internationalisation of japan’s top universities). understood within this context, the fact that plus three-asean regionalisation is more pronounced than intra-asean relations may be reflective of the ‘plus three’ actively driving integration, so as to make inroads into the asean market. if we are to reappraise the concept of collaboration-as-grounded-in-competition, it is necessary to reconsider the principal agents of this dynamic, since the tier 2 hypotheses were determined to have missed the mark in this respect. in an absolute sense, malaysia and china have maintained this role within southeast and northeast asia, respectively. however, from the perspective of relative collaborative growth, the most marked shift is seen in south korea. accordingly, if one looks outside of the ‘sino-japanese rivalry’ that is perceived to dominate the socio-political landscape of northeast asia, it is clear that south korea has itself 38 the higher education dimension ‘been developing and implementing internationalisation policies with the main goal of establishing korea as an academic centre in east asian higher education’ (cho & palmer, 2013, p.292). the south korean government’s 2007 strategic plan for internationalisation of higher education focusses on achieving this through the regional educational hub model, built on partnering with esteemed foreign institutions (mcneill, 2008) and increasing the number of international faculty and students (gress & ilon, 2009). critically, the wider strategy also sets a 2020 target of south korea ranking at least 9th worldwide in the number of journal articles published. this paper’s analysis indicates that the implementation of these policy objectives is also serving to drive east asian international co-authorship growth. thus, we may transition to the conclusion by asserting that south korea is rapidly moving to a position of acting as a principal agent for higher education regionalisation within the dominant interface in this respect (i.e. the plus three-asean dynamic). conclusion this paper has analysed the development of higher education regionalisation within east asia, measured in terms of the level of international co-authorship growth amongst asean+3 nations. the evidence presented indicates the fulfilment of the policy objectives of the aun and asean+3 unet, with respect to the development of a research community within southeast asia and east asia, respectively. as this “functional” underpinning of regionalism has been successfully established, it may provide a sufficiently robust platform upon which to build a more thoroughgoing formal framework for higher education integration within east asia, including ‘the establishment of regional institutions related to mobility, quality assurance, and mutual recognition’ (chao jr., 2014, p.573). although initial steps have been made in this direction (e.g. acts, aun-qa etc.), when compared to the successes of bologna, progress has been slow; piecemeal; and typically focussed on southeast asia, rather than extended to the wider east asian region. as this paper has shown, although comparatively recent, efforts to nurture higher education regionalisation in east asia as a whole have so far been met with success and, consequently, there should (in theory) be no greater practical barrier to achieving formal forms of regionalism at this level, than purely within southeast asia. the issue with formal regionalism, of course, is that it is prone to political impediments such as the above referenced sinojapanese rivalry. however, if regionallyminded policy-makers can build on collaborative efforts such as the asean+3 unet, as well as the evident micro-level integration demonstrated in this paper, then further integration is certainly realisable. returning to the above noted discrepancy between southeast asian and east asian regionalisation, although no direct comparison is possible between the two (owing to the different time periods journal of asean studies 39 involved), the fact of intra-asean coauthorship growth not achieving statistical significance relative to the ‘asian’ control leads to the conclusion that efforts directed at building an east asian research community have been comparatively more successful than those directed specifically at southeast asia. this should represent an important finding for the aun. in particular, if the achievement of a specifically southeast asian research community remains a key objective, then consideration should be given to the success of the south korean regional education hub model in promoting this and whether elements of this model (such as the article publication target) are directly translatable to the context of the two aspirant education hubs of malaysia and singapore. nonetheless, a number of limitations should be acknowledged. firstly, it is worth restating that coauthorship patterns do not necessarily provide an exact map of international research collaboration as a whole4 and, as such, appropriate caution should be exercised when considering the generalisability of the analysis to this wider field. moreover, it is important to note that there are numerous factors influencing co-authorship growth within east asia other than the collaborative drives initiated by the aun and asean+3 unet. in this respect, whilst a large portion of these factors will have been appropriately accounted for in the us and ‘other asian’ controls utilised in 4 see katz & martin (1997) for a detailed exposition of this point. the analysis, it is likely that a few of these factors are wholly (or, at least, largely) specific to the east asia region and have not thereby effectively been controlled for. although it is beyond the scope of this paper to speculate as to the precise nature of such factors, it would seem likely that the difference between the actual and hypothetical growth rate coefficients within the tier 1 analysis are not wholly attributable to an asean effect. that said, although the calculated differentials may be somewhat inflated, the strength of the statistical significance in three of the four cases (0.1%-0.5%) should be sufficient to allow for the influence of other factors, whilst still showing evidence of an asean effect. in addition to consideration of these limitations, factors other than research collaboration need to be considered in informing the policy recommendations indicated by this paper and further research is merited in this regard. in particular, there are many other facets to higher education regionalisation (e.g. academic and student exchange programmes), as well as instances of (more complete) forms of higher education regionalism (e.g. bologna) within which the regionalismregionalisation dynamic can be tested and both represent fertile avenues for future research. the findings of this paper should, therefore, represent a beginning, rather than the end point for research with respect to this interface. 40 the higher education dimension about the author oliver gill obtained his ba in philosophy & politics from the university of warwick and ma in philosophy from the open university. he has since transitioned to specialise in the education field and has obtained an ma in comparative education from university college london. his current research focus is principally on education reform movements, studied from both a national and comparative international perspective. reference asean+3 unet (2009). recommendations of the asean+3 higher education policy dialogue. retrieved 4 january 2017, from http://www.aunsec.org/policy .php asia-pacific education ministers’ meeting (apem) (2006). the brisbane communiqué. brisbane: apem. aun (2017). history and background. retrieved 4 january 2017, from http://www.aunsec.org/ourhistory .php beeson, m. 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(2013). are china and the asean ready for a bologna process? – factors affecting the establishment of the chinaasean higher education area. educational review, 65(3), 321-341. 44 the higher education dimension appendix 1 – model formulae (tier 1) hypothesis: 𝐻0: 𝐵1 = 𝐵1 0 𝐻1: 𝐵1 > 𝐵1 0 hypothesis test: the test statistic is 𝑡 = 𝐵1 − 𝐵1 0 √(𝑠𝑏1 2 + 𝑠 𝑏1 0 2 ) ~ 𝑇(𝑛1 + 𝑛1 0 − 2) where 𝐵1 is the intra-asean / aptasean (𝑡2) slope coefficient and 𝐵1 0 = 𝑅(𝐵2) where 𝐵2 is the intra-asean / aptasean (𝑡1) slope coefficient and 𝑅 = 𝐵3 𝐵4 where 𝐵3 is the asean-asia/us / aptasia/us (𝑡2) slope coefficient and 𝐵4 is the asean-asia/us / apt-asia/us (𝑡1) slope coefficient. consequently 𝑛1 0 = 𝑛2 + 𝑛3 + 𝑛4 − 6 and 𝑠𝑏1 0 = 𝐵1 0 [√[( 𝑠𝑟 𝑅 ) 2 + ( 𝑠𝑏2 𝐵2 ) 2 ]] where 𝑠𝑟 = 𝑅 [√[( 𝑠𝑏3 𝐵3 ) 2 + ( 𝑠𝑏4 𝐵4 ) 2 ]] appendix 1 – model formulae (tier 2) hypothesis: 𝐻0: 𝐵1 = 𝐵1 0 𝐻1: 𝐵1 > 𝐵1 0 hypothesis test: the test statistic is 𝑡 = 𝐵1 − 𝐵1 0 √(𝑠𝑏1 2 + 𝑠 𝑏1 0 2 ) ~ 𝑇(𝑛1 + 𝑛1 0 − 2) where 𝐵1 is the country-asean (𝑡2) slope coefficient and 𝐵1 0 = 𝑅(𝐵2) where 𝐵2 is the country-asean (𝑡1) slope coefficient and 𝑅 = 𝐵3 𝐵4 where 𝐵3 is the intra-asean / aptasean (𝑡2) slope coefficient and 𝐵4 is the intra-asean / apt-asean (𝑡1) slope coefficient. consequently 𝑛1 0 = 𝑛2 + 𝑛3 + 𝑛4 − 6 and 𝑠𝑏1 0 = 𝐵1 0 [√[( 𝑠𝑟 𝑅 ) 2 + ( 𝑠𝑏2 𝐵2 ) 2 ]] where 𝑠𝑟 = 𝑅 [√[( 𝑠𝑏3 𝐵3 ) 2 + ( 𝑠𝑏4 𝐵4 ) 2 ]] journal of asean studies, vol. 2, no. 2 (2014), pp. 103-120 ©2014 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn2338-1353 electronic china’s crisis bargaining in the south china sea dispute (2010-2013)1 eryan ramadhani pembangunan nasional university “veteran” at surabaya, indonesia abstract as one of china’s most intricate territorial dispute, the south china sea dispute has sufficiently consumed significant amount of chinese leaders’ attention in beijing. this paper reveals that china exerts signaling strategy in its crisis bargaining over the south china sea dispute. this strategy contains reassurance as positive signal through offering negotiation and appearing selfrestraint and of negative signal by means of escalatory acts and verbal threats. china’s crisis bargaining in the south china sea dispute aims to preserve crisis stability: a stabilized condition after escalation in which neither further escalation nor near-distant resolution is in order. from the yearly basis analysis in the four-year span study, china’s longing for crisis stability fits into its conduct in crisis bargaining with southeast asian states. keywords: china, asean, south china sea dispute, crisis bargaining background the relations between china and the association of southeast asian nations (asean) date back to early 1990s when china struggled to break out the ostracism by international community following the tiananmen incident in 1989 (storey, 1999). china acknowledged the importance of southeast asia region for its economic and strategic values (li, 2010). in their first encounter, the south china sea dispute stood as an obstacle that could pose a threat to the nascent relations. china asserted its claims on the disputed territory in the south china sea by releasing its law on the territorial sea and the contiguous zone in february 1992, hatching uproar from the apprehensive asean states about china’s wave of aggressiveness (buszynski, 2003). soon after, at the 25th asean ministerial meeting (amm) in july the six regional leaders issued asean declaration on the south china sea. it was asean’s first common stance on the territorial row involving china. the succinct declaration called for all interested parties to exercise peaceful manner in handling the dispute so that it would not magnify into an open conflict. facing the more urgent and beneficial relations especially in economic field, inter alia, both china and asean doggedly agreed not to let the dispute drive a wedge between them. in fact, china has firmly announced incessantly its position to put aside dispute settlement and to harness the more possible joint development (fravel, 2011). any attempts pertain to settlement must be discussed bilaterally between china and each asean claimant states (buszynski, 2003). despite its recalcitrant to have discussion with asean as a group, china moderated its attitude in 1999 by toeing the line of asean’s path-breaking agenda to establish a regional code of conduct (coc) on the south china sea. it is worthy of notice that during that period china decided to play relatively miniscule role while unequivocally reiterating that joint development was of no consequence than dispute settlement writ large. the first ‘phase’ of discussion on a coc did not lend 104 china’s crisis bargaining in the south china sea dispute (2010-2013) any success. devoid of unified positions on what a coc should be, a non-legally-binding declaration of conduct (doc), in lieu of a coc, was signed in 2002. valencia correctly asserts that “the sad truth is that the claimants agreed on a ‘declaration’ because they could not agree on a binding code,” (rowan, 2005: 435). the doc aims to tone down the tensions in the respected area and rein the claimant states in from any escalation by means of building trust and confidence between and among them and holding dialogues. china agreed to sign the document for it does not touch on dispute settlement, a position china withholds. for the past two decades china has been maintaining the pivotal role of bilateral negotiation, for the dispute itself is bilateral in nature, over multilateral negotiation. it is worth highlighting that bilateral negotiations are set only for sovereignty-clung issue which is ambiguous since china believes that it has indisputable sovereignty over the notorious nine-dashed line (yahuda, 2013). the negotiation on a coc, as well as its predecessor the doc, is based not on one-onone dialogues. china’s malleability is associated with the characteristic of a coc itself: a means to manage the dispute, not to settle it. before the idea of regional coc was put forward on the negotiation table, china was in an agreement with the philippines (storey, 1999) and vietnam (thao, 2001) to have bilateral cocs-alike although the implementation of the codes remains questionable (odgaard, 2003). hence, the border should be drawn to differentiate between china’s bilateral and multilateral negotiation on the south china sea dispute. china is fine to have talks with asean as one entity in managing the dispute so as to preserve stability. adversely, china is highly resistant to discuss sovereignty-related resolution beyond bilateral domain. china’s then premier wen jiabao once said “we disapprove of referring bilateral disputes to multilateral forums because that will only complicate the issue,” (thayer, 2011: 560). this is consistent with china’s claims that the south china sea dispute is by all accounts bilateral issue. that china has been indifferent to live up to asean hope for concluding a coc; a sudden detour can be contemplated as marvelous. at the 19th asean-china senior officials’ consultation held on 2 april, chinese officials appallingly announced their willingness, on behalf of china, to commence discussion with asean on a coc later in the year (thayer, 2013). the success organization of the 9th asean-china joint working group on the doc and the 6th asean-china senior official meeting (som) on the doc in suzhou in mid-september 2013―dubbed as the first official round of consultations on the coc, sheds the light on a more cooperative china and a hope for a better dispute management and, to a lesser degree, settlement (thayer, 2013). the formulation of a coc undoubtedly has been a much-awaited result the negotiation between china and asean could bring about. although a coc does not amount to settlement, it certainly will become a guarantor of dispute management in south china sea (thao, 2001). literature review when a territorial dispute ensues, there are three distinct destinations it can end up in: escalation or war, settlement or resolution and stalemate or status quo. china is of no difference. looking back at history, china has long experience of dealing with twenty seven territorial disputes: both resolved (twenty two) and enduring (five). of this number, seventeen are resolved through negotiation. the only occasion when china brandished its weapon was during the border wars with india in 1962 and the defunct soviet union in 1969―the latter eventually results in peaceful border demarcation culminating in 2005.2 regardless the appalling low level of coercion china has performed, the rhetoric of china’s proneness 105journal of asean studies toward using force lingers. in the period between 1949 and 1992, alastair iain johnston (1998) finds that among major powers china holds higher probability to be violent in territorial dispute as opposed to foreign policy-related issues and regime change, except for the united states (us). this, johnston (1996) asserts, is rooted in china’s strategic culture that does not depart from realpolitik that justifies the long-standing offensive nature of china’s foreign policy. andrew scobell (2003: 193) finds that china performs a dual-mentality he calls ‘cult of defense’ representing both china’s nature of defensive and offensive (neither pacific nor belligerent) that renders “beijing readiness to employ military force assertively against perceived external or internal threats all the while insisting that china possesses a cultural aversion to using force, doing so only defensively and solely as a last resort.” the negative power shift theory by m. taylor fravel (2007/2008) addresses that in some of its territorial disputes china takes inimical and dicey moves by exerting force based on two indicators responsible for state’s bargaining power: the amount of disputed land it holds and the ability to project power. thus, when its claim is weak relative to the adversaries combined with declining power, china is keener to use force to avoid further unfavorable position. taking the opposite view, some scholars argue that china also has proclivity to not use force in coping with territorial-related row. fravel’s (2005) regime insecurity theory forges link between china’s regime insecurity and china’s decision to give concession of territorial claims to its neighboring states. the embattled regime is more lenient in conferring concession in exchange for domestic security. china’s domestic cleavages bring out negotiations aimed for domestic political stability which in turn will pull china from the brink of regime collapse. using the south china sea dispute as a case study, ian james storey’s (1999) ‘creeping assertiveness’ theory underlines that china refrains from using force and maintains diplomacy while concurrently strengthening its claims in the contested area. the same thought is depicted by fravel’s (2011) delaying strategy, in which china prefers to delay the settlement in favor of conflict management without abandoning its claims. this strategy is chosen when china confronts an intractable dispute and reluctant claimant states to accept china’s terms. ang cheng guan (2000: 202) says that china allows for a same pattern to recur with regard to the way it grapples with the south china sea dispute called ‘capitalizing on opportunities’: dexterity in taking action at the right moment “when its perceived opponents are either distracted or when no strong response is expected.” according to sun xuefeng and huang yuxing (2012: 414-415), “in the absence of the homeland encirclement by foreign powers china might not respond to territorial disputes by resorting to forces.” to sum up, the existing literatures mostly focus on the enigma of how and when china uses force and gives concession. however, none of them provides satisfactory explanation on china’s policy in negotiation with the adversaries. furthermore, the way china conducts negotiation relating to territorial dispute over the south china sea is left unexplored. thus, this paper aims to fill the gaps on china’s territorial dispute policy in the south china sea. crisis bargaining and china’s strategy when states get embroiled in a conflict or crisis, the options available to them are either to go to war or to negotiate. as war becomes even more costly to execute, when the parties involved reach a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’, bargaining through negotiation can be a promising alternative to ponder (zartman, 2001). although there is no guarantee that crisis bargaining will always lead to a peaceful trajectory, once states learn the benefit of taking such strategy, even slightly compared 106 china’s crisis bargaining in the south china sea dispute (2010-2013) to that of shooting war, they are likely to carry it through (fearon, 1995, 1998). the importance of crisis-bargaining lies in its ability to both prevent escalation and to usher in war. states involved both want to prevail on the crisis as well as to thwart war from happening (morrow, 1992: 153). history provides abundant examples how crises were managed through bargaining that wound up in either peaceful resolutions or further crises or even wars. there is no universal definition of what crisis bargaining is. bargaining, according to robert powell (2002: 2), is deciding how to divide a ‘pie’, in which although potential gains might lure states to cooperate, they also posses the lust to maximize each own gains. in a not-so-distant view, thomas schelling states that bargaining is not a zero-sum game for the sake of winning absolute gains; rather, it is a relative-gains game with which states can cooperate to accomplish through bargaining (lebow, 2006: 431). crisis bargaining, simply put, is a way states entrapped in a crisis make attempts to bargain through various strategies to secure its interests and pursue gains. spotted in an interstate crisis, state a employs a gesture of demand that results in state b’s response whether to accede to or defy such demand. if state b accedes, the crisis is resolved and state a gets what it demands. if state b defies, state a examines the defiance and sends threat asking for further compliance. here, two scenarios might happen: either state b complies or state a compels once it learns that state b is unlikely to bend and back down. the bargaining itself takes place when each state responds to each other’s demands and threats that transpire in a sequential manner (morrow, 1989: 941). crisis bargaining steers state to considerately gauge the cost and benefit of every visage it displays to its own advantage. in so doing, a state employs disparate strategies that best fulfill its interests as costless as possible. different strategies bear different costs and benefits. there is no best strategy that is superior to others. nor is one that can guarantee the accomplishment of interests a state seeks for. as james morrow (1989: 965) sums up, “the appropriate crisis bargaining strategy must reflect a nation’s commitment to the stakes of the crisis and its willingness to run the risks of escalation.” signaling strategy a classic work of robert jervis (1970: 18) on images in ir signifies the indispensable role of signals as one component that buttresses crisis bargaining: “signals are statements or actions the meanings of which are established by tacit or explicit understandings among the actors.” from this definition a signal is premeditatedly showcased and deployed so that the other side can surmise the meaning of such action and learn the message contained. james fearon (1997) is among the laudable scholars whose work roots in crisis bargaining. in one his seminal work, he proclaims that when a sender sends a threat adequately credible that it incurs cost that he might otherwise be unwilling to do, it is a costly signal. here, he chains costly signal to the credibility of using a threat. a credible threat is associated only with a resolved sender who is willing to pay the cost. andrew kydd (1997: 141) weighs in by stating that states can capitalize on a costly signal as a means to unfold their utilities and sustain themselves in a crisis without turning eyes to war. a costly signal is more palatable for security seeker states than aggressive ones. a security seeker signals its willingness to do certain things, e.g. arms control, costly enough for it to renege and jeopardize the security it seeks. on the other hand, an aggressive state would be reluctant to forfeit its arms in exchange for insecurity and vulnerability because for it the cost is too extravagant. a costly signal shared and exchanged between security seeker states enables cooperation to be achievable. in another work, kydd (2000: 326) 107journal of asean studies defines costly signals as those that distinguish trustworthy from untrustworthy states―only trustworthy states that are not hesitant to issue such signals, while untrustworthy ones find it too risky to materialize. regarding trustworthy-vs.-untrustworthy actors described by kydd (2000: 326), a costly signal is of relevance to reassuring the other side of goodwill and trust that shepherds to cooperation. janice gross stein (1991: 432) defines reassurance strategies as an “attempt to reduce miscalculation through verbal assurances but a broad set of strategies that adversaries can use to reduce the likelihood of the threat of use of force.” on the same page, richard ned lebow (2001: 128) affirms that reassurance can allay the would-be challenger from taking any action that could inflame the crisis by communicating its benign and defensive intention. taking a bit distinctive stance, alexander george (2003: 466) assumes that the very conditions by which an adversary is more prone to taking hostile action due to its weaknesses, vulnerability, or misperception toward the intention of the other side is the reason that evokes reassurance’s prominence over deterrence. that adversary possibly feels vulnerable and insecure respecting its position in a crisis, strategy of reassurance can help manage fear and misunderstanding to dissipate, thus toning down the menace of escalation and war (lebow & stein, 1995: 317). joining the discussion, kim jungsoo (2010) inserts an alternative definition of reassurance strategy as a compensation for what deterrence cannot attain by performing a positive signal instead of threat. to ward off the use of force in a crisis, stein says, reassurance can help gradually scale down the tension and make recourse-to-force an infelicitous option (kim, 2010: 9). china’s signaling strategy the south china sea discord is believed to be the hot spot for an actual man-to-man conflict insofar it is not handled considerately. since the first military clash between china and vietnam in the battle for paracel islands in 1974 onwards, the region has been oscillating between escalation and de-escalation. in the past decade, nonetheless, the parties involved has buckled down in formulating regulation alike called the doc, albeit not legallybinding, to manage the crisis to not spiral out into an open military conflict. such attempt is a part of crisis bargaining between china and asean states and is still undergoing. the current tug-of-war centers on discussion and consultation among parties involved to orchestrate a legally-binding coc. china’s signaling strategy is divided into two categories: positive and negative signals. positive signal is any policy that helps temper the crisis from escalation. if a signal is positive, china is reassuring southeast asian neighbors of its longing for stability. a positive signal of reassurance constitutes displaying openness to negotiation on a coc and appearing selfrestraint. in reverse, if a conduct triggers a surge in crisis or escalation, it is a negative signal. negative signals consist of escalatory acts (e.g. display of force, sanction, etc.) and verbal threats. looking through the events coming about year-on-year from 2010 to 2013, it is conceivable to break down each policy into positive or negative signals. positive signals reassuring self-restraint among other actions that can be classified as signal, protest remarks are not oblivious. one example was a rebuttal to vietnam’s indignation that china’s vessels transgressed its sovereignty over the paracel islands in august 2010. a remark such this can be either positive or negative signal, depending on the message herein. if the remark was a proclamation of war, it certainly was a negative signal. in contrast, a self-restraint remark, such that displaying disagreement about other claimant state’s infuriating statement or controversial policy, could be 108 china’s crisis bargaining in the south china sea dispute (2010-2013) regarded as a positive signal. the aforementioned remark on vietnam accusing china’s violation of its sovereignty exemplifies a positive signal, for it could be translated into keeping china from provocation. the rift between china and the philippines was another source of beijing’s appallingly positive signals. in july 2011 during his visit to beijing, philippines secretary of state albert del rosario made an agreement with china to concertedly look after the peace and stability in the south china sea. president aquino then made his own official visit to china in september for the sake of securing the $60 billion-worth economic cooperation between the two nations. china appeared self-restraint when spokesperson hong lei on 14 july remarked a response to philippines’ argument that china would not be able to validate its claims in concurrent with unclos. he instead reaffirmed china’s insistence on resolving the dispute through “direct negotiations between related parties… [as] the most effective way,” (an, 2011). positive signals rooted in self-restraint remarks were detectable in 2012. departing from the scarborough shoal incident, in april the philippines requested china to bring their dispute before the itlos (international tribunal for the law of the sea). it was soon rejected by spokesperson liu weimin echoing the agreement that presaged the deal agreed by the two states to handle the dispute delicately through bilateral talks (china summons manila, 2012). deputy foreign minister fu ying then summoned manila’s chargé d’affaires in beijing to protest against the incident in the scarborough shoal in accordance with china’s rejection of the philippines’ earlier request (zhang & qiu, 2012). the protest and rejection served dauntingly as china’s positive signals that revolved around the standoff in the disputed territory. even though the hawkish atmosphere hovered in beijing, it did not make china exploit the moment forthwith. china’s embassy to the philippines consigned strongworded protest to the government in manila castigating the harassment of chinese fishermen who took shelter at a lagoon as the storm hit the area. on 19 june vietnam national assembly passed the law of the sea encompassing both paracel and spratly islands. following this news vice foreign minister zhang zhijun summoned vietnamese ambassador to china to protest hanoi’s unilateral move that was also infringement upon china’s indisputable sovereignty. zhang said that such action was “illegal, invalid and detrimental to peace and stability in the south china sea,” (china opposes vietnam, 2012). along with the summons, china’s foreign ministry released a declaration to protest the law and the npc officially shoved vietnamese government to correct the disservice. china’s reaction toward this particular conduct was less belligerent than it actually could do. instead of exerting a more coarse counteraction, china’s feedback on those protests was undoubtedly positive signals. beginning the year of 2013, the philippines decided to follow through its plan to file an arbitration case, respecting the dispute against china, with itlos. besides sending back a note verbale to the philippines government, china basically did not take any superfluous action to correct or even punish manila. instead, china issued a remark that countercorroborated philippines baseless claim for arbitration and explicated that china’s turndown of the request was solidified by international law, i.e. unclos (united nations convention on the law of the sea). reassuring openness to negotiation on coc remarks can also carry positive signals to buoy negotiation on a coc. on 30 september 2010 china and asean started negotiation on establishing a binding coc. held in manila, the discussion converged on the making of draft for the coc. china convinced its counterparts of its willingness to work with 109journal of asean studies asean in constructive way to conclude a coc. as of the end of the discussion, no specific date was set for the conclusion of the negotiation, leaving it at a standstill. albeit china’s commitment to push for negotiation had satisfied asean states, china was resistant to “the inclusion of sanctions in the draft against claimant states that [would] violate the code under the process of consultations,” (china, asean begin 2010). this conduct referred to china’s positive reassurance toward asean by welcoming a discussion on a coc, regardless some reservations china held as to what to include in the document. with the signing of the guidelines for the implementation of the doc in the south china sea in 2011 a positive outlook for peace and stability came to live. on all accounts, china acknowledged the value of having a coc to keep the stability in the region intact. assistant foreign minister liu zhenmin said that “enacting a coc is part of the process to implement the doc [and] china is willing to actively push forward the implementation of the doc with asean nations,” (li & zheng, 2011). the commitment to move forward discussion on sustaining peace and stability was reiterated at the 14th china-asean summit on 18 november in indonesia. on his official speech before the summit, premier wen jiabao said that china is “ready to work actively with asean… and begin discussions on a coc in the south china sea,” (wang, 2011). at the 6th east asia summit on 19 november wen phrased that china along with asean shared the common will to work for a coc (ministry of foreign affairs of the prc, 2011). although the detail of when and how the discussion shall be embarked on was not present, such statement embedded a clue on the positive trajectory china wanted to take. representing china at the 45th amm on 9 july 2012, vice foreign minister fu ying informally held a dialogue with asean leaders to determine the best way for them to forge a coc. similar tone was detected when foreign minister yang jiechi delivered a statement at the 19th arf that “china is ‘open’ to launching discussions on coc on the basis of full compliance with the doc by all parties [and] hopes that all parties [would] do more to enhance mutual trust, promote cooperation and create necessary conditions for the formulation of coc,” (yan, 2012). wen’s iteration of the consensus reached by china and asean to brew favorable conditions for the doc to be fully actualized and a coc to be hashed out during the 15th china-asean summit invigorated china’s attempts to reassure asean, especially after the fray at the july meeting. china reassured asean about its willingness to perpetuate consultation on a coc at the 19th china-asean senior officials’ consultation in april 2013. the newly appointed foreign minister wang yi vouched china’s lingering will to work along with asean to develop a coc from the principles laid out in the doc. the 8th china-asean joint work group on the doc celebrated the same spirit to promote a coc. to up china’s goodwill to contribute toward the management of peace and stability in the south china sea, china and asean made an accord at the 20th arf in july to start the official consultations on establishing a coc. the same message was conveyed by prime minister li keqiang at the 10th china-asean expo in september that china would “continue to comprehensively implement all provisions in the [doc] with an attitude of accountability and steadily facilitate talks over a coc in the south china sea step by step under the framework of the [doc],” (yan, 2013). official consultations eventually were held between china and asean under the tagline of the 6th som and the 9th joint work group on the implementation of the doc in september. the official dialogues were a follow-up of the shared commitment between the two sides that there was “the need to steadily move 110 china’s crisis bargaining in the south china sea dispute (2010-2013) toward the conclusion of a coc on the basis of consensus,” (fu, 2013). vice foreign minister liu briefed that the meetings concluded “an agreement on a principle guiding the coc consultations which is a principle of gradual approach based on consensus and the consultations on the coc within the framework of implementing doc,” (bi, 2013). attending the 16th china-asean summit in october, premier li vowed to pursue the official consultations with asean to formulate a coc as to better manage the dispute over spared territories and waters in the south china sea. in the same month, li later made a promise at the 8th eas that china would “work jointly with asean members to effectively implement the doc and advance the consultations on a coc in an active and prudent manner based on the principle of consensus-building,” (mu, 2013). as the year drew to an end, at the 9th conference of the council for security cooperation in the asia pacific (cscap) on 3 december, liu confidently stated that “china and asean countries are making joint efforts to implement the doc comprehensively and effectively and will push forward coc discussion,” (mofa of prc, 2013). negative signals escalatory acts the first negative signal discovered in 2010 stemmed from the national people’s congress (npc) standing committee approval of the national defense mobilization law in february. this new law would step up the regulation, organization and coordination of such program in all level of governance from county to state up to the state level. even though in its defense white paper china restated its adherence to peaceful development dictum, this law constituted to some degree china’s preparation for dealing with external uncertainties. in february 2011 a china’s ship threatened a group of philippines’ fishing boats whose activities were located in the west of palawan island. according to the philippines government, the china’s ship opened fire to the fishing boats as they sheared off. there was no casualty reported as the three-round shots landed hundreds of meters from the fleeing fishermen. another strain between china and the philippines was repeated in march when a china’s vessel gave strong order to a survey ship mv veritas voyager to leave the reed bank. the ship was conducting research for oil and gas exploration. the next flashpoint of the year was the cable-cut incidents involving china and vietnam in may and june. accusations and counteraccusations as to who was right and wrong marred the retained stability in the south china sea. on a remark dated 28 may spokesperson jiang yu bluntly quipped that vietnam had stained the bilateral consensus between the two states on the south china sea―the same remark was repeated by spokesperson hong lei on june 9 (mofa of prc, 2011). the harbinger of 2012 sprang majorly from the scarborough shoal standoff between china and the philippines. both states took hawkish approach in order to prevail on the crisis. the decision not to back down which at one point contributed to the escalation that could drive both states to a shooting war nightmare illustrated china’s negative signal. the followup decision not to escalate the heated crisis at the same time proved china’s weighing on the need for de-escalation. unfortunately, conversed policies were soon taken by china that helped hamstrung the dispute management in the south china sea. following it, china’s embassy in manila issued a safety alert for chinese people in the country of an impending wide-scale protest. the tension did not wane yet. the chinese government announced a travel advisory to the philippines that pummeled its tourism hardly. tourism is one of philippines most important source of domestic income, accounting for 5 percent of the total income. the travel warning “led to the cancellation of 111journal of asean studies scheduled airlines seats by approximately 1520 percent” (ortuoste, 2013: 247). tourism was not the only economic aspect struck by the territorial row in the scarborough shoal. due to the tension china suspended its banana imports from the philippines―the country’s fifth largest export commodity. the next big wave struck in july after the establishment of sansha city located in a woody island, the biggest island in paracel groups, equipped with a military garrison. spokesperson qin gang expressed that “setting up sansha city is the chinese government’s necessary adjustment of the current administrative agencies, which is completely within china’s sovereignty,” (china opposes us, 2012). as a result of this policy, the philippines and vietnam addressed strident protests toward china. in march 2012 china’s naval exercise that took place in waters near james shoal approximately 80 km from malaysia’s sarawak inciting protest from kuala lumpur. a month later a china’s maritime surveillance ship came back to the area and left steel markers to assert beijing’s sovereignty. although this incident was quickly scuttled by malaysia, it could not help but raising fidgetiness among other claimant states. later on, china and the philippines were embroiled in a near-to-second-standoff situation on the second thomas shoal. when china dispatched thirty ships to outflank the philippines soldiers who defended the area, many predicted that an escalation was in the offing. however, beijing did not live up to that prediction and only accused manila for illegal occupation on china’s territory. verbal threats foreign minister yang’s response at the 17th arf in 2010 hanoi was acted as china’s negative signal of verbal threat. having discovered that his fellow stateswoman clinton encouraged asean states to speak up their minds regarding the south china sea dispute and herself later addressed a lengthy speech on the prominence the united states placed on the freedom of navigation and uninterrupted economic activities going through the south china sea, yang was chafed and retorted that “china is a big country and other countries are small countries and that is just a fact,” (storey, 2010: 4). he then was reported storming out the room after making such insolent remarks. this reaction is a negative signal that could aggravate tension in the territorial row over the south china sea. in november another negative signal came out of chinese leaders’ decision to start the annual naval exercise in the south china sea. in the aftermath of the reed bank incident in 2011, yang warned for unilateral and illegal activities, including oil and gas exploration, in china’s territory without beijing’s approval. in the following june, vietnam and india concurred to jointly explore oil and gas in the blocks located in the contested waters in the south china sea. china directly condemned such action adding a warning that no foreign company could conduct exploration in china’s waters without its sole permission (mofa of prc, 2011). in the beginning of the scarborough shoal crisis, china retained its self-restraint not to further confound the imminent crisis through the use of diplomatic protest. once the crisis failed to be tamed, both china and the philippines were trapped in a two-month standoff. beijing could not help but adjust its policy to a more hawkish one creating a surge of counter-action by manila. china then announced the assignment of combat-ready patrols to disputed areas to defend its territorial sovereignty. summary of china’s signaling strategy this four-year span study discloses changes in china’s bargaining strategy. in 2010 both positive and negative strategies were not utilized sublimely. reassurance on negotiation and self-restraint was hardly noticeable. starting in 2011 china became 112 china’s crisis bargaining in the south china sea dispute (2010-2013) more amenable in signaling self-restraint and especially in reassuring its openness to negotiation, albeit fairly limited to general discussion on managing the south china sea dispute. in the same year negative signals were also evident, spanning from verbal threat to physical protest toward illegal oil and gas exploration by claimant states. an alluring trend in this crisis bargaining strategy existed in 2012 with abounding positive and negative signals. in 2013 both signals pitched in to maintain the stability in the region, climaxing on the commencement of formal negotiation on a coc in september. china’s strategy in crisis bargaining with asean can be summed up as follows: table 1. china’s crisis bargaining strategy self-restraint is powerful reassurance, for states with superior capability have tendency to use it lavishly at their own advantage. this logic is corroborated by lebow’s study on the cuban crisis of 1962. he contends that the success of the crisis defuse lay with the mutual reassurance between john f. kennedy and nikita kruschev. one illustrious factor forging such triumph was kennedy’s self-restraint not to attack cuba regardless his country’s superiority both militarily and geographically, instead continuing extensive communication with kruschev (lebow, 2001). in this study context, official protest remarks must be differentiated between ones that constitute self-restraint and threat. threat-bound remarks imply what stein (2013) calls ‘if-then’ scenario: if b does not do what a says, then a will harm b. this implication however need not accrue in a crystal-clear form. china’s verbal threat through protest remarks, such as the warning for illegal oil and gas exploration in the disputed waters, do not unreservedly touch on harmful treatment the contestant might receive should it defers. yet, different remarks mentioning and emphasizing china’s resoluteness to defend its territorial integrity accustom stein’s scenario. for example, spokesperson hua chunying said that “china is firm and resolute in defending national territorial sovereignty [while] at the same time…always maintain that relevant territorial disputes should be properly solved through bilateral negotiations and friendly consultations,” (mofa of prc, 2013). self-restraintbound remarks conversely imply china’s response toward other claimant states’ actions that instead of using force the china’s side opts for verbal protests. aside from signaling self-restraint, china has been studiously reassuring asean states of its willingness and support to persist dialogue and consultation including negotiation on the widely endorsed coc. reassurance aims at calming down tensions that otherwise might spur into military conflict. states reassure their adversaries through establishing cooperation or giving certain rewards out of compliance. in this study reassurance focuses on openness to negotiation and self-restraint. this does not mean that cooperation is not offered. positive signals self-restraint openness to negotiation negative signals escalatory act verbal threat 113journal of asean studies instead, both bilateral and multilateral cooperation with asean states has savored an upsurge in the past years. the reason for choosing reassurance on negotiation and self-restraint is that they straightly connected to the dispute itself, in a sense that they do not need longer period of time to affect the responses or policies of asean states. china’s offered cooperation is in majority long-term projects and every single project takes time for adjustment and enforcement. china’s less belligerent conducts in the south china sea dispute as suggested by preceding analysis does not tally with what the pessimists has long predicted. it is not deniable that china did flex its muscle several times by signaling threats of both verbal and non-verbal forms. nor is the fact that china’s naval activities become more numerous in the past few years. however, it is noteworthy to cogitate what veers china to perform certain conducts under the crisis bargaining theme. connecting china’s crisis bargaining to crisis stability in the south china sea the goal of crisis bargaining is avoiding further escalation or war. states resort to bargaining when the cost to continue their bellicose acts exceedingly becomes unaffordable. or simply because they find it more lucrative to win the crisis through bargaining regardless their willingness and capability to bear the burden of protracted war. although there is no certainty that such bargaining will cater for resolution instead of exacerbating the crisis, states come to this at least hoping for stability. stability itself does not necessarily mean resolution. the prospect for both sides to be drawn into another escalation or war remains. crisis stability in international relations (ir) literatures is mostly associated with the cold war era nuclearbased stability between the us and soviet union. the main thesis is that first-strike advantage might not be offsetting on account of the capability of second strike to induce high-scale retaliation (powell, 1989). thus, stability had oddly prevailed during that period, since neither the us nor soviet union would like to wager on starting war. even though most literatures on crisis stability were written during and in the wake of cold war, some lessons for today’s conditions could be drawn upon. steven j. brams and d. marc kilgour (1987: 833-834) state that crisis stability ensues after escalation from which states attempt to curb the simmering situations. they find that sometimes threats can be utilized to prop up conciliatory postures of both sides in order to stabilize the crisis. states escalate on purpose before damping it down to stabilize the crisis through the use of threats. nonetheless, there has to be a capability to recourse the crisis, otherwise it would be just a suicide risk-taking mission (langlois, 1991: 802). crisis stability aims primarily to impede an outbreak of war and not merely to come out of feud as a winner (axelrod, 1990). it can be attained when both sides agree that war gives birth only to mutual destruction (jervis, 1991). according to these literatures, the element of threat is crucial to support crisis stability. another is escalation. albeit none of them mentions how the message of crisis stability states prefer is best conveyed, crisis bargaining can be one way. this paper argues that crisis bargaining is a means for states to achieve crisis stability. as avery goldstein (2013, 51-52) says, “crisis stability is greatest when both sides strongly prefer to continue bargaining.” china’s bargaining in the south china sea is of no difference. crisis stability in the south china sea means that the territorial fracas does not 114 china’s crisis bargaining in the south china sea dispute (2010-2013) escalate into an all-out war. nor does it get resolved. it does not equal to status quo per se either. rather, it is a transition from escalation to status quo (langlois, 1991). therefore, the south china sea crisis is stable when there is an upward movement of frictions between and/or among the parties involved followed by a downward movement of such occurrences. a yearly-based analysis shows the dynamic of china’s crisis bargaining that leads to crisis stability over the south china sea row. the previous section unveils china’s bargaining strategy consisting of both positive and negative signaling. in 2010, no heavy escalations emerged although negative signals were apparent. reassurance was not ostensible partly because of the lack of escalation. that being said, the year 2010 was entitled to crisis stability. the following year of 2011 was home to a wave of escalation, such as the cable-cut incidents and the expulsion of survey ships in the contested waters. there was for certain an ascending trend of escalation. reassurance through offering negotiation on a coc and selfrestraint started to bounce up too albeit fairly limited. the mixture of varying positive and negative signals was commensurate with crisis stability premise. moving forward to 2012, the escalation rate was almost similar to that of 2011, perhaps more intense. the brinkmanship in scarborough shoal lent support for the heightened tensions between china and some of its southeast asian neighbors. the ‘punishment’ received by the philippines succeeding the incident made the dispute even fester. in spite of it, what is striking was the positive signaling, particularly reassurance of openness to negotiation. chinese leaders made more remarks and pledges aiming at reassuring asean states of china’s preference of negotiation over force. the mentioning of discussion and consultation on a coc boosted up china’s de-escalation endeavor. yet, china did not set a certain date for negotiation to start that rendered asean states’ suspicion of beijing real motive. despite the dearth of realization of the vowed negotiation, there was the south china sea crisis stability in 2012. escalations were discernible in the first half of 2013. china’s incursion in malaysia-claimed james shoal and encirclement of the second thomas shoal were the major source that succeeded in straining the relations between china and asean. similar to the preceding year, positive signals attempting to deescalate tensions were spotted. but unlike 2012, the words orchestrating pledge of negotiation on a coc eventually turned to deeds; hence, making the crisis more stable in 2013. the aforementioned analysis confirms the argument that china seeks for crisis stability in the south china sea spat through crisis bargaining―by means of signaling strategy. positive signal of reassurance contributes to stability; the negative one to instability. table 2. crisis stability in the south china sea dispute (rough measurement based on china’s signals) level of escalation level of de-escalation crisis stability 2010 low low stable 2011 medium medium stable 2012 medium high stable 2013 medium high stable 115journal of asean studies it can be fairly said that positive and negative signals are offsetting each other in order to keep the crisis stability intact. that beijing has pinned an ‘indisputable sovereignty’ on the disputed territory and waters in south china sea, skeptics are certain that any resolution that might strip china off the territory is not on demand. it is true that china has steadily articulated its position that its sole sovereignty is unquestionable. however, china highly values its strengthened relations with asean that it will not let anything, including the south china sea dispute, to come between the two sides. china delicately takes care of this crisis by ensuring its stability. it is in accord with what crisis stability is about that at a certain point states, regardless of their capabilities vis-à-vis the adversaries, advocate a u-turn from escalation to stabilization. the motivation might vary. china surely is in possession of more cutting-edge military technology against asean states combined, but it has not gone further from escalation stage. instead, china fosters negotiation with asean on something that it had been against, the coc. this way, china has validated the maintenance of crisis stability in 2013. conclusion this paper argues that china performs crisis bargaining in coping with the south china sea dispute against southeast asian claimant states in order to keep the crisis stable. by stable it means the crisis does not escalate into a military conflict. since china keeps insisting on its indisputable sovereignty over the contested areas in the south china sea which reflects to some degree the unlikelihood for it to give up its claims, a stable crisis could also refer to a condition when concession is unlikely to be given at any time in the near future. thus, keeping the crisis stable amounts to managing the dispute to stay in the domain of status quo. china crisisbargains in the south china sea dispute by means of implementing signaling strategy. this strategy is categorized into two types: positive and negative signals. positive signals are those that prop up crisis stability over the south china sea; negative signals are those that catapult the crisis to escalation. in 2010, both signals were hardly conspicuous, making crisis stability difficult to discern, although the dispute itself was sufficiently stable. escalation began to crescendo in 2011 and peaked in mid-2012 with the cable-cut incidents involving china and vietnam and the scarborough shoal standoff between china and the philippines served as the highlight respectively. it did not cease in 2013 but slightly descended. along the way, positive signals of reassurance parched the holes resulting from the negative signals. reassurance shot in 2012, especially in the half-end of the year, driven partly by the scarborough shoal incident earlier in the year. from crisis stability point of view, stability was apparent in 2012 on account of the escalation that opened the year and the reassurance that ended it. this stability was retained in 2013 whose escalation, drawing from the james shoal and second thomas shoal incidents, was menacing but then offset by a high-level of reassurance climaxing in the initiation of coc negotiation. the major finding from the analysis on china’s crisis bargaining in the south china sea dispute is that crisis stability at this juncture is the most favored goal the leaders in beijing are aiming for. notes 1 the year 2010 as the starting point is chosen because it was the first time the south china sea dispute became 116 china’s crisis bargaining in the south china sea dispute (2010-2013) internationalized with the united states’ interference in the regional meeting. this is at odds with china’s persistent in keeping the crisis between itself and southeast asian states, especially the claimant states. some studies suggest that china’s assertiveness started to take off earlier and capped in 2009, e.g. the killing of a vietnamese fisherman by chinese patrol vessels in 2007 and the impeccable incident and vietnam-malaysia joint submission to the united nations commission on the limits of continental shelf in 2009 (emmers, 2010; thayer, 2011). however, during that period interesting twist-and-turn in chinaasean relations was not generously ample. china’s responses to such events were quiet modest. also, there is a constraint with regards to the availability of the archive on china’s official remarks (the english version) before the designated period of this study. according to bj�rn jerden (2014), the rhetoric of china’s new assertiveness in its overall foreign policy is a sheer misunderstanding. in contrary, after clinton’s remarks confirming the united states national interest on the south china sea in 2010, the tensions began to accrue. alastair iain johnston (2013), in a similar tone, argues that china’s new assertiveness in the south china sea started to take shape in 2010. thus, it is worthy of investigation as to how china comes to grips with the new dimension of a more convoluted, if not partially internationalized, territorial dispute against some asean member states. the year 2013 is selected because it was a start of china’s policy change in terms of negotiation with asean from a staunch objection to moving forward with negotiation on a legally-binding coc to an endorsement of one. 2 the war with vietnam in 1979, though broke out in the border between the two states, was not driven primarily by territorial issue. in a year leading up to the war, scores of border provocations between the two sides occurred without clear evidence of who was responsible for the first shot. nonetheless, the main reason for china’s ‘teach vietnam a lesson’ military assault was more geopolitical than territorial: vietnam’s closer relations with the soviet union and invasion to china’s partner cambodia. meanwhile, china accused vietnam for intruding its border, which was counterargued by vietnam, and for persecuting and expelling ethnic chinese to south china provinces. for comprehensive analysis on vietnam war 1979 see tretiak (1979) and zhang (2005). about author eryan ramadhani holds a bachelor of social science degree in international relations from universitas indonesia and a master of law degree in political science (international relations) from tsinghua 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(2012, april 19). manila’s attempt to internationalize dispute. china daily usa online. retrieved december 12, 2013, from http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2 012-04/19/content_15084620.htm inaugural editorial: asean studies from capital city of asean we are very grateful to announce the launch of first edition of international journal of asean studies, the first and only international journal specifically addressed association of southeast asian nations (asean) as institution as well as individual country’s developments from jakarta, the heart of asean. the new initiatives of studying asean are urgent yet very important as southeast asian countries have been moving forward towards asean community 2015 and beyond. the international journal of asean studies (jas), a peer-reviewed bi-annual journal that enriches understanding of past, current and future issues relevant to asean, particularly, provides an academic venue for academician, practitioners, diplomats, businessmen and larger stakeholders of asean to create an intriguing deliberation about asean in order to address the need towards asean as community theoretically and empirically. jas welcome any thoughts that encourage debate, controversy, new understanding on asean with sharp analysis and rigorous methodologies either quantitative, qualitative or mixed method. we thank to our editorial board members that make this inaugural edition possible. they are very helpful by providing their time, energy, and resources to share views and efforts to push this journal forward. blending of prominent scholars with world class reputation in the international relations, diplomacy and business as well as related disciplines and younger generation of scholars in the region will be an instrumental factor in making this journal as first-class international journal. in this inaugural edition, jas covers five scholarly articles and one practical note. first article entitled the mandala culture of anarchy: the pre-colonial southeast asian international society, written by pandu utama manggala from australian national university, australia. he provides an interesting thought in examining the interplay that had existed between pre-colonial southeast asian empires and the hierarchical east asian international society during the 13th-16th century. he argues that southeast asian international relations in precolonial time were characterized by complex political structures with the influence of mandala values. in that structural context, the majapahit empire, one of the biggest empires at that time had its own constitutional structures of an international society, albeit still sought close relations with china. his study has set an open space for discussion about the alternative explanation of non-western analysis of international relations. while manggala’s article focuses on the origin of southeast asian international order, the second article focuses on the current regional orderbeing established by southeast asian countries namely asean. the second article entitled why asean could stay strong? is written by dinna wisnu from paramadina university, indonesia. she argues that despite many tensions among members of asean but it also recognizes such challenge as the one that unites asean members together. there are some dilemmas among members of asean that does not left much room for members but to cooperate with each other: the dilemma of risking higher tensions among members, the dilemma of risking the benefits of existing pooling of resources, the dilemma of improving connectivity among members and the dilemma of facing global pressure on good governance and liberal democracy. the third article discusses political economic issue in the context of global financial crisis in the late 2000s between indonesia and china in energy sector that become hot debate recently. muhammad badaruddin from bakrie university, indonesia writes about indonesia-china energy trade: analyzing global and domestic political economic significance in indonesia-china lng trade. he urges thatlng export as a medium to strengthen indonesia-china strategic partnership using tangguh lng export to china as a case study. the bilateral relations between southeast asian countries and china are one of the main issues in enforcing the sustainability of asean as a single market. the fourth article discusses cyber security cooperation as one of the understudied cooperation by asean. the article entitled a secure connection:finding the form of asean cyber security cooperation written by khanisa from centre for political studies, indonesia institute of sciences (lipi) examines how asean framework can widen its security agenda to cyber world in the future to complete its preparation of being connected. the fifth article is written by wan-ping tai and samuel c.y. ku entitled state and industrial policy: comparative political economic analysis of automotive industrial policies in malaysia and thailand. in this piece, the writers discuss how despite having the same states’ intervention in automotive industry, malaysia and thailand has difference trajectories in their automotive industry. tai and ku argue that the choice of strategy and political interference are the two main reasons the automotive industry in malaysia is less competitive than that in thailand. the discussion of how state policy influences the economic outcome is central in the discussion for asean to be able to stay as a single market economy. in the practical note, article written by pingkan umboh entitled education for the asean community – the case of indonesia discuss the importance of education in asean community. using indonesia as a case study, she analyses how initiatives taken by the government and higher education institutions can deepen people to people cooperation as one of the pillars of asean community. last but not least, editor-in-chief would like to express highest appreciation for authors who submitted their articles as response from our invitation. we also thank to indonesian association for international relations for supporting this joint publication with centre for business and diplomatic studies (cbds) department of international relations bina nusantara university. in order to become internationally renowned journal, we are very happy to receive comments, feedback and advice for quality improvement of the journal. we hope jas will bring an academic oasis that nurture new thoughts and encourage innovative practical application of asean studies in southeast asian region and the world. jakarta, 1 july 2013 tirta n. mursitama editor-in-chief journal of asean studies, vol. 6, no. 1 (2018), pp. 1-23 https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v6i1.3897 ©2018 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic causes, origins and possible effects of the asean economic community (aec) pawel pasierbiak maria curie sklodowska university abstract in 2007, the association of southeast asian nations (asean) at its 13th summit decided to create the asean economic community (aec). in assumptions, the common market was to be established by the end of 2015, and the introduction of free movement of goods, services, capital and skilled labor was to lead to an increase in the degree of market integration among member states. but the creation of a single market is not an easy process, as illustrated by the case of the european community/european union, where a process of single market creation has been implemented slowly and with numerous difficulties. on the other hand, if the process of a common market creation is successful, the integration brings benefits to the participating countries. the primary goal of this article is to indicate potential effects as well as to show the progress of the implementation and functioning of the common market in the asean economic community. to achieve the objective, the author will analyze the theoretical implications of a common market and the real implications, taking the european union as an example. having done this part of the analysis, the author will try to indicate and evaluate the possible effects of the process of the common market creation in the association of southeast asian nations. key words: asean economic community, regional economic integration, the european union, southeast asia introduction regional economic integration is one of the most important processes in the contemporary global economy. together with globalization, it is a significant tendency at the current stage of international economic relations development. the processes of regional economic integration take place in virtually all geographic areas, while their scope, scale, and intensity vary due to the chosen model of integration. in asia, the regional economic integration is taking place, even though it has different characteristics from those in europe. while in europe, these processes are rather institutional and instrumental, in asia, they are mainly bottom-up market processes, developing between individual traders. although regional integration in asia is principally motivated by economic factors, there are also some institutional initiatives. if one were to take into account intraregional initiatives only in asia, the asean should be put in the center. 2 causes, origins and possible effects asean is the most advanced east asian regional grouping, seeking to pursue higher levels of economic integration. one such initiative is the construction of an internal market, which would be a higher form of market integration. in 2007, asean member states formally decided to roll out the establishment of the asean economic community (aec) by the end of 2015. free movement of goods, services, capital and skilled labor, would constitute a significant step towards improving the economic competitiveness of the group. the primary goal of this article is to indicate potential effects as well as to show the progress of the implementation and functioning of the common market in the aec. to achieve the objective, the author will analyze the theoretical implications of a common market and the real implications by taking the european union as an example. having done this part of the analysis, the author will try to indicate and evaluate the possible effects of the process of the common market creation in asean. to achieve the goal, the author predominantly used a critical review of the literature and the descriptive method. furthermore, to a limited extent, statistical data analysis was used. regional economic integration in theory the concept of regional economic integration has many definitions. the first of them were presented in the 1950s, but today the term continues to be newly defined vigorously. the very meaning of the term 'economic integration' infers a spectrum of definition and depends on the individual approach of the author. it is all about the presentation of the essence of integration, what elements are considered the most relevant, and whether the definitions present all or only selected elements (mucha-leszko, 2012, pp. 16). these elements are: reasons, purpose, scope of integration, mechanisms of the functioning, model, the creation of common institutions and the creation of new international order. thus, one can expect the definition of regional integration to vary from narrow to wide. in the 1950s a definition was presented by j. tinbergen (1954, pp. 95) as 'creation of the most desirable structure of the international economy, removing artificial hindrances to the optimal operation and introducing deliberately all desirable elements of coordination or unification.' this definition has been criticized as having too many evaluative terms, sometimes vague and ambiguous. another definition, now recognized as a classic, was proposed by b. balassa (1961). according to him, economic integration means the abolition of discrimination within an area. the author suggested that economic integration should be approached in static and dynamic manners. in the static approach, integration can be represented by the absence of various forms of discrimination between national economies. in the latter, integration encompasses measures designed to abolish discrimination between economic units belonging to different national states. b. balassa journal of asean studies 3 claimed that regional economic integration is carried out in stages, taking several successive and increasingly sophisticated forms (free-trade area through customs union, common market, economic union up to complete economic integration). in the 1960s, the wide definition of international economic integration was presented by z. kamecki (1967, pp. 93–94) as the 'formation, based on the developed single economic structure, of an economic organism comprising a group of countries, the organism which – due to the high degree of internal economic links and resulting from this internal economic cohesion – can be distinguished in a visible manner from the whole world economy.’ as mentioned, definitions of regional economic integration are also formulated today such as presented by p. robson (1998, pp. 1), for whom international economic integration should be defined as the institutional combination of separate national economies into larger economic blocs or communities. this definition includes only one aspect of regional economic integration called regionalism. regionalism means a planned, top-down process of integrating various economies in the same geographical area, due to the signing of trade agreements and/or economic cooperation. the second aspect of regional economic integration is called regionalization, which is formed by the intensification of economic interdependence on a regional scale, but resulting from bottom-up (market) development of trade, capital, financial or production ties (misala, 2005, pp. 434– 435). in this case, we are dealing with the real component of integration (de facto integration). this distinction between de jure and de facto integration is essential from the point of view of the processes taking place in asia as opposed to those in europe. while in asia economically driven integration dominates, in the case of europe the process is more politically driven. theoretical analysis of regional economic integration would not be complete without a presentation of the benefits resulting from an accession to the grouping. in theory, authors try to identify the benefits and the costs of accession in various forms of integration. it should be noted, however, that joining the regional grouping realizes not only economic but also political and social objectives. therefore, it is quite hard to find a quantitative measure of the ultimate combined effect of joining the grouping (mucha-leszko, 2012, pp. 17). in the shortterm, benefits arise mainly from the increase in trade, but in the long run, they rely on the growth of production, factors of production productivity, gdp and gdp per capita growth. j. bhagwati and a. panagariya (1996, pp. 82) believe that the theories of international integration passed through two phases of their development, each reflecting the current priorities of the different policy concerns. the first group of theories, so-called traditional ones, explains the possible benefits of integration and presents a static approach. 4 causes, origins and possible effects on the other hand, the second group, taking into account the changing trade and economic environment, presents a dynamic approach to an analysis of economic integration. the standard (traditional) economics of preferential trade agreements is founded on the work of jacob viner who introduced two basic effects arising from the establishment of a free trade area or customs union: trade creation effect and trade diversion effect (hosny, 2013, pp. 134). according to j. viner countries will be willing to take regional integration in the form of a customs union when this action creates more static benefits than losses. in other words, the trade creation effect outweighs the effect of trade diversion. the second group of theoretical concepts explaining the benefits of regional integration takes into account the dynamic effects of the process. these effects include economies-of-scale, technological change, the impact on market structure and competition, productivity growth, risk and uncertainty, and investment activity (hosny, 2013, pp. 139). since small markets increase costs, reduce the intensity of productive specialization, limit competition and weaken the tendency to technological progress, countries will likely seek to remove these disadvantages through the integration processes. the selected theoretical concepts of regional integration presented above can be applied to real existing integration groupings, indicating effects of the cooperation between member states. this issue will be partly a subject of further analysis of this study. benefits of common market – a case of the european union the european economic community/european union has gradually implemented the stages of market and monetary integration. achieving the common market proceeded in stages, and the process has not always been smooth. the first stage was a formation of a customs union on 1 july 1968 (watts, 2008, pp. 22) concerning trade in goods; however, agricultural products were still protected. other freedoms (movement of services and factors of production), except for foreign direct investment, were not immediately provided. b. eichengreen and t. bayoumi estimated the effects of integration in the economic area. they found that the internal turnover within the eec-6 as a result of the customs union creation increased faster by three percentage points on average (mucha-leszko, 2012, pp. 32). at the same time, the trade increase stimulated gdp growth by 3.1 percentage points per year. at the same time in the 1960s, the share of intra-trade within the group increased from 35% to 49%, which is a clear manifestation of the growing integration of the eec. in the 1970s and 1980s, the integration of markets of member states faced severe difficulties. even regressive tendencies were observed. the economic slowdown, rising unemployment and weakening international competitiveness, journal of asean studies 5 particularly in high technologies, as well as existing barriers to internal trade limited opportunities to benefit from integration. in order to overcome the above difficulties, the decision to create a genuine single market by the end of 1992 was made (eichengreen, 2008, pp. 337). in 1985, the white paper on completing the internal market was published, which spelled out a program and a timetable for unifying european markets. the white paper proposed an abolishing by the member states all remaining barriers to the free circulation of goods, services, persons and capital (european commission, 1996, pp. 1). elimination of internal barriers as a consequence of the single european market (sem) was to lead to better resource allocation by improving comparative advantage and specialization. also, it was expected to increase efficiency in many sectors, as the effect of the rationalization of the production resulting from greater use of economies of scale. in 1996 the european commission presented a report on the overall effectiveness of measures taken so that the single european market could be created. the commission (1996, pp. 1–11) analyzed the period of 1985-1995 and presented its assessment of the effects of the single european market: 1. the share of intraregional imports of industrial products increased by 6.7 p. p., from 61.2% (1985) up to 67.9% (1995). the share of intra-eu imports of services increased from 46.9 to 50%. 2. the impact of the sem on foreign direct investment was higher than on trade – in the early 1990s, the eu was a destination for 44.4% of the global fdi inflow, while in the period 1982-1987 the share was 28.2%. moreover, in the period from 1984 to 1992 intra-eu investments grew four times faster than intra-trade. 3. the share of intra-industry trade in the total exchange was increasing. in the years 1985-1992, it rose from 35 to 42% for products of different price and quality. 4. as a result of the sem, there has been an increase in the gdp, which, depending on the model used, ranged from 1.1 to 1.5 percentage points. the main reasons for this increase were the increase in competition/efficiency and the rise in the total factor productivity (tfp), each accounting for around half of the overall effect. 5. increased efficiency and competition resulting from the implementation of the sem were made possible primarily due to the significant restructuring of european industries. in the period of 1985-1993, the reduction of costs associated with the size of the company resulted mainly from achieving greater economies of scale. 6. implementation of the smp has had a significant positive effect on the degree of competition in manufacturing sectors. the data on the reduction of the margin between costs and prices confirm this phenomenon. 7. changes in the structure and degree of competition in the market, resulting from the implementation of the smp resulted in increasing price convergence in the eu between 1985 and1995. 6 causes, origins and possible effects 8. estimates of the impact of the smp on employment showed a positive relationship. depending on the model, the introduction of smp resulted in an increase of employment by 300 000 up to 900 000. 9. the introduction of the single european market project has brought real convergence among some member countries. the statistical analysis confirms that ireland, portugal, and spain showed higher average economic growth rates after 1987, which proves the effect resulting from the implementation of sem. the analysis of the various areas of benefits creation was carried out mainly for the european union, but it could be used as well to analyze other integration groupings organized on the principle of the common market. the liberalization of economic flows deals with the free movement of goods, services, and factors of production. an openness of markets and increased competition, as well as an increase in the size of the market, internal trade and improving the allocation efficiency of labor and capital, are the tangible benefits of the common market. as a result, gains from liberalization of the movement of goods, services, capital, and labor make up for the effects of the accumulation of the common market, namely gdp and income growth, increased economic and competitive strength of the region. there are also several mechanisms by which the common market also helps to improve the economic strength and competitiveness of the whole group in the world economy. it is because of more intense competition, which leads to higher efficiency and greater attractiveness of the internal market for foreign investors. the benefits mentioned above can be achievable by the asean economic community. at the same time, it must be emphasized that aec is not a typical common market according to b. balassa's classification. although it includes its essential elements, such as the freedom of movement of goods, services, capital, and people, this freedom is not full. aec implements the ‘common market minus’ integration, which means that areas or sectors that are excluded from liberalization are still covered by joint actions (soesastro, 2005, pp. 29). additionally, the case of aec is so interesting that it remains an attempt to move from the free trade area to the common market, bypassing the phase of the customs union. reasons behind the aec creation economic cooperation between asean member states intensified in the early 1990s, with the entry into force of the asean free trade agreement (afta). other initiatives undertaken (including those on investment, or services) contributed to an increase of the integration level, but member states have concluded that the creation of a qualitatively new initiative will bring additional benefits. in addition to the benefits, there were also some risks, which could have been avoided by the aec creation. several primary reasons for the formation of the aec can be identified. journal of asean studies 7 first is a need to remain competitive in an increasingly growing global competition (austria, 2012, pp. 142). the growing importance of china and india, increased the interest of the member states to achieve benefits from a larger and more integrated internal market (sakane, 2018, pp. 12). the broader and more cohesive market, the higher are the possibilities of achieving economies of scale in operations, which increases the attractiveness of the asean internal market (adb, 2008, pp. 86). reduction of transaction costs, the progressive unification of the rules of origin requirements, improving infrastructure and logistics under conditions of global and regional value chains mean that the integrated market is easier to operate. second, the global trend towards regionalism has reinforced the need for more intensive economic integration. asean had to start seeking investors and compete for their export markets much more actively. third, asean must continue to maintain its credibility as the integration hub for fta activities in east asia (austria, 2012, pp. 144). fourth, the implementation of increasingly sophisticated market integration would prevent excessive individual approaches to agreements by member states. this is a serious issue that has been called "noodle bowl syndrome." the creation of the aec seeks to prevent further complications. fifth, the factors related to the external environment exert more pressure on asean nowadays. because the asian crisis of 1997-1998, the asian countries have realized the need to develop a common mechanism for achieving and maintaining economic stability and prevent future financial crises (yean & das, 2015, pp. 191). in addition, the crisis made countries realize that cooperation in both the real and financial spheres should grow together, and one of the conditions for achieving positive effects will be to ensure the free movement of skilled labor (plummer, 2006, pp. 7). sixth, the competitive threat of china has become more significant. the accession of this country to the world trade organization resulted in the increase of its attractiveness as a place of investment and production location. asean decided to strengthen internal cooperation to improve economies of scale resulting from the functioning of the domestic market and thus improve their position towards china. the above-described factors made the asean leaders consider the future of asean. the experience of afta, the asean framework on services and the asean investment area, were positive and promising. however, they may not be enough to maintain a competitive advantage, and most of all, empowerment of the grouping in east asia. therefore, in 2003 it was decided to deepen integration through the asean economic community creation. the aec was to be 8 causes, origins and possible effects the area with freedom of movement of goods, services, capital and skilled labor. scheme 1. the asean economic community milestones a g re e m e n t o n a s e a n p re fe re n ti a l t ra d e a g re e m e n ts a s e a n f ra m e w o rk a g re e m e n t o n s e rv ic e s (a f a s ) si g n e d b a li c o n co rd i i (a s e a n c o m m u n it y ) n o v 2 0 0 7 , a e c b lu e p ri n t a s e a n t ra d e i n g o o d s a g re e m e n t (a t ig a ) e n tr y i n to f o rc e e n d 2 0 1 5 , f o rm a l e st a b li sh m e n t o f th e a e c b ir th o f a s e a n a s e a n f re e t ra d e a re a (a f t a ) e n tr y i n to f o rc e a s e a n v is io n 2 0 2 0 ja n 2 0 0 7 , c e b u d e cl a ra ti o n (a cc e le ra te t im e t o 2 0 1 5 ) a s e a n c h a rt e r a s e a n c o m p re h e n si v e in v e st m e n t a g re e m e n t (a c ia ) e n tr y i n to f o rc e a e c b lu e p ri n t 2 0 2 5 source: (asean, 2015a) road to the asean economic community the concept of the asean economic community refers to the 1997 asean vision 2020, a document adopted in december 1997 at the summit in kuala lumpur. it marked the integrating countries and their long-term direction of actions. by 2020, asean was to become the community based on three pillars: 1) asean security community, 2) asean economic community and 3) asean socio-cultural community (yean & das, 2015, pp. 193). in october 2003 at the asean summit in bali, it was decided to introduce aec 2020 (bali concord ii) (asean, 2008, pp. 5). the primary objective of the aec was ‘to create a stable, prosperous and highly competitive asean economic region in which there is a free flow of goods, services, investment and a freer flow of capital, equitable economic development and reduced poverty and socio-economic disparities in the year 2020' (yean & das, 2015, p. 193). in january 2007 at the summit in cebu, the assumed date of entry into force of the community was shortened by five years – the aec was to be finalized by the end of 2015. in november of 2007, an important decision was adopted regarding the introduction of a specific action plan with strategic steps in its implementation the 2007 aec blueprint. the blueprint is organized according to the aec’s four objectives: 1) single market and production base; 2) competitive economic 1967 1977 1993 1995 1997 2003 2007 2008 2010 2012 2015 2 0 1 6 -2 0 2 5 journal of asean studies 9 region; 3) equitable economic development; and 4) integration into global economy. clearly defined objectives and a timetable for implementation were introduced. in 2015 the formal establishment of the aec was officially announced, but not all of its goals have been achieved. as a result, a new plan, which outlines the vision for aec in the next decade (the aec blueprint 2025), was prepared (asean, 2015c). the aec blueprint 2025 is based and develops the aec blueprint 2015 and consists of five areas: 1) a highly integrated and cohesive economy; 2) a competitive, innovative, and dynamic asean; 3) enhanced connectivity and sectoral cooperation; 4) a resilient, inclusive, people-oriented, and peoplecentered asean; and 5) a global asean. assumptions and progress in realizing of asean economic community as already mentioned, the decision about the realization of the asean economic community was taken during the 9th asean summit held in bali in 2003, but the concrete actions started in 2007 when the aec blueprint was introduced. the aec’s pillars and core elements are presented in table 1. what is unique is the fact that the aec blueprint 2015 set out measures and schedules for their implementation, that is, during four two-year periods: 20082009, 2010-2011, 2012-2013 and 2014-2015. the primary instrument of measuring the progress on the aec implementation – the aec scorecard mechanism was established in 2008. this is a selfassessment tool that monitors the achievement of milestones that were indicated in the economic blueprint’s strategic schedule (menon & melendez, 2015, pp. 1). in the first two periods of implementation of the community, the aec scorecards were published. in subsequent phases of implementation they were not. information about implementation appears in different places and in an unorganized way. for example, after the 26th asean summit in kuala lumpur held in april 2015, the chairman stated that the rate of implementation of the aec scorecard stands at 90.5% (458 out of 506 measures) (asean, 2015b, pp. 43). but the progress on the implementation rates for each pillar was missing. the same situation was observed in the asean annual report 2013-2014 when it stated that by end-2013 81,7% of the 229 aec prioritized key deliverables targeted by 2013 have been implemented (asean, 2014, pp. 35). in the report on progress in the implementation of the aec (asean, 2015a), the asean secretariat explained the changes that have occurred in the methodology of reporting progress towards the creation of the aec. in 2012, at the 20th asean summit adopted the phnom penh agenda for asean community building called for prioritizing high-impact activities and concrete, key measures to address the challenges and obstacles for realizing the aec by 2015. as a result, two lists of 10 causes, origins and possible effects prioritized key deliverables (pkds) were created – one for implementation by 2013 and another for implementation by 2015. from mid-2013 through 2014 reports on the implementation of the aec scorecard focused on these pkds. the secretariat stated that the implementation of all, not only the priority instruments, was monitored continuously and presented to asean sectoral bodies. it seems that the lack of information about the planned change has contributed to the lack of consistency of the analysis and the limited possibility of a comprehensive assessment. below are the results of the aec based on the information available. table 2 presents detailed information on the implementation of the planned instruments in the first two phases (200809 and 2010-11). table 1. the 2015 asean economic community blueprint pillar core elements a. single market and production base a1. free flow of goods: 9 strategic approaches a2. free flow of services: 3 strategic approaches a3. free flow of investment: 5 strategic approaches a4. freer flow of capital: 7 strategic approaches a5. free flow of skilled labor a6. priority integration sectors a7. food, agriculture, and forestry b. competitive economic region b1. competition policy b2. consumer protection b3. intellectual property rights b4. infrastructure development: 10 strategic approaches b5. taxation b6. e-commerce c. equitable economic development c1. small and medium-size enterprises development c2. initiative for asean integration d. integration into global economy d1. coherent approach toward external economic relations d2. enhanced participation in global supply networks source: (asean, 2008, pp. 6–29). the overall ratio for the two implementation periods listed in table 2 reached 67.5%. achievements in key areas have contributed to the overall ratio: ‘single market and production base’ 65.9%, ‘competitive economic region’ 67.9%, ‘equitable economic development’ 66.7% and ‘integration into the global economy’ 85.7%. the largest number of fully implemented instruments concerned the area of ‘single market and production base’ (114 instruments in phase i and ii). this area was however given only a 65.9% rate of implementation, because 59 instruments were not implemented, mainly in the area of services. in turn, the highest rate of implementation was observed in the area of ‘integration into the global economy.’ in this case, 12 instruments were implemented, while the number of not implemented instruments was 2. the relatively high number of implemented instruments occurred in the area of ‘competitive economic region’ (53), but the same was true for instruments not implemented (25). this journal of asean studies 11 provided the implementation rate of 67.9%. what is rather worrying from the point of view of an implementation of the asean economic community is that the implementation of measures was losing momentum. this can be seen in table 2 when examining the indicators during different phases and areas. table 2. the aec scorecard for phase i and phase ii (2008-2011) specification phase i (2008-09) phase ii (2010-11) total measures f u ll y im p le m e n te d n o tfu ll y im p le m e n te d f u ll y im p le m e n te d n o tfu ll y im p le m e n te d f u ll y im p le m e n te d n o tfu ll y im p le m e n te d single market and production base free flow of goods 9 0 23 24 32 24 free flow of services 10 3 13 17 23 20 free flow of investment 5 1 5 8 10 9 freer flow of capital 1 0 5 0 6 0 free flow of skilled labor . . 1 0 1 0 priority integration sectors 28 0 1 0 29 0 food, agriculture, and forestry 8 0 5 6 13 6 total number of measures 61 4 53 55 114 59 implementation rate 93,8% 6,2% 49,1% 50,9% 65,9% 34,1% competitive economic region competition policy 2 0 2 0 4 0 consumer protection 2 0 5 4 7 4 intellectual property rights . . 4 1 4 1 transport 15 10 6 8 21 18 energy 0 0 2 1 2 1 mineral 1 0 7 0 8 0 ict 2 0 4 0 6 0 taxation . . 0 1 0 1 e-commerce . . 1 0 1 0 total number of measures 22 10 31 15 53 25 implementation rate 68,7% 31,3% 67,4% 32,6% 67,9% 32,1% equitable economic development sme development 1 0 4 3 5 3 iai 2 0 1 1 3 1 total number of measures 3 0 5 4 8 4 implementation rate 100% 0% 55,5% 44,5% 66,7% 33,3% integration into global economy external economic relations 5 0 7 2 12 2 total number of measures 5 0 7 2 12 2 implementation rate 100% 0% 78% 22% 85,7% 14,3% iai – initiative for asean integration source: own preparations based on (asean, 2012). in ‘single market and production base’ the indicator has declined from 93.8% (2008-09) to 49.1% (2010-11) in ‘competitive economic region’ from 68.7 12 causes, origins and possible effects to 67.4%, in ‘equitable economic development’ from 100 to 55.5%, and in the area of ‘integration into the global economy’ from 100 to 78%. it seems that this situation resulted from the exhaustion of the ability to easily achieve the objectives. initially, the easiest measures and indicators were implemented. later, along with the more difficult changes, implementation indicators deteriorated. this was not an optimistic situation from the point of view of the subsequent stages of integration. perhaps, the deterioration of the indicators has changed along with the way of presenting integration achievements. figure 1. asean economic community scorecard key deliverables, january 2008-march 2013 source: (menon & melendez, 2015, p. 2). a further complication was the expansion of the list of measures included in the aec scorecard. initially, 316 such measures were identified, however, with the passage of time and updates to the agenda, their number increased to 611 (as of october 2016). the presentation of achievements took an aggregated form for the entire period and selected priority areas. one such presentation is shown in figure 1, depicting the aec scorecard key deliverables for the period january 2008march 2013. according to data from figure 1, the overall level of implementation of the planned measures in turn, the highest level of implementation occurred in the area of ‘equitable economic development,’ reaching 77.8%, and then ‘single market and production base’ (77.2%). unfortunately, as data is aggregated, one cannot discern the reasons for this level of implementation of measures in different areas. similarly, aggregated data were made public in 2015, while they relate to the period from january 2008 to the end of 77,2 76,1 77,8 70 76,5 22,8 23,9 22,2 30 23,5 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% single market and production base competitive economic region equitable economic development integration into the global economy total fully implemented not implemented journal of asean studies 13 october 2015 and another group of measures. in the last year before the formal establishment of the aec, an overview of not implemented prioritized key deliverables was prepared. based on the evaluation of their implementation possibilities by the end of 2015 and on their importance for the trade development, 54 measures were selected (high-priority measures – hpms). together with the measures implemented since 2008, hpms form a group of 506 measures to monitor the implementation of the aec (asean, 2015a, pp. 9). figure 2 shows fully implemented asean-wide and high-priority measures by the aec pillar for the period january 2008 – october 2015. figure 2. fully implemented asean-wide and high-priority measures by the aec pillar, 2008-2015, in %, as at 31 october 2015 source: (asean, 2015a, pp. 9). according to data presented in figure 2, the change in the number of measures under consideration has increased the overall rate of implementation in priority areas up to 92.7%.1 in the ‘single market and production base’ 256 measures were implemented (92.4%), while the number of not fully implemented was 21 (7.6%). on the other hand, in ‘competitive economic 1 when all the instruments declared earlier (611 in total) are considered, the implementation rate decreases to 79.5%, or 486 measures (asean, 2015a, p. 10). region’s 154 measures were implemented (90.5%) and 16 not implemented (9.5%). the other two fields were claimed to be fully implemented (ratio implementation was 100% in both cases). an assessment of the degree of implementation of the aec solely on the aec scorecard is subject to the risk of error (menon & melendez, 2015, pp. 2–3). first, there is no certainty whether the aec blueprint covers all needed measures so that the establishment of the common market could be possible. second, as the 92,4 90,5 100 100 92,7 7,6 9,5 0 0 7,3 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% single market and production base competitive economic region equitable economic development integration into the global economy total fully implemented not implemented 14 causes, origins and possible effects aec scorecard is a compliance tool that relies on self-assessment, there could be a willingness to give overestimated compliance and achievement (jones, 2016, pp. 648). third, the aec scorecard measures the aggregate process, and it does not take into account differences within individual countries. fourth, the scorecard fails to capture differences in speeds of liberalization among member states fully. fifth, the aec does not analyze and explain results. sixth, there is no efficient mechanism for exerting peer pressure on member states when the aec targets are missed. taking into account the above, it is worth taking a closer look at the most crucial achievement of the asean member countries in their quest to establish the asean economic community. the most critical areas developed in the aec blueprint 2015 will be explored. the primary sources of information are documents such as: (asean, 2015d), (asean, 2015b), (asean, 2014), (menon & melendez, 2015), (chia, 2013). pillar 1. single market and production base pillar 1 is the most critical element of the aec. it includes items such as: free flow of goods, free flow of services, free flow of investments, free flow of capital and free flow of skilled labor. the most significant achievement in the area of free flow of goods is a reduction of tariffs among members. in 2014, the average atiga rate for all asean member states stood at the level of 0,54%, while mfn average at the level of 6,9%. for asean-6 tariffs have fallen to virtually zero, while for other countries (cambodia, lao pdr, myanmar and viet nam clmv) have been declining up to their planned elimination in 2018 (asean, 2015d). according to menon and melendez (2015, p. 5) the progress was possible as achievements in pillar 1 relate to ‘low hanging fruit.’ more sensitive areas of reforms remain – such as opening up the agriculture sector, steel, and motor vehicles. what is characteristic and not necessarily good for the assessment of the asean free flow of goods, is the fact that utilization of the common effective preferential tariffs has been relatively low. there are some reasons behind this: difficulties complying with rules of origin (because of the high level of product fragmentation in the region, high import content of major export products, administrative costs of proving origin); lack of progress in reducing non-tariff barriers (ntbs) to intra-asean trade. services market integration in the asean is conducted under the 1995 asean framework agreement on services (afas). nine packages of commitments under afas have been concluded. even though afas commitments have improved over time, liberalization in services was hampered by flexibilities introduced in the ‘asean-x’ formula. this formula allows member states to liberalize according to each country’s readiness – this is one of the barriers in progress of liberalization process. journal of asean studies 15 ‘free flow of investment and capital’ is one of the most important goals of the aec. in the afta one of the key objectives was to remove barriers to trade to attract foreign direct investment in regional production networks. in 1998 the asean investment area (aia) was established. while it was to facilitate fdi inflows, the scope of the aia placed too much emphasis on intra-regional fdi. it granted national treatment to asean investors by 2010 and to non-asean investors by 2020 (chia, 2013, pp. 20). the full realization of the aia was advanced to 2010 for asean-6 and 2015 for clmv. in 2012 the asean comprehensive investment agreement came into effect and superseded the earlier agreement (yean & das, 2015, pp. 195). the initiative is seen as a way toward enabling the most important investors (external as the eu, the us, china etc.) to be treated equally to national enterprises. the asean comprehensive investment agreement offers investment liberalization, investment facilitation, investment protection and investment promotion. the aec blueprint stated that strategic actions for a free flow of skilled labor are: facilitating the issuance of visas and employment passes, mras for major professional services, core concordance of services skills and qualifications. mutual recognition arrangements are one of the most important instruments for skilled labor mobility in asean. by date the mras were concluded for (asean, 2015a, pp. 33): 1) engineering services (2005); 2) nursing services (2006), architectural services (2007); a framework for surveying qualifications (2007); medical practitioners (2009); dental practitioners (2009); a framework for accounting services (2009) replaced by mra on accountancy services (2014) and tourism professional (2012). although some actions and initiatives were introduced, the majority of labor flows occurs independently of these arrangements and is market-driven. quite the opposite of assumptions, the overwhelming share of labor flows within asean is in lowand semi-skilled labor. pillar 2. competitive economic region the second pillar of the aec comprises such areas (among others) as: competition policy, intellectual property rights protection, consumer protection and infrastructure development (see table 1). activities undertaken in all these areas lead to lowering production and transaction costs, encouraging more efficient allocation of resources and improving consumer welfare. business climate improvements attract more fdi inflows. several initiatives for competition policy were introduced in asean such as a formation of the asean expert’s group on competition (2007), asean regional guidelines on competition policy, handbook on competition policy and laws in asean for business. according to menon and melendez (2015, pp. 9), five asean member states have comprehensive competition policies and laws, while the others were working on the introduction of competition policy and law by 2015. 16 causes, origins and possible effects in the field of intellectual property rights, some actions have been undertaken. for instance, the asean working group on intellectual property cooperation (established in 1996) was to assess the implementation of the asean ipr action plan 2011-2015. additionally, the task force on trade mark has been established to complete the trade marks related action lines by 2015. it seems that competition policy and intellectual property rights protections are sensitive areas of the asean integration. although the blueprint mentions a commitment to integrate the regional economy, competition policy and ipr protection are national in application. keeping in mind the differentiated level of development of the asean member states, it does not appear that full uniformity in competition and ipr rules is possible soon. developments in physical and telecommunication infrastructure took place in asean, but there is a lot to be done. the main problem is to coordinate different national needs with the regional vision and plans. another issue is a huge need for financing. in asean the wealthiest countries are the smallest, so there is a necessity to use different methods and sources for infrastructure development. even if there are gains in infrastructure development, this can be challenged in the area of transport liberalization. pillar 3. equitable economic development the third pillar of the aec blueprint 2015 aims to address issues connected to intra-country development gaps and the development gap between asean-6 and clmv. measures foreseen in the blueprint consist of sme development and initiative for asean integration (iai). under the strategic action plan for asean sme development (2010-2015) a few projects have been realized: the asean business incubator network, the asean sme guidebook towards the aec 2015, asean online sme academy. the iai was invented to be a framework for regional co-operation where more advanced (richer) member states could contribute resources and expertise to the less developed ones. pillar 4. integration into the global economy in the fourth pillar of the aec blueprint, we can see the most significant progress. multilateral and unilateral actions taken by asean countries have led to a reduction of trade barriers in goods, services as well as investments. this has made the asean one of the most open regions in the world economy (menon & melendez, 2015, pp. 12). on the other hand, since 2000 there is a proliferation of ftas among asean member states. however, these ftas deal solely with tariffs and do not address regulatory and other non-tariff barriers such as product standards, services, investments, intellectual property rights, government procurement and movement of business people. asean's ftas are not supportive of regional economic integration; they create many problems, journal of asean studies 17 usually described as the ‘spaghetti bowl.’ one of the examples is the regional comprehensive economic partnership (rcep) which started to be negotiated in 2012. the asean negotiates with six other countries (australia, china, japan, republic of korea, india and new zealand), but the partnership will add to, rather than replace, existing asean+1 ftas. the rcep also uses the ‘flexibility’ clause, which allows the inclusion of provisions for special and differential treatment and some provision for lesser developed countries. differences in the detailed provisions of individual ftas are another point of concern. for instance, rules of origin provisions can vary significantly from agreement to agreement. this elevates the level of difficulty in harmonizing agreements. this has not mentioned the negotiation of interregional agreements by individual member countries instead of the whole asean such as agreements of singapore and viet nam with the eu (mazur, 2017). the above-presented assumptions and achievements of the implementation of the asean economic community allow for some assertions. the analysis of the various areas of integration shows that there is still much to be done. if the implementation of the aec is measured by the implementation of the planned actions and activities, the aec has not fulfilled its objectives (i.e., the culmination of the process by the end of 2015). many authors emphasize, however, that the aim of the establishment of the aec should be considered as a milestone, not as an end of the process. if economic integration in asean is to develop, this approach seems appropriate. possible effects and problematic issues of the process potential impact on the growth of wealth as a result of the establishment of the asean economic community has been the subject of research, and the results have been presented in several publications. according to a computable general equilibrium (cge) model presented by plummer and chia (2009), an additional increase of wealth as a result of the realization of the aec would amount to 5.3 percentage points (chia, 2013, p. 12). all member states would benefit from that, but singapore would benefit the most (9.7 p. p.), together with brunei darussalam (7.0) and cambodia (6.3). the lowest gains would be attributed to viet nam (2.8) and malaysia (3.0). other estimates prepared by the economic research institute for asean and east asia (eria) show that the effect of gdp growth as a result of tariff reductions would be small, but the most substantial impact would be from the reduction of barriers in the services sector and time savings associated with the introduction of trade facilitation and infrastructure improvement (chia, 2013, pp. 12). in 2014, the asian development bank together with the international labor organization conducted a study that showed that the full implementation of the aec blueprint 2015 would lead to an increase in regional gdp by 7.1% and create 14 million additional jobs by 2025 (ilo-adb, 2014, pp. 39, 52). in most cases, 18 causes, origins and possible effects this would include less economically developed asean countries. in turn, the mckinsey global institute in its report states that the introduction of the aec could cause a shift of global manufacturing from china toward the asean. as a result, by 2030, annual gdp for the entire grouping could increase from 280 to 615 billion usd, which would represent 5 to 12% of asean's gdp in 2030 (woetzel, tonby, thompson, burtt, & lee, 2014, pp. 4). the estimates presented above are subject to an error resulting from theoretical assumptions. however, they all show the benefits asean could gain as a result of the aec. however, those benefits are not guaranteed. on the contrary, they can be hard to achieve. so far, it is said, that the aec brought fewer benefits than had been expected. this is because there are some problems asean faces. according to k. sakane (2018, pp. 12–13), there are several significant obstacles to the aec development, namely: still existing domestic non-tariff barriers; regulatory frameworks on transport facilitation (even if physical infrastructure developed); low integration of service sector in the region; difficulties with implementation of free flow of skilled labor; little progress of capital market integration. according to k. sakane, due to these obstacles, the aec is far behind the eu. m. g. plummer (2006) compared the creation of the aec with the experiences of the european union. he pointed out certain similarities and differences that can be summarized in a few points. first, the institutional environment in asean is now much different from that of the european economic community (eec) in the 1950s. the political and social motivations for economic integration in europe were far different from asean's today. institutional development in the asean is difficult as: 1) nation-state formation was much later than in the european context; 2) divergence in socio-political institutions is larger than in europe; 3) european institutions are successful in economic-related matters; 4) european institutions are rather costly and asean’s budget much smaller. second, the international economic environment is far different nowadays than in the 1950s. the global marketplace is much more open nowadays. this means that the current cost of the diversion effect resulting from the integration is significantly higher than in the past. third, asean faces much greater internal economic diversification. this results in the fact that the possibility of implementation of the aec will be more complicated and difficult. even the possibility of taking into account all the countries in the process will be difficult. this is expressed in the 'flexibility' approach, the example of which is the inclusion of asean-x rules in the liberalization of services. fourth, asean is now much more open than the eec was in the 1950s. these different conditions make it impossible to transfer the european experience directly to the asian theater. nevertheless, there are some experiences journal of asean studies 19 of european integration, which asean can learn from. firstly, asean should not solely focus on the internal market and pursue a policy of inward-looking discrimination. this would be particularly disadvantageous, keeping in mind that as many as 75% of the total of asean’s trade is directed outwardly. secondly, the example of eec/eu shows that trade and investment are strictly interconnected with the change of the economies’ structures. this is also the case for asean. thirdly, the european union has gained from internal trade liberalization. the creation of a customs union and a single market was important because it led to the reduction of transaction costs. this resulted in a more efficient international division of labor in most of eu’s member states. asean should focus on creating not only the internal market but on the creation of global economic relations. prospects of the asean economic community most observers of integration processes in asean have realized that the formal establishment of the asean economic community in 2015 does not end the integration process. what is more, they treat the aec as a milestone towards further integration. also, decision-makers in the asean realize that there is still a lot to do. all this resulted in the adoption of the new plan – the asean economic community blueprint 2025 (asean, 2015c). the document states that the overall vision articulated in the aec blueprint 2015 remains relevant. the new blueprint builds on the aec blueprint 2015. the priority is to complete the unfinished implementation of measures under the aec blueprint 2015 by end2016. as the blueprint states, in the next decade, asean will also provide a new emphasis on the development and promotion of micro, small and medium enterprises (msmes) in its economic integration efforts (bobowski, 2017). at the same time, asean will likewise embrace the evolving digital technology as the leverage to enhance trade and investments, provide an e-based business platform, promote good governance and facilitate the use of green technology. for the monitoring and assessment of the aec blueprint 2025 implementation, the aec 2025 monitoring and evaluation (m&e) framework was introduced (asean, 2018).2 it should be remembered that the creation of formal plans is not sufficient to achieve real economic integration. it is necessary to convince the member states about the benefits that result from the deepening of integration and get their commitment. sizeable internal diversity, conflict of interest and the asian style of discussion can be reasons opposing a statement that economic integration within asean will develop systematically. on the other hand, it shows that determining a particular date (2015, 2025) is mobilizing for (some) member states. without such fixed date 2 due to difficulties in data gathering, the evaluation of the implementation of the aec blueprint 2025 will be of interest to the author in the future research. 20 causes, origins and possible effects progress in the economic integration of asean would be far lower. conclusion at the end of 2015, the creation of the aec was announced. although the comparison with the single european market was automatically imposed, it is not entirely appropriate. the aec is not a typical common market with features as pointed out in theory nor it is similar with that in the european union. in asean, a model called 'common market minus' is implemented. moreover, in the integration process in asean, it was decided to bypass the customs union as an intermediate form between the free trade area and the common market. asean realizes that deeper integration is needed, but because conditions are different, it uses other methods of intensifying cooperation. firstly, the much higher than in europe diversity between countries (e.g., economic, political, religious, cultural, linguistic) causes that asean way is perhaps a reasonable strategy used in negotiations. however, it affects the effects of integration, its dynamics, and scope negatively. asean countries are sensitive to even small attempts to limit their sovereignty, so they do not show a willingness to transfer of national competences (this is why there is no customs union because here it would be necessary to conduct at least a common external tariff). national interests are more important than those of the community, which means that integration is uneven. this is confirmed by data showing the stages of the aec implementation. after a relatively good beginning, the following years brought a weakening of the dynamics of change. this is probably the effect of 'low hanging fruits.' it is currently more difficult to implement increasingly advanced integration tasks. the effects of aec are lower than assumed because barriers still exist. the lack of fulfillment of the conditions of the common market results in lower effects than expected in theory (lack of free flow of labor causes suboptimal allocation of production factors, which limits the increase in their productivity). secondly, integration within the aec is carried out under different external conditions. if ¾ asean trade is realized with third countries, it is difficult to expect strong promotion of internal integration, excluding third countries from the market. this would involve high costs of the trade diversion, especially under conditions of high dependence of asean countries on the chinese market. to conclude, it can be said that the asean economic community is an interesting initiative undertaken by asean, however, different from the classic common market and the single european market. it is good that the initiative was formulated and implemented, but at the moment it is difficult to determine its effects reliably. this will be possible only in the future, and it will be of interest to the author of this study. journal of asean studies 21 about the author the author works in the chair of world economy and european integration at the faculty of economics of maria curie sklodowska university in lublin, poland. his main discipline is international economics and in particular regional economic integration in europe and east asia. he also researches on economic development and position of individual asian countries as well as on economic relations between both countries and groups of countries. reference adb. 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(2015). the asean economic community and conflicting domestic interests. an overview. journal of southeast asian economies, 32(2), 189–201. https://doi.org/10.1355/ae32-2a journal of asean studies, vol. 6, no. 1 (2018), pp. 64-81 https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v6i1.4927 ©2018 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic political leadership in south korea’s developmental state: a historical revisit ratu ayu asih kusuma putri bina nusantara university, indonesia abstract south korea under president park chung hee underwent rapid industrialization and experienced phenomenal economic growth making the country one of the asian tigers alongside hong kong, taiwan, and singapore. had suffered by the long-standing japanese colonialization, south korea’s development strategies in its incipient economic venture, interestingly, postulate unforeseen similarities with those imposed by japan primarily during the phenomenal industrial revolution of the meiji government (18681912). exponential modernization in south korea was substantially forged by the implementation of ‘developmental state’ model. the term was initially coined by johnson (1982) to explain the pacification of government policies – rather than market – to achieve successful economic rejuvenation of post-war japan. in light to this historical paradox between south korea and japan, this article attempts to revisit the embarking point of south korea’s rapid economic development beginning in the 1960s by drawing attention to the importance of leadership as one of the major components of the developmental state model. it concludes that park chung hee’s strong japanese linkage combined with his pretext for imposing ‘hard authoritarianism’ is particularly influential in determining south korea’s pragmatic development trajectory. key words: developmental state, south korea, park chung hee, modernization, leadership introduction the behind-the-scenes animosity of south koreans to japan is inevitable. despite the shared cultural heritage and close geographic positions, some unpleasant contacts since the ancient period culminated during the annexation of korea in 1910 emotionally afflicted the two countries’ view of each other and led to a prevailing sense of rivalry even until today. the harsh colonial rule, ‘japanization’ policy, and ruthless exploitation of koreans by the japanese had consequently built a deep hatred amongst koreans toward japan. conversely, as lee (1985) points out that most japanese are disdainful and intolerant of korea, do not understand and are insensitive to the feelings of koreans, and do not wish to be involved with anything related to korea, unless, there are rational reasons for doing so. although there has been a significant shift toward the much better relationship between the two, these emotions are not journal of asean studies 65 easily extinguished especially amongst the old generation and the more conservative population. japanese and korean can form lasting friendships and working relationships at the individual level, yet there is no sense of genuine friendship at the collective or societal level. despite the bitter relationship, south korea’s successful development policies in the 1960s demonstrate striking similarities with those imposed by japan during the meiji’s industrial revolution and japan’s post-war economic renaissance. once pronounced as one of the poorest countries in the world after suffering from the devastating korean war, south korea emerged as a global economic power in a relatively short period. albeit being on the american side, south korea demarcated from the marketbased liberal economy and instead imposed an ‘interventionist state pattern’ to boost its economy, a pattern first instituted by the meiji government during the industrial revolution in japan (kim & jaffe, 2010). the pattern demonstrates a state-centric development or state-driven economic growth in which state utilizes its effective control of the national economy to pursue their global economic interests (johnson, 1982; amsden, 1989; tønnesson, 2017). the pattern distinguishes the east asian model of development in comparison to the western model that supports minimization of state intervention. in the early stage of its rapid economic expansion, south korea emulated the ‘developmental state’ model, pioneered by japan, to a significant degree. in addition to placing the centralized state as the engine powering the industrialization, most notable similarities can be seen on the prominence of military power to ensure internal and external stability; its focus on heavy and chemical industries; and the interlocking relations between the state and the business groups (chaebol, similar to japan’s zaibatsu) that were given incentives by the government to develop industry deemed vital to development and state’s interests. south korea’s economic take-off began during park chung-hee’s rule (1961 – 1979) after a military coup he initiated against chang myon’s administration. immediately after assuming power, park imposed some policies oriented to the goal of rapid industrialization such as the nationalization of country’s financial assets, including the banking system; and the acceleration of foreign loans inflow to the chaebol with both the principle and interest were guaranteed by the government (minns, 2001). park’s administration had significantly been inspired by the meiji government’s principle of “rich state and strong army policy” (fukoku kyohei). in the early 1970s, park shifted its industrial emphasis from light manufacturing towards heavy and chemical industries. the shift was exponentially driven by the us retrenchment post-vietnam war and its détente with the soviet union that consequently decreased its reliability. park imposed the heavy and chemical industry plan (hcip) to provide the capability for self-defense and focus on 66 political leadership in south korea’s developmental state the production of steel, petrochemicals, electronics, and shipbuilding (minns, 2001). to ensure internal stability, the regime ensured order and stability through a nationally organized and centrally responsive police and intelligence structures as instruments of rule (cumings, 1984). opposition parties were effectively banned during the fourth, and fifth republics and their leaders were subjected to harsh treatment, including imprisonment. any opposition should be suppressed to keep the whole aspects of state under its control. moreover, control over the media has been stern (eckert, 1991). on the other words, park defaulted on the western bloc’s most cherished ideas of free elections, liberal democracy, fundamental human and political rights. the south korean modernization is characterized by particularly acute tensions and discrepancies between effective strategies of development and ideological hypocrisy (kim k., 2006). the u.s. approach of supporting the global south’s undemocratic and authoritarian regimes during the cold war, nevertheless, was common and unsurprising. the need to contain the spread of communism became the strategic imperative to tolerate the atrocious rule of such regimes and to justify their postwar economic reconstruction effort (wong, 2004). in turn, these regimes accommodate the united states to gain benefits from aid, investments, and market access and eschew from becoming targets of its hostility (tønnesson, 2017). against this backdrop, this article aims to elucidate the historical paradox between south korea and japan through a micro-analysis of political leadership focusing on the role of park chung hee as the developmental state elite. in the next section, i will elaborate on the developmental state model and how the role of political leadership is prominent when applying the model. the sections thereafter will explain the features of the japanese developmental state model particularly during the meiji restoration and the ‘presumed’ japanese legacies prevalent to south korea’s subsequent development. lastly, this article will explore the role of park chung hee in actualizing the japanese developmental state formula to south korea by reflecting on his personal and professional ties with japan. developmental state model: the central role of political leadership many observers illustrate the successful modernization process in some countries in east asia using the developmental state paradigm. the term developmental state is coined by chalmers johnson (1982) in his seminal work on japan’s post-war development. the japanese formula has been described as ‘plan rational state’ or ‘plan-oriented market economy’ to substantially elucidate the intimate relationship of state with the private sector and the intensity of its involvement in the market (johnson, 1982). beeson (2009) posits that unlike “market rational” state that concerns with simply establishing the rules of the journal of asean studies 67 economic game, the “plan rational” states sought to formulate and pursue substantive social and economic goals. a developmental state model is defined by some significant components which include a determined developmental elite who effectively conceives executive dominance, creates bureaucratic unity, and a powerful, competent and insulated economic bureaucracy; selective and strategic use of resources and instruments; the effective management of non-state economic interests; and the use of repression, legitimacy and performance which in corollary sustain a weak and subordinated civil society (johnson, 1982; amsden, 1989; haggard, kim, & moon, 1991; leftwich 1995; tønnesson 2017). a developmental state is also characterized by the path dependency, institutional cohesion and the interlocking patterns of political and economic power that are such a ubiquitous and distinctive part of development in east asia (beeson, 2009). the core component of the developmental state is political leadership that accentuates executive dominance and embodies determined developmental elite. a developmental state has to be governed by determined and economically oriented elite. political leadership is central in choosing and realigning economic policies by political rationality and ‘developmental ideology’ (johnson 1989; amsden, 1989; moon & prasad, 1994). leader’s motivations and calculations are the vital clues to priority shift and policy change that usually require a perceived crisis among the population and for the new priorities to resonate with the emotional needs of public opinion (moon & prasad, 1994; tønnesson, 2017). sakata & hall (1965) on their study about meiji restoration argue that study of the motives of the political leaders is a formidable task to explain the figures who were to lead the way in the creation of a new structure of state and society. leadership style, therefore, determines how the executive dominance in a developmental state is being enforced (reigning vs. ruling). amsden (1989) suggests the importance of ‘learning’ rather than invention or innovation as the basis of industrialization which is relevant to the context of south korea. manufactures were initially developed and competed from borrowed technology which later optimized. they created products similar to those internationally available but with improvements in the specification and lower price thus enhance competitiveness (amsden, 1989). other incremental features of determined developmental elites include the intimate linkage of their civil and military bureaucracy and high political components; and the strong patron-client relations that eventually prompted the practice of corruption, technocratic economic management, patrimonialism, and coercion. leftwich (1995) further asserts the importance of the executive head of government who plays an instrumental role in establishing the developmental regime and its culture. moon & prasad (1994) examines the bureaucratic-executive nexus in the countries where executive dominance prevails. they posit that in such case, 68 political leadership in south korea’s developmental state policymaking is profoundly top-down, and bureaucrats hardly have autonomy and power. for instance, south korea during park chung hee regime, the nexus was rigidly vertical in which the president controls the concentration of administrative and personnel power. korean bureaucrats were structurally dependent on and vulnerable to the president (moon & prasad, 1994). in the east asian context particularly during the cold war, the emergence of ‘hard authoritarian’ regimes were the common historical precondition for developmental state model to take place. hard authoritarian regimes penetrate and prevail over civil society, and organized, subsidized, and controlled social groups (moon & prasad, 1994). most of such regimes in east asia commonly obtained their political source of the relative state autonomy through military coup d’état or forced transmission of state power (leftwich, 1995). traditionally, developmental regimes use the historical mission to deter communist forces to justify their concentration of power and nondemocratic practices hence legitimate the state’s intervention in a wide array of civil society’s activities. the unbroken lineage between south korean and japanese developmental state? this section will examine the features of the japanese developmental state model notably that implemented during the meiji era, and the japanese colonial legacies which presumably had laid a necessary foundation for south korea’s development. the locus of this study is meiji restoration, and the subsequent modernization of japan as the foundational establishment of the japanese developmental state model occurred during the period. even the japanese post-world war ii economic development indicated a replication of the reform formula of japan’s meiji era (tønnesson, 2017). distinctive features of japanese developmental state model in the meiji era (1868-1912) what makes the japanese development model – particularly that of the meiji era – different from the western model? the japanese model of development is recognized as the developmental state system where the state has dominant control over economic development. the government involvement in economic affairs is following ‘the command and control’ mode. the command and control mode demonstrate the extent of the military organizations’ reliance on the hierarchy and direct commands as well as central planning in which bureaucrats set production targets and quotas for farms and manufacturing firms (mosk, 2008). at an early stage of its industrial development japan was so poorly endowed by raw materials to support industrialization. the strategy to overcome this was to become an exporter of industrial goods to ensure foreign exchange availability which can be used to import raw material and to meet the cost of imported technology and expertise journal of asean studies 69 required to ‘catch up’ with other industrial countries (breen, 1997). the japanese model of development can be understood by observing the historical, political and social aspects that establish the distinctive features of this model. the japanese unprecedented rapid development was led by the meiji restoration (meiji ishin) starting in 1868 through the restoration of the imperial rule in japan. some historians argue that the breakdown of feudal economy and weakening defense capability during the late period tokugawa had led to the increased threat of foreign invasion by the western powers and caused widespread resentment against the shogunate (sakata & hall, 1956). the restoration was trademarked as a ‘revolution from above’ to modernize and maintain independence from a threatening west. after the coup which ended the tokugawa rule, the meiji oligarch leaders, consisting of those from satsuma and chōsū, launched a rapid program of industrialization emphasizing economic development as the key of security and to escape the country from backwardness (ginsburg, 2001). the restoration led to enormous changes in japan’s political and social structure which marked as the starting point of japanese modernization. it created an immensely powerful central government; abolished warrior privileges and open the administration office to anyone with the required education and skills; and instituted a compulsory military service system and universal public education to all people (mosk, 2008). meiji restoration has some distinctive features in its way of modernizing japan. first, the most crucial element of the meiji period was the principle of fukoku kyohei (enrich the country, strengthen the military) which explicitly aimed at absorbing western technology and institutions in political, economic and military affairs with the ultimate aim of resisting the pressure of and subsequently repelling the western power (mosk, 2008). macpherson (1987) posits that this xenophobic nationalism apparently dictated meiji’s rapid industrialization. as the industrialization became an economic underpinning of military power, the state particularly encouraged the import – then followed by the production – of indigenous technology and industry in fields such as steel, machine tools and shipbuilding (alexander, 2008). japan began to adopt the western military technology, build arsenals and shipyards, establish technical schools, and invite foreign military advisers (hacker, 1977). while internally, the politics of the early meiji period were dominated by the need to extinguish domestic opposition particularly by the disgruntled samurai. until domestic unrest could be squished, it would be difficult for the government’s authority to effectively institute policy and force the public to comply with it. secondly, one of the corollaries of fukoku kyohei was the shokusan kogyo (encourage the manufacture and promote industry) led to the emergence of zaibatsu in japan. it demonstrates a close interaction between government and 70 political leadership in south korea’s developmental state manufacturing as well as between economic policy and industrial development. the government at all levels should assist industry by coordinating it, by taking a long view of development rather than the short-run emphasis on making annual profits characteristic of decentralized “invisible hand” capitalism, that can appreciate the input-output connections between different sub-sectors of manufacturing (mosk, 2008). they see that the manifestation of shokusan kogyo could be achieved through the emergence of zaibatsu and the financial groups who controlled diversified economic empires, ranging from banking to insurance to international trade to textiles to iron and steel to shipbuilding to iron and steel manufacture. through these strategies formulated by the meiji oligarchs, japan jumped rapidly into the phase of capital monopoly. on the other hand, mosk (2008) argues that this strategy had a detrimental consequence to the emergence of a military-bureaucratic class who monopolizes capital in the form of the zaibatsu operating hand in glove with the authorities. the nation was hijacked by a tiny elite consisting of influential militarists and capitalists taking advantages from the government absolute power over the economy. the japanese system is unique due to this compact system of networks between state agencies, and business firms coined as ‘crony capitalism’ which portray collusion between all parties rather than competition. furthermore, in japan’s case, the state possesses the strength to penetrate and mobilize the society using the development narrative (evans, 1995). this relative autonomy, as evans (1995) described, includes bureaucratic agencies that were not only capable and coherent but also manipulation of the society and close ties with the economic actors who in turn support the policy implementation and the ‘guided’ development. presumption of ‘japanese colonial legacies’ there is still an ongoing debate amongst koreans – and scholars – about the japanese colonial legacies on korean development. some argue that the japanese colonization transformed korea into a developmental state through the production-oriented policy and establishing a business-government alliance that facilitated industrialization (kohli 1994; kohli 1997; kohli 2004; cumings 1984). the colonial economy experienced steady growth and industrialization, but it also became rather heavily export-oriented, including exports of manufactured products. besides, the colonial imposed brutal repression and systemic control of the lower classes in both the cities and the countryside. the cumulative impact of these state-class configurations was to create a framework for the evolution of a high-growth political economy (kohli, 1994). eckert (1991) further asserts that there is a continuity between colonial and postcolonial korean economic structure, noting the common elements in both the development models: ‘the pivotal economic function of the state, the concentration of private economic power in the hands of a few large business groups or chaebol (zaibatsu in japanese journal of asean studies 71 terminology), the emphasis on exports, and the threat or actuality of war as a stimulus for economic growth. conversely, some skeptics argue that amidst a claim of economic growth in the colonial korea, the record was relatively modest. furthermore, there were restrictions on indigenous business activity, limited employment opportunity in both public and private sectors for koreans, agricultural surplus and investments were primarily directed to military rather than economic imperatives (haggard, kang, & moon, 1997). there was a period gap between the end of japanese rule and the beginning of korea’s economic takeoff in which korea suffered from fundamental policy change and war. much of the japanese-financed capital was destroyed during the war. lastly, the japanese involvement in the emergence of korean firms and entrepreneurs in the interwar period is questionable. some of the current chaebols, like samsung and lg (formerly luckygoldstar), had ostensibly begun their operations during the japanese rule (breen, 1997). it is argued that irrespective of japanese colonialization, such firms would have emerged, although the korean acquisition of japanese assets had contributed to the rise of some economic groups in the 1950s (haggard, kang, & moon, 1997). why does the japanese legacy become so essential in discussing the korean model of development? as a starter, it is necessary to understand the nature of japanese colonization in korea. japan’s annexation policy toward korea was driven by its desire to become the hegemonic power in the region by building a mighty military might with the supports from the annexed states (kim k., 2006). thus, any ‘modernization’ policies and infrastructure built by the japanese in the colonial korea were selfishly motivated and most koreans did not obtain any benefits from them (kohli, 1997). it can be argued that leaving vital resources to support the future development in korea is not of the prudent intention of japan when colonizing the peninsula but merely an ‘unintended’ result of japan’s expansionist policy. before the japanese annexation, korea had been experiencing domestic instability due to some political riots as well as unequal agreements with foreign powers mainly japan, china, the u.s., germany, russia, italy, and france which resulted in weakening sovereignty of the country. these agreements significantly reduced korea’s control over ports, railways, and many other vital assets. besides, corruption had become the common practice of the government officials and rigid social structure widened the economic gap between the higher social class and the lower class that consequently fueled resentment by the commoners against the government. after the assassination of queen min in 1895 by the japanese and their korean followers, political unrests were culminated and fueled by the increasing japanese domination following the murder. russia took advantage of this situation by forcing 72 political leadership in south korea’s developmental state king kojong to submit to the russian legation in the hope that the foreign power can help deter the japanese. however, after japan’s victory over russia, the treaty of portsmouth assured japan effective supremacy in korea. furthermore, the agreements of 17 november 1905 and 24 july 1907 arbitrarily gave the japanese government the rights to interfere in korea’s domestic affairs signaling the beginning of japanese occupation (kleiner, 2001). kohli (1994) argues the ‘modernization’ experience was the most plausible – if not instrumental – legacy of the japanese colonialism. korean capitalism learned from the provided framework established during the colonialization. the colonial power emphasis on building not only military and police forms of control but also the development of the peninsula under strong state auspices is a particularly instrumental lesson for the future korean developmental elite. japan had brought the access to modern technology and management. managerial practices were changed in agriculture, industry, transportation, and government. for instance, japanese government's deliberate promotion of modern agricultural practices such as irrigation, improved seeds, and the use of fertilizer had pushed productivity growth in colonial korea (rice production rate of 2% per annum) (kohli, 1994). japan also introduced and utilized the “mighty trio” formula of the developmental state which is a coalition of the state bureaucratic organization, central banks, and zaibatsu conglomerates to industrialize korea and parts of manchuria (cumings, 1984). japan also located various heavy industries – steel, chemicals, hydroelectric power – in korea and built an extensive network of railways in korea (cumings, 1984). however, much of those infrastructures were destroyed during the korean war. japanese imperialism differs from its western counterpart in several fundamental respects. japan always sought to exercise a more intensive form of control over its colonies than european powers and to integrate its colonies into its economic structures. to facilitate economic exploitation and political control, the japanese constructed a highly repressive, efficient, modern state in korea. it exercised a pervasive and highly intensive form of control over all aspects of social and economic life in korea (piric, 2008). japan distorted the structure of korean society by replacing confucian and other indigenous teachings into a disciplined colonial bureaucracy education. other influences of the japanese colonialization to the korean education include large-size classes, a heavy emphasis on academic – rather than vocational – studies, moral education, deep respect for the authority of the teacher and a government-managed system of examinations for entrance to the high school and university (mason, 1980). it has been argued that the japanese transformed a relatively corrupt and ineffective traditional state into a modern one that was capable of transforming the society. one could argue that the japanese journal of asean studies 73 empire had significant contribution in liberating koreans from the backwardness and stagnation, in which koreans were otherwise unable to generate political and economic change (palais, 1995). however, eckert (1996) asserts that the authoritarianism that for decades epitomized south korean politics after the korean war owed much to the political character of the various korean elites generated during the late-colonial period. political leadership of park chung hee (1961-1979) and south korean developmental state following the end of world war ii, the relationship between the two countries develops in an intricate pattern. japan and korea (north and south) were engulfed in the post-war political realm as the world entered the tumultuous cold war period. korea was divided into the communist north and the ‘nominally’ liberal democratic south. meanwhile, japan began its pacifism era in which it drastically diminished any armed forces with war potentials. in the wake of korean war (1950-1953), japan and south korea were awkwardly unified under the security patronization of the united states and inherently be an integral part of the global political contestation between the superpowers. south korea and japan had connected another link in their future where both countries are to prepare to enter the battlefield side to side, regardless their past chronicle, if the truce with north korea is broken. in the immediate aftermath of korean war, south korea evidenced the fall of syngman rhee, an anti-communist independence figure who was elected as south’s first president, due to the widespread discontent of his iron-hand and corrupt government. a nation-wide protest eventually took place but was responded by police shooting which led to a subsequent chaotic mass riot. rhee was ultimately ousted and replaced by yun bo-seon as the president and chang myeon as prime minister. despite the exit of rhee, the political and economic instability persisted which provided a political opportunity for the military coup d’état, carried out by park chung hee in 1961. park was a high-rank military officer who had long initiated the establishment of the military revolutionary committee within the military corps to plan the coup. the coup brought park into power, and the subsequent approval and official recognition from the united states gave him the legitimate leadership status after that. under park administration, south korea experienced a ‘miraculous’ modernization that turned the country from one of the poorest one in the world into one of the global economic powerhouses. essentially, park chung hee has a significant japanese influence in his life. park chung hee had the primary education at kumi elementary school and taegu normal school, both of them using the japanese educational system. there is a notion of park chung hee being a cold and self-centered realist. it was reflected in his elementary school days where he 74 political leadership in south korea’s developmental state always carefully calculated his strategy and enjoyed exercising the authority given to him. he also had a great attraction to soldiering since a very young age. after spent some years becoming a teacher in munkyong, he got a chance to be an army by receiving japanese military education in japanese-occupied manchuria and imperial japanese army academy for several years. this japanese experience was seen as a vital component in the character of park’s future rule. not only was he exposed to japanese military planning, but he and his fellow korean officers were imbued with the japanese attitude of placing the interests of the group and nation before personal or family interest. in this sense, they were much less typically korean than the preceding generations. even after he became the president of south korea, he still showed the mentality and behavior of a japanese (breen, 1997). it was observed that park chung hee, mentally, was obliged to think “japanese,” by devoting to the yamato spirit of “one hundred million hearts beating as one,” and giving the loyalty and self-sacrifice to the emperor (kim h.a., 2004). park chung hee was even accused of being a pro-japanese due to his action of submitting the oath of allegiance demonstrating his devotion to the japanese empire (hankyoreh, 2009). park was also seen as having the ambition to reinvent his identity as a ‘victorious’ japanese army officer. within just three months of being in the army, park voluntarily japanized his name to takaki masao. it was described that park chung hee looked like a japanese soldier from the way he sat and stood to his actions characterized by his accuracy, speed, decisiveness and his action-oriented based character. park graduated from the military academy with an excellent record and the emperor of manchuria henry p’uyi awarded park a gold watch for his academic excellence (kim h.-a., 2004). there are some policies and development strategies imposed by park chung hee demonstrating the significant influence of his japanese experience. had it not been park chung hee, it could be unlikely for south korea to adopt the japanese developmental state model to an unprecedented degree. the most fundamental policy was the normalization of south korea-japan relations in 1965 in exchange for japanese aid and investment. by february 1964, just a little over a month after park’s presidential inauguration on 27 december 1963, normalization talks between japan and korea began. normalization of korea’s relations with japan had also been part of the us policy from 1947 as part of the us containment strategy, which was designed to make japan a partner in the cold war against communism. the us policy regarding normalizing korea-japan relations demonstrates a shift from demilitarization and democratization toward economic rehabilitation to create a dominant anti-communist force in northeast asia. in contrast to syngman rhee’s anti-japanese stance, park chung hee made a bold move to support this normalization idea. he visited japan’s prime minister ikeda in tokyo in journal of asean studies 75 november 1961 and talked not only with ikeda but also many japanese business leaders. although park’s primary interest was economic, this move shows his flexibility in dealing with japanese compared to the former regimes. park chung hee was seen to be greatly inspired by the meiji restoration’s principle that emphasizes the need of economic development to strengthen the military in order to resist the potential threat (fukoku kyohei). park’s “administrative democracy” or “koreanized democracy” was the public rationale for his military-style administration, which, he claimed, was necessary to root out the past and to construct a new generation of national leadership comprising former military officers, technical engineers and other experts with professional qualifications (kim h.-a., 2004). park chung hee mentioned that: “i want to emphasize, and reemphasize, that the key factor of the may 16 military revolution was to effect an industrial revolution in korea…i must again emphasize that without economic reconstruction, there would be no such things as triumph over communism or attaining independence.” (park chung hee) (kim h.-a. , 2004) this statement demonstrates how the potential threat from the north drives the economic development view of the south korean leader. his regime rejected the use of force against north korea and instead stressed the need to build national strength and security through economic modernization. in this manner, park wished to win over the communist in the north. the ‘mighty trio’ formula of japan’s meiji was replicated during park chung hee regime with the presence of the economic planning board (epb), state’s control over the nationalized banking system, and the role of the chaebol. only months after he assumed power, park nationalized the banking system and controlled 96,4% of the country financial assets by 1970 (lueddeneurath, 1988). economic planning was taken seriously in south korea during park chung hee administration where he set up the economic planning board (epb), the ministry of finance, and the ministry of commerce and industry as the core economic bureaucracies. these ministries held the responsibility to combine the budgetary and planning powers and had tremendous power over economic decision-making (haggard, kim, & moon, 1991). organized business groups are regularly consulted on matters affecting the private sector, but it is evident that such groups exercise no influence on the country’s decisionmaking (mason, 1980). institutions are structured to facilitate this participation, and there is ample testimony that president park and his economic secretariat in the blue house were fully engaged in the process. park subjugated bureaucrats under his grip and dictated virtually every policy detail (moon & prasad, 1994). 76 political leadership in south korea’s developmental state the south korean pattern of development has a strong sense of nationalism on it which demonstrates another similar pattern with the fundamental factor driving the meiji restoration. while the threat of western invasion ostensibly drove the meiji regime’s modernization policy, south korea’s economic development was defined to address the threat from the north. unlike western companies, whose raison d’etre is to increase the wealth of their shareholders, korean firms were substantially established and existed for nation-building. thus, korea appeared to be a capitalist country on the surface, whereas on the inside its practices and attitudes made it look much more socialist (breen, 1997). it was during the park chung hee regime that business conglomeration structure (chaebol) gained its momentum. park particularly wanted firms that could compete internationally with the japanese. he thought that, as koreans were not hard workers, and, as businesspeople and politicians were corrupt, a few loyal and capable lieutenants would be more effective than the vast army of small and medium business people. there was a risk that the development of large, powerful groups could provide power bases for ambitious tycoons to challenge his authority. however, park chung hee thought he was able to control the chaebol with his hard authoritarian and militaristic approach (breen, 1997). another similarity between park chung hee’s strategy and the meiji regime was the use of western economic and technological advance without necessarily adopting the western model of development. the developed west, in general, was crucial to the koreans for its technological import. korean growth was possible because korean workers were cheap and disciplined, and educated enough to learn how to use or copy foreign machines (breen, 1997). although independence is the main emphasis in park chung hee’s idea of economic development, he understood the importance of the alliance with the u.s. for korea’s growth. the u.s. government provided a security shield against possible renewed conflict with north korea, and a market for korean products. there have been tensions and difficulties, but the benefit to korea was that it was both in american strategic interest and a natural consequence of american values as a nation born in opposition to imperialism, that its client state grows economically and politically from near-total dependency to equal partnership. ultimately, following the path of the meiji government on extinguishing the corrupt tokugawa rule, park chung hee also had been enforcing the resurrection of korean national character, primarily those in support of economic development since the national character on his view was – to some extent – had been polluted during the choson dynasty era, the last dynasty of korea prior to the japanese annexation. during his presidency, park chung hee was known as a supporter of anti-elitist and anti-populist ideals, which were manifested in the self-restrained and disciplinary atmosphere (han, 2004). park journal of asean studies 77 was one of the most financially disciplined dictators in history showed his strictness in handling political funds in an attempt to prevent corruption, especially within the elite circle. immediately after taking power, he launched an anti-corruption campaign. reflection on indonesia’s past and present south korea’s developmental state model somewhat mirrors indonesia’s experience during the new order regime led by suharto (1967-1998). both park chung hee and general suharto had a military background and rose into power through a military coup in around the same period. suharto’s regime, dubbed as the new order, also combined a successful economy-first policy with hard authoritarianism and harsh internal repression. upon assuming power, suharto deliberately abandoned his predecessor’s confrontational policy against malaysia and instead formed the association of southeast asian nations (asean) in 1967 with the former enemy. furthermore, he sought rapprochement with japan, indonesia’s former colonial. indonesia experienced remarkable economic growth and development throughout the 1970s and 1980s. industrialization was undertaken by conglomerates, mostly of chineseindonesian descendants, who dominated the nation’s economy even until now. suharto was consolidating both his power over the army and bureaucracy and the indonesian developmental state by winning over support or buying off opposition (leftwich, 1995). however, this strategy consequently provided a fertile ground for the high-level corruption which contributed to the regime’s downfall in the late 1990s. following the economic crisis in 1998, the regime was unable to sustain the domestic political unrest and the wave of democratization which subsequently ended the regime 31year rule. amidst demonstrating similar patterns, indonesia failed to reach south korea’s level of modernization. it can be argued that indonesia has lost the momentum to modernize the country due to the regime’s inability to control corruption and sustain the emerging domestic political forces. the question is whether the developmental state is still relevance in the current political and economic context? indonesia’s bitter experience with the authoritarian regime makes it difficult to maintain the old developmental state model which imposes the authoritarian political system. in a democracy, civil society and business sectors are more willing to criticize the government policy or challenge it. moreover, greater trade and financial integration with other countries can hinder the state from taking full control over the state’s economic process and financial assets. however, hayashi (2010) argues that the developmental state is not necessarily extinct. the developmental state in the era of globalization needs to accommodate the global market strategically while maintaining the proactive role of the state. to achieve this trajectory, according to the developmental 78 political leadership in south korea’s developmental state state formula, the political leadership should be assumed by determined developmental elite with a visionary economic orientation. conclusion despite its hatred and negative sentiments toward japan due to the colonization experience, south korea seems to adopt the japanese model of development. this condition is contradictive with what south korea was expected to do if it considers this negativity. with its close ally with the united states, there was a high possibility that south korea could adopt the western model of development instead of the japanese one. as we could see that the main difference between the japanese and western model can be seen in the level of the state’s role in the development process. while the western model supports the market rational with less interference from the state, japanese model implements a developmental state model in which the state holds effective control over the development process. by referring to the political leadership element within the developmental state concept, i argue that the role of park chung hee is instrumental in south korea’s adoption of the japanese developmental state model. had it not been park chung hee, it would be unlikely to happen. park chung hee was a central figure that could make this paradoxical condition plausible due to his japanese linkage and his trajectory about south korea’s modernization in its conjunction with the threat from north korea. about the author ratu ayu asih kusuma putri is a faculty member and researcher at the department of international relations, bina nusantara university, jakarta. she earned her bachelor's degree in international relations from universitas indonesia and master's degree in international relations from the graduate institute of peace studies, kyunghee university, south korea. her specialized research interest has been primarily on the issues of forced displacement, human rights and democracy. some of her recent works include those related to urban refugee management in makassar city, the work of rohingya self-organized organizations in malaysia, and the role of digital game-based learning in studying international relations. references alexander, a. 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(2004). the adaptive developmental state in east asia. journal of east asian studies, 4, 345362. journal of asean studies, vol. 7, no. 1 (2019), pp. 73-85 doi: https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v7i1.5520 ©2019 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic business and human rights in asean: lessons from the palm oil sector in malaysia andika ab. wahab institute of malaysian & international studies, malaysia abstract the release of the united nations guiding principles on business and human rights (ungp-bhr) in 2011 aims to address gaps in human rights governance by setting a standard and corporate culture of respecting human rights. as part of the state responsibility to implement these guiding principles, some member states of the association of southeast asian nations (asean) have already embarked preliminary steps towards establishing their respective national action plan on business and human rights (napbhr), while others are still lag behind. drawing from the palm oil sector’s experience in malaysia, this study aims to provide lessons for asean member states to contemplate when developing their napbhr, in particular under pillar 2 of the ungp-bhr. in this article, i argue that while some large palm oil companies have shown modest progress in realizing their human rights obligation, challenges emerge in many forms including the lack of leadership, collaboration and ambition to steer and scale up industry transformation on human rights across the supply chain. equally important, challenges around certification scheme depict that it is not the only solution in persuading respect to human rights. meaningful values transfer often overlooked in certification practice resulting in typical "ticking the audit box" exercise without understanding principles behind it. as such, the development of napbhr among the asean member states should reflect on this reality and challenges. key words: business and human rights, palm oil, due diligence, compliance, certification introduction globalization has brought with it increasing economic interdependence through a rapid expansion of cross-border movement of goods, services, technologies and human capital across the globe. arguably, such expansion has strengthened trade-related standards as the economic actors compete to provide the best products and services in their respective businesses. while it has benefited the international community on various aspects of life, the globalization and expansion of transnational economic activities have its dark side. corporate-related human rights violation has been argued to be one of the critical negative consequences brought by globalization in the context of today’s international business. ruggie in his final report submitted to the united nations’ human rights council (unhrc) 74 business and human rights in asean highlighted that the root cause of the business and human rights predicament today lies in the governance gaps created by globalization – between the scope and impact of economic forces and actors, and the capacity of societies to manage their adverse consequences. the gaps in governance provide a permissive environment for wrongful acts by unscrupulous companies without adequate reparation (ruggie, 2008, pp. 3). in 2011, the united nations’ human rights council (unhrc) endorsed the united nations guiding principles on business and human rights (ungp-bhr) – a global framework that aspires to serve as an authoritative focal point to enhance standards and practices with regard to business and human rights so as to achieve socially sustainable globalization. the ungp-bhr is grounded in recognition of its core general principles, namely (i) states’ existing obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human rights and fundamental freedoms (pillar 1); (ii) the role of business enterprises as specialized organs of society performing specialized functions, required to comply with all applicable laws and to respect human rights (pillar 2); and (iii) the need for rights and obligations to be matched to appropriate and effective remedies when breached (pillar 3) (unhrc, 2011, pp. 1). in order to implement these guiding principles, the states are expected to develop and enact a national action plan on business and human rights (napbhr). the napbhr is expected to assist the states to identify national priorities, develop concrete policy and regulatory options related to business and human rights. the office of the high commissioner for human rights (ohchr, 2019) reports that there are 21 countries who have already produced their respective napbhr. none of the member states of the association of southeast asian nations (asean) has produced a napbhr, but countries such as thailand, indonesia and malaysia have expressed their commitment to developing theirs. the ohchr (2019) also reports that countries such as the philippines and myanmar had earlier indicated their readiness to develop napbhr in coming years. in short, the years 2019 and 2020 are a very crucial period for some asean member states in developing their napbhr. while the development process of the napbhr would certainly involve businesses as one of the stakeholders, limitations persist due to time, geographical and methodological constraints. as such, the stakeholders' engagement might not be able to fully reflect the real challenges facing businesses dealing with the complex supply chain. pillar 2 of the ungp-bhr stresses the important role of the industry players as specialized organs of society – to comply with all applicable laws and corporate regulations, as well as to initiate their respective commitment and strategy journal of asean studies 75 to respect human rights beyond legal compliance. drawing specifically from the palm oil sector’s experience in malaysia, this study aims to provide lessons for asean member states (including malaysia) to contemplate when developing their napbhr, in particular under pillar 2 of the ungp-bhr. in this article, i rely heavily on publicly available sources comprising companies' annual and sustainability reports, sustainability progress updates, sustainability dashboards and other related sustainability information available in their respective official websites. business and human rights development in asean human rights are becoming a more prominent subject in asean. article 1(7) of the asean charter provides a clear commitment among the asean member states to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms in the region. the establishment of the asean intergovernmental commission on human rights in 2009 and the proclamation of the asean human rights declaration (ahrd) in 2012 further show that human rights are an important regional agenda. amongst the earliest initiative with respect to human rights and business in asean was the conduct of a thematic study on corporate social responsibility (csr) and human rights initiated by the asean intergovernmental commission on human rights (aichr). the thematic study reports that though many member states are already in possession of rules and regulations to address potential corporate human rights impacts, general awareness on the nexus between csr and human rights remains low. the report suggests the aichr and other asean bodies to work together to develop an asean-wide csr-human rights guidelines to assist member states to enhance their understanding and corporate practices that are aligned with internationally-recognized standards on human rights. as the follow up to the publication of aichr thematic study on csr and human rights, the aichr organized a four-day training in bangkok in november 2017 to exchange views on issues and challenges facing the asean member states and businesses in their respective country in the implementation of ungp-bhr. at the end of this training, participants reiterated the need for the aichr to develop a regional framework on business and human rights in the region. in june 2018, the aichr collaborated with the undp asia-pacific and several other international organizations in organizing an interregional dialogue to share good practices among different regional mechanisms and countries from other regions in bangkok, thailand. the thai government representative who officiated the interregional dialogue expressed its 76 business and human rights in asean government strong commitment to expedite the development process of its napbhr and subsequently urged other asean member states to do the same. at the state level, as discussed previously, some asean member states have already committed to develop and publish their respective napbhr. in fact, some of them are already in the final stage of its development process. thailand, for example, has recently circulated its final draft napbhr to the public for comment in february 2019 and is projected to publish it by the end of 2019. similarly, indonesia has started the process to develop napbhr in early 2019 and is also expected to publish it in december 2019. in malaysia, though the human rights commission of malaysia (suhakam) had published its strategic framework for malaysia’s napbhr in 2015, the government does not have a robust plan for its actual development process. the ohchr (2019) reports that myanmar and the philippines have taken their preliminary steps towards developing their respective napbhr. however, no further details as to how the development process progresses. other countries such as brunei darussalam, cambodia, lao pdr, singapore and viet nam do not clearly indicate their intention to develop napbhr. why palm oil in malaysia, and why now? malaysia is uniquely positioned as a southeast asia’s business hub, attracting more than 5,000 foreign corporations from 40 countries operating their businesses in many key economic sectors including agriculture (yusof, 2017). in this article, i focus specifically on the palm oil business in malaysia. the reasons for choosing palm oil business sector in this article are manifold. first, the palm oil industry is an important source of economic growth and development (szulczyk, 2013), contributing to malaysia’s annual export revenue between rm60 billion (approximately us$15 billion) and rm70 billion (us$ 17.5 billion) (azman, 2013). moreover, malaysia is the second largest producer of palm oil and a global major exporter. secondly, after more than a hundred years of its existence, palm oil is still a labour-intensive sector, hiring a half million of workers – the majority of which are foreign labourers (azman, 2013). undeniably, the growing demand and expansion of business operations have benefited many pockets including the small farmers, local community and workers. however, as the palm oil business proliferates, so has the alleged human rights harms in the palm oil sector. on this note, it is worth mentioning that for the past few years, an increasing number of watchdogs’ reports have documented serious labour exploitation against foreign workers in the palm oil sector in malaysia. these include a report published by finnwatch (2014) which monitors the realization of labour rights in the activities of finnish companies and journal of asean studies 77 their supply chains, including some malaysian palm oil companies. this justifies another reason why palm oil business is the focus of this article. in malaysia, business conducts are governed by the existing national laws and regulations, which include the prohibition of forced and child labour, respecting customary land and indigenous people rights, compliance to safety and health, implementation of a minimum wage, restriction of excessive working hours, and the enjoyment of the right to association. however, human rights in the business sector in malaysia focuses much on complying with the right to safety and health, and barely pays attention to other labour and human rights as mentioned above. businesses in malaysia are very much accustomed to the concept of csr (suhakam, 2015) – a set of voluntary actions companies undertake that goes beyond compliance with the existing laws and regulation. in fact, malaysia is deemed to be one of the emerging economies that are involved in csr activity (thompson & zakaria, 2004). as part of their csr activity, many businesses especially malaysian public listed companies are engaged in corporate disclosure and publicly reporting their social responsibility activities (mohd nasir et al., 2013). in 2007, the securities commission (sc) and bursa malaysia began to impose a mandatory requirement for all public listed companies to report their csr activities (human rights resource centre, 2013). in addition, the securities commission promulgated the malaysian code for corporate governance and the bursa corporate governance guide – which encourage corporate directors to consider producing sustainability reports that address a company’s community involvement activities, provision of equal opportunity and diversity, prohibition of child labour, access to grievance and freedom of association (human rights resource centre, 2013). furthermore in 2014, the government of malaysia through its regulatory body, bursa malaysia, initiated the ftse4good bursa malaysia index, which requires companies who wish to be included in the index to achieve the set requirements such as monitoring and reporting companies’ commitment on human and labour rights, supply chain labour standards, climate change and countering briber (nordin et al., 2016). despite the presence of sustainability certification standards such as the roundtable sustainable palm oil (rspo), the industry’s enforcement of human rights standards is weak and insufficient to address human rights harms in the palm oil sector (varkkey, 2015). human rights campaigning ngos such as international and rainforest action network (ran) have criticized the rspo for having a little concern for the welfare of palm oil workers, and strongly citing that it is a not reliable certification scheme that could ensure sustainable and responsible palm oil production (chow & ananthalakshmi, 2016). 78 business and human rights in asean in view of the mounting pressure on corporate-related human rights harms and relatively slower progress from the government of malaysia in relation to having a strong governance structure on business and human rights – suhakam published its strategic framework on national action plan (nap) on business and human rights in 2015. the strategic framework aims to support the government to develop a dedicated nap to guide businesses to respect human rights. however, as of end 2018, the government has yet to adopt such nap, leaving corporations in malaysia unregulated of their human rights obligations. challenges in the palm oil sector in malaysia collectively, the palm oil business in malaysia is expanding rapidly – in response to the rising global market demand. in doing that, they need more lands to be converted to oil palm estates, and for that – they need more workers to plant seeds, grow it and harvest them once matured. it has been argued that while some large palm oil companies have expressed their policy commitment and modest progress in embracing human rights into their business operations, such development has yet to reach their suppliers – comprising small and medium-sized oil palm players. this section discusses what challenges facing oil palm companies, in particular, the small and medium-sized industry players to replicate the progress on corporate respect to human rights that have been performed by large companies. gaps in legal and regulatory infrastructure current legal and regulatory infrastructure in malaysia does not progress on par with the palm oil business expansion, and their responsibility to respect human rights. companies are not specifically duty bound to declare their human rights commitment, or to undertake human rights due diligence, and report their progress on a regular basis. however, public listed palm oil companies are required by the laws and regulations to at least report their corporate social responsibility activities. some companies listed in the bursa malaysia are encouraged to produce sustainability report addressing their community engagement activities and other activities related to the promotion of human rights such as the prohibition of child labour, assurance for freedom of association and equal opportunity. nevertheless, such requirements are only imposed to a very small number of businesses as compared to the entire industry players in the palm oil sector. the rest of the companies, in particular, the small and medium-sized enterprises including mills, estates and smallholders are left unregulated specific on their human rights commitment. journal of asean studies 79 leadership when campaigning ngos, consumer-based associations and regional organizations like the european commission (eu) lobbying and advocating for the banning of the palm oil products linked to human rights violations – the target often goes to large and established companies and brands. the small and medium-sized industry players are barely affected though they are part of the supply chain. let us go back to the spirit of the ungp-bhr that says every company, regardless of their size of operation has equal responsibility in upholding and respecting human rights. the next question would be how best such responsibility is to be equally distributed when the small and medium-sized companies have many limitations including lack of resources, capacity and ambition to transform their practices? this brings me to discuss what should be the role of large and public listed palm oil companies in order to bring their supply chain to collectively align their commitment to respect human rights? and, what has been done by these companies, and what else they may consider undertaking? in this article, i argue that leadership is necessary for large companies to inspire their suppliers to be part of this human rights transformation journey. many large companies' human rights commitment such as sime darby’s human rights charter, or wilmar’s no deforestation, no peat and no exploitation (ndpe) policy are ambitious in nature, and sometimes beyond the capability of their suppliers to execute. many of these large companies are also aware of the barriers hindering their suppliers to comply with their human rights commitment. the companies are also aware that the current legal and policy infrastructures do not guarantee their suppliers could achieve their ambitious human rights commitment. as such, ambitious and visionary policy commitment as shown by these large companies require strong leadership. leadership in this sense refers to a far-reaching commitment by large companies to lead and drive industry transformation across its supply chain, and possibly across the palm oil sector. initially, each level of suppliers (e.g. mill, estate, fresh fruit bunches dealer, small grower and smallholder) has their equal responsibility when it comes to respecting human right. however, each of them has a different level of resources available, capability and exposure to human rights. as such, the suppliers are not well-equipped and ready to commit to human rights requirements. an easy example such as undertaking human rights due diligence is a resource-intensive and heavy exercise, requiring sufficient understanding of the application of human rights principles into the business' activities. hence, the responsibility to lead transformation goes back to the large company's prima facie responsibility to 80 business and human rights in asean raise awareness, train, build capacity and support the implementation of human rights initiatives for their suppliers. with that, it is hoped that the trained suppliers will replicate such responsibility with their respective business partners and contractors. large and public-listed companies such as felda global ventures (fgv), sime darby plantation and wilmar international have been organizing capacity building initiatives for their suppliers including mills and estates supplying oil palm fruits and oils to its owned-mills and other operating facilities. if so, why are there still gaps with respect to human rights responsibility among their suppliers on the ground? and, why many other small and medium-sized palm oil companies still lack human rights policy in place? why some workers are still getting salary below minimum wage? industry collaboration and innovation there is no easy answer to respond as to why there is still a gap with respect to human rights responsibility among industry players. potential answers may range from the lack of appetite among small and medium-sized companies to change their practices to the lack of legal obligation to govern companies to do so. this brings me to discuss how, and/or whether industry collaboration and innovation could bring industry players, in all its forms, to play their part to respect human rights in the business sector. wilmar international was quoted that "individually, we are one drop, collectively, we are an ocean" (wilmar international, 2017). collaboration is not just important for companies to act collectively in addressing emerging issues such as corporate-related human rights violations, but also to transform their business practices aligned with the expected standards through sustained collaboration. importantly, collaboration among the palm oil players is needed to address common issues facing the industry. often industry players face common or industry-wide issues. for example, labour shortage and the hiring of undocumented migrant workers are two common issues and practice facing the palm oil companies. these issues are complex to be resolved by industry players alone as it involves the government's migrant worker policy and regulations. as such, the collaboration between companies is needed to raise such issues for the government's immediate intervention. collaboration in the palm oil sector often linked to the multi-stakeholder’s group, the rspo. other than guiding its member companies to comply to the internationally-recognized standards, the rspo has an important role to play in spearheading collaboration among its members, their suppliers as well as other third party including civil society and regulators. the rspo is also expected to serve as an advocacy platform in raising and addressing industry-wide human rights issues such as child labour, forced labour, issues relating to non-payment of wages and bonded labour, discrimination journal of asean studies 81 and gender inequality at the workplace, restriction of freedom of movement and retention of workers’ passports. varkkey claims that rspo has been transforming its role from an organization championing sustainability issues into a supra-national policy organization (varkkey, 2015, pp. 157). does it mean that rspo is now being an active platform for policy advocacy that could shape and influence global oil palm commodity market? to be fair, this is a question needing a thorough observation and analysis, and responses from its member companies. with respect to human rights, the rspo deserves appreciation for being able to continuously strengthen its human rights principles. the recently revised rspo’s principles and criteria (p&c) (2018), as endorsed by its board of governors on 15 november 2018, have included a commitment to provide a decent living wage (see criteria 6.2) and respect to the rights of human rights defender (see criteria 4.1). while the rspo has been able to strengthen its human rights commitment under its rspo p&c, the lack of incentives and added costs to its members triggered more uncomfortable feeling among its members. in fact, the strengthening of human rights principles and criteria in its certification standards is argued to be risking its members to public scrutiny – in relation to human rights noncompliance. consequently, as claimed by varkkey there is on-going speculation that there will be rspo's members in malaysia will quit from the group and focus more on nationally-based sustainability standard under the malaysia sustainable palm oil (mspo) certification (varkkey, 2015, pp. 157). the idea of collaboration is often linked to innovation. technological advancement has been leveraged well by industry players especially in high-value industries such as communication and electronic industries. the palm oil sector, especially the downstream level such as the processors, traders and consumer brands have been innovating ways through technology to map out and share their traceability data, monitor and report the progress of their human rights activities. similarly, the oil palm growers and large oil palm companies such as fgv, sime darby plantation and wilmar international – have begun to collaborate with various non-profit organizations and social partners such as the verite, solidaridad, oxfam novib and forest peoples programme to innovate the ways they assess human rights impacts, and gather, compile and report their human rights activities. going beyond certification the next question is whether the suppliers comprising the medium-sized mills, estates, and growers further down the supply chains – are truly benefiting from this collaboration and innovation, and replicating it at scale. in my final point, i argue that while sustainability certification standards in particular national standards such the mspo are getting more support from industry 82 business and human rights in asean players – certification alone is not adequate to guarantee the respect to human rights a reality. while the certification standards have positive impacts, we can no longer afford to gloss over its failures (poynton, 2015). the objectives of certifications standards, amongst others, to address the wicked environmental and social issues including human rights violations committed by businesses regardless of their place and size of operation. certification promises the solution to environmental calamity and social issues facing the global community as a whole. to achieve this vision, millions of dollars have been invested to come up with certification model, auditing methodology and compliance mechanism let alone money that has been invested in the form of consultation and auditing fees. the result of this – a handful of business operations being certified and are eligible to supply their oil palm products to selected global brands who buy only socalled highly traceable and certified oil. in reality, nevertheless, truly sustainable and responsible practices even among certified companies are not guaranteed. what more among the small and medium-sized oil palm mills and estates who do not even have a standard on human rights to comply with. for the past few years, a number of large and sustainably-certified companies continue to have been associated with numerous human rights violations. for example, wilmar international was alleged to have committed to child labour in its own plantations and suppliers in indonesia in 2017 (amnesty international, 2016). two years earlier (in 2015), fgv was alleged of committing forced and bonded labour (almahmood, 2015). another malaysianbased palm oil conglomerate, kuala lumpur-kepong (klk) was alleged of mistreating its workers in its palm oil estates in sumatra and kalimantan, indonesia in 2013 (varkkey, 2015). wilmar international, fgv and klk were among rspo-certified companies who had been strictly audited and certified against internationallyrecognized sustainability standards including human rights. having been strictly audited by competent auditors, these companies still cannot excuse themselves from critical issues such as human and labour rights violations. while certification standards emphasize on documentation, assessment and implementation of the action plan – "values" in the certification process are often forgotten. essentially, human rights are about upholding universal values such as "children should not working in the oil palm estate simply because it may compromise their physical safety, child development and access to education". this is not difficult to understand. however, even until today, no one would be able to guarantee that no children are working and/or assisting their parents without proper guidance and adult’s supervision in oil palm estate – especially in east malaysia. for values to be effectively shared to all industry players and translated into journal of asean studies 83 business actions there must be a constant and meaningful engagement and interface between industry players and human rights experts and institutions. not to say that such engagement has never occurred before but the questions of "what motivates such engagement to take place" and "what messages were transmitted to industry players during auditing process" are essential. in short, human rights values need to be meaningfully transferred to industry players, and it is more than just a simple exercise of "ticking the audit boxes". conclusion based on the palm oil sector’s experience in malaysia, the gaps in governance are contributed by, and exist in many forms, including the lack of national regulatory and policy frameworks from the side of the states, and lack of expertise, ambition and leadership among industry players to steer industry transformation on human rights. consequently, too few of the industry players that have progressed and reached a scale commensurate with the challenges at hand. the greatest challenge is how we could ensure the supply chain, which forms the majority of the industry players are progressing, and at the same time making sure that they are not being excluded from the supply chain just because they do not comply with the sought standards. excluding a problematic or non-compliance supplier from a pool of supply chain does not guarantee that human rights violations will end. in fact, such practices may prevail, and escalate as they continue their business as usual. as some asean member states are expecting to produce their respective napbhr by the end of 2019, while others are expected to follow suit in the coming years – it is important for the states to reflect the real encounters facing companies dealing with complex supply chains such as in the palm oil sector. discussion in this preliminary article provides opportunities for future research and may serve as a source of hypotheses for further critical and quantitative studies on human rights governance, within and outside the palm oil sector. for example, future research may further investigate the aspect of human rights disclosure among public listed companies to better understand strategy or system the companies have in place to manage their human rights impacts. quantitative research may also be undertaken to measure and analyse human rights impacts the companies have in their own business operations, and their suppliers. further critical research can be initiated to understand the readiness and real challenges facing suppliers in the palm oil sector to commit and fully comply with the expected standards of human rights. about the author andika ab. wahab holds a phd in anthropology and international relations from the national university of malaysia (ukm), and currently working as a 84 business and human rights in asean research fellow with the institute of malaysian & international studies (ikmas), ukm. he previously served as a researcher with the foreign ministry of malaysia, working closely with the asean secretariat and the asean intergovernmental commission on human rights (aichr). references al-mahmood, s. z. 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https://www.nst.com.my/business/2017/11/306520/nestle-opens-its-global-procurement-hub-malaysia%c2%a0 the shift and continuity of japanese defense policy: revolutionary enough? ria putri santoso president university, indonesia anak agung banyu perwita president university, indonesia abstract the security environment in east asia has continuously evolved, particularly concerning china’s maritime expansion and north korea’s provocative behavior. japan, with its military that is being limited by its pacifist constitution, has been steadily shifting its defense policy to respond to its strategic environment for its past three prime ministers: naoto kan, yoshihiko noda, and shinzo abe. historical enmities, military capability, as well as territorial disputes have increased the threats from japan’s neighbors to tokyo’s national security. since 2010, japan has established a national defense program guideline (ndpg), shifted its defense strategy from the basic defense force (kibanteki boei ryoko) to dynamic defense force (doeki boei ryoko), revised its three principles on arms exports, created the national security council (nsc), the national security strategy (nss), and the medium term defense program (mdtp), as well as reinterpreted the article 9 of its pacifist constitution. while the nsc, nss, mdtp, and article 9 are conducted under the abe administration, the claim that the steps abe has undertaken to be revolutionary is misleading, as they are in fact a continuity from his predecessors despite coming from opposing political backgrounds. despite of several significant changes in its defense policy, japan still abides to its constitution and its military is still limited. key words: shinzo abe, defense policy, japan, defense force, military introduction located in the easternmost of east asia, japan is bordered by seas with other east asian nations. on its western coasts, the sea of japan lies among north korea, south korea, and japan. furthermore, china lies next to japan’s southwestern most islands, separated by the east china sea. with historical enmities with several of japan’s east asian neighbors and territorial disputes, combined with china’s maritime expansion, and north korea’s missile and nuclear threats, japan has a lot to consider in its strategic environment. as of recent years, japan seems to have been making bold moves in regards to its military and the constitution. the cabinet’s approval for a reinterpretation of its japan self-defense forces (jsdf) in order to help defend foreign countries under the notion of self-defense has now given way for jsdf to fight overseas with its allies when they are under attack (withitwinyuchon, 2016). the step has been met with criticism from its neighbor, china, whom believes that tokyo has journal of asean studies, vol. 4, no. 2 (2016), pp. 156-177 doi: 10.21512/jas.v4i2.1906.g1747 ©2016 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic journal of asean studies 157 endangered the peace in the region (bbc news, 2015). while it may seem bold, the steps taken by tokyo, however, are derived from japan’s security threats from its strategic environment that needs to be addressed to achieve its national security. this article discusses the shift and continuity of japanese foreign policy related to the changes of its strategic environment. most often, the defense policies of states in a particular region are influenced by the geopolitics of the region. the purpose of this is to achieve the best possible strategic environment so that national interests and ultimately national security will be attained. the significant interest of superpowers in a particular region has altered the significance of that region’s geopolitics not only regionally, but also internationally. in particular, this paper elaborates the japanese defense policy under three different administrations: naoto kan, yoshihiko noda, and shinzo abe. threat perception of japan as one of the nations located in east asia, japan’s wellbeing is affected by the region’s strategic importance. japan’s geographical location is surrounded by the seas (figure 1), ensuring that maritime security is of critical importance to japan. ‚japan is surrounded by the sea, and has a long coastline, numerous remote islands and a vast exclusive economic zone (eez). japan is a maritime state and dependent largely on international trade for its supply of food and natural resources.‛ (japan’s 2014 national defense program guideline (ndpg)) figure 1. map of japan in its 2015 defense white paper and its 2014 national defense program guideline (ndpg), japan has identified itself as a maritime nation that depends on 158 the shift and continuity of japanese defense policy sea transport to import resources such as energy and hence achieving secure sea lanes as much more vital for japan’s survival (ministry of defense, japan, 2015). in fact, japan’s focus on its maritime capability goes as far back as its 2005 ndpg, where it has emphasized the need for maritime perimeter and strengthening its capability to deter threats away from its shores (ministry of defense, japan, 2004). ‚in considering japan’s security, we have to take into account vulnerabilities resulting from: limited strategic depth; long coast lines and numerous small islands; and a large number of important facilities in coastal areas, in addition to frequent natural disasters due to japan’s geological and climatic conditions, and the security of sea lines of communication which are indispensable to the country’s prosperity and growth.‛ (japan’s 2004 ndpg) the authors use various literatures to analyze the level of threats and how it affects japan’s strategic environment. particularly, both north korea and china who pose significantly more dangerous threats to japan as compared to other states in the region, bearing in mind their proximity. ‚the fact that north korea is carrying out nuclear testing and strengthening its ballistic missile capabilities is a significant threat to the safety of japan.‛ (japan’s 2010 defense white paper) the analysis on north korea and china as threats perceived by japan is based on the analysis of several authors. the authors base it on a combination of barry buzan’s, robert o. tilman’s, and janice gross stein’s elements of threats (structural, geopolitical, socio-cultural, economic, and historical), as well as ole elgström’s level of threats assessment (specific/diffuse, immediate/remote, probability/severe). the threat dimension can be specific to an issue or diffused. it can also be an immediate threat to the national security or a remote one that is not as threatening. last but not least, a threat dimension may be in the short-term (probability) or in the long-term (severe). as shown in table 1, north korea poses a structural threat that is specific, immediate, and can be both in a probability (long-term) and severe (shortterm) under the kim jong-un regime to japan. the geopolitical system in east asia, where north korea is an ally of another source of japan’s threats, china, is the same as its structural dimension: specific, immediate, and can be both in the long and short-term. china is north korea’s biggest trading partner, as well as its main source of food, arms, and energy (albert and xu, 2016). moreover, as the most secluded country in the world (davis and jared feldschreiber, 2013), north korean people are highly homogenous and are subjected to long years of propaganda from their government (uria, 2016). however, both the historical and economic dimensions are more to a diffused, remote, and in the long-term aspect of threat perception by japan. japan and north korea have not had any direct war, and north korea’s economy is not large enough to threaten japan’s economy, considered be as one of the world’s worst economy especially since its great north korean famine in the 1990s (eberstadt, 2016). journal of asean studies 159 table 1. north korea as a threat to japan structural dimension geopolitical system historical dimension socio-cultural dimension economic dimension specific    diffuse   immediate    remote   probability      severe    ‚china is increasing its activities in waters close to japan. the lack of transparency of its national defense policies, and the military activities are a matter of concern for the region and the international community, including japan, and need to be carefully analyzed.‛ japan’s 2010 defense white paper china also poses a threat to japan’s national security, whose structural dimension is specific, immediate, and both probable and severe. china’s regime under xi jinping has been more assertive, especially in its maritime expansion (matsuda, 2014) and has increased more pressures to japan both through its east china sea activities and its south china sea ones (dingli et al., 2016). table 2 below shows that in terms of geopolitical system, historical, and social-cultural dimension, china is a perceived threat to japan that is specific, immediate, and both probable and severe. this is so as china’s proximity is very near to japan, while its size is enormous. the historical enmity has shown considerably the bad blood between the two nations. the threat of beijing is exemplified with the rapid economic rise of the state (ministry of defense, japan, 2015), and has also become a specific, immediate, and both long-term and short-term. tabel 2. japan's threat perception to china structural dimension geopolitical system historical dimension socio-cultural dimension economic dimension specific      diffuse immediate      remote probability      severe      as such, bearing in mind that japan is surrounded by seas, and its location in east asia is in proximity to both north korea and china that are seen as threats to its national security as mentioned in japan’s 2014 and 2015 defense white papers respectively, the strategic environment of japan is of the utmost importance to preserve tokyo’s position and stability. identifying itself as a maritime nation (ministry of defense, japan, 2015), its maritime and naval prowess is at the front of its focus, especially considering china’s expansion of its open seas activities. 160 the shift and continuity of japanese defense policy the vulnerabilities of japan’s security, combined with threats perceived from its east asian neighbors, have contributed to the need to reassess japan’s defense strategy and doctrine. japan self-defense forces (jsdf): an overview japan’s military force is a conundrum; despite of its status as the military of the state, it relinquishes its right to wage wars and the use of force or threat of force in ‘settling international disputes’ as means since the end of world war ii which then puts japan’s military as ‘abnormal’ in statehood (hagstro m and gustafsson, 2015), despite of the reform of article 9 that now enables tokyo to assist of its allies under attack (fackler & sanger, 2014). as such, its military force focused on self-defense and is known as japan self-defense forces (jsdf). established after world war ii (gady, 2015), and despite of its heavy limitation, the jsdf is the world’s sixth best-equipped troops (fitzpatrick, 2013). the jsdf is comprised of its ground selfdefense force (gsdf), maritime selfdefense force (msdf), and air selfdefense force (asdf). their operations are not limited to each branch specialty, but rather can also be done in joint operations (ministry of defense, japan, 2015), which will be explained further in section …. the gsdf is comprised of multiple divisions and brigades, directly controlled units with five regional armies in charge of the defense of their respective regions. its divisions and brigades are made of combat and logistic support units. it also has its central readiness force consisting of helicopter and airborne brigades, the central readiness regiment, the central nuclear, biological, or chemical (nbc) weapon defense unit, and the special operation group (ministry of defense, japan, 2015). the msdf consists of the selfdefense fleet with several main units such as the fleet air force, the fleet escort force, and the fleet submarine force. they are responsible in defensing the sea areas surrounding japan through its mobile operations (ministry of defense, japan, 2015). the msdf also has regional district forces that mainly protect their territories as well as support the selfdefense fleet. meanwhile, the asdf has the air defense command consisting of three air defense forces as well as a southwestern composite air division. they are tasked for general air defense tasks (ministry of defense, japan, 2015). the asdf also has its air defense force made of several key units such as air wings, air defense missile groups, and the aircraft control and warning wing. japan under the democratic party of japan (2010-2012) the two prime ministers prior to shinzo abe were from the democratic party of japan (dpj), and were the precursors to japan’s military reforms. with mounting tensions and a deteriorating security environment in the east china sea, the then prime minister of japan, naoto kan, and his administration released a new defense guideline called the national defense program guidelines (ndpg) (berkofsky, 2012). his successor, yoshihiko noda, further expanded the reform by approving the three principles on arms exports. the dpj is the leading opposition of japan’s current prime minister shinzo abe’s party, the liberal democratic party journal of asean studies 161 of japan (ldp) (liff, 2015). however, the course of actions done by the two prime ministers from the dpj prior to abe’s administration was reflective of the increasingly important need for japan to defend itself from the changing strategic environment. in particular, the need came from north korea’s ballistic missiles and nuclear threat, as well as china’s maritime ambitions and expansions. in fact, japan’s defense posture trend that predated abe’s return as the prime minister in 2012 was centered on reforms of security-related institutions, and steady expansion of the geographical and substantive scope of the jsdf’s operations (liff, 2015). the dpj initiated japan’s most significant reforms that continue until abe’s administration today. figure 2. timeline of japan's prime ministers from 2010 to present 2010 national defense program guidelines – naoto kan the 2010 national defense program guideline (ndpg) was adopted by tokyo in december 2010 under the naoto kan’s administration. it outlines japan’s ten-year defense strategy to restructure and relocate japan’s armed forces (berkofsky, 2012) and has mapped out a significant changes in the japanese defense policy, decision-making process, and force structure (fouse, 2011). the 2010 ndpg is the fourth defense program guidelines in the postwar era after the first three released in 1976, 1995, and 2004 (fouse, 2011). in particular, the 2010 ndpg focuses on increasing the capability of jdsf and equipping them to be able to react to any crisis situations going past the defense of japanese territory on the japanese mainland, and developing japan’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (isr) prowess in its southern islands to address its security challenges: north korea’s destabilizing influence and china’s maritime ambitions and expansion. ‚china is stepping up and expanding maritime activities in the region’s surrounding waters, and these activities, coupled with the lack of transparency shrouding china’s military and security aims are of concern to the regional and global community.‛ (japan’s 2010 ndpg) seeing china as a threat, the 2010 ndpg also outlines the relocation of jsdf troops and defense capabilities from north of japan to its south, which includes its southern island chains closest to china and taiwan (berkofsky, 2012). at the same time, the ndpg highlights japan’s conceptual shift of its defense strategy from its basic defense force (kibanteki boei ryoko) that was in place prior to the 2010 ndpg to dynamic defense force (doeki boei ryoko) (fouse, naoto kan (dpj) •january 2010 september 2011 yoshihiko noda (dpj) •september 2011 december 2012 shinzo abe (ldp) •december 2012 present 162 the shift and continuity of japanese defense policy 2011). the shift to dynamic defense force that is highly mobile (liff, 2015) enabled japan to react accordingly to its perceived security needs, instead of just maintaining its minimum defense capacity. moreover, to highlight japan’s focus on the maritime/navy, it substantially reduced the amount of tanks and heavy artillery and increased its number of submarines and aegis destroyers (fouse, 2011). three principles on arms exports – yoshihiko noda after three months in office, prime minister yoshihiko noda lifted a fortyyear self-imposed ban on japan’s weapon shipments that barred japanese arms manufacturers from joint development and export of military technology (dawson, 2011) by relaxing its three principles on arms exports. the move aimed to reduce costs for developing and manufacturing advanced technology such as jet fighters and ballistic-missile defense. the three principles on arms exports were to abstain from arms exports and was mapped out in three principles to prevent exporting to 1) communist nations, 2) countries subject to a united nations (un) resolution or arms embargo, and 3) countries involved in armed conflict or in the midst of entering armed conflict (wallace, 2012), and to further strengthen japan’s image of a pacifist state (dawson, 2011) prior to the decision to lift the ban. the reinterpretation of the three principles on arms exports ensured a more lenient approach as compared of the version prior to this revision that is reminiscent of the 1967 one. in order to reassert japan’s pacifist sentiment domestically and internationally, it further limited the 1967 principles on arms exports in 1976 to include all types of military technology to all countries unless there is an exceptional reason to do so (wallace, 2012). the only exception to this was the united states (u.s.), or ‘individual exemptions’ particularly during the cold war period in 1983. another exception was the 2004 ballistic missile defense (bmd) weapons and non-bmd weapons produced by co-development and coproduction between the two states that could be exported to the u.s. although several exceptions have been done in the past, however, the new three principles on arms exports has now ‘institutionalize*d]’ arms exports in a comprehensive manner (dawson, 2011). even though the ban has long been considered to be reinterpreted even before noda’s term in office, the move has not been green-lit until under his administration. the three principles on arms exports has been reinterpreted under yoshihiko noda’s administration to facilitate more collaboration in developing and producing weapons for international trade under the notion of humanitarian and peaceful purposes (reuters, 2014). at the same, it also enabled japan to achieve an indigenous production and procurement of its military that is state-ofthe-art and avoided being too costly to strain japan’s defense budget, especially with japan’s fiscal conditions (ministry of defense, japan, 2004). the 2011 easing of the arms exports law allowed japan to also take part in joint development projects on arms, as well as supplying equipment for humanitarian purposes (harlan, 2011). japan under the liberal democratic party of japan (2012-present) shinzo abe, as part of the ldp, was elected for the second time on december 2012 as japan’s prime minister journal of asean studies 163 and has since then built on and accelerated japan’s defense reforms (liff, 2015). within a year of his administration, abe started three major pillars of the current japanese security policy: japan’s first-ever national security council (nsc), far-reaching national security strategy (nss), and the revised ndpg. although the steps abe has undertaken seems to be revolutionary – from pacifistcentered ideology to proactive pacifism – what he has done are based upon his two dpj predecessors, naoto kan and yoshihiko noda’s acceleration of japan’s defense policy reforms. moreover, the security threats faced by his predecessors have not dwindled, but rather, elevated to a new level. ‘the gray zone’ contingencies initially mentioned in japan’s 2010 ndpg are situations that are not peacetime but which remain below the threshold of armed attack. this term has become pivotal to major documents under abe’s administration (liff, 2015). ‚there are ongoing regional conflicts involving various countries as well as an increase in the number of so-called ‚gray-zone‛ situation, that is, neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territory, sovereignty and maritime economic interests. ‚… north korea has also repeatedly heightened tension in the region by conducting military provocations in the korean peninsula and by escalating its provocative rhetoric and behavior against japan and other countries. ‚… china is rapidly expanding and intensifying its activities in the maritime and aerial domains in the region including the east china sea and the south china sea… and has intruded into japanese territorial waters frequently and violated japan’s airspace…‛ (japan’s 2014 ndpg) as such, there is a continuity from abe’s two dpj predecessors that has now become the foundation to his administration’s defense policy. however, at the same time, abe’s establishment of new institutions such as the nsc and nss as well as the recent reinterpretation of japan’s military law are bold steps that reflect japan’s steps towards military normalization process (spitzer, 2016). japan’s declaration as a maritime state (ministry of defense, japan, 2015) and the rapid expansion and advancement of china’s high seas operations further accentuate tokyo’s direction on its defense policy that is centered on its maritime and naval operations through its ‘proactive contribution to peace’ (ministry of defense, japan, 2014). national security strategy (nss) the nss was the first for japan in terms of policy concerning national security focusing on foreign affairs and defense policy. it outlines which approaches japan should take according to the long-term outlook of its national interests. the nss replaced the ‘basic policy on national defense’ that japan used as a foundation for its defense policy prior. in turn, the nss was used as the basis for the ndpg and both are designed for the next decade. the ndpg was devised for a medium to long-term outlook and the medium term defense program (mdtp) highlights the budget limit and the total of defense equipment acquisition in the next five-year period to accomplish the defense posture and capability as has outlined in the ndpg. japan’s nsc along with other basic foreign and defense policies regarding japan’s national security create the ndpg. the nsc was established on november 2013 based on the ‘act of partial revision of the establishment of the security 164 the shift and continuity of japanese defense policy council.’ the nss, ndpg, and mtdp then become the foundation to determine japan’s annual budget and appropriate it based on relevant situations, as outlined in figure 3. figure 3. relations among nss, ndpg, mtdp, and annual budget japan’s nss is constructed on the principle of ‘proactive contribution to peace based on the principle of international cooperation’ as its base, outlined in the 2015 defense white paper, in which tokyo reasserts itself as a major player in international politics and as a peace-loving nation to seek of its own security and peace and security in the asia-pacific region. japan also believes itself as ‘a proactive contributor to peace’ through the basic principle of international cooperation, and thus will provide ‚more than ever before to peace, security and prosperity of the international community‛ (ministry of defense, japan, 2014). the nss is also based on japan’s national security objectives and national interests. in particular, japan clearly states its national interests in the 2015 defense white paper (ministry of defense, japan, 2015) as follow:  ‚to maintain its sovereignty and independence; to defend its territorial integrity, to ensure the safety of life, person and properties of its nationals, and to ensure its survival while maintaining its own peace and security grounded in freedom and democracy and preserving its rich culture and tradition;  to achieve the prosperity of japan and its nationals through economic development, thereby consolidating its peace and security; and  to maintain and protect international order based on rules and universal values, such as freedom, democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law.‛ furthermore, japan also highlights its national security objectives to achieve journal of asean studies 165 its national interests (ministry of defense, japan, 2015) as follow:  ‚strengthen the deterrence necessary for maintaining japan’s peace and security and for ensuring its survival, thus deterring threats from directly reaching japan, and defeating such threats and minimizing damage if by chance such threats should reach japan.  improve the security environment of the asia-pacific region and prevent the emergence of and reduce direct threats to japan, through strengthening the japan, u.s. alliance, enhancing the trust and cooperative relationships between japan and its partners within and outside the asia pacific region, and promoting practical security cooperation.  improve the global security environment and build a peaceful, stable and prosperous international community by strengthening the international order based on universal values and rules, and by playing a leading role in the settlement of disputes.‛ tokyo has also outlined its nss into six main points (ministry of defense, japan, 2015) as follow: 1. solidification and expanding japan’s capabilities and positions, 2. strengthening the japan-u.s. alliance, 3. reinforcement of diplomacy and security collaboration with japan’s allies for peace and stability in the global stage, 4. proactive contribution to global efforts for peace and stability of the global stage, 5. increasing collaboration according to the universal values to settle international issues, 6. consolidation of the domestic basis that provisions national security and endorsing domestic and international understanding japan acknowledges the importance of the security environment surrounding japan as its national security challenge. with the u.s.’s focus shifting on the asia-pacific region, the balance of power is also altered. nation-states possessing large-scale military force and in possession of nuclear weapons, such as china and north korea, are considered as challenges to japan’s national security. japan’s 2015 defense white paper further mentions on the ‘gray-zone’ situations with north korea and china. japan’s national defense program guidelines similar with the 2010 ndpg under naoto kan, shinzo abe’s administration emphasizes and expands upon ‘the dynamic joint defense force’ as the center for japan’s peace and security. focusing on isr activities, as well as improving japan’s deterrence and response capability, tokyo pursues more on joint operations, improving its equipment and hire in handling activities, and developing defense proficiencies in terms of its quality and quantity (ministry of defense, japan, 2015). compared to its predecessor, the 2013 ndpg has increased its authorized number of personnel from 154,000 in 2010 to 159,000, active duty personnel from 147,000 in 2010 to 151,000, and reserve166 the shift and continuity of japanese defense policy ready personnel from 7,000 to 8,000 (ministry of defense, japan, 2015). the 2013 ndpg under abe’s administration emphasizes on the security environment challenges, paying particular focus on north korea and china. at the same time, it also reinforces japan’s status as a maritime state, especially considering its geographical characteristics and belief that it needs to address several issues concerning security challenges and destabilizing ones that are more prominent and severe through reinforcing its defense architecture, and also promoting bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with other countries. as its long-time ally, the u.s. is viewed as vital to japan’s security (ministry of defense, japan, 2015), especially when needing further deterrence from the u.s. when it comes to nuclear weapons threats. in responding to japan’s security environment challenges, it believes the role of is the jsdf is vital to deter and response to various situation (ministry of defense, japan, 2015). an emphasis on the sea and airspace surrounding japan is of the utmost importance, followed by responding to attacks on remote islands, as well as ballistic missile ones, as outlined in japan’s 2015 defense white paper. the emphasis on the seas surrounding japan calls for a maritime supremacy as well as air superiority. moreover, to respond to ballistic missile capability of north korea, japan specifically mentions its commitment to enhance its readiness, sustainable response, and simultaneous engagement capability (ministry of defense, japan, 2015). although putting the term ‘maritime supremacy’ in its 2015 defense white paper, japan uses a combination of both maritime and naval forces to defend its surrounding focus. as maritime and naval supremacy is one of tokyo’s focus in 2013 ndpg (ministry of defense, japan, 2015), the msdf also undergoes significant changes in terms of its quality and quantity. the msdf will have an increased number of destroyers to 54 new destroyers that have the capability to detect submarines and minesweeping underwater vehicles (ministry of defense, japan, 2015) (figure 4) to enhance japan’s response capabilities in patrols and to defending japan’s surrounding waters. moreover, the msdf architecture is also enhanced to be able to increase its capability in information gathering as well as surveillance and warning activities. as such, japan has increased another escort division in its omura based in the southwestern territory of japan – close to china and north korea. the majority of the msdf are also concentrated in the south of japan such as in kure, komatsushima, omura, sasebo, kanoha, and naha. journal of asean studies 167 figure 4. japan's new destroyer and plans to increase in 10 years source: ministry of defense, japan, 2015 japan also emphasizes its joint operations as part of the dynamic joint defense force and plans to move its asdf fighter aircraft units, air warning and control units, as well as air refueling/transport units deployment from the northern part of japan to its southwestern territory (figure 3). the establishment of a new 13th squadron and the increased number of squadron stations in naha to two are also located at south of japan. one squadron is added to each air warning and control units as well as air refueling/transport units (ministry of defense, japan, 2015). figure 5. changes in major units of the asdf source: ministry of defense, japan, 2015 168 the shift and continuity of japanese defense policy medium-term defense program created based on the ndpg, the mtdp is comprised of six programs to achieve the targeted number of defense buildup. the programs are in line with the aforementioned ndpg (ministry of defense, japan, 2015) as follow: 1. emphasize on isr, intelligence capabilities, response to ballistic missile attacks, and attacks on remote islands; 2. prioritize development of capabilities to achieve maritime and air supremacy, rapid deployment, preparations for invasions; 3. efficiently secure defense proficiencies in quality and quantity; 4. endorse processes to restructuring its personnel management system; 5. strengthen the japan-u.s. alliance to achieve greater deterrence and response capabilities; 6. obtain greater efficiencies and streamline the defense forces’ buildup. the mtdp, most importantly, highlights the reorganization of jsdf units, with the gsdf having the largest reform since its establishment. to be able to achieve better cooperation in its joint operations amongst units, the gsdf established a ground central command (gcc) and a coast observation unit and area security units to better respond to any attacks on japan’s remote islands, particularly in its southwest region (ministry of defense, japan, 2015). the plan of relocation of the gsdf since 2010 from northern part of japan to its southern and southwestern territory is devised to better defend japan’s territorial waters and its surrounding seas as part of its dynamic joint defense force against incoming security threats, particularly from japan’s neighbors. the new coast observation unit in yonaguni and area security unit under the gsdf, as well as its ‘amphibious rapid deployment brigade’ (ministry of defense, japan, 2015), are part of japan’s strategy to defend its territory from incoming attacks that is largely defensive in nature. revised ‘three principles on arms exports’ following the move by his predecessor, yoshihiko noda, shinzo abe’s government further relaxed the ‘three principles of arms exports’ on march 2014 and renamed it as ‘three principles on defense equipment transfers.’ the new rules allow for transferring defense-related equipment to foreign governments and to international institutions as long as it is to ‘contribute to peace and be helpful for the active promotion of international cooperation’ and ‘japan’s national security’ (takashi, 2014). despite the revision under abe’s administration, however, the re-entry of japan into the international arms market still faces several setbacks. its joint arms development plan with turkey in 2014 failed just three months after the revision under abe due to concerns of usage of japanese arms to conflict-ridden states. at the same time, domestically, the new three principles on arms exports also face scrutiny and criticisms (knowler, 2016) in light of its failed deals. successful submarine deal with australia would have strengthened abe’s bid for japan’s new proactive pacifism, that is, to also journal of asean studies 169 establish or expand japan’s military industry technological coordination and integration with its allies (harner, 2014). yet, the deal failed, and the failure was credited to the lack of apt strategy by the government (knowler, 2016) and the industry that signifies japan still has more to tackle before it is able to enter the international arms market as a fullyfledged player (sentaku magazine, 2016). japan’s overseas military operations the japanese military currently functions as a self-defense force to japan and is unable to conduct campaigns overseas outside of the notion of selfdefense according to its constitution. however, japan’s reinterpretation of its pacifist constitution is reflective of a more offensive move of a defensive purpose. japan reinterpreted its pacifist constitution, allowing the jsdf to combat on foreign soil for the first time since its pacifist constitution was established after world war ii (mccurry, 2016). the security law is the reinterpretation of article 9 of the constitution (ford, 2015) that also enables tokyo to aid its allies in overseas conflicts under the term of collective self-defense. the move by the japanese parliament is said as the biggest shift in japan’s defense policy since world war ii (mccurry, 2016). the reinterpretation itself was motivated by the changing security environment of japan, especially with north korea’s nuclear and ballistic missiles, as well as chinese naval activities in the japanese surrounding waters (fackler and sanger, 2014). after the reinterpretation, japan has been able to use force in the event of an attack on a foreign country that would also indirectly threaten japan’s survival (figure 6 and 7). the scope is no longer limited to only an attack on japan and the united states, but also other japanese allies (figure 7). the reinterpretation of the japanese pacifist constitution, especially in terms of the allowance of its military to now conduct overseas operation under the self-defense term, seems to imply japan’s plan to extend its defense to the nearby south china sea, if there is an escalation of conflict. more is at stake when it involves the spratly islands, especially when one of the key threats perceived by japan, china, is heavily involved in the south china sea dispute (dingli et al., 2016) where it is the gateway to the east asian region. military modernization in lieu of japan’s military focus change from its basic defense force (kibanteki boei ryoko) that was in place prior to the 2010 ndpg to dynamic defense force (doeki boei ryoko) (fouse, 2011), tokyo has continuously modernized its military to better equip the dynamic defense force. japan is considered as one of the most powerful military forces in the globe today (mapp, 2014). in particular, its msdf and asdf are armed with state-ofthe-art aircrafts and ships (mapp, 2014). the japanese ministry of defense (mod) has plan to convert its gsdf to be mobile and can be transferred to the east china sea quickly when crisis occurs by 2023 (gady, 2015). at the same time, the 2016/2017 shopping list for the jsdf includes amphibious assault vehicles, as well as tanker aircraft, aegis destroyers, and mobile missile batteries. 170 the shift and continuity of japanese defense policy figure 6. reinterpretation of japanese legislations source: ministry of defense, japan, 2015 figure 7. reinterpretation of armed attack situations response act source: ministry of defense, japan, 2015 journal of asean studies 171 on april 2013, the japanese cabinet approved the basic plan on ocean policy – an initiative to ensure security of the oceans through: ‚reinforcement of the wide-range routine system of surveillance, systematic improvement of warships, aircraft and other vehicles, strengthening of the system of collaboration between the sdf and japan coast guard, and development of a system of collaboration to ensure order and safety on the coasts and isolated islands.‛ (japan’s 2015 defense white paper) japan has also increased its defense budget and military spending as of recent years. japan has increased its military expenditure in 2015 (table 3), which further highlights and increases threats from north korea and china (sipri, 2016). furthermore, in august 2016, abe’s administration has further requested for another increase in spending for the jsdf, particularly to expand tokyo’s missile defenses (rich, 2016). table 3. japan’s defense budget comparison, 2014 and 2015 source: ministry of defense, japan, 2015 the new proposal is budgeted at $50.2 billion, another increase of japan’s military spending for the past five years (gady, 2015). the new proposal is also a 2.3 per cent increase in budget as compared to the year prior (rich, 2016). as shown in table 3, there is quite a significant increase from fiscal year 2014 to 2015. the increase in japan’s defense budget is expected to create more amphibious warfare capabilities, as well as a lighter dynamic joint jsdf (ministry of defense, japan, 2015). as shown in figure 8, japan has increased its procurements on tanks, vessels, as well as aircrafts. the mod has increased the number of all three military vehicles in response to the growing security risks in japan’s regional environment. 172 the shift and continuity of japanese defense policy figure 8. current status of the unit price and acquisition quantity of defense equipment source: ministry of defense, japan, 2015 the msdf are equipped with 50 modern guided missile destroyers, as well as the general-purpose frigates on par with the u.s. navy. these sophisticated guided missile destroyers have the capability of anti-ballistic missile. figure 8 has also shown tokyo’s plan to continue to increase its destroyers for the next ten years. a large helicopter carrier, dubbed as a destroyer by the japanese, was launched in august 2013 by the msdf to be able to better project its power. moreover, the asdf is also equipped with over 300 fourth-generation combat aircraft, and is planned to further purchase the f-35 multirole aircrafts. the f-35 multirole aircrafts are connected into a state-of-the-art command and control system network that also includes the airborne warning and control system (awacs) aircrafts. furthermore, japan has also been extensively constructing its anti-aircraft missile system that would also have the anti-ballistic missile proficiency according to the pac-3 missile. table 4 below shows other plans for japan’s acquisition of new state-of-theart aircrafts, naval vessels, and other military equipment. journal of asean studies 173 table 4. japan's plans for its military modernization source: ministry of defense, japan, 2015 japan has also focused on modernizing its southern and western hemispheres, as evidenced in japan’s interim defense review in july 2013 (mapp, 2014). japan planned to obtain military capabilities best for defense, especially in terms of striking down enemy forces, missile forces in their home bases, increase in surveillance capability, amphibious forces, and brand new naval vessels. moreover, the focus is on improving the japanese capability in interception scrambles by asdf aircraft to incoming chinese aircrafts into japan’s airspace. the focus on modernizing the southwestern parts of japan has been in the picture since as early as 2011, under prime minister naoto kan and then followed by yoshihiko noda. the mtdp for fiscal year 2011-2015 highlights on restructuring japan’s armed forces in all three branches where there will be relocation of all three to japan’s southwestern parts. the asdf’s defense capabilities were planned to be upgraded, and its f-4 fighter aircrafts were to be replaced with the fifth-generation ones. moreover, the budget for japan coast guard (jcg) was also increased to buy more ships and jets, while the navy would receive modern aegis destroyers made by the u.s. other planned purchases were 21 patrol ships, seven reconnaissance jets, and addition of its aegis destroyers from four to six. japan under the liberal democratic party of japan’s shinzo abe: revolutionary enough? during his visit to washington in february 2013, then newly-elected japanese prime minister shinzo abe proclaimed that ‚japan is back‛ (sakaki, 2015). as a right-wing nationalist, abe had been criticized for attempting to move away from the traditional aspects of japanese security policy (sakaki, 2015) to proactive pacifism. the introduction of a nsc and scc, the relaxation of the ‘three principles of arms exports,’ and the reinterpretation of japan’s constitution on its jsdf have given more concerns to its east asian neighbors (sakaki, 2015). 174 the shift and continuity of japanese defense policy at the first glance, abe’s administration seems to be radical in shifting japan’s direction from a pacifist country to proactive pacifism. various documents under the abe administration have continuously used the term of ‘proactive contribution to peace,’ namely the 2014 ndpg, which states that japan will achieve as such by ‚proactively securing peace, stability and prosperity of the international community while achieving its own security as well as peace and stability in the asia-pacific region by expanding and deepening cooperative relationships with other countries‛ (ministry of defense, japan, 2014). however, the change itself is not out of the ordinary when we observe the security environment and the geopolitics surrounding japan in the past six years. abe’s two predecessors, naoto kan and yohihiko noda of the dpj, have built upon the foundations to the more prominent shifts done by abe’s administration towards japan’s military normalization process. table 5. the shift and continuity of the japanese defense policy naoto kan (dpj) yoshihiko noda (dpj) shinzo abe (ldp) ndpg   three principles on arms exports   nsc  mtdp  article 9  as shown in table 5 above, naoto kan pioneered the modified concept of ndpg, which altered the concept of the previous basic defense force to dynamic defense force. shinzo abe continued this concept in the 2014 ndpg and expanded it with the additions of nsc and mtdp to create a more comprehensive japanese defense policy. furthermore, abe also further revised the initial reinterpretation of the three principles on arms export under noda’s administration. the subsequent additions by abe are indicative of a shift to ‘proactive pacifism.’ the focus on maritime and naval activities is reflective of japan’s geography and geopolitics of the region. both north korea and china pose great threats to japan’s national security. the increase in threat levels of its strategic environment has resulted in measures to counter the security challenges of its region since the era of prime minister yoshihiko noda. abe seeks to protect japan’s national security from threats in the region, as well as to better increase japanese influence for the nation’s advantage. abe has also established a more substantial shift towards japanese military normalization as compared to his predecessors, namely, the establishment of the nsc and the nss, as well as the reinterpretation of article 9 of the constitution. as such, defense reforms under abe’s administration are notable, but not radical and are still limited under its ‘self-defense’ umbrella. conclusion japanese defense policy is continuous, but also evolving: it responds to its strategic environment but ultimately still follows by its maritime focus. with journal of asean studies 175 the rise of china and its maritime ambitions and expansion, as well as north korea’s threats of ballistic missiles and nuclear arsenals, japan has to shift its defense policy to protect its national security from external threats. what the last three prime ministers of japan – naoto kan, yoshihiko noda, and shinzo abe – have done are all a combined effort that takes years to come into fruition to address japan’s security issues. ultimately, when considering japan’s security environment, the course of actions taken by japan is nothing out of the ordinary. whilst reorganizing its military and reinterpreting its article 9 of its pacifist constitution, japan still abides by its pacifist constitution – its military is still under the context for peace and selfdefense only and are still a far cry from a normal military albeit being dubbed under a new name, the proactive pacifism under abe’s administration. about the authors ria putri santoso obtained her ba in international relations from the school of international relations, president university. she is currently a research assistant at the school of international relations, president university. she has won several awards at international humanitarian law (ihl) national debate competition and model united nations (mun) during her undergraduate study. she has special interests in security studies. anak agung banyu perwita is a professor of international relations at the school of international relations, president university. he obtained his ma in international relations and strategic studies from lancaster university and his ph.d. from flinders university, adelaide. he is also involved with the indonesian ministry of defense and the indonesian national resilience council (dewan ketahanan nasional). reference albert, e., & xu, b. 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(2016). japan's new defense policy: identity change or strategic shift. international journal of social science and humanity, 6(3), 243. journal of asean studies, vol. 3, no. 2 (2015), pp. 93-101 ©2015 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic global indonesian diaspora: how many are there and where are they? salut muhidin macquarie university, australia ariane utomo australian national university, australia abstract in the last few years, there is an increasing interest in connecting indonesian diaspora around the world in order to assist in the national development. a recent event called “congress of indonesian diaspora” held by indonesian diaspora network (idn) in jakarta was conducted to focus on this issue. to date, not much is known about the size and composition of the global indonesian diaspora. this paper attempts to address this gap by analysing the migration patterns and several specific demographic factors related to the global indonesian diaspora. the paper will also explore the potential impacts of indonesian diaspora could play in indonesian development. key words: indonesian diaspora, migration, development. “population dynamics and the restructuring of economies have contributed to increasing awareness among policy makers about the key role that international migrants play in satisfying labour demand in particular sectors and in maintaining the international networks necessary for the operation of the global economy…international migration is an integral part of the development process and the functioning of modern economies.” (un secretary general 2010: 3). introduction in august 2015, many overseas indonesians from around the world arrived in jakarta to attend the congress of indonesian diaspora (cid). this is the third cid since its first congress in los angeles in july 2012 and the second congress in jakarta in august 2013. the 2nd cid had a theme of ‚pulang kampung‛ which means ‚coming back home‛ in an attempt to bring together indonesian diaspora in one network community (so-called indonesian diaspora network or idn) and to build a new emerging power of the millions of overseas indonesians. many ideas and lessons have been learned and exchanged from the events that have been carried forward into actions. the theme of the third cid was ‘diaspora bakti bangsa,’ which means ‘diaspora devotion to the nation.’ it emphasizes the spirit of global indonesian diaspora in their attempts to promote shared prosperity for indonesia. the congress highlighted several main issues, including sustainable cities (with the case studies in jakarta and bandung), healthcare, higher learning education, the 94 the global of indonesian diaspora economy, culinary, creative economy, dual citizenship, and maritime development. in recent years, the government of indonesia has started to pay more attention to the existence of its diaspora and to appreciate them as a national resource. the indonesian ministry of foreign affairs, for example, established the indonesian diaspora desk that is headed at ambassadorial level. the former president yudhoyono in his message at the 2nd cid also stated that the ‚diaspora‛ approach should become the new strategy of indonesia. the current vice president kalla in his message at the 3rd cid said that the support of indonesian diaspora could take the form of experiences, networks, capital and access to foreign markets. while the cid had showcased a number of contributions from indonesian diaspora, there are still many more potentials that have been untapped. one fundamental question that keeps on coming up in the ensuing discussions on the indonesian diaspora relates to its size and distribution. drawing from an earlier working paper from muhidin and utomo (2013), this paper aims to update and stimulate further discussions on the estimated size and distribution of the indonesian diaspora in the global world. this paper is structured as follows. first, we outline two problems associated with the great variability with current estimates of the size of the diaspora: its definition and data source. after outlining these various estimates, we explore results from two different databases on international migrant stock to look at the distribution and the growth of indonesian-born migrants in recent years. since these databases primarily target indonesian-born international migrants only, we then use an example of detailed tabulations from the 2011 australian population census using data on ancestry, country of birth, and language spoken at home to illustrate how the size of the diaspora may be potentially different to the one estimated using the international migrant stock data. to conclude, we discuss potential positive impacts of indonesian diaspora on development in indonesia. estimating indonesian diaspora: definition and data sources the first step in estimating the total number of indonesian diaspora is to define the diaspora itself. broadly speaking, diaspora is defined as ‚a group of people who live outside the area which they had lived for a long time or in which their ancestors lived,‛ (merriam-webster, retrieved 23/04/2015). this is the result of the ‘dispersion of a people from its original homeland’ (butler, 2001:189). despite the clarity of this explanation, diaspora is a word that has evolved in meaning overtime and to this day doesn’t have a precise definition. this is because there are several paradigms as to what the term truly means and as to how it can be applied to certain populations. the term ‘diaspora’ originally comes from the greek word ‘diaspeirein’ which is ‘dia’ for across and ‘speirein' for scatter. in the past, this term carried negative connotations as it was associated with the forced dispersal of jews population from their homeland. in today’s globalised world, the term diaspora becomes universal phenomenon and has replaced a variety of flows of migration like labour migrants, refugees, and marriage migrants. this is because 95 journal of asean studies more migrants today are due to moving voluntarily rather than due to forced or involuntarily migration such as slavery, persecution or convictions. in addition, many diaspora populations have been established for the centuries. despite the sufferings experienced by diaspora populations during colonisation centuries ago, its significance in history has in some respects been forgotten by members of the present generation (safran, 1991). this is because of their tendency to forge their identity with the ‚host land‛, as well as their entitled legal status as citizens of the country. in short, this modern migration allows for a triangular relationship, where diaspora are able to review, reformulate and re-define their terms of engagement vis-à-vis both the home and the country of residence. following this simplest definition, one may consider the indonesian diaspora as consisting of indonesians by birth and ancestry who live outside of indonesia. in many cases, this definition of the diaspora is used interchangeably with ‘overseas indonesians’. while the above definition seems simple, in practice, any attempt to trace the patterns and the scale of the dispersion of a large number of people from any particular point of origin is far from being straightforward. the first problem relates to the aforementioned definition. the indonesian diaspora/overseas indonesians, by and large, is a socially constructed population (muhidin, 2013). brubaker (2005) highlights the three general criterions to define what constitutes a diaspora: dispersement, homeland orientation, and boundary-maintenance. the last criterion refers to a set of homeland-anchored collective identities shared by the transnational members of the diaspora over an extended period of time. following these criterions, identifying members of the indonesian diaspora in a statistical manner becomes harder. it is not clear through how many migrant generations, on average, the boundary-maintenance characteristics of the diaspora would last. in this case, should we then limit statistical estimates of the indonesian diaspora to first generation migrants only? alternatively, should we include anyone with any ancestry of indonesians, no matter how small, including an australian whose great-great-great grandfather was a seafarer from makassar? having such a comprehensive picture of anyone with indonesian ancestry living abroad would be ideal. unfortunately, we are faced with a second problem in our exercise, that of data source. table 1 illustrates the varying estimates of the number of the indonesian diaspora depending on both the definition and data source. these estimates ranged between 2 to 8 million. the conservative estimates of the indonesian diaspora are mainly drawn from international migrant stock datasets. these estimates are mostly based on statistics of foreign-born population obtained from national population censuses. international migrant stock datasets provide estimates of the number of indonesian-born population living abroad, and exclude second and later generations as well as other overseas indonesians who were not born in indonesia. the first data source of this kind, the global migrant origin database, is compiled by the development research centre on migration, globalisation and poverty of the university of sussex 96 the global of indonesian diaspora (migration drc., 2007). the dataset records stocks (not flows) of lifetime migration by looking at data of overseas born population in each host country with year 2000 as a reference period. the estimated total number of indonesianborn migrants from this dataset is 1.8 million. a more recent dataset on stocks of indonesian-born migrant is available from the population division of the united nations department of social and economic affairs (un desa., 2013). this dataset estimated that there are almost 3 million indonesian-born migrants globally in 2013. in contrast to the estimates based on international migrant stock datasets, publicly circulating estimates of the global size of the indonesian diaspora tend to be much larger. for example, the wikepedia site on overseas indonesians proposed that there are about 5.3 million overseas indonesian abroad. such estimates are based on a range of host country-specific data which often include second and later generations overseas indonesians. the estimates from the indonesian ministry of foreign affairs based on official reports from 167 diplomatic offices, as cited by the indonesian ambassador for the united states is 4.7 million (satrio, 2013). in a later occasion, the number cited increased to 6 million (rahadi, 2013). furthermore, the bureau of overseas general election (badan pemilihan luar negeri, or bpln) reports that about 2,040,368 indonesian overseas have currently registered as potential voters in the 2014 election. the largest number of these overseas voters is recorded in malaysia and saudi arabia where most indonesian workers are located. this last figure only refers to those who are eligible to vote in the election (i.e. at least 17 years old or ever married). in other words, there are still more overseas indonesians who are not registered such as children aged less than 17 years old and undocumented migrants. last figure from indonesian diaspora network (idn) website indicates that there is an estimated eight million indonesian diaspora currently living in over 120 countries. table 1. various estimates on the size of the indonesian diaspora source date estimates link global migrant origin database version 4 2007 1,832,945 http://www.migrationdrc.org/re search/typesofmigration/global _migrant_origin_database.html un desa international migrant stock by destination and origin 2013 2,992,550 http://esa.un.org/unmigration/ migrantstocks2013.htm?msdo dino patti djalal (estimates from 167 indonesian diplomatic office overseas) 3/01/2013 4,700,000 http://idn.kbrikualalumpur.org/ index.php/80-templatedetails/general/111-idn http://www.migrationdrc.org/research/typesofmigration/global_migrant_origin_database.html http://www.migrationdrc.org/research/typesofmigration/global_migrant_origin_database.html http://www.migrationdrc.org/research/typesofmigration/global_migrant_origin_database.html http://esa.un.org/unmigration/migrantstocks2013.htm?msdo http://esa.un.org/unmigration/migrantstocks2013.htm?msdo http://idn.kbrikualalumpur.org/index.php/80-template-details/general/111-idn http://idn.kbrikualalumpur.org/index.php/80-template-details/general/111-idn http://idn.kbrikualalumpur.org/index.php/80-template-details/general/111-idn 97 journal of asean studies wikipedia (various sources data for certain countries include second generations indonesians abroad) 26/11/201 3 5,313,000 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ov erseas_indonesian dino patti djalal 11/06/201 3 6,000,000 http://www.republika.co.id/beri ta/nasional/umum/13/11/06/mv u01i-dino-patti-djalal-dukungkewarganegaraan-gandadiaspora-indonesia indonesian diaspora network 2015 8,000,000 www.diasporaindonesia.org in summary, these estimated figures indicate that there is no single and detailed record of the composition of indonesian diaspora globally. whether one would lean towards using the estimates of indonesian-born global migrant stock or other available estimates as listed above, would depend on which definition of overseas indonesians/ indonesian diaspora is being discussed. at this point, the un-desa international migrant stock data is readily available, and relatively most accessible, to further look into the pattern of distribution and the growth of overseas indonesians overtime. size and distribution of indonesianborn migrants irrespective of the varying definitions and resulting estimates of the size of the indonesian diaspora, one thing that we could assert is the fact that it is growing. figure 1 outlines the rise of the estimated size of indonesian-born migrants globally from 1990 to 2013 (un desa., 2013). there is an estimated growth of 50 per cent in the stock of indonesian-born migrant between19902000. in the last two decades, the estimated size had more than doubled. figure 2 depicts the estimated distribution of indonesian-born migrants by the top ten country of destinations in 2013 (un desa., 2013). malaysia remains the top destination country, hosting about 35 per cent of indonesian-born migrants or 1,051,227. together, saudi arabia and the united arab emirates host almost a quarter of indonesian-born migrants. please note that the figure here, however, has limitation in terms of its data coverage. the data are mainly derived from censuses which are often systematically exclude migrant groups. moreover, the data do not yet include all countries in which indonesians are living. it does not include second and later generations born to expatriate indonesiaborn parents and grand-parents. it does not include many indonesians who are temporary residents (foreign workers, students etc.) it is also questionable whether undocumented migration is fully captured in census data. despite those limitation, the figure has been able to indicate the general distribution of indonesian diaspora around the globe. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/overseas_indonesian http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/overseas_indonesian http://www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/umum/13/11/06/mvu01i-dino-patti-djalal-dukung-kewarganegaraan-ganda-diaspora-indonesia http://www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/umum/13/11/06/mvu01i-dino-patti-djalal-dukung-kewarganegaraan-ganda-diaspora-indonesia http://www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/umum/13/11/06/mvu01i-dino-patti-djalal-dukung-kewarganegaraan-ganda-diaspora-indonesia http://www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/umum/13/11/06/mvu01i-dino-patti-djalal-dukung-kewarganegaraan-ganda-diaspora-indonesia http://www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/umum/13/11/06/mvu01i-dino-patti-djalal-dukung-kewarganegaraan-ganda-diaspora-indonesia http://www.diasporaindonesia.org/ 98 the global of indonesian diaspora figure 1. estimates of indonesian-born populations overseas 1990-2013 source: united nations desa (2013) figure 2. selected countries with the highest stock of indonesian-born populations 2013 source: united nations desa (2013) case study: estimating the indonesian diaspora in australia using australia as an example, different estimates on the size of indonesian diaspora owing to the different data sources and the variables used for the analysis. to begin with, estimates from the un desa international migrant stock data suggest that there were 72,967 and 78,744 99 journal of asean studies indonesian-born persons in australia in 2010 and 2013 respectively. as expected, because the international migrant stock data is primarily based on the stock of first generation migrants, these estimates are lower than the estimates of indonesian diaspora directly generated from the 2011 australian population census by muhidin and pardosi (2012). to estimate the size of the indonesian diaspora, muhidin and pardosi (2012) used three variables from the 2011 australian population census: persons speaking bahasa indonesian at home, persons nominating indonesia as an ancestry, and persons born in indonesia. all three variables yield different estimates ranging between 50,688 to 63,159 individuals. combining these three individual identifiers, muhidin and pardosi (2012) estimated that the indonesian diaspora in australia is about 87,807 persons. this case study shows that even when researchers used the same data source, the estimated size of the indonesian diaspora would be contingent upon the choice of variables used in the analysis. potential positive impacts of diaspora on development in indonesia indonesian diaspora today consist of indonesian who live overseas, or foreigners who have indonesian origin, as well as individuals who have indonesian linkage personally or socially. using such definition provided by idn, it is estimated about 8-10 million indonesians diaspora (both wni and wna) all over the world. in short, the diasporas are not only contribute in terms of their number but also their potential impacts. following hugo (2013), here are five main potential impacts of diaspora to the development on their home country: firstly, remittances from expatriates have been demonstrated to be a larger and more reliable source of development funds than the official development assistance from donor agencies such as the world bank (mohapatra, ratha and silwal 2011). for indonesian diaspora, data from the agency for the placement and protection of indonesian migrant workers (bnp2tki) revealed that indonesia received over rp 97 trillion (us$7.18 billion) in remittance in 2014 alone from migrant workers. this remittance would be much more if it is combined with other types of diaspora that is currently estimated about 8 million. yet, this is a relatively smaller compared to vietnamese, who have just started to mobilise their diaspora network and have been earning $10 billion in remittances a year. secondly, the diaspora can be both a direct source of foreign direct investment (fdi) and an effective ‘middleman’ to channel fdi towards the home economy. lucas (2003) in his study shows how chinese diaspora has contributed about 60-70% of fdi, as the biggest in the world. there has been considerable discussion of how chinese business and social networks have overcome barriers to international trade. thirdly, the diaspora can be a bridgehead into expansion of the economic linkages of the home nation. korean americans were the bridgeheads for the successful penetration of the united states market by korean car, electronics and white good manufacturers. canadian based studies have shown that a doubling of skilled migration from asia saw a 74 percent increase in asian imports to canada (head and reis, 1998; lucas, 2001). fourthly, diaspora networks have become important in transmitting 100 the global of indonesian diaspora information both formally and informally. this dimension is largely confined to skilled migrants. lucas (2001, 22) has shown how professionals in origin and destination economies have maintained strong linkages so that ideas flow freely in both directions. fifthly, many expatriates return to their homeland country and contribute to development (conway and potter, 2009). as a matter of fact, indonesian diaspora network has started those paths by establishing several task forces (i.e. liveable cities, health, culinary as well as immigration policy and dual citizenship) and special programmatic function (i.e. indonesian diaspora foundation, business council, brain-bank and women forum). it has been expected that those activities can direct more partnerships between foreign hosts and home countries with the supports from indonesian diaspora. at the same time, diaspora can transfer the invaluable skills and experience they gained abroad. conclusion estimating the size of the indonesian diaspora is not a straightforward exercise. available estimates on the size and distribution of the diaspora vary greatly depending on the definitions, the data source, and the choice of the variables used to derive the estimates. up to 2015, the estimated size of diaspora ranged from between 2.9 to 8 million, with the lowest estimate bounded to the global numbers of indonesian-born population residing abroad. while the available estimates of the size of diaspora are subject to high variations, data from the un international migrant stock suggest that the size of the diaspora is growing, and has more than doubled in the period between 1990 and 2013. further estimates from the un international migrant stock database suggest that close to 60 per cent of indonesian-born migrants in 2013 are in malaysia, saudi arabia, and the united arab emirates. as shown by the australian case study presented briefly in this paper, future efforts on estimating the size, the changing nature, and the composition of the indonesian diaspora would benefit from detailed tabulation and in-depth country studies in top destination areas about the author salut muhidin, phd is a senior lecturer of demography program at macquarie university in sydney, australia. salut muhidin can be reached at bus.mq.edu.au; detail profile see at: bus.mq.edu.au ariane utomo, phd is a research fellow at crawford school of public policy, the australian national university. ariane utomo can be reached at ariane.utomo@anu.edu.au; detail profile see at: https://crawford.anu.edu.au/people/acade mic/ariane-utomo the earlier draft of this study was presented at the 4th icobirdinternational conference on business, international relations, and diplomacy, at binus campus, jakarta, on 3-4 november 2015. http://bus.mq.edu.au/ mailto:ariane.utomo@anu.edu.au https://crawford.anu.edu.au/people/academic/ariane-utomo https://crawford.anu.edu.au/people/academic/ariane-utomo 101 journal of asean studies reference brubaker, r. (2005). the 'diaspora' diaspora. ethnic and racial studies, 28(1), 1-19. butler, k. d. (2001). defining diaspora, refining a discourse. diaspora: a journal of transnational studies, 10(2), 189-219. migration drc. (2007). global migrant origin database, http://www.migrationdrc.org/research/ty pesofmigration/global_migrant_ori gin_database.html. muhidin, s. (2013). indonesian diaspora in australia: background and current development, the 2013 indonesian council open conference, 11-12 july 2013. university of tasmania, hobart. muhidin, s. and pardosi, j (2012). indonesian diaspora in australia, the 2012 biennial conference of australian population association, 57 december 2012. melbourne, victoria. muhidin, s and utomo, a. (2013). how many overseas indonesians are there? indonesia diaspora network, discussion paper series no.1/2013. rahadi, f. (2013). dino patti djalal dukung kewarganegaraan ganda diaspora indonesia. republika online. safran, w. (1991) diasporas in modern societies: myths of homeland and return. diaspora: a journal of transnational studies, 1(1), 83-99. satrio, b. e. (2013). diaspora indonesia, konektivitas menjadi jiwa nasionalisme http://idn.kbrikualalumpur.org/in dex.php/80-templatedetails/general/111-idn. un desa. (2013). trends in international migrant stock: migrants by destination and origin, pop/db/mig/stock/rev: un department of economic and social affairs, population division utomo, a. (2011). indonesian diaspora: mapping the road to brain gain. http://www.sr-indonesia.com/webexclusives/view/indonesiandiaspora-mapping-the-road-tobrain-gain http://www.sr-indonesia.com/web-exclusives/view/indonesian-diaspora-mapping-the-road-to-brain-gain http://www.sr-indonesia.com/web-exclusives/view/indonesian-diaspora-mapping-the-road-to-brain-gain http://www.sr-indonesia.com/web-exclusives/view/indonesian-diaspora-mapping-the-road-to-brain-gain http://www.sr-indonesia.com/web-exclusives/view/indonesian-diaspora-mapping-the-road-to-brain-gain journal of asean studies, vol. 6, no. 2 (2018), pp. 117-136 doi: 10.21512/jas.v6i2.5120.g3494 ©2018 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic questioning the regional integration of higher education in asean: equality for all? dudy heryadi universitas padjajaran, indonesia anggia utami dewi universitas padjajaran, indonesia akim universitas padjajaran, indonesia cecep hermawan universitas padjajaran, indonesia waki’ah universitas padjajaran, indonesia abstract regional integration in asean, within the framework of asean community has three pillars. asean socio-culture community as one of the pillars brought the vision of equality of access toward education aligned with the united nation sustainable development goals. specifically, integration of higher education is institutionally spearheaded by the asean university network (aun) established in 1995, which currently is still the only legitimate hei’s platform under the asean secretariat. this paper discusses the question on the exclusivity of aun membership that had created the narratives of doubt among the non-member universities of aun. by taking the case studies on selected universities in indonesia and thailand, the research is conducted with the qualitative method using triangulation of data collection from in-depth interview and structured focus group discussion (fgd) as primary sources, supplemented by the desk study on current research on the area of regional integration and higher education management. the result presented the positive view on the question posed in the research. aun is adapting to change, with several universities are now holding the status of associate membership. aun also stated that they are under the preparation of making scheme and procedure of new membership application. as a unique space of integration in asean, aun is continuously adjusting to accommodate the needs of the greater audience. key words: higher education, asean university network, inclusive, regional integration, asean introduction in the modern times, what it means by regional integration is not only defined by economic and political integration. it is also defined by the socio-cultural integration including cultural and people mobility across the region, and regional standardization of the quality of education. in this context, the united nations sustainable development goals (un sdgs) as the continuation program of 118 questioning the regional integration millennium development goals (mdgs) which elapsed in 2015 is supportive of regional integration in the way that it calls for collaboration with regional initiatives in achieving its goals by 2030 including in the field of education. the goal number 4 from the un sdgs is quality education. one of its targets is ensuring equal access for all men and women for affordable vocational and tertiary education, including university (un sdgs, 2015). the target of this goal does not only mean equal access toward the tertiary education, but also equal access toward the same qualified universities for all men and women. thus, the process of achieving this goal will involve the role of regional education standardization that could ease the process of global standardization. consequently, it will improve the capability of not just university in achieving its goal of internationalization, but also improve the capability of youths in achieving what they need in the global competitive market. integration always gets around the europeanization of the european union, but another region is rising too. in southeast asia, regional integration has taken place ever since the bali concord was concluded in 2002 and the vision of asean vision 2020 was established. hence, today we see the gradual integration of asean member states, under three main pillars, namely politicalsecurity, economy, and socio-cultural. these three aspects of integration are named as the asean community. the asean economic community is the spotlight after all of its achievements in decreasing the trade barriers and improving the human mobility across the region, meanwhile the asean sociocultural community, the third pillar, is rarely mentioned. education, social and cultural exchanges, and human settlements are some objectives within this pillar (letchumanan, 2015). but this poses several challenges to the member states of asean, in term of education itself. the biggest challenges are related to: (1) the different education system across the region; (2) the challenges of balancing the universal value from the region and local values (umboh, 2013). in this context, education integration is the priority of regular meeting of the senior officials on education and university networks in asean, such as the seameo-rihed: southeast asian ministers of education organization – regional institute of higher education and development. in the term of higher education, asean university network (aun) is spearheading the progress of higher education standardization and integration to let all students across asean could enroll for higher education in any asean countries without being concerned of the university’s different grading and curriculum. however, it is still an only unfinished vision. currently, after 23 years from the commencement of the aun in 1995, only 30 universities are involved in the process of quality assessment and curriculum standardization for the asean university network (aun, 2017). the aun is journal of asean studies 119 planning to expand its participating member by the upcoming years, starting by giving the observer status of prospectus university, followed by quality assessment, and decided by the board of trustees of the asean university networks. this exclusiveness emerging in the process toward an inclusive integration is not without precedence. taking an example from the bologna process for the region of europe with currently 50 signatories, both eu and non-eu member calling for the unification and standardization of higher education in europe. thus, a student in andorra could enroll at oxford, when they are qualified disregard where they enrolled previously (ehea, 2016). even during the bologna process, four countries were rejected from the process, namely, kyrgyzstan, israel, kosovo, and northern cyprus (bfug, 2007). it is always a long process for some integrations to become extensively inclusive, but the question is, whether the integration will be inclusive for all members within the designated region or not? this is particularly important in asean, when the process of integration seems to be exclusive only for certain universities. this exclusiveness, however, has also its own advantages. the small number of universities as members has enabled the aun to fasten the process of standardization and quality assessment of higher education in each country. it includes the ability of the networks to conduct various workshops and training regarding the quality of education in asean as well as the integration of higher education under the regime of asean socio-culture community (ascc). here, it can be seen the paradox of integration. on the one hand, the exclusive networks enabled the forum to be more effective and efficient in achieving their goals. on the other hand, it indirectly and unintentionally left other universities behind. by taking the experience of aun and the case studies in indonesia and thailand, this study aims to discuss the process of integration of higher education in asean with the perspective of the universities as the main actor of the integration process. the process of integration can be explained in two ways. first, seeing it outside of the box, observing the process of integration through analyzing the patterns comes within the legal standing being made by the states’ actor. second, is through observing each actor within the process of integration itself. the study aims to describe and analyze the process through the second way to gain clear and diversified picture of the experienced of the specific actors in term of regional integration of their field. the study shall pose two main questions. first on whether the integration of higher education in asean has already inclusive enough to cater all the needs of the higher education institutions in asean? second, on understanding the current condition of integration of higher education in asean, what factors might 120 questioning the regional integration affect the process and what is beyond the current integration? by answering the questions, this paper seeks to fill the gap of discussion on the inclusivity of regional higher education integration in asean. study design and research method this study adopts a qualitative research method, with triangulation on data collection processes, combining indepth interview, focus group discussion, and in-depth library research to the current research on the field of regional integration and the dynamic development of higher education in southeast asia (berg & lune, 2011). the triangulation has enabled the author to make the crossreference between the results of the indepth interview with senior leaders and senior officers within universities, result of the focus group discussion involving the university office of international affairs, as well as results of the in-depth library research on the current study in the same field to draw the red line of the research. the countries selected as case studies in this research, indonesia and thailand, are chosen based on the almost similar development of economies, also the non-english speaking background, who exercise the comparable higher education reform direction. both countries have started to put priorities in making higher education institutions as important actors in supporting the nation’s competitiveness and development (dewi, heryadi, & akim, 2017). the ground bases for institution selection in this research are their management status, their status of membership in aun, and their national and regional reputation. the sample of institutions taken as case studies was an opportunity sample, in which the data gathering processes were able to be conducted through professional contacts and formal request (foskett, 2010, p. 41). therefore, the results of the study present the early analysis of the question posed from the case studies rather than a generalization. the primary findings are divided into two kind series of data in the mid2017 and late-2017. first, the in-depth interview was taking place in the mid2017 to two universities in thailand: one is a private university in thailand, member of the aun, mention as university a, the other one is a non-aun member public research university that specializes in agricultural science, hereby mentioned as university b; also, to the representative of aun secretariat in bangkok, thailand. as for the universities in indonesia, in-depth interviews were conducted in three institutions. university c is a public university, recently gained special autonomy from the government, university d is a public university, member of aun, advances in sciences and technology; university e is a comprehensive public university, member of aun, and one of the oldest universities in indonesia. the in-depth interviews were conducted with the resource persons coming from the senior leaders and/or officers of each university who engaged with international cooperation activities. journal of asean studies 121 second, the findings were collected from the result of the focus group discussion held in bandung in october 2017, involving four universities based in bandung city, namely: (1) university c, (2) university f, a private university based in bandung; (3) university g, a public university, specialized and advances in education and pedagogy learning, and (4) university h, a private university based in bandung. the focus group discussion (fgd) mainly discussed about the role of international offices in each university to conduct international cooperation and to achieve the internationalization of the university in the current trend of regional integration. for this research, selected parts of the interview and focus group discussion were excerpted. meanwhile, to improve the validity and analysis of this research, the extensive confirmation was made with the current research about the related field until the first half of 2018. theoretical framework regional integration theory the theory of regional integration is mostly related to the case of regional integration of the european union. caporaso (2008) mentioned the four phases of regional integration as to include respectively the early phase of integration, goodness fit/misfit, mediating institutions and domestic structural changes. the theory itself is drawn from the preceding circumstances of the european union from the early rome treaty in 1957 to the maastricht treaty in 1993 that marked the establishment of european union. however, in the context of asean, it is important to note that the dynamics must be different from the experience of european integration or other regions. one different aspect is related to the origin of the establishment of asean which comes from political and security rather than economic prosperity rationales. the other aspect is the relatively weaker institutionalization of integration process. however, in general, comparative assessment between european and asian regionalism focuses on the inclusive network structure of asian regionalism versus exclusive formal institutions in continental europe (katzenstein, 1996, p. 150). network regionalization which main features are the regional identity-driven response to globalization and powers that rely mainly on non-institutionalized or inter governmental working methods, is argued to fit the typology of regional integration in asean (warleigh-lack, 2006, p.760). integration of higher education regional integration of higher education includes the broad-sense of the equal standardization across the region. meanwhile, for higher education, the measurement of standardization needs to be more accurately considered based on the higher priority and importance of vocational function of the higher education. however, like other process of regional integration, higher education faces the same dual problems of integration: (1) resolving drawn-out 122 questioning the regional integration violent conflict in several sub-regions; (2) overcoming the extreme differences in economic prosperity and social development among member countries (feuer & hornidge, 2015). the correlation between conflict prevention and higher education institutions relates to the improvement of youth’s capability. in managing existing or residual conflicts, higher education integration concerns on how comprehensive these initiatives of integration facilitate the cultural tolerance, integration, and peaceful coexistence within the region (selvaratnam and gopinathan, 1984). since numerous conflicts within the member of asean are drawn from the cultural and political identity issues, it is understandable how the knowledge society could help to achieve the peace in the region. here, it can be argued that building knowledge societies also means building the longterm peace and resilient in the region. higher education integration depends mainly on two factors to shape the control: (1) competitiveness/ attractiveness of the region, and; (2) legitimation of their degree system (feuer & hornidge, 2015). in addition, the integration is also affected by the university characteristics and quality assurance. as stated by the aun, those two aspects will remain important in the integration process. it is also the case during the bologna process, where the admission of a country to enter the bologna process was mainly based on the attractiveness of a higher education in the country and the degree system. above all, higher education integration means creating space in the region for all member to come over as one. the asean integration of higher education is initiated by the meeting of elite networks including the southeast asia minister of education organization (seameo). koh (2007), citing from massey (2005), mentioned that space for integration needs to consider three things: (1) space as product of interrelations and is constituted through interactions; (2) space as the domain where heterogeneity and difference are not only permissible but norm, and (3) space as work of continuity in the field, not a static onetime event. to understand the process of integration, therefore, it is important to understand how space is created in asean. in asean, the orientation of the integration resembles the regionalistculturalist one (feuer & hornidge, 2015). it is argued that asean is thriving for aseanization in order to compete with europeanization and americanization of higher education (nith, 2013). it aims to be unique unlike the other region across the globe (kanyajananiyot, 2017). nature seems to be inherent. it is withdrawn from the regional diversity of asean to conduct the higher education with normative values applies to the process of law-making emphasized by each respective government. the integration of higher education also tends to have two orientations: neojournal of asean studies 123 liberals with pro-business type and idealists, who focus on education quality and justice (feuer & hornidge, 2015). this can be seen in each asean member states. cambodia is facing the outburst of private heis (sen & ros, 2013). meanwhile, countries in the peninsula such as malaysia, singapore and indonesia seemed to be more idealists with numerous special admission programs to make sure education is inherent right for all. the reform for both orientation centers around the “optimistic conceptual progression of integration’, ‘building knowledge society’, and ‘reform in the region’ (feuer & hornidge, 2015). integration itself has been seen more competitive in the practices than it should be, balancing the dual process of building strategic partnerships across the region as well as defending the sovereignty and specialty afar from duplicating by the partner university. thus, it seems that a more complex analysis is needed to describe the process of integration of higher education in the region with cultural and political complexity like asean. the divine gaps among the countries and the domestic structural instability are the challenges for integration. result and discussion aun: space for integration? the first space of the integration is about the organizational architecture where the plurality of network emerged (jetschke & murray, 2012). the asean university network (aun) is not a part of the asean vision 2020 agreed by the asean member states in bali concord and hanoi action plan 2003, but it is an initiative comes as (un-)intended effect of education cooperation in asean. this refers to the regular meeting of the senior official of education of the member states as well as the advance development of the seameo where the elites come together to create specific network and processes to build the blueprint of the aun. as functionalist argued, the spillover effect is often unpredictable to the extent on what field the integration will take place after the previous integration finally emerged. asean started as the community to create political awareness among the member states as well as creating the economic web within the peninsula and archipelagos. however, after the early 2000s, the development has finally arrived in the intersection where the institution of asean took all the turns to be multi-dimensional regional institution, following the success of the eu after the commencement of the maastricht treaty by 1993. as argued by acharya (2001) and ba (2009), asean is a regional organization comes from the norm appropriation of its member. the cultural differences along with the different system of government are bound and tied together by the spirit of decolonization and challenging the cold war. thus, asean had a fast development during the cold war and facing the gap between the end of the cold war to the establishment of the asean vision 2020 by 2002. kahler (2000) 124 questioning the regional integration even argued that asean is not a diplomatic cooperation platform, not until the end of cold war. meaning, it denied the rationalist argument that member of the regional organization is tied to the same interest for greater cooperation. yes, asean is tied by that argument, but not until 2002. the aun was built under this argument as well. at the beginning, the vision was too low with only 17 university members by 1995. the rational of the small membership at this initial step was the view on how large membership would be a big deal to handle if all universities in the region with various standards of a degree came together as one network at that time. also, there was an authority factor on aun membership, where the government representatives from each asean member states were the one determining the chosen institutions from their country to be member of the aun. thus, the question of exclusivity of aun was in the first place originated from how the membership was arranged, with the consideration of each member states on which universities were eligible to become the member of aun. the aun itself is trying to open the membership for more universities gradually in order for the network to adapt to the changing system. although the opening for unlimited number of universities to apply for membership in the aun shall create hassled in the longterm, aun is optimistic that open membership will come eventually to the region, but gradual changes shall be expected. aun is not just working like other regional networking with membership fee. they are working based on the spirit of contribution, with layers of collaboration, policy dialogue level and operational level. thus, aun is trying to portray themselves as the voluntary network giving it best to create decent framework for the whole region. the expansions of aun with participation of various dialogue partners including the asean+3 and european union, asian development bank, and other partners, give aun more sources of funding that help growth of the aun. currently aun, along with various dialogue partners, are conducting programs that not limited to the aun members or associate members, but also to the rest of universities and higher education institutions (heis) across the region, consist of faculty and student mobility, conference programs, as well as the scholarship programs, both for shortterm or degree-based programs. within the last two years (20162018), aun has been planning to achieve mainly five goals in its mission to create a standardized quality of education across the region. those goals are (1) quality gap narrowed; (2) emerging priorities engaged; (3) exposure expanded; (4) indepth awareness, and; (5) quality of teaching and learning (aun, 2017). according to aun, the aun-quality assurance (here forward aun-qa), is the tool in achieving those goals by incorporating universities (member or journal of asean studies 125 non-member) to the same standard of the quality assurance. it is expected that the gap between university degree system and quality of grading could become thin in a long-term. in other words, the current institutions are working as board of director for the greater membership of the aun in the region itself. the purpose of aun to create the system of aun-qa is establishing an internal quality assurance system for the network’s member universities and harmonizing the higher education in the region (umemiya, 2008). however, some might argue that aun is way too exclusive by saying that the membership is too limited to only 30 universities out of thousands across the region. to respond to the argument of exclusivity, we could use the logic of aun as the same with the laboratory test toward guinea pig. the current member is set of examples for what going to be applied to the whole region in near future. within the board of trustee of the aun itself, there are three kinds of member; (1) secretariat of asean (sec-gen and the chairman of ascoe); (2) country’s representatives; (3) director of aun (aun, 2017). it means the aun is working as the sub-organization under the umbrella of asean’s secretariat. thus, the program soon or later will have disseminated back to the greater region. for example, the asean credit transfer system is currently available only for a member of the aun because the university that currently meet the standards are only members. however, it opens opportunity to get into the acts to enlist the application of the aun-qa and later admit themselves to the acts system. there are 77 programs conducted by the aun to mainstreaming the aunqa by july 2016-2017, incorporating member of the aun, associate member of the aun, as well as non-member to gain more knowledge about the quality management of higher education. these activities are important to note certain qualities that aun has as the regional institutional backbone for the asean’s integration of higher education. second, asean is a unique platform with great cultural diversities. consequently, asean university network is a rich mix of cultures and education values coming from across the region. thus, the works of the aun took more considerations and times than the process of bologna process. in europe, the bologna process took place in the single region with vast similarities, make it easier to create standardization, because culturally and economically speaking, their characteristics are mainly the same. in contrast, the biggest obstacles for asean come not only from the economic gap among the member states, but also the gap in education quality. umemiya (2008: 286-288) understands this condition and stated that the effort of asean integration by 2015 could have positive (un)intended effect on the quality of education in asean. countries like singapore and malaysia have changed from sending their student abroad to receiving overseas student. countries like indonesia, thailand and vietnam are 126 questioning the regional integration working on the effort in gaining more exposures on publication and research to increase their quality in the region because research is one of the base qualities that aun-qa focusing on (umemiya, 2008). asean university network is not a static organization which does not adapt to changes in their environment. in 1995, they only had 17 universities as members, but since 2013 they have 30 members with some universities applying for observer status and quality assurance for their universities. from 2007-2017, aun has conducted 248 programs, incorporating 19 aun members, 17 associate members, and one non-member university (aun, 2017). the progress is considerably slow, but it takes the stand in the standardization of university and education quality in asean. it makes the internationalization of heis is important, not just for the improvement of higher education quality in the region, but also as bargaining power in the regional level, since aun is attractive due to its intensity in conducting intra-regional programs as well as improving the cooperation of asean with the university partners beyond asean such as asean+3 and eu (rezasyah, konety, rifawan, & wardhana, 2017)(gill, 2018). talking the practices of integration in asean: university experiences aun has been contributing significantly in spearheading the integration of higher education institutions in asean by creating measurement system and quality assurance which enabled the member universities to have the same standard and equal footing in term of higher education (rezasyah et al., 2017). however, as mentioned previously, aun still does not have an open membership, and it has postponed the application of many universities to join the aun. the current programs are dominantly under the umbrella of the aun-qa to many universities across asean. hasanudin university in indonesia received a visitation from the aun-qa team in february 2018 for three of their undergraduate programs after six other programs also have passed the aun-qa by december 2016 and august 2017 (puluhulawa, 2018). the successful result of assessment from the board of aun-qa assessor, however, does not mean that the university is qualified to become the full member of the aun. here, it can be argued that the aun is the exclusive platform that needs to maintain its exclusivity to remain effective in works and efficient in term of decision making to foster the process of integration. thus, the role of aun here is the driver for integration. it is easy to say that the logic of exclusive membership of aun is like the exclusive membership of the security council it exists that way to make the world peace sustainable. yet, in term of education, the network like aun, which could foster the development of the colleges and universities, need to be more inclusive in term of membership and create more programs that support the inclusion of the higher education in the region. journal of asean studies 127 the effort to create inclusive program might have already taken place within the body of the aun. the creation of aun-seednet (aun-southeast asia engineering education network) is an effort of the aun to create more specified network catering more specific issue about curriculum and other matters that perhaps only become the needs of certain faculty. nevertheless, other universities that are not capable of entering these exclusive networks (but feel the necessity to have the network for cooperation), have begun to create new association like asten (asean teacher education network). asten proposed to be a leading network of teacher education institutions (teis) of asean members and serves as the medium for collaboration in research and academic activities within and across members (asten, 2015). the aun has also capable to undergo the aun-qa system to many universities across asean, makes the aun remain solid as the most legitimate institutions of higher education integration in asean, as part of the asean vision to create asean community that aimed to build resilient in university student in asean to face the global market of workforce competition. thailand universities: the pattern in thailand, the current guiding principle for higher education policy is the 20-year national strategy grand framework (inside thailand, 2016). it aims to achieve the goals of thailand 4.0 industrial revolution, which among other is to make thailand a high-income country based on knowledge-economy, where the quality of human capital is crucial. universities, here, are expected to follow the framework and contribute to the achievement of the goals. university a, ranked as top three in thailand, has a big vision of internationalization in term of students, lectures and staffs. the three aspects of internationalization of higher education that involved the students, staffs, and lectures are well-preserved by the office of international relations of this university. university a, among other universities in thailand, has a strategy to make research as its main form of international collaboration with international public, not limited to education and research institute, but also government, international governmental organizations and non-governmental organizations. it appears that it has already successfully implemented the current cooperation within the asean university network as the regional framework, and bilateral memorandum of understanding with the united kingdom, norwegian government and also another particular university across the globe. besides, the role of government is strong here, since university a is working with thailand government’s program of thailand 4.0 under the prime minister prayuth chan o-cha and the university is also becoming the spear of glocalization of the higher education in thailand with the peoplecenter development as the main engine to foster development of thailand both inward and outward. 128 questioning the regional integration like other non-english speaking countries, language is an enormous issue in thailand. however, in an era of growing international network with the system of complex interdependence of research and the university as the main actor, these universities need to overcome the barrier. vocational training for both academic and administration staffs is preeminent not only for the development of their capacity, but also for preparing the regional integration itself. as the university with an exclusive membership of the aun, university a gains benefit that eases them in getting the regional partner for research and teaching collaboration. as a university with wellknown medical school, the university has taken a great effort to remain as decent university along the time, helped by many networks they join in the international level. different from university a, university b in bangkok is the nationalpublic-autonomous university that ranked-well in the area of agriculture and forestry. this university has strategy to gain as many partner as possible without seeing the university rank as the one that really matters. not being a member of aun, thus, they could not gain better exposure for decent university partner. the university is focusing in more university-to-university arrangements under a centralized system within the university where all international affairs of the university are centralized to the main international division office. it has proven well since university b already gained improvement in the number of international students and also ranks in agriculture department despite the downward trend of the whole university ranking. they believed that it is due to the rise of the specialized university in science and technology such as the king mongkut university of technology thonburi, as well as the demographic problem of the ageing society that consequently create the issue of studentuniversity imbalance proportion. despite all the issues, university b is committed to always open for wide-range international cooperation as well as improving its specialty in agriculture and forestry. improving only certain department in a university, however, has its own weakness. media coverage mostly brings the university rank instead of certain department ranks. in term of networking itself, university b is a university with realistic view that it is hard to get a membership in the aun. thus, they are becoming the university with more open arm and receiving as many offers of partnership as they could, and plan to expand their partnership to be vastly developed first. as further steps, they are also open to be a part of universities network. for one example, they are the member of asten, representing thailand in the association. based on the experiences of the selected thailand universities in this paper, there are possibly two ways that could be identified on how university reacting the face-off in the regional competitive networks of higher education entities. the first is the more selective journal of asean studies 129 approach where university with high reputation leveraging their status to gain more exposure for strategic partners. second, the more emancipative, open-arm university that believed ranks and exclusive membership does not really matter if you could reach out universities that less-seen by the more advanced and high-rank universities. indonesian universities: the pattern although international education activity has started long before the existence of indonesia as a sovereign country, the beginning of internationalization efforts to boost up the competitiveness of indonesian universities have just started recently (dewi, 2018). intense attention towards research and publication activities as well as international partnership and collaboration have only become priorities in the past ten years. in southeast asia, despite indonesia is major player in regional economic affairs, it is not in education. the capacity of the office of international affairs or international relations in indonesia is different from one higher education institution to the other. some are already powerful enough to conduct independent cooperation with other universities. university d as one of the top-tier universities even ever hosted international guests from china that coming from various universities. some other have already had long-cooperation with universities abroad. university c, for example, has cooperation with tenri university in japan and ajou university, korea as well as other institutions that could provide scholarships for the graduates. in some cases of small universities, the activity of international cooperation is not strong enough to make the office of international affairs exercise their function. as a member of the aun, university d optimizes the leverage of its membership by joining various aun meetings such as the aun rector meeting, aun international office meeting, aun transfer meeting, aun business, as well as doing community engagement internationally across the region of southeast asia. there is a shared belief among many universities in indonesia that inward-looking vision must dominate the purpose of the internationalization of the university. university d, university c, and university e has the same voice on internationalizing indonesia to the world. when indonesia is well-known for its strong political power in the region, the university are trying to vie with the other universities across the region. yet, the problem with integration is always about strategic planning of cooperation and partnership with other universities and companies related to research and innovation as the output of the joint-research. university d has many partnerships with engineering companies. the priority to be discussed in the memorandum of understanding (mou) will be about the copyright and patent of the research output and product. this is also the case in greater southeast asia as it 130 questioning the regional integration is still developing region with various regulative issue of property rights. in the case of the aun, it has the aun intellectual property network as the network coordinated by chulalongkorn university and another member of the aun to understand the implementation of the wto’s agreement on traderelated aspects of intellectual property rights. this case shows the significance of aun engaging university in the economic deal and to act as the provider of scientific argument on the table (techakumphu, 2016). in the case of university e, as also one of the prestigious universities in indonesia, it earns benefit from aun membership through its role in the decision making of higher education integration in asean. the university itself has an adaptive principle, in which it believe that regional framework and national regulation shall be adopted by the university in certain way that suited ti the university characteristic. the system of its internationalization is decentralization system. it means university e utilizes the smaller unit within the university to handle the operation of international affairs while maintaining the legal discussion in the international office in university level. the existence of international unit in each faculty make the system transparent in its implementation and monitoring by the office of international affairs. the decentralization system aimed to find the hidden jewel that may foster the international cooperation of the university even further. in addition, university e also highlighted that its programs and systems were sometimes emulated by other institutions, yet they are rather optimistic by saying that improvement of partner universities is a good sign of collaboration. it means that they are successful in placing the benchmark on what constitute a good program. trying to be the norm entrepreneurs seems to be the goal for university e in term of internationalization in national and regional level. the importance of setting a benchmark as one institution’s main aptitude is corresponded to the statement of university f, g and h during the focus group discussion. it demonstrates that one university is leading on that issue. for example, if university e are succesful in setting benchmark for community engagement program across indonesia, university g, as leading education and pedagogy-based university, is also leading in teaching pedagogy, setting benchmark as one of the earliest universities in asean teaching the arts of pedagogy. university h, as private university, seems to be more proactive and leading in the number of international cooperation they have among the private universities in bandung. the active role of international office and full-support -with less-hassle from the university bureaucracy are making it easier for faculty to gain more opportunity to cooperate with various university across the globe. assessing the regional integration: on what stage are we on? journal of asean studies 131 role of the central government the role of government is vital in facilitating the process of internationalization in asean. the policy of higher education becomes the umbrella of the direction of universities to formulate their vision and missions, also to further exercise their strategies to achieve them. in the context of international cooperation, indonesia for example, the ministry of research, technology, and higher education has a specialized sub directorate to support university cooperation domestically and internationally (kemenristekdikti, 2015). bureau of cooperation and public communication is one of sub-organ right under the general secretary of ministry of research, technology, and higher education of indonesia that is responsible to handle the cooperation activities of the ministry, between indonesia (as a state or represented by the university) and another country or universities abroad. the existence of these sub directorate and bureau are important in order to support the office of international affairs in each university to be able to compete in the international level. as for thailand, the office of the higher education commission (ohec) is appointed under the ministry of education to promote thailand’s higher education, and to formulize the policy recommendations with international perspectives. the special bureau of international cooperation strategy is also established under the ohec, with some tasks are to formulate strategies and implement international cooperation activities on higher education sector (ohec, 2017). role of networks in join research and university partnership cooperation among universities in the development of education and degree system as well as in in-depth research is important. research-based universities such as university a, university d, and other universities across the region believe that research network is the most important part for the university development. gill (2018) believed that the effort in creating functional regionalism in research collaboration is successful when no significant function barrier exists achieve it. it is the sign that theoretically, the existence of aun and the expansion of university partner and dialogue partner shall excel the programs even further. the aun is the way to excel the process to gain more decent research partner for the university. imagine, if one university needs to conduct mou to each university, they would like to have cooperation and joint research, how many mou they need to make and keep it sustainable and active each year? more than hundred. the networks like aun, seednet, and asten are the proper medium and efficient platform for the university in gaining more connections in term of exchange programs for staff, lectures and student as well as getting the university partners in terms of research for short, middle or long-term basis. 132 questioning the regional integration university a, b, c, and d admitted that the alumni networks is one of the important benefactors for generating research partner for the universities. university d said that dozens of the joint research emerge from the relations with the alumni in many well-known institutions across the globe. however, university b is rather hesitant in promoting themselves to university partner. some universities might have seen university rank as big matter. the ranking of university seems to ‘indicate’ the capability of the university in teaching and research. the ranking also creates the bigger gap in the international network, since good-ranked university many times only wanted to cooperate with universities from their rank, and vice versa. the university ranking seemingly has become counter-intuitive, since it is creating more disparities among universities and makes the cooperation is harder for middle-rank to low-rank university group to get decent research and teaching counterpart. roles of university’s offices of international relations offices of international affairs or international relations (oia) hold a vital role for universities to socialize in the international networks. some offices of international relations work only for the hospitality purposes, holding the reception of international guest as well as facilitating the mou without participating in the implementation of the mou. there are also cases where the offices have the extensive role to the level that the office controls the whole system of international affairs across the university starting from the planning, signing the legal agreement, implementation as well as evaluation of the program. oia from highly reputable universities such as university a, university d, and university e, have these extensive roles. yet some other universities new to internationalization like university c is still trying to build its measurement about the role of the international office. overlapping roles of the international office with the office of academic and student affairs sometimes become an issue in the university management. in facing regional integration of higher education, oia is challenged by the fast development of the networks. those who could beat the pace will be able to excel in the development of their ranks and status in the region, those who fail, decided to make their own initiatives to adjust their pace. every action has their own rationales, since the process of regional integration is not a rally to prove which networks are better, but instead working in parallel to create better education of the region. the aun, for example, demands the extensive role of the international offices to handle not only the quality assurance system and programs of the aun that works beyond the level of university agreement, but also the active participation and mobility of the student, and also staffs (both academic and administrative). facing this face-off, some universities find it hard, but along the journal of asean studies 133 time, some universities like hasanudin university in indonesia, university of economics of ho chi minh in vietnam, universiti teknologi malaya in malaysia, and some other universities have been coping up the race by becoming the associate member of the aun-qa. conclusion under certain circumstances, regional integration could entirely benefit the institutions, but sometimes, it also could hamper the development of the actors when they are not ready. most asean countries believed in the common interest they had on creating the vast community with depth and multidimensional integration as part of the asean community that gradually integrated asean in every 10-year-phase. the integration of higher education in asean through the asean university network is believed to be the (un)intended impact of the spill-over of the regional integration. as the result, the aun has not yet entirely cover the whole level of higher education in asean. instead, they work in more intensive and exclusive environment, enabling them to effectively take a measurement of their membership as well as ease the process of decision making. the aun will not always being the exclusive circle that will evolve gradually. the burden of proof is not entirely answered on whether or not aun could provide equality for all. for now, they are trying to provide the equality in form of aun-qa to university wish to admit for quality assurance. in the future, the discourse might change. this paper has been discussing the undergoing research on current dynamics of regionalization process of higher education in asean by analyzing the aun and specifically taking the case studies from selected indonesian and thai universities. therefore, future assessment by taking different approach that also examines other higher education institutions in other asean member states will be very beneficial for the advancement of the study. acknowledgment this research was supported by the universitas padjadjaran internal research grant year 2017-2018. we would like to 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(2006). towards a conceptual framework for regionalisation: bridging'new regionalism'and'integration theory'. review of international political economy, 13(5), 750-771. editorial: migration, mobility and diaspora in asia greetings from the journal of asean studies. in this issue, jas offers a broader range of discussion on the migration and mobility. some of the articles published in this issue were previously presented at the 4th international conference on business, international relations, and diplomacy at bina nusantara university, jakarta. however, jas also includes several other articles that update our intellectual underpinnings on both indonesian role in the organization of petroleum exporting countries and australian foreign policy. the first article in this issue highlights the migration flow between taiwan and southeast asia. ching-lung tsay, in his article entitled migration between southeast asia and taiwan: trends, characteristics, and implications, identifies that the trend of taiwanese migration to southeast asia is more homogenous in comparison to the southeast asian migration to taiwan. taiwan migration to southeast asia is actively triggered by the flow of investment to the region while the inflow migration to taiwan from southeast asia involves the movement of contract workers, immigrant spouses, professionals and the skilled, as well as students. tsay also suggests that this trend could be seen as a potential for both countries to build a better migration management. indonesian diaspora in this issue also receives considerable attention from salut muhidin and ariane utomo through their article entitled the global of indonesian diaspora: how many are there and where are they? this article attempts to provide an analysis of the patterns and demographic feature of indonesian diaspora as a part of the largest global community. this article also explores the potential that indonesian diaspora can contribute to indonesian development. on the protection of indonesian women migrant workers, sylvia yazid and elisabeth dewi contend that women play a significant role. their involvement in influencing the policy making is evident in the indonesian context. yazid and dewi intensely interviewed six prominent woman figures who, through their efforts, promote the protection of women migrant workers. furthermore, this article gives a broad insight as the discussion covers the role that a diverse group of professionals plays in empowering women as a migrant worker. another two titles in this volume deal with indonesia and the organization of the petroleum exporting countries (opec); and the impact of the growing prc’s role in southeast asia to the australian foreign policy. badaruddin in his article discusses the reactivation of indonesia as a member of opec and its trajectory. in the latter title, lidya sinaga highlights how the australian authority reacts to the increasingly assertive chinese foreign policy in southeast asia. by the publication of this issue, jas is also glad to announce that to improve performance as a growing international scholarly journal on southeast asian affairs, we are now in full operation of open journal system. jas would like to express its gratitude to indonesian ministry of research and technology and higher education from whom the jas receives a grant to improve our professionalism and commitment to be an internationally reputable journal. in addition, we would like to express our deepest condolences on the loss of bantarto bandoro, our advisory board member, in the end of last year. he has shown his dedication and instrumental contributions in the making of jas since the early development of this journal. we also would like to welcome tamas novak of budapest business school hungary as our newest international advisory board member. this shows our commitment to continuously broaden our networks of readership and to engage intellectuals whose area of interest is southeast asia from all around the world including countries in the central and eastern europe. jakarta, 30 january 2016 prof. tirta n. mursitama, ph.d editor-in-chief journal of asean studies, vol. 6, no. 2 (2018), pp. 192-212 doi: 10.21512/jas.v6i2.5354.g3497 ©2018 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic the (in)visibility of taiwan – indonesia relations: indonesian student on the side-line rangga aditya bina nusantara university, indonesia abstract this paper aims to examine the role of students in indonesia-taiwan relations. students are important agents of change in indonesia’s nation building as apparent during indonesia’s struggle for independence in 1945 and democratization movement in 1998. however, with over 3,052 indonesian students in taiwan, taiwan government has not taken such advantage from this situation to increase its bilateral relations with indonesia which has been for long overshadowed by taiwan status and indonesia’s one china policy. there are two arguments developed in this paper. first, taiwan academic relations with indonesia are still focusing on the effort to increase the number of indonesian students in taiwan and neglect their potential as agent of cooperation. this condition has made the students as agent become invisible. second, taiwan’s policy in academic cooperation with indonesia is not in line with taiwan’s effort to upgrade its relation with indonesia. as an impact, taiwan – indonesia relation remains stagnant and invisible. in collecting the data, this paper uses observations and interviews to indonesian students in taiwan. key words: indonesian student, taiwan-indonesia relations, academic exchange introduction discord with china over sovereignty has positioned taiwan to exercise extensive effort in maintaining their existence in the world. china’s consistent claim and diplomatic isolation have created complexity for taiwan to exercise their international relations in an official form. therefore, semi-official and unofficial forms become visible options for taiwan in dealing with other states. this forms include economic, sociocultural as well as academic relations with other states in the world, especially those who do not have diplomatic relations with taiwan. as the nearest region, southeast asia has become taiwan’s primary destination for struggle of existence. their semi-official relations with countries in the region have begun since many decades ago through the establishment of de-facto representative office. through this office, taiwan is trying to establish connection, coordination and cooperation to ensure taiwan relations and presence in the region. elizabeth freund larus (2006) states that the establishment of taiwan’s semi-official relation is to journal of asean studies 193 maintain unofficial relation that has switched diplomatic relations from taiwan to china. this effort attempts to broaden taiwan’s international space by strengthening non-political relations with southeast asian countries, the so-called pragmatic diplomacy. yet, the practice is also driven by economic interest. in this context, indonesia, as the biggest and influential nation-state in southeast asia, is a potential partner for taiwan in exercising their foreign relations and influence. however, like many other non-diplomatic partners, relations between taipei and jakarta are built upon the establishment of semiofficial representative institutions; taiwan under chinese chamber of commerce to jakarta and indonesia through indonesian chamber of commerce to taipei in 1971 (jie, 2002). although there is an absence of indonesia’s political recognition to taiwan but this kind of obscure institutional arrangement has expanded both government operation and to some extent enhance probability to create cooperation. herein after, cooperation between both sides starts to emerge on agricultural, mail services, and air services. in 1989, taiwan upgraded their office into taipei economic and trade office (teto) after receiving permission from jakarta. nonetheless, influenced by jakarta’s understanding of “one china policy”, reciprocal action had to wait the memorandum of understanding (mou) on diplomatic restoration signed between indonesia and china on august 8, 1990. five years later, indonesia also upgraded its office into indonesia economic and trade office to taipei (ieto). the upgrade of those offices has made enormous progress to indonesia-taiwan relations in economic as well as sociocultural aspects. in total, both indonesia and taiwan have signed 27 agreements and memorandum of understandings in 11 different fields. those cooperation have increased taiwan’s visibility in the region particularly with indonesia. (elias, 2015) table 1. field and amount of indonesia-taiwan cooperation phase total fields name 1971-1988 11 3 1. agreement on agricultural technical cooperation 2. agreement on agricultural technical cooperation 3. agreement on agricultural technical cooperation 4. memorandum for extension and amendment to the agreement on agricultural technical cooperation 5. agreement on agricultural technical cooperation 6. memorandum for extension and amendment to the agreement on agricultural technical cooperation 7. amendment ii of the agricultural technical cooperation agreement 8. agreement on agricultural technical cooperation 194 the (in)visibility of taiwan – indonesia relations phase total fields name 9. memorandum for extension and amendment to the agreement on agricultural technical cooperation 10. memorandum of understanding on international express mail service 11. air services agreement 1989-1994 6 3 1. memorandum of understanding concerning cooperation for the promotion of investment 2. agreed minutes on matters related to the air services 3. agreement for the promotion and protection of investments 4. amendment on the annex to air service agreement 5. agreement on agricultural technical cooperation 6. the extension to the agricultural technical cooperation agreement 1995-present 10 8 1. agreement for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to 2. memorandum of understanding on marine and fisheries cooperation 3. memorandum of understanding on recruitment of indonesian worker 4. agreement on agricultural technical cooperation 5. one village one product agribusiness cooperation plan 6. memorandum of understanding on recruitment, placement and protection of indonesian overseas workers 7. memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the field of higher education 8. memorandum of understanding on concerning cooperation in immigration affairs, human trafficking and people smuggling prevention 9. memorandum of understanding on morotai development project 10. agreement on agricultural technical cooperation source: compiled from many sources by author despite many agreements have been successfully conducted between both parties, nevertheless most of them are merely technical, particularly in air services, mail services, marine and fisheries, agribusiness and agricultural, as presented on table 1. those agreements only regulate coordination, information exchange and capacity building between both sides. on the other hand, mou on labour is only based on supply and demand, whereas mou on immigration has no progress on operational phase which makes it on framework-basis agreement only. even the three economic agreements are emphasizing on technical part only. the most promising economic agreement, mou on morotai development project, has encountered stalemate since it was signed in december 2012 (ieto, 2012). even though the steering committees have conducted a meeting for three times, up to this end the blueprint of the project is still far from being released (ieto, 2013). those agreements are unable to provide much contribution on the journal of asean studies 195 enhancement of indonesia-taiwan relation because of the precautious actions taken by indonesian government due to indonesia’s effort to maintain good relation with china in accordance to their understanding of one china policy. the only agreement that potentially could enhance indonesiataiwan relation is academic relation. however up to date, academic relation is still under-explored in order to achieve maximum gains. therefore, this paper aims to correlate academic agreement with the enhancement of indonesiataiwan relation. there are two arguments to be delivered in this paper. first, taiwan academic relations with indonesia are still focusing on the effort of increasing the number of indonesia students in taiwan and neglecting their potential as agent of cooperation. second, taiwan’s policy in academic cooperation with indonesia is not in line with taiwan’s effort to upgrade its relation with indonesia. taiwan’s effort in enhancing relations with indonesia: an overlapping effort to enhance its relations with indonesia, taiwan is utilizing five approaches: institutional relations, technical assistances, economic relations, informal forum, and academic relations. first, institutional approach is established through direct contact between defacto institution teto and ieto. starting with the establishment of taiwan’s chinese chamber of commerce to jakarta in april 1971, indonesia reciprocally established indonesian chamber of commerce to taipei in june 1971 (jie, 2002). since then, cooperation has emerged in technical matters. in its development, taiwan received permission to upgrade the officialdom of their office in october 1989 into teto that shifted the institution from being obscure to be more official. five years later, after signing mou with china on 8 august 1990 to restore its relation, indonesia also upgraded its office into ieto. although both offices by nature are de-facto, they have made enormous progress to indonesia-taiwan relations, increased the number of cooperation and expanded it into various fields. second, technical assistance approach includes providing assistance, conducting coordination and information exchange with indonesia in the field of agricultural, air and mail services, marine and fisheries, and agribusiness. the purpose of this approach is to gain good perception about taiwan appearance to indonesian government as well as the people who become the beneficiary. it is clear that taiwan is trying to construct their good image as cooperation counterpart by showing their goodwill in assisting developing countries like indonesia. it can be perceived through agricultural technical assistance which was chosen by taiwan as the first field cooperation with indonesia in 1976 due to two reasons. first reason is that indonesia is an agricultural country, thus accepting technical assistance in agricultural is suitable and such technical assistance is giving less obligation and less formal arrangement for indonesia. the second 196 the (in)visibility of taiwan – indonesia relations reason is that the receiver of the program’s is a targeted group of people, particularly farmers. in addition, this approach also becomes stimulant for economic approach and peopleto-people exchange through tourism and flights by adopting cooperation in mail and air services. both cooperation are to expedite people-to-people interaction through tourism and facilitate business movement and exchange. third, economic approach applies through economic diplomacy and cooperation. as kuo-hsiung lee (1990) states, taiwan’s economic achievement is the tools for taiwan to establish cooperation with southeast asian countries. the economic diplomacy is utilized by taiwan to gain their economic interest through cooperation and in the same time increase their international political status. similarly, gary klintworth (1995) states that taiwan economic cooperation is built upon the flow of investment which gives compatible effect to taiwan and counterparts. investment flow from taiwan is needed by developing countries like indonesia in pursuing higher economic growth. it will create more jobs to indonesia large population whereas on the other hand gives access for taiwan to competitiveness cost of labour, natural resources as well as increases taiwan’s influence in the southeast asia. in order to embed their economic cooperation with indonesia, taiwan established technical economic cooperation through mou on promotion of investment, agreement on promotion and protection of investment, and agreement on avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion. those agreements have promoted businessmen from taiwan to invest in indonesia. in recent years, taiwan has become indonesia’s 10th largest investor with total amount us$ 15,360,000,000 (bkpm, 2014). this amount keeps increasing as represented by recent data from indonesia investment coordinating board. from october until december 2013 taiwan’s investment in indonesia has reached us$ 402 million. in trade, taiwan has become indonesia’s 9th largest trade partner whereas indonesia is taiwan’s 10th largest trade partner with total trade us$ 12,299,446,111. in addition, economic diplomacy has promoted movement of businessmen in constituting the opportunity to establish cooperation in labour affairs. in chen jie’s argument, pragmatic diplomacy especially in economy is built not only upon government effort but businessmen as well. further, he elaborates how businessmen channel has created an impact to the government from both entities to establish closer relations (jie, 2002). taiwan domestic economic demand for workers has been creating adjacent relations related to business and labour affairs with indonesia. thus, with its larger population, indonesia is the largest supplier for foreign workers in taiwan (taiwan ministry of labour, 2014). data in 2017 demonstrated that there was 258.000 indonesia people in journal of asean studies 197 taiwan which 97% of them are workers. they are not only working in productive sector (manufacture, construction, and other industry) but in social welfare (domestic sector) as well. this has encouraged both governments to work closely in dealing with this matter. thus, in respond with this issue, teto and ieto signed “memorandum of understanding between the indonesian economic and trade office to taipei (ieto) and the taipei economic and trade office in indonesia (teto) on the recruitment, placement and protection of indonesian overseas workers”, on january 24th, 2011. fourth, the informal forum approach. along with above three approaches, taiwan also conducts several informal forums to share and promote cooperation as well as build good perception about taiwan as a friendly neighbour. this approach is carried out by inviting scholars, parliament members, government officers, and influential individual to have a short visit to taiwan. in conducting such effort, teto is acting as the inviting party to potential individual in policy circle. most of the visits are organized secretly to avoid protest from china embassy in jakarta. the agenda of this informal forum mostly are visit to government offices, research centre and thinktank, university and industrial company. in maintaining the balance of information, several taiwanese government representatives are also invited to visit jakarta with agenda courtesy meeting with university, company, research centre, asean secretariat and other government or private institution. table 2. recipients of taiwan scholarship academic year moe hes icdf most 2009/2010 9 5 n/a 2010/2011 9 5 n/a 2011/2012 9 5 0 2012/2013 10 5 2 2013/2014 10 6 5 source: taiwan economic and trade office in jakarta lastly is the academic approach which is conducted through academic exchange. the embryo of this approach started in 2004 when taiwan provided aid in academic area through taiwan scholarship program. the scholarship is given to indonesian students who are eager to pursue their degree in one of taiwan education institutions. in its development, taiwan is increasing the number of scholarships by diversifying the scheme from different government institutions such as minister of education (moe), minister of science and technology (most), international cooperation and development fund (icdf) as well as scholarship for mandarin language under huayu enrichment scholarship (hes). currently, taiwan is providing 20 scholarships every year for indonesian students. in supporting research collaboration, taiwan academic exchange is built upon taiwan 198 the (in)visibility of taiwan – indonesia relations scholarship program under the ministry of foreign affairs, taiwan. the objective is to award foreign scholars and expert to conduct advance research with topics related to taiwan, cross-strait relations, mainland china, asia-pacific region and chinese studies at universities or academic institutions in taiwan. since 2010, there are six recipients who have been awarded taiwan scholarship with various research topics such as economics, international migration, non-traditional security and disaster management (taiwan fellowship, 2015). table 3. recipients of taiwan fellowship from indonesia year recipient research topic no position institution origin 2010 1 researcher lipi international migration and economic 2011 2 1.researcher 2.doctoral candidate 1.lipi 2.green talent scheme sponsored by the german federal ministry of education and research 1.green economy 2.international migration 2012 1 associate professor padjajaran university non-traditional security (human trafficking) 2013 2 1.researcher 2. assistant professor 1.university brunei darussalam 2.university of airlangga 1.non-traditional security (health security) 2.disaster management source: taiwan fellowship, 2015 in addition, both parties also successfully conduct joint research between lembaga ilmu pengetahuan indonesia (lipi) and chung-hua institute for economic research (cier) on “the dynamics and current status of taiwan – indonesia relations” and “feasibility study of economic cooperation arrangement (eca) between taiwan – indonesia”. the researches, which can be perceived as policy recommendation, have concluded that economic cooperation between indonesia and taiwan will not only increase trade and investment flows but also reduce the trade barriers. suitability and compatibility between both economic may direct them to build economic cooperation arrangement which could enhance economic development in various fields including smes, human resources, electronics and automotive industries as well as agriculture (lipi, 2012). apart from scholarship and research, academic approach is also journal of asean studies 199 attempted to establish agreement. on may 21, 2011, ministry of education from both parties successfully conducted taiwan-indonesia higher education summit in bali indonesia followed by signing mou in the field of higher education. this mou covers cooperation in six academic areas such as academic exchange, providing scholarship, developing bilateral programs, training educational administrators and teachers, facilitating joint research & international publications and mutual recognition of degrees and professional qualifications (lin, 2012). the mou is projected to strengthen academic exchange between both sides which until 2009 already concluded 55 inter-university bilateral agreements. in supporting the implementation of the mou, taiwan established taiwan education center (tec) in surabaya, a non-profit organization that has an objective to promote higher education in taiwan and strengthen bilateral academic exchange between taiwan and indonesia. as an education centre, tec is operated to fulfil several services i.e. providing related information about taiwan education, participating in overseas education exhibitions, holding the annual taiwan higher education exhibition, assisting taiwan institutions to establish academic and administrative staff exchanges with indonesia (taiwan education center, 2015). utilizing those approaches, taiwan is attempting to enhance and upgrade their relations with indonesia. although there are five approaches, however, from above elaborations, essentially those approaches are overlapping. institutional approach become the centre of gravity to other approaches which contributes in initiation, process and concluding phase while the rest are supporting each other. taking economic approach as example, institutional approach is indeed the main utilized approach to realize the agreement whereas other approaches are obviously perceived supporting it by: conducting academic research on feasibility studies, creating technical economic agreement, and inviting related stakeholder. matrix 1. taiwan five approaches in enhancing relations with indonesia source: elias, 2014 obstructions in taiwan-indonesia relations although taiwan could maintain and nurture their relations with indonesia by utilizing those approaches, however, the development of their relations remains stagnant since the establishment of teto and ieto two decades ago. indonesian foreign policy is much left behind compare to other major asean members like singapore and malaysia. in 200 the (in)visibility of taiwan – indonesia relations both countries, the function of taiwan’s office is already expanded not only in economic related but cultural as well under the name of taiwan economic and cultural office. reciprocally, their offices in taipei also have political officer assigned by their ministry of foreign affair. taiwan – indonesia relations become stagnant because of three factors: first, indonesian rigid policy over taiwan which was built under consideration of the mou 1990 with china. it stated on the mou that indonesia’s relations with taiwan is established only in economic and trade relations which is nongovernment in nature. thus, in maintaining their relations with taiwan, indonesian ministry of foreign affairs released “one china policy” guideline to avoid mistreatment of their domestic institution especially governmental when deal with taiwan. the guideline, to some extent, is preventing indonesia to expand mutual benefit relation with taiwan. second, limited understanding about cross-strait relations. restriction in governmental, measured by the guideline, has made the understanding of policy makers regarding taiwan-china relations limited, especially related to “one china policy”. on interviews with few government officials who remains anonymous as requested, their understanding about “one china policy” is very limited to zero sum game understanding. they said, “one china policy” means profound relations with taiwan is highly avoided because indonesia has diplomatic relations with china. they also understood chinataiwan relations in discord relation where taiwan is part of china (ieto taipei official, 2014). their knowledge about development of cross-strait relations was lack behind even they did not understand about the “92 consensus”. it can be assumed, from the interview, that indonesian government has a very limited understanding about cross-strait relations which contributes to stagnant relations with taiwan. third, limited function of the defacto institution. accumulation of the first two factors has contributed to the limited function of de-facto institution. ieto was established under presidential decree no. 48/1995 which the basis was come from the mou in 1990. on the decree, the first dictum determines the increasing role of chamber of commerce into ieto whereas the second dictum is stressed on its non governmental economic institution status. moreover, the fourth dictum states in general that ieto is under coordination of indonesia ministry of trade (indonesian presidential office, 1994). however although the decree regulates the enhancement of economic and trade relations but in the implementation 47,4% of ieto activity is consular, 15,8% is research, 5% is promoting indonesia tourism and 31,6% is economic and trade mostly to promote and coordinate trade related issues (ieto, 2014). thus, limited function creates limited relations. therefore, taiwanindonesia relations could be enhanced journal of asean studies 201 and upgraded if only those obstructions can be solved through appropriate effort. indonesian students in taiwan as agent of cooperation the above obstruction in taiwanindonesia relations could be potentially improved by enhancing the fifth pillars, the academic cooperation. the effort can be implemented by conducting treatment and collaboration with indonesian students in taiwan as counterpart. in order to be able to construct the analysis, it is highly important to understand the concept of epistemic community as stated by peter haas (1992). he mentions that epistemic community is a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policyrelevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area. yet, it is not necessary to identify epistemic community made up of natural scientist per se. social scientists or even individuals from any discipline and profession can be defined as epistemic community as long as they have a sufficiently strong claim to a body of knowledge that is valued by society. he further argues that the epistemic community may come from various background or expertise but they share four principles in common; which are (1) shared set of normative and principled beliefs, (2) shared causal beliefs, (3) shared notions of validity, and (4) a common policy enterprise. altogether, these four principles not only provide the valuebased rationale for their analysis but also deliver their professional competence towards certain policy. furthermore, haas (1964) defines complexity and uncertainty as problem for decision makers in the stage of policy design. complexity occurs because interlinkage of issue in the current global world has forced decision makers to deal with the complex interplay among issues and interests. on the other hand, uncertainty occurs as consequences of growing number of issues and limited information received by decision makers. as mentioned by alexander george, characterizing conditions of uncertainty, as those under which actors must make choices without "adequate information about the situation at hand" or in the face of "the inadequacy of available general knowledge” is needed for assessing the expected outcomes of different courses of action. thus, control over knowledge and information is an important dimension of power which it is best served by epistemic community. haas does believe that epistemic community is an actor to define complex problem. they can give knowledge-based expert in international policy making by giving influence to the decision makers that encounter complexity and uncertainty with beneficial information. it arises through their ability in helping to formulate policy using three main ways: first, elucidating cause-and-effect relationship and providing advice on the likely result of various courses of action. their ability to explain causality relations of phenomenon is helping to estimate 202 the (in)visibility of taiwan – indonesia relations various probabilities which could bring various answers to what will happen in the future. second, shedding light on the complex interlinkages between issues. ability to gain information could make them resolve interlinkages between issues on the interconnected events. third, helping to define the selfinterest of states. it derives from the process of explaining causality relationship which leads to redefinition or identification of new idea. the diffusion of new ideas along with information can lead to new patterns of behaviour and is proved to be an important determinant of international policy coordination. hence, as demands for information arise in decision making setting, epistemic communities are becoming one possible provider in providing information and advice. they have capabilities to produce and provide the information in helping states to identify their best interests, form the issues for collective debate, recommend specific policies, as well as identify substantial element for negotiation which decision maker could learn new patterns of reasoning. in sum, epistemic community is able to explain causality relations of phenomenon to estimate various probabilities, gain accurate information and redefinition or identification of new idea which consequently begin to pursue new state interests. the characteristic and nature of indonesia student in taiwan in this paper, indonesian students in taiwan are considered as the epistemic community. they could play certain roles as agent of change as well as agent of cooperation. their ability to some extent would contribute in enhancing taiwan indonesia relations, particularly indonesia’s policy over taiwan. indonesian students are the third largest foreign students in taiwan with total number of 3,052 students. this number consists of international degree seeking (ids), overseas chinese student (ocs), chinese language center (clc) student and exchange student. ids is non-chinese ethnic student who seek for degree in taiwan from undergraduate level until doctoral level with total number in 2014 1,174 student (taiwan ministry of education, 2015). they come to taiwan after gaining scholarship from taiwan scholarship scheme, indonesian government scholarship scheme like aceh scholarship, or local scholarship from the university in taiwan. on contrary, overseas chinese student is indonesian chinese student who seeks for degree in taiwan and mostly are on undergraduate level with total number of 1,009 students (taiwan ministry of education, 2015). considering the ocs comes from businessman family, most of them are funded by their parents in enrolling at taiwan academic institution. both ids and ocs are studying in taiwan for more than one year, depend on their degree and achievement. in term of field of studies, for ids, top five fields in 2013/2014 are engineering 403, followed by business and administration 312 and humanities 67, medical 57 and agriculture 52 students. journal of asean studies 203 figure 1. detail number of indonesian student by field of study source: taiwan ministry of education in contrast, clc student and exchange student have only limited time of studying in taiwan. their program would be finished in six months to one year period. clc student is those who learn mandarin in mandarin language center while exchange student is those who join an exchange program for a short period in taiwan universities. a number of indonesian students who enrol in the clc are 1,009 in 2014 while there are 33 students join the exchange program in 2013 (taiwan ministry of education, 2015). 204 the (in)visibility of taiwan – indonesia relations figure 2. demography of indonesian student in taiwan 2009-2014 source: compiled by author from many sources by its nature, indonesian students had played major role in carrying out changes in politics and policy realm. starting with the establishment of first student organization in 1908, which was called boedi oetomo, the indonesian students arranged an event in 1928, called “youth pledge”, which enabled to unify indonesia’s diverse ethnics under three principles; one nation, one country, and one language of indonesia. indonesian students continued playing major role in indonesia’s independence from japan’s colonialism by kidnapping soekarno and hatta, and forcing them to declare indonesia’s independent as soon as japan lost the battle in world war ii. initially soekarno and hatta were resistant in doing so but due to the pressure of indonesian students, they agreed to declare the independence of indonesia on august 17, 1945 (weiss, 2012). furthermore, indonesian students were also the forces behind indonesia’s reformation in 1998. the new order era, under president soeharto, have ruled indonesia with authoritarian leadership for 32 years and resulted economic crisis. the poor economic and politic performance under the new order regime have triggered indonesian students to organize mass through student organization bodies and held a massive demonstration in asserting president soeharto to step down from the presidential office. their militancy and heroic action resulted a major change in indonesia’s political realm. pursuant to the aforementioned elaboration, indonesian students by nature are, indeed, the agents of change in indonesia’s major history conducted by their ability in organizing themselves on student organization. on the other hand, many indonesian students who pursue their education in taiwan also come from various backgrounds. nevertheless, they successfully established three different student organizations to accommodate their interests and network in taiwan. the journal of asean studies 205 first student organization, as well as the oldest one, is persatuan pelajar indonesia in taiwan/perpita (the association of indonesian students in taiwan). it was established in 1960 and mainly to facilitate the issues of cultural differences and communication among indonesian students in taiwan. perpita is affiliated with ikatan citra alumni indonesia setaiwan (icati) which is a jakarta-based association of indonesian student alumni who obtain their degree in taiwan. in order to become the member of perpita, the students have to apply and pay membership fee. in addition, most of perpita members are the overseas chinese students who are enrolling in undergraduate program. in achieving its organization purpose, perpita holds various activities, such as seminar and sports activity, for the indonesian students in taiwan. the second student organization is forum mahasiswa muslim indonesia di taiwan/formmit (forum of indonesian muslim students in taiwan) which was established in 2006 and applies islamic tenets as their organization’s platform. the purpose of formmit is to facilitate communication among indonesian muslim students as well as a platform for islamic proselytizing. even though there is no membership to join this organization, all members still have to apply for membership and are limited to indonesian muslim students only. formmit holds several religious activities in collaboration with indonesian migrant workers’ organization in taiwan and annual international scholars conference in taiwan (aisct) which is aimed to conduct technological transfer from taiwan to indonesia. last, yet most substantial indonesian student organization, is perhimpunan pelajar indonesia di taiwan/ppi taiwan (indonesian students association in taiwan) which was established in 2010. the objective of this organization is to facilitate all indonesian students regardless their ethnic, religion or background. no registration or membership fee is required as the indonesian students in taiwan automatically become the member of ppi taiwan. the structure of ppi taiwan is similar with the structure of government where there are two different bodies, namely legislative and executive, in exercising its objectives. in addition, ppi taiwan has network with other indonesian students around the world or known as overseas indonesian student association alliance (oisaa) which links every ppi in different countries. in order to achieve its objectives, ppi taiwan has the support from other indonesian student organization in university level and indonesian economic and trade office in taipei (ieto). their activity consists of conducting research for ieto policy recommendation, holding student capacity building and entrepreneurship program, as well as charity and sport event. the existence of several indonesian student organizations in taiwan is more or less influenced by the various backgrounds of indonesian 206 the (in)visibility of taiwan – indonesia relations students which can be classified as three major backgrounds; ethnic business network, government officials and scholars. ethnic business network mainly are the overseas chinese students who are enrolled as undergraduate students. they have selected taiwan as destination to pursue their education since 1960s. after graduation, most of them are either continuing to master degree, working in taiwan or coming back home to help their family business. on the other hand, government officials mainly come from aceh province where the local government provides scholarship to its citizens, particularly officers in local and municipal government, through lembaga peningkatan sumber daya manusia aceh (aceh human resource improvement agency). most of them are pursuing higher education in master or doctoral degree program. lastly, the scholars mainly come from indonesia’s public universities, i.e. institut teknologi sepuluh nopember, university of brawijaya, and university of indonesia. most of them are also pursuing higher education degree with the assistance of various scholarship frameworks offer by taiwanese government. in addition, scholars also come from “dikti bridging program” under directorate of higher education, ministry of national education in 2012. this program is a pre master and doctoral degree scholarship for academician from the universities in indonesia to stay for three months in one of the universities in taiwan. the objective of this program is to grant an access for an indonesian academician to taiwan and at the end of the program the recipient is expected to get a letter of acceptance (loa) from the university in taiwan. the bridging program already conducted twice in two batches. the first batch was followed by 85 persons and the second one was followed by 144 academicians from various backgrounds. table 4. indonesia student in taiwan from aceh province academic year number of student 2009/2010 27 2010/2011 33 2011/2012 40 2012/2013 45 2013/2014 22 2014/2015 4 total 171 source: lembaga peningkatan sumber daya manusia aceh, 2015 taking into account the ability of indonesian students in providing policy recommendation, therefore, it demonstrates their ability to influence the government’s policy. furthermore, as they are studying and living in taiwan, they have direct contact with taiwanese people and understand taiwanese society and culture better by gaining trustful information and situation in taiwan. in addition, the nature of indonesian students, who are able to encourage student movement in order to create major change, convinces their ability to redefine or identify new idea in pursuing state interest. thus, indonesian students can be considered as epistemic community and influence the relation journal of asean studies 207 between indonesia and taiwan only if they are treated accordingly as agent of cooperation. misguided treatment: indonesia student as invisible agent of cooperation the aforementioned elaboration is identifying obstructions in taiwan indonesia relation occur because of rigid policy and limited understanding. approach in institutional, economic, technical and assistance, and informal forum cannot assist much in breaking through the obstructions because they never touch upon the very basic problem. thus the epistemic community effort has to be encouraged in helping solve the obstructions. however, academic relations with indonesia which could establish the epistemic community is still not supported by appropriate effort in enhancing taiwan-indonesia relations. indonesian students in taiwan are still treated as commodity than as subject of agent of cooperation by taiwan government. according to taiwan’s moe, shrinking population in taiwan has created a demand of foreign student to support the operation of universities in taiwan (wei, 2015) effort in increasing the number can be seen obviously from two aspects. first from six areas on mou in higher education, they are only providing scholarship and mutual recognition of degrees and professional qualifications which are successfully implemented but left behind research collaboration and capacity building. second, as the only taiwan academic related institution in indonesia, tec, is functioned only for disseminating information of taiwan education and attracting students especially they who come from surabaya to study in taiwan. it can be seen from the services offer by tec. there is no such effort in developing taiwan discourses over the indonesian students e.g. maintaining alumni network or establishing research collaboration. in order to obtain comprehensive analysis, interview session has been conducted to three students who represent three classification backgrounds of student in taiwan; ethnic business network, government officials and scholars. based on the interview with ethnic business network, the interviewee said after completing their study, most of ocs would return back home to support their family business. however when the interviewer asked about what kind of cooperation is possible to be conducted between taiwan and indonesia, the interviewee was confused due to the received lack of information from taiwan’s side. the interviewee further said there was no effort from taiwan government to explain the future opportunity in business between taiwan and indonesia (representative of indonesian overseas chinese student, 2013) the only thing they asked was only to promote and recommend their friend to study in taiwan universities. this situation has neglecting the fact that almost 60% of indonesia’s economic is run by indonesian chinese people. lack of effort to maintain the information of taiwan to them would make their potential become invisible. 208 the (in)visibility of taiwan – indonesia relations in the second interview session with government official particularly student form aceh, the interviewee said, as foreign partners, taiwan is one of the potential partners which compatible in developing aceh through their capital and technology meet with aceh’s natural resources. the interviewee further said, the government of aceh is considering taiwan as one of future partners especially to build special economic zone. however, lack of connection with taiwan government makes this potential factor becomes invisible. several attempts have been made through ieto to obtain information and connection to reach taiwan government, according to the interviewee. nevertheless, the development is still insignificant to establish contact between aceh local government and taiwan government. the interviewee also mentioned that their connection with taiwan only occurs through esit when they arrive in taiwan for the first time (representative of indonesian aceh student in taiwan, 2013). lack of attention to indonesian students from aceh makes taiwan lost an enormous opportunity to establish further economic cooperation. furthermore, in interview with scholars, findings resulted that scholars perceive taiwan’s advanced research method as one of the potential research and academic exchange partner. yet, lack of initiative from the taiwan government to maintain the network with indonesian scholars has made the connection only up to relation between scholarship giver and recipient. there is no certain academic activity for them while they are in taiwan as well as after they finish their study in taiwan except studying in taiwan’s university (recipient of taiwan scholarship from indonesia, 2013). lack of effort to further reach indonesian scholars has made academic network opportunity missing. thus, the scholars who study in taiwan is only aimed to fulfil their pragmatic purposes to obtain their degree in order to get better position when they return to their institution in indonesia. up to this end, the indonesia scholars in taiwan become an invisible agent. concerning with the obstruction of taiwan – indonesia relations, regarding the understanding of cross-strait relations, all of the interviewees responded relatively similar. their understanding of cross-strait relations is almost similar with perception of indonesian government that taiwan and indonesia have a limited cooperation because of “one china policy” which is acknowledged by indonesia. this situation is acceptable concerning the issue is heavily political and most of students enrol in engineering or business as field of studies. however two of the interviewees are recipient of taiwan scholarship provided by taiwan government and they stated that no such effort from the scholarship committee in providing understanding on particular issues. even the government official who came from aceh who should took orientation for one month held by esit, one of taiwan institution, said that topic regarding such issue was not subject of the orientation and made their perception remain the same. therefore journal of asean studies 209 taiwan government through esit or other institutions should provide a comprehensive understanding of “one china policy” in order to avoid misunderstanding among indonesian people, particularly indonesian students who study in taiwan. lastly, network of alumni is not maintained appropriately. there is no network of taiwan alumni particularly taiwan scholarship alumni. after the completion of their study, their relation with taiwan also finished. according to the interviewees, although not particular for indonesian student, there is only icdf which has global network of alumni. this situation has made taiwan lose their leverage to deal with the alumni and, to some extent, lose opportunity to conduct collaboration with them. clearly, a network of alumni for indonesian student needs to be established not only to facilitate communication among them but as an institution for taiwan’s government in actuating indonesian students as agent of change to enhance taiwan – indonesia relations through every possible means. in sum, the attempt to treat indonesian students seems still to be put on the side-line by taiwan. so far, indonesian students only are only required to fulfil the regular requirement of students for taiwan academic institution. this makes potential ability of indonesian students to play role as agent of cooperation remains invisible. although many efforts have been conducting by taiwan through many approaches to enhance relations with indonesia, but the elaboration in utilizing academic cooperation is still far from such objective. serious effort has to take into account in order to activate the epistemic community that has potential role in constructing new interest of indonesia in enhancing their relation with indonesia. conclusion this paper is the continuity of preliminary research on indonesia students in taiwan which previously elaborates only on the potential of indonesian students as a cooperation agent to enhance indonesia-taiwan cooperation. from the analysis, two conclusions can be drawn. first, taiwan academic relations with indonesia are still focusing on the effort to increase the number of indonesian students in taiwan and neglect their potential as agent of cooperation. this condition has made the students as agent become invisible. second, taiwan’s policy in academic cooperation with indonesia is not in line with taiwan’s effort to upgrade its relation with indonesia. as an impact, taiwan – indonesia relation remains stagnant and invisible. findings from the analysis recommend taiwan to maintain and give appropriate treatment to indonesia student. it reaches through providing the understanding about cross-strait relations and maintaining network of alumni of indonesian students from taiwan particularly those who receive taiwan scholarship. in addition, further research 210 the (in)visibility of taiwan – indonesia relations has to be conducted to enrich the concept and effort. it can be reached by conducting comparative studies with other countries especially malaysia and singapore regarding the epistemic community role in shaping government relations and policy to taiwan. thus, the concept would be fruitful in building mutual benefit between taiwan and asean countries particularly indonesia. acknowledgement this paper was presented at the 12th annual conference of the european association of taiwan studies in jagiellonian university, krakow, poland on april 8th, 2015. about the author the author is a lecturer at international relations department, bina nusantara university in jakarta. he is a ph.d graduate from international doctoral program in asia-pacific studies, national chengchi university in taiwan. his dissertation focused on the enhancement of taiwan-indonesia relation through institutional framework. his research interests are taiwan-indonesia relation, taiwan-asean relation, as well as crossstrait relation. apart from being lecturer, he is also involved actively in formulating policy paper for both indonesian and taiwan government, as well as conducts research on indonesia-taiwan relation. references bkpm. 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(2012). student activism in asia: between protest and powerlessness. minessota: university of minnesota press. https://stats.moe.gov.tw/files/gender_e/e111-1.xls https://stats.moe.gov.tw/files/gender_e/e111-1.xls https://stats.moe.gov.tw/files%20/gender_e/e111-1.xls https://stats.moe.gov.tw/files%20/gender_e/e111-1.xls https://stats.moe.gov.tw/files/gender_e/e111-1.xls https://stats.moe.gov.tw/files/gender_e/e111-1.xls https://stats.moe.gov.tw/files/gender_e/e111-1.xls https://stats.moe.gov.tw/files/gender_e/e111-1.xls http://statdb.mol.gov.tw/html/mon/c12030.pdf http://statdb.mol.gov.tw/html/mon/c12030.pdf journal of asean studies, vol. 6, no. 2 (2018), pp. 155-178 doi: 10.21512/jas.v6i2.5004.g3495 ©2018 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic the unbreakable relations between indonesiavietnam under “sink the vessels” policy: a complex systems approach rusadi kantaprawira bakrie university arry bainus universitas padjadjaran indra kusumawardhana universitas pertamina abstract the vibrant bilateral relations between indonesia-vietnam has been tested by the “sink the vessels policy”, a robust measure executed by indonesia to tackle rampant illegal fishing that encroach indonesian waters. the policy has caused in the demolition of, among else, vietnamese fishing vessels; and has also led to near-clash and incidents at sea. nevertheless, both countries bilateral relations were far from hostile condition, and uphold their neighbourly relations to manage the illegal fishing problem. how could indonesia’s foreign policy action not further exacerbate indonesia-vietnam relations post “sink the vessels” policy? to tackle our question, this article probes to describe the complex systems underlying the relations between indonesia and vietnam during the rising tension. we argue that the complex systems encapsulated indonesia – vietnam relations post “sink the vessels” policy consist of symbol system, interest system, and role system that maintain their friendly bilateral relations, even in the turbulent ocean. this article exposes that indonesia-vietnam responds to tackle the problem stems primarily from the linkage between the three systems to escape the security dilemma. key words: indonesia, vietnam, illegal fishing, sink the vessels, complex systems introduction since 2010, the improved bilateral relations between indonesia and vietnam have brought significant proximity of the two nations. in 2013, the adjacency between the two nations reached its peak due to a strategic partnership between indonesia and vietnam was being commenced. the strengthening cooperation between them makes vietnam as the only strategic partner of indonesia in southeast asia (anjaiah, 2011). however, this optimistic trajectory has been tested by a tough measure exercised by indonesia's president joko widodo in encountering rampant illegal fishing in indonesian waters. the policy has resulted in the demolition of, among else, vietnamese fishing vessels; and has also led to near-clash and incidents in the maritime domain. after joko widodo came into office on 2014; indonesia astonished the world by joko widodo’s administration firm 156 the unbreakable relations between indonesia-vietnam policy to detonate domestic and foreign fishing vessels caught stealing fish in indonesian waters. the policy known as "sink the vessels" (stv), commanded by the minister of marine affairs and fisheries “susi pudjiastuti”, one of indonesia’s ministerial rank that is infamous of her dedication for delivering her duties to protect indonesia’s marine resources. by far, public in indonesia regarded the stv policy as a symbol of indonesian government considerable measure to pursue “global maritime axis” agenda by president joko widodo. this agenda demands the ability of indonesia to secure its maritime security and national sovereignty for the sake of the future indonesian prosperity. some says that this policy originated from joko widodo’s utmost admiration toward indonesia’s vast territorial waters and the long-standing ‘archipelagic outlook’. rather than valuing indonesian archipelago as a natural disadvantage, president widodo regards the waters for its economic potential and as national strength (gindarsah & priamarizki, 2015, p.15). indonesian governance acknowledges the policy as highly important. post to stv policy, the mass media keep broadcasting the amount of vietnam vessels seized by indonesian patrol ship in natuna waters (al birra, 2017). from the geopolitical approach, obviously the involvement of south china sea claimant states is inevitable on this issue (for instance vietnam, in our case, as a claimant state over the south china sea territorial dispute whose fishermen have been heavily be caught doing illegal fishing activities). thus, it is predictable that the detonation of foreign fishing vessels policy triggered protests from neighbouring countries, especially from whose fishing vessels seized and detonated by indonesian government. nevertheless, indonesia has consistently and firmly stood to their stv policy and unwilling to reconsider its unilateral movement, even in the midst of opposition by neighbouring states (deny, 2018). interestingly, so far, vietnam's toughest response to indonesia's national policy is in the form of reminder that such unilateral action violates the 2003-2004 continental bilateral agreement between indonesia-vietnam which is still in the process of delimiting its authority. other than those steps, vietnam also sent diplomatic note to indonesia to maintain good bilateral relations between the two countries, by prioritizing the principle of cooperation and understanding by stating that indonesia must “(pay) attention to the strategic partnership of the two nations” in dealing with vietnamese fishermen” (parameswaran, 2015). departing from the above mentioned context, authors questioned how indonesia’s foreign policy action did not further aggravated indonesia-vietnam relations post “sink the vessels” policy? this article probes to describe the complex systems that enchase indonesia and vietnam behaviour during the rising tension. we argue that complex systems approach as a conceptual tool offers a journal of asean studies 157 noteworthy insight to understand this case, especially to captured holistically, indonesia – vietnam relations post “sink the vessels” policy. using this approach, we draw the interaction between symbol system, interest system, and role system that encapsulated the unbreakable relations between indonesia-vietnam, even in the turbulence ocean. this article found that the response of indonesia and vietnam in tackling the problem stems primarily from the linkage between the three systems that helps escape the security dilemma. using qualitative research methods and in-depth interview with some primary sources, this paper conducted in-depth study to thoroughly uncover indonesia-vietnam relations post stv policy. theoretical framework: foreign policy action and complex systems approach according to vinsensio dugis, foreign policy is traditionally understood as authoritative action taken or is officially decided by governments both to maintain the desirable aspects of the international environment and to change its undesirable aspects. therefore, in its basic understanding, foreign policy encompasses of statements and actions taken by state subjects to its relations with other external actors, states or non-state actors (dugis, 2008). then, in order to analyse foreign policy, there are three main features of foreign policy: sources of foreign policy, the process of producing the sources become policy, and actions taken to implement it (dugis, 2008). by this explanation, we could agree upon three different trajectories to distinguish the three main features of foreign policy. theoretical instrument for analysing foreign policy can be divided into three groups; systemic theories, societal theories, and state-centric theories (barkdull & harris, 2002, pp.63-90). according to dugis (2008), the first stream denotes to scholars that eager to scrutinise and elaborate foreign policy by questioning about how the international system implicates the conduct of foreign policy between actors in international relations. in our words, to tackle the dynamic of external environment within international system, states adjust their existence through foreign policy as a strategic instrument. the second group advocates foreign policy by emphasizing the importance of domestic aspects, especially the combination of domestic politics and the culture of a particular country. these theories stress on the spirit to dismantle the “black box” of state as unitary actor and highlight the importance of domestic political factors over foreign policy. the third group is theories that chase the answers to questions regarding foreign policy within the structure of the state, and this also includes the individuals who transmit and implement foreign policies on behalf of their country. in other words, individuals and their occupying institutions are seen as instrumental in analysing foreign policy. our theoretical framework supported the first group among those three theories of foreign policy. whereby, we aim for systematic explanation regarding indonesia-vietnam foreign policy action 158 the unbreakable relations between indonesia-vietnam to tackle the dynamic of external environment within international system, especially to manage the rising tension cause by illegal fishing activity. therefore, we utilize complex systems approach to draw systematic explanation regarding those two countries bilateral relations during the rising tension. the complex system as a terminology used in this paper exhibits the concatenation of interconnected and interdependent parts between actors in international system. according to rusadi kantaprawira (1987), ‘the system can be defined as a unit which is formed of several elements, or components, or part of each other are in a latch-hook attachment and functional. each is cohesive with one another. it means the aggregate of the unit maintained intact its existence. the system can be construed also as something higher than just a means, procedures, plans, schemes, or method. furthermore, the system is a mechanism patterned manner and consistent, even the mechanism is often automatic’. it means that the system is everywhere around us, the world is the shed of systems. according to kazuko hirose kawaguchi (2003), a complex system can be understood as a set of systems; in other words, the most important features of the complex systems are interconnectedness and the emergence, i.e. the fact that the whole cannot be reduced to the sum of the components (cîndea, 2006). however, the most important thing is not to decompose a complex system into lower level complexities, or to increase the level on a scale of increasing complex, instead, we should look at the logic of the interaction and the manner in which it reaches the emergence of the phenomena. in complex systems, from the living cell to the global social system, we can essentially identify infinity of levels of the organization (kusumawardhana, 2017). departing from this vantage point, we define complex system as a collective of two or more simple systems. based on our conceptual understanding, in any action and interaction within international system, actors stand as an important and dynamic unit in our realm of thought. within a larger social unit (for instance, an actor within a family, society, nation, or a collection of nations or the international community as a whole in the case of international relations), we could conceptualized an actor as a complex entity, especially if the actor has expectations and principles of action are implicated by various restraints, and when, that actor contributes in the growth, maintenance, and development of that larger social unit while making its own view thereof, mediated by symbols of various kinds (kawaguchi, 2003, p. 45). realities that bind the human world, however, encompasses many systems in each of which a diverse action principle operates. this is how, actors in our view, situated in myriad uncertainty and ambiguity within international system as a larger social unit that constrain their existence. journal of asean studies 159 therefore, making a social phenomenon into parsimony theoretical hypotheses, is not a trivial matter, but requires careful intellectual work to deal with all its complexity, uncertainty, and diversity intact. in this context, the best that one can do is to draw the simplest possible ideal type that represent the essential characteristic of that complex phenomenon. to embrace this possibility, kawaguchi (2003) depicted some guidance regarding this ideal type by explaining that actors’ types of behaviour can be construed into three different and independent types of behaviour, each of this type can be exercised as analytical concept or in his terminology “ideal types”. departing from the enormously complex array of definite behaviour that takes place in the world; he illustrated the three types of behaviour are interestoriented behaviour, role-expected behaviour, and symbol-oriented behaviour, and the three types of systems that correspond thereto are interest systems, role systems, and symbol systems, respectively (kawaguchi, 2003, p. 46). moreover, kawaguchi elaborates his theoretical framework into three clear definition as follows; interest-oriented behaviour signifies the logic of an individual actor, while role-expected behaviour is the behaviour likely of an individual actor according to the logic of the whole within which he or she is situated (kawaguchi, 2003, p. 46). furthermore, symbol-oriented behaviour is behaviour whose frame of reference is a symbol system. wherever, symbol systems exist self-sufficiently of reality (matter and energy); furthermore, if this independent system interacting in intense dialogue with realitya dialogue that involves of recurrent interactions with itthese systems develop ordered relations among themselves that can be stated as laws (kawaguchi, 2003, p.48). the study toward this certain symbols within these systems has often been done in social sciences, commonly focus on analysing shared knowledge among members of certain society, especially to understand the impact of this shared knowledge toward decisions and actions of those members, and how those constitutive aspect contribute to the preservation and control of social structures or social order (such symbols include laws, norms, traditions, ideologies, and ideals such as democracy or human rights). additionally, the bodies of knowledge equipped by social, cultural, and natural sciences are themselves among the symbol systems that can be studied by social scientists (kawaguchi, 2003, p.49). to summarize these three aspects, in our explanation state to state interactions determined by interestoriented behaviour, constrain by roleexpected behaviour, and influenced by symbol-oriented behaviour. the first system, “interest”, plays an important role that dictates state behaviour in the international system. in other words, state behaviour in international system tends to come from the most basic behaviour that is which promotes the continued existence of the actor. whereby, if we agree upon the 160 the unbreakable relations between indonesia-vietnam survival of an actor as an important interest among the member of international system, and regard behaviour that obliges to promote one's own survival as interest-oriented behaviour. in the case of a nation, let us call such behaviour national-interest oriented behaviour (kawaguchi, 2003, p.51). moreover, a certain actor's interests originate internally from that actor and that they abide in isolation from the whole in which that actor is situated (if the actor is a nation, it refers to the international community) (kawaguchi, 2003). meanwhile, the role system is based on the existence of a goal that must be attained if the system itself is to remain in existence (kawaguchi, 2003, p.59). whereby a system's goal is accomplished through a synchronised division of labour, known as role differentiation, among the members of the system (the actors or parts). the share of labour expected of an individual member is known as a role expectation, and behaviour grounded solely on a role expectation can be understood as role-expected behaviour (kawaguchi, 2003, p.59). the third system was symbol system. the concepts of an interest system and a role system can be understood as specific abstractions from certain features of social phenomena or interactions between actors internationally that can be elucidated by, correspondingly, both at the level of individual logic and the logic of the whole. this third category of system can be recognised though a careful study toward the same social phenomena or international relations among actors: a symbol system, that is, a special case of a system of signs that embody and carry those aspects of social phenomena or international relations that kawaguchi (2003) mention as the 'realities' thereof (or aspects of 'matter and energy'). among states, according to our understanding, common or general interests are shaped by a similar process that produce a certain meaning through symbols. example of this can be seen when international community was discussing about the international regime to manage resources on ocean floor or the sea-bed and in the subsoil thereof (in the context of development or exploitation and exploration) at the third united nations conference on the law of the sea (treves, 1982). in our opinion, the interests and positions of any nations featured by these specific maritime features progressively converged in one trajectory and those of the 'have-not' nations gradually converged in another, while repetitively attract conflictual relations among them. based on the above mentioned conceptual discussion, we draw complex system analytical framework to analyse indonesia-vietnam relations post “sink the vessels” policy (figure.1). our framework consists of three level of systems analysis, namely state system, international system, and symbol system. the linkage of those three systems captured the interaction between states in international system, particularly in our case, indonesia-vietnam relations to tackle illegal fishing problem that tested their bilateral relations lately. in the remaining journal of asean studies 161 sections of this paper, we will examine both state system of indonesia and vietnam based on interest system, roleexpectation system, and symbol system. thereafter, we draw some explanation about the linkage between indonesiavietnam national interest with the international system as a larger system in the social structure that encapsulated their existence. at the last analysis, we scrutinize the influence of symbol system during the rising tension between indonesia-vietnam in this issue. figure.1 complex systems analytical framework state system: interest, role expectation, and symbol in a turbulence ocean in this section, we will analyse interest, role expectation, and symbol as the foundation of state system, both indonesia and vietnam. by elaborating each part of the three system within state, we hope for gaining comprehensive understanding about the nature of actor in the rising tension at play within the larger system. on indonesia: wawasan nusantara, nationalistic ideology, and global maritime axis according to kawaguchi (2003, p.52), in order to come with a clear understanding about how national interests evolve by the dynamic of international system, we must perceive the nation itself as a system and to enquire the explicit or implicit objective has been established to uphold that system's existence. furthermore, he emphasized that the key to grasp comprehensive understanding toward conflict resolution among actors lies on the processes by which conflict is resolved among conflicting interests of the individuals and interest groups that make up a nation must be measured carefully, in conjunction with the nature of the overall national interests that arise as a consequence of those processes and that are asserted in relation to the external world. consequently, this would 162 the unbreakable relations between indonesia-vietnam encourage our efforts to scrutinise the structure within the black box of nationstate as a system, in the context of its foreign policy. friedrich ratzel believed that the state is a geographical organism. understanding indonesia from this point of view, we can denote, the archipelago geographically has acted as an important aspect that influenced the history of indonesia. in fact, until now, it is the largest archipelagic state in the world. its gigantic size is salience by the geostrategic location for the asia pacific region both geopolitically or geoeconomically, which controls four of out of the seven major maritime chokepoints in the world (habir et al, 2013). in addition, the rich natural resources be inherent in within the archipelago, including oil and gas, intensifies the strategic importance of indonesia. despite geographical advantages, there is a paradox due to the size of the country and its resources also brings insecurities in indonesian policy makers as they struggle to ward off external threats and to manage internal security threats to the unity of the country (laksmana, 2011). according to ahmad derry habir et al (2013), this outlook has been influenced by a history of the archipelago that highlighted – with few exemptions such as the precolonial kingdoms of sriwijaya and majapahit – geographically limited land-based powers. after indonesia claims its independence from colonial power, they delineated its territorial sovereignty based on the netherlands 1939 ordinance on territorial waters and maritime zones, which had divided the archipelago into several areas. these territorial divisions and the three-mile extent of its territorial sovereignty were later apprehended as the source of indonesia’s vulnerability to foreign maritime infringement in the archipelago. consequently, the vastness of the archipelagic boundaries at that time presented a real challenge for indonesia, some of which, related to the increase of smuggling and growing regional unrest. in december 1957, to tackle the urgency of this concerns then prime minister juanda kartawidjaja deprived the 1939 ordinance and declared indonesia an ‘archipelagic state’. the archipelagic state referred to a belt of baselines (islands and water between islands) that contained the territory of the indonesian modern state. thereafter, when president suharto’s new order came to power, they formulated the archipelagic outlook or wawasan nusantara in 1966, based on the juanda declaration. with the official commitment to the wawasan nusantara concept, the new order government engaged on diplomatic campaign for the recognition of the archipelagic state concept in the united nations conference on the law of the sea and various international forums. eventually, the two decades of indonesian diplomacy's efforts led to the concept of archipelagic state was adopted in 1982 by the third united nations convention on the law of the sea (unclos iii). indonesia ratified the unclos in 1985 through law no. 17/1985 (habir et al, journal of asean studies 163 2013). moreover, to spread the concept of the archipelagic state throughout the country, citizenship and national resilience education became the most important agenda of the new order regime. regardless of these domestic and international developments, the wawasan nusantara has been principally inwardlooking instead of outward-looking in spirit, it appears from the tendency to emphasize continuously on indonesia's strategic geographical location, a distrust towards potentially exploitive external powers wishing to take advantage of the location and indonesian resources, and a concern for national unity in the face of separatist threats. after the emergence of post-new order democratic system, president yudhoyono navigated indonesia’s foreign policy to an active and outward orientation grounded on democratic and idealistic values. in may 2005, during his first foreign policy speech, shortly after he was elected president, he defined indonesian nationalism as ‘a brand of nationalism that is open, confident, moderate, tolerant, and outward looking’ (yudhoyono, 2005). moreover, frequently the president highlighted the same themes, emphasising tolerance as an important component of freedom and democracy. for example, when he opened the 2011 bali democracy forum, he stated, ‘we believe that freedom must be coupled with tolerance and rule of law, for without them freedom leads to unbridled hatred and anarchy’ (habir et al, 2013). the shifted trajectory of indonesian foreign policy from inward-looking to more open and outward-looking, multilateraloriented, and grounded to norms within international law during president yudhoyono leadership, in some extent overshadowed the discourse about wawasan nusantara. arguably, in the practice of these foreign policy, the traditionally independent and active foreign policy of indonesia – as formulated by the first indonesian vice president mohammad hatta – has been adapted to the present globalisation period. whereby, the core interest of indonesian foreign policy, at that period, was perceived as reinforced indonesia’s image as independence and activism as a peace maker, confidence builder, problem solver, and bridge builder (rosyidin & tri andika, 2017). however, indonesia’s foreign policy after the election of joko widodo (jokowi) shows a different trajectory. unlike his predecessor, susilo bambang yudhoyono, jokowi has seemed less ambitious in bringing indonesia onto the world stage (rosyidin, 2017). based on jokowi’s vantage point, indonesia is a “regional power with selective global engagement” (widodo and kalla, 2014, p.13). following a mantra of ‘pro-people diplomacy’, jokowi desires to transform indonesia’s foreign policy into an action that can contribute directly to the interests of the people. this involves a foreign policy orientation that leans towards the domestic rather than the international (rosyidin, 2017). the most salient example of jokowi’s aggression is his policy of 164 the unbreakable relations between indonesia-vietnam sinking illegal fishing boats. in 2014, interior minister tjahyo kumolo asserted that the government should take aggressive decisions on behalf of the dignity and honour of the country, defending its territorial sovereignty and protecting natural resources (cnn indonesia, 2014). to support this commitment, indonesia strengthened stv policy by creating special task force to eradicate illegal fishing namely satgas 115, which was endorsed by president joko widodo through presidential decree no. 115 in 2015 (marta, 2017). in other words, satgas 115 signifies indonesia's commitment to defend its sovereignty through reinforcing law enforcement capacity by initiating a one-roof enforcement system, which consists of elements of the indonesian navy, national police, bakamla, and the republic of indonesia prosecutor's office. also, to facilitate coordination, encourage synergy, and carry out facilitation functions in combating illegal fishing. this nationalist sentiment was also evident when indonesian officials later announced that the government would sink 71 foreign vessels as indonesia commemorated 71 years of independence (parameswaran, 2016). besides, indonesia also reacted directly after chinese fishing boats trespassed the waters off natuna, an indonesian territory. to demonstrate his commitment to defend indonesia’s sovereignty, jokowi held a cabinet meeting from the warship kri imam bonjol, sending a signal to the chinese government that it should not violate on indonesian sovereignty. as reported by jakarta post, cabinet secretary pramono anung blatantly underlined this symbolic political stand point, “[n]atuna belongs to the unitary state of the republic of indonesia [nkri] and that’s final. as the head of government and the head of state, the president wants to make sure that natuna always remains part of indonesia” (jakarta post, 2016). at this point, we could grasp some understanding that indonesia’s under jokowi’s leadership wants to pursue their national interest based on its archipelagic outlook as a symbol, economic interest, and limited strategic interaction with external actors as a role-expectation. this system behaviour reconfigured indonesia’s state system to be more inward-looking rather than outward-looking orientation. on vietnam: self reliance and independence, anti-external aggressor, and economic prosperity overtime, vietnam’s foreign policy has experienced dramatic shifts one way or another, propelled by structural changes at the international system level and domestic political change. the first major theme of vietnam’s current foreign policy is the stress on independence and self-reliance. this is based on three historical legacies: first, resistance to foreign intervention during the colonial and post-colonial eras; second, as a member of the socialist camp when vietnam was caught in the crossfire of the sino-soviet dispute; and third as a dependent ally that was left isolated when the soviet union suddenly collapsed in journal of asean studies 165 1991. according to vietnam’s national defence white paper, it stated “vietnam consistently realizes the foreign guideline of independence [and] self-reliance…” (ministry of national defence, 2009). these two nationalistic values consistently uphold by vietnamese government by formulating their national defence policy based on three principals namely “three no’s”: vietnam consistently advocates neither joining any military alliances nor giving any other countries permission to have military bases or use its soil to carry out military activities against other countries.” (ministry of national defence, 2009: 21–22). these three principles stand as safeguard for vietnam from being involved in scaremongering contestation between external powers, which often undermines the existence of southeast asian countries, especially the united states and china. furthermore, independence and self reliance, as vietnam's primary identity as a sovereign country are highly reflected in the vietnam defence white paper published in 2009. as in the following sentence, as a nation having experienced wars for national independence and freedom, vietnam thoroughly respects other countries’ independence, sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and national interests on the basis of fundamental principles of the united nations charter and international laws. at the same time, vietnam demands that its independence, sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and national interests must be respected by other countries. vietnam advocates against the military use of force first in international relations but is ready to resolutely fight against all aggressive acts (ministry of national defence, 2009, p.19). territorial integrity and unity as a representation of vietnam's independence, embedded very strong for this country as a sovereign country. historically, this is very reasonable, if we look at the long history of vietnam, where its existence is determined by the struggle to fight external aggressor that threatened the very existence of this country. therefore, in the national defence corridor, the country's white book reinforces the importance of independence and self-reliance as state identities. as follows “vietnam’s national defence is always closely linked to the cpv and the state’s guideline of independence, self reliance, peace, cooperation and development in external affairs, and the foreign policy of openness, multilateralization and diversification in international relations” (ministry of national defence, 2009, p.21). besides emphasizing the affirmation of the principles of independence and self-reliance as guidance for vietnam to build its foreign policy trajectory. vietnam also holds firm and consistent for, the importance of maintaining an international legal regime as a common ground in the region and internationally. especially in solving 166 the unbreakable relations between indonesia-vietnam various disputes that vietnam must dealing with, in the contemporary era. this is reflected in the vietnam defence white paper with the following sentence “vietnam’s consistent policy is to solve both historical and newly emerging disputes over territorial sovereignty in land and at sea through peaceful means on the basis of international laws” (ministry of national defence, 2009). obviously, threats related to the territorial integrity faced by vietnam are certainly related to the dispute in the south china sea which has the potential to trigger open conflict between vietnam and the larger chinese government. therefore, on a larger context vietnam considers the existence of unclos to be very important to be a joint reference, especially as a basis for defining the problem of territorial disputes in the south china sea. in this case, unclos as an international maritime regime is acting more than as a common norm but also an identity that gives meaning to vietnam’s territorial integrity in the international system. this acknowledgment appears in the following sentence. “as for disputed sovereignty rights at sea, though there is sufficient historical evidence and legal foundation to prove vietnam’s undeniable sovereignty over water areas and islands in the east sea, including the paracels and the spratlys, it is always ready to negotiate with all parties concerned to find peaceful solutions to those disputes in conformity with regulations of the 1982 united nations convention on the law of the sea (ministry of national defence, 2009, p.19)”. in addition to unclos, when vietnam dealing with the issue of territorial disputes in the south china sea, asean as a regional institution has an important role also. vietnam’s national defence white paper reflecting this notion, whereas vietnam expressed the importance for all parties to the dispute to respect the declaration of conduct regarding south china sea problematic condition, and jointly resolve the discussion of the code of conduct for resolving the problems that occurred (ministry of national defence, 2009, p.19). in the light of this view, we can understand asean is also an important institution for vietnam, because discussions related to coc with china are carried out within the framework of dialogue between asean-china. consequently, vietnam promotes defence cooperation between asean countries based on security cooperation mechanism to build the asean community. the second major theme of vietnamese foreign policy is the multilateralization and diversification of external relations. this objective stands for the role-expectation of vietnam as an actor in contemporary international system. on may 20, 1988, the vcp politburo adopted a seminal policy document known as resolution no. 13 entitled, “on the tasks and foreign policy in the new situation.” journal of asean studies 167 this document codified vietnam’s foreign policy by giving priority to economic development and calling for a “multidirectional foreign policy” orientation with the goal of making “more friends, fewer enemies” (thêm bạn, bớt thù). specifically, resolution 13 called for vietnam’s extrication from the conflict in cambodia in order to normalize relations with china, develop relations with asean states, japan, and europe, and “step-by-step” normalize relations with the united states. this trajectory also denote vietnam’s foreign policy want to pursue “cooperation and struggle” among nations, especially to pursue economic international integration for the welfare of vietnamese society. in 1986, vietnam adopted “đổi mới” or renovation and, two years later, mapped out a major reorientation of its foreign policy. to overcome its isolation and secure access to markets, vietnam withdrew from cambodia in 1989. subsequently, to ensure external support for “đổi mới”, vietnam adopted a policy of pro-active international integration and became a member of all major global economic institutions. to ensure its strategic autonomy more broadly, vietnam diversified its diplomatic and strategic relations. as a result, today vietnam is a member in good standing of major global institutions, a leader in asean, and increasingly integrated in the global economy (thayer, 2017). the linkage between indonesiavietnam national interest to tackle illegal fishing as a maritime security threat the main argument of this paper is that the problem of illegal fishing between indonesia and vietnam within unsettled economic exclusive zone near to natuna islands occurred in interconnected complex systems. in this sense, a complex system formed when interactions between actors’ process dynamically in nature. a system is an integrated whole in which this process of interplay cannot be broken down and the actors cannot be separated (kawaguchi, 2003, p.30). especially, within international system, any states decide their actions in the context of its relationships with other states; constitutively among them share basic assumption that other state’s acting in their own national interests. thus, a relationship between two states often is one in which national interests collide. this situation, according to kawaguchi could lead the nature of interaction between actors in international system into “a relationship that will inevitably lead to the use of force, a struggle for life by every available means,” or even what could be called a hobbesian state of nature (kawaguchi, 2003, p.52). we claim the recent challenge faced by indonesiavietnam regarding illegal fishing can be another empirical record that when statestate relations intertwined as complex systems, the key to manage tension lies on the synergy between those relations. when it does, even if the sovereign states anxious might have appeared to be motivated only by their national interests or by the desire for power, all of them 168 the unbreakable relations between indonesia-vietnam shared common internalized ideals because they had come into being in the same region (kawaguchi, 2003). high tensions between indonesia and vietnam over iuu fishing activity started from indonesia’s policy to destroy hundreds of vessels, mostly vietnam origins. popular online media in indonesia recorded that since serving as minister of marine affairs and fisheries, susi pudjiastuti, managed to implement stv policy. the number of illegal fishing vessels that had drowned since october 2014 until april 1, 2017 were 317 ships, with details as following: 142 vietnamese vessels, 76 philippines vessels, 21 thailand vessels, 49 malaysian vessels, 21 indonesian ships, 2 papua new guinea ships, 1 china ship, 1 belize ship and 4 ships from unidentified country (kuwado, 2017). indonesia’s decision to firmly execute the policy was aimed to secure the maritime resources, as stated by susi pudjiastuti as the minister of marine affairs and fisheries. "i am not talking about the territorial authority, but about maritime resources and fish. fish in our exclusive economic zone is our fish” (tempo.co, 2016). responding such situation, vietnam realizes the need to express its concern about indonesia's firm policy related to iuu fishing. on august 2015, hanoi’s foreign ministry spokesman stated that vietnam is highly considerate about indonesia sinking vietnamese vessels for illegally fishing in indonesian waters. according to tuoi tre news, le hai binh, the spokesperson for vietnam’s ministry of foreign affairs, said vietnam felt “deeply concerned” about the sinking of fishing boats belonging to vietnamese fishermen who had violated jakarta’s territorial waters. binh added that vietnam had sent a diplomatic note to indonesia thursday recommending that jakarta “(pay) attention to the strategic partnership of the two nations” in handling vietnamese fishermen (parameswaran, 2015). in recent decade, vietnameseindonesian relations have come into a new period of collaboration. the ongoing vietnam-indonesia strategic partnership was designed to improve economic relations throughout the 2014-2018 period. the target set up to us$10 billion of twoway trade by 2018 (ward, 2017). during deputy prime minister, vuong dinh hue’s recent visit to indonesia in july 2017, he highlighted the importance of vietnam’s regional economic connectivity. he specifically mentioned the significance of the regional comprehensive economic partnership, which both vietnam and indonesia are a part of. hue also reinforced vietnamese and indonesian collaboration on common viewpoint initiatives such as sustainability, natural disaster response, water management and food security. however, hue’s list of cooperation did not mention about maritime and fishery issues. as the economic relationship between the two nations has grew more massive, the lack of cooperation over these prominent issues is even more glaring (ward, 2017). accordingly, the indonesia’s stv policy undermine the reinforcement of bilateral journal of asean studies 169 relations between two states. at this point, it is likely that both vietnam and indonesia are standing on a critical juncture, where the complicated problem that occur needs to be immediately responded. complex systems approach offers more comprehensive picture of how interaction between states bring up a very complex system; based on interest behaviour, role expectation behaviour, and symbol behaviour. this interconnectedness may affect and transform state interests and behaviour. the explanations fit into the way indonesia-vietnam projected its interest and role as an agent of socialisation to respond problematic situation among asean countries. by utilizing any opportunity to engage in constructive dialogue among actors, both by bilateral and multilateral, the problem could be settled by formal or informal interaction between them. this is the basic element to elevate constitutive common purpose to organize mutual issues between actors. in this case, if the social arena to maintain common purpose between them was not exist, the problem between indonesia – vietnam regarding iuu fishing will be more complicated to be resolved. since indonesia implementing stv policy to manage its maritime security, vietnam put serious consideration about indonesia act of sinking vietnamese vessels who illegally fishing in its waters (parameswaran, 2015). pham thu hang, spokesperson for vietnam’s ministry of foreign affairs, stated that vietnam had contacted indonesia about the sinking of vietnamese-flagged boats and appealed to indonesia to deal with the fishermen “in accordance with international laws, based on humane spirit and on the relations between indonesia and other countries.” (thayer, 2014). in addition, in a separated explanatory note by the government of vietnam, it stated that “to closely coordinate in dealing with issues relating to fishermen and fishing boats that encroach each side’s territorial waters on the basis of humanity and friendship” (mofa, 2013). meanwhile, jakarta insists that the policy is not only needed but it should be executed given the scale of the problem of iuu fishing in indonesian waters. under this condition, refer to robert jervis (1976) argument in his famous work “perception and misperception in international politics”, this condition conventionally exacerbate the spin of international insecurity among disputing parties. because the attempts of one state to achieve security precipitate the feeling of insecurity of other states (jervis, 1976). jervis, as one of many realist scholars in international relations, believes that all states tend to assume the worst of others and respond accordingly. these unintended and undesired consequences of actions lead to a situation called ‘security dilemma’ that herbert butterfield sees as that ‘absolute predicament’ that ‘lies in the very geometry of human conflict. […] here is the basic pattern for all narratives of human conflict, whatever other patterns may be superimposed upon it later.’ 170 the unbreakable relations between indonesia-vietnam (jervis, 1991). from this point of view, the unilateral movement by indonesia’s government to seek security by implementing hard measure regarding iuu fishing could trigger hostility of vietnam’s perception toward indonesia’s action. in addition, according to jervis “the perceptions and reactions of the other side are apt to deepen the misunderstanding and the conflict”. nonetheless, after the implementation of this unilateral movement, not to mention all the incidents between state apparatus regarding iuu fishing law enforcement, the relationship between indonesiavietnam is far from hostile condition. an interview with a mid-level diplomatic staff from the ministry of foreign affairs of the republic of indonesia confirm this statement “it is true, our firm policy did not exacerbate indonesia-vietnam bilateral relations. moreover, in 2017, indonesia and vietnam had undergone an improvement of both states defence bilateral cooperation”. this event also publicly records by credible media: as indonesia-vietnam relations have developed over the years……. recent defence dialogues have focused on further steps to implement their memorandum of understanding inked in 2010, efforts to develop defence ties more generally including joint exercises, dialogues, and military equipment, and means to better manage challenges, including the treatment of fishermen amid some recent clashes at sea (parameswaran, 2017). moreover, responding to indonesia’s concern toward iuu fishing, indonesia-vietnam utilizing any instrument to promote iuu fishing as a common challenge through various multilateral dialogues. for instance, at asean regional forum on illegal, unregulated and unreported (iuu) fishing held in bali, arif havas oegroseno, deputy minister for maritime sovereignty, coordinating ministry of maritime affairs of the republic of indonesia, highlighted the possible measures to address the issue. countries in the region should ratify the port state measures agreement (psma) and its provisions should be promoted and adopted as regional norms. regional instruments should also be established with focus on combating the iuu fishing, enhancing coordination and information sharing, as well as building cooperation in law enforcement (arf workshop, 2016). at the same forum, the delegation of vietnam conveyed a statement highlighting its national efforts and perspective on iuu fishing. one important aspect emphasized is that vietnam has fulfilled its diligence and obligation to combat iuu fishing by undertaking specific measures to prevent, deter, and eliminate iuu fishing. the implementation occurs in form of educating fishermen not to conduct iuu fishing in other states’ waters (arf workshop, 2016). asean security community, in this view, play its role as an agent of socialization and social arena journal of asean studies 171 to resolve common problem in the region through a set of community practices. in this case, indonesia’s unilateral movement through discursive practices within the system was projected as a common problem for vietnam. this condition constructs a “we feelings” and alleviate mistrust among actors. this situation displayed through vietnam delegation statement “vietnam also underscored its willingness to cooperate with other countries, because it too is a victim of iuu fishing conducted by foreign vessels (arf workshop, 2016). this statement was further reinforced by vietnamese national assembly and had passed the revised law on fisheries, including new features to strengthen illegal unreported unregulated (iuu) fishing fight (fis.com, 2017). this constructive measure followed with a recent vietnam’s national effort to tackle iuu fishing through implementing national action plan to prevent, mitigate and abolish illegal, unreported and unregulated (iuu) fishing until 2025 (vietnamnews.vn, 2018). the approach of the two countries that emphasizes constructive dialogue in understanding the problems that occur, reinforces our opinion that through habituation in the practice of community at the international level, it can encourage peaceful inquiry in the event of conflict between members of the international community. certainly, this is possible because of the linkages within the system, where both countries interact as social units continuously. the recent statement by vietnamese ambassador to indonesia hong anh tuan, support this paper point of view that under difficult time both countries uphold the primacy of regional peace, security and stability "asean is very important for vietnam and indonesia and we see the great role of indonesia in strengthening asean cooperation," (antara news, 2018). therefore, this paper prudently claims that indonesia-vietnam relations post “sink the vessels” policy is guided under the framework of complex systems. the indonesia-vietnam cooperation to tackle the problem stems primarily from each country’s interest, role-expectation of others, and the symbol associated with them. thus, the construction of inter-subjective meanings to develop shared understanding, identity, and interest which mutually constitutes as non-material aspects that affect their relations could maintain the anarchy situation and even eliminate the possibility of security dilemma. the role of symbol system to tackle the rising tension between indonesiavietnam the next explanation to reinforce this article proposition toward indonesiavietnam peaceful diplomatic conduct post to stv policy stand on the symboloriented behaviour that developed within symbol system as a common ground between both countries. in this context, constructivist international relations scholars already saturated with the discourse about the primacy of norms as ideational matters that govern state-state relations, especially when it comes to asean countries. one of them, amitav 172 the unbreakable relations between indonesia-vietnam acharya (2009) shows that the members of asean have generally adhered to one of the core diplomatic norms enshrined in its constitutional documents, the non-use of force in intra-mural relations, during a thirty-year period: 1967–97. this is the main basic norm that enfold bilateral relations among members in asean, including indonesia-vietnam in our case. at this point, norms are beneficial to coordinate values among states and societies. in this context, indonesia-vietnam (both are asean members) adherence to the non-use of force in intra-mural relations as the core diplomatic norms could help them to negate the perception of threats against each other, even counteract the misperception of their increasing military capacity as a preparation of war. considering indonesia-vietnam military build-ups, both countries experienced increased military expenditure in the last 10 years. since arms races usually emerge as an impact of threat perception that elevate security dilemma among the conflicting countries, the increase of military expenditure can create a detrimental effect because it could be perceived as preliminary sign as some organized preparations for war. according to the data from stockholm international peace research institute (sipri), military expenditure in indonesia increased from us$ 3722 million in 2009 to 7911 usd million in 2017. whereas, in similar timeline with indonesia, vietnam’s military expenditure is increasing from us$ 3044 million to us$ 4962 million (sipri, 2018). nonetheless, under this condition, indonesia’s stv policy did not trigger security dilemma between indonesia-vietnam. to put it clear, this article strengthening deutsch’s proposition that within security community military build-ups between members did not automatically lead to competition and security dilemma. history reveals itself, southeast asian countries have managed interstate disputes short of armed conflict and developed peaceful settlement of disputes through consultation and dialogue. to that extent, despite intra-mural squabbles and differences, indonesia-vietnam diplomatic step to tackle the problem reinforcing the fact that norms matter in shaping solution between conflicting countries. the recent clash between two countries state apparatus and how the backlash can be managed is a perfect example of the way norms could help states to coordinate values among states and societies. the incident in natuna occurred when the ministry's patrol boat hiu macan intercepted five foreign fishing vessels from vietnam that had trespassed into indonesian eez in natuna. at the same time, the vietnamese coast guard boat demanded those boats to be released (republika.co, 2017). the incident led to a collision and sinking of a vietnamese fishing boat. around 44 fishermen jumped into the sea and were later rescued by the vietnamese coast guard. journal of asean studies 173 for asean members states, the norm of non-use of forces to settle dispute is not something new. how indonesiavietnam handle the clash between them in this problem stands for this norm, to tackle the possibility for the incident endangering indonesia-vietnam bilateral relations, the indonesian and vietnamese governments have diplomatically agreed to solve the natuna incident that occurred in indonesia's exclusive economic zone (eez) in may 21, as stated by marine affairs and fishery ministry's secretary, general rifki effendi hardijanto. responding this incident in a conducive and cooperative manner, indonesia and vietnam have carried out a joint investigation to settle the incident, which according to indonesian authorities, the vietnamese coast guard has tried to forcibly free five fishing boats and their crew detained in waters near the natuna islands (reuters.com, 2017). moreover, during prime minister nguyen xuan phuc diplomatic visit to discussed about opportunity to elevate cooperation between the two countries to new heights, bringing tangible benefits to their peoples. apart from bilateral agreement for facilitating market access between two countries, in order to aiming bilateral trade on amount of us$10 billion. pm phuc also thanked the indonesian government for the return of 177 vietnamese fishermen arrested and detained in indonesia, proposing both sides regularly exchange information and handle the issue of arrested fishermen and fishing vessels in a humanitarian spirit and in accordance with the good relations between two countries. then, the two sides agreed to accelerate the establishment of a hotline on fishing and sea-related issues, while actively coordinating to implement the joint communiqué on voluntary international cooperation against illegal, unreported and unregulated (iuu) fishing signed last month. also, the two leaders welcomed the progress in the demarcation of the exclusive economic zones (eez) between the two countries after 11 rounds of negotiations and consented to work harder for a solution suitable for both sides and in line with international law (vietnamnews.vn, 2018). the constructive way between indonesia-vietnam to manage iuu fishing as maritime security threats that endangering their bilateral relations is a solid proved that both countries shared common visions and committed to increasing cooperation and coordination at international forums, especially within the frameworks of asean. conclusion this article explained that lately indonesia and vietnam relations has been tested over iuu fishing activity. the tension started from indonesia’s firm policy to destroy hundreds of vessels, mostly vietnam origins. authors reach the conclusion by answering question of how could indonesia’s foreign policy action did not further aggravated indonesia-vietnam relations post “sink the vessels” policy? the answer to this intriguing question is derived from our core argument that the rising tension 174 the unbreakable relations between indonesia-vietnam between indonesia – vietnam post “sink the vessels” policy took place within complex systems that connecting indonesia-vietnam as actors in international politics. which has developed a long-term habit of peaceful interaction and ruled out the use of force in settling disputes. our analysis shows that based on interest system, roleexpectation system, and symbol system, indonesia-vietnam determined their national interest. meanwhile, the symbol system practically, influence by symbol system at the larger social unit which is asean. both of them, within complex systems, contribute as an agent of socialisation to respond problematic situation among asean countries through community practices. thus, our systematic description about indonesiavietnam dynamic relations post unilateral movement by indonesia exposes that indonesia-vietnam cooperation to tackle the problem stems primarily from each country’s interest behaviour, roleexpectation behaviour, and symbols associated with them. therefore, the construction of inter-subjective meanings to develop shared understanding, identity, and interest which mutually constitutes as non-material aspects that affect their relations could manage anarchy and even escape the security dilemma. about the author rusadi kantaprawira is professor of international relations at bakrie university who has expertise in indonesian political system. he is well recognised as an intellectual figure who brought systems approach and systems philosophy in studying social and political science in indonesia intellectual milieu. his research interest includes systems approach, systems philosophy, indonesian political system, and indonesian democracy. e-mail: rusadi.kantaprawira@bakrie.ac.id. arry bainus is associate professor in department of international relations, universitas padjadjaran, indonesia. currently, arry bainus serves as vice rector i for academic affairs and student affairs universitas padjadjaran. e-mail: wr1@unpad.ac.id. [scopus id] 57192382311. indra kusumawardhana is lecturer at department of international relations, universitas pertamina, jakarta. he is doctorate candidate at universitas padjadjaran, bandung, indonesia. e-mail: indra15008@mail.unpad.ac.id. [orcid] https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8801-7506. references acharya, a. (2009). constructing a security community in southeast asia: asean and the problem of regional order. new york: routledge. al birra, f. 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(2005). ‘speech before the council on world affairs (icwa). retrieved from http://www.presidenri.go.id/index. php/pidato/2005/05/19/332.html. journal of asean studies, vol. 6, no. 2 (2018), pp. 179-191 doi: 10.21512/jas.v6i2.5095.g3493 ©2018 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic technology transfer and the promotion of technical skills from japan to southeast asia: case study of vietnam quynh huong nguyen ritsumeikan university abstract technology transfer is regarded as a significant channel by which developing countries can both acquire technologies and develop the workforces. also, the skill level of employees has been identified in playing a critical role in making technology transfer effective. in the case of southeast asia, particularly, vietnam, japan is one of the largest investors with large investment capital in high technology industries. however, the lack of a skilled labor force in vietnam has currently impeded the transfer of technologies from japan to vietnam. this paper aims to examine the current situation of technical skill levels of employees in the vietnamese manufacturing industry as a challenge to technology transfer from japan to vietnam through japanese fdi manufacturing firms. it is suggested in this paper that bridging the huge gap between japanese technical standards and the vietnamese workforce’s technical skills requires the crucial role of the vietnamese government. key words: technology transfer, human resources development, japan, vietnam, southeast asia, manufacturing industry introduction human resource development is one of the important elements for longterm national economic development. a well-equipped labor force will contribute to individual, organizational and national development through improved performance. in vietnam’s case, worker development in general – and technical skill improvement in particular – has become a critical issue, especially in the context that vietnam has successfully attracted foreign direct investment (fdi), but technology transfer has remained low. vietnam ranks as the 14th most populous country in the world and the 3rd in southeast asia. vietnam’s population reached over 95.5 million in 2017 (un, 2017), among which 54.4 million are of working age as noted in the ministry of planning and investment 2016 report. nevertheless, the percentage of unskilled laborers who have not experienced any technical training in vietnam is over 80 per cent of the total workforce (mpi, 2016). it is correct to say that vietnam is in the “golden population period” in terms of quantity of working-age people but the quality of the labor force is not “golden”. the vast majority of the labor 180 technology transfer and the promotion force in vietnam does not have experience in any technical training, so the quality of labor remains low and needs to be improved. especially in the manufacturing industry, the technical skills of laborers are in critical need of improvement. this paper focused on the manufacturing industry, particularly the fabrication, processing, or preparation of products from raw materials and commodities as the main part of industrialization (sustainable development indicator group, 1996). in the manufacturing industry, skilled laborers who have abilities and knowledge needed to perform specific tasks (ilo, 2010) play a vital role in operating and maintaining the technology and production. manufacturing skilled labor has four level: (i) skill level 1 involves the performance of simple routine physical or manual tasks, which requires physical strength; (ii) skill level 2 involves the performance of tasks such as operating machinery, which requires ability to read instructions; (iii) skill level 3 involves the performance of complex technical and practical tasks, which requires a high level of literacy and numeracy and communication skill; (iv) skill level 4 involves the performance of tasks that require complex problem-solving and decision making skills (ilo, 2012). based on this classification of skill levels, skills of most vietnamese workers remain at level 1 and level 2. for a long-term strategy of human resource development and industrialization in vietnam, the skills of the labor force need to be upgraded to level 3 and level 4. in order to upgrade the technical skills of vietnamese laborers in the manufacturing industry, technology transfer could be promoted through fdi projects and secondly facilitated through educational training programs. in this context, japan have been traditionally known to be keen on genuinely transferring technologies in order to foster human resource development (hrd) in the host countries (suematsu, personal interview, 2017). the tradition, philosophy and willingness of japanese companies in developing human resources of host countries are widely acknowledged and appreciated. however, technology transfer through fdi and technical skill promotion with benefits for host countries does not happen automatically. the level of technical skills from local labors as well as government intervention are important in ensuring the effectiveness of this technology transfer. yet, in the case of vietnam, many have pointed out to the gap between the current level of the vietnamese workforce’s technical skills and japanese technical standards and requirements as the main impediment to actualize the process of effective technology transfer. this paper, therefore, aims to examine the current situation of the technical skill level of the vietnamese workforce as a challenge to technology transfer from japanese manufacturing journal of asean studies 181 firms. the main research question of the paper is how the current situation of technical skill level of the vietnamese workforce has contributed to be a challenge to technology transfer from japanese manufacturing firms. this paper is organized in the following order. first, it presents the current situation of technical skills of human resources in vietnam as well as the current policies of the vietnamese government in human resource development. secondly, it examines the challenge of technology transfer from japan to vietnam using case study of vina mazda. the last part will draw conclusion and offer policy recommendations with respect to human resource development in general, technical skill promotion, in order to benefit from technology transfer. conceptual framework the conceptual framework that is presented and used in this research is the capacity development results framework, or cdrf, or simply the framework, which is a strategic and results-oriented approach to learning for capacity development. it was introduced by the world bank in 2009. the framework is a guide for the planning, implementation and evaluation of capacity building at the national level. according to the organization for economic co-operation and development (oecd), capacity is understood as the ability of people, organizations and society to manage their affairs successfully. capacity development is understood as the process whereby people, organization and society as a whole unleash, strengthen, create, adapt and maintain capacity over time. (world bank, 2009). figure 1. capacity development as a part of the development process source: (simplified figure from the world bank, 2009) according to the framework for capacity development provided by the world bank, the development goal is based on resources and local ownership and the effectiveness of resources use. such types of resources include financial capital, infrastructure, technology, and other endowments. local ownership consists of the sociopolitical environment, policy instruments, and organization arrangements. however, according to this framework, development goals will be achieved from learning. the learning process, which based on learning activities, will facilitate a change to local ownership and the effectiveness of resource use, those being the sociopolitical 182 technology transfer and the promotion environment, policy instruments, and organizational arrangements. for the purpose of this research, the development goal is defined as the capacity building of human resource development, the primary catalyst needed to upgrade technical skills of the vietnamese labor force in the manufacturing industry. the success of human resource development of vietnam, as suggested by the above explanation, is reliant upon its domestic human resources and their working relationship with foreign institutions and firms. as such, a well-educated and well-trained domestic labor force through skill transfer from this relationship is vital. the main factor which is affecting the development of learning is the type and quality of learning activities conducted. for this reason, learning by doing is the suggested primary activity in terms of technical transfer from japanese firms to vietnamese employees. summarized in a model, a successful or smooth learning process or technology transfer from japanese company to vietnamese labor will be as follow: based on this model, this paper argues that the lack of well-educated labor in vietnam and the huge gap between this labor skill to the required standard has become a challenge in technology transfer by the japanese firms. as a consequence, the type and quality of learning activities both by japanese firms and the government are central in determining the success of this technology transfer. methodology the problem of technology transfer is a practical issue but at the same time a complex issue which might not be similar between one company and another. in addition to explaining the current situation on technical level skills of vietnamese labors in general, this paper, therefore, also uses a case study to better capture and approach the problem rather than discussing it at theoretical level. while each case might be unique, this case study is expected to help illuminate the case in real situation. the selection of the collaboration between mazda motor corporation japan and vina mazda thaco group as one of the major companies in vietnam is also expected to represent other companies with shared characteristics. as a partner, vina mazda cooperates with mazda japan in terms of transferring technical skills in the automotive industry to vietnamese employees through on-the-spot workshops with japanese experts and have been reported to demonstrate a case where learning by doing is the main factor which drives the capacity building of the firm. data collection for this paper is conducted through observation of the activities of thai-nichi institute of technology as well as interviews with dr. phan tiem, the principle of vocational journal of asean studies 183 school of thaco group and phan quynh trung, director of technical division, vina mazda. in addition, this paper also conducts many in-depth interviews with japanese organizations such as japan external trade organization (jetro) hanoi, jetro ho chi minh, jetro bangkok, jica bangkok, and denso international asia bangkok. these interviews were conducted in order to get additional information not found in the previous literature. the current status of the technical skills of the vietnamese workforce in the manufacturing industry according to the general office for population family planning of vietnam, the advantage of vietnam is its human resource, which reached 63 million people, the working age population, in 2018 (the ministry of labor-invalids and social affairs, 2018). this potential source of labor is attracting many foreign direct investments to vietnam. however, the disadvantage of vietnamese labor is the shortage of technical skills. the number if high skilled labor in vietnam is smaller than other countries in southeast asia. as reported by the global human capital report 2017, the high-skilled labor occupies 10% in vietnam, 14% in thailand and 25 % in malaysia (wef, 2017). according to the report of labour of vietnam in 2017, the percentage of labor force with technical qualification is 21,5% of the total labor force (general statictis office of vietnam, 2017). this low percentage demonstrates the disadvantage of the vietnamese labor force as it means most of the vietnam labor is lacking technological skills. they are grouped as workforces that can only work in simple job such as assembly work and cannot utilize the hightechnology from foreign firms. besides, the number of graduated students from higher education is small, about 21,5% of the labor force (general statictis office of vietnam, 2017). these numbers reflect the lack of engineers who can work in sophisticated works or research and development projects. the lacking number of skilled workers and engineers presents the quality of human resources of vietnam in manufacturing industry. according to mr. yusuke taguchi, deputy representative, ameicc secretariat, aem-meti economic and industrial cooperation committee, japanese manufacturing firms want to build up technical skills for employees, but there is a huge gap between japanese technical standards and the current local technical level, which keeps preventing the transfer of the technical skills to local workforce (yusuke taguchi, personal interview, 2016). in order to take advantage of golden population structure and bridge the gap of technical levels, vietnamese government should play a crucial role. the current policies and strategies of the vietnamese government in promoting technical skills of human resources the vietnam policy framework for long-term hrd is defined and guided by 184 technology transfer and the promotion the key government strategies and plans, including the socio-economic development plan 2011-2020 and the human resources development strategy 2011-2020. this plan focuses on restructuring and reforming the education and training system while addressing various challenges as could be seen on table 1 and table 2. table 1. targets of the hrd strategy 2011-2020 targets 2015 2020 rate of trained laborers (%) 55 70 rate of vocationally trained laborers (%) 40 55 state management, policy making and international law 18,000 20,000 university and college lecturers 100,000 160,000 science-technology 60,000 100,000 medicine, health care 70,000 80,000 finance – banking 100,000 120,000 information technology 350,000 550,000 sources: the human resources development strategy 2011-2020 of vietnam table 2. actual figure of the targets of the hrd strategy 2011-2020 actual figure 2017 rate of trained laborers (%) 53 rate of vocationally trained laborers (%) 19,9 state management, policy making and international law 18,000 university and college lecturers 72,792 science-technology 43,849 sources: ministry of laborinvalids and social affairs these two table list the challenges in human development by the vietnamese government, highlighting the gap between the intended development rate and the actual achievement this program has made. the table indicates that vietnam human resources is apparently still lacking trained laborers and vocationally trained laborers despite of this government policy. in the strategy, for example, the targeted percentage of trained laborers are 55% in 2015. however, the actual percent of trained workers in 2017 are 53%, or less than the targeted percentage which supposed to be increasing to reach 70% in 2020. this has not mentioned other targets which also do not met the targeted goals. as the theoretical framework used in this paper suggested, these workforces need to be promoted by learning activities such as vocational and education training system of vietnam and through technical training in japanese firms. in regards to the focus of this paper on manufacturing industry, the strategies on the development of human resources during 2011-2020 period do not provide detailed action plans especially in the manufacturing industry. technical skill promotion is an important part of human resource development because it relates to the process of industrialization and modernization which drives the country to a higher level of long-term development. the decision no. 579/qđttg is still a general plan without priorities and specific policies for implementation in order to develop the quantity and quality of skilled labor. journal of asean studies 185 among asean countries, vietnam is lagging behind thailand in terms of policy measures and directions for human resource development adopted by the government. in the case of thailand, the government has promoted human resource development with five action plans: (i) the vocational education act 2008, (ii) the skills development promotion act 2002, (iii) the national science, technology and innovation (sti) policy and plan 2012-2021, (iv) the national education act of 1999, and (v) the 11th national economic and social development plan (2012-2016) (unctad, 2015). these action plans are being implemented at all levels of education and the government has finances to support sti teaching and training, provided research scholarships and promoting cooperative education. (unctad, 2015). furthermore, the thai government has cooperated with the japanese government in many human resource development programs with assistance from jica initiated by a project of king mongkut’s institute of technology ladkrabang and have been implemented since 1971, which has resulted in a pool of high-quality engineers and scholars for the industrialization process in thailand (katsuya miyoshi, personal interview, 2017). meanwhile, the vietnamese government has not yet promoted any detailed action plans for effectively actualizing the general strategy of human resource development. technology transfer to vietnamese workforce by japanese firms technology transfer through fdi projects is one of the channels to upgrade technical skills for human resources since employees have to adapt to new technology, new machinery, and new management. japanese companies have always made their intention clear in promoting the technical level of human resources in host countries through the process of technology transfer (suematsu, personal interview, 2017). the transfer of technologies to a country has been undertaken by the japanese firms investing in the country. japanese companies frequently train local employees from the beginning and provide on-the-job training so that employees can learn technical know-how. furthermore, not only japanese firms but also japanese organizations have held many programs facilitating the process of technology transfer programs in vietnam. on-the-job training or learning by doing in japanese firms is the training which the employee will take part in in the workplace and it taught technical skills by seniors or experts. the employee will enhance the skills by learning on the spot or learning by doing. for example, in denso international asia in thailand, new employee is paired with a senior employee so that the new employees can learn know-how by working in the factory (suematsu, personal interview, 2017). onthe-job training programs are often organized in the workshop for the workers and technicians. 186 technology transfer and the promotion based on the research conducted in this study, the two major challenges facing japanese firms in vietnam is the technical gap of employee and job hopping (sato susumu, personal interview, 2017). there are several reasons for the job-hopping phenomenon in vietnam. firstly, there is a different working culture compared japan with where the employees stay with the same company for their entire life. vietnamese employees want to gain experience in order to get a higher-paid job from other companies. secondly, in general, japanese companies have not yet offered higher positions level for foreigner employees therefore encouraging vietnamese skilled employees to move to another company if they can get a higher position (dao trong hieu, personal interview, 2017). in fact, it usually takes a lot of time and money invested by the japanese firms in order to bridge the gap of technical skills by providing new employees with on-the-job training programs. however, workers, once they are trained and equipped with a certain level of technical skills, do not commit themselves to the companies but want to move to any other firms that pay a them higher wage. japanese firms then must restart the process of recruitment and training which is very costly. the job-hopping problem has also made the technology transfer process distracted and less efficient because firms must repeatedly provide technical training for new comers, then they are constrained to advance the technology transfer to the higher levels. case study of vina mazda in the process of knowledge and technology transfer to local employees, japanese firms’ training systems have mainly been based on the form of on-thejob training or learning by doing. employees are supposed to acquire essential technical knowledge and skills in the workplace where the seniors provide verbal instructions rather than written materials. when japanese investors started establishing factories in vietnam, they set up such a system, in which vietnamese senior workers give guidance to junior ones, in order to improve practical and technical skills for the vietnamese workers. the paper presents vina mazda – thaco group as a case study of technology transfer from mazda of japan to vina mazda of vietnam because vina maza is the only private vietnamese company that assembles and produces japanese cars and receives technology from japan in the automotive industry. as a short introduction, thaco truong hai auto corporation ltd. was established on april 29, 1997.thaco group is vietnamese company that produces and assembles passenger cars with the localization rate of 15-40 per cent (thaco auto, 2016). from the beginning, thaco group assembled automobile spare parts imported, and now the company is establishing its own value chain, taking the roles as a supplier, a manufacturer, a distributor, and a retailer. the main business to manufacture and assemble of thaco group are the passenger vehicles of journal of asean studies 187 kia (korea), mazda (japan), and peugeot (france). mazda, japanese auto brands, had arrived at vietnam in late 2010 through its manufacturer and distributor vina mazda – a subsidiary of truong hai auto corporation (thaco). after 8 years of operation in vietnam, vina mazda achieved sales of 80.000 units; vina mazda is getting popular as a leading auto brand in vietnam. (thaco auto, 2016). vina mazda manufacturing and assembly factory was built with the maximum capacity of 10,000 vehicles per year. all spare parts in the manufacturing process in vina mazda factory are imported from japan with a process controlled by mazda’s experts. in addition, vina mazda and mazda signed contract of sharing important technology production line with high investment cost such as electrostatic painting or spraying and fire-retardant paint production lines, test-drive road, etc. the technology transfer from mazda trainers from japan to vina mazda’s vietnamese engineers has been conducted based on learning by doing activities through many steps. mazda sends japanese engineers to vietnam to work with vina mazda’s engineers on mazda’s technology. depending on the process of transferring technology and know-how to vietnamese engineers, japanese trainers must stay in vietnam from 6 to 8 months. there are 5 steps in the process of technology transfer from japanese trainers to vietnamese engineers: (1) vietnamese engineers read and understand the technology guidelines; (2) vietnamese engineers read and understand the technology guidelines and practice the work; (3) vietnamese engineers don’t read the technology guidelines and do the job 50%; (4) vietnamese engineers don’t read the technology guidance and do the job 70%; (5) vietnamese engineers don’t read the technology guidelines and do the job 100%. when the vietnamese engineers can carry out the work successfully without reading the guidelines, the technical transfer is completed. after participating in the technical training courses by mazda’s japanese trainers, vietnamese engineers then train vietnamese workers at the workplace and japanese trainers from mazda become examiners. the exam for vietnamese workers tested on the workshop and on paper (100 multiple – choice questions). when the trainers of mazda return to japan, vietnamese engineers play the role of examiners. the technology transfer can be upgraded only when thaco group make a request to mazda. in order to prepare for a promotion of technology transfer, thaco group must prepare all the fees and technical preparation for trainers from mazda. the fees include allowances to trainers from mazda at the rate of 800 usd per hour and the accommodation fee. the technical training duration is 2 – 2.5 months. the acceptance by mazda depends on the technology which thaco group requests to be transferred and the demand of vietnamese market (in case of increasing local content). currently, the 188 technology transfer and the promotion process of technology transfer from mazda to thaco group is going well. in march 2017, thaco group started building a new plant for vina mazda automotive factory with the capacity of 100,000 cars per year and new technology from mazda of which robots’ control 70% of the assembling work. besides, the testing line will be equipped with modern technology facilities connected to the global technical information system of mazda (nguyen, personal interview, 2017). challenges in technical know-how transfer in case of vina mazda based on the research, the process of transferring technology from the mazda firm to the thaco group has encountered some difficulties in terms of upgrading the technical skills for employees and promoting local content for thaco group. the finding of this research shows that among the two most significant challenges are as follows. firstly, language has become one of the main challenges in communication between vietnamese engineers and japanese trainers. the japanese trainers usually speak japanese so there is a language is the problem for the vietnamese engineers. although there is some senior japanese employee that can speak english, the majority of training activities are given in japanese because they cannot speak english very well. in addition, the technical guidelines are also written in japanese, so the vietnamese staff must study japanese. thaco group is in quang nam province, in central vietnam. the industrial zone is a hundred kilometers away from the city, and it is not an attractive working place for those who can speak both japanese and english. currently, the thaco group staff has offered free japanese courses after office hours in the evening, but the courses are not so effective since employees are already tired after a full working day. it may be more effective if the thaco group organize japanese language courses at least 3 months prior to the technical training time so that the employees can get familiar with the technical vocabulary in japanese and it may help the technical training from japanese trainers to be more effective. secondly, the technology transfer depends on mazda in japan; the thaco group can only upgrade technology if the market for mazda cars. this is really a big challenge for vina mazda because the vietnamese government has not encouraged a bigger automotive market yet. conclusion human resource development with regards to the promotion of technical skills in the vietnamese manufacturing industry has been facing many challenges which related to technology transfer from japan to vietnam through japanese manufacturing firms. echoing to the proposed hypothesis, this paper found that the lack of vietnamese labor skill has become one of the challenges in technology transfer from japanese firms. while the firms have initiated learning activities as also apparent in the case of journal of asean studies 189 vina mazda, there are also challenges to maximize the quality of this learning activities. the paper, therefore, recommends that the vietnamese government also take part in filling this gap in order to ensure a successful technology transfer and broadly human development in vietnam. in this respect, the vietnamese government is supposed to enable and support the cooperation between firms and universities. moreover, the vietnamese government should listen to the investors in order to provide more relevant policies on technology transfer. in addition, the government of vietnam should establish national institutions for r&d in advanced technologies which could create s pool of high-level engineers which ready to supply the manufacturing industry. educational policies first, in order to make the human resource development strategies effective in enhancing technical skills, the vietnamese government should develop detailed action plans not only for vocational training activities, but also for strengthening university and institutes of higher education for sophisticated r&d activities. moreover, the government should provide a budget for r&d activities in universities. according to nasati (2014), the budget for r&d activities from the vietnamese government to the universities is just about 5 per cent of the total government budget for r&d activities. universities should be the places which provide most engineers and technical personnel to the industrial sector for technical advancement of the country. the r&d budget for universities should be increased for use in new laboratories, equipment, scientific books, and training programs for students. secondly, japanese language is very important in training process in japanese manufacturing firms. the educational policies should not only promote the technical skills but also the language should be enhanced. thirdly, the government should establish national engineering sectors for the promotion of high – tech manufacturing industries, which may provide sophistication of basic technologies to be applied in many sectors of industry. moreover, the government can become the coordinator connecting firms and universities. the collaboration may include lessons, projects on training, scientific research, and technology transfer between the manufacturing firms and universities. such cooperation has proved to be effective in other countries. for example, in thailand, the thai-nichi institute of technology (tni), established in 2005 by the thai-japanese technology promotion institute, provides education at undergraduate and graduate levels in engineering, information technology, business administration and language skills with the programs combining academic teaching and practical training in japanese companies which based in thailand. the monozukuri program is a program for third-year students of 190 technology transfer and the promotion engineering studies which consists of many japanese manufacturing plant tours for tni students and lecturers. the japanese government strengthens the connection between tni and japanese manufacturing firms through joint research and the sharing of technology. industrial policies firstly, the promotion of technical skills for hrd in vietnam is closely related to foreign firms in general, and to japanese manufacturing firms. the government should listen to the japanese firms and consider the challenges which they are facing while they invest in vietnam. for example, according to one japanese firm, vietnam’s tax system for foreign investment companies has not been stable, thus, some japanese firms intend to invest in vietnam only for a short period of time (sato susumu, personal interview, 2017). the vietnamese government should consider providing consistent tax policies for foreign investment companies. secondly, the vietnamese government should introduce concrete policy measures to promote supporting industries, including the automotive industry in cooperation with potential japanese firms to expand the production. about the author quynh huong nguyen is currently a ph.d candidate at the graduate school of international relations, ritsumeikan university. she obtained her ba in orientals studies from vietnam national university and ma in international relations from gadjah mada university. she has strong interested in socialeconomic development in southeast asia. she also researches on the policy making of individual asean’s countries as well as foreign policy between both countries and group of countries. references general statictis office of vietnam, g. 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(2017). the global human capital report 2017. geneva: world economic forum http://www.chinhphu.vn/portal/page/portal/english http://www.chinhphu.vn/portal/page/portal/english editorial deepening connectivity and mobility in post-pandemic asean moch faisal karim, tirta nugraha mursitama, lili yulyadi arnakim department of international relations, faculty of humanities, bina nusantara university, jakarta, indonesia, 11480. mkarim@binus.edu, tmursitama@binus.edu, lili.yulyadi@binus.edu how to cite: karim, m. f., mursitama, t. n., & arnakim, l.y.& (2022). deepening connectivity and mobility in post-pandemic asean. journal of asean studies, 10(1), https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v10i1.8868 keywords: connectivity, mobility, asean integration, infrastructure, post-pandemic introduction it has been widely discussed in the literature on regionalism that connectivity and mobility are two critical concepts that underpin the deepening of the regional integration project. connectivity allows increased mobility of ideas, people, and goods, creating a more robust regional community. connectivity enables a regional integration project to be economically sustainable and resilient against external shocks (bhattacharyay, 2010). arguably, regional integration should facilitate the mobility of welcomed and trusted travellers while concentrating their control resources on those prone to ‘irregular’ forms of migration. as a result, regional integration often deepens the establishment or reconfiguration of mobility spaces (gülzau et al., 2016). however, connectivity and mobility should not be seen merely as economic and infrastructural issues. we contend that these two issues are linked with the context of geopolitics, especially in light of the growing great power rivalry in the region. connectivity could be mobilized as an instrument for a rising power to increase its domination in the region as a way to counter geopolitical competition with the great power (flint & zhu, 2019). mailto:lili.yulyadi@binus.edu https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v10i1.8868 this is why the notion of connectivity has become the major impediment to asean regional integration. in 2009, asean member states’ leaders envisioned the importance of increasing asean regional connectivity among asean member states. such vision is translated into master plan on asean connectivity (mpac) 2025 adopted in 2010. arguably asean connectivity is a cooperation program between asean countries by building transportation and infrastructure connectivity between southeast asian countries in order to create an asean community. asean connectivity exists for the development of infrastructure, institutions and community empowerment. asean connectivity refers to three important things: physical connectivity, institutional connectivity, and inter-community connectivity. physical connectivity includes connectivity in transportation, information, communication, and technology (ict), and energy. institutional connectivity covers trade liberalization and facilities, service and investment liberalization along with its facilities, mutually beneficial agreements and agreements, regional transportation agreements, inter-border procedures, and capacity-building programs. lastly, inter-community connectivity focuses on the fields of education, culture, and tourism (das et al., 2013). concerning the logistics service sector, connectivity will determine the development of the logistics sector in asean member countries, as well as determine the direction of continued cooperation in an effort to realize the asean economic community (aec) (permatasari, 2020). such connectivity then arguably allows for better regional mobility. in the context of regional integration, mobility within the region can be seen as an indicator of successful regional connectivity. that is why connectivity and mobility have become the primary objective under the presidency of joko widodo (wicaksana, 2017). president joko widodo’s speech at eas in november 2014 emphasized the connectivity aspect of the global maritime fulcrum scheme. this can be seen in the government’s emphasis on infrastructure development and maritime connectivity by building a sea highway along the java coast, deep seaports and logistics networks, and the shipping industry and maritime tourism. meanwhile, in the plan of action for indonesia’s ocean policy 2016-2019, maritime connectivity and the maritime industry are among the five priority program clusters (muhibat, 2017). for this reason, it is not surprising that asean will always strive to synergize between mpac 2025 and bri and enhance regional connectivity while noting the principles of openness, transparency, inclusiveness, and asean centrality presented in the asean regional initiative, asean outlook on indo-pacific, which puts connecting the connectivity. indonesia is ready to collaborate with foreign investors from asean plus three (apt) countries, especially china, to develop connectivity infrastructure. one form of collaboration can be done by synergizing the master plan on asean connectivity (mpac) 2025 and the belt and road initiative (bri). the main goal of asean connectivity is to make the southeast asian region more competitive in the global environment. the basic foundation for the development of asean connectivity is the asean connectivity master plan (mpac). regional connectivity formed between the regions of asean member countries is expected to increase the economic growth of asean member countries. moreover, the asean connectivity initiative should be put within the context of the asean geopolitical objective. the objective of increasing asean connectivity is to maintain asean centrality amidst the growing regional tension. this is why indonesia, as the largest country in southeast asia, puts so much emphasis on asean connectivity, given indonesia policymakers continue to view asean as its priority for indonesia’s ambition to be a global player and regional manager (karim, 2021; rosyidin & pattipeilohy, 2020). the challenges of connectivity and mobility in this pandemic era, mobility becomes very limited when borders become stronger, and mobility is considered a threat. in an effort to recover after covid-19, asean member countries agreed to take advantage of the momentum of economic recovery in promoting asean financial stability and integration and affirmed their commitment to strengthen cooperation to mitigate economic risks and challenges after the covid-19 pandemic, climate change, digital disruption and geopolitical tensions (mursitama et al., 2021). this ensures that connectivity and mobility remain integral to efforts to build the asean regional community. in creating capital mobility, asean tries to encourage further integration of the regional financial services sector, including upgrading the financial services annex in the aseanaustralia-new zealand free trade agreement (aanzfta) negotiations. in addition, asean is completing studies on improving the asean banking integration framework (abif) guidelines toward increasing banking integration in the digital era. in the context of digital banking, asean has undertaken a bilateral cross-border qr code payment linkages initiative among asean member countries, which is expected to be the first step toward developing a cross-border payment network in the southeast asian region. this initiative could position asean as a global leader in inclusive retail payments connectivity. it is continuing the commitment to increase financial inclusion through increasing access, use and quality of financial services in the region. the meeting also appreciated the achievement of the average level of financial exclusion in asean, which had exceeded the target and welcomed the publication of the “policy note on digital financial literacy” and “measuring progress 2021: financial inclusion in selected asean countries”, which supports financial inclusion measures. such efforts to create capital mobility align with the notion of regulatory regionalism that dominates the approach to asean banking integration (karim et al., 2021). despite the institutional connectivity that asean aims to achieve, the domestic social forces dominating the banking industry might resist a deepening regional integration in banking by focusing on their respective domestic market rather than going abroad. the biggest problems faced by asean member countries in developing sustainable infrastructure are coordination, ownership, political leadership, funding (insufficient resource mobilization), and managing stakeholder expectations. at the regional level, the coordination problem becomes more complex because it does not only coordinate between countries and stakeholders within them but also with the subregional organizations that cover them. each sub-regional cooperation organization likely has different development priorities with varying levels of complexity of problems in other regions. to illustrate, sub-regional cooperation organizations such as imt-gt and bimp-eaga have their connectivity projects and want their projects to be a priority. therefore, asean seeks to support the activities of sub-regional organizations as a form of cooperation in achieving common goals. on the other hand, infrastructure projects are very vulnerable to external challenges from outside the southeast asia region. uncertain world economic conditions will hamper the funding and project implementation. the global economic downturn will also hinder project completion because infrastructure projects are capital-heavy. apart from economic problems, infrastructure projects also have big geopolitical nuances. donor countries will tend to choose projects that provide not only economic benefits but also provide geopolitical leverage. however, there is still a gap between the need for funds and the availability of funds for connectivity development. based on data from the asian development bank, the funds needed for connectivity development in 2016 – 2030 are around us$ 26 trillion, or around us$ 1.7 trillion per year, to meet regional infrastructure needs, including climate change mitigation and adaptation costs. without climate change mitigation and adaptation costs, the essential infrastructure investment required for the region is about $1.5 trillion per year (ra & li, 2018). understanding connectivity and mobility in this issue, we present seven articles that address the issue of connectivity and mobility in asean. the first contribution, entitled asean centrality: comparative case study of indonesia leadership, examines why asean should maintain its centrality in the regional integration process in asia. centrality allows asean to be the hub for any connectivity built to strengthen cooperation in asia. indraswari (2022) further argues that asean centrality varies as indonesia’s leadership depends on mutually inclusive variables. the three primary variables influencing asean centrality are individual country competencies to exercise leadership, especially the institutional mandate they received, the domestic interest of followers, and prevailing external pressures. the second article, entitled “a visual identity-based approach of southeast asian city branding: a netnography analysis”, focuses on the importance of city branding to boost their competitiveness among the global city brands. mohamad et al. (2022) show how city branding enables a city to be metaphorically seen as an entity with the advantage of displaying its own visual identities and characteristics for attracting visitors and tourists and ultimately enhancing the city’s economic value. this shows the importance of city branding in improving mobility within the region. the third article, entitled “enhancing social integration through intra-asean travel”, examines whether the social integration dimension connects individuals in preference to travelling within the asean region. fardhiyanti and wee (2022) find a strong relationship between cultural adaptations, positioning, interaction and the growth of intra-asean travel. they further show how asean countries have developed a stronger familiarity and a sense of belonging to the community over the past five years since the asean economic community (aec) establishment. in other words, cultural interaction is important in increasing regional mobility. the fourth article, “the effect of the internet on inflation: a research on asean-5 countries”, examines how the internet connection has had a significant economic impact and provided financial benefits to nations worldwide to increase productivity and efficiency and reduce costs. specifically, çoban investigates the internet’s effect on inflation in asean-5 countries (indonesia, malaysia, philippines, singapore, and thailand). he finds that internet usage increases and inflation rates decrease in asean-5 countries. çoban’s article focuses on an important yet unexplored aspect of connectivity, namely internet connectivity, in enhancing regional integration. while all four articles above focus on how connectivity and mobility enhance regional integration, the other three explore how mobility and the lack of it may create a threat at the state and human levels. the fifth article, “far from home: profile of pro-is deportees’ mobility throughout 2016-2020 and prevention strategy of indonesian government”, discusses how mobility could relate to security concerns. while mobility should be celebrated as part of the regional integration project, it also has a negative impact. ashar and maharani (2022) show how pro-islamic state terrorists exploit loopholes in border and immigration control to join is abroad and the shortcoming in the indonesian government’s strategy to counter their mobility. in the previous edition, jas published research on how cooperation at the state level through the framework of eu-asean counter terrorism cooperation has mainly focused on building a common normative framework in responding to terrorism within the corridor of democracy and pre-empting the terrorist networks from exploiting connectivity networks (wibisono & kusumasomantri, 2020). this article contributes to further the debate by unpacking how the indonesian state restrict the ability of a terrorist network to exploit the connectivity networks. the sixth article, entitled “conflict potential of the rohingya people in bangladesh and beyond”, investigates how myanmar’s rohingya conflict could generate a potential for conflict within the borders of bangladesh and beyond. this is because myanmar’s civil conflict had spilt over into bangladesh’s borders due to a sequence of events starting from when myanmar’s civil conflict erupted from its national citizenship act. islam and wara (2022) show how unregulated mobility might create potential conflict in other countries. in previous editions, jas has published pieces on how the civil conflict in southeast asia can be resolved through the role of mediators that reduce the commitment issues of the negotiations and ensure the trust and confidence of the conflict parties (candelaria, 2020). such solution could be applied to the case of myanmar by engaging asean as the mediator. the last article, entitled “journey to justice: the united nations declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples in the context of west papua”, examines the implementation of the united nations declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples (undrip), focusing on the rights of the indigenous papuan people in the indonesian provinces on the western half of the island of new guinea, commonly referred to in english as papua or west papua. as suggested by soetjipto (2022), as a result of migration, papuans are becoming strangers in their land, with tens of thousands of migrants coming to the region every year. as in many other regions in indonesia where migration is high, resentment toward migrants is widespread in papua. this study shows how mobility should be put within the local context. mobility, in other words, may create marginalization of indigenous people. we hope that this regular issue vol 10. 1 2022 would invite further examination of the notion of connectivity and mobility in the post-pandemic order. we look forward to more studies that aim to conceptualize connectivity and mobility through the experience of asean. editorial team, 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(2017). indonesia’s maritime connectivity development: domestic and international challenges. asian journal of political science, 25(2), 212–233. https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2017.1339618 https://doi.org/10.1080/09733159.2017.1410936 https://doi.org/10.21512/%e2%80%8cjas.v9i1.7648 https://doi.org/10.21512/%e2%80%8cjas.v9i1.7648 https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v8i1.6040 https://www.adb.org/%e2%80%8cpublications%e2%80%8c/%e2%80%8cclosing-financing-gap-asian-infrastructure https://www.adb.org/%e2%80%8cpublications%e2%80%8c/%e2%80%8cclosing-financing-gap-asian-infrastructure https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v8i2.6596 https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v10i1.8491 https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v8i1.6171 https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2017.1339618 journal of asean studies, vol. 2, no. 1 (2014), pp. 19–28 © 2014 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn2338-1353 electronic the us rebalance policy and the management of power politics in asia pacific anak agung banyu perwita president university, indonesia denisa rizkiya president university, indonesia abstract the policy was introduced by the u.s. president barack obama early in his first administration in 2010, marked specific changing to the u.s. foreign policy like never before. the u.s. continuously views south and south east asia, including the indian ocean, as a crucial driver for america’s economic growth and prosperity throughout the 21st century. numerous numbers of cooperation and partnership have been done to enhance the ties between the u.s. and the regions. the u.s. presence and involvement in most essential regional meetings and summits can also be seen as an effort to seek opportunities, politically, economically, as well as security. this article tries to analyze how the u.s. rebalance towards asia policy, a term used for the u.s.' foreign policy influenced the regional stability in asiapacific region. keywords: us foreign policy, east asia, southeast asia, mandala, tributary system introduction asia pacific has recently been growing as the new emerging region that has successfully remained stable during the current global economic crisis. the rise of china is one of the most important factors that have triggered the countries in the region to be more powerful, not only in terms of economics, but also in military, and democracy. with its strategic position, asia pacific has become the region with the most growing main export markets for the united states and eu countries, and with two third of the u.s. market is asia pacific. meanwhile, the region is also a home to major powers with nuclear weapons, half of the biggest six defense budgets in the world, and six of the top ten strongest defense forces in the world (berteau & green, 2004). the fact that asia pacific region is getting stronger and potential, then invited the u.s. under obama administration, to shift its concern to the region, was marked with the announcement of the new foreign policy called “the u.s.rebalance policy”. china’s territorial claims in the south china sea have also led several asean members to welcome the increase of us military presence, produced joint military exercises, and even the purchasing of more advanced weaponry system to southeast asian allies and partners (sheldon, 2014). this paper discusses the shift of us foreign policy to asia and its possible 20 the us rebalance policy in asia pacific impacts to the regional security. it divides into several parts. the first part is the origin of us rebalance policy to the region which highlights the rationales behind the shift of the policy. it then follows by the discussion on the question of who and what to balance in the region. the third part discusses the different reactions and possible future scenarios of the region due to the shift of us rebalance policy to asia. the origin of us rebalance policy during bush administration, the us had embraced a challenging international security environment of the post 911 attacks. this situation obviously led the us to pay more attention and efforts toward the middle east, in its global war on terror. as the war in afghanistan and iraq becoming the highest agenda of us foreign policy, many countries in asia pacific, particularly in southeast asia, perceived that the us was lacking of concerned to the region. the us’ allies and partners in the region consequently questioned us commitments to the regional security mechanism and cooperation in the region (tsai, 2013). after barack obama steping into the office on january 2009, he started his term with many new things on his foreign and defense policy agenda. many questions can be raised, such as how president obama would lead the us and more importantly, what would be the us national interests under the new administration. interestingly, obama administration totally brought major changes and transformations, in terms of national interests as well as foreign and defense policies. recognizing the under-weighted attention to asia-pacific region, while the region was emerging into stronger in terms of economics and security, the u.s. under president obama finally made a shifting it never had done before in the history of us foreign policy. in the past, us propelled its relations with some of asean members in number of different symbolic actions. the u.s. was among the first partners of asean to set up its mission to asean in jakarta, and seriously strengthened its bilateral relations with most asean states, particularly vietnam, cambodia, singapore, malaysia, philippine, and indonesia. in addition to that, obama has also stated clearly that the us would be more involved in the shaping of regional security architecture where asean serves as the “fulcrum,” (clinton, 2012). the sign of rebalancing to asia can also be seen from secretary clinton’s remarks on “regional architecture in asia: principles and priorities” in honolulu, 2010: “but for these reasons and more, we began last january to lay the foundation for a revitalized asiapacific relationship. my first trip as secretary of state was to asia – in fact, this will be my fourth to the region in the last eleven months… we signed the guam international agreement that helps sustain a strong u.s. military presence in the region; and we signed the asean treaty of amity and cooperation.” in security-defense aspect, the u.s. focuses on the asia-pacific can be pictured by its numbers of deployments as well as the re-established numbers of military bases located within and along the region. leon panetta (2012), the u.s. secretary of defense stated on his speech delivered in shangri-la conference, singapore, 2012, that: “over the next few years we will increase the number and the size of our exercises in the pacific. we will also increase and more widely distribute our port visits, including in journal of asean studies 21 the important indian ocean region. and by 2020 the navy will re-posture its forces from today’s roughly 50/50 percent split between the pacific and the atlantic to about a 60/40 split between those oceans.” after being introduced in early 2010, obama and his administration made quick movements as the put major focus to the region. obama and secretary clinton’s first asia trip marked the beginning of the policy implementation and actions. on october 2010, us foreign minister, clinton commenced her very first asia trip for two weeks visiting hawaii, new zealand, australia, vietnam, papua new guinea, china, cambodia, and malaysia. the purposes of the visits were reflected in her opening remarks at her first stop in honolulu, hawaii. during her visit in hawaii, clinton met with japanese foreign minister seiji maehara to discuss a wide range of issues, including the future u.s.japan relations and the us strong commitments to maintain the regional stability. that bilateral talk underscored the significance of the u.s.-japan alliance as a cornerstone of the us involvement in asiapacific (the u.s. govt, 2012). on the other hand, president obama made a separate visits to india, indonesia, south korea and japan. the main objective of obama visit to those countries was to further increase economic, political and security relations between us and some of important countries in the region (u.s. govt, 2010). the most dramatic shift lies in the defense sector. as part of us plan to expand its presence in the region, president obama has also enunciated new deployments or rotations of its troops and newer military equipment to australia and singapore. u.s. military officials have also argued that the future reductions in military spending will not jeopardize its allies in the region. additionally, underlying the “pivot” is an extended geo-strategic vision of the asiapacific that includes the indian ocean (the u.s. govt, 2012) in mid-2011, the us secretary of defense, leon panetta stated in singapore that washington would look up a “geographically distributed, operationally resilient and politically sustainable” for u.s. military posture in asia pacific, particularly in southeast asia, with an emphasis on air superiority and mobility, an easier maritime security access, more control of air space and cyberspace, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (isr) capabilities (berteau & green, 2012). the u.s. strategy in security was also pivoted to asia, as president obama stated in the u.s. department of defense strategic priorities (2012): “it will have global presence emphasizing the asia-pacific and the middle-east while still ensuring out ability to maintain our defense commitments to europe, and strengthening alliances and partnerships across the region.” in mission to reach its goal to strengthen its military power in asia pacific, the u.s. assigned the u.s. pacific command (uspacom) to focus on the region more than it had ever been before. the key aspects that the uspacom focused on were: homeland defense in the asia-pacific; alliances; partnerships; shared sea, air, space and cyberspace domains; china; north korea; weapons of mass destruction; terrorism and; all hazards including natural disasters. according to the uspacom strategy approach (uspacom, 2013), the u.s. defense strategy in the asia-pacific focuses on bolstering the security architecture of 22 the us rebalance policy in asia pacific alliances and partnerships, including building new partnerships and enhancing regional security cooperation. in asia itself, there are over 67,000 us troops in at least 225 bases in japan, south korea, including in philippines and in darwin marine base in australia (zachary, 2009). detailed amount of military personnel can be seen from the table 1. spreading more of its military power to southeast asia region, the u.s. also planned to deploy the latest littoral combat ships (lcs) to singapore, as u.s. secretary of defense robert gates disclosed in his speech at 2011's shangri-la dialogue on 4 june. us planned to give more naval depolyment. this plans indicated the increased operational interest on behalf of the us to further monitor the growing chinese military presence (yee, 2011). u.s. rebalance policy: what and who to “rebalance” many perceive that the term "rebalance" in the u.s. foreign and defense policies is referring to the emergence of china as the new global actor. in short, with the policies, the rebalance policy was made to contain china due to china's increase of economic and military power. the u.s. policymakers are certainly aware of china's peaceful rise, but washington believed that the rebalance policy has been driven by strategic, economic, and political factors (sutter, brown & adamson, 2013) table 1. us military personnel in asia bases number of personnel various bases in south korea 28000 mainland japan 4000 kadane air base, okinawa 18000 camp hansen, okinawa marine corps air station futenma, okinawa 4000 various troops on rotation for training purposes in philippines 111 darwin marine base, australia 2500 journal of asean studies 23 the first factor is china’s economic rise and domination in the region. china’s gdp has escalated from 7.3 trillion usd 2012. chinese defense budget has also reached $105 billion in 2012, the largest military expenditure in asia and the second biggest in the world, although it was only one sixths that of the us defense budget (yunzhu, 2012). china’s allocation on defense expenditure has also increased along with the increase of its gdp. the chart below shows the increase of china’s defense budget from 1990 to 2012. figure 1. china’s defense budget increase (1990-2012) according to figure 1, chinese defense budget has increased significantly from 1990 to 2012 and it was us $106.4 billion in 2012 (xinhua, 2012). however, china argued the budget was 1.28 per cent of the country’s gross domestic product (gdp), decreased from 1.33 per cent in 2008 singh & kumar, 2012). figure 2. china’s defense budget increase (1990-2012) with all the strengths that china had, the u.s. realized that it was necessary to get involved in the development in order to “balance” china’s dominance in the world, especially in asia-pacific. moreover, the u.s. at that time was experiencing great recession and had its economy weakened. another factor is asia-pacific’s dynamics. as has been mentioned before, all the ups and downs that took place in asia were seen as opportunities as well as threats by the u.s. as a superpower state, the u.s. clearly wanted to be in the dynamics, taking chances, beating up challenges and expanding wider and bigger influences towards asia, the region in which the u.s. had put less concern and attention. emerging economy in most asian countries was an opportunity for the u.s. at that time, directing foreign investment to asia was considered the best, noting that europe, as the u.s. most foreign direct investment recipient fell due to euro zone crisis. moreover, countries in southeast asia were emerging in economy but at the same time in needs of back up in many sectors as they are developing themselves. this condition attracted the u.s. to come to southeast asia within many missions and even pursued its allies from outside the region to come to asia as well. from security sectors, it seemed that the u.s. found more of threats rather than opportunities in asia-pacific. the u.s. also concerns on nuclear development in region. north korea was one of the most threatening for the u.s. moreover, the military development of china was very rapid and had tendency to threaten the u.s. in addition, there were numbers of conflicts regarding security including the border disputes in which the u.s. tried to get involved in for resolutions, such as the south china sea border dispute. 24 the us rebalance policy in asia pacific reactions and future scenarios as the u.s. strategy of rebalancing began, the role of u.s. alliances in asia pacific has become more important. there are several countries in asia which have been the u.s. closest allies such as japan, south korea, the philippines, south vietnam, thailand and australia which became the backbone of the us “hub and spoke strategy to contain china in the region (aggarwal & koo, 2008). australia continued to maintain enhanced relationship with the u.s by integrating the us into the multilateral architecture (baker & glosserman, 2013). obama's decision to station u.s. marines in northern territory of darwin and put rotations of u.s. air force planes also signaled a recognition of alliance really mattered during the implementation of u.s. rebalance to asia policy. in addition, many also viewed this become a main component of the obama’s "pacific pivot" or strategic pivot to asia (vaughn, 2012). japan is one of the u.s. long-term allies in the region. both countries' cooperation in defense in military has been very strong, compared to any other cooperation. the u.s. has been involved by stationing its military component in okinawa, supporting japan on its border disputes with china and assisting japan in upgrading its defense preparedness (xu, 2013). in addition, south korea has recognized the advantage of the having the u.s.’ supports in promoting its national interests in regional and global level (baker & glosserman, 2013). moreover, the philippines perceived itself as a main proponent of the us engagement in southeast asia, but its primary interest is using the bilateral alliance to assure national security agenda. meanwhile, thailand has been the most reluctant country in southeast asia to acknowledge the influence of military alliance in shaping its defense policies (baker & glosserman, 2013). however, it appeared that thailand's close relations with the u.s. was built in order to put thailand in an advantageous position, rather than to get difficulties. therefore, it seemed that thailand only gave a little influence for the u.s. role in the region. besides the five countries mentioned above, another asian country that is also the u.s. most loyal ally is singapore. from singapore's view, the u.s. rebalance to asia policy is a reaffirmation of the u.s. longstanding interest in the region (denmark, xuetong & yamaguchi, 2013). in economic sector, singapore and the u.s. are involved in trans-pacific partnership (tpp) negotiations. tpp is a free trade agreement of nine countries, consists of: the united states, australia, new zealand, peru, singapore, brunei darussalam, chile, malaysia, and vietnam (2014). the u.s. entered the negotiation by 2008, and since then, it has been taking major control and flow of the negotiation process. in this forum, the u.s. is aimed to develop a high-standard that will support the creation of jobs in the united states and promote economic growth (the u.s. govt, 2014). furthermore, singapore benefited greatly from the u.s. rebalance to asia policy as the strategy enhanced singapore to play more important role in the region. just like a coin which has two sides, the u.s. military deployment to singapore creates pros and contras, especially among asia-pacific countries. the positive ones mostly came from the u.s. major allies such as singapore, philippines, japan and south korea while the negative ones came from u.s.’ rivalries such as china, north korea. journal of asean studies 25 china’s perspective as the deployment was announced, china was probably the most country that felt distracted by the plan. the sino-u.s. relation has been dynamic through the years, especially when china started to rise and played larger role in the region (yee, 2011). china did not attend the 2012 shangri-la dialogue, in which u.s. announced its military deployment plan to singapore. however, in responding to the statement by secretary of defense, leon panetta during shangri-la dialogue on u.s. plan to improve military presence in asiapacific region, a spokesman for china's foreign ministry, liu weimin (2012) stated that: "deliberate emphasis on military and security agendas, and strengthening military deployment and alliances are not in step with the times," liu weimin warmly welcomed a u.s. role in the region, as long as washington respects the interests of beijing and other states in the region (weimin, 2012). however, he then added that military buildup was not necessary since the current focus of asia was peace and cooperation. many policymakers, including chinese government, perceived that the u.s. deployment to singapore was actually one of the u.s. strategies to contain china in the south china sea territorial dispute. the disputes between china with the philippines, vietnam, brunei, malaysia and taiwan over the south china sea are mainly due to oil and gas resources ownership. in 2012, china warned the u.s.philippines military joint exercises, believing the exercises raised the worsened clashes over south china sea between beijing and manila (wolf, 2012). asean countries’ perspectives asean countries received great influence from not only the u.s. military deployment to singapore but also the u.s. rebalance towards asia policy in general. this is caused by those countries’ geographical locations which directly determine their regional security architecture. within asean, some countries are the u.s. allies such as philippines and singapore, but there are also indonesia and myanmar which strategically are not the u.s. allies. however, most of asean countries are still developing and the u.s. arrival to the region somehow has attracted them in many ways. indonesia, as one of the most influencing asean states, always maintained to be over-dependent into one certain power country with its “independent and active” foreign policy concept. however, the u.s. presence in the region has somehow shaped the country’s behavior to remain unclear. under president yudhoyono, indonesia shifted its foreign policy doctrine to “thousand friends, zero enemies”. given this changing, indonesia started to receive and become more open from external influences. this situation was coincided with the u.s. rebalance to asia foreign policy and has met with the u.s. national interests. the u.s. rebalance towards asia policy has engaged the u.s. and indonesia in a more enhanced relationship than both have ever had. currently both countries are tied in a bilateral agreement called the u.s.indonesia comprehensive partnership, launched in 2010. the partnership covered up broad sectors from education to security development. given such close bilateral relationship, indonesia’s perspective towards the u.s. rebalance policy seemed to be unclear. previously, marty natalegawa 26 the us rebalance policy in asia pacific (2011), indonesia's foreign minister argued that the u.s. military deployment to darwin was threatening the region by saying that: “what i would hate to see is that if such developments were to provoke reaction and counter reaction, precisely to create that reverse, a vicious circle or tensions and mistrust or distrust, and that's why it's very important when decision of this type is taken there is transparency of what the scenario being envisaged is or are and that there is no misunderstanding as a result." however, on the contrary, president susilo bambang yudhoyono of indonesia diplomatically argued that “indonesia stance in declaring the stationing plans as non-threatening, pointing to normative constraints that would prevent the use of force in the region” (sambhi, 2012). it seemed that president yudhoyono tried to be very carefully consistent with his doctrine of “thousand friends, zero enemies”. meanwhile, from myanmar’s perspective, the u.s. rebalance to asia policy and the u.s. military deployment to asia were perceived as something revolutionary. u.s.-burmese ties had been unwell due to human rights violations issue, in specific was aung san suu kyi's imprisonment. the u.s. responded by conducting embargo and downgrading diplomatic relations with myanmar. however, in accordance with the shifted foreign policy, the u.s. has tried to engage and enhance its bilateral relations with myanmar. this could be reflected from how president obama chose myanmar as his first stop of his asia trip in 2010. this improvement in bilateral relations with myanmar has marked as one of the early successes of the u.s. pivot towards asia. meanwhile, the advancement of u.s.burmese relations would be perceived differently by china. as the u.s. cut off its bilateral relations with myanmar, china started to move in and gain greater influence from the country. china’s relationship with myanmar then has grown for strategic importance for both sides (daga, 2012). conclusion asia-pacific is in now the phase of experiencing multiple dynamics in many sectors from economics to security. the u.s.’ allies in the region also have important roles in supporting the u.s. presence and reaching its goals in order to engage in closer relationship with countries within the region. the u.s. also used the allies in positioning itself to get involved in the region’s dynamics. most of u.s. allies in the region are involved in important issues that determine the region’s stability: south korea with north korea regarding nuclear development; japan with china regarding the disputed senkaku/diayou islands; philippines and singapore regarding the south china sea; and philippines with china over the scarborough shoal. by getting involved in those important issues, the u.s. seeks to gain greater power in asia pacific. the u.s. presence in asia pacific has also leveled-up asian countries’ dependence on assistances that the u.s. offered. the assistances are formed in terms of cooperation, partnerships and aids. most asia countries are developing countries that need stronger back up in order to develop themselves. given that situation, the u.s. came in with many interesting offers that asian countries finally decided to join in. this is a good opportunity for the u.s. in investing greater influences towards those countries. journal of asean studies 27 however, the u.s. military deployment to some southeast asian countries has also triggered greater tensions between the u.s. and china in engaging asian countries to gain more power in the region which made asia-pacific a stage of the two superpowers’ competition. this situation, of course, may also lead to the unstable regional security architecture which has marked with the return of power politics in the regional and global level. about author anak agung banyu perwita is professor of international relations and currently is vice rector for student affairs, international cooperation and marketing, president university. he can be contacted at banyu@president.ac.id denisa rizkiya is currently a qualitative research assistant at insight asia research group, jakarta. prior to her graduation, she worked as a program staff intern for 8 months at the u.s.-indonesia society (usindo) 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http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/07/2 1/us-deployment-of-littoral-combatships-to-singapore/ on feb 10, 2014 at 1:35 am http://securityscholar.wordpress.com/20 http://www.state.gov/secretary/trvl/2010 http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/pres http://www.pacom.mil/abouthttp://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/ http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/07/2 http://www.chinausfocus.com/peacehttp://www.cfr.org/japan/us-japanhttp://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/07/2 journal of asean studies, vol. 6, no. 1 (2018), pp. 97-115 https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v6i1.4819 ©2018 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic confessing love to the nation: audrey yu jia hui’s works and identity reconstruction alberta natasia adji universitas airlangga, indonesia diah ariani arimbi universitas airlangga, indonesia adi setijowati universitas airlangga, indonesia nur wulan universitas airlangga, indonesia kukuh yudha karnanta universitas airlangga, indonesia abstract this article addressed identity reconstruction through an analysis of two of the most prominent fictional works by one of the chinese indonesian young writers, audrey yu jia hui. in encompassing the idea of identity rewriting, i addressed hui’s second and third novels respectively, mellow yellow drama (2014) and mencari sila kelima (searching for the fifth principle, 2015), through the post-structural concepts of derrida’s deconstruction, and also in relation to cultural studies views on identity. the works were analyzed through close-reading technique. the novels were published during the reformation (reformasi) era, where politics had served to be a profound aspect that directed the cultural identity and social attitude of the society. in a range of aspects, from narrative structure to their deeper themes, hui’s literary works were found to draw on a distinguishable set of strategies which enabled hui to establish her own identity as someone who was liberated, culturally accepted and free to embrace local colors. this article also showed that audrey yu jia hui’s narratives have served as an acceptance of an individual’s multiple identities, which often depends on the problem at hand as well as the context of choices. key words: contemporary chinese indonesian literature, audrey yu jia hui, identity reconstruction, deconstruction, postmodern narrative introduction by and large, the chinese indonesians have mostly been viewed for their powerful stronghold in the economic sectors which accounted for more than 70% of the elite business in indonesia – a condition which at the same time often makes them object of controversies and scape goats for political dissatisfaction (suryakusuma, 2013, pp. 91-92) (anggraeni, 2010, pp. 113-114). this, however, is hardly followed by acknowledgement of their roles in other fields such as politics and literature, with the latter was deemed to have emerged in around 1918 by the end of world war i. 98 confessing love to the nation the indonesian chinese literature or sastra melayu tionghoa was initially part of the chinese malay literature in 1870, but it did not receive the same level of acknowledgement as that of its indonesian literature counterpart (alisjahbana, 1957, pp. 57). at that time, sastra melayu tionghoa was kept in a separate category from sastra indonesia. despite its repressed honor, chinese malay literature continued to provide colorful aspects to readers for its diverse genres and problematic issues of dutch colonization. it later joined the indonesian literature after the country officially gained its independence in 1945, and known as the contemporary indonesian literature, of which it is commonly known today. this research focused on how the works written by audrey yu jia hui, mellow yellow drama (2014) and mencari sila kelima (searching for the fifth principle, 2015), presented ideas on identity reconstruction from a young chinese indonesian woman writer. this research was important based on the following reasons. first, mellow yellow drama and mencari sila kelima were among the first books to have revealed “new” ideas of identity reformation from a chinese indonesian millennial, who was born during the reign of the new order and was raised during the reformation era. while other chinese contemporary authors after reformasi write about metropolitan romance and interest of studying abroad, jia hui writes about her concern of indonesia and issues regarding national identities of its citizens. second, in tandem with the first reason, if one had looked at the role of chinese malay literature as the earliest “crystallization” of indonesian history which represented the events occurring during the era of dutch colonization but received little acknowledgement from balai pustaka, the leading indonesian board of literature committee at that time (bandel, 2007, pp. 189), it could be seen that chinese malay literature was a crucial chain to view the whole “face” of the growing contemporary indonesian literature. hui’s works in this case represented minority’s perspective on the condition of chinese indonesians at that time, who were discriminated and segregated during the colonization, and only limited on the economic sector. so far, audrey yu jia hui’ viewpoint as an author and structural elements found in mellow yellow drama (2014) had been explored using goldman’s genetic structuralism approach, a theory that analyses literary works based on the authors’ worldview and social background. it results in some standpoints that: 1) the upheld theme is the dimension of egoistic and social levels, 2) the extrinsic element described in the narrative is the interrelation of historical background which makes for the social depiction in the narrative, 3) audrey yu jia’s views consist of the values of humanism, existentialism, nationalism, and religiosity (fernando, mulawarman, and rokhmansyah, 2018). the weakness of this study is that genetic structuralism only viewed jia hui’s works according to her social and cultural background (which journal of asean studies 99 constructed her worldview), but it missed to notice the text’s instability and “other” meaning found within the text, which could be slightly different from the author’s intended worldview. in this article, the researchers would like to discuss the identity reconstruction in audrey yu jia hui’s works in which she tried to redefine her identity as a part of a minority in indonesia using derrida’s deconstruction approach. compared to using genetic structuralism, using derrida’s approach has several advantages. first, it can view the instability and the “other” perspective found in both texts that were barely visible when they were analyzed using genetic structuralism perspective. secondly, it can prove more about jia hui’s transformed identity and its dynamics. it was done so by examining the detailed descriptions when jia hui as the main narrator faced rejections to her love of her country and her will to be of use to her surroundings. to fulfill this purpose, the researchers specifically focused on two titles of audrey yu jia hui’s works, which were mellow yellow drama (2014) and mencari sila kelima (searching for the fifth principle, 2015). after the introduction part, the researchers discussed derrida’s deconstruction theoretical exposition, conceptualization of identity, a brief outlook on the emergence of contemporary chinese indonesian literature, audrey yu jia hui’s life chronologies from the two books, the literary elements found in them, then the main discussion regarding deconstructing audrey’s identity and the idea of indonesia-ness, and finally, conclusion. theory and method the research of this study, which was based on three printed texts in total, was conducted in 2017. the focus of the study was on analyzing two textual sources written by a contemporary chinese-indonesia author, audrey yu jia hui. this study primarily used the closereading technique. the data, which consisted of direct quotations of both texts, was elucidated using jacques derrida’s deconstruction theory. through identifying binary oppositions, the power of centralization toward aspects or categories which were previously considered ‘dominant’ such as men, ratio, and progressivity could be seen to possess their own inconsistencies, and thus the order can be rearranged. in that way, one can understand what kind of thoughts that lurk behind any expression delivered from one party to another, and then be able to unravel them. being skeptical and questioning become the primary purposes from deconstruction in any existing text reading. interestingly, derrida showed that in any text itself, there are forms of inconsistencies which emerge naturally through word parables, choices of sentence, and partiality (haryatmoko, 2016, pp. 134). for derrida, the text is the life itself, “... has no stable identity, no stable origin, no stable end” (derrida, 1974, pp. xii), which is consistently open to any 100 confessing love to the nation kind of interpretation. other than that, a tradition expressed in a text, when it is viewed through the eyes of deconstruction theory, can reveal new forms of interpretation which have never been thought or known before. haryatmoko provided an example that the concept of ‘pribumi’ in indonesia, which refers to ‘the natives’, can possess a gap that even migrants can be categorized as the natives since they did ‘arrive’ and ‘settle’ first than the children of the ‘real pribumi’ (haryatmoko, 2016, pp. 134). this kind of discourse concept was the one that was continually applied by derrida, “deconstruction is inevitable or it is nothing at all; ... its process involves an affirmation, this latter being linked to the coming [venir] in event, advent invention” (derrida, 1992, pp. 337). derrida saw that meaning or understanding from everyday languages is actually a trace/track, which is the search/tracking of meaning concept in mind that is grasped because of the game between the signifier and the signified working all this time (aminuddin, 2002, pp. 177-178) (tyson, 2006, pp. 253). this mental trace works best at speech or writing level, but for performative written texts, retrace or reconsideration can be done to probe complete new perceptual possibilities. interestingly, those texts will later establish a number of new relations/connectivity with other texts so there can be found a repetition/alterity, escapement, and eventually displacement, which can alter one image concept to another (aminuddin, 2002, pp. 179). the ultimate concept coined by derrida was différance, meaning delay or reversal, which is the approach that strives to delay the establishment of signifier and signified as well as reverse binary oppositions found within his predecessor’s approach, saussure’s structuralism (haryatmoko, 2016a, pp. 217). word suffix ‘ance’ was deliberately used by derrida to represent two verb meanings at once, which is différer. the word was derived from english words, ‘defer’ and ‘differ’. though when pronounced the sound is just the same as ‘difference’, with the election of the term, derrida wished to prove that what can be understood by one of the five senses (of which the concept is none other than the ratio) actually cannot grasp what is truly operating behind it, that one mere word does not mean literally in black and white. according to haryatmoko, an expert of discourse analysis from indonesia, the first step of derrida’s deconstruction is undécidable, which is the disassembling of the metaphysical hierarchy (haryatmoko, 2016a, pp. 218). what is meant by metaphysical hierarchy is none other than binary opposition; hence one can consider what kind of ideology that is at play behind a text. therefore, undécidable is a strategy logic which no longer takes side in black or white area. however, this initial strategy is still inside the logo centric limitation because it is still bound to the previously established concept, so a continuing step is necessary to neutralize the relationship of those logo centric forces (haryatmoko, 2016a, pp. 221). journal of asean studies 101 the second step is the dissemination. contrary to the saussure’s structuralism which highlights syntaxes and metaphors, dissemination views that texts are no longer texts, and that materials are no longer matters that are bound to the previous hierarchical relation, but it is also not super-writing or super-material (haryatmoko, 2016a, pp. 222). metaphors, which were founded by philosophers, apparently still exist within the braided western logic so they are unable to get out of logo centric network. in this sense, metaphors are understood as interpretation which has myriad faces or meanings, as well as being unstable in text reading, which can overthrow the hierarchy of concept-metaphor (haryatmoko, 2016a, pp. 223). through the syntax of metaphors which provide acknowledgement toward the other, deconstruction resolute that texts are no longer fixated on absolute truth. in this study, derrida’s deconstruction approach is applied to prove that identity is not something that sticks to every individual from birth, with particular characteristics which originated from the social construction. the approach would show that a person can see him/herself to be belonging to a variety of groups altogether. more importantly, derrida’s deconstruction would highlight that each of the mentioned identities can be of importance to the person, based on the existing complications, the context of importance to the person, based on the existing complications, the context of choice as well as the his/her own sense of values. audrey yu jia hui’s life chronologies in mellow yellow drama, audrey yu jia hui recalled her childhood memories when the death news of her akung (grandfather) reached their family twenty years ago. being a spoilt four-yearold girl, an only child from a very affluent merchant chinese family in surabaya, she remembered being shocked to the core for having ‘lost’ both of her grandparents in less than a month, despite her akung still had been in a perfectly good health several weeks previously. jia hui noted that while her ama (grandmother) was still in comatose after a road accident and awake later after her grandfather’s death, her ama was permanently defected and had to live the rest of her life as a cripple. upon learning the hard truth that life is indeed short and fragile, audrey was determined to make her life meaningful. unfortunately, jia hui’s “off-limit” perspectives were deemed too early for her age and she was always bullied by her peers and relatives. this condition had gone on for several years until jia hui entered elementary school, when she learned and memorized everything about pancasila, bhinneka tunggal ika, indonesia raya, and other philosophical concepts. jia hui confessed to have fallen deeply in love with them that they stayed everlastingly in her heart for years. yet, most of the sneering’s and rejections jia hui had received ensured her that a chinese indonesian, let alone a young woman of a well-to-do family background, should not entitle herself to the matters of a country which were 102 confessing love to the nation ‘owned’ only by those who called themselves the natives or pribumi. audrey’s worries were soon confirmed when she was just about 10 years old, as the news of the 1998 riot in jakarta finally opened her eyes. she saw how many tionghoa girls and women had become victims of rape, arsoning, and murder at the downfall of soeharto’s new order regime. from then on, jia hui had instilled a feeling of self-hatred toward every physical attribute that made her chinese and the social status gap which divided the locals from the tionghoa people. to distract herself, jia hui developed a fondness for reading english classics, learning foreign languages (english and french) and watching international news as preparations for studying abroad. yet, to jia hui’s disdain, her mother began to introduce her to the circle of chinese elites in the hopes that one day audrey would marry one of the sons of their business conglomerate acquaintances. jia hui finally escaped these marriage arrangements as she got accepted in a special program for gifted young women at mary baldwin college, virginia, usa. after a year, she transferred to college of william and mary for her undergraduate studies; majoring physics while also taking social courses in various fields of study. jia hui obtained her bachelor’s degree with a summa cum laude, as well as getting elected as a member of national society of collegiate scholars (nscs), golden key international honor society, and eventually phi beta kappa. when she finally returned to indonesia, jia hui joined an ngo to volunteer to teach and help unfortunate children for a brief period before her parents restrained her from those activities as they were deemed ‘dangerous’ toward her safety as a chinese woman. for the next four to nine years, jia hui was unable to take a job or start a new life, until the time she went to singapore that she encountered chinese singaporeans who loved their country, but were able to keep their original chinese names and still spoke mandarin freely as their vernacular tongue. later, in order to return some of her lost ‘parts’ of identity, jia hui changed her name legally from ‘maria audrey lukito’ to ‘audrey yu jia hui’, although she feared that her new name would probably cause more sentiments and obstacles in the future. along the way, jia hui met an old friend of her father, dr. zhang qi wen, who shared her ideas about loving indonesia and chinese cultural heritage. in mencari sila kelima, jia hui had taken a job in changzhou, china, in an international machine factory where she translated documents from mandarin to english and vice versa, as well as teaching english to employees. audrey expressed her genuine admiration toward the present-day tradition of chinese people which was ingrained so deep in their ancient philosophies and literary works. jia hui constantly compared the situation in china to the one in indonesia, and concluded that indonesia would need to journal of asean studies 103 revise its educational root system in order to advance itself in the world. literary elements of mellow yellow drama and mencari sila kelima mellow yellow drama (2014) told audrey yu jia hui’s life story from her childhood, school days in indonesia (from kindergarten to high school), college years (in college of william and mary, virginia, usa), and her meeting with dr. zhang qi wen, who instilled her interest in learning mandarin language. on the other hand, mencari sila kelima (2015) told the continued life story of audrey, with her taking a job as an english translator and teacher in china. jia hui also narrated her days as she was enrolling in qinghua university, majoring in marxism studies. the choice of title for mellow yellow drama was interpreted as such: ‘mellow’ referred to jia hui’s melancholic state in falling for her indonesia but at the same time feeling lost and abandoned as nobody supported her love, while ‘yellow’ stood for her chinese identity as part of the ‘yellow-skinned people’, and drama referred to jia hui’s emotional upheavals in which her patriotic enthusiasms were met with rejections from both her chinese acquaintances and the pribumi. meanwhile, for the title choice of mencari sila kelima, ‘mencari’ is the indonesian word for ‘looking/searching for’ and sila kelima referred to the fifth principle of pancasila which declared “social justice for all of the people of indonesia”, inferring a clear irony of the long-term political situation which has often degraded the position of the chinese/tionghoa minority. the genre of both books was fiction, and the content was autobiographical, based on the author’s life background. the narrative structure of mellow yellow drama was separated into eighteen sequences, with seventeen of them are linear one after another, and one retrospective sequence which served as the trigger as well as the strong reminder for audrey in pursuing her dreams and ambitions for her birth country, indonesia. it can be seen in table 1. table 1. the narrative structure of mellow yellow drama no. the unit content of plot in mellow yellow drama sequence aspect 1 audrey’s description about her first time of falling in love with national symbols and motto: 1.1 “my nationality is indonesian. the symbol of my country is the garuda bird (eagle). on its chest, the five principles of pancasila are plastered...” (jia hui, 2014, pp. 14) linear love for the nation 2 audrey’s description about her school days: 2.1 “growing up, i slowly came to realize that my questions about the country and the nation, as well as life, though deemed unfit for a child my age, were seeds of nationalism. however, i thought that people around me were the ones who were not ready to deal with a shrewd and opinionated child like me” (2014, pp. 17) linear audrey’s experience as she felt that she was marginalized and as a citizen, she has the right to question the nation. 104 confessing love to the nation 3 audrey’s description about the incompatibility of pancasila teaching in education with the real social condition: 3.1 “growing up, i realized the misuse of national ideology in the education system would only bring catastrophe to the nation. [...] all of the pancasila idealisms are rubbish if they are used as propaganda tools. meanwhile, there is still ethnic, religious, and racial discrimination” (2014, pp. 20) linear contradiction of reality 4 audrey’s description about her experience during the may 1998 riot: 4.1 “during my stay in indonesia, i have to be careful to protect myself since i am a chinese woman. women like me are weaker than the locals. my parents told me this in a fearful and earnest tone that i knew that they were not lying” (2014, pp. 45) linear identity 5 audrey’s description about the deprived ethnic chinese identity: 5.1 “the chinese no longer possess any pride except their money. name shaved, culture seized. orientation to financial profit as well as hard work ethic which are the culture of the traditional chinese immigrants have become a double-edged sword in indonesia” (2014, pp. 56) linear confiscated identity 6 the description of atmosphere when audrey was musing about herself: 6.1 “i was also shy and angry about being chinese. in a school where the majority of its students were chinese, i was not interested in any of the guys whatsoever. every time i looked at myself in the mirror, the only thought that came to my mind was “chinese, chinese, chinese” (2014, pp. 56) linear a result from new order regulation in suppressing chinese identity. it worked on audrey, but she later chose to remain chinese-indonesian. 7 the confession from audrey about indonesians which she obtained from the us: 7.1 “no friend or lecturer ever felt that i was weird when i revealed my opinion about my country. they even admired me. a non-american female student with such sublime achievement who truly loved her country” (2014, pp. 66) linear love for the nation that provides equality to every citizen. 8 the rejection received by audrey from her friends: 8.1 “for many local javanese friends i have ever encountered, i was a spoiled pretty chinese girl. they thought i knew nothing about the sorrow of the people. that’s what they said. ‘it’s so easy for you to say things such as loving your country. your parents can pay for your college abroad’” (2014, pp. 94) linear gap in economy, and it reflects the stereotypes toward the chinese indonesians. 9 audrey’s description toward her refusal to marry one of her kind: 9.1 “when the reverend asked my reason, i could not explain that i did not want to date a chinese guy. the reason was that, i was often degraded carelessly by people from my ethnic group. whereas, i had never been treated like that in a foreign country” (2014, pp. 99) linear audrey’s reluctance to date chinese men due to their patriarchal thinking and preference to westernized men (as they allow women to raise their voices). 10 audrey’s decision to legally change her name: 10.1 “from my birth name maria audrey lukito to be audrey yu jia hui. [...] as chinese, i wanted to reclaim my identity with a chinese name. some thought i was joking. some threatened me in the name of god” (2014, pp. 114115) linear identity reclaiming journal of asean studies 105 mellow yellow drama presented how audrey struggled with her concepts of being a woman and a minority from a young age. audrey’s experience with the death of her grandparents (audrey’s grandmother had been put in a comma due to a hit-and-run, and her grandfather died very suddenly) became the trigger of her endless questions about death and the fragility of life. when she asked her mother what it meant to live, jia hui received a rude-awakening answer that people should just have fun as long as they live until it is time for them to die. horrified, jia hui vowed to live her life worthwhile and create meaning by helping others. the older members of jia hui’s family were totok chinese who spoke little chinese and mostly indonesian language. jia hui decided to pursue her undergraduate studies in the united states, being under the impression that if she could prove herself worthy in another country, she would be accepted wholeheartedly in indonesia. during this period, audrey also narrated her school days in virginia as she had to adapt to the western education system and culture. yet, though her friends and most american people regarded her patriotic ideals, she could not help feeling alien to their culture. audrey kept on hoping that soon after finishing her studies, she could serve her country and then be considered equal to her pribumi counterparts. meanwhile, the narrative structure of mencari sila kelima was divided into seventeen sequences, with three retrospective and linear sequences, as seen in table 2. table 2. the narrative structure of mencari sila kelima (searching for the fifth principle) no. the unit content of plot in mencari sila kelima sequence aspect 1 the description of audrey’s emotion when she was still living in indonesia: 1.1 “all my life living in indonesia, never once had i ever felt to be considered as tóng bāo (in mandarin: ‘born from the same womb’ or ‘fellow citizens’) (jia hui, 2015: ix). i had always been perceived as different” (jia hui, 2015: ix). retrospective (flashback) identity 2 audrey’s account about her prejudice which she brings since she was little: 2.1 “you probably think that my big love to the nation automatically makes me unprejudiced, having none of it all. it’s not true. i am well aware of every seed of prejudice implanted in me since i was very young. every day i try to fight it by acting the opposite” (2015, pp. 17). linear the fight against prejudice 3 audrey’s account about the danger of prejudice: 3.1 “well, the greatest danger of prejudice is the closing of conscience. actually, those who teach prejudice perhaps mean well. it could be that he/she has just experienced a quite unpleasant incident so he/she teaches that prejudice to other people (to his/her friends, children or family) with the hope that they would not experience the same thing in the future” (2015, pp. 19). linear the danger of prejudice 106 confessing love to the nation 4 audrey’s account about the prejudices common in indonesia: 4.1 “the second prejudice, which is common in indonesia is the prejudice against different tribes. there were many times when i became an object of prejudice like this, just because i was born chinese! and, why should i be called chinese? because my ancestors were from china and my face resembles theirs. therefore, i was judged to have certain traits, which were not completely true (that’s why they call it prejudice!). my heart, which loved pancasila, loved the nation, became invisible that i lost count how many times i have been the object of this prejudice” (2015, pp. 22). linear prejudice 5 audrey’s accounts about religion: 5.1 “one of the religious misuses emerges in the problem of absoluteness” (2015, pp. 23). linear religious misuse 6 audrey’s description about the absence of identity of the nation’s young generation: 6.1 “why do many youngsters who are highly educated, fluent in english, search for their identity not from figures who love their country? instead they search it from actors or actresses who lack morality, live recklessly and aimlessly, then later their outfit, outlook, movements, words are copied?” (2015, pp. 33). linear the young generation was neglecting the significance of the nation. 7 audrey’s description about her stay in liyang, changzou, people’s republic of china: 7.1 “frankly, i was very happy in liyang. it was solely because i felt for the first time embraced by the country. what i meant as ‘country’ certainly not the prc government; instead it was the ancestors’ very beautiful cultural tradition, which was so great, so engrossed, until i was almost in high spirits although my health condition generally worsened” (2015, pp. 47). linear multiple identities 8 audrey’s description about her heartfelt experience while living in china: 8.1 “in indonesia i had always (once again, without realizing it) viewed myself as part of a certain group: i was chinese, a christian, a graduate from an abroad university, et cetera. however, in china all of the variations seemed to have vanished and i was forced to dig deeper, to erase all of them” (2015, pp. 62). linear identity reconstruction 9 audrey’s memory when she was still in indonesia: 9.1 “later i was reminded of my love toward pancasila and the country, an unrequited love of mine. i remember the first time i fell in love with it, there was a shame that i was born chinese. i even rejected all cultural traditions and language of my ancestors which actually truly attracted my heart” (2015, pp. 117). retrospective (flashback) multiple identities 10 audrey’s description about the current condition and situation of indonesia: 10.1 “living in indonesia, i didn’t feel like living in a pancasila country. on the contrary, i felt like i was living in colonial feudalistic era, when every social system had seemed to be ‘designed’ to simplify the lives of the wealthy” (2015, pp. 128). linear the problem of unfinished nation-building and the weakened rule of laws that challenge indonesian democracy journal of asean studies 107 in mencari sila kelima, audrey accepted an english teaching job in changzhou, people’s republic of china, and even got accepted to enroll in qinghua university. she described how different the attitude of the chinese was from indonesian when it came to studying, since she considered the chinese were mostly diligent and serious about their studies regardless of age or occupation. she often compared the educational system between both countries as to perceive the upsides and downsides of their international advancement. on deconstructing audrey’s identity and the idea of indonesia-ness in mellow yellow drama, in order to return some of her lost ‘parts’ of identity, audrey tried to follow this step by changing her name legally from ‘maria audrey lukito’ to her mandarin one, but still kept her nickname ‘audrey’, which is an old english christian name, into ‘audrey yu jia hui’; although she worried that her new name would probably cause more sentiments and obstacles in the future. many of her relatives reacted to her name-changing decision by using words such as ‘stupidity’, ‘god will not be happy’ to demean and condemn audrey’s effort to regain her identity, implying further difficulties with the major javanese society and the government if she continued to flaunt her ‘chinese-ness’. however, phrases such as ‘have everything’, ‘no right to be miserable’, ‘god will surely be sad’, and ‘he will despise your attitude’ did not only present judgmental traits; they also revealed a sense of ignorance and superficiality toward audrey’s personal issues. it also implied that all these years her family, relatives, friends, and counterparts of church congregation had only accepted the discriminatory practices without struggling to negotiate them or adjust themselves more to the ways of the local culture and traditions in order to gain respect and achieve mutual understanding in the society. contrary to what most people believed, to audrey, her identity as chinese descent was somewhat ‘invisible’ to the eyes of the society. she sharply pointed out that her physical chinese attributes were actually not that different from those of president soeharto, the second indonesian president who formed the new order regime, whose physical characteristics actually did resemble those of most chinese-indonesians. audrey’s perception about her ethnic identity coincided with chris barker’s idea that identity touches both aspects of similarity and difference, meaning that one can be ‘similar’ to the rest of his/her cultural group, but at the same time he/she can become ‘different’ from the majority of the society (barker, 2003, pp. 220). this not-sostark-contrast fact about the similar physical traits of president soeharto with that of chinese-indonesian boosts audrey’s confidence that although being a member of the minority, she was in fact not that different from the rest of the ruling majority. her narration, above all, showed that audrey was well aware of the hidden truth about the discrimination 108 confessing love to the nation she and her people were up against, which was despite the intense adversity, she and her people could still negotiate the social conformities hedging them in order to rise and prove multiple identity, and inclusiveness within pancasila. in tandem with the previous argument, many of audrey’s native friends still tried to belittle her ambition and achievements by pointing the fact that audrey’s ancestors literally came from china, therefore she was still somehow labeled as immigrant. although identity is indeed fluid and flexible (barker and galasinski, 2001, pp. 29), in indonesia this was still considered a significant issue since identity is perceived as something fixed, homogenous and monolithic, coinciding with western past essentialism ideals (budiman, 2011b, pp. 233). thus, this automatically made it difficult for its people to treat any aspect of difference coming up with sympathy or understanding, since most of them were already set to think that they had to corner and push things that were ‘alien’ to them; in this case, people with different ethnicity. based on the kbbi (big vocabulary of indonesian language, kamus besar bahasa indonesia), the word ‘real’ native meant ‘no alloys’, ‘pure’, ‘no doubt on its origins’, and ‘inborn sense of quality’ (kbbi, accessed on april 11, 2017). according to barker and galasinski, identity is most significantly shaped from the existence of language, since it is the main ‘glue’ which interlinks someone with the cultural attributes he/she adheres to (barker, chris and galasinski, 2001, pp. 29-30). also, based on the amendment of the 1945 constitution article 6 paragraph 1 year 1999-2002, the use of the phrase ‘real indonesian people’ or ‘real pribumi of indonesia’ in mass media has been avoided since it was considered no longer relevant to the current indonesia’s sociocultural condition (artharini, 2016). therefore, it is clear that audrey’s native peers deliberately underscored her ethnicity, trying to alienate her and labelling her as an additional member of the country. it was merely to tone down her predominating achievements and distinct prodigy since they realized they could neither catch up nor compete with her academically. this was also strengthened with the following quote from audrey, about her father’s perspectives about the country and her friend’s further reaction to her ideals: my papa despises it most whenever i start talking about the nation. papa himself experienced the era when many people vanished suddenly. the security officials were even like dogs that turned to the sheeps. houses were plundered. my papa often says that pancasila is “bullshit”. by working hard, earning a living for his family, actually papa has felt to be indirectly contributing to the country’s economy. papa believes it to be much more useful than my shallow ideas of loving pancasila. (jia hui, 2014, pp. 94) journal of asean studies 109 the paragraph of the statement above revealed that the elder generation of chinese-indonesian born in the 1950s, in which audrey’s father belongs to was still deeply traumatized and hurt by the discriminatory and repressive treatment of the new order. this explains why audrey’s father has never had much patience for her aspirations about the country, since he and the rest of his generation had instilled a fixed mindset that their flawed relationship with the government and the javanese majority could never be mended. in most of the eyes of my pribumi friends that i talk to, i am a beautiful chinese girl who is spoilt by her parents. i was considered not knowing anything about the misery of the small people. this is what they say. “of course, you can say these pretty things about loving the nation. your parents could pay for your schooling in america.” i am confused and furious inwardly for getting that kind of reaction. what is the relevance between loving the nation and studying abroad? many people who study abroad have no any regard at all to the condition of indonesia. none of my friends can understand it. they listen to my explanation while shaking their heads. “we do not get it, though.” both paragraphs explained that audrey yu jia hui was trying to fit in and demand inclusiveness for the chinese indonesians. it was also revealed that audrey’s pribumi friends had secretly resented their own birth country since they were not given equal rights in many aspects such as family, health and educational welfare. although they were considered the ‘true’ or ‘pure’ citizens of indonesia, they could not completely hide the ironical fact that they had hardly benefitted from that supposedly ‘privileged’ status. in relation to what jia hui has narrated about the turbulent situations in indonesia, benedict anderson’s multiculturalism believed that a nation is in truth not a ‘political community’ but an ‘imagined political community’ that is depicted as ‘imagined as sovereign’, ‘imagined as limited’ and ‘imagined as a community’ where the majority of the people have hardly met one another in groups or being able to see the geographical borders of their nation with their own naked eyes, but they can sense the togetherness that the people across the seas are also part of their nation, and that they can have the feeling of limited border which places the location of their country (anderson, 2001, pp. 8). he also explained that these ideal practices should constitute as an everlasting continuum for they are the foundations that put an entire nation strong together. as nations are built upon the patriotic and nationalism spirits of the people; indeed, there should always be a vast portion of space where it can accommodate myriad differences among the citizens itself, be it one’s religious faith, cultural background and tradition, 110 confessing love to the nation gender, sexual orientation, political views, and so on. the term multiculturalism indeed first emerged in the social studies as there were marginalized communities who wished to obtain acknowledgement of equal rights and obligations as part of a country. they demanded that the country they inhabited provide them not only with the land space and job sources, but also a legal acknowledgement from the government that guarantees their social position and identity in it (dasgupta, 2016, pp. 1-2). from this point, it can be concluded that a nation should protect, value, and celebrate their essentials as colorful ways of life that should be respected and upheld (willet, 1998, pp. 34). as indonesia has claimed itself to be a civic nation instead of an ethnic nation, the country has a permanent duty to underline the unity values in terms of citizenship instead of concerning religious, race, ethnic and certain community matters (santoso, 2016). therefore, indonesian multiculturalism fundamental ideology has to follow its only way to deal with its people’s differences, which is through embracing them as the pillars supporting the existence of the country in the global world (parekh, 2000, pp. 3). with these ideals in mind, it can be understood that in mellow yellow drama, jia hui strived to remind her people that indonesia still has not completely accepted their position and status as a permanent part of the country. their long and various contributions in many aspects (except in economy) have often gone unmentioned and reluctantly acknowledged, with their presence in media and daily matters tended to be mostly depicted in a negative social perspective rather positive. as she was aware that both communities, the pribumi and the chinese, needed each other for support, jia hui struggled to prove those who opposed her nationalist aspirations by advancing herself in education abroad. she later realized that the only way to regain her pride and full identity as a chinese who loved her country is to study her original cultural backgrounds closely, accepting them as part of her ‘old world’ so that it would help her face the ‘new world’. as her acts mutually coincided with the profound points of multiculturalism perspectives, we can conclude that jia hui offered a personal narrative reflecting the private journey for re-establishing a multicultural identity that had not been solely applied in the real life of her birth country. her continual acts to embrace her cultural roots by studying mandarin language fluently, aspiring to take further study in her ancestral country of people’s republic of china, and spreading the analects of confucius in her book to introduce people toward the ancient chinese philosophy, have all been considered as the necessary steps for anyone who was part of a marginalized community to reconstruct her identity. while constantly sharing ideas about the nation she loves, audrey also criticized her upbringing in which since a young age, she had been constantly surrounded by people who were not only journal of asean studies 111 righteous but also repressive to other ways of life and thinking. audrey used words such as ‘lost defiant’ and ‘threatened’ to define her and a few others who dared to speak out against the church authorities. this explicitly implies that the church officials whom she had long been acquainted with were simply ignorant and close-minded people who had never felt the need to adjust their religious teachings to real-life practices, especially how to negotiate the injustices and the damaged relationship between the chinese and the natives. at the same time, they declared that they were the people who did not need to keep questioning themselves and their actions but rather attack and corner those who did not adhere to their ways. unfortunately, this kind of thinking only sparked bigotry, hatred, and misunderstanding. in the midst of her troubled adolescence, audrey also criticized the rapid growing trend in the emergence of ‘international’ schools as a setback which only generated higher social rift between the stereotypical affluent chinese and the pribumi. in indonesia, this practice apparently overlapped with the process of being westernized, thus automatically served as the means for the elites to reinforce their power to the society (tanu, 2014, pp. 579). somehow, the cultural reproduction of the elites only strengthened the glass ceiling which separated the have and the poor. thus, the possibility of creating a larger social gap in indonesia has increased and therefore made it more prone to inter-ethnic prejudice and violence. audrey quickly saw the lurking danger in this system and implicitly tried to warn readers that the best remedies for any mistreatment from the majority toward the minority are the awareness to nurture mutual understanding between each other as well as the willingness from both parties to blend in with one another. looking back, although it has been numerously claimed that indonesia is the most plural nation in the world with so many differences, we cannot neglect the fact that it is prone to inner attacks from the hardening religion-based organizations. first of all, by relating to what jia hui has written so far, reformasi of indonesia has failed to withstand its promise to eradicate corruption, collusion, nepotism (kkn) from political practices. on the contrary, these ‘classic’ traditions spread much quicker and far worse than during the reign of president soeharto as freedom of democracy sets in (magnizsuseno, 2015, pp. 56-57). disruptions rose to power as many hardline extremist groups are now threatening the unity and diversity of indonesia by condemning the use of ‘pluralism’ and ‘multiculturalism’ terms in many chances whilst at the same time preferring to sharia laws instead as the country’s sole anchor (magniz-suseno, 2015, pp. 58-59). what is more dangerous is that these people are keen on using force and violence to fulfill their ends. indeed, it is the right time for pancasila to come back into the light as a reminder of what is actually has been decided as indonesia’s basic foundation. audrey yu jia hui’s mencari sila kelima was written for this pressing urge as an answer to her 112 confessing love to the nation people’s ignorance toward the country. sila kelima here referred to the fifth principle of pancasila that says: “social justice for all of the people of indonesia”, in which jia hui noticed as the very missing principle in the everyday practices of indonesian people, albeit her concern for the other four silas that were generally left dormant. indeed, we can agree that justice often presents itself as a privilege for the rich and powerful, with the opposite that it displays itself as some luxury that the poor and the powerless can hardly afford. through examining the views of audrey yu jia hui that were inclusive and liberal, it was crucial to look at her sociocultural background as a chinese indonesian who was born in the era of new order regime and was raised in the reformasi era. among many other literary works written by contemporary chinese indonesian authors, jia hui was one of a few who was persistently consistent in presenting her identity as a ‘new’ member of the minority, unbound by shadows of the dutch and japanese colonization and barely touched by the then-ruling new order. from the very start of her writing, jia hui has never shied away from the spotlight; she continued to use herself, her own identity, as the primary homologic symbol of the discriminated voiceless. the most interesting aspects of her published writings were her perspectives that strive to break stereotypical attributes and embrace diversity and multiculturalism in which the chinese and the pribumi could blend in and adjust themselves to one another. compared to other writings produced by other chinese-indonesian writers of her generation, one can immediately see that jia hui held her chinese ancestry and heritage at such high regard, not as a way to reinforce her stereotypical cultural exclusiveness but to fully comprehend her cultural roots and therefore prepare her to embrace and combine her still-incomplete identity with the indonesian culture she had received since childhood. jia hui spoke of prejudice, hatred, and stereotype with a clear, dramatic language that put the blame on the ignorance of the adults who chose to live exclusively and apart from their local culture. this was indeed different from many other writings by her counterparts which were mostly concerned in the ‘lighter’ themes of love, fantasy, mystery and more. in this way, jia hui has also made her statement (via her own narration in both books) that she has accepted her multiple identities as part of the values she held and evaluated over and over, as well as the pressing social pressures she faced. conclusion this article has demonstrated that, as a contemporary chinese-indonesian author, audrey yu jia hui has become a distinctive figure in voicing out her reflection as a suppressed and stereotyped member of a minority group in indonesia. by applying derrida’s deconstruction to the analysis, jia hui’s works could also be seen as an extension as well as illumination toward what was actually occurring behind the long-going journal of asean studies 113 misunderstanding and glass-ceiling segregation between the chinese and the pribumi, especially the reluctance of the majority of the chinese to blend in with the rest of the society. their submission to the discrimination and their reinforcement of their exclusiveness were considered by jia hui as flaws rather than accomplishments since they would only lead to more embittered ethnic conflicts in the future. through the lenses of deconstruction, audrey (the books’ character) was seen as a prism that reflects the current chinese indonesian millennials who were still in search of their hybrid identity. instead of throwing away her ‘much-prejudiced’ heritage in order to embrace the local culture completely, audrey did the opposite by studying and retracing her chinese ancestry in philosophy, language and literature; even going as far as living, working and taking up college in people’s republic of china. although all of these might seem to be re-strengthening her embedded stereotypical exclusiveness, the step was necessary as it was the most first basic foundation in constructing a new identity for any country citizen. with this in mind, audrey also highlighted the importance of embracing and adhering to multiculturalism values in day-to-day practices as these were the most conducive for indonesia’s diversity principles, pancasila and bhinneka tunggal ika (unity in diversity). therefore, once again, audrey yu jia hui has managed to state her own acceptance of her multiple identities as part of the response toward the problem and the context of choice at hand. about the authors alberta natasia adji is a graduate of english language and literature and master of literary and cultural studies from faculty of humanities, universitas airlangga. she can be contacted at alberta.adji@gmail.com. diah ariani arimbi is a lecturer at the english language and literature department, faculty of humanities, universitas airlangga. she can be contacted at diaharimbi@yahoo.com. adi setijowati is a lecturer at the indonesian language and literature department, faculty of humanities, universitas airlangga. she can be contacted at ad_setio60@yahoo.com. nur wulan is a lecturer at the english language and literature department, faculty of humanities, universitas airlangga. she can be contacted at nurwulaneka@yahoo.com. kukuh yudha karnanta is a lecturer at the english language and literature department, faculty of humanities, universitas airlangga. he can be contacted at ky_karnanta@yahoo.co.id. references alisjahbana, s. t. 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(1998). theorizing multiculturalism. massachusetts and oxford: blackwell publishing, ltd. the effectiveness of de-radicalization program in southeast asia: does it work? the case of indonesia, malaysia, and singapore yosua praditya suratman secretariat of the board of strategic analysis, indonesia abstract the counterterrorism approach is still harnessed to tackle the spread of radical movement and it is deemed to be a soft strategy for a long-term purpose. in the several past years, the government has been conducting deradicalization program in attempt to bring the terrorist inmates safely to social life after the prison release. this program commonly conducted in the prison while the inmates serving the jail time for terrorism-related offences. nevertheless, debates rise due to the fail of the program results which prove some recidivists appear to execute another terror attack. an opinion of prison environment which is considered as a potential breeding ground for radicalization aggravates the government effort to reintegrate the prisoners into normal society. this worsened by the activities like recruiting other prisoners and supporting extremist groups from prison which still often occur in indonesia. taking two examples from international scope, france has announced to close its de-radicalization program, meanwhile united states under trump’s leadership prefer to heightened the sentences related to terrorism and to ban muslim migrants excessively. meanwhile, indonesia still convinces that de-radicalization program is one of the most strategic approaches in fighting terrorism, and it is deemed as a soft strategy with a long-term oriented. therefore, this paper will analyze the effectiveness of the program through theories, facts, and phenomenon. thus it will yield some recommendations for indonesian government in strengthening and reshaping its policies. key words: terrorism, radicalization, de-radicalization, and counterradicalization journal of asean studies, vol. 5, no. 2 (2017), pp. 135-156 doi: 10.21512/jas.v5i2.4302 ©2017 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic 136 the effectiveness of de-radicalization program in southeast asia introduction terror attacks still happen in some countries in western europe, turkey, and southeast asia and it is worsened by the calls as a genuine message from islamic state (is) whose followers have been urged to execute terror attacks in their home country. this leads to the increase number of terrorist inmates in the prison in several past years. unfortunately, the prison has served as recruitment center and headquarters for ideological extremist (mulcahy, merrington, & bell, 2013). in addition, according to neuman (2010), prisons are places of vulnerability which produce identity seekers, protection seekers, and rebels in a greater number than other environments. prison also often gives extremist a chance to regroup and preach their radical ideologies, so that many prisoners who were not radical prior to imprisonment become radicalized through the prison environment (johnston, 2009, p.3). now, the challenge is how the government deals with the imprisoned extremist who cannot be assured to reintegrate with the society after the release. according to ismail and sim (2016), in 2013, the national agency for combating terrorism (bnpt) said that 25 out 300 terrorists released from prison had gone back to their old terror habits, and it estimated that the recidivism rate to be at least 15 percent now. this number is not counted yet for some who just went to syria to join is after release, which more convincing that prison does not change their extremist beliefs. some questions like – where will they go? who will monitor them? will they re-offend? or whether they will be turned away from terrorism after the release from the prison will be challenged (horgan & braddock, 2010, p.268). the matter is there is no valid program that is claimed to be a success in running deradicalization, and there are still many factors such cultural, psychological, and educational are involved. in australia, consequently, programs have been deemed pointless and criticized by some influential muslims (the guardian, 2016). the de-radicalization approach seems to fail to build a constructive thought in battling the extremist idea, which causes more funds are used without any significant results. there is still a debate in the word of the ‚de-radicalization‛ itself because there is no consensus on what it really means and ends. in contrary, hikam (2016) argued that the indonesian government should still depend on the deradicalization program because it is a soft approach that involves public participation. therefore, this paper wants to assess whether the de-radicalization program in southeast asia is effective or not. there are three asean countries chosen for the objects in this paper, those are indonesia, malaysia, and singapore. according to kurlantzick (2018), both countries are considered as the leader at a regional level whose population is muslim majority and has been helping up as a global example of democratization. meanwhile, dr. kumar ramakrisna, head of policy studies in rsis (s. rajaratnam school of international studies), claims that terrorist (isis) is going a step further to consider carrying out the attack in the strategic hub and international port in singapore’s territory. moreover, singapore considered as one of the countries in the ‚crusader coalition‛ that terror group was battling (cheong, 2017). these reasons have limited the range of objects into only three countries at the regional level. journal of asean studies 137 theory de-radicalization ashour (2008) defines deradicalization as a process in which radical group reverses its ideology and de-legitimizes the use of violent methods to achieve political goals while moving towards an acceptance of gradual, political and economic changes within a pluralistic context. in addition, according to rafique and ahmed (2013), the deradicalization program is the process of abandoning an extremist worldview and concluding that it is not acceptable to use violence to affect social changed– radicalization. it should not be considered soft, but strategic because deradicalization aims to prevent further escalation of violence (dechesne, 2011; p.288). this makes de-radicalization is different with disengagement because it involves an approach to build a conductive dialogue the inmates. therefore, many claims that deradicalization is a significant strategic tool in tackling terrorism, and unsurprisingly conducted by many countries. based on dechesne (2014; p. 179 – 180), there are four strategic uses of the de-radicalization, firstly, it is excessively used in its response against a more flexible and agile opponent that can hide in a larger crowd (civil society); secondly, it highlights the difference between deradicalization, military, and repressive way; thirdly, it can occur spontaneously; and fourthly, it pertains to the cognitive side of radicalism comprising attitudes, values, and belief. in the case of indonesia, according to rabasa, et al. (2010), the de-radicalization has an approach which operates at two levels, first, it seeks to develop intelligence on the terrorist network and second is to return detainees to society, thus the key objective does not to change the terrorist’s mindset, but to obtain intelligence on the terrorist network in order to disrupt it and prevent the terrorist attack. indonesian government prefers to use cultural aspect as a tool to find a solution to urgently change the mind-set of terrorist prisoners. the cultural approach has been used due to a humane way and developed bonds, which are believed by each other to disrupt the spread of radical ideology and mitigate the extremist character inmates in prison (martin, 2007). unfortunately, the debates on the de-radicalization still appear and are due to the no effective outcomes. istiqomah (2011) said that the deradicalization program in indonesia still needs to be evaluated and improved due to limited knowledge and understanding from the apparatus personnel about how to de-radicalize terrorist inmates. this sometimes worsened by the lack of inclusiveness means of it and how to run a clear de-radicalization program in prisons. radicalization before continuing the analysis of a soft and strategic power which is represented by the de-radicalization program, the concept of radicalization needs to be analyzed further. payne (2009) claimed that radicalized ideology leads the subject in having extreme ideas and it is deemed as the ‚battle of idea‛, not ‚war on terror‛, and yet the ideas are still believed as the questions of which ideas, among whom, and at what level of extremism continue to be debated. alonso et al. (2008) argue that the radicalism is also an ideology that challenges the legitimacy of established norms to lead to violence act, but there can be also radicalism without the advocacy of 138 the effectiveness of de-radicalization program in southeast asia violence to strive for the relations of social change. there are four steps that people turn to be radicalized person. silber and bhatt (2007) said that the four levels are (1) pre-radicalization phase; (2) selfidentification phase; (3) indoctrination phase; and (4) jihadization phase, in which each phase consists a different condition, particularly on the leverage of the subject itself before they already become a perpetrator. the first stage of the radicalization process shows that the condition of the individual is normal before they start to involve in the militant activities. the second stage is selfidentification, which the individual keen to learn and understand the radical ideology which indirectly leads them to form irrational ideas. the third stage shows that the individuals tend to learn the radical ideology, and the last stage points the individuals accept and obey the leader command in jihad participating (aslam, othman, & rosili, 2016; p. 154). moreover, radicalization emerges when an individual has adopted an extremist worldview that is rejected by main-stream society (hafez and mullins, 2015). therefore, they often legitimate the use of violence as a method to affect societal change. recently, the radicals often act to be connected with the islamist extremist. borum (2011; p.13) stated that opinion is hardly rejected due to the facts that many violent acts are committed by those who support islam extremist. this is because of islamist ideology that might pose a security concern, particularly those that are anti-democracy and often blame the west for all islam’s problem, and may support directly or indirectly, or condone the acts of terrorism. lastly, hikam (2016) claimed that radicalization is the ideological process which is very vital, thus its spread must be halted earlier when the government wants to cut or at least to mitigate the radicalization issues. it is not surprising that not many countries face the threats of radical views from their own citizens who now tend to be affected easily. one of the critical cases is the rising of isis ideology which boosts the number of radicals groups and supporters. counter-radicalization while the de-radicalization program focuses on rehabilitating radicalized people in order to re-integrate them into the society, counterradicalization has an anticipatory action. as quoted by (schmid, 2013, p.50), it seeks to prevent members from the nonradicalized population from being radicalized, and it comprises in three ways namely, (1) counter-grievance, (2) counter-ideology, and (3) countermobilization. first, most of the terrorist often legitimate their grievances (krauter, 2015) due to the economic, social, and political issues, thus the effort of counterradicalization has the purpose to tackle these grievances which quite often become the reasons why some people become terrorist. second, before terrorist group promoting their extremist ideology, the security apparatus must counter it to prevent its spreading. previously, rana (2008) emphasize the importance to neutralize the extremist narrative before becomes a popular theme in public. once it becomes popular, the ideology will become an encouraging drive in rising of radicalism movement. third, counteringmobilization helps the people to disconnect extremist networks and knowledge. as powell (2016, p. 58) claim that counter-radicalization is a prevent strategy, thus a multi approaches are journal of asean studies 139 needed. not only social and economic approaches but surveillance and intelligence strategies, including military, are important too. in the polarized debate of counter-radicalization theory, there are two major views, first, the group who sees social and economic (soft strategy) and second is the group who emphasizes the importance of counter-intelligence and coercive action. (taspinar, 2009, p.75). the approach of counterradicalization still avoids the hard strategy, because the strategy itself is empowering the community itself. in other words, the resilience of the community is strengthened by the proper understanding of ideology, religion, and even culture. again, schmid (2013, p.50) states that to strengthen the capacity building, there are four ways that must be done in counterradicalization program, namely (1) expanding focus from violent to nonviolent extremism; (2) empowering mainstream moslem voice; (3) addressing the local grievances as local issues; and (4) promoting prosperity and democracy. these four steps are absolutely notmilitary approach. the implementation can be done through the relations between government apparatus and society, especially religion figures. tackling the grievances issues such as poverty, injustice, and inequality must use soft strategy and usually it takes long time planning. in addition, trethewey and corman (2009) add the four elements inside the counter-radicalization, those are naturalizing, obscuring, universalizing, and structuring. naturalizing means restoring socially constructed by facing all belief and meaning behind the extremist ideology that jeopardizes public assumptions. this approach must need some process as borum (2011, p.8) said radical beliefs are a proxy. meanwhile, obscuring means to omit the contradictions behavior between extremist and public opinion, in which the behavior of extremist is a key factor to be assessed to determine whether there is a risk or not (klausen et al, 2016). the effort of universalizing means to understand the interest and influence of all terror group leaders. all of them must have the universal or common goals to establish the state under the islamic law. to implement universalizing target in counter-terrorism program, thus engaging subgroups and their leader, politicizing the differences in interest is necessary (schmid, 2013). and lastly, structuring means to preserve the prevailing ideology by empowering rules and resources. taking an example in indonesia, the ideology of pancasila used to fight back radicalization movement and to structure the social system (rahman, 2017). counter-terrorism previously, the definition of terrorism is a political act that stands at once at the nexus between individual and collective action (gurr and marshall in schmid, 2013). and there is another definition by matusitz (2013) who stated that terrorism is the use of violence or threat of violence in the pursuit of political, religious, ideological, or social objectives. there are many definitions of terrorism; there is no universal and absolute consent on the definition due to the complex and multi-approach on its problem-solving. to counter or to end terrorism, it cannot be done by a single approach, both military and non-military are used by the state. in 2003, us national grand strategy combatted terrorism by attacking their sanctuaries; leadership; command, control, and communications; material support; and finances. this 140 the effectiveness of de-radicalization program in southeast asia approach will have a cascading effect across the larger terrorist landscape, disrupting the terrorist’s ability to plan and operate (cia.gov, 2013). meanwhile, european union have established four ways in conducting counter terrorism, first, preventing people to terrorism by tackling the factor or root cause; second, protecting citizens and infrastructure and reduce our vulnerability attack, third, pursuing and investigating across the borders and globally from terror attack; and four, managing and minimizing the consequence of terrorist attack (euct, 2005). in addition, cronin (2009) said that to end terrorism, the state can decapitate like catching or killing the group leader or even negotiating (non-military way) which aims to transit toward a legitimate political process. cronin (2012, p.192) gave an example of killing osama bin laden considered as the us grand strategy counter terrorism, and it is believed that helping us to prevent al-qaeda influence in the world, especially in the us. the influence of the head of group terror is very significant. they have a moral effect to develop their influence to the terror group, especially their ideology. although killing leaders does not completely destroy terror group, but fisher (2016) said that killing group terror should weaken the organization (isis), especially depriving its direction and radical ideology spread. stopping this means to support the effort of counter-radicalism too by other means or hard power. moreover, preventing radicalism influence could be done by reducing support of all kinds of group terror (powell, 2016, p.50). bearing in the mind that group terror like isis, alqaeda, and boko haram must have its bureaucracy/level (fisher, 2016); therefore using hard power to diminishing its figure could help countries to hamper radicalism influence from group terror. therefore, the main difference between countering radicalization and terrorism is using what power in diminishing terror movement. soft approach (non-military) can be used both for counter-radicalization and terrorism; meanwhile hard power (military) is only used to end terrorism. de-radicalization programs in southeast asia countries indonesia the government has established the national agency for combating terrorism (badan national penanggulangan terorisme/bnpt) through presidential decree no. 46 of 2010. this agency has three main duties, first to establish national policies, strategies, and counterterrorism programs; second, to coordinate related government agencies in the field of counterterrorism; and third, to implement the policy by forming the task forces consisting of elements of relevant government agencies (bnpt, 2017). in addition, sari (2016; p.73), stated that to perform the de-radicalization, bnpt has three main coaching programs, which are personality mentoring, independency mentoring, and continuous mentoring. personality mentoring aims to fix the radical ideology which is not in accordance with the philosophy of pancasila. this mentoring is being done with the help of the inmate’s family who supports the program. meanwhile, the independency mentoring aims to equip the inmates with soft-skills to get the work after release from the prison. the softskills are needed to develop and enhance every detainee capability, thus they will be more ready for the integration process with the civil society. lastly, the continuous mentoring aims to prevent the potential of post-release recidivism. in the mid-2017, the bambu apus prison has sent 152 inmates to their journal of asean studies 141 hometown across indonesia, and this deemed as the successful of the deradicalization program. (halim, 2017). parameswaran (2016), said that indonesian government has promised to increase the fund of de-radicalization efforts due to the concern of the indoctrination of prisoners to become is supporters behind the bars. the indonesian government efforts to tackle the terrorism and radical groups must be praised, because since 2002, indonesia has experimented initiatives aimed at the countering violent extremism as can be seen with the establishment of bnpt in 2010. (sumpter, 2017). moreover, bnpt’s programs consist of ‚a cultural interrogation approach‛, whereby the officers displayed their own faith of islam, treated detainees with the respect and attempted to build trust (rabasa in sumpter, 2017; p.117). malaysia the major malaysian deradicalization initiative is by introducing the religious rehabilitation program. most of the programs are based on reeducation and rehabilitation. reeducation focuses on correcting the political and religious misconceptions of the militants, while the strategy of rehabilitation is adopted for monitoring of the militants after their release (noor & hayat in aslam et al., 2016; p.157). subsequently, the rehabilitation proves is divided into four phases. first, counselors and the police extricate radical ideology or twisted islamic perception; second, counselors open the discussion to address the misunderstood ideologies; third, all twisted islamic ideologies are replaced by correct interpretations of the holy quran, and lastly, the process is continued by education program about islam comprehensively (aslam et all, 2016; p. 158). the malaysian de-radicalization program is under the royal malaysian police, and it claimed the success by 95%. most of the inmates had successfully reintegrated which only five percent returned to recidivist. (ismail, 2016). singapore even though the case of violent attacks in singapore is far less than indonesia, but three out of four singaporeans believe that it is only a matter of time before the country comes under a terror attack, with changi airport the likeliest target. (cheong, tan, and qing, 2016). this survey has been conducted after the brussels’s airport attack which killed 30 people and injured more than 300 people. moreover, lam (2017), said the ministry of home affairs of singapore confirmed that the country was specifically targeted by terrorist groups in the past years and the terrorism threat to the country remains the highest in recent years, as isis has been linked to several violence cases in southeast asia countries. due to the least number of terrorist attacks, singapore has preferred to conduct the cve (countering violent extremist) rather than to focus on deradicalization. the cve program has been conducted through the courses given to all students to understand a theoretical foundation in countering violent extremist and radicalization (taylor and romano, 2015). the efforts from singaporean government differ compared to other countries like indonesia and malaysia. the government prefers to conduct the ‚vetting process‛ to check whether its society have been influenced by radical’s views or not. aslam et al. (2016) said that the vetting process aims to screen the potential detainees actively involved in terrorism. throughout the process, the 142 the effectiveness of de-radicalization program in southeast asia terrorist detainees will be reviewed by the psychologist and given security assessment. the failure, debate, and assessment of de-radicalization program the case in france apart from southeast asian countries, france has announced that they will shutter its first and only deradicalization center for islamic extremist in the mid-2017, because its experimentation was claimed unsuccessful (chasmar, 2017). the france de-radicalization center which is called as ‚the pontourny centre‛ is the voluntary center and has nine participants only who none of them completed the program. spencer (2017), argued that deradicalization programs which the west countries has placed so much hope have long been a failure. this is because the holy koran and sunnah are full of commands to make war against the unbelievers, and the idea that jihadist can be ‚de-radicalized‛ by reference to them is just a myth told to infidel authorities to lull them into complacency. previously, in 2016, 400 people were arrested on suspicion of links to jihadist groups, and 2,400 people and 1,000 families are actively monitored. this data also linked to the bataclan attacks which killed around 120 people (euronews, 2017). this is why, in the beginning, france really depends on the de-radicalization program which designated to the young people between 18 – 30 ages to halt their association to is. unfortunately, the fact that france government officially closed its deradicalization program has opened the debates among experts in examining whether the program is effectively run or not in diminishing the radicals group. mcauley (2017), said that the failure caused by the lack of evaluation of the mechanisms set up by the state in the area of taking responsibility for radicalization and the lack of a comprehensive prevention strategy. moreover, some believe that trying to change the perspective of the radical people is not working, thus the effort of preventive measures are more fit and preferable. the report from france implies that deradicalization does not work because most islamic radicals do not want to be deradicalized. this can be seen by the fact that from 8,250 islamic radicals, only 59 people have inquired about going to france de-radicalization center (pontourny) since its opening. among those, only 17 submitted applications and just nine arrived and not a single resident has completed the full ten-month curriculum (kern, 2017). another reason of france deradicalization program failure was the issue of volunteering, which deemed as the crucial factor that leads into the failure. crowell (2017) said that the issue of volunteering was very problematic, because it was impossible to someone to declare himself as a radicalized people and announce that he needs a treatment to de-radicalize his mind. the ambiguity of the term of ‚radicalization‛ becomes the question, because radicalization is subjective and cannot be categorized as an illness or like suffering from addiction. some experts continue to argue that government is not supposed to use the deradicalization term because they cannot invent a vaccine against the radical temptation/islamist (dunleavy, 2016). in the beginning, de-radicalization should not take a radical inmate as a patient like in the hospital, but unfortunately, some de-radicalization, particularly in france, implement the programs similar with the journal of asean studies 143 drugs rehabilitation in prison which actually very contradict in dealing the terrorist prisoners. de-radicalization program: are they effective? it is not easy as some people think in running the de-radicalization program. sometimes, it is hampered by the definition of radicalization itself. yusuf (2016) said the term of ‚radicalization‛ is defined in an extremely broad manner, and this becomes more especially difficult given that the concept of terrorism/radicalism is so contested and politically loaded. this lead to the government, for instance australia, to more prefer the policy of ‚countering violent extremism‛ rather depend on their de-radicalization program too much. as a matter of a fact, the australian government has developed a parallel criminal justice specifically for acts deemed ‚terrorist/radical acts‛ (yusuf, 2016). this show the complexity of deradicalization occurred, and some believe the program is too instant in removing the radical ideology which already inhibited in every mind of prisoners. moreover, some countries are still finding the best format to implement the de-radicalization program, and of course the program must be realistically run. if we saw violence caused by recidivism, means that the deradicalization program is failed. actually, the facts of recent attacks in the uk and western europe from the charlie hebdo in france and lee rigby in the uk point the repeated of terrorist recidivism. , rates of recidivism are understood to be legitimate markers of a program’s success, and indeed, they are consistently referred to when discussing the effectiveness of programs and initiatives (koehler, 2017; p. 172). there is no a certainty to assure that there will be no recidivism in the upcoming years after the release. even though the recidivism rate among terrorist can be consistently lower than ‘normal criminals’ but still it will be always used as a measurement whether the program is success or not. only in saudi arabia who claimed 0 percent of recidivism, but meanwhile in europe the rate is nearly 3040 percent (pettinger, 2017; p. 11). in the case of uk, marsden (2015), said the de-radicalization program still needs to be explored, thus it will have a clear set of metrics that reflect what successful reintegration ‘looks like’. the program should notice on ‘push and pull’ factors to make sure the ex-prisoners are not surprised when they try to integrate with the community. the push factors deemed as the reaction to leave the group because he/she has lost a faith in it. meanwhile, the pull factors underline the essence of achieving a normal life after prison, so the financial incentives, the jobs, and the support from the family are important. in further explanation, bjorgo in johnston (2009; p.12), explained push factors may consist of a loss of faith in the ideology of the group or the feelings that the violence went too far or even the loss of confidence in the group. meanwhile, pull factors consist of a longing for the freedoms of a ‘normal’ life‛. previously, many scholars have distinguished the meaning of deradicalization and disengagement. according to kruglanski et al. (2014; p.87), disengagement denotes the discontinuation of active participation in violence whereas de-radicalization denotes a belief system that supports violence. this means the de-radicalization program focus on halting the ideology which has been portrayed as a triggering and motivating key factor. the challenge 144 the effectiveness of de-radicalization program in southeast asia is can the program change the radical ideology to normal perspective? in which, it is difficult to measure its progress. it becomes harder when de-radicalization program occurs when a group or an individual no longer believe in a violent ideology; meanwhile ‘disengagement’ occurs when a group or people no longer engage in violence (johnston, 2009; p. 9). this is a key point why conducting deradicalization program is much more difficult rather than disengagement. it will take a very long time to convince inmates to leave the radical view behind, rather to stop being engaged in any kind of violent acts. more critics come from dechesne (2011; p. 2), who said that deradicalization may not require any coordinated action to get it underway, or in other words, de-radicalization may rise spontaneously. this means that structured programs do not guarantee a success to eliminate radicals view in every inmate’s head. on the contrary, many countries still depend on the structured programs to run de-radicalization strategy, and this cost a high amount of state budget. if the de-radicalization process is really occurred in the ‘spontaneously stage’, then every structured programs are a waste of government spending. this has been criticized by some scholars who believe that the de-radicalization program tends to spend budget inefficiently. assessing the de-radicalization program in indonesia, malaysia, and singapore assessing the progress of the deradicalization program in those countries will give the results whether the programs run effectively or not. both indonesia and malaysia are countries in which muslim is the highest population and they are still depending on the de-radicalization program to minimize the number of radical groups. indonesia performing the program in prison clearly needs an adequate fund and reliable practitioners, especially the person who capable in teaching the koran meanings without against any law in indonesia. moreover, the practitioners must have the ability in approaching inmates and his families and networks. the family connection is a vital part to success the program, so the family support from outside prison is clearly needed, and it is a responsibility for the practitioner to make it happens continually. the failure of the program is usually caused by the instant process, so the program officer cannot understand the root of the problems why the inmates still stand with their radical paradigm. from the previous research, sukabdi (2015) found that some inmates believe the deradicalization program does not alter their views and they do not understand on what strategy the government will change them into normal people. in addition, from the fgd and interview, sukabdi found an inmate who totally denies the program. he believes the program cannot change his heart to love allah and jihad, and only possible to stop bombing (sukabdi, 2015). to assess whether the program is success or not, i evaluate the behavior transformation of every inmate who just follows the program routinely. it is not easy to assure them to avert their behavior, from pro-violence to contraviolence, moreover for the challenge for them to integrate with the social community after the release. in this reason, sapiie (2016) said that the program is not really optimal because it cannot convince the former terrorist to return journal of asean studies 145 back to society after serving their sentences. in fact, the main purpose of the program is to bring the ex-extremist to their community, but unfortunately, it is contradicted by the facts that many recidivists joined their previous radical group. this can be seen by the case of thamrin attack in 2016, which one of the five perpetrators was a former terrorist convict, thus it was a concrete example of the de-radicalization program failure (sapiie, 2016). finding this fact, the result of de-radicalization program obviously needs to be assessed in some certain stages. lestari (2016), moreover, said that the de-radicalization program in indonesia is under fire. her opinion is same with the previous reason, because the terror attacks have continued with the perpetrator who just released from prison bars. it also shows the example of the police’s inability to completely monitor the former detainees in terrorism-related cases. another reason that points the failure of the program is the accessibility in every prison. this means that every crowded prison actually is no longer effective to run program. in fact, the more crowded prison, the bigger the possibility to spread the extremist ideas among detainees, thus many international experts still claim that a breeding ground for islamic extremism (beech, 2016). the general results from assessing de-radicalization program shows three answers; first, many prisons lack of capable staff who runs the program. the officer with the educational background of social-security science is really needed to back up the prison. it is a different matter if the prison still uses the staff who only capable in engaging criminal acts to run the de-radicalization program. second, the program often stops after the release; in fact it should maintain the life of exprisoners outside the bars. the government has a difficulty in seeing exprisoner’s network in his new environment. due to this, the government has failed in solving the question why there are still many recidivists perform terror acts. and the last one is the condition of the prison that too overcrowded, so the program could not run effectively. even though the program has been implemented by the capable staff, but as long as the prison environment is not supported with the good condition, hence the desired goals cannot be achieved. in addition, from the primary data taken from the field research by samto isnanto (2017), the number of inmates of terrorism cases in prisons until 2015 has reached 215 people in 47 prisons scattered in 13 provinces, which can be seen from table 1. from his research from 2009-2015 in surakarta prison, isnanto found that the challenges do not come from the inmates, rather the prison officer or supervisor who do not possess special ability in conducting the de-radicalization program. mostly, the officer/supervisor only has the understanding of law enforcement and criminalization, thus the lack of human resources readiness, facility resources, guidance preparation, and controlmonitor still persist. 146 the effectiveness of de-radicalization program in southeast asia table 1. the capture of terrorists in indonesia until 2014 no status total indonesia 1 inmates in prison 215 2 released from prison 598 3 death penalty 3 4 killed in the scene 103 foreign countries 1 repatriated from turkey 169 2 killed in syria 53 3 suicide bombing 4 source: isnanto (2017) malaysia looking to the neighbor country – malaysia, seems they are really appreciated by the international community. malaysia has achieved recognition from international organizations over the success of its deradicalization program. the government has claimed a total of 130 people were arrested in connection with is, and had been placed under the program. malaysia has succeeded to collaborate through the welfare ministry to support the finance for the program and many psychological experts (povera, 2016). malaysia’s advantage compared to indonesia is they have formally enacted the relationship between the prison with welfare department, which is very important to make sure the prosperity and safety of every inmate after the release. meanwhile, indonesia seems still need to find the best format to build the relationship between the related stakeholders. this is much contradicted with the malaysia’s achievement which claims the success rate in implementing de-radicalization by 95%. this is caused by the malaysian government effort who success in building and modifying its experience to design rehabilitation program in order to respond to the current generation of islamist militants (besant, 2016). moreover, malaysia also strengthens the relationship with the neighbor states, particularly in exchanging the ideas on de-radicalization and rehabilitation. this makes this country has a knowledge advantage to perform their program compared to indonesia. having a success implemented strategy lead malaysia to set broader discussion in the international level. malaysia’s counterpart in exchanging the views on de-radicalization is not only asean members, but international states like us, japan, and south korea. malaysia has a good image in annihilating the communist influence during 1960’s, and the method in combatting communist has been transformed to fight is threats. according to najimi and ramli (2016), journal of asean studies 147 malaysia has a long experience in the deradicalization program due to the successful of campaigning against a communist insurgency in the aftermath of world war. this makes malaysia has a standard temple on diminishing any kind of radical perspective in their country. their standard temple is clearly considered as the good method, which can be seen by the few of number terror attacks. moreover, there is no case of recidivism who conducts terror attack in the last several years in malaysia. singapore since 2007, singapore has been aware with the potential threat from radicals group, thus the government has gathered 122 muslim organizations to condemn and reject the ideological extremism (hassan, 2007). after that, the number of terror attacks in singapore is none until now. even though the number or attacks is none, but the government still has a procedure for de-radicalization program such counseling time and financial support for the detainee. aslam et al. (2016; p. 158) said that singapore has performed continuous and comprehensive efforts undertaken by the government to combat terrorism, which should be praised and improved in the deradicalization program is an obligatory with the uncertainty of political atmosphere at present to ensure harmony among the citizens are protected and to ensure national security free from militancy which sought to develop radicalism around the world. even though, there are no terror attacks in singapore, but in september 2017, the government under isa (international security act) has arrested two suspects – imran kassim (male) and shakiran begam (female), who tried to go to syria for jihad purpose (channel news asia, 2017). the screening has been performed well by singapore because the government has vowed to not let any singaporean to become radicalized. the government emphasizes the effort of disengagement, for instance adding the policy to screen every citizen they have. this is not hard compared to indonesia, because singapore citizen is only 5.6 million, or only half of jakarta. prioritizing counter-terrorism through military operation other than war (mootw) policy tackling terrorism issues is quite complex and it takes many approaches. due to the fail of the de-radicalization program in france and the rising debate of de-radicalization, thus the effort must put forward the preventive way that seems more plausible. powell (2016) affirmed that the objectives of preventing (countering) will be achieved by responding immediately and working with a wide range of sectors. to response terrorism threats, the government can implement the military other than to optimize what security apparatus have done. in indonesia case, supriyatno (2014, p.218), said that military operation other than war (mootw) – operasi militer selain perang (omsp) in indonesian – can be used to tackle non-military threats such as terrorism, even though it requires political decisions from parliament. using mootw actually is like to combine the military-intelligenceterritorial operations, which aims to secure the territory security. for the us case, their counter-terrorism forces are active in 40 percent of the world’s countries (76 countries), and their presence comes with striking repercussions (besteman and savell, 2018). the u.s. has emphasized the ‚war on terror‛, and it has been 17 years since 148 the effectiveness of de-radicalization program in southeast asia the attack of world trade center. the us government has provided its latest military technology and hardware, including to training local military personnel in africa and middle east countries. since 2005, the mootw aims to end terrorism threats, which blais (2005, p.5) claims that the program has provided a quick response measures that includes preemptive, retaliatory, rescue operations, and normally, counterterrorism program requires specially trained personnel capable of mounting swift and effective action. previously, before the reformation era, indonesia has done the same thing as the u.s., in which the qualified personnel to tackling the terrorism threats is under the responsibility of special detachment 81 (gultor kopassus). however, due to anti-terror law no. 16/2003, terrorism handling currently under the control of indonesia police (polri) with the formation of detachment-88 in 2003. it is been 15 years that polri still fighting terror groups, and now the number of personnel have been strengthened by the additional of 600 densus-88 personnel, bringing the total personnel to 1.300 (soeriaatmadja, 2018). the presence of tni to tackle terrorism has decreased significantly and the effort of mootw seems never to exist, because based on the anti-terror law, polri is the main actor to maintain the security at the national level, including terrorist attack. this leads to the ineffectiveness of mootw due the tni who is not supported by the anti-terror law, whereas using mootw can yield a significant result in combating terror groups. as quoted by supriyatno (2014, p.219), there are four elements of mootw namely offense, defense, preventive diplomacy, and recovery. the element of offense aims to capture the leader and to destroy terrorist and networks (baker, 2007), which, the military force (tni) can be used to help polri implementing its operation. the challenge of the synergy between tnipolri is still being debate due to the regulations and applicable law. from the perspective of polri, terrorism is considered as the criminal acts, thus the effort to diminish them still not using the mootw. in addition, prasetyo (2016, p.46), the implementation of current collaboration by tni-polri is only limited to the policy makers levels at the headquarters, however, the collaboration at the forefront level such as military rayon command/koramil (babinsa) and police sector/polsek (bhabinkamtibnas) still has not happened yet. moreover, the doctrine of tackling terrorism between tni and polri is different, as putranto (2014) said that police aims to enforce the law, while tni aims to defend its territory from any kind of threats, including terrorism. this leads into the debate of tni-polri collaboration and cannot implement mootw. the rest mootw elements (defense, preventive diplomacy, and recovery) also cannot be implemented as long as indonesian government still finding the best format of tni-polri collaboration. the question is how to implement mootw, thus tni can support polri to fighting end terrorism? the answer is having the national security council (dewan keamanan nasional), as singapore, malaysia, and major players such us, uk, and russia did. as praditya (2016, p.45) said that the main purpose of national security council is to formulate the security policies and strategies, which include how to tackle terror attacks by tni assistance. unfortunately, the draft bill (laws) of national security council has been rejected and still has not received approval yet from the parliament (mukti, journal of asean studies 149 2015). the strategy to implement mootw cannot be run as long as the country (indonesia) possesses national security council and its law. again, according to praditya (2016, p.55), singapore already had its national security agency called nscs (national security coordination secretariat) which formed in 1999. this agency (nscs) aims to strengthen coordination between singapore’s defense agencies (militarypolice-intelligence agency), thus they can prevent terrorism acts with the assistance from the military based on its law. meanwhile, malaysia also already had national security division (badan keselamatan negara) which formed in 2006, and it aims to coordinate national security issues, including terrorism (praditya, 2013, p.57). the further explanation can be seen by table 2. meanwhile, if we see major players, they have their national security, like national security council for the us; security council of the russian federation for russia; and mi5 for the uk. therefore, the conclusion is that the country must own its national security acts/council as a single entity to coordinate military-police in tackling the terror threats. in other words, the mootw can be done effectively to combat terrorism as long as there is no law on it. in indonesia case, polri still regarded as the leading sector due to the laws. solutions for in-effectiveness of de-radicalization program there are some strategic solutions to answer the debate of the effectiveness of de-radicalization, however, the writer divides into two conditions: 1. if the government still keep running the de-radicalization program: first, the program officers in prisons must understand the concept of de-radicalization, and they cannot only have the knowledge background of criminal science and extra-ordinary crime. second, program officer in prisons can handle the radicalized inmates by embracing the existence of their family and religion figures. moreover, the program officer has the ability to interpreting (tafsir) the qur’an. third, for indonesia case, bnpt must be authoritatively and financially empowered to conduct the deradicalization program. the main agenda is to provide many qualified program officers to oversee de-radicalization course. table 2. comparison between indonesia, malaysia, and singapore security councils countries security council indonesia (none) cannot implement mootw optimally malaysia bkn (badan keselamatan negara) can coordinate military and police under one agency, thus could perform mootw effectively singapore nscs (national security coordination secretariat) can coordinate military and police under one agency, thus could perform mootw effectively source: praditya, 2016; elaborated 150 the effectiveness of de-radicalization program in southeast asia 2. if the government stop the deradicalization program (for indonesia case): first, empowering the counterterrorism policy with the help of military (tni) through mootw. this should be supported by the applicable laws and regulations (revision of anti-terror law) to enable the mootw works. second, to have national security council/acts immediately like singapore and malaysia did, thus the collaboration between tni-polri would be run effectively by one/single entity. third, strengthening the intelligence operation to capture the group leader and prominent actors of terror, thus their influence can be cut immediately. this role falls under the bin (national state intelligence agency) as the leading sector to coordinate tni and polri in gathering intelligence information. this is very useful for indonesia while the government still don’t have national security entity. fourth, strengthening joint patrols and intelligent sharing through admm (asean defense minister meeting) to secure from terrorist and radicalism movement. from indonesia case, the admm can be chosen as a place to perform indonesia defense’s preventive diplomacy. conclusion de-radicalization program cannot be harnessed as a primary way to annihilate the extremist movement, because the process to de-radicalize is a long process and it is not an instant stage. there is no certain step to de-radicalize inmates, and it is still debated among the scholars and experts. the government cannot cut the radicals ideology immediately, but they can stop violence acts which are called as a disengagement strategy. moreover, indonesia needs to re-evaluate what is the best format for the de-radicalization program, thus it will deliver a desired result. and lastly, after comparing the program in indonesia with two neighbor countries (malaysia – singapore), the cultural aspects only deemed as a crucial factor only in indonesia, while others depend on the quality of the program without engaging cultural approach. meanwhile, the effort to implement mootw to crush the terror group by tni is still being limited by the applicable law in indonesia. until now, indonesia can only 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(2016, april, 26). deradicalization program = do they work?. retrieved from the sidney morning herald: https://www.smh.com.au/opinion/d eradicalisation-programs-do-theywork-20160426-gofgi3.html https://www.smh.com.au/opinion/deradicalisation-programs-do-they-work-20160426-gofgi3.html https://www.smh.com.au/opinion/deradicalisation-programs-do-they-work-20160426-gofgi3.html https://www.smh.com.au/opinion/deradicalisation-programs-do-they-work-20160426-gofgi3.html journal of asean studies, vol. 9, no. 2 (2021), pp. 101-116 doi: https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v9i2.7771 issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic the role of the asean summit in the asean economic dispute settlement intan soeparna international law department, faculty of law, universitas airlangga, campus b, jl. dharmawangsa dalam selatan surabaya, indonesia 60286 intan@fh.unair.ac.id received: 01st october 2021/ revised: 20th october 2021/ accepted: 01st november 2021 how to cite: soeparna, i. (2021). the role of the asean summit in the asean economic dispute settlement. journal of asean studies, 9(2), 101-116. https:/doi.org/10.21512/jas.v9i2.7771 abstract like the world trade organization (wto) dispute settlement mechanism, the association of south-east asian nations enhanced dispute settlement mechanism (asean edsm) recognizes trade countermeasures in the event of non-compliance with rulings made by the panel and appellate body. however, the injured party sometimes has to deal with stumbling blocks in requesting an authorized trade countermeasure. the pitfall highlights the consequences if the dispute is unresolved. meanwhile, asean recognizes a procedure to allow the disputant parties to render unresolved disputes to the asean summit according to article 26 of the asean charter. moreover, if the non-implementation of the asean dispute settlement decision affects the injured party, this party can submit the issue to the asean summit according to article 27(2) of the asean charter. this research investigates whether the role of the asean summit can be a solution for the postadjudication issue in the asean edsm. the research methods consist of a literature review and close reading of the article 26 and 27 of the asean charter. the result shows that the intervention of the asean summit to the postadjudication of asean edsm is likely to apply political solutions that would, in turn, make legal decisions subject to politically driven scrutiny. however, asean commits that any economic disputes must be resolved to ensure economic stability in the asean. keywords: asean summit, asean dispute settlement mechanism, unresolved disputes mailto:intan@fh.unair.ac.id 102 the role of the asean introduction the creation of the asean enhanced dispute settlement mechanism (edsm) is intended to ensure expeditious and legally binding resolutions of economic disputes among asean members. however, since it came into force in 2004, the mechanism has never been invoked and so has never been tested. many scholars remain doubtful that asean members will use the asean edsm (limenta, 2017; ewing-chow & yusran, 2018; beckman, et al., 2016). nonetheless, although it has never been utilized, an economic dispute mechanism is essential for implementing asean economic agreements. asean requires a “rules-based” process to ensure the viability of asean economic integration. thus, the asean edsm is expected to reinforce asean's legitimacy as a vehicle to bring about predictable, transparent, centralized, and rules-based dispute settlements. at the 51st asean economic ministers’ (aem) meeting on september 6, 2019, an agreement was reached to replace the 2004 protocol on the asean enhanced dispute settlement mechanism.1 given the importance of regional dispute settlement, the completion of the asean edsm 2019 represents a significant change from the existing asean edsm 2004. asean members are willing to reconstruct the mechanism so that it is more expeditious and transparent. some additional provisions include the procedure of the panel,2 special procedures for less developed countries,3 and equipping the asean secretariat with additional legal resources to assist asean members with dispute settlements.4 the efforts by aem to improve asean edsm reflect members’ prioritization of trade dispute settlements. it is noteworthy that the asean edsm has features similar to the world trade organization (wto) dispute settlement mechanism (dsm). these include provisions allowing the suspension of concession or other obligations as a temporary measure in the event of non-compliance with the panel's findings and recommendations and the appellate body or trade countermeasure. unfortunately, learning from wto dsm experiences, sometimes disputant parties encounter a stumbling block in implementing the provision of a trade countermeasure. the pitfall of trade countermeasure's authorization will lead to the dispute remaining unresolved due to the persistence of non-compliance with panel and appellate body decisions. meanwhile, unlike wto dsm, asean recognizes a procedure to allow the disputant parties to render unresolved disputes to the asean summit according to article 26 of the asean charter. moreover, if the non-implementation of the asean dispute settlement decision affects the injured party, this party can submit the issue to the asean summit according to article 27(2) of the asean charter. the main issue in this article is whether the pitfall of the implementation of trade countermeasures under the asean edsm constitute an unresolved dispute according to 1 at the time of writing, the revised asean edsm has not yet entered into force. 2 article 8 of the asean edsm 2019 (not enforced yet). 3 article 23 asean edsm 2019 (not enforced yet). out of 10 asean member countries, three are lowincome countries (lics; cambodia, laos, and myanmar). the special procedures for least-developed countries in the asean edsm may encourage recourse initiation by lics using the asean edsm 4 article 22(4) asean edsm 2019 (not enforced yet). journal of asean studies 103 article 26 of the asean charter, and whether the effect of non-compliance under the asean edsm could be submitted to the asean summit under article 27 of the asean charter. therefore, the research analysis focuses on the role of the asean summit in the asean edsm. the commentary is divided into five sections. the first section consists of the background of the issue and the problem to solve in the research. the second section examines that in the event of non-compliance with the adopted panel and appellate body decision under article 16(2) asean edsm, asean adopts trade countermeasure similar to the wto dsm. the third section looks at whether articles 26 and 27(2) of the asean charter provide solutions for unresolved disputes and the effect of non-compliance with the asean edsm decision. this section also explains the asean summit’s role in these matters, while the fourth section examines whether the asean summit can adjudicate over unresolved disputes or whether redressing a post-adjudication issue to the asean summit undermines the legitimacy of the asean edsm. the fifth section discusses the asean summit’s role in the asean edsm to contain further trade imbalances between the disputant parties due to nullification and impairment of trade benefits. analytical framework non-compliance with the panel and appellate body adopted decision the purpose of the asean edsm in following the wto dsm is to create an effective economic dispute mechanism. the prompt dispute settlement in the wto maintains a proper balance between the disputant parties’ rights and obligations. article 16(2) of the asean edsm5 is similar to article 22(2) of the wto dispute settlement understanding (dsu). for instance, in the event of non-implementation of the findings and recommendations of the panel and appellate body, the asean edsm provides a “wto-like” trade countermeasure. significantly, article 16(2) of the asean edsm notes that any measures taken under the clause mandate the violating party to comply with the asean economic agreements,6 noting that: “if the member state concerned fails to bring the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement into compliance therewith or otherwise comply with the findings and recommendations of panel and appellate body reports adopted by the senior economic official meeting (thereafter seom) within the period of sixty (60) days or the longer time period as agreed upon by the parties to the dispute as referred to in article 15, such member state shall, if so requested, and no later than the expiry of the period of sixty (60) days or the longer time period referred to in article 15, enter into negotiations with any party having invoked the dispute settlement procedures, with a view to developing mutually acceptable compensation. if no satisfactory compensation has been 5 article 18 under the new asean edsm 2019 (not yet in force) 6 asean edsm article 1 para 1: "the rules and procedures of this protocol shall apply to disputes brought under the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the agreement as well as the agreements listed in appendix i and future asean economic agreements (the covered agreements).” 104 the role of the asean agreed within twenty (20) days after the date of expiry of the period of sixty (60) days or the longer time period as agreed upon by the parties to the dispute as referred to in article 15, any party having invoked the dispute settlement procedures may request authorization from the seom to suspend the application to the member state concerned of concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements.”7 in this article, the phrase "to suspend the application to the member state concerned of concession or other obligations" indicates the act of countermeasure. the act of countermeasure is that member state could suspend concession or other obligations under asean economic agreements due to non-compliance of the violating member. although article 16(2) does not mention “countermeasure”, the act of countermeasure is known as a form to retaliate the violating member. moreover, the act is reminiscent of the law of the treaties. article 16(2) of the asean edsm focuses on three measures taken by parties to the dispute. the first measure is to end the violation committed by the violating party. in public international law, the measure is known as “cessation and non-repetition" and is generally considered the first remedy for a wrongful act.8 the second measure is negotiable compensation in the event of non-compliance. article 36 of the international law commission of state responsibility invokes compensation as a remedy that is usually denoted by a financial measure. such compensation should cover any financially assessable damage, including loss of profits.9 however, in the wto dsm, this compensation does not mean monetary payment, but instead refers to additional trade concessions, such as tariff reductions that the noncomplying party must institute. the purpose is to ensure that the compensation does not restrict trade but opens it up, albeit temporarily, as long as the non-complying measure remains in place (mercurio, 2009). it is challenging for countries to find and offer a compensatory reduction of trade restrictions since such compensation requires achieving a “mutually acceptable” settlement based on the principle of “full and fair addresses” (cho, 2004). both parties to the dispute must determine the assessable damages. the wto record shows how problematic it is for members to achieve voluntary and mutually acceptable compensation since this affects other stakeholders in the dispute, such as exporters, importers, and producers. it is argued that "innocent bystanders in the importing country would oppose any proposal from their government to expose them to more foreign competition as a means of compensation." (brokers & van den brock, 2006) however, since the asean edsm has never been invoked, it remains unclear whether the compensation procedure will be similar to the wto dsm. the third measure is the suspension of concessions or other obligations under the asean economic agreements. the injured party can take this measure if both parties fail to 7 article 16(2) of the asean edsm 8 article 30, cessation and non-repetition, the state responsibility for the internationally wrongful act is under an obligation, articles on responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts, 53 un gaor supp. (no. 10) 43, u.n. doc. a/56/83 (2001). 9 article 36 (compensation), (1) the state responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to compensate for the damage caused thereby, insofar as such damage is not made good by restitution. (2) the compensation shall cover any financially assessable damage, including loss of profits insofar as it is established. journal of asean studies 105 agree on compensation, and the violation remains in place after a specific period has elapsed. it must be noted that the measure is only applied by the injured party unilaterally and temporarily after authorization from the seom. the trade countermeasure has been widely accepted as restitution or a retrospective form of reparation under public international law.10 in certain situations, where it might be challenging for the parties to comply with the recommendations and findings of the panel or appellate body, the violating government will have no choice but to leave the breach as it is (capucio, 2016). likewise, when the violating party has modified the trade policy in question, but another party declines the modification, the compliance measure is not fulfilled. a useful precedent was set in a wto dispute between thailand and the philippines regarding custom and fiscal measures on cigarettes (thailand customs and fiscal measures on cigarettes from the phillippines, 2011). in this case, thailand modified its policy to respond to the wto panel and the appellate body’s reports. however, the philippines found that the changes were insufficient, holding that thailand’s measures were still inconsistent with the customs valuation agreement and general agreement on trade and tariff (gatt) 1994. hence, in 2018, the philippines sought recourse from the wto panel under article 21(5) of the dsu concerning thailand’s alleged failure to comply with the decision of the wto dispute settlement body (dsb) (thailand customs and fiscal measures on cigarettes from the philippines: recourse to article 21.5 of the dsu by the philippines, 2018) and again in 2019. the philippines identified two different measures: the charges filed by the public prosecutor against pmtl and the revised notice of assessment, neither of which had any significant changes to comply with the wto dsb’s decision (thailand – customs and fiscal measures on cigarettes from the philippines: second recourse to article 21.5 of the dsu by the philippines, 2019). thailand’s experience, in this case, reflects the complexity of achieving compliance under the wto dsm. significantly, the compliance measure requires a government to modify or entirely withdraw the policy related to the dispute. besides, all interested parties must accommodate the government’s compliance with the rulings and recommendations. some countries will find it difficult to modify their policies, especially if national (or political) interests are at stake (horlick, 2002). in the wto legal system, a right to impose a trade countermeasure is usually done by withdrawing tariff concessions, which raises tariffs for specific imports from the violating member. although, in general, trade countermeasures are intended to prevent continued losses for the injured party in the future and to induce compliance with the dsb decision, implementing the measures tends to have an adverse impact on both parties. the wto countermeasure by raising tariff levels is particularly troublesome for small developing member countries, which lack the capacity to retaliate against non-compliance members (guzman & simmons, 2005: shaffer, 2006). according to the wto panel in the us-gambling case, the economic costs of withdrawing concessions in the goods sectors would have a more significant adverse impact on a complainant developing country than on a defaulting developed 10 article 35 (restitution): “a state responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to make restitution, that is, to re-establish the situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed,” 106 the role of the asean country. it is especially if the complaining party is dependent on imports from the defaulting country (united states-measures affecting the cross-border supply of gambling and betting service (us-gambling), 2007). some developing countries have outlined the criticism of trade countermeasure in the wto dsu review proposal. for example, india has outlined the tremendous imbalance of trade countermeasures between developed and developing countries. trade imbalances have placed severe constraints on the developing countries’ ability to exercise their rights under article 22 of the wto dsu. it would also deepen the imbalance that is already seriously undermined by the nullification and impairment of trade benefits.11 in addition, trade countermeasures through the withdrawal of tariff concessions can have detrimental effects on the economic welfare for both the non-complying and the retaliating members. the developing and least-developed countries are not likely to have the capacity to impose trade countermeasures in a way that puts real pressure on non-complying members (shanin, 2011). trade countermeasures are ineffective in the hands of smaller players, with small and developing countries encountering challenges when they attempt to implement effective trade countermeasures (mavroidis, bagwell, & staige, 2004; mavroidis, 2000). for asean countries, the trade countermeasure will be more detrimental since most asean firms are small–medium enterprises (smes). the smes in the asean represent around 88% to 99% of the enterprise population in most asean countries (the asean secretariat, 2018). since the number of activities of the asean smes to international trade is considered lower compared with a large firm, they often encounter resources constraints to a greater extent than large firms (wignaraja, 2012); therefore, many asean smes will suffer resources constraint if they have to pay a high punitive tariff to sell their products abroad. even if asean countries attempt to do trade countermeasure, it may well damage their economies due to the high interdependency of intra-asean exports and imports.12 asean members with small domestic markets such as cambodia, laos, and myanmar cannot impose sufficient economic losses on the bigger members due to trade countermeasure. despite the controversial argument of trade countermeasure, in february 2020, the philippines made a breakthrough in a trade dispute with its asean counterpart under the wto by requesting an authorized trade countermeasure to the dsb. the request was related to thailand’s alleged failure to implement the dsb decision in a cigarettes dispute between thailand and the philippines. the philippines sought authorization from the dsb to impose 11 wto negotiation on the dispute settlement understanding: special and differential treatment for developing countries, proposal on dsu by cuba, honduras, india, indonesia, malaysia, pakistan, sri lanka, tanzania, zimbabwe, dsb special session, tn/ds/w/19, (october 9, 2002). 12 the trade-in goods in the asean reached usd 2.574 billion in 2017, where intra-asean trade accounted for the largest share of the asean’s total trade. meanwhile, asean trade in services reached usd 703 billion in 2017. collectively, the intra-asean is the largest market for asean total trade since the interdependency of export and import within the intra-asean is significantly high. the share of intra-asean merchandise exports and imports in 2017 represented 23,5% and 22,3% of asean total exports and imports, respectively (adb, asian development outlook 2019: strengthening disaster resilience xii, 2019) journal of asean studies 107 countermeasures on thailand by suspending the concession or other obligations under the wto covered agreements (thailand customs and fiscal measures on cigarettes from the philippines: recourse to article 22.2 of the dsu, 2020). however, thailand disputed the authorization’s request, not on the substantive complaint, but on the basis of procedural hurdles in the wto dsm (thailand customs and fiscal measures on cigarettes from the philippines: communication from thailand, 2020). hypothetically, if the dispute between thailand and the philippines had been submitted to the asean edsm, but the non-compliance with the panel and appellate body decision was the same, the philippines could request an authorized trade countermeasure to the seom. however, if thailand disputed the request due to the disagreement of the level of trade countermeasure or the principle and procedures regarding the trade field to be suspended, asean edsm provides article 16(7) that the disagreement shall be referred to arbitration. nevertheless, learning from the wto experience, the pitfall of the request of trade countermeasure sometimes occurred due to procedural matters.13 unlike the wto, the stumbling block of implementing trade countermeasure under asean edsm would constitute unresolved disputes, according to the asean charter. the unresolved disputes would also generate the effect of non-compliance with asean edsm's judicial decision. this would invoke articles 26 and 27 of the asean charter as shimizu (shimizu, 2011) posited that article 26 of the asean charter is important for asean's economic dispute settlement. research methods the research implements a literature review methods by describing what has been ruled and defined as a trade countermeasure under the asean edsm. the main purpose is to provide legal analysis on the role of the asean summit in the asean edsm. the research finds the possible role of the asean summit in the asean edsm by analyzing and close reading of the article 26 and 27 of asean charter. 13 for example, when indonesia sought authorization from the wto dsb to impose countermeasure against the united states due to non-compliance with this country over the appellate body decision on the clove cigarette case, the european union, as a third party, challenged the request. the european union claimed that indonesia disregards the ongoing compliance by the united states. moreover, the european union opposed indonesia's decision to exclude the european union as a third party in the arbitration proceedings under article 21(5) of the dsu (indonesia recourse to article 22.2. of the dsu in the u.s. clove cigarettes dispute: request for consultation by the e.u., 2014). 108 the role of the asean analysis are articles 26 and 27(2) of the asean charter a solution for unresolved disputes and the effect of non-compliance with asean edsm’s decision? article 26 of the asean charter says, “when a dispute remains unresolved, after applying the preceding provisions of this chapter, this dispute shall be referred to the asean summit, for its decision.” this provision raises three points. the first is “when a dispute remains unresolved.” referring to article 1(e) of the protocol to the asean charter on dsm (protocol 2010), the definition of unresolved disputes means a dispute over the interpretation or the application of the asean charter or other asean instruments that have not been resolved by mutual agreement. the meaning of “other asean instruments” in this protocol refers to all asean agreements, including asean economic agreements. in the context of the asean economic agreements, the term unresolved disputes must refer to the condition when the relevant asean countries fail to comply with the adopted asean edsm judicial decision (vergano, 2009). furthermore, an unresolved dispute also refers to the condition when the injured party seeks an authorized trade countermeasure, but the request faces a stumbling block due to procedural disagreement. accordingly, a violation and the trade impairment will persist due to the failure to request a trade countermeasure. the second point relates to the specification “after the application of the preceding provisions of this chapter.” this clause refers to all relevant disputes settlement mechanisms under the chapter viii of the asean charter, such as the asean treaty of amity and cooperation (tac), the asean edsm (protocol 2004) and the asean dsm (protocol 2010). the third issue is the directive that the matter “shall be referred to the asean summit for its decision.” this stipulates that the asean summit shall act as a final arbiter if a dispute remains unresolved after the parties have used all dispute settlement mechanisms available within the asean framework (tan, 2008). the asean charter also provides a specific rule in article 27(2) that says that “any member state affected by non-compliance with the findings, recommendations, or decisions resulting from an asean dispute settlement mechanism, may refer the matter to the asean summit for a decision.” this article allows an injured party affected by non-compliance of the other party to seek recourse from the asean summit. the non-compliance can be due to the violating party failing to comply with the asean edsm’s judicial decisions. although nothing in the asean charter expressly provides specific non-compliance with an award under the asean edsm, the natural expectation is that article 27(2) will be followed despite the absence of explicit rules (woon, 2016). therefore, the asean summit could act as a final de facto arbitrator and enforcer of a decision that has been reached in any asean dispute settlement mechanisms, including the asean edsm (ewing-chow & yusran, 2018). the possibility of redressing an unresolved dispute and the effect of non-compliance with asean edsm’s judicial decision to the asean summit entails two different propositions. first, the asean summit could provide an avenue to seek a solution for the dispute if the specific remedies prove futile. furthermore, the asean summit could provide journal of asean studies 109 a political solution if unresolved disputes is due to the lack of the implementation of article 16(2) of the asean edsm. second, since it introduces an element of political discretion, the resort to the asean summit will conversely undermine the strength and legal certainty of the asean edsm as a system based on the rule of law. the role of the asean summit for unresolved disputes and the effect of noncompliance with the asean edsm’s decisions it is noteworthy that the function of the asean summit is to make a final decision in matters referred to it by the asean ministerial bodies or the secretary-general, along with acting as a final arbiter for dispute and non-compliance with all the asean dispute settlement decisions. the crucial principle in the asean summit’s decision-making is “consultation and consensus” (wan, 1997). article 20 of the asean charter empowers the asean summit to maintain the consultation and consensus rule as a form of decision-making. however, when consensus cannot be reached, the charter allows the asean summit to utilize other decisionmaking approaches (desierto, 2011). the alternative way set up by article 20 is essential for the asean summit to proceed with its decision, even if one of the parties (for example, the violating party in the issue of noncompliance) refuses to reach a consensus. the asean summit will make the final decision either through consensus or other ways. consequently, the asean summit appears to have been vested with quasi-judicial oversight due to its role as a final arbiter (desierto, 2011). even so, the summit is not, in fact, a judicial body but rather a supreme policy-making body of the asean that presides over the entire gamut of asean institutions (ha & chalermpalanupap, 2018). in any event, the asean summit will give discretion to the disputant parties to accept or decline its decision since nothing in the charter explicitly obliges the asean members to comply with the summit’s decision. the asean summit could act as a final arbiter and enforcer to resolve the postadjudication issue through a political solution (ewing-chow & yusran, 2018). if the summit is acting as a final arbiter, the decision could be overriding the legal power of the asean edsm. it is worth recalling that the asean summit is a political body. therefore, when an issue is rendered to this body, the resolution will be more political than legal. therefore, an intervention by the asean summit in a judicial decision would tend to erode the asean’s credibility (piris & woon, 2015) and undermine the rules-based asean dispute settlement. conversely, if the summit is acting as an enforcer of the adopted panel and appellate body’s rulings and recommendations, it could be deemed to be extending the legal power. there are two situations in which the asean summit is likely to seek a political solution in the event of non-compliance with asean edsm’s judicial decisions. the first is when the violating member disregards the panel and appellate body decision. the asean leaders will discuss why the violating member is not complying with the decision and, if there is no specific reasonable reason, apply pressure to the member. the second situation is when the injured party refuses to accept the modification of the violating member’s trade policy, even though the violating party has attempted to implement the judicial decisions. in that eventuality, 110 the role of the asean the leaders will pressure the injured party to accept the modification. for these situations, the asean summit is expected to be an enforcer of the asean edsm judicial decision. another possible outcome is that the asean summit will seek a win-win solution. for example, if an unresolved dispute occurred due to the condition when the injured party is seeking an authorized trade countermeasure, but the request is facing a stumbling block, the summit can act as a final arbiter. it may suggest an alternative to trade countermeasure, such as monetary compensation (asean countries had experience giving compensation to settle the dispute (toohey, 2011). either way, the idea behind the asean summit’s role is to build a strong economic community (phan, 2013). ha and chalermpalanupap (2018) posite that “the presence and influence of the asean summit are to the effect that the parties concerned would choose a give-and-take approach and develop win-win solutions to their problems so as not to affect the asean unity and credibility.” for example, in 2006, when thailand disagreed over the malaysian import permit requirement, and thailand maintained a 20% retaliatory import duty, the malaysian trade minister downplayed the dispute as a mere interpretation and maintained the dispute as a bilateral issue at the summit. thus, the disagreement would not impact the significance of the asean relationship (siong, 2011). phan (2013) argues that in the context of unresolved dispute under protocol 2010 if it reaches a high-level meeting among the asean members, this can have a "naming and shaming" effect, which may create pressure to comply with the adjudication's decision. however, in the context of asean edsm, the non-compliance with the asean edsm's decision would encourage trade countermeasures. bearing this in mind, since the asean countries have not determined if trade countermeasures or sanctions would be more effective than political pressure in fostering compliance, thus, when the disputant parties decide to avoid the adverse impact of trade countermeasure, perhaps they will accept a give-and-take solution. the role of the asean summit in the asean edsm is to rebalance the trade between disputant parties to date, it remains uncertain if asean countries will use the asean edsm to settle their trade disputes. the reason is due to the asean countries experiences that using nonasean dispute settlement mechanisms could be seen as less confrontational. in fact, the asean countries rely more on other dispute settlement mechanisms such as the wto dsm. for example, the wto dsm allows the participation of non-asean third parties to elevate the dispute settlement from an asean regional dispute subject to review by asean peers (inama & sim, 2015; soeparna, 2019). wto dsm also allows the dsb that consists of nonasean members to make a decision regarding the authorization of trade countermeasure. accordingly, the role of the asean political body in maintaining ultimate political control over the asean trade dispute settlement system will pose the most significant challenge (puig & tat, 2015; udomjitpittaya & fitriana, 2019). journal of asean studies 111 reviewing the asean experiences in political disputes such as territorial sovereignty, the asean summit had little influence in bilateral disputes unless the parties involved were willing to allow it (jenne, 2017). for example, in the sabah dispute between the philippines and malaysia, these countries agreed not to raise the matter in any asean forum. in the same way, indonesia and malaysia preferred to discuss the ambalat conflict bilaterally during the 19th asean summit in bali (druce & baikoeni, 2016). it was probably because the asean countries would have been more discomfited politically if they had asean peers reviewing and determining their territories’ sovereignty due to the political susceptibility of territorial issues (sim, 2014). when a political dispute was raised in the asean summit, most asean countries were reluctant to even admit to that disagreement at the meeting (jenne, 2017). for example, when the indonesian leader brought up the issue over the border dispute surrounding the preah vihear temple between cambodia and thailand at the 18th asean summit, the summit failed to achieve an amicable solution (chachavalpongpun, 2013). another issue is the dispute on the south china sea between the people's republic of china (prc), taiwan and five asean's members (indonesia, brunei, malaysia, vietnam, and the philippines). the role of the asean summit to manage this dispute has been questioned. although the summit has issued a declaration on the conduct of parties in the south china sea (doc) (asean, 2004), the doc did not design to resolve the dispute but rather maintain the peace and prevent a potential conflict. furthermore, the doc encourages asean members to conduct direct negotiations with prc to solve the dispute. it shows that the asean maintains its nonintervention principle. this principle somehow respects the territorial integrity of each member. the key strategic of this principle allows the member to resolve jurisdictional disputes bilaterally. nevertheless, until today the south china sea dispute is still unresolved. an economic or trade dispute does not raise political issues such as sovereignty. trade disputes usually involve more technical issues with a resolution to rebalance trade relations between disputant parties. trade disagreements are more likely to have an impact on both disputant parties and asean countries that are not involved. this is because the interdependency of export and import within the intra-asean is significantly high, and most asean trade occurs within the bloc (asian development bank, 2019). any unresolved trade disputes will eventually undermine the trade balance among the asean countries. therefore, it would not be surprising to see the pressure from other asean counterparts to settle any trade disputes. for example, in the early implementation of the asean free trade area (afta), when malaysia delayed the implementation of the automobile tariff under the common effective preferential tariff agreement, the delay brought an outraged response from asean members such as thailand and indonesia. malaysia’s halting entry into afta by lowering its automotive tariff impeded afta and inhibited the automotive trade balance among the asean countries. eventually, malaysia sought a bilateral discussion with thailand to settle the dispute following the afta framework agreement on dispute settlement (lau, 2006). likewise, in the cigarettes dispute, before elevating the dispute to the wto dsm, the philippines government had raised the issue first within the asean. the philippines used diplomatic ways to talk to thailand bilaterally to avoid the tax dispute from further escalation. unfortunately, the official meeting between these countries over the cigarettes dispute failed to reach an amicable result. despite the fruitless solution, the philippines adhered to the 112 the role of the asean principle that bilateral trade disputes in the asean should be solved first within the asean (“p.h. has legal options at wto”, 2016). understandably, an economic or trade dispute should eventually be resolved to prevent trade imbalances among asean members. learning from the previous dispute under afta, trade imbalance affected asean economic relations. likewise, the impact of unresolved disputes will extend to the economic players. when unresolved disputes occur due to the violating party challenges the implementation of article 16 of asean edsm, the trade nullification or impairment still exists and deprives trade benefit of the injured parties. furthermore, although a trade countermeasure is a last resort to induce the compliance with panel and appellate body decision, its pitfall will also prolong the trade damage that occurs to the injured party. the situation will restrain the trade balance between disputant parties. hence, the role of the asean summit in the asean edsm is expected to avoid unresolved disputes and rebalance the trade between the disputant parties. although the role of the asean summit in the asean edsm contravenes asean non-intervention's principle, the members are willing to tolerate the role of the asean summit in the economic disputes. the reason is to secure economic or trade relations among the asean members. a strong economic relation within asean is a major objective of the asean economic community. therefore, any trade dispute should be resolved to maintain economic growth in asean. conclusions it seems that articles 26 and 27(2) of the asean charter do not leave alone the asean dispute settlement mechanism to the rule of law, since the role of the heads of states and governments as final arbiter and enforcer denies any separation of power and is incompatible with a politically neutral dispute resolution. however, the role of the asean summit in the asean edsm is to resolve the post-adjudication issue. the intention is to find a solution for the pitfall of asean edsm’s mechanism. first, the role of the asean summit is to resolve the disagreement of trade countermeasure's request under article 16 of asean edsm. the disagreement of the request will eventually lead to the dispute being unresolved. second, unresolved disputes will cause the extended effect of non-compliance with the asean edsm decision that is trade imbalance or injury toward the economic actors. for such reason, the role of the asean summit is preferable to enforce the panel and appellate body decision, where the political will is supporting the judicial decision. meanwhile, the act of asean summit as a final arbiter will provide an alternative solution for disputant parties. if the disputant parties decide to avoid the adverse impact of trade countermeasure, perhaps they will accept a give-and-take solution such as monetary compensation. the intervention of the asean summit to the post-adjudication of asean edsm might be seen as an advantageous measure to settle trade disputes among asean members. the idea behind the role of the asean summit in the asean edsm is that the trade dispute must be resolved to retain further damage of trade. however, unlike protocol 2010 annex 5 (rules for reference of unresolved disputes to the aseas summit), the asean edsm does not provide a procedure to submit the postjournal of asean studies 113 adjudication issue to the asean summit. it appears that the role of asean summit as the enforcer and final arbiter in the asean edsm needs a specific mechanism. ultimately, although article 26 and 27(2) of the asean charter may provide political reassurance to the asean members over the post-adjudication issue from all dispute settlements available within the asean framework, nothing in the charter prescribes any mechanism enabling the function of the asean summit to the post-adjudication issues. therefore, it is advisable that further research elaborate on the possible mechanisms to implement article 26 and 27(2) of the asean charter to the economic disputes. about the authors intan soeparna is associate professor at the department of international law, faculty of law, universitas airlangga surabaya indonesia. she obtains join phd from vrije brussel universiteit and gent universiteit belgium. she is teaching international law, international trade law, asean law, european union law, cyber law, and nuclear law at the universitas airlangga. her research interests include international law, international trade law, and asean law. references asian development bank (adb). 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(2016). the asean charter. singapore: national university singapore press. http://dx.doi.org/10.20473/ydk.v35i2.16876 journal of asean studies, vol. 7, no. 1 (2019), pp. 18-39 doi: https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v7i1.5684 ©2019 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic beyond brinkmanship: the implication of south china sea conflicts on china’s soft power in southeast asia randy w. nandyatama universitas gadjah mada, indonesia abstract while contemporary scholarly literatures on south china sea conflicts have been dominated by hard power calculations, some other aspects remain under-researched. rather underplayed in the existing literature is the question on the political implication of the conflicts on china’s soft power in the region. in responding to this issue, this article tries to carefully investigate the nature of the china’s soft power and the linkage between the increasing chinese assertive measures in the south china sea and the foundation of china’s soft power in the region. through some cases of china’s skirmishes with southeast asian countries on the south china sea between 2009 and 2012, this article argues that beijing’s increasing hard power measures have induced growing threat perceptions in the region. this very context not only signals a distinct dissonance of beijing’s image in southeast asia but also creates surging discontents and rejections to china’s role and political position in the region. ultimately, china’s perceived inappropriate hard power measures affect its soft power, particularly in eroding the reputation of being a benign political entity as its source of soft power in southeast asia. key words: china-southeast asia, soft power, threat perception introduction the twenty first century has generally deemed to be an important era for china. along with its remarkable transformation and modernization since 1978, china’s political power in the international arena began to expand rapidly. the poor and weak china has become a center of attention in global politics (brahm, 2001; senkar, 2004). the modernization of its military posture and the fast growing of its economy have changed how other countries engage with beijing. its neighboring countries have started to build friendly interactions with the rising china, including southeast asian countries. nevertheless, concomitant with its growing international profile, beijing also started to have strong military measures, particularly in the south china sea (wong, 2010; thayer, 2010, pp. 2-6; jayakumar, 2011). along with existing conflicts over territorial claims between china and some southeast asian countries, the growing china’s assertive measures eventually created a greater political concern in the region. journal of asean studies 19 indeed, there is a general tendency in privileging the preponderance of hard power calculations in the international relations literatures (baldwin, 1999, pp. 173-183). this specifically exists in the scholarly literature on south china sea conflicts (green & daniel, 2011; karim & tangguh, 2016) however, as the rise of china increasingly influences contemporary global politics, it becomes important to not only investigate china’s actual capability in terms of its traditional ‘hard’ power in influencing southeast asia, but also assess its soft power and the implication of its ‘hard power’ measures on its soft power in the region. this is not without a clear logic. in an event which involves hard power measures, for instance, it is easy to prioritize hard power’s examination and overlook its soft power aspect, such as how the united states (us) calculate its hard power capability in ‘securing’ iraq and afghanistan. however, it is important to note that us hard power measures as part of global ‘war on terror’ campaign, in fact, weaken its ‘soft power’ in the middle east (nye, 2004, pp. 42-44). reminiscing this context, a similar concern for china may arise, especially in light of the rising tension in the south china sea conflicts. as such, it is important inquire what is the nature of china’s soft power in southeast asia? and how south china sea conflicts affect its soft power in the region? echoing todd hall’s (2010) effort in investigating soft power as a category of analysis, this article underlines the logic of how soft power, especially in the form of reputation, serves as an important reference for political interactions in the international arena. within this context, the capability to project and sustain particular reputations ‘provide states with issue-specific forms of influence’ (hall, 2010, pp. 209). this logic is well apparent in china’s foreign policy, especially as a logical pathway for beijing’s soft power in southeast asia. nevertheless, since this article emphasizes good reputation as the source of soft power, its existence and foundation can be easily weakened by negative perceptions, such as excessive or inappropriate use of hard power. hence, we can see that beijing’s growing assertiveness, particularly the utilization of hard power measures in managing the south china sea conflicts, has induced the burgeoning of ‘threat perceptions’ among southeast asian countries and eroded china’s reputation as its source of soft power. specifically, in investigating the dynamic quality of beijing’s soft power in southeast asia and the linkage between the growing ‘threat perception’ from china’s hard power measures and its soft power in in southeast asia, this article gathers qualitative data from the series of surveys on china’s popularity as well as elites’ opinions and statements on china (including beijing’s increasing hard power measures in south china sea). indeed, given the complex relationship between china and southeast asia, including the different characteristics of mainland southeast asia and maritime southeast asia in dealing with china, it is impossible to claim that there is a solid and definitive southeast asian perception 20 beyond brinkmanship of china (percival, 2007; storey, 2013). however, this does not mean that we cannot see a growing trend of how some southeast asian countries respond to beijing’s growing assertive measures in the south china sea. as a result, this article reviews the existence and quality of china’s soft power in two countries that represent different geo-political groupings in southeast asia, namely vietnam and the philippines. despite this decision may also have a certain bias, this decision is based on the data availability. existing survey data on popularity of china in southeast asia only covers particular countries like vietnam and the philippines. the gathered data also only covers the time span of 2000 to 2012. this is aimed to provide a better analysis on the impact of south china sea conflict on china’s soft power. in 2013, beijing formulated a new policy—i.e. one belt and road—which alters the political map of china-southeast asia relations. ultimately, this article evaluates china’s approach in exercising its soft power projection in southeast asia and underlines how inappropriate hard power measures eventually entangle with soft power. specifically, article is structured into four main parts in which each element is taken into account. following this introduction, the next part covers on the conceptualization of soft power as the foundation of this research. the second part will focus the nature of china’s soft power in the southeast asia. the third part of this article broadly elaborate the case of the south china sea conflicts, especially in assessing southeast asian responses. in the end, it will discuss the linkages of the south china sea conflicts to the contemporary china’s soft power. conceptualizing soft power the term ‘soft power’ is a unique notion. it becomes a distinct phrase as it refers to a large spectrum of non-military hard power in the international arena. it is also generally adopted in implying the various non-tangible modalities which support a particular state to persuade or influence the preferences of other states (hall, 2010, pp. 190). this concept is rooted from e. h. carr’s (1949) notion of ‘power over opinion’ which acknowledges that public and elite opinion is one of the essential elements in the international arena and it forms a distinct political force from military or economic power. steven lukes (2005, pp. 25-29) advances further this idea into the so-called ‘the third dimension of power’—i.e. the ability to affect and shape the formation of perceptions and preferences in ensuring the acceptance of a particular role in the existing order, and vice versa. however, only after joseph nye writes about ‘power’ along with the growing interdependent and transnational issues and actors in international politics, ‘soft power’ becomes a well-known concept in ir literatures. nye (2005, p. x) specifically defines soft power as ‘a country’s ability to get what it wants through appeal and attraction.’ this concept underlines the logic of how various viable resources can be applied to make other countries acquire more positive beliefs and perceptions which eventually resulted journal of asean studies 21 in the targeted states’ greater tendency to respect and give amicable response. thus, nye’s exposition of soft power becomes a ground-breaking analytical tool, especially for identification of the new trend in culture and positive image projection from a rising state in the world, such as china. at this juncture, it is important to note that nye offers a relational approach as a new model in making sense the existence of soft power in international politics. nye notes that soft power is not always fungible. in other words, the effectiveness of soft power depends on how each country utilizes its ‘ability to influence other’s behavior’. as such, a particular country does not have an inherent soft power; yet, it has to be generated from the process of attribution among the international actors. any country will get the result it prefers because the other states realize the legitimacy of the respective state and follow its narrative (huang & sheng, 2006, pp. 23-34). therefore, the study of soft power in this article is not focused on the quantity of soft power, but in the context of how the source of soft power turns into an active element in shaping other countries’ behavior. nevertheless, sinologists have realized some difficulties in assessing china’s soft power (yan, 2006, pp. 6). despite major works on china’s soft power, such as kurlantzick (2007) and lampton (2008), researches often focus on identifying and predicting the impact of beijing’s soft power and pay less attention to how does it actually operate. in this regard, looking at hall’s (2010) logic of the various sources of soft power may offer an important analytical tool. for him, a set of issue-specific reputations will support a particular country on the respective issue, signifying the so-called ‘reputational power’ (hall, 2010, pp. 209). along with the conditions which are predominated by the inadequacy of beijing’s contemporary leadership in the global arena and the characteristics of suspicion and mistrust between countries in asia, the primary source of china’s soft power basically lies on its reputation. in the manner where every actor interprets each other, the image (mianzi) of beijing reputation in the international arena is important for the decision-making process of other actors (hall, 2010, pp. 207-211). certainly, the examination of soft power needs to also acknowledge the intertwining mechanism between soft power and hard power. as nye (2004, pp. 25-30; li, 2009, pp. 4-5) notes before, soft power needs to be welded in a tactical manner in the realm of intersubjectivity among international actors. as such, the research on soft power demands a further exposition in its structure of action and the surrounding influencing factors, including whether hard power measures exist. at this point, one cannot simplify the structure of hard power as the utilization of military force in destroying and paralyzing the enemy, but on a much broader aspect, especially in terms of its ability in imposing clear directive through its consequences for other countries and 22 beyond brinkmanship generating a distinct perception among other entities. in the case of the complex relations between china and southeast asia, the analysis of soft power, thus, relies on other countries’ perception of chinese reputation. it implies that hard power measures and the basis of soft power are interlinked, as both powers may share the same juncture, namely ‘threat perception’. by adopting the notion of threat perception, this research tries to elucidate the crucial conceptual bridge in understanding how china’s hard power measure affects its soft power and political images, particularly along with the repercussion of actual misconduct or ‘be perceived as misconduct’ measures (li, 2009, pp. 5). moreover, it also indicates the subjective nature of international actors, especially the elite, as they perceive the growing external hard power measures (tilman, 1984, pp. 2-3; novotny, 2010, pp. 67-68). the nature of china’s soft power in southeast asia along with the onset of the postcold war era, beijing’s foreign policy was gradually transformed with renewed vigor. there was a strong willingness to sustain its rapid economic development through being an active actor in the international arena. however, at the same time, china’s meteoric economic rise started becoming a global spotlight. often being compared with and likened to the rise of germany and japan during the preworld war ii, western scholars regarded the rise of china as a new global concern, forming the so-called ‘china threat’ theory (mearsheimer, 2001, pp. 396-402; krauthammer, 1995, pp. 72; roy, 1996, pp. 758-771). by mid 1990s, this narrative started to influence some major powers’ political behaviors against china. as a result, a growing ‘containment’ policy towards beijing seemingly manifested in the international arena, such as the usjapan alliance in 1996 as a gesture in restraining chinese ambitions (nye, 2002, pp. 22), and us effort in persuading the european union to retain its armsembargo on china (archick, grimmett, & kan, 2005). against the abovementioned backdrop, beijing became fully aware that the growing anxiety over ‘china threat’ theory could negatively impact its prospect for development. besides that, considering that the modern china was initially emerged as mere one of developing countries in the world, beijing had a limited claim and legitimacy, especially in terms of its source of soft power (wang, 2011, pp. 37-53). in this regard, china realized the need for overcoming the suspicion and mistrust from its regional environment and encountering the growing china threat theory with a careful projection of its soft power via promoting a better ‘reputation’ in the international arena (deng, 2006, pp. 186-206). in seemingly echoing hall’s categorization of reputational power, beijing underlines how building a certain new image and reputation as a ‘benign’ rising country will help inducing other states to respect and support china’s journal of asean studies 23 agenda and position at the international arena. as a response, chinese government and scholars have rapidly began to endorse a new consideration in improving national image, especially through the domestic debate on how china should encounter ‘china threat’ theory and pursue its national goal. zheng bijiang, for instance, notably points out the conception of ‘the development path of china's peaceful rise’ (zhongguo de heping jueqi fazhan daolu). zheng (2005, pp. 18) stresses that china requires tactical measures to sustain a peaceful international environment, including the cultural support for the country and coordination of interests in its various sectors to create a better ‘climate’ for its development. beijing soon adopted this concept through prime minister wen jiabao’s speech during a visit to the us in 2003, where for the first time china officially stated the determination of its rising power as a ‘peaceful’ country. subsequently, after some minor alteration, beijing finally used the term of ‘peaceful development’ as its official policy (the state council information office, 2006). indeed, in supporting the sustainability of its rapid growth, tapping into soft power has become one of china’s foreign policy agenda. the concern in creating a better international environment for china eventually manifested through the projection of soft power, especially in the form of campaigning china’s commitment for creating ‘peaceful development’ and ‘harmonious society’ (guo & jean-marc, 2008). in all, there is a strong element of the efforts in building ‘benign’ reputation and transforming other countries’ perception to benefit china’s interests as its core policy framework. this is also reaffirmed by hu jintao’s (2007) statement which emphasizes the necessity to develop chinese cultural soft power in dealing with domestic needs and the increasing global challenges. in the context of china-southeast asia relations, beijing’s commitment for building its soft power in the region is essential. many countries in the region, particularly maritime southeast asian countries, have often been having a suspicion against china and maintaining close relations with the us and its allies (cho and park 2013; kristof, 1998). therefore, southeast asian reaction to china can be deemed to be as a litmus test for its soft power projection (rozman, 2010, pp. 201). within this context, beijing finally developed a set of slogans, such as ‘friendly and good-neighbourly’ (mu lin you hao) and ‘benevolence towards and partnerships with neighbors’ (yi lin wei shan, yu lin wei ban), in elucidating china’s new approach to the region (tang, mingjiang, & acharya, 2009, pp. 17). in responding to asian financial crisis, for instance, beijing took the risk not to devalue its reminbi and agreed to give additional financial support for some countries in southeast asia (jones & michael, 2007, pp. 169-172). in contrast to the us which supported the imf’s unpopular austerity packages, beijing’s foreign policy signaled a real 24 beyond brinkmanship transformation in its engagement with southeast asia (percival, 2007, pp. 8). moreover, beijing also manifested its soft power campaign with being the first nonmember of the association of southeast asian nations (asean) to sign the treaty of amity and cooperation (tac) with asean in 2003 and the support for the east asia summit (eas) in 2005 (pan, 2008, pp. 39-62; storey, 2011a, pp. 64-87). this signals the logic of china’s soft power projection—i.e. its determination in promoting a ‘benign’ image and assuring the neighboring countries with amicable foreign policy implementation. reacting to china’s soft power projection, southeast asia demonstrated a positive gesture towards china. beijing’s soft power projection have proven significantly in boosting southeast asia’s good perception of china. the initial east asia summit (eas) formation, for instance, is aligned with beijing’s preference to limit regionalism in east asia (nanto, 2008; sutter, 2008, pp. 261282). in fact, this condition is also verified by how southeast asian eyes view china has transformed from ‘the state most often feared into, for most but not all, a perceived partner’ (percival, 2007, pp. 3). besides that, a public opinion survey in six southeast asian countries by the japanese foreign ministry has indicated the rapid increase of china’s influence in the region, even compared to that of japan (er, narayanan, & colin, 2010, pp. 44-66). at this juncture, china has demonstrated its ability to put project a distinct reputation as a benign rising power in southeast asia. denoting with the nye’s conceptualization of soft power which emphasizes the ability to influence other countries’ perception and behavior, this condition affirmed the existence of china’s source of soft power in shaping southeast asia’s preference in accordance with its intention. nevertheless, beijing’s soft power projection in this region is not progressing on a linear pattern. in fact, china’s soft power is, somehow, complex and non-static, especially after the growing tension in the south china sea conflicts since 2009. beijing’s increasing hard power measures in the south china sea although there was an improvement in southeast asian’s perceptions and attitudes towards china after the end of cold war era, some existing problems in china-southeast asia relations still exist. there are at least two important issues in here. first, looking back to the long history political interactions in the region, including the memory of china’s hegemony over its periphery, there is a widely shared attitude among elites which stresses the notion of sovereignty and power politics to as the means to survive (kang, 2003; katzenstein & rudra, 2004). second, there are some uncertainties about the rise of china, especially the enigmatic decisionmaking process in beijing and the question of what role china will want to play in the international arena. both of these issues eventually lead to the formation of the general pattern of many southeast asia countries’ suspicion journal of asean studies 25 towards china rise (kristof, 1998, pp. 3749; cho & park, 2013). being perceived as both opportunity and latent threat, many countries in southeast asia generally pursue a tactical approach in gradually engaging with china and maintaining the balancing options in case of engagement measure fails (acharya, 2003a, pp. 2). this generates the variety of each state’ reactions towards china, ranging from the bandwagoning trend to the inclination of acting to balance against china (kang, 2003, pp. 58; acharya, 2003b, pp. 150-153). accordingly, the issues of power politics, geopolitics, the economic gap and dependence as well as the potential of the apparent territorial conflicts in the south china sea added up to the strategic calculations of each country. thailand, for instance, seem to have a better perception of china than vietnam or the philippines, which perceive themselves as the ‘frontline’ of china’s possible aggression. the conflict is rooted in the multiple overlapping territorial claims. southeast asian countries such as malaysia, vietnam, the philippines, brunei, had laid official claim to several territorial features in the south china sea in the mid-1960s and 1970s (emmers, 2010, pp. 66-77; ott, 2011, pp. 1). however, many of these claims overlapped with china’s claim, which declared the area limited by nine dashed lines covering the south china sea as its territory in 1947. indeed, it is important to note that china has been only demonstrated a limited physical claim in the initial era, comparing to the other claimants which have a closer distance to the disputed area. beijing has only started its active claim along its growing military power, such as the 1974 china-vietnam battle of the paracel islands and 1988 china-vietnam skirmish over spartly islands (shirk, 2007, pp. 114). china believes that the other claimants have been taking advantage for a long time, especially in exerting its claim over and extracting resources from the south china sea. this logic pushes beijing to pursue a more active measures (li, 2008). despite some efforts in managing the conflicts, such as the agreement of the declaration on the conduct of parties in the south china sea (doc) in 2002, there have been growing hard power measures on the south china sea (banlaoi, 2010). indeed, since 1999 china had been annually declared unilateral fishing ban in the south china sea from june to july. however, since 2009, beijing extended the fishing ban from may to august (macikenaite, 2014). moreover, in reacting to malaysia-vietnam joint submission of the clarification of their claim on the ‘southern part of the south china sea’ to the commission on the limits of the continental shelf (clcs) under the united nations convention on the law of the sea (unclos) on may 2009, china declared its rebuttal to the claim (rajagobal, 2016). subsequently, beijing made unprecedented move in enforcing its jurisdictional claims in the south china sea, especially by actively dispatching its patrol vessels to the south china sea to protect chinese fishing vessels outside the period of its unilateral fishing ban (thuy, 26 beyond brinkmanship 2011). this certainly marked a significant change in beijing’s approach to the south china sea conflicts. map 1. conflicting claims over south china sea source: u.s. department of defense’s annual report on china to congress (2012) during 2011, there were, at least, three events which illustrate the growing use of china’s hard power measures in the south china sea conflicts. first, china often unilaterally patrol the south china sea and expel other countries’ traditional fishing boats. in fact, chinese people liberation army-navy is reported firing some warning shots at the filipino trawler near the jackson atoll on 25 february 2011 and vietnamese fishing boats on 1 june 2011 (jamandre, 2011). second, china has deliberately used the vessel of the paramilitary maritime law enforcement agency, namely china marine surveillance (cms), to actively block foreign vessels from conducting research and exploration in the disputed area regardless their executive economic zone (eez) claim. two cms vessels dispelled filipino-owned vessel mv veritas voyager near reed bank on 3 march 2011. on 26 may 26 2011, cms vessels intentionally cut the seismic survey cables journal of asean studies 27 of petro vietnam vessel binh minh 02 within the area of vietnam’s eez (storey, 2011b, pp. 2-3). likewise, when hanoi complained about china’s actions in flaring tensions in vietnamese waters, the chinese response was an explicit warning for vietnam to stop any activities ‘where china has its claims’ (gomez, 2011). third, despite the visit of chinese defense minister, general liang, to manila and the joint agreement between china and the philippines to refrain any unilateral action on 23 may 2011, beijing allegedly kept installing markers at reed bank, amy douglas reef, and boxall reef which are well within the philippines’ eez (mogato, 2011; pazzibugan, 2011). beijing’s growing hard power measures also occurred in 2012. the philippine navy sent its warship to the area of scarborough shoal, 220 kilometers west of zambales and also within the philippine’s eez, after spotted eight chinese fishing boats anchored inside the lagoon. soon after that ‘two chinese surveillance ships arrived and taken up a position at the mouth of the lagoon’, creating standoff and preventing the arrest of the chinese fishermen’ (cnn, 2012; dupont & baker, 2014). moreover, china also began enforcing the fishing band in larger area of south china sea in may 2012, including the disputed scarborough shoal (the jakarta post, 2012). by july 2012, beijing dispatched its fisheries law enforcement command on and erected a barrier to the entrance of the disputed shoal (pazzibugan, 2011). the chinese government even promulgated local law in december 2012 which authorized the law enforcer to board and seize control of foreign ships which enter the chinese-claimed waters and order them to change course or stop sailing (banchard & mogato, 2012). the abovementioned beijing’s measures in the south china sea have eventually triggered negative reprisals in the region, especially with how some southeast asian countries rapidly upgraded their naval capability. these actions are basically a harbinger of regional instability, and more importantly, to the degree of southeast asian confidence of china’s menacing intention (banlaoi, 2010). likewise, beijing’s diplomacy in southeast asia has suffered a series of setbacks since 2009. while the issue of china’s aggressiveness was hardly securitized in the previous forum of asean dialogue, the asean regional forum (arf) in 2010 finally raised the issue in regional public debate. in fact, some southeast asian countries, especially vietnam and the philippines, pushed for the involvement of other great power, particularly the us, in the debate (asean, 2010). indeed, although the growing southeast asian concern over china’s hard power measures in the south china sea is apparent, it does not mean that all countries in the region have the exact same degree of grievance. there are still diverse forms of reactions from southeast asian countries, especially with regards to each country’s economic dependency and security concern towards china (khong, 2004, pp. 192-197). while some southeast 28 beyond brinkmanship asian countries, such as cambodia, laos and myanmar, generally have a closer relations and cooperation with china, other countries, such as singapore, malaysia, thailand, and indonesia, tend to show a more cautious and circumspect manner, largely due to the concern in maintaining regional stability. however, the philippines and vietnam have become more assertive in resisting china's domination in the region. as such, both countries have been supporting for the internationalization of south china sea issues beyond china-asean framework, including advocating for us’s involvement as a counter balance measures (chongkittavorn, 2011). nevertheless, one shall clearly see the emerge of a new distinct pattern in the southeast asian reactions towards china’s growing hard power measures in the south china sea conflicts. the disconnected message between beijing’s good image projection and its actual actions in the south china sea conflicts inevitably generated grievances, induced counter-measures, and ultimately, exacerbated china’s soft power. with the fact that the characteristics of suspicious and mistrust still prevail in the region, southeast asian countries have the opportunity to internalize the concern over beijing’s hard power measures in the south china sea among its regional. as a result, there is now a growing trend in openly discussing the south china sea issues in the asean-related forums, such as the arf’s joint statement in 2010 and eas’s joint statement in 2011. revisiting china’s soft power the development of beijing’s hard power measures in the south china sea has eventually incited the growing ‘threat perceptions’ in the region. but how it actually affects china’s soft power? acknowledging reputation can turn into an essential source for inducing other states to respect and follow a particular state’s articulation, certain aspects that affects a particular country’s reputation can also acts as an important reference for other states in acting and responding to its environment (hall, 2010, pp. 207-211). in the case of china-southeast asia relations, the growing ‘threat perceptions’ that southeast asian countries have against china are deemed as the crucial element in eroding a state’s reputation as the source of its soft power. there are two sources for identifying the weakening of its soft power. firstly, one can see the effects of china’ measures in south china sea on its soft power via investigating the southeast asian elites’ perception. as southeast asian elites maintain a strong role in foreign policy’s decision-making and policy implementation process (tilman, 1984, pp. 2-3), their perspectives reflect the attitude toward other states and the efficacy of their respective soft power performance. secondly, the identification of how china’s soft power is affected by its growing assertive measures in the south china sea can also be identified by the second source, namely the degree of favorability in public opinion. as the government is expected to respond to its journal of asean studies 29 people’s aspirations, the public mood may act as an essential stimulant for the state’ attitude and action towards other states; and in the same time, display the result of other states’ soft power projection. indeed, it is difficult to claim that there is a coherent and persistent perception of china among southeast asian elites. however, political elites in both vietnam and the philippines started demonstrating a striking perception of china, especially in their public statements. in his response statement to the beijing’s action in the binh minh incident in may 2011, pm nguyen publicly noted that ‘we continue to affirm strongly and to manifest the strongest determination of all the [vietnam’s communist] party, of all the people and of all the army in protecting vietnamese sovereignty in maritime zones and islands of the country’, signaling a deep distrust of china (agence france-presse, 2012). moreover, in the shangri-la dialogue forum in 2011, vietnamese general phung quang thanh specifically cited that ‘china has violated the doc, raising concern in vietnam and in the rest of the region’ (iiss, 2011). likewise, filipino secretary of defense voltaire gazmin also expressed his concern about beijing’s growing threat in his reference to another incident in may 2011 involving china in the filipino-claimed area. gazmin specifically underlined the importance of the philippines’ ‘robust alliance with the us’ for tackling the growing china’s threat in the south china sea and ensuring the freedom of navigation in the region (iiss, 2011). moreover, southeast asian countries have also eventually signaled a reaction to beijing’s hard power measures in the south china sea, indicating a growing shared perception of china in the region. while prior to 2010 asean generally demonstrated its affinity to china, some southeast asian countries signaled a new political message within asean-led regional mechanisms. all countries represented at the eas in 2011, for instance, agreed to discuss the regional concern over the south china sea conflicts and embrace the us as a new member of eas. given the symbolic gesture, namely the involvement of other great power outside china in the region and the suggestion that the current tension should be carefully managed on the basis of ‘multilateral resolution of the conflicting territorial claims’ (calmes, 2011), the eas statement signaled how most asean countries accepted the growing beijing’s activities in the region as a real concern. besides eas, this particular concern was also affected asean internal mechanisms. despite not reaching a consensus, asean foreign ministers’ meeting in 2012 discussed the philippines and vietnam’s concern about how beijing was imposing ‘its claim over the entire south china sea and raising the risk of a conflict’ (thul & grudgings, 2012). this meeting created a new precedent where ‘asean way of consensus failed’ and some countries held a strong and extreme perception of china (emmerson, 2012). the above responses, indeed, signify the problem of beijing’s soft power projection. denoting the nye’s primary 30 beyond brinkmanship definition of soft power as the ability of a state’s allure in shaping the behavior of other countries, the shifting of asean’s perspective and attitude to the opposite of china’s strategic interests, have shown a major change in the strength of beijing’s soft power in southeast asia. some southeast asian countries’ elite perceptions, especially from vietnam and the philippines, have indicated that beijing’s aggressive measures in the south china sea were perceived as excessive or inappropriate actions. aligning with li (2009) argumentation, the inappropriate utilization of hard power, which is formed the ‘threat perception’, can result in the demise of its soft power. instead of beijing’s good image and reputation projections that primarily affect southeast asian countries’ policy, the other forms of action—i.e. its growing hard power measures in the south china sea, —has increasingly led elites in other countries to doubt beijing’s reputation and act in contrary to the interests of china itself. beyond the southeast asian elites’ statements, one can also indicate the weakening of beijing’s soft power through the declining popular favorability towards china, especially after the growing of its hard power measures in the south china sea. this condition is reflected in the public opinion in showing how china is perceived. pew research database (2017), for example, reveals a distinct trend of china’s favorability. although the research data base is limited to some countries in southeast asia, this data shows the dynamics of southeast asian response towards china. from table 1, one can see that while showing a good respond to china in 2002, vietnam and the philippines signaled a dramatic change in the growing of unfavorable perception of china. both countries showed a relative higher number of unfavorable views of china in 2014, especially with 78 percent of the surveyed people in the philippines and 58 percent of the surveyed people in the philippines regarding china negatively. table 1. percentage of southeast asian countries’ unfavorable responds to china country 2002 2013 2014 2015 vietnam 18 78 74 the philippines 30 48 58 43 source: adapted from database pew global attitudes project pew research centre 2017 likewise, the bbc world service poll (2011) provides a similar data on the rising doubt over china’s amicable intention in the region. the bbc world service poll data reveals that some countries in southeast asia, especially the philippines, have shown a gradual declining positive perception towards china. whereas 54 percent of the surveyed people in the philippines showing positive view in 2006, the favorability towards china dropped rapidly in 2009, resulting in only 39 percent of the surveyed people maintaining such positive view. this is certainly not a standalone phenomenon. linking this trend with the record of how beijing builds its soft power, we can see journal of asean studies 31 this trend as the weakening of china’s capability in projecting benign image in southeast asia since its heyday in the first half of 2000s. despite it had been actively wielding soft power projection as a ‘peaceful’ country since its official campaign in 2003, beijing’s foreign policy was not perceived as a genuine characterization of its ‘peaceful’ rise campaign. in southeast asia, this condition was well apparent with a growing external context outside beijing’s active in efforts building its soft power. table 2. change in the views on china’s influence in southeast asian countries 2006 2009 mainly positive mainly negative mainly positive mainly negative the philippines 54 30 39 52 source: adapted from bbc world service poll 2011 during the latter half of 2000s, there is a growing discrepancy between china’s perceived intention and capability in terms of its economic and military, especially in the form of bigger anxiety over china’s military threat compare to the confidence of china’s economic collaboration tendency (bbc world service poll, 2011). table 3, for instance, indicates the dissonance of beijing’s image in southeast asia and, therefore, the paradox of its soft power strategy in the region. while china’s soft power projection was in line with the development of the positive belief on its economic rise, the increasing beijing’s assertive measures in the south china sea also added to a growing perception that china is a threat to regional security. bbc world service poll (2011) even shows that there is a sharp contrast in the philippine’s public view on china’s military capability. whereas 46 percent of the surveyed people showing unfavorable view of china’s military capability in 2005, the number of negative perceptions rose rapidly to 63 percent of the surveyed people in the philippines in 2011 (globescan, 2011). this dissonance between the perception on beijing’s economic and military rise eventually affected china’s reputational power as the source of its soft power. with the growing discrepancy between its good reputation projection and actual action in the south china sea, the ability of china’s soft power in influencing other countries was weakened. table 2 and table 3 demonstrate the decline of china’s positive image in the philippines’ public opinion and the link to beijing’s growing hard power measures in the region. this becomes even clearer if we link the decreasing public favorability of china and the increasingly tougher southeast asian elites’ statements on beijing’s policy 32 beyond brinkmanship in the region. the existence of beijing’s hard power measures in the table 3. the discrepancy in the opinion on china’s economic and military concern in 2011 china becoming more powerful economically china becoming more powerful militarily positive negative positive negative the philippines 61 32 29 63 source: adapted from bbc world service poll 2011 south china sea has influenced the narrative of china’s reputation and its soft power in southeast asia. indeed, the overall data presented cannot be deemed to rule out that there are diverse southeast asian countries’ reactions and perceptions towards china (goh, 2007, pp. 823-824). however, at the same time, one shall also note that the shifting of southeast asian elites and public opinions towards china reflects an essential and unprecedented gesture in the china-southeast asia relations. ultimately, the findings in this case vividly exemplify the importance of perception of china’s behavior. as one of the most influential major countries in asia, china still has real impediments in wining ‘hearts and minds’ of its neighboring region. notwithstanding its complexity, this also underlines the importance of reconsidering the notion of ‘soft power’ and how it cannot be separated from other aspects in the international arena. learning from the context of southeast asia, it is important for china to consider a nimbler approach in southeast asia, such as reconsider its hard power measures in the south china sea and developing the use of military approach for the soft power purpose. hence, with a better coordinated strategy, china can project a clear message in easing the threat perception in southeast asia and building a more coherent reputation as a benign country in the world. conclusion realizing the complex relationship between its image projection and actual actions in southeast asia, china’s experience has marked an important illustration of the logic and nature of soft power. china has made a significant transformation to wield its soft power in an appealing way. more importantly, china has demonstrated its ability in reducing suspicion and building a benign ‘responsible global stakeholder’ image in the post-cold war era. however, along with beijing’s increasingly active hard power measures in the south china sea since 2009, there has been a growing concern over china’s intention in the region. this uniquely added a new journal of asean studies 33 complexity in how southeast asian countries perceive and react to china. the existence of many, albeit not all, southeast asian countries’ actions against china, especially in aseanrelated forums and its bilateral relations, have become a major turning point in china-southeast asia relations. at this juncture, one can see the growing threat perception from the increasingly beijing’s hard power measures in the south china sea affect its soft power, particularly in the form of inciting ‘threat perceptions’ among southeast asian elites and public opinions. this, in turn, casted doubt on beijing’s virtue and real intention in the region, eroding china’s ‘reputational power’ as the source of its soft power. the south china sea conflicts, in fact, have vividly demonstrated the fragility of china’s soft power in the region. in summary, beyond the focus on the possibility for open conflict in the south china sea, it is important to see other political implications in the region, especially on beijing’s soft power efforts in southeast asia. as china’s soft power it is still muddling through the current problem of the south china sea conflicts, the only certain thing is that the remaining threat perception from the repercussion of its hard power measures will affect further the source of its soft power. the prospect of china’s soft power in southeast asia will rely on how beijing can ponder the broader aspects of wielding its soft power effectively, such as the consideration of minimalizing the perceived-excessive measures in south china sea and the ability to project its reputational power through a better understanding of southeast asian regional contexts. about the author the author is a lecturer at the department of international relations, faculty of social and political sciences, universitas gadjah mada, indonesia. his research interests span chinese foreign policy, the politics of international regimes, and asean studies. this article is adapted from the author’s master dissertation at the s. rajaratnam school of international studies, nanyang technological university, singapore. the author would like to express his gratitude to ms. ambar widiastuti, ms. ezka amalia, and mr. jonathan rayon for their help during the research and the writing processes. references acharya, a. 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(2005). china’s peaceful rise: speech of zheng bijian 1997-2005. washington dc: brookings institution press. http://chr.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/42/2/21 http://chr.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/42/2/21 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-asean%20-summit/se-asia-meeting-in-disarray-over-sea-dispute-with-china-idusbre86c0bd20120713 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-asean%20-summit/se-asia-meeting-in-disarray-over-sea-dispute-with-china-idusbre86c0bd20120713 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-asean%20-summit/se-asia-meeting-in-disarray-over-sea-dispute-with-china-idusbre86c0bd20120713 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-asean%20-summit/se-asia-meeting-in-disarray-over-sea-dispute-with-china-idusbre86c0bd20120713 http://nghiencuubiendong.vn/en/conferences-and-seminars-/second-international-workshop/586-recent-development-in-the-south-china-sea-from-declaration-to-code-of-conduct-by-tran-truong-thuy http://nghiencuubiendong.vn/en/conferences-and-seminars-/second-international-workshop/586-recent-development-in-the-south-china-sea-from-declaration-to-code-of-conduct-by-tran-truong-thuy http://nghiencuubiendong.vn/en/conferences-and-seminars-/second-international-workshop/586-recent-development-in-the-south-china-sea-from-declaration-to-code-of-conduct-by-tran-truong-thuy http://nghiencuubiendong.vn/en/conferences-and-seminars-/second-international-workshop/586-recent-development-in-the-south-china-sea-from-declaration-to-code-of-conduct-by-tran-truong-thuy http://nghiencuubiendong.vn/en/conferences-and-seminars-/second-international-workshop/586-recent-development-in-the-south-china-sea-from-declaration-to-code-of-conduct-by-tran-truong-thuy http://nghiencuubiendong.vn/en/conferences-and-seminars-/second-international-workshop/586-recent-development-in-the-south-china-sea-from-declaration-to-code-of-conduct-by-tran-truong-thuy http://nghiencuubiendong.vn/en/conferences-and-seminars-/second-international-workshop/586-recent-development-in-the-south-china-sea-from-declaration-to-code-of-conduct-by-tran-truong-thuy http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/world/asia/24navy.html?pagewanted=all http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/world/asia/24navy.html?pagewanted=all http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/world/asia/24navy.html?pagewanted=all journal of asean studies, vol. 4, no. 1 (2016), pp. 20-33 ©2016 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic how does neo-liberalism explain the likelihood of china’s threat towards united states’ global hegemony in the 21st century? dennyza gabiella bina nusantara university, indonesia abstract this paper elaborates the likelihood of china to revise the current international regime led by us’ global hegemony. the main questions of this paper are: how does neoliberalism explain the chance of china’s threat towards united states’ global hegemony in the 21st century? moreover, how the assertive approaches of china under xi jinping leadership could be explained under ‘china peaceful rise’ thesis? a number of analysts, such as john j. mearsheimer and g. john ikenberry have already engaged in a debate on whether the rise of china’s economy would change it into a revisionist state that engage in a hegemonic war against the united states. this paper contributes to this debate by providing an analysis of ‘china threat theory’ vs. ‘china peaceful rise’ thesis. in order to find out the likelihood of china to pursue global hegemony in the near future, an analysis is conducted by utilizing neo-liberalism as a theoretical framework. this paper argues that despite the neo-realists’ assumption of china’s potential threat over the current liberal international system, china’s tremendous economic rise can be accommodated peacefully. the assertive foreign policies of china under xi jinping leadership do not necessarily imply china’s threat towards us global hegemony. the inference of this paper has a wider implication on the literature of ‘china peaceful rise’, as the concept has evolved in addressing the dynamic challenges encountered by china along the way. keywords: china, hegemony, neo-liberalism introduction ever since the chinese economic reform under deng xiaoping’s leadership in 1978, the people’s republic of china (prc) has experienced a transformation from a rural agricultural society to an urban market-based society. the chinese economic reform has lifted 500 million people out of poverty as china’s poverty rate fell from 65 per cent to less than 10 per cent in 2014. china’s economy in the 21st century is among the biggest economies in the world. after overtaking japan’s economy in 2010, china today is the second largest economy after the united states (world bank 2014: p. 4). in the international relations realm, china’s transformation and economic rise consequentially have created a political 21 journal of asean studies debate on whether the country will be a revisionist power (considering china’s different ideological orientation from the united states, it can be a systemchallenging power or threat to united states’ global hegemony) or a power that preserves the ‘status quo’ of the current international system led by the united states. the idea of china’s rise as a threat towards the current international regimes led by the united states is originated in the neo-realist school of thoughts, the idea then spread out across other international relations’ perspectives. within the neorealists’ literature, the ‘china threat theory’ portrays china as a rising power that will destabilize global political and economic system (scott and wilkinson 2013: p. 761). according to the ‘china threat theory’, the growing economic strength of china will lead the country to pursue its national interests in a more assertive manner. china’s assertiveness then will trigger the united states to balance against it and create a competition between these two great powers. this competition will generate a situation parallel to the ideological hegemonic war between the united states and the soviet union during the cold war (glaser 2011: p 81). in response to the ‘china threat theory’, the chinese government felt an urgency to decrease the tension and build a supportive international environment for china’s ascendancy. in his december 2003 speech at harvard university, the chinese premier wen jia bao came with the thesis of ‘china’s peaceful rise’. several points that highlighted in the speech were first, china's development depends upon and in return will contribute to the world peace; second, china will resort to peaceful means for development; third, china's development will rely more on its own resources and market; fourth, china is prepared for a long-term process of hard work, even several generations, for economic prosperity. finally, even as china has achieved its economic development, it will not seek hegemony in the world or come out as a threat to any country (ming xia: 2005). despite the chinese government’s effort to calm down the speculation about china’s intention to challenge united states’ global hegemony in the 21st century, a neo-realist scholar, mearsheimer (2010: p. 383) argued that a country’s intention could not be empirically verified from its diplomats’ statements, as it has been known that the credibility of leaders’ statements to foreign audiences is doubtful. hence, it is hard to know chinese leader’s motivation with their rising economic power just from their claim on a peaceful rise. this essay examines the existing debate between ‘china threat theory’ and ‘china’s peaceful rise’ in the 21st century from the neo-liberal perspective. it tries to elaborate the possibility of china to challenge the united states’ global hegemony by utilizing its rising economic power. by means of neo-liberal perspective and supported by empirical analysis, this essay makes two main arguments. first, it argues that despite the neo-realists’ assumption of china’s potential threat over the current liberal international system (which is led by the united states as the global hegemony), china’s tremendous economic rise can be accommodated peacefully for two reasons. the first reason is that china’s economic rise itself is enabled by the existing liberal international system, which is perpetuated by the united states’ and its allies. whereas the second reason is because it is less costly for the current 22 neo-liberalism explain china threat towards united states one-party-rule china to achieve its national interests by maintaining a cooperative strategic relationship with the united states compared to challenging the united states’ global hegemony and revising the current liberal international system. second, this essay argues that the assertive foreign policies of china under xi jinping leadership do not necessarily imply china’s threat towards us global hegemony. china has entered the ‘peaceful rise 2.0’ period. in this period, china is more tenacious in protecting its core national interest. the ‘peaceful rise 2.0’ does not signify zero conflict with other countries, yet china still strives to accommodate its rise peacefully. even though china does not have the ambition to challenge us’ global hegemony in the near future, it does pursue a hegemon status in the region. china sees its leadership in the region as naturally and historically legitimate; however, china’s ambition to be regional hegemon would meet challenges including the indirect balancing from southeast asia. this essay will be organized into three main parts. the first part of this essay will elaborate the theoretical debate between neo-realism and neo-liberalism perspectives and their assumptions about the ‘china threat theory’. the second part will provide empirical analysis to support the analysis of china’s likelihood to challenge united states’ global hegemony in the 21st century based on the neo-liberalism perspective. the third part will analyze the potential of china to become the regional hegemonic power and then followed by a conclusion. how neo-liberalism is different from neo-realism in explaining the ‘china threat theory.' the neo-realist school of thought is an international relations’ perspective that is built on several main assumptions (mearsheimer 2013: p.79). the first assumption is that the world politics operates in an anarchic system, and great powers are the main actors within it. the second assumption is that states are uncertain about other states’ purpose. therefore some states balance their power against each other (the revisionist states) while other states are satisfied with the current system and have no intention to change it (status quo states). the third assumption is that the main goal of all states is maintaining their survival. states always try to maintain the autonomy of their domestic political order and their territorial integrity. the fourth assumption is that states are rational actors that always come out with a strategy to perpetuate their survival. based on the neo-realists’ assumptions mentioned above, the rising economic power of china will be a serious threat for united states’ hegemony, as china’s rising economy will rationally be followed by its military build-up. moreover, as the world bank confirmed china’s position as the second-largest economy after the united states, the united states will try to balance its power against china. all united states’ postcold war presidents, including barack obama, have stated that they were committed in maintaining american primacy. hence, washington is more likely to go to prevent china from becoming too powerful (mearsheimer 2010: p. 385). as neo-realists assume that both china and united states are rational actors that will maximize their security in the anarchic world politics, there is no way for both countries to secure their survival but to compete in becoming the most powerful state or the only 23 journal of asean studies hegemonic state of the system. according to neo-realists, a hegemonic war is the logical consequence of china’s rising economy (mearsheimer 2010: p. 387). furthermore, the neo-realists argue that in order to fully eradicate its poverty, china has to make a fundamental change in this western imperialist economic regime and promote its ideology (being a revisionist power to the existing system). china also will use its newly built economic power to coerce other states towards chinese interests. the neo-realists believe that china’s economic power is worth nothing if it is not being used. china could, for example, utilize its holding of us treasury bonds to get the united states to stop selling arms to taiwan (shambaugh 2011: p. 11-12). in contrast to neo-realism perspective, neo-liberalism offers a different view of china’s threat towards united states’ hegemony. neo-liberalism shares neo-realism assumption that states are unitary, rational, utility-maximizing actors that interact in an anarchic system. states always make decisions that prioritize their national interests. however, it also includes the role of international institutions as a framework for analyzing international relations’ issues. international institutions or international regimes are ‚sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations‛ (krasner 1983: p.2). international regimes give positive contributions in the anarchic global politics by helping states in obtaining international collective outcomes. states will obtain an absolute gain through collective cooperation on a global scale. the negative impacts of the anarchic international system can be mitigated through the existence of international institutions (folker 2013: pp. 114-115). the neo-liberalists’ optimism in international institutions makes them see the prospect of china’s peaceful rise in a more optimistic way, relatively to the neorealists. ikenberry, a neo-liberalist, argue that the narrative of china as a revisionist state that will challenge united states’ global hegemony and bring the word into hegemonic transition period has missed the reality that despite there is diminishing gap between china’s and united states’ power, the liberal international order which is currently led by the united states is still alive and stands firm. it is rational for china to struggle in pursuing its national interest by utilizing its economic power in global politics however china will not pursue its interest by contesting the basic rules and principles of the existing liberal international order. instead, china wishes to gain more bargaining power and leadership within it. in other words, china will not be a revisionist state to the current international system that goes through an ideological hegemonic war against the united states, despite the fact that china holds different ideology (communism) from the united states’ (democracy) (ikenberry 2011: p 57). moreover, ‚an aggressive or hegemonic china is out of the question because china needs as a long-lasting peaceful international environment for its development" (roy 1996: p. 762). the neo-liberalists argue that the current international order be defined by economic and political openness through international regimes and institutions (such as word trade organization (wto) and international monetary fund (imf)). thus, it can accommodate china's rise peacefully (glaser 2011: p.80). 24 neo-liberalism explain china threat towards united states furthermore, china’s economy has already deeply integrated into the international economic system that its domestic national interests have become part of a larger quest (nathan 2012: pp.3233). the deep economic interdependence between china and united states in the existing liberal international system will be the reason for both powers to avoid a breakdown of the multilateral international regime itself. as a consequence, china’s rising economy will not threaten united states’ global hegemony in the existing order as the international regimes should enable both the united states and china to protect their vital interests without posing large threats to each other (glaser 2011: p.83). overall, a strategic peaceful partnership between china and united states within international regime framework will be more advantageous for both powers compared to a hegemonic war as it could increase the probability of sustained worldwide economic growth, peaceful resolutions of outstanding regional disputes, and successful cooperation in solving global transnational problems including terrorism and the nuclear weapons proliferation (friedberg 2005: p. 8). analysis of china’s likelihood to threat united states’ global hegemony in the 21st century since the neo-realists argue that the neo-liberalists’ thesis of a peacefully rising china in the 21st century could not be empirically verified by chinese diplomats’ statements only, an analysis of china’s national interests and how the state rationally pursues them in the global international institutions is prominent in order to confirm the validity of neoliberalists’ argument about china’s nonthreatening intention towards united states’ global hegemony. the neoliberalists argue that china’s rising economy in this 21st century will not make china a revisionist threat to the united states’ global hegemony because the rise happens in and is enabled by the united states-led international order. china is currently facing a western international order (consisting of international regimes and institutions), which is a product of centuries of struggle and innovation. the existing international regimes (for example the international monetary fund, world bank and world trade organization) are highly developed, integrated, institutionalized and rooted in both advanced developed countries and developing countries (ikenberry 2011: p.58). as the world largest manufacturer and exporter, the availability of foreign markets and low trade tariffs are important for china’s economic development. one of the clearest evidence of how china maintains the status quo of united stated-led international system is china’s effort to integrate deeper into the western international regimes by joining the world trade organization (wto) in 2001. after 15 years of diplomatic effort, the country became a fully-fledged member of the wto after the 142 members of the wto ratified china’s application (bbc: 2001). china’s decision to integrate itself to united states-led international economy regime is fully rational. without wto membership china will counter protectionism and discriminatory trade tariff, whereas by being wto member, china is granted the most favored nation (mfn) status that gives it non-discriminatory equal trade advantages to other wto members. the wto is one of the most developed regimes of the liberal international system. china is deeply integrated to the existing 25 journal of asean studies global trading system in which 40 per cent of its gross national product contributed from exports, and 25 per cent of its export market is the united states. china’s tremendous economic development in the past few decades is also enabled by unrestricted investment and trade with the united states and european countries (ikenberry 2011: p. 62). the united states leadership in the existing international economic system can be traced in its dominance power in the world bank. the world bank, which consists of five institutions, is one of the international regimes in which the voting power system is varied among member states based on their share of capital stock. the voting share in international bank for reconstruction and development (ibrd), one of the world bank’s institutions, for example, is dominated by the united states by 15.09 per cent share, japan holds the second largest share of 8.17 per cent, whereas china’s share is 5.7 per cent and the majority of developing countries has less than one per cent voting share in ibrd decision-making process (ibrd: 2014). in international finance corporation (ifc), another world bank’s institution, the united states dominates the voting power by 21.92 per cent share (ifc: 2014). the united states also dominates voting power in international development association (ida: 2014) by 10.42 per cent share and the multilateral investment guarantee agency (miga: 2014) by 15.02 per cent. the primacy of on-going economic development for china at this moment is rationally translated into the neoliberalists’ integration strategy to the existing international liberal economy system led by the united states. it is more rational for china to gain its national interests by pursuing more bargaining power and leadership within the wellestablished international system (being a status quo state) compared to challenging us’ global leadership or trying to overthrow the liberal international regime led by the united states through the cold war-type of hegemonic war (being a revisionist state). china finds incentives and opportunities in engaging and integrating itself into this us-led world order, doing so to advance china’s own national interests. for china, the road to modernity runs through integrating itself to the existing international order (ikenberry 2011: p.61). furthermore, china is externally bound by interdependence with their markets and suppliers. therefore, the chinese government is now convinced that strong links with the liberal international regime will best facilitate china’s struggle for economic development. this requires china to maintain a peaceful relationship with all states in the system since a conflict would destroy the political environment and opportunity necessary for economic development (roy 1996: p.762). a strategic cooperative relationship with the united states is advantageous for china at the moment, not only in economic matter but also in many other areas. regarding economic interest, the united states has been taking 40 percent of china’s exports and has been a major source of foreign direct investment (scott 2013: p. 80). china would be vulnerable if the united states decided to punish it economically. china’s strategists believe that the united states and its allies could deny supplies of oil and metal ores to china during a military or economic crisis and that the us navy could block china's access to strategically crucial sea-lanes (nathan 2012: p.38). 26 neo-liberalism explain china threat towards united states foot (2006: p.80) argued that aside from economic benefit, the us global hegemony is also critical to china’s pursuit of another core national objective, which is reunification with taiwan. without united states’ support, the taiwan’s leader would have long since been forced to give up their independent existence. it is also advantageous for china to integrate itself in the united states led international regimes to gain support in solving transnational problems such as terrorism, epidemics, and environmental degradation. overall, even though china undoubtedly would like to be recognized as an equal to or even better than the united states in the future, it realizes that this is unlikely to happen any time soon. in the present, china’s goal is a more egalitarian world system, which it hopes to achieve by maximizing the benefits of integration to the existing liberal international system led by the united states (foot 2006: p.95). how long then china’s rising economy can be accommodated peacefully before it challenges us global hegemony? ikenberry (2012: p. 64) argued, considering the fact that democracy and the rule of law are the hallmarks of global governance standard in the existing liberal international order, china will not overtake the us in world leadership in the current 21st century world order until it changes its authoritarian one-party-rule government system into a democratic government system, because the majority of democratic states in the current system will not support the leadership of authoritarian china. it has not been predicted how long a democratic reform will take place in china, yet the growing chinese middle class, the business elites, and human rights defenders will keep bringing the pressure. what the neo-realists missed in analyzing the likelihood of china’s threat towards united states’ global hegemony in the present is to include the wellestablished liberal international order as the variable of analysis. the existing international order is the background of china’s rising economy that eventually will not only create opportunities but also constrain china’s rational choices of foreign policy. whereas the neo-realists assume the state as a unitary rational actor, the neo-liberalists assume the state as a unitary rational actor whose policy options are limited by the international order. china’s peaceful rise vs. china’s assertiveness in the region as the emerging superpower in asia, the rise of china has inevitably affected northeast asian and southeast asian countries directly due to geographical proximity. the region stability, in particular, is greatly influenced by china – asean relation. china – asean relation has historically gone through evolution. china was previously perceived as a threat by asean member states. however, the end of cold war was marked as a pivotal point of china – asean relation. china aimed to play a role as a benevolent neighbor for asean member states to strengthen regional stability, which would support china’s interest of economic development. (egberink 2011: pp. 19-20). despite the claim of the neoliberalists regarding the negligible potential of china’s rise to challenge united states’ world hegemony in the immediate future, china’s rising economy and military power in the region has formulated several discourses arguing that china has succeeded united states’ 27 journal of asean studies status as a hegemonic power in south east asia. the notion of china’s rise as a threat towards the current international regimes led by the united states has also remained as china, under xi jinping leadership, pursues more leadership and assertive foreign policies in the region. in november 2013, china established the air defence identification zone (adiz), which included the disputed senkaku/ diaoyu islands in east china sea (zhang 2015: p. 9). china also developed antiaccess/area denial (a2/ad) force that could deter us intervention in a conflict in the east china sea and the south china sea (o’rourke: 2016). the initiative of asian infrastructure investment bank (aiib) by chinese president xi jinping in october 2013 was another indication of china’s assertive policy in providing economic leadership in the region. the chinese-led financial institution is a multilateral development bank that will fund the development of infrastructure and other productive sectors in asia (aiib: 2015). around 50 states have signed the legal framework of aiib in june 2015, excluding the united states and japan. aiib -which 30.4 percent of its equity belongs to chinawas suspected as a revisionist instrument of china towards united states’ hegemony, particularly in the region. us president, barack obama, stated that china might utilize aiib loans to meet its political or strategic rather than economic interest. as a consequence, the aiib would have lower lending standards than existing us multilateral financial institutions like the world bank and the asian development bank, and thus decreasing their effectiveness (aiyar: 2015). nevertheless, china tried to mitigate the rising competitive tension with the united states as xi jinping visited the white house in september 2015. during the visit, the united states and china issued the official factsheet on us-china economic relations which notes that ‚the united states welcomes china’s growing contributions to financing development and infrastructure in asia and beyond.‛(the white house: 2015). the aiib is not mentioned explicitly in the document, yet the content of the document implicitly signals mutual understanding between the united states and china concerning multilateral financial institution. united states officials also noted that xi jinping provided his guarantee that the aiib would abide by the highest international environmental and governance standards, just as other multilateral financial institution led by the united states (panda: 2015). from this commitment, the presumption of aiib as a revisionist effort of china towards the us hegemony in the region is quite weak, as the aiib’s lending standard would less likely challenge the us-led liberal international system. china’s assertive approaches under xi’s administration inevitably raised questions towards the chinese peaceful rise thesis, which was developed by zheng biijian (an important policy adviser to chinese leaders) in 2003 and has been embraced by chinese leaders ever since. such assertiveness seemed like an endorsement to the proponent of ‘china threat theory’, such as schweller and pu (2011) whose paper argued that china is mapping various strategies to delegitimize us-led international order. according to them, on the one hand, china currently pragmatically accommodates us hegemony, but on the other, it contests the us’ legitimacy. 28 neo-liberalism explain china threat towards united states jian zhang (2015: pp.1-4) provided an alternative in depth analysis to china’s assertive approaches under xi jinping. according to zhang, beijing still adheres to its declared ‘peaceful rise’ policy to maintain the stability of external environment conducive to its ascendance. the manner in which it seeks to do so is considerably different from past decades. china under xi’s leadership faces more challenges in foreign relations compared to its predecessors. he concluded that beijing since 2013 had entered the socalled ‘peaceful rise 2.0.' zhang’s thesis of china’s ‘peaceful rise 2.0’ has three main features. first, china is more determined to vigorously protect its core national interest. in 2014, xi called for the chinese military to accelerate its effort in military modernization and improve its capabilities of winning wars. china has in recent years taken provocative actions in the region, especially in the south china sea and the south china sea disputes. according to zhang interpretation, the new china’s ‘peaceful rise 2.0’ does not equal to zero conflict at all. even if several limited conflicts takes place between china and other countries on certain issues, those conflicts will not amend the overall peaceful nature of china’s rise (zhang 2015: pp. 4-5). the second feature of china’s ‘peaceful rise 2.0’ is the conditional nature of china’s commitment to the peaceful development policy. under xi’s leadership, china’s commitment is opted based on reciprocity. china seeks reciprocal strategic reassurances from other states in various international forums. china called for an augmentation of an asian community with shared responsibility to maintain regional peace and stability. the third feature of china’s ‘peaceful rise 2.0’ is a more coordinated and proactive effort to create and maintain a stable external environment for the sake of china’s internal development. this feature is marked by xi’s top-level foreign policy formulation, meaning the urgency to develop strategic visions, strategic planning and coordination at the national level (zhang 2015: pp. 6-7). jian zhang (2015: pp. 9-11) argued that in an effort to manage its relations with the us and its neighboring countries in the region, beijing proposed two concepts: ‘the new type of great power relationship’ and ‘community of common destiny.' the purpose of ‘the new type of great power relationship’ is to manage us-china relations based on non-conflict and non-confrontation principles, mutual respect and win-win cooperation. on the other hand, the concept of ‘community of common destiny’ is utilized by xi to manage its relationships with neighboring countries, particularly in southeast asia. regarding external relations, asean has occupied a strategic importance as a top priority in china’s periphery diplomacy. china aims to let the sense of the ‘community of common destiny’ take root in its neighbors. this initiative reflected china’s ambition to create a china-centric regional order. china’s claim over peaceful nature of its rise and its assertive behaviors in the region, particularly in the east china sea and the south china sea, somehow evoke a fundamental question as to whether the current china is aspiring for hegemony. professor minxin pei (2016) addressed this question by arguing that the current china is aspiring for regional hegemony, but not a global hegemony. china seeks regional hegemony for three reasons. first, it sees its role as asia’s preeminent power 29 journal of asean studies as a legitimate, natural and part of historical reality. china sees nothing wrong in becoming asia’s hegemon because it has always been, except for the last 150 years (including the century of humiliation). the second reason is because china under xi has the capabilities to pursue regional hegemony compared to the past when it has the aspiration but no capabilities. if the current growth of china continues, the gap of capabilities between china and the rest of asia’s rising power is projected to be wider in the next ten years, whereas the gap between china and the us is forecasted to be closer. the last reason is that china aspires to gain the capacity to veto us’ actions in east asia and the region in general. the expected question followed then is why china does not seek global hegemony in the near future. pei (2016) argued that china not pursue global hegemony because it does not have the ability to do so. global hegemony requires the ability to acquire allies, while china does not have allies. china does not consider north korea and pakistan as its regional allies. china might have many trading partners inside and outside the region, but no allies. in order to be allies, two states should share the same value system and fundamental strategic interest. china also does not aspire for global hegemony because the current us’ global hegemony provides many benefits for china. china does not see us’ hegemony outside asia as an obstruction for china’s interests. from the perspective of the ruling chinese communist party, seeking for global hegemony in the near future would bring detriments to china. if china pursues global hegemony, it has to commit enormous resources abroad and engage in an arms race with the us. a global hegemon should bear a lot of responsibilities abroad in the expense of its domestic regime security. the chinese communist party is a very inwardlooking regime. it prioritized domestic survival compared to international glory. lastly, to be a global hegemon, a state should have an ideological vision that justifies its international role. china is clearly lack in this aspect. miller (2006) presented the concept of global hegemon as a status that plausibly attained by a superpower that possesses four axes of power (political, military, economic and cultural) and a capacity to project power and influence in more than one region of the globe at a time. as liu (2010) argued that each theoretical perspective in international relations be inadequate to comprehend the rise of china, this paper acknowledges that neo-realism does provide supplementary explanation towards southeast asian states’ balancing behavior against china’s rise. aside from china’s ambition to become the regional hegemon, how did southeast asia respond would be a strategic variable that determines china’s prospect as a regional hegemon. karim and chairil (2016: p.3) argued that despite the less perceived balancing behavior from southeast asian states towards china, it does exist. the rationales behind the less apparent balancing behavior from southeast asian states, even though china’s potential power is increasing and creating a military threat in southeast asia, is because southeast asia countries pursue indirect balancing against china by facilitating the continued us security commitment to the region. indirect balancing is also being conducted through military build-up with the purpose of deterring the expansionist nature of the rising china, not of directly opposing china. given china’s more assertive 30 neo-liberalism explain china threat towards united states approaches in the region, several southeast asian countries have increasingly decided to conduct indirect balancing due to the close economic relations between china and southeast asia, the state of asymmetric power between the southeast asian states and the lack of a possible defensive coalition among the southeast asian countries. china under xi jinping would indeed gain more leadership in the region through its assertive approaches. however, china’s effort to succeed us’ hegemony in south east asia would be restrained by several factors including china’s non-interference principle; other remaining well established us-led multilateral financial institutions in the region; china’s conflicting interest with its neighboring countries over the east china sea and the south china sea; and southeast asia’s indirect balancing against china’s rise. conclusion the rising economic power of china has generated speculations and scholarly debate on its likelihood to challenge the united states’ global hegemony and the existing international order. according to the neo-liberal school of thought, china’s rising economy in the 21st century will not pose a challenge to the well-established liberal international system that has been maintained by the us since the cold war era. moreover, china becomes a free rider in the system and its tremendous economic rise is enabled by the existing liberal international system. instead of going through ideological hegemonic war with the us, a peaceful economic rise will give china more bargaining power and leadership within the whole system in general and its region in particular. from the elaboration of neo-liberal theory, it can be generated that the united states leadership and the existing liberal international system are two correlated yet separated facts. while the neo-liberals argue that china’s rising economy will not bring it to challenge the system, there is still possibility for china to challenge us’ global hegemony within the liberal international order. 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initiatives taken by both indonesian and australian governments in undertaking bureaucratic reform to support small and medium enterprises. the focus is on how government harmonizes bureaucracy and regulations to empower small, medium enterprise in starting, operating, and growing their business. one of the key initiatives in the two countries is to streamline business regulations and licensing through a single portal so-called “one stop shop for licensing”. both indonesia and australia have started such initiatives almost at the same time, in 2006 and 2008 respectively. until recently, the two countries have made important progresses but with different approaches. in indonesia, the objective of the one-stop shop is to provide easiness for companies to start the business; while in australia, the purpose is broader and more comprehensive, which is to achieve “seamless australian economy”. this study was conducted in canberra and queanbeyan, australia. the research has found important key lessons from australia that may be applicable to indonesia in establishing mechanisms for government initiatives to better support small and medium enterprise through one stop shop for licensing. keywords: small and medium enterprise, one stop shop for licensing, ablis, ptsp introduction implementing government policies and initiatives in empowering small and medium enterprises (smes) have never been easy. blackburn and schaper (2012) found common issues in government policy development and implementation across asia. the sme development would need very long term commitment from the government, but in reality, the policy making is often ad-hoc and subjective (blackburn& schaper, 2012, p.12). furthermore, blackburn and schaper (2012) posit that the policy makers often fail to recognize the real need of smes thereby the government interventions become ineffective, especially when the policies are implemented without proper evaluation (p. 12). how do blackburn and schaper’s arguments apply to indonesia and australia in conducting their bureaucratic reforms in supporting smes? both indonesia and australia have deployed a national initiative to roll out ‚one-stop shopping for business licensing‛ in 2006 and 2008 respectively. indonesia has started the nationwide initiative of one stop shop for licensing, so called pelayanan terpadu satu pintu (ptsp) 88 government initiatives to empower small and medium enterprise for almost one decade, but the implementation has been inconsistent across regions (forum ptsp nasional, 2010a). indeed, up to 2013, 80% of regulations in indonesia are not streamlined, and the mechanism for monitoring and evaluation of this initiative is yet to established (sutiyono, 2013). therefore, continuous reform and harmonization in various government regulations and initiatives are necessary to make it easier for smes to flourish and grow (mourugane, 2012; sutiyono, 2013; tambunan, 2013). in the meantime, almost in the same period, australia has made progress with integrated nationwide mechanisms to support mse through two mechanisms: business.gov as one-stop shop for smes to open, operate, grow, and close their business; and australia business licence and information services (ablis) that serves as one-stop shop for business licensing (hamburger, 2014). taking salient lessons from australia, this article explores how the national, provincial, and local governments are integrated to empower smes in starting, running, expanding, and closing their business. this study is intended to be a first step in getting the bigger picture of the interplay among different government entities to support smes. the lessons from australia may be applicable to indonesia, especially in improving coordination and mechanism for effective ptsp implementation. this research was conducted in two cities in australia: canberra, act and queanbeyan, nsw, and was funded by the australian leadership award and allison sudradjat award scholarships. this topic was chosen because of its relevance to the current development of indonesian government initiatives in streamlining business licensing and in supporting smes. this study combines desk research and interviews. the researcher interviewed small business commissioner, australian competition and consumer commission, act government officials, independent advisors, university researcher, officers of the australian parliament house, and manager of business enterprise center to seek further information and confirmation for the findings she found from desk research. the process of desk research, meetings, report writing, and editing was conducted from november 2013 to early february 2014. the findings of this study were communicated to the public through a seminar on 18 march 2014 in jakarta, funded by the allison sudradjat award of the australian government. this article starts with comparing the roles of smes in indonesian and the australian economy, followed by comparisons of initiatives by the two governments in supporting smes. subsequently, the article compares and contrasts indonesia’s and australia’s efforts in streamlining regulations and licensing procedures through one stop shop for licensing called ptsp in indonesia and ablis in australia. finally, the last part of the article discusses the relevance of australian experience into indonesian context, the conclusions, ways forward, limitations and further research. the roles of smes in indonesian and australian economy smes become backbones of the indonesian and australian economy. as discussed below, australian smes have larger scale compared to indonesian journal of asean studies 89 smes, but the australian government provides supports to sme development because of their ‚smallness.‛ indonesian smes face australian’s because of their informality and very low capacity that makes them more dependent on supports from government and other stakeholders. smes in indonesia indonesian companies can be categorized into micro, small, medium and large enterprises as shown in table 1. table 1. category of micro, small, medium and large enterprises net assets not including land and buildings (idr) net assets not including land and buildings (us$) total annual sales (idr) total annual sales (us$) workers micro enterprise < 50 million <5,263 <300 million <31,279 1–19 small enterprise >50–500 million >5,263–52,632 >300–2,500 million >31,579– 263,195 1–19 medium enterprise >500–10,000 million >52,632– 1,052,632 >2,500–50,000 million >263,195– 5,263,158 20–99 large enterprise >10,000 million >1,052,632 >50,000 million >5,263,153 >100 source: law no. 20 of the year 2008, indonesian agency of statistics and ministry of cooperatives and mses development as written at mardjuni (2010) and tambunan (2010) the above table shows that the scales of micro and small companies in indonesia are very small. however, despite their smallness, micro-enterprises account for more than 50 million or 98% of total business units in indonesia as compared to 520 thousand units of small enterprises, around 39 thousand units of medium enterprises and around 4 thousand units of large enterprises (tambunan, 2010). moreover, yet, micro and small enterprises provide the livelihood for over 90% of the and the youth in rural areas (tambunan, 2008). the majority of micro and small enterprises are dominated by self-employed enterprise without hired wage-paid workers (tambunan, 2008). by 2008, total workers absorbed by micro enterprises reached more than 83 million people, compared to almost 4 million people in small enterprises, around 3 million people in medium enterprise and almost 3 million people in large enterprises (tambunan, 2010). although the capacity of micro and small enterprises are still limited because they face major constraints such as lack of capital, lack of access to business information, difficulties in marketing and lack of technical competence, they are actually the engine of economic growth and source of income for poor families in local economy and communities (tambunan, 2008, p. 150). micro and small enterprises are also the source of entrepreneurship, especially in rural areas (tambunan, 2008, p. 150) and became the backbone of indonesian economic recovery the economic crisis in 1997 (mourugane, 2012). therefore, the empowerment of smes will contribute to 90 government initiatives to empower small and medium enterprise national and regional development, especially in generating employment, local income, local economic growth and poverty eradication (kementerian koperasi dan ukm, 2010). smes in australia like indonesia, micro and small businesses are the backbone of the australian economy, representing 95.8% of business entities in the country. the australian bureau of statistics categorizes micro enterprises as the establishment of having 0-4 staff; small firms have 5-19 staff; medium sized firms with 20-199 staff; and large firms with 200 or more staff (australian bureau of statistics, 2013, p. 22). by 2012, micro-enterprises account for 85% of business units; small enterprises 10.8%, medium-sized firms 3.5%, and large firm 0.3% of business units respectively. table 2 shows the number of establishment and the percentage of business establishment in australia. table 2. structure of australian business units by size (units and percentage of business establishment) micro enterprises 0−4 staff small enterprises 5−19 staff medium enterprises 20-199 staff large enterprises 200+ staff total number of business 1,820,952 231,891 82,326 6,411 2,052,543 percentage 85 per cent 10.8 per cent 3.8 per cent 0.3 per cent 100 per cent source: australian bureau of statistics (2013b, p. 22) further, schaper, volery, weber and gibson (2014, p. 83) and the australian bureau of statistics (2013) also identify the profile of small business owners as being male, aged between 35 to 54, australianborn, independent contractors who works as tradespersons or professionals working under contracts for their services with clients. they operate as sole traders or work in partnerships with no formal management training, have no business plan. they work from home and do not employ staff. the productivity commission of australia finds that the motivations of entrepreneurs to run micro and small business vary from capitalizing their skill set, the flexibility of for being their ‚own boss‛, and flexibility to balance family and work lives (productivity commission, 2013, p. 30). although the scale of smes in australia is larger than indonesia, they have similar challenges. most of the micro and small enterprises in australia have a limited market as they sell their goods and services in the local market. very limited numbers of them sell their products overseas (productivity commission, 2013, p. 31). besides, because of their limitations in finance, staff, and skills, the owners of micro and small business have to deal with regulatory compliance themselves. such requirements to comply with regulations take away their time from running the business. hence, it is very important to politicians as the policy makers in the country to understand the limitations of small business in complying with regulations (mazzarol, 2013). the journal of asean studies 91 productivity commission of australia posits that small business would appreciate the regulatory environment that is more ‚educative, facilitative and not combative.‛ that means smes expects compliance requirements that are easy to ‚find, understand, and implement‛ including communication access of compliance and reporting. accordingly, in dealing with smes, regulators have to be flexible and proportionate in their enforcement (productivity commission, 2013, p. 38). government initiatives to support smes in indonesia and australia to some extent, both indonesian and australian governments are aware of the challenges facing smes in the countries. the governments have conducted various initiatives in empowering the smes as discussed below. indonesian government initiatives to support smes in indonesia, besides the government, large corporations play a significant role in empowering smes by building smes capacity and providing access to smes products. large corporations develop smes through the transfer of technology and subcontracting arrangements between large companies and smes (tambunan, 2009, p. 31). the indonesian government has also enabled the large companies to do so through their corporate social responsibility initiatives (menteri hukum dan hak asasi manusia republik indonesia, 2007a, 2007b). furthermore, the indonesian government has also supported smes in getting access to government procurement since 1994. unfortunately, as discussed below, because of lack of management system in the government, such initiatives are still scattered with many rooms for improvement to achieve the expected outcomes. participation of smes in government procurement back in 1994, indonesian government stipulated that government tenders using the state budget should be given to smes without middlemen. such commitment was enacted through government regulation no. 16 the year 1994 and presidential decision no. 24 the year 1995 on government procurement. however, there has been a lack of mechanisms for smes to be able to access to government tenders, and for the government to monitor the successful implementation of that regulation (dharma bhakti astra foundation, 1996a). building the linkages between large companies and smes a national movement to build the linkages between mses and large companies was established in 1996 by the former president soeharto. the president had obtained commitments from large companies called ‚jimbaran group‛ and state-owned companies that they would set aside a certain percentage of their profits to develop cooperatives and msmes (dharma bhakti astra foundation, 1996b). there has been government policy in existence since 1989 providing that state-owned companies must invest 1 to 5 % (later it became 1 to 3 %) of its profit to support cooperatives, micro and small businesses regarding working capital, fixed asset, education and training, internship, promotion and research. the funds should be allocated for micro and small business (50%) and 92 government initiatives to empower small and medium enterprise cooperatives (50%), including 5% to be allocated for the state-owned companies’ cooperatives (dharma bhakti astra foundation, 2003). however, there have been no operating regulations on how large companies and state-owned companies are to implement such obligations (dharma bhakti astra foundation, 2003). corporate social responsibility (csr) the government enacted indonesian investment law no. 25 of 2007 and the company law no. 40 of 2007 stipulating that csr is compulsory for companies operating in or related to natural resources. companies face legal sanctions for a failure to comply with the law (menteri hukum dan hak asasi manusia republik indonesia, 2007b). with the stipulation of these laws, companies should start to think about cocreating value with smes in their supply chain, hence improve local economy while managing the sustainability of companies in the long run. however, like the first two initiatives, the government mechanisms to implement, monitor, and evaluate the law has not been established (waagstein, 2011). in sum, indonesia still needs to develop and establish mechanisms to integrate scattered initiatives in supporting smes. an australian experience below may generate insights which may be relevant to indonesia. australia government initiatives to support smes in australia, small business regulations and support are delivered at three different levels of government: local, state, and national government. according to schaper (2013), local municipalities enforce regulations relating to premises, food, health and related matters. state governments have responsibility for areas such as occupational health and safety and licensing of many professions and trades. the national (federal) government regulates laws on business incorporation, taxation, and competition provides general support and also regulates some other areas where nation-wide rules apply. the state and federal governments also provide advice and support to smes. for example, there is a network of free advisory centers, usually known as business enterprise centres, in most states. several states also have small business commissioners that provide information gateways and dispute resolution services. the federal government operates a national telephone hotline service and online gateway, business.gov.au (schaper, 2013). the role of regulators in supporting smes regulators in australia are defined as ‚entities that are empowered by legislation to grant approvals, monitor compliance and enforce laws‛ (productivity commission, 2013, p. 27). regulators will often have complementary roles such as developing and reviewing regulations or standards and providing information or education about regulatory requirements. the productivity commission of the australian government reports there is approximately 130 national regulators, 350 state/territory (equivalent to provincial) regulators, and 560 local councils in australia. they cover all areas that touch the livelihood of australians, including to ensure that businesses comply with the required licenses and code of practices (productivity journal of asean studies 93 commission, 2013). the productivity commission suggests that the nature of the relationship between business and regulators cover four areas: education, licensing and approvals, compliance and risk monitoring, and enforcement, as shown in table 3. . table 3. nature of relationship between business and regulators nature of relations what regulators should do what business should do education  deliver information on regulatory requirements  provide advice on compliance  seek advice  understand responsibilities  provide feedback to regulators (& policy makers) licensing and approvals  assess application  issue licenses, registrations, and accreditations  impose and collect fees  apply for licenses, registrations & accreditations  pay fees  provide requested information compliance and risk monitoring  assess risks  collect data, monitor compliance and outcomes  conduct inspections and audits  meet regulatory obligations  facilitate inspections and audits  provide information to demonstrate compliance enforcement  impose pecuniarily and nonpecuniary penalties  reward good compliance practice  implement required changes to practice  comply with penalties imposed source: productivity commission (2013, p. 36) with such interactions, the australian government or regulator plays very important roles in educating business about laws and regulations that may impact the business at the federal, state and local levels. in sum, the above the experience of indonesia and australia in empowering smes confirmed the findings of blackburn and schaper (2012) that the policy objectives of governments often pursue similar goals across the world, but its implementation frequently takes different routes (p. 12). the following discussion on the indonesian and australian government initiatives in designing and implementing a one-stop shop for licensing shows how indonesia and australia took such different paths. one stop shop for licensing in indonesia and australia indonesian and australian governments started harmonizing and streamlining their regulations on business licensing through ‚one stop shop for 94 government initiatives to empower small and medium enterprise licensing‛ almost at the same time. indonesia has started earlier, in 2006, compared to australia that started two years later, in 2008. however, as discussed below, australian government took a more holistic, long-term, and coordinated approach in designing and implementing such an initiative. one stop shop for licensing in indonesia to streamline, harmonize and reduce regulatory burden for business, indonesian government rolled out a national program for the one-stop shop (oss) for licensing or pelayanan terpadu satu pintu (ptsp) in 2006. the implementation of ptsp relies on commitments from the heads of provincial and city governments to delegate their authorities on the licensing process to ptsp. this government policy was made to enhance the business climate in indonesia (forum ptsp nasional, 2010b). the presidential decree no. 27 the year 2009 on ptsp in the field of investment stipulates that the ptsp be situated under the investment board of provinces, regencies, and municipalities. it has delegated authority to process licenses and non-licences in its jurisdiction. based on the delegation of authority, the head of investment board can process the licenses, from the proposal up to the issuance. the licenses and non-licences related to investment (which were previously handled by different institutions) then could be handled by the investment board. the government expects that ptsp could improve the service quality for licensing process, regarding speed, punctuality, simplicity, transparency and legal certainty (forum ptsp nasional, 2010a). according to forum ptsp national (2010a), until 2010, 33 provinces, 282 regencies, and 79 cities were participating in the ptsp program, with the authority to process the proposals and issue licenses in the following sectors: 1. education 2. health 3. public works 4. spatial planning 5. transportation 6. cooperatives, micro, small and medium enterprises 7. manpower and cooperatives 8. social welfare 9. defence 10. environment 11. culture and tourism 12. communications and informatics 13. agriculture and food security 14. forestry 15. energy and mineral resources 16. industry 17. trade 18. ocean and fishery the services to be provided by ptsp are very comprehensive, covering licensing and non-licensing services as summarized in table 4 journal of asean studies 95 table 4. licensing and non-licensing services of ptsp licensing services non-licensing services 1. investment registration 2. principle permits for investment 3. principle permits for change of investment 4. principle permits for investment expansion 5. business licences 6. business expansion license 7. license to merge companies 8. license to change the business 9. location licence 10. license for space utilization 11. license to build 12. license to avoid disruption (ho/uug) 13. license to utilize water (under soil water) 14. company registration (tdp) 15. land rights 16. other licences 1. facilities for importation of machinery taxation 2. facilities for importation of materials taxation 3. recommendation to get facilities for corporate taxation 4. identification number for producerimporter 5. planning to employ expatriates (rptka) 6. recommendation for working visa (ta.01) 7. permit to employ expatriates (imta) 8. regional incentives 9. information and feedback mechanisms 10. other on licenses services source: forum ptsp nasional, 2010a to achieve such an ambitious plan, the government issued a joint decision of three ministers on 15 september 2010, signed by the minister of trade, minister of home affairs and the chief of investment coordinating board issued a joint letter no. 570/3727/sj, se/08/m.panrb/9/2010, and 12/2010 (forum ptsp nasional, 2010c). a recent development of ptsp implementation at a provincial level is discussed below. one stop shop for licensing in jakarta in 2012 dki jakarta, the capital city of indonesia, had a new governor. by 18 december 2013, the parliament of jakarta province enacted provincial regulation to implement ptsp (ptsp jakarta, 2013a). to do so, dki jakarta established an agency to coordinate the regulations across regulators in the provinces, and to have full authority to provide the licensing and information service for business (sutiyono, 2013, p. 8). the jakarta governor stated his commitment to providing better service for the citizens through ptsp. for example, the process of getting the license to start up a business (siup) would only take three days, and there would be clear information to citizens about the issuing agencies, the process, the length, and the cost of obtaining the license to start the business (ptsp jakarta, 2013a). in line with the national government plan, ptsp jakarta would eventually cover licenses in 18 sectors discussed above (ptsp jakarta, 2013b). 96 government initiatives to empower small and medium enterprise ptsp initiatives at the national and provincial level cover general licensing and non-licensing requirements to startup the business; and there are not yet requirements for compliance with code of practices (see section for licensing and code of practice requirements for business licences in australia). to illustrate, the following table 5 provides the list of licenses need for a company to start its business in jakarta and its surrounding areas: challenges in implementing one stop shop for licensing in indonesia the current report produced by the university of canberra found five challenges for jakarta and indonesian government to roll out ptsp (sutiyono, 2013; sutiyono, 2014), especially related to sme development. firstly, the entities that manage smes and ptsp are not table 5. licenses needed to operate in dki jakarta and its surrounding areas: licenses/compliance issuing agencies 1. legality of land title national land agency (bpn) 2. location permit provincial development agency, office of city planning (bapeda) 3. permit to use and utilize the land (ippt) provincial development agency, office of city planning (bapeda) 4. site plan provincial development agency, office of city planning (bapeda) 5. compliance of flood management (pel banjir) municipality office of public works and irrigation 6. permit to use of public roads (adalalin) municipality office of transportation 7. permit to avoid public disturbance (ho/uug) municipality office of environmental impact 8. compliance to environmental management (ukl) and environmental impact evaluation (upl) municipality office of environmental impact 9. recommendation letter from team 17 to utilize the land (sppl) provincial development agency, office of city planning (bapeda) 10. permit of building establishment (imb) provincial development agency, office of city planning (bapeda) 11. permit from local communities head of community groups (rt/rw) adjacent to the business location. 12. recommendation letter from head of village and head of sub-district office of village (desa/kelurahan) and office of subdistrict (kecamatan) source: buletin ydba (2007); ptsp jakarta pusat (2014) journal of asean studies 97 connected. the coordination of the business licencing part of ptsp is managed under the national investment coordinating board (bkpm), and their portfolio does not include smes. matters related to mses are coordinated under the ministry of cooperatives and sme. therefore, the ptsp initiative does not necessarily support sme development. secondly, there has been a lack of coordination between national, provincial and local government related to ptsp implementation. business owners at the local level may not be able to find relevant regulations issued by the provincial or national level. they have to find such information at different government offices, resulting loss of time and increasing costs. thirdly, business owners are reluctant to deal with bureaucracy because of the lack of clarity and inefficiency of government employees in providing services for business. this has led to the increased use of middlemen such as notary services or third parties in dealing with government bureaucracy. fourthly, there are problems in harmonization of regulation between national, provincial and local governments. for example, over 80% of provincial and local government regulations related to company registrations are not harmonized with existing regulations issued by the ministry of trade. finally, the requirements for a company to obtain business licensing do not address the issue of compliance with codes of practice. the compliance with codes of practice will ensure that companies, when they are in operation, will comply with the standards such as consumer protection, health, safety and environment. in sum, indonesia has made various attempts to support smes and to reduce regulatory burden for business through ptsp. however, despite the implementation of ptsp, the country still faces many challenges in empowering smes. insights about how other countries implement similar initiative more successfully would enable indonesia measure and assess its progress and to make relevant adjustments and plan for the future. the following section outlines how australia supports smes through one stop shop for licensing mechanism. one stop shop for licensing in australia to empower smes in dealing with government requirements and to support their business, the australian government has established the australian business licence and information services (ablis) and business.gov. ablis is the ‚first stop‛ for business seeking for licensing and compliance in establishing, growing and exiting the business. and through business.gov, business owners can get information on resources that enable them to do business (hamburger, 2014). the australian business license and information services (ablis) ablis provides single place for business to find all regulations from national, state or territories, and local level of government. ablis works in partnerships with state and local government to provide supports for small business if they have questions about compliance with the regulatory requirements. it provides business with personalized information pack for companies to start, operate, grow and exit the business. by having access to ablis, 98 government initiatives to empower small and medium enterprise smes can process their business compliance simultaneously. the licence requirements in australia are much more rigorous compared to indonesia, as they also include codes of practice, but australian smes can apply for various licenses simultaneously because ablis shows clearly the contact person, the cost, and the procedures of getting the licences ((australian business licence and information services, 2014) . ablis initiative started when the australian government (commonwealth, states and territories) agreed in 2008 to implement reforms on competition and regulation under the national partnership of council of australian government (coag) called ‚the national partnership agreement to deliver a seamless national economy‛. the aim of this reform is to reduce the regulatory burden imposed on enterprises that operate in multiple jurisdictions. the cost reductions to business could achieve aud 4 billion per year, and an increase of 1.5% of national gdp or around aud 6 billion per year (coag reform council, 2012). the australian government attempt to achieve the overall target by 2020. under this partnership, there have been 45 separate reforms: 27 deregulation priorities; 17 areas of competition reform; and 1 reform to regulation making and review processes (coag reform council, 2012). in implementing this reform, the commonwealth (national) government provides incentives for states and territories to start the program, and to reward the states and territories if they can achieve progress in on the agreed reforms. coag reform council sets very clear balanced score card to evaluate the report, and conducts monitoring and evaluation on the implementation of reform process, and provide feedback to coag on necessary improvements. the national partnership is a longterm initiative with measurable outputs. deregulation priorities to achieve seamless national economy cover are listed below (coag reform council, 2012) 1. environmental assessment 2. health workforce 3. trade measurement 4. rail safety 5. consumer law 6. product safety 7. trustee corporations 8. consumer credit (three reforms) 9. development assessment 10. standard business reporting 11. food 12. wine labelling 13. payroll tax 14. occupational health and safety 15. chemicals and plastics 16. business names 17. personal property securities 18. licensing system (this is related to ‘one stop shop’ or australian business licensing and information services/ablis) 19. construction code 20. mine safety 21. electronic conveyancing 22. oil and gas 23. maritime safety 24. directors’ liability 25. consumer credit (phase two) 26. retail tenancy 27. anti-dumping and countervailing 28. parallel book importation 29. infrastructure (rail access) 30. not-for-profit sector (fundraising) 31. energy (market investment) 32. infrastructure (port regulation) 33. infrastructure (competitive neutrality) 34. occupational licensing journal of asean studies 99 the reform has clear milestones with specific targets on outputs and outcomes. coag reform council (2012) reported that after four years of implementation (by june 2012), the government has completed the first 15 reforms. for the reforms which are not completed, the reform council provides the national partnership with thorough analysis and recommendations on actions to be taken. business.gov in addition to ablis, the australian government establishes another mechanism to support smes at the national, state and local government through one stop portal called business.gov. through business.gov smes can get supports on how to start, operate, grow and exit the business. business.gov can be accessed on-line and through business enterprise centers and local business points located in cities all over australia. assistance to start the business the business enterprise centers and local business points will advise the small businesses about their readiness to enter the business, including the skills, the finances, the markets, time commitments, the investment, and the awareness about regulatory requirements to enter the business. when preparing smes for business readiness, the australian government assists small business to assess whether they are ready to start a business and whether their business ideas are likely to succeed. small business can also talk to business service points or business enterprise centers to discuss how to develop the plan, and join relevant training related to business plan. the government also ensures that smes comply with all licenses, permits, approvals, registrations, codes of practice, standards and guidelines which are integrated into ablis. assistance to operate the business the assistance to operate the business includes support for marketing and promotion, employment and training, and getting business premises. the australian government provides support for small business to promote and target their client base and meet the changing needs of marketing. in terms of employment and training, the government also assists small business in considering type of employment, organization structure and finding the right skill for their business. in getting business premises, the government also provides referral for small business to get expert assistance on their business premises, whether they want to rent or buy property or whether they want to conduct business from home. business has to comply with relevant laws and regulations on business premises. assistance to grow the business business.gov and its partners all over australia provides small businesses with opportunities to grow and improve their business performance by networking, mentoring, training, and seminars; business advisory services; grants and financial assistance; new enterprise incentive schemes; and events to promote their business. one-on-one consultations, free or at low cost, subsidized by the government, are available through business enterprise centers and business points throughout the country (hamburger, 2014). 100 government initiatives to empower small and medium enterprise when small businesses are planning to export, the government provides supports for developing business plan; consultation on mandatory and voluntary standards, mandatory and voluntary industry codes of practices that are required for companies to export; as well as the free trade agreement with overseas countries and the international intellectual property (ip) protection. the government provides assistance to small business through export market development grants (emdg) scheme and the export finance and insurance corporation (epic), so smes are able to tackle large scale business which may otherwise beyond their financial capabilities. government procurement and tenders the australian government encourages small business to sell their product or services to government as a way to grow their business. small businesses have to follow guidelines and procedures of procurements, including open tenders, select sourcing or tendering, direct sourcing or single select tendering. the government tendering guide is available online through austender website, where small business can register to get updates for tender opportunities. in act, the government’s commitments to support smes are also reflected in the procurement decision, where for procurements of over $200,000, the tender participants should indicate whether they are local smes. if not, they have to indicate that they will subcontract to local smes. assistance to exit the business the government through business enterprise centers and business points provide guidance and referrals for business owners who want to leave the business. it is inevitable that businesses owner will retire or for some reasons have to sell the business. a good succession plan will maximize the value of the business. guidance from the australian government on succession plan include: template in developing succession plan, seminars on succession plan, and free advice and support from business enterprise centers and business points. in sum, the access to information on government support to smes in australia is available online and offline. they are integrated into a national system, which are translated into local actions. such availability of supports and information shows comprehensive and harmonized efforts by the australian government to support smes. key success factors of ablis according to the act government officials in charge of ablis, the implementation of ablis has been very challenging because the national, state and local governments have to integrate over 6,000 records related to regulation, and the logic to produce information pack for the public on regulations and licensing to open a certain business. such massive tasks require collaborative actions from the national government, state governments, and local governments to ensure that all regulations within their jurisdiction are integrated into data management system which is current, accurate, and accessible. the key success factors of the implementation of ablis include commitment of top-level leaderships, clear vision about seamless national economy, clear structure and communication mechanisms, clear division of responsibilities regarding funding, and flexible choice by local journal of asean studies 101 governments to reach mses (hassett, 2014; honeyman, 2014). at the national level, top level leaderships at all level of government through coag (chaired by the prime minister of australia, with prime ministers of states, chief ministers, and chairperson of the association of local government serve as members of coag) are committed to implementing ablis’ strategic plan. such commitment is translated into a clear vision about seamless national economy at the national level, which is operationalized at the local level. ablis service delivery aims at stopping digital divide; no people left behind. for example, canberra connect and canberra business points are the shop fronts that can provide ‘one stop shop’ for the citizen, and ‘referral’ for business. the shop fronts provide access to a phone line, website, and consultants to guide business to get information on how to start, how to operate, how to grow and how to exit the business. the shop front also guide businesses if they have a question related to ablis. in canberra, 95% of clients access the information online, and 5% go to service points (honeyman, 2014). furthermore, there have been clear structure and communication mechanisms among stakeholders involved in ablis. representatives from each state work together as management committee and business design reference group. the working groups have monthly meetings to check progress, discuss issues and evaluate the program. meetings can be done face to face, or via online meetings. in terms of funding and ways of working, the national government provides incentives for state government to roll out the program; the department of industry in charge of ablis portal; and the state government in charge of ongoing cost. for data update, the state governments are in charge of updating the central database to ensure that they are correct; educating business for compliance and helping business to do the right thing. finally, the state and local governments have the flexibility to establish service points to reach the clients. for example, in canberra, the business point is an outsourced service funded by the act government to conduct mentoring and advises for small business; provide a referral for legal issues and finance issues; connect people with the right contacts. in new south wales (southern region), the government provides salaries and facilities for consultants, but the business enterprise centers also need to generate funding from their services to finance some overhead costs. these key success factors of the implementation of ablis can serve as key lessons for indonesia in implementing its own ptsp. comparing the implementation of one stop shop for licensing in indonesia and australia from the above discussions, it can be seen that streamlining business regulations and licensing through one single portal (ptsp and ablis) is very challenging and important. however, having one single portal for licensing is only one of many important tasks that the governments of indonesia and australia have to do to support smes. in indonesia, the objective focus of one stop shop (ptsp) is to provide easiness for companies to start the 102 government initiatives to empower small and medium enterprise business; while in australia, the purpose is broader, which is to achieve ‚seamless australian economy‛. as the result, in indonesia, the focus of ptsp is to enable the business to get a licence from one office, while in australia, ablis is designed as the ‚first stop‛ for the business to get their licenses. ablis refers business people to relevant regulators, because there are very technical matters, for examples, compliance on food handling or control of hazardous substances that should be handled by relevant regulators directly. furthermore, in indonesia, efforts to develop smes are not part of ptsp initiative, while in australia, ablis is an integral part of sme supports. ablis is part of the overall government support for smes to start, operate, grow and exit the business. in indonesia, holistic approach by the government still needs to be developed. due to limited supports by the government, some roles for sme developments are provided by large companies and ngos. while in australia, government plays the role as the leading institution to serve msmes. the roles or private companies or ngos in assisting smes are usually supported and coordinated by the australian government. the australian experience does demonstrate the power of having a single portal that links the services available from different levels of government. the single portal allows smes to see everything that is available. it also allows widespread delivery of capacity building. it also provides a capacity for analysis of the sector and support that is available to identify gaps, lessons, and areas of possible improvement (hamburger, 2014). conclusions, ways forward, limitations, and further research conclusions overall, there are four lessons from australia that can be derived from this research. firstly, the australian government policy on small business has been improved continuously to make it effective to a specific context. to achieve ‚seamless national economy‛ by 2020, the australian government started ablis in 2008. the program is evaluated yearly to ensure that it generated the expected outcomes, such as reduction of the burden for small business to start, operate, grow and exit the business; reduction of the cost of doing business, and improvement of national gdp. secondly, when delivering policies on small business, australian government needs to work with local institutions to translate the policy into actions. different states or cities cooperate in the same national government portal to support small business. the australian government has established two ‚onestop portals,‛ that is, ablis and business.gov. for effective implementation, the state and local government may use different mechanisms in delivering the services to reach their local citizens and business. thirdly, prior to implementing policy, the australian government pretests policy ideas with business owners. once the policy is implemented, continuous improvements are conducted with inputs from the business and industry players. mechanisms to provide inputs to drafts of policies and the implemented policies are available on-line or through direct communications with the national, provincial and local journal of asean studies 103 government. small enterprise association of australia and new zealand (seaanz), council of small business owners of australia (cosboa) and small business commissioners play important roles in bridging the views of smes with the government (brennan, 2013; baxter, 2013). finally, policy objectives can only be delivered and achieved through the integration of policy objectives into the structure of australian government. for example, ablis is an initiative of the national partnership between national, state and local government of australia to achieve seamless national economy by 2020. there are 47 reforms in various areas with very specific targets of yearly outputs and outcomes. coag reform council, consisting of prime minister and heads of state and territories and head of association of local government, ensures that the targets are achieved, obstacles are overcome, and improvements are implemented. there are mechanisms of stakeholder interactions and management cycle to ensure effective implementation and evaluation of ablis. ways forward lessons from australia show that sme development requires holistic and strategic actions with very disciplined monitoring and evaluation by the government. along this line, the indonesian government can drive the harmonization of currently scattered efforts in supporting smes. the ministry of cooperatives and sme can play a key role in coordinating this effort (sutiyono, 2014). the government can start making an inventory of what have been done by the national, provincial and local level of government, large companies/state owned companies and communities/ngos to support smes. furthermore, the implementation of ptsp should be integrated into the overall strategy of sme development rather than being a separate initiative. more broadly, is it worth looking at what the ptsp delivers and whether it can deliver more to smes (hamburger, 2014)? to do so, the government should assess all regulations related to business at a national, provincial and local level in indonesia, not only on the licensing but also on the code of practices. the government can also start evaluating the current status of ptsp implementation in indonesia, especially to what extent each ptsp has been able to harmonize business-related regulation. ptsp is not only about delivering the service to provide the license quickly but also to ensure that the licenses are given to companies that could comply with code of practices. the government should also develop realistic long-term plan (at least 10 years) with realistic milestone of achievements monthly, quarterly, yearly. by doing so, scattered initiatives in empowering smes can be integrated; conflicting regulations can be streamlined; and smes could be empowered towards a more prosperous indonesia. limitations and further research this study serves as a good start for getting ideas from australian experience to apply relevant lessons into indonesian context. australian experience can be a good lesson for indonesian government efforts to streamline regulations for smes. however, because of the difference in the characteristics of smes in indonesia and australia, indonesia has to refine the model to make it suitable for indonesian context. furthermore, because indonesia 104 government initiatives to empower small and medium enterprise has entered asean free trade by 2015, it may also beneficial to look at other asean countries’ efforts in preparing their smes to compete in the regions. references australian bureau of statistics. 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(2011). the mandatory corporate social responsibility in indonesia: problems and implications. jounal of business journal of asean studies, vol. 11, no. 1 (2023), pp.45−62 issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic received: 3rd october 2022/ revised: 24th february 2023/ accepted: 8th march 2023 agenda setting within asean: thickening, broadening, and breaking pressures ryan ashley university of texas at austin rashley@utexas.edu how to cite: ashley, r. agenda setting within asean: thickening, broadening, and breaking pressures. journal of asean studies, 11(1), 45−62. https:/doi.org/10.21512/jas.v11i1.9035 abstract the association of southeast asian nations (asean) is a clear example of an “organized anarchy” within agenda setting literature; meaning that asean has problematic preferences due to its multiple conflicting goals, relies on unclear methods to accomplish those goals, and experiences fluid participation of its members and leaders. this leaves the organization a case study in the path dependency of norms, as asean typically defaults to its founding principles of non-interference, economic inter-connectivity, and regional “centrality” during crises. the research question was on the examples of variation when asean broadens the scope of its mission. the research aimed to answer by framing asean as a subsystem of southeast asian regionalism and conducting a comparative historical analysis of three case study periods: the creation of the asean regional forum (arf), the failure to reach a joint communique in 2012 over tensions in the south china sea, and the ongoing crisis of human rights and governance in myanmar. the case studies demonstrate that the most effective broadening forces for asean are exogenous. the conclusion argues that this is a problematic status quo for a regional organization that seeks to promote its centrality to counter interference from outside powers. keywords: thickening, broadening, breaking, path dependency, norms introduction the association of southeast asian nations (asean) was found in 1967 in bangkok by the foreign ministers of thailand, singapore, malaysia, indonesia, and the philippines. each of these post-colonial 1 and developing states attempted to head off the forces of the 20th 1this phrase arguably excludes thailand, the only southeast asian state not colonized by western powers. in p re ss mailto:rashley@utexas.edu 46 agenda setting century’s global ideological conflicts, civil strife, and southeast asia’s political rivalries. considerably, they hoped to create a more stable and cooperative bloc that embraced a regional identity. to do so, asean sought to rise above the forays of the mid-cold war period by structuring itself as the institution “central” to the affairs of southeast asia, desiring all outside powers go through its auspices to interact with the region. asean also gave itself a requirement for absolute consensus of all member states before adopting any new initiative, ensuring that even the smallest southeast asian countries would have their voice represented. nevertheless, since almost the day of its creation, asean’s consensus driven and lowkey decision-making process and culture, frequently known as the “asean way,” has sparked debate. the organization’s supporters praise asean’s role as an inclusive, consistent, and stabilizing force in a region once known for none of these qualities. meanwhile, its detractors point to asean’s seemingly lackluster responses to several economic, human rights, and security crises in southeast asia, often ironically resulting in further interventions in the region by outside powers. regardless of these feuding perspectives, asean’s norms have acquired a nearly axiomatic status within the organization and the politics of the region. for example, the economist described the october 2021 asean summit, held in brunei, as holding a “decidedly sacramental quality,” with religious adherents bowing to the “creed” of the “asean way” (“south-east asia’s regional club”, 2021). the research will provide a new perspective to understand the decision-making process known as the asean way by viewing it through a new theoretical framework, policy agenda setting literature. the research is organized into six main sections: a literature review covering previous analysis of asean within organizational theory, a section covering methodology and the theoretical logic underpinning this research, three separate case studies highlighting key moments of crisis in asean’s history, and a conclusion discussing the larger implications of the theory of the research. literature review previous scholarship on asean’s decision-making emphasizes the group’s unique organizational culture and style of consensus building. for example, atena feraru charts the evolution of the “asean way” as a reflection of the evolution of informal procedures and the formal rules of the asean charter, both of which worked to promote the organization’s seemingly contradictory goals of enhancing regional cooperation and consolidating national sovereignty (feraru, 2016). alice ba also describes the importance of institutionalization of regional norms within asean’s auspices (ba, 1997). however, as made clear by david jones and michael smith, this complex series of norms and practices does not lead to meaningful security cooperation within the bloc, as asean’s internal processes remain decidedly intergovernmental and bureaucratic, rather than integrationist (jones and smith, 2007). the seeming inability of asean to accomplish these goals leads scholars to apply varying policy and choice theories to the bloc, in an attempt to understand what restrictions may limit its in p re ss journal of asean studies 47 effectiveness. yi-hung chiou’s application of rational choice theory to asean’s decision making, for example, shows that each member state’s varying interests and decision-making priorities negatively impacts the effectiveness of asean resolutions (chiou, 2010). building on these insights, the application of another decision-making theory, policy agenda setting, provides a unique and applicable logic to understand asean. considering the relevance of three core concepts within agenda setting: the idea of an “organized anarchy,” the existence of policy “subsystems,” and the concepts of “thickening” and “broadening.” first, an “organized anarchy,” as defined by cohen, march, and olsen (1972), is any organization that: has problematic preferences due to its multiple conflicting goals, relies on unclear methods to accomplish those goals, and experiences fluid participation of its members and leaders. understood in this framework, the “asean way” acts as a default setting for the organization’s actions, providing a baseline of norms for the organization to act under during uncertain times. this, in turn, suggests that asean is best understood as what agenda setting literature terms a “subsystem” of the larger force of southeast asian regionalism. subsystems are those institutions that act as reflections of the beliefs, values, and policies of a larger system (baumgartner and jones, 1991), making asean an institutionalized reflection of southeast asia’s practiced norms. indeed, asean purposefully lacks a crisis-ready decisive organizational and leadership structure. alternately, asean often responds to crises through yet another concept elucidated by agenda setting literature: by “thickening” or “broadening.” according to baumgartner and jones (2005), thickening refers to the reinforcing of current norms in response to a crisis, while broadening describes the opposite outcome of an organization expanding the scope of its mission outside of its founding principles. in the case of asean, the default response to crises is typically to thicken, i.e., promoting additional cooperation derived from its founding principles of non-interference, consultative consensus, and regional centrality. as such, asean is sometimes criticized, typically by outside great powers, as a “talking shop,” struggling to cope with a myriad of conflicting and overlapping priorities and jurisdictions. however, despite this criticism, asean’s norms have been crucial in transforming the region into an area largely (albeit not entirely) defined by peace, growth, and opportunity. yet, all norms have a breaking point. in the face of several economic and security crises asean has evolved and changed, occasionally even broadening. this research, then, will provide a unique and novel framework to understand asean’s decision-making by asking: why does asean “broaden” its scope of responsibilities in the face of some crises, while “thicken” in response to others? methodology the research conduct a comparative historical analysis of three case study periods of variation in asean’s history: the creation of the asean regional forum (arf), the failed attempt to agree to a joint communique surrounding a maritime code of conduct for the south china sea, and the ongoing breakdown of human rights and governance in myanmar. in each, in p re ss 48 agenda setting asean faced pressures from two primary directions: exogenous pressures to “broaden” the scope of its mission to include regional stability, and endogenous forces promoting a “thickening” of current priorities. all the while, some other exogenous forces sought to break the subsystem entirely. the case studies will demonstrate that, short of “exogenous broadeners” overcoming “endogenous thickeners,” often using the threat of potential breaking as leverage, asean typically thickens (i.e., reenforces its norms) or does not change its norms at all in response to regional crises. this theory of broadening and thickening is based on a framework of the same name found in baumgartner and jones (2005), which is typically applied to american public policy. the expansion of this framework to asean can provide novel insights into the actions of international organizations and small states facing crises. a summary of the influences of all potential actors in this framework is found in table 1. table 1 influence of potential actors thickeners broadeners breakers endogenous primary complementary negligible exogenous complementary primary disruptive theoretical logic within this model, exogenous broadening is defined as any pressure coming from states or other external actors and its member states intended to push asean towards expanding into new policy spheres to address crises, namely regional security. to paraphrase baumgartner and jones, such pressures are typically manifested in calls of “why doesn’t the government [asean] do something?” in response to a crisis (baumgartner and jones, 2005). endogenous thickening is defined as any pressure coming from within the organization or its member states for asean to contrarily address crises by reinforcing its norms (i.e., expanding on its existing institutions and initiatives) oriented towards regional consensus and economic inter-connectivity. to again paraphrase baumgartner and jones, “government [asean] gets thicker when it increases its activities within a previously occupied arena” (baumgartner and jones, 2005). simply put, most exogenous forces want asean to broaden their scope, increasing their range of attention to security. in contrast, endogenous forces want asean to thicken, increasing their capacity for building consensus and thus making the organization more central to its region. while endogenous thickeners and exogenous broadeners are the primary actors of this research, four additional actors must be contextualized: endogenous broadeners, exogenous thickeners, and “breakers” from either direction. as for the first two, while such actors exist in asean’s international politics, the research paper treats such forces as essentially complimentary of the comparatively more impactful trends of exogenous thickening and endogenous broadening. exogenous calls for thickening are typically uncontroversial, perhaps the best example of which being chinese, japanese, and (initially) indian support for in p re ss journal of asean studies 49 the asean-initiated regional comprehensive economic partnership (rcep) trade pact (petri and plummer, 2020). as such, while not within the scope of the research, rcep is another example of the efficacy of the research framework. on the other hand, endogenous broadening pressures, such as somewhat frequent calls for a stronger regional security architecture by more china-skeptic member states, should be treated as a necessary but insufficient variable of asean broadening. the research argues that such calls are only heeded when supported by successful and relatively larger exogenous pressures. similarly, while exogenous breaking forces are separate from endogenous thickening forces, their shared anti-broadening priorities can sometimes overlap. in times of strong broadening forces, this leads the former to act in complementary fashion with the latter. defined as any state or organization outside of asean or its member states that wishes to break down the organization as a subsystem, exogenous breakers are those actors who seek to keep the asean from effectively acting in any policy sphere. a full breakdown of potential alignments between each actor can be found in table 2. while some endogenous forces seek to break asean, these are more commonly exogenous, typically in the form of countries who seek individual (i.e., bilateral) relations with the nations of southeast asia, rather than being forced to negotiate with the bloc as a whole. importantly, the simple threat of an exogenous force to turn itself into a “breaker,” or the stressing of the potential threat of third-party breaker, can act as a measure strengthening that exogenous (typically broadening) pressure. table 2 provides more information on the cross-alignment of all potential actors. table 2 cross-alignment of potential actors exogenous broadeners exogenous thickeners exogenous breakers endogenous thickeners unaligned regardless of thickening aligned and complementary unaligned except against broadeners endogenous broadeners aligned and complementary negligible overlap unaligned entirely viewed through a model of strong or weak endogenous-thickening and exogenousbroadening pressures, asean exhibits three measurable behaviors over four sets of conditions. first, in times of weak endogenous thickening and weak exogenous broadening pressure, asean does not meaningfully thicken or broaden, and thus continues acting within its previous norms. second, in times of strong endogenous thickening and weak exogenous broadening pressures, asean chooses to thicken. that is to say, asean reinforces its previous norms by strengthening existing institutions without expanding those to a new sphere. third, in times of weak endogenous thickening and strong exogenous broadening pressures, asean will “broaden” itself by expanding its remit into new policy areas. lastly, in times of strong endogenous thickening and strong exogenous broadening pressures, asean will default to its previous norms, with both forces negating eachothers’ impact. a depiction of each of these outcomes can be found in table 3. in p re ss 50 agenda setting table 3 endogenous thickening forces vs. exogenous broadening forces weak endogenous thickening strong endogenous thickening weak exogenous broadening continuation of previous norms thickening (reenforcing of norms, for example: rcep) strong exogenous broadening broadening (organizational expansion, for example: arf) continuation of previous norms each case study was selected to represent the greatest diversity across different combinations of these forces at work. yet, seeing as the scope of the paper is to ask why asean broadens when it does, each features strong exogenous broadening pressures. breaking forces are also factored in; in order to determine whether the presence of a strong breaking force could serve as an alternative explanation for variation, one of the case studies includes such an actor playing in a primary role. for the first case study, the research argues that during the creation of the asean regional forum, the organization faced strong exogenous broadening forces that were met by comparatively weak endogenous thickening forces. for the second, the failure of asean to reach a consensus on a code of conduct for the south china sea in 2012 was an example of strong exogenous broadening forces from the united states and japan meeting strong endogenous thickening forces (albeit backstopped by china’s breaking forces). for the third, the ongoing breakdown of human rights and governance in myanmar has led to asean facing near-constant calls for broadening by powerful exogenous forces and some member states, yet those calls jostle with strong endogenous thickening pressures from within asean. the analytical conditions and outcomes of each case study are summarized in table 4. as it demonstrates, the only constant independent variable during times of unsuccessful broadening despite strong exogenous broadening forces is a strong endogenous thickening force. meanwhile, broadening has been unsuccessful despite the presence or absence of strong exogenous breaking forces. table 4 case study overview case study i: creation of the asean regional forum (1994) thickening forces broadening forces breaking forces exogenous negligible strong (united states, japan, australia) weak (china) endogenous weak complementary negligible outcome: weak thickening + strong broadening + weak breaking = broadening thickening forces broadening forces breaking forces outcome creation of arf weak & mostly endogenous strong & mostly exogenous weak & exogenous successful broadening scs code of conduct strong & mostly endogenous strong & mostly exogenous strong & exogenous unsuccessful broadening myanmar governance strong & mostly endogenous strong & mostly exogenous weak & exogenous unsuccessful broadening in p re ss journal of asean studies 51 the asean regional forum (arf) is a regional security institution bringing together twenty-seven countries on a near-yearly basis. it comprises the ten member states of asean (brunei, cambodia, indonesia, laos, malaysia, myanmar, philippines, singapore, thailand, and vietnam), ten official asean “dialogue partners” (australia, canada, china, the european union, india, japan, new zealand, south korea, russia, and the united states), one asean “observer” state (papua new guinea), and the additional invitees of bangladesh, the democratic people's republic of korea, mongolia, pakistan, sri lanka, and timor-leste (asean secretariat, 2019). functionally, the arf focuses on five work streams, namely: 1) counterterrorism and transnational crime, 2) information and communications technology, 3) disaster relief, 4) maritime security, and 5) non-proliferation and disarmament (asean secretariat, 2019). the breadth, depth, and inclusivity of the arf grants asean a uniquely strong convening power on security across south and east asia. yet, the arf does not owe its origins to an internal asean initiative. considerably, the creation of arf is the story of exogenous forces pressuring asean to broaden into a new policy sphere somewhat unwillingly. at the end of the cold war, southeast asia was coming off a long stretch of successful initial thickening. beginning with the first asean summit meeting in bali, indonesia in 1976, the organization clearly prioritized economic growth and regional stability, best exemplified by the “treaty of amity and cooperation” ratified by all member states (asean secretariat, 2015). to the extent that the organization discussed security concerns, asean took a decidedly neutral and non-aligned stance, most notably through the creation of the zone of peace, freedom and neutrality (zopfan). this declaration, signed in 1971 by the original five asean members, declared southeast asia should be “free from any form or manner of interference by outside powers,” and called on asean members to “broaden the areas of cooperation” between themselves (international center for not-for-profit-law, 2019). these norms-enforcing initiates and actions gave asean its initial institutional heft, and helped forge the nascent “asean way.” yet after the fall of the soviet union, asean faced a new world order. this shift was largely positive, as the cold war brought decades of inter and intrastate conflict to southeast asia. whether in the decades-long wars in indochina, the internal convulsions and genocides of indonesia, or other crises, the region suffered a disproportionate burden of the era’s ideological and proxy conflicts.2 therefore, with the cold war over, asean’s energies shifted away from inward-focused thickening, largely in the form of accepting new members. from 1991-1999, asean accepted laos, cambodia, myanmar, and vietnam as observer, then full members. vietnam’s accession application was particularly striking, as much of asean’s origin story lies in regional opposition to vietnamese expansion into laos and cambodia. yet, this endogenous shift away from thickening should not be understood as a shift towards broadening. instead, asean’s growth is better understood in the context of arf as representing a period of relatively weak endogenous thickening forces. while asean’s current members were interested in the bloc’s expansion in the 1990s, placing more 2for more on southeast asia’s experiences of cold war conflicts, see: amitav acharya, the making of southeast asia: international relations of a region, cornell university press: new york, 2012. in p re ss 52 agenda setting conservative thickening forces on the back-burner, there was still far from a consensus in support of broadening, particularly into security. indeed, the expansion of asean can be apprehended as an act of thickening, as it represented growing the number of states in the region who agreed to abide by the organization’s previous rules and norms. nevertheless, because of these changing dynamics, endogenous thickening forces within asean around this time are best described as relatively weak. indeed, despite asean’s desire for autonomy and predilection against outside interference, some of the region’s largest outside actors hoped for the bloc to broaden into security. most notably, the united states, japan, and australia each pushed asean towards broadening, the former motivated by a desire to draw down u.s. military forces in the region as the cold war ended. facing the prospect of their most important ally withdrawing from their backyard, japan and australia began advocating for asean to create robust security institutions in southeast asia in order to maintain a stable balance of power. at times, both tokyo and canberra made it clear that, if asean did not act, outside powers may do so themselves, representing an implicit threat to act as a breaking force (ba, 1997). yet, japan and australia consistently offered asean the more appealing alternative of broadening, which was each country’s true preference. as a result, neither should be understood as an exogenous breaking force. these actions are best understood as broadening forces attempting to use the tactic of breaking threats. this choice came from a sense of urgency, as each of these exogenous broadening actors was increasingly concerned by the security prospects of a rising china. beijing’s claims in the south china sea were beginning to cause friction in the region, and the prospect of the sea turning into a “chinese lake” following american military withdrawal motivated japan and australia to push asean towards more meaningful security ownership of its territorial waters. true breaking forces, albeit minor, were also at play in the formation of the arf. while china was inclined against any external southeast asian security architecture, beijing did not yet pose a credible breaking threat to asean in the early 1990s. most states in asean perceived china in this period as economically focused and peaceful, yet still held resentment towards beijing for its sponsoring of various inter and intra-state conflicts in the region throughout the cold war (ba, 1997). the early 1990s also witnessed a period of chinese military expansion and modernization, featuring the construction of new military facilities on disputed south china sea territories and acquisition of advanced military hardware from the former soviet union (ba, 1997). in particular, vietnam was wary of chinese security aims in southeast asia. hanoi’s suspicions deepened when, following vietnam’s signing of the asean treaty of amity and cooperation in 1992, beijing authorized the use of military force to stop “encroachments” on its territorial waters and lands, including disputed territories with vietnam (ba, 1997). china’s skepticism towards the arf was also centered in taiwan, as beijing feared that the regional institution could be used to force an undesired diplomatic solution to china’s most sensitive overseas issue. in p re ss journal of asean studies 53 put into action, the overwhelming nature of american, australia, and japanese exogenous broadening forces overcame asean’s relatively weak endogenous thickening forces. despite its reluctance to expand into security, leaders from across the region began to openly state “their desire to see the united states maintain a presence in asia,” perceiving the same security risks as japan and australia (tasker, 1992). these calls even came from historically non-aligned states like indonesia, demonstrating the depth of asean’s desire to not lose the era’s lone superpower as a security partner (tasker 1992). endogenous forces opposed to expansion into security did win certain concessions, including demands that the united states not attempt to open any military bases inside the region (ba, 1997). nevertheless, the exogenous demand for broadening, which included an implicit threat of potential breaking, won the day. while the arf did not meet every exogenous demand, it was considered robust enough for the regional powers to back down from their breaking threats. arf, then, formally came into existence following its inaugural 1994 meeting in bangkok, attended by representatives from each asean member and the ten official “dialogue partners” (asean secretariat, 2009). to be sure, asean’s broadening into security via the arf was relatively halting and incomplete. to this day the arf provides a valuable regional meeting ground and security dialogue, perhaps the only of its kind in the asia-pacific region. nevertheless, the arf is, like asean itself, frequently denigrated by outsiders as a “talking shop,” incapable of sufficiently addressing southeast asia’s myriad security challenges. nevertheless, from an asean institutional perspective, such criticisms belie the considerable leap taken by the organization to expand into security in the first place. case study ii: failure to reach joint communique at asean summit (2012) thickening forces broadening forces breaking forces exogenous negligible strong (united states, japan, australia) strong (china) endogenous strong (cambodia) complementary (philippines, vietnam) negligible outcome: strong thickening + strong broadening + strong breaking = continuity of norms (no action) perhaps no southeast asian security topic garners more attention from outside powers than the balance of power in the south china sea. a critical waterway positioned in the heart of the region, the south china sea serves as a crossroads for roughly one third of all global trade by volume, and a majority of such trade for the advanced economies of northeast asia (united nations conference on trade and development, 2016). as such, historically, outside powers that depend on access to trade via the south china sea, including imperial japan in in p re ss 54 agenda setting the second world war and the united states during the cold war, exerted their influence over the waterway in order to maintain critical supply lanes.3 the american-backed security order around the south china sea that began with the end of the second world war persisted through the end of the cold war. this maritime pax americana ensured that trade routes remained open, and the contested claims of various states, including china, taiwan, vietnam, malaysia, brunei, and the philippines kept from boiling over. nevertheless, this stasis did not last forever. amidst growing chinese military capabilities and a dearth of u.s. strategic attention due to wars in the middle east and central asia, small disputes from 2011-2012 soon spiraled to form a tense security dilemma. at the heart of these disputes is china’s so-called “nine dash line,” an expansive territorial claim by beijing to own the majority of the south china sea. as it gained more international confidence in the early 2010s, beijing refused to budge from these maximalist claims, and rejected any interventions by southeast asian claimants as interfering in chinese “internal” matters (hayton, 2014). at an arf meeting in hanoi, vietnam in 2010, chinese foreign minister yang jiechi summed up china’s attitude regarding asean’s concerns in the south china sea by stating “china is a big country and you are small countries, and that is a fact” (mitchell, 2016). in 2011, china stepped up its provocative military actions in the south china sea, hoping to act as a breaking force against asean’s preferred security order. in february 2011, a chinese frigate fired three shots at philippine fishing vessels near the disputed scarborough shoal (francisco, 2012). this was followed up in may when three chinese patrol vessels clashed with a vietnamese survey ship near the similarly disputed paracel islands (council on foreign relations, 2022). most notably in 2012, china gained effective control of the scarborough shoal from the philippines following a fishing ban in the area and the deployment of controversial chinese law enforcement vessels to the area (petty, 2017). throughout this period of provocations, beijing focused its energies on breaking potentially adversarial subsystems like asean, hoping to strike deals with other claimants on a bilateral basis. for example, china reached an agreement with vietnam in october 2011 to create principles to settle maritime disputes near the paracel islands, a deal that was not negotiated via asean. this strategy, sometimes referred to as “salami slicing,” was favored by beijing due to its denial of other claimant states’ ability to collectively negotiate (haddick, 2012). divided one-by-one, each individual southeast asian country fared little chance against china. unsurprisingly, the regional powers of the asia-pacific region opposed to china, namely the united states, japan, and australia, pushed asean to take a strong stance against these actions. fearing potential chinese hegemony in the south china sea, each power encouraged the claimant states of southeast asia to “internationalize” the dispute (council on foreign relations, 2022). ideally, to these exogenous broadeners, asean would serve as a vehicle to pool each southeast asian claimant’s grievances towards china. this would force 3 for a more in-depth history of the south china sea, see the opening chapters to: bill hayton, the south china sea: the struggle for power in asia, yale university press: new haven, 2014. in p re ss journal of asean studies 55 beijing to reach a lasting and multilateral settlement to the dispute. with the 2012 asean summit in cambodia approaching, each of these three actors sought to demonstrate their commitment to help asean broaden to address the security challenge of the south china sea. however, unlike in the case of the arf, these exogenous broadeners never threatened to potentially break the subsystem were it to fail to act. rather, they sought to promote the voices of potential endogenous broadeners, and lend them diplomatic support at the upcoming summit. nevertheless, for the claimant states of southeast asia themselves, vietnam, malaysia, brunei, and the philippines, the issue was far more complicated than just a security dilemma. for one, china was (and is) a major trade and investment partner with all of the claimant states. additionally, no southeast asian country held the ability to project meaningful naval power across the entire south china sea. rather, maritime states like the philippines and vietnam struggled to maintain parity with their chinese adversaries to control disputed territories like the scarborough shoal and paracel islands. as a result, these countries agreed with the exogenous broadeners on internationalizing the dispute, calling upon the remaining six member states of asean to ratify a previously-discussed “code of conduct” for the south china sea (thayer, 2012). such a document would create maritime “rules of the road,” intended to minimize the chance of any individual incident spiraling into a larger conflict. however, asean was far from reaching a consensus on broadening the organization into sponsoring a security code of conduct. specifically, 2012’s asean host-state, cambodia, acted as a strong thickening agent, complementing china’s exogenous breaking force. encouraged by china, cambodia used its ability to spoil the bloc’s consensus by refusing to sign onto a draft joint communique calling for asean to act on the philippines claims in the scarborough shoal and vietnam’s desire to address delineated exclusive economic zones (eezs) in disputed waters. controversially, it is widely believed that cambodian negotiators even shared drafts of these agreements with chinese representatives, breaking the trust of its regional partners (bower, 2012). in doing so, cambodia did not seek to break the asean subsystem. phnom penh is a long-standing beneficiary of asean’s largesse and economic support. cambodia, itself, has survived as a state thanks partially to asean’s blessing of a united nations security and governance conservatorship in the early 1990s that reshaped the country.4 yet, cambodia’s leader, hun sen, resented the power this give external actors in cambodian politics. thus, cambodia likely aligned with china to stay on good terms with its largest economic benefactor, while simultaneously keeping asean from expanding further into unwelcome security topics. put simply, cambodia preferred asean to stay within its current policy spheres, and was willing to work with a pro-breaking china in order to achieve this goal. thus, in an unprecedented setback for the organization, the 2012 asean summit ended without any agreement on a joint communique (bower, 2012). critics outside of the region 4 for more information on untac, see a contemporaneous report: trevor findlay, “cambodia: the legacy and lessons of untac,” sipri, research report no. 9, 1995, https://www.sipri.org/publications/1995/cambodialegacy-and-lessons-untac. in p re ss 56 agenda setting cited the failure as another example of the bloc’s inability to effectively organize itself as a subsystem (bower, 2012). internally, those member states determined to oppose chinese claims in the south china sea were forced to seek other methods of resolution. for example, without any formal asean mechanism, the philippines went on to seek international arbitration with china under the united nations' 1982 convention of the law of the sea, known as unclos, in january 2013 (permanent court of arbitration, 2013). nevertheless, while asean’s norm of consensus led to its inability to reach a settlement in 2012, its norms did succeed in keeping china from breaking apart the subsystem. while the failure to publish a joint communique was arguably embarrassing for asean, the fact that the organization persisted past this failure speaks to the strength of asean’s norms as a tool of convening and consensus building. despite clear chinese interference in the matter, cambodia’s unwillingness to sign onto any joint communique represented a clear lack of consensus within the bloc. while the outcome was disappointing to almost all members, and most exogenous actors, the fact that asean persisted beyond this failure without breaking or resorting to intra-regional conflict speaks to the strength of the organization’s norms, if not its ability to play effectively within the great power politics of the region. case study iii: myanmar human rights & governance (2010 – today) thickening forces broadening forces breaking forces exogenous weak (japan) strong (united states, european union, australia) weak (china) endogenous strong (thailand, cambodia) complementary (indonesia) negligible outcome: strong thickening + strong broadening + weak breaking = continuity of norms (no action) of all the regional security crises facing asean, perhaps none elicits more criticism of the organization and its norms than the ongoing crises in myanmar. sometimes even referred to by media both within and outside the region as “asean’s shame,” myanmar’s threepronged crises of the genocide of rohingya muslims, military coup against a semi-democratic government, and the post-coup intercommunal violence and near-state collapse present a daunting challenge to asean.5 it is also one of the few topics in asean on which internal divides between member states on thickening and broadening are clear and apparent for external actors to see. several outside powers clearly want asean to broaden in response to conditions in myanmar. specifically, the united states, european union, and australia all varyingly advocate for the organization to suspend myanmar’s membership, speak out against military violence, and provide some level of recognition for the in-exile “national unity government” (nug) made up of former opposition figures (“myanmar shadow government”, 2021). these 5 examples include: nile bowie, “myanmar’s crisis becomes asean’s shame,” asia times, 11 june 2021; richard heydarian, “southeast asia’s moment of shame,” al jazeera, 20 june 2015. in p re ss journal of asean studies 57 moves would represent a broadening outside of asean’s norm of “non-interference” in member state affairs, as it would set conditions for minimum acceptable security conditions within member states. to be sure, few outside powers expect asean to take concrete action, like military intervention, to stop the ongoing violence. nevertheless, these powerful exogenous actors represent a strong force advocating for the broadening of asean into a new set of internal-facing security norms. however not all exogenous actors are advocating for broadening. similarly to its role in previous case studies, china acts as a weak breaking force on asean in response to the myanmar crisis. beijing has a complicated relationship with myanmar’s armed forces (frequently referred to as the “tatmadaw”), but clearly prefers bilateral engagement with the government of the day over any hypothetical multinational or asean-led mediation process (myers, 2021). china covets access to trade routes that bypass the south china sea (and, thus, minimize asean’s relevance), a benefit that a stable myanmar could theoretically provide via the overland transport of goods from southwestern china to the indian ocean (myers, 2021). as a result, both china’s strategic interests in myanmar and practice of softly backing the tatmadaw regime are evidence of beijing’s desire to break asean as a subsystem on this issue. perhaps more surprising is the exogenous role of japan. tokyo has a long history of cooperation with myanmar’s successive military governments, dating back to imperial japanese backing for the nascent burmese army that soon developed into the modern tatmadaw. as a result, japan historically favors a more low-key approach in dealing with myanmar, promoting an ideal methodology of improving the country’s human rights through “positive” engagement. as a result, japan is best described as an exogenous thickening force on asean in response to the crises in myanmar (ashley & silverberg, 2022). the member states of asean themselves are also split between thickeners and broadeners on myanmar. for the former, the mainland southeast asian states of thailand and cambodia both variously promote engagement with and accommodation of the tatmadaw (“west condemns myanmar coup”, 2021). it is perhaps unsurprising that each of these states host a government that is either highly authoritarian (cambodia) or has a history of military coups itself (thailand). indeed, some commentators point to the “thai model” as an ideal outcome in the minds of tatmadaw leaders; thailand being a largely stable and economically prosperous country in which the military exercises political control through recurrent coups against undesired governments (kurlantzick, 2021). for his part, hun sen, the authoritarian head of cambodia, stunned observers after becoming the first regional leader to visit myanmar since the 2021 coup in january 2022, providing a certain level of diplomatic legitimacy to the tatmadaw government (thul, 2022). on the other hand, indonesia serves as southeast asia’s most outspoken broadener on the myanmar crisis. immediately following the 2021 coup, president joko widodo stated that the situation in myanmar was “unacceptable and cannot be allowed to continue” (“asean leaders demand”, 2021), a stance much stronger than most other member states. at subsequent asean summits to discuss the crisis, indonesia advocated for the toughest line in p re ss 58 agenda setting against the tatmadaw, seeking to punish the coup regime by limiting its access to the organization and denying its leaders legitimacy (“asean leaders demand”, 2021). joined to a lesser extent by singapore and malaysia, this bloc of endogenous broadeners sought to expand past asean’s typical norms to improve the security situation of the region. when this complicated mixture of forces clashed within asean, the result was largely inconclusive. the most significant outcome of asean’s post-coup summits, the so-called “5point consensus,” is widely considered a failure. this initiative, agreed to by asean and the tatmadaw’s leader min aung hlaing in april 2021, called for an immediate end to violence in myanmar, dialogue among all parties, the appointment of an asean special envoy, humanitarian assistance by asean, and the special envoy’s visit to myanmar to meet with all parties (“factbox: asean’s five-point”, 2022). days after its acceptance at a 2021 asean meeting in jakarta, the tatmadaw government recanted its support, stating that the agreement would be “considered” after “the situation returns to stability” (“myanmar: asean’s failed”, 2022). as such, the result of the meeting of this confluence of thickening, broadening, and breaking forces was the failure of any force to overcome the rest. rather, asean largely defaulted to its previous norms, and has so-far let the failure of the 5-point consensus go without any meaningful consequences. as a result, the organization is once again receiving criticism from across the world for failing to act on a regional security crisis. in contrast, its boosters argue that asean’s most important attribute is its status as an inclusive collection of heterogenous states, and that allowing the organization to be redefined by such outside pressure would represent a failure of its core ideology.6 more important for asean’s prospects, though, is the reaction within myanmar itself. rather than continuing to appeal to the organization, anti-coup protesters are largely ignoring asean in their messaging, instead appealing to international norms like the united nations’ “responsibility to protect” (often shortened to r2p) clause. this states that the international community must collectively intervene in other state’s affairs when that state is “manifestly failing” to protect innocent people (strangio, 2021). protest signs across myanmar often feature appeals to the international community to fulfill their obligations under “r2p.” this sidestepping of asean as southeast asia’s regional subsystem is not only limited to myanmar’s domestic politics. a united nations general assembly resolution denouncing the coup on june 18, 2021 also split asean into two diplomatic factions. five member states, indonesia, singapore, malaysia, vietnam, and the philippines supported the resolution, and called for an arms embargo against the tatmadaw. however, four other members which are thailand, cambodia, laos, and brunei abstained. somewhat ironically, myanmar voted in support of the resolution, a result of the country’s u.n. ambassador’s defection to the nug following the coup (peters, 2021). in summary, the myanmar crisis cannot be understood as either a thickening or broadening event for asean, as the organizations norms have been 6 an example of this argument can be found in: moez hayat, “give asean diplomacy a chance in myanmar,” the diplomat, 19 july 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/07/give-asean-diplomacy-a-chance-in-myanmar/. in p re ss journal of asean studies 59 neither reaffirmed or expanded in response. rather, asean once again fell back on its preexisting norms. conclusions asean is best understood as a subsystem of a larger sense of southeast asian regionalism. that subsystem faces endogenous and exogenous pressures, and friction between these creates turning points for the bloc. put simply, asean is an organized anarchy as defined by cohen, march, and olsen (1972). as such, asean is a case study in the path dependency of norms. that is to say, the organization defines itself by its norms and ideals, and typically acts on them when faced with conflicting endogenous and exogenous forces. considering that asean’s norms are highly communitarian and consensus-based, the organization rarely broadens (as opposed to thickens) outside of them without exogenous pressure. such broadening pressures sometimes depend on an implicit threat that unless asean broadens, the subsystem may be broken. this is a problematic conclusion for those who value asean’s norms and ideals. while two of the three case studies in this paper highlight the arguable shortcomings of the “asean way,” this often-maligned system has ensured that southeast asia has remained relatively peaceful and prosperous since the end of the cold war. yet, all norms have their limits, and all organizations must inevitably adjust to the realities of a changing world. as such, this research’s observation that asean only successfully broadens when exogenous, rather than endogenous, forces are sufficient serves as a cautionary tale. the pattern observed in this research, asean’s protection of its norms through thickening, often itself results in the subsequent creation of future policy frictions. these frictions, then, often result in even larger punctuations of change when prompted by exogenous thickeners. while asean has not expanded into new policy realms at the pace that exogenous actors like the united states and japan would like it to, this conclusion implies that asean would be well served to reach its own consensus on when such a move would be proper. the research lacks a case study where endogenous thickening and exogenous broadening forces are weak, but exogenous breaking forces are strong. however, such a scenario, in which exogenous forces seek to break asean into an organization that aligns with their wishes, is the exact nightmare scenario asean was formed to prevent. the south china sea crisis, which draws intense attention from powerful outside actors, appears to be the most likely scenario that could bring such an outcome. were the security situation in the south china sea to degrade to the point of military intervention by the united states and china, it seems unlikely either state would hesitate from breaking asean as a subsystem to achieve their security aims. thus, asean must prepare for the day where, unless endogenous forces prove sufficient to broaden, exogenous forces will seek to break apart its subsystem. indeed, such endogenous forces can only exist in diverse international organizations like asean thanks to in p re ss 60 agenda setting agreed-to norms. otherwise, without such norms, there would be no such “endogenous” forces to speak of at all. in both case studies where asean failed to broaden in response to a security crisis, actors within southeast asia chose to expand their grievance to the international community (philippines to unclos, myanmar’s protesters with r2p) rather than accept that asean failed to reach a consensus. while these actions did not threaten to break asean as a subsystem at the time, such internal frustrations could morph into a particularly undesirable force: a group of endogenous breakers dissatisfied with asean’s effectiveness as a subsystem. thus, asean must ask itself when it should make its own choice to broaden, lest it risk being broken. acknowledgement the author thank professors bryan jones and apichai shipper for their mentoring, advice, and guidance throughout the writing of this article. about the authors ryan ashley is a phd candidate at the university of texas’ lyndon b. johnson school of public affairs focusing on japanese security relations with southeast asia. he is also an active-duty officer in the united states air force. the views expressed here are those of the author’s and do not represent those of the u.s. air force, the department of defense, or any part of the u.s. government. references “the founding of asean,” https://asean.org/about-asean/the-founding-ofasean/ #:~:text=history%20%2d%20asean&text=the%20association%20of%20southeast %20asian,%2c%20philippines%2c%20singapore%20and%20thailand. 1971 zone of peace, freedom and neutrality 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an asean perspective abdullah dahana bina nusantara university, indonesia kelly rosalin bina nusantara university, indonesia abstract since the death of mao zedong in 1976 and deng xiaoping in 1997, factionalism and power struggle as the characteristic of leadership change in china has ended. although factionalism still exists, it has been converted to collaboration among all factions within the chinese communist party (ccp). the election of xi jinping to the presidency of the people’s republic of china (prc) and to the position as general secretary of the chinese communist party (ccp) is therefore, as the result of cooperation among factions. this paper discusses various challenges, including nationalism as the most serious issue faced by xi jinping as a leader elected through compromise. keywords: xi jinping, factionalism, current chinese nationalism. introduction change of leadership in countries practicing single party dictatorship is usually marred with power struggle. china, especially during the era of mao zedong (1949-1976) and deng xiaoping (1978-1997) was not exception to this rule. the causes of this phenomenon could be personal ambition, personal relationship among leaders, policy differences, fragmentation within the ruling party or more popularly known as factionalism, and other factors. post-mao/deng china, however, seems not to follow this tradition anymore. even if power struggle persists, it is no longer an “open warfare” known to the public but carried out within closed doors. the election of xi jinping as general secretary of the chinese communist party (ccp) as the result of the 18th congress of the party in november 2012 and his appointment as the president of the people’s republic of china (prc) as the outcome of the 14th national people’s congress (npc) on march 14, 2013 consolidated his position, because in addition to the general secretary of the ccp and the president of the prc, he is also chairman of the military commission. transition of leadership from the 4th to the 5th generation of leader is therefore, complete and he is the most powerful person in the country of 1,4 billion people. however, even though the change of leadership can be said as smooth. it doesn’t mean that dissent among various wings of the party has gone. in the past, mao and deng eliminated any different opinion within the ranks by harsh means. series of 30 challenges against xi jinping political campaigns during the era of mao(1949-1976) and 1989 suppression of tiananmen protest are proofs on how in the past different opinions were denied. post–deng/mao leadership however, regard different opinions within ranks and files as positive as long as differing opinios do not develop into what mao called as “antagonistic contradiction” (diwo maodun). dissent is therefore tolerated as long as it is within “party lines.” with the reemergence of factionalism, all big decisions, like the appointment of leaders, formulation of policies and their actualizations have to be discussed among factions. thus, the appointment of xi jinping as the leader of china, is therefore the result of compromise among factions. so is his policies. based on the above considerations and facts, this paper will deal with challenges faced by xi from both within and without the party. these will include factionalism itself, xi as the leader, and other factors he has to deal with. this paper is written based on qualitative method and supported by data, both english and chinese sources, available through library and internet search. who is xi jinping? western press and of course china’s own media have all dubbed xi jinping as a great diplomat who has been able to influence and gain the trust of all circles including the army. and because xi is the descendant of let’s say a “lord” in the dynasty of chinese leaders, the chinese press have named him the ‘crown prince of the people’. therefore, his appointment as secretary general and as president this, was considered the right choice. as an “aristocrat” in the chinese leadership, he is known to all the levels of the society, coupled with his impressive experience as a local and national official before occupying his present number one position. even nicholas kristoff (2013), a senior analyst that usually very critical perspectives of chinese politics, has a positive impression of xi jinping and refers to him as a genuine reformer. kristoff’s opinion is based on several factors. first, xi already has the spirit of a reformer implanted in him. he has inherited this from his father, the late xi zhongxun, a pioneer in economic development who openly condemns the tian’anmen square massacre in 1989. his mother chose to stay in shenzhen, the most capitalistic region. xi also sent his daughter to harvard university, which, kristoff said, proved his personal perception of the importance of english and his admiration for the american education system. kristoff also speculate about the possibility of xi releasing liu xiaobo, the critical author and nobel prize winner who is now languishing in jail. xi is also quite attentive and listens to public demands for a more transparent government. in fact, it is likely that he will abolish detention and punishment not preceded by judicial process. kristoff further speculates that one of his main programs is to move the body of mao which is preserved and now still on display in the mausoleum in tiananmen square. this is meant to eradicate the tradition of the cult of personality in the chinese political system. with the election of xi jinping for a period of up to 10 years, the leadership of the party and the country has moved from 4th to 5th generation. one of the characteristics of the 5th generation is the fact that they grew up, experienced and suffered during the cultural revolution(c.r.) launched by mao (19661976). xi is not exempt from this phenomenon because of the effects of the massive campaigns which occurred over the longest period in the history of mao’s journal of asean studies 31 leadership involving not only ordinary people but also the elite and their families. even deng xiaoping, the architect of reform, and his family, suffered. holding various positions in the party leadership over that period of 25 years, his career continued to soar (callahan, 2012). at first he was made the party secretary in hebei province (1983-85), a backward and poor province. then he was placed in the two prosperous provinces of fujian (19852002) and zhejiang (2002-07). in both provinces, he managed to launch an anticorruption campaign earning him the nickname "mr. clean." in 2007, he was stationed in shanghai and in this metropolitan city of south china, he was considered to have succeeded in eradicating corruption. due to those success stories he was called to beijing to take over the party leadership. his career continued to rise with his appointment as vice president under hu jintao in march 2008. xi jinping was born in beijing in 1953 when his father was serving as head of the ccp's central propaganda department and concurrently deputy minister of education and culture. thus from his childhood xi junior grew up in an elite community and school environment. he was a member of the so-called cynics of "the red aristocracy". westerners called them “princelings” or taizi in chinese. their number today is estimated at 300 people and they were the ones who used their positions or guanxi (connections) and networking to get quality education, which in turn secured them promising career paths in various fields. however, xi jinping made an extraordinary move. when other members of the aristocracy plunged into business to reap abundant wealth, he used those connections to achieve a position in politics. when the c.r. erupted, xi jinping was just 15 years old, and as a "child of counterrevolutionaries" he was sent to the rural shaanxi province to do forced labor and to "learn from the peasants”. towards the end of the cultural revolution, he avoided the frantic atmosphere of the capital because everyone was jockeying for a position to show case themselves as revolutionaries to get mao’s attention and get good positions in the party and government. his career continued to escalate and in 1983 he chose a career that would place him in the regions. in rural shaanxi, due to his organizational skills, he was able to secure the peasants’ admiration who then appointed him party secretary of the village he was working in. because of his capabilities, towards the end of the cr he obtained a recommendation to study at a university – an opportunity that is rarely obtained by a descendant of a "counterrevolutionary". after earning an engineering degree from qinghua university, one of china’s leading university in beijing, he was appointed deputy secretary of the ccp in zhengding county, hebei province, a place that was still very backward. however, an opportunity arose which xi so cleverly used. zhengding had been used as the setting of a television series adaptation of the classic chinese novel honglou mengor better known in the west as the dream of the red chamber. the television serial which was spiced up with slight episodes of sex became very popular entertainment for the people. xi cleverly turned the former tv series production set into a tourist object making zhengding a successful tourist destination. at that time all development programs were still under central planning and tourist destinations were limited to the forbidden city, the summer palace, the great wall or bataling (burial place) of the ming emperors in beijing. because of his expertise, the chinese media praised xi as a person with a soul and spirit of a reformer and pioneer. 32 challenges against xi jinping chinese media also praised xi as a leader who embraced the philosophy of reform. he continued what his father had pioneered by turning several cities in the south into "special economic zones." as the mayor of xiamen in 1985 he encouraged the development of trade relations with taiwan, which was just opposite the city. xi held that position for 17 years and the economic chain between the two sides of the taiwan straits grew rapidly, in spite of their ideological opposition. in 2002 he brought this pioneering and reformist spirit to the zhijiang province whose economy was growing smoothly. xi’s leadership became more open and more reformist as reflected in his acceptance speech after his election, "our people love life and hope for better education, steady jobs, better incomes, reliable social security, high standards of healthcare, as well as pleasant living conditions and environment. they expect their children to grow, work, and live better lives. people long for a life that is good and beautiful; that's what we must strive for" (xinhua, 2012). however, looking at the constellation of forces within the ccp, this praise may be somewhat exaggerated and its validity remains to be tested. there is still a lot that he needs to do in order to secure a productive leadership, and it obviously will take time. one of the main causes of this is none other than the factionalism within the ccp and various other challenges faced by him. factionalism first it should be noted that the ccp is not a monolithic organization because it was always plagued by factionalism—this is no strange matter for a party with no rivals. in the mao era there were only two factions which were always competing to determine policy. that is what experts outside china called a radical wing versus a moderate wing. and because the position of "chairman mao" as "a great leader of the revolution" was so dominant, radicalism always had the upper hand. mao was therefore able to determine all policies freely and arbitrarily in all areas. the basis of all decision-making was also simple because the only reference was ideology. factionalism within the ccp is now much more complex. its appearance is based on place of origins, education and training, and family background, although there are also groups who base their movement on ideology, especially maoism. with the changing times, today in the postmao/deng pkc there are least four main factions that competing each other. first is the shanghai faction, known as haipai, who gather around jiang zemin the prc president and the ccp general secretary during the 1992-2002 period, the former boss of the shanghai ccp branch who was personally designated by the late deng before his death to succeed him. this faction is known as a champion for increasing the fruits of development. the main idea of the shanghai group is essentially to keep the rate of economic development at the highest level. according to them, in order to maintain china’s position as a world economic power when global competition is so tight, coastal areas should remain a priority as the machine of economic development. this is the reason for their lack of concern for segments of society and regions of china that are still lagging behind in various fields. the concepts of this group are focused on the ideas of jiang zemin about the three representatives (san ge daibiao) which suggests to give the opportunity to entrepreneurs (read: capitalist) emerging after the launching of the reform, to become members of the ccp. the shanghai faction conceptually competed with the young communist journal of asean studies 33 league alumni group, one of the party’s organizations whose primary objective was to prepare young people to become future leaders. in chinese politics they are called the faction league or tuanpai. political analysts from the west often referred to them as "populists." the principles adopted by tuanpai are strengthening and consolidating the power of the central leadership, preserving and maintaining social stability, trying to distribute the fruits of development to eliminate significant differences between developed areas and underdeveloped areas, reducing the wide gap between the poor and the rich, and healing every social disease caused by the capitalization of the chinese economy. the group is led by former party chief hu jintao and the concept of sharing the fruits of development was incorporated into his theory of creating a "harmonious society" (leonard 2008). by using this discourse, they emphasized the importance of eliminating the gaping differences between the advanced and the backward regions and classes. in addition to the two wings that hold opposing concepts, there is another group of younger people who are often referred to as the "princes". as a group within the chinese political scene they got the name taizipai and western observers referred to them as princelings. this group consisted of about 300 people with an average age of 5060 years. they were the sons/daughters of veterans who were comrades of mao zedong during the revolution to establish the ccp and the prc. due to their position as the elite, they were fortunate to obtain a good education, and thanks to their guanxi, they successfully occupied important positions in the party and government. however, it should be noted that the strategic positions they occupied were not merely due to heredity or guanxi alone, but came with education, business, and experience they acquired as regional and central authorities or by being engaged in bureaucracy and business. bo xilai, the former party boss of chongqing, is another taizi figure who joined the group aspiring to maintain the teachings of mao zedong. he was eager to revive all mao’s teachings in the city he led. unfortunately, behind this mask of maoism, he was involved in degrading practices such as violations of human rights and corruption. linked to bo xilai, there was another elite group aspiring to preserve the teachings of the late mao which emphasized ideological purity and the concept of equality in a classless society. the initiators of this movement are mainly senior revolutionaries who fear that the introduction of deng’s reforms will lead the society further away from the ideals of egalitarianism initiated by mao. however, since the fall of bo xilai, the group is now in a much weaker position and their influence is receding. thus in china's political arena there are now two main groups competing, the shanghai faction and the faction supported by most of the league of the "princes". the shanghai faction actually represents the concept of thinking of those outside the central government in beijing, while the league reflects concepts of what must be done to manage the dynamics of the central government in developing the chinese community in connection with china's entry into the arena of globalization. interestingly, the rivalry between these two schools has its own historical background. china is a country with such a vast territory that is has a diversity of geographic and human features. thus, the existence of a central government in the north is a necessity for maintaining unity and political unity. however, throughout history, political unity has often been disrupted and in some cases even developed into separatism. this occurred because some regions have their 34 challenges against xi jinping own ambitions and interests. not infrequently this led them to achieve their ambitions by cooperating with outside forces. the case of warlordism (1924-1927) in china is an example of this pattern. tensions between the centralist and regionalist groups in the past have led to increasing conflicts between the north based in beijing and the south led by shanghai. in the mao era, shanghai which is located in the south was known as a center of radical extremists under the leadership of mao's wife, jiang qing while the north (beijing) was a fortress of those who were stamped by mao as bureaucrats and revisionists. when he felt his position was coming under escalating political pressure, mao usually went to the south (shanghai) to gather power and returned to beijing to reclaim his influential position. from a modern perspective, this conflict is characterized by the conflict of ideas between hu jintao and jiang zemin as reflected in the conflict between the ideas of the elitists versus the populists. however, if the first discourse was concerned with political opposition and the revolution, it has now turned into an economic discourse. it is also important to keep in mind that although there are conceptual differences as a result of factionalism and opposing perceptions, every conflict is always debated behind closed doors and not transformed into antagonistic contradictions. this is important to ensure that the public sees the ccp as a solid and monolithic organization. with the entrance of this factionalism, although it seemed that the shanghai faction had the upper hand with the election of xi jinping, he still is the result of a compromise between the two factions. the distribution of power between the two factions is reflected by the election of xi who had to be accompanied by a figure who would become prime minister, namely li keqiang—a follower of tuanpai. thus, the present is, in fact, a collective leadership. gone are the days of dominant leaders or dictators of mao and deng xiaoping's caliber. various challenges facing xi jinping there are still many issues to be dealt with in china under the leadership of xi. as a person who has just made his entrance into the stage of leadership, he still needs time to consolidate his power. for that he still has to use " give and take" tactics in order to secure his position and to gain the support of the opposing factions, especially tuanpai and haipai. based on the analysis that xi jinping’s leadership is the result of a compromise, the following are the greatest challenges he will have to face. politics and ideology on the surface, the fall of bo xilai, who glorified mao zedong and desired to revive his teachings, was a blow to the maoism revival movement. hence, long before the opening of the congress of the ccp, international observers predicted that the ccp congress would, among others, throw out maoism as it was no longer relevant to the reform path taken by china. however, mu chunshun, a chinese analyst has come up with a different opinion. mu endorses the idea that reform is no longer linked to maoism, but he argues that observers are going too far or being too wishful when they think that the ccp will abandon maoism. because, said mu futher, if they do that, its social impact will be huge. disposing of maoism will give the party a bad image in the eyes of the people, since if that happens, it will only go to show that the leadership of the party is not monolithic. mu said that the reason was that maoism is the symbol of the unity journal of asean studies 35 of national leadership regardless of whether it is relevant or not to present-day china (mu 2012). abandoning maoism will also cause dissatisfaction among the army. it must be noted, mu added, for example, that the doctrine adopted by the people's liberation army (pla) has never been changed. it is the concept that "political power comes out of the barrel of the gun, but the gun must remain under the control of the party" (mu 2012). it is important to keep in mind that the army, together with the party and the bureaucracy, is one of the pillars of political power in china. pla acts as the security guard or body guard of the party, and it is evidenced by the way it did not hesitate to suppress demonstrations that threatened the party in june 1989. in other words, maoism is still relevant. those are the ideological challenges xi will face. the speculation of western observers were way off target. the results of the party’s congress barely touched issues relating to ideology. however, this does not mean that the problem of ideology has been resolved, because the main problem lies in its position among the people and leaders of china. the introduction of economic reforms that actually implement a capitalist system has resulted in a race to pursue material gains among the people and also widened the gap between the rich and poor, between urban and rural areas. as a result there has been an erosion in ideology which in turn poses a threat to the position of the ccp because the ruling party's monopoly of power is based on the principles of marxism-leninismmao zedong’s thoughts. this threat will continue to overshadow the ccp even if it is trying to mask the implementation of this capitalist principle behind such terms as "socialism with chinese characteristics" and"socialist market economy". capitalism has pushed socialism/communism to the back seat and to overcome this tendency, the chinese authorities have tried to promote nationalism among the masses and the youth, particularly after the 1989 tian’anmen incident. but this has brought its its own problems which will be discussed in the final part of this paper. economy the next challenge is the economy. analysts generally say that in the last two years of the reform era that has actually been going on for more than three decades, there has been a tendency of a slowing down in china's economy. this is not caused by mismanagement of the chinese leaders, but rather caused by the global economic crisis, particularly in america and europe as the lifeblood of china’s economy depends to a greater part on exports to both those continents in particular. during the crisis, the two continents that are china's export targets are no longer able to absorb all the chinese commodities as in previous years. economists believe that one solution to overcome this is to increase the ability of domestic consumers to accommodate china's own products. the old slogan "made in china" must now be replaced by a new "made by chinese for the chinese ". however, to achieve this, the government should first of all make efforts to increase the purchasing power of domestic consumers. the population which is approaching 1.4 billion people is a paradise for their own products. however, increasing the prosperity of the grassroots will be a subject of debate among the elite, i.e. those who want to enlarge the “pie of development” in opposition to the populist faction that aspires to improve the living standards of the people by distributing the results of 36 challenges against xi jinping development more evenly. but, given the importance of strengthening the purchasing power of domestic consumers, there is a possibility that xi’s economic policy will lean towards the league faction. however, in order to maintain the image of a monolithic leadership, he will also have to pay attention to the shanghai faction. according to analysts, xi’s economic policy will be more inclined towards the shanghai faction, although he also has to listen to the expert advice of the tuanpai (steinbock 2012). this has to do with the collective leadership system will inevitably require xi to consider the opinions of his colleagues. closely related to the question above, is how to educate chinese consumers to better appreciate their own domestic products. changing consumer attitude is quite a big challenge. restructuring the roles of state enterprises in the chinese economy will also pose a challenge. according to statistics, at present, state owned enterprises account for more than 60% of the economic activity and circulation of money. in other words, the prc are implementing a state capitalist system. and similar to conditions in other developing countries, state enterprises are also a source of corruption in china. there are many more economic problems that xi must face. among others, the swelling local government debts and the aging population of china which will become a burden for the economy. it has been argued that the one family one child policy should be changed into two children for each family. however, this change in policy will lead to huge economic and social consequences because even with the present policy the country's total population has reached approximately 1.4 billion. demands for "democratization" increasingly strong demands of the grassroots for a system of government that is more open, more "democratic" and more attentive to public interests also need to be dealt with. dissatisfaction was associated with a violation of civil rights, such as punishment without trial, the appropriation of the people’s rightfully owned land in the form of "freeing" of land for the sake of "development" and various other violations. it should also be noted, there were violations of the rights of the minorities in tibet and xinjiang. this is closely linked with the constitution that had actually been approved by the national people's congress (npc) in 1982. the process began with disappointment and upheavals over various violations of laws during the cultural revolution campaigns (1966-1976). ccp leaders who survived the atrocities and violence that took place during the campaign concluded that it was essential for china to have a constitution that respects individual rights and also ensures that rulers be subject to this rule of law. the times when tyrants could exercise power and control irresponsibly should be terminated. it should be noted that this attitude was not implemented as a direct criticism of the policies adopted by mao. in fact the constitution was never effective and various offenses were still committed by people in power. but, now the demands for the realization of a state and a government that follow the rule of law are becoming more forceful. actually these demands are a reaction to xi’s various speeches which invariably stressed the need to enforce the enactment of the constitution. in line with this, approximately 72 intellectuals submitted a petition to push the party to uphold the constitution." we are in agreement that constitutionalism should be a central issue in the reform journal of asean studies 37 program," said zhang qianfan, professor of law at beijing university who drafted the petition. he further stated that economic factors were far too dominant in the reform program in the past. but, from experience over the last 20 years, zhang said that the economic reforms could go wrong if they were not offset by meaningful political reforms which imply constitutional reform (wong and ansfield 2013). the echoes of these demands were reverberated even louder by the newspapers and other media supporting reforms, including a journal issued by the central party cadre school once headed by xi jinping. but the petitioners were actually stimulated by a speech in which xi said that among others, that the constitution should be a legal weapon for the people to defend their rights. deng yuwen, a newspaper editor, has boldly said he has not seen xi take any concrete steps to make the constitution work. "the constitution cannot be implemented by mere talk,"said deng (wong and ansfield 2013). indeed, since occupying the highest position in the country, although he has talked a lot about the importance of freedom, xi has placed more emphasis on the importance of internal party discipline. he keeps reminding people that china should avoid repeating the fate that led to the break up of the soviet union. thus, the issue of freedom will again stumble into something very basic: deng xiaoping only introduced economic reforms since his ultimate goal was to preserve the power of the communist party. his successors continue this principle. social issues because she has embraced the capitalist system, china has also been infected by the various diseases of capitalism. take for instance, the gap in wealth between the coastal and inland regions. actually, the government has made many breakthroughs to bridge the gap between the rich regions and the backward regions, particularly by building infrastructures. many remote areas are already open and connected to the urban areas (johnson 2013). however, china is so vast with a population so large that many more efforts should be made to overcome this. in the mao era, political campaigns were carried out to bridge the urban-rural gap. now this method can no longer be used. closely related to the above is the richpoor gap. only few chinese people with the capacity to be global player that are able to enjoy the fruits of economic reform. in a capitalist system in which the rules of the game have not been fixed like that of china, money synergizes with power. there are allegations made by the lower classes that in such a wild system, where the rich are getting richer and the poor poorer, a contributing factor is corruption. this will all lead to jealousy and social unrest. how to overcome a habit that has been embedded in the system for over 20 years is a big challenge for the ccp and its leaders. another common phenomenon is the clearing of slum areas in urban districts to be turned into modern residential areas and business centers. the evictions to free those slum areas have resulted in protests and social tensions. one of the events that got the world’s attention is the displacement that occurred in a small town, wukan, near guangzhou, in the guangdong province. as a result of the massive protests of the local residents, the evictions were postponed. this event is described as the people's victory over the capitalization of residential areas. 38 challenges against xi jinping party relations and the masses xi jinping faces another big task no less important, namely, putting back the ccp in the hearts of the people. in the past, especially when mao was still alive, the party was still very close to the people. to maintain such a relationship mao created a concept known as the mass line (cunzhong zhongxian). the cadres were instructed to listen to all complaints and wishes of the masses so that the party would not be isolated from the people. internally, mao applied the leninist principle known as democratic centralism (waller 1981). the concept demanded the leadership of the party to inform all levels of administration under their supervision of the plan-making policies to be pursued. thus, all units were asked to discuss the party's policy plans and submit suggestions or objections. however, once a decision had been taken, all party elements ranging from the highest to the lowest units had to comply with the policies and implement them. during the time when the ccp was in control, in the framework of the mass line concept, mao always involved the masses in all political campaigns pertaining to both domestic and international issues. starting in the early 1950s until his death in 1976, mao and his supporters launched a series of mass campaigns. as a result, on the one hand people became very literate in politics, but on the other hand they also became tired of the never-ending mass campaigns. after mao's departure and after deng xiaoping came to power, the number of mass campaigns was greatly reduced. however, because the masses were not involved, politics became an elite movement. occasional mass action was launched but under very tight control. an example of this was the anti-american demonstrations in 1999 when american planes accidentally bombed the prc embassy in belgrade. however, the demonstrations were eventually stopped because there were visible signs that the chinese government was also becoming one of the targets of the demonstrations. strict control over all kinds of mass action was applied after the 1989 tian’anmen demonstrations which almost caused the breakup of the ccp due to internal conflicts. thus, one of the major tasks that xi jinping must shoulder is putting the party back in the hearts of the people without threatening the ccp monopoly of power. nationalism nationalism emerged at the end of the 19th century when there was a hot debate among chinese elite regarding the question on how to come out of national crisis and humiliation. all parties basically agreed that the fundamental reason for the crisis was the presence of western colonialism and the weakness of qing dynasty. on how to come out of the crisis, however, they have different opinions. some thought that the main cause was the backwardness of chinese military and weaponry power, and thus they campaigned for “learning from foreigners” (read west) or yangwu yundong and “self strengthening movement.” others urged for “keeping chinese thinking as national identity while using western technology for practical means”(zhongxue wei ti, xixue wei yong). there were also groups which advocated anarchism, while two confucian scholars, kang youwei and his disciple liang qichao, spread the idea of constitutional monarchy system copying from england. of all the popular ideas which came out at that time, mostly wanted journal of asean studies 39 to maintain monarchy system. it was during these fierce debates dr. sun yatsen came up with a radical thought: the qing dynasty was a foreign conquerer and a colonialist power, it had to be overthown and china should establish a republic state based on chinese nationalism. it was under the leadership of dr. sun the qing dynasty was abolished by 1911 revolution (xinhai geming) and a republic was later created (lin 2011). however, chinese nationalism remained buried for quite a long time and only reappeared on mainland china in the last 30 years, particularly after the introduction of deng xiaoping’s reform. it is important to note that since the prc was founded in 1949, the only ideology for the government and the people is communism/socialism or better known as marxis-leninism and the thought of mao. however, marxism-leninism and the thought of mao seems not have anymore place in the hearts of most of the people as a result of mao's policies that imposed the principle of "politics in command" especially after 1957. since then for the next 20 years, mao for the sake of realizing his ideals of creating a socialist society, launched a series of mass campaigns ranging from the great leap forward (da yuejin), the socialist education movement, the people's communes (renmin gongshe), which peaked in 1966 with the start of the cultural revolution (zichanjieji wenhua da geming). the last campaigns was the greatest, longest (about 10 years), and with a large number of victims and only stopped after mao’s death. during the series of mass campaigns all the elements of society that opposed mao were considered "counterrevolutionaries" and put to jail or killed. the victims included his comrade in arms in fighting to establish the ccp and the prc. only two years after mao died in 1976, after successfully eliminating the maoists, deng xiaoping introduced reform and opening of china up as well as the capitalist economicsystem (tyler 1997). as a result, because of the cruelty of the maoist system, almosteveryone in china welcomed reform and was encouraged to pursue material gains. consequently, socialist ideologies were marginalized. with the end of the cultural revolution era and the introduction of the capitalist system, some segments of chinese society, particularly students and intelectuals tempted to follow an western liberal democracy. this culminated in a series of demonstrations during the spring and summer of 1989, followed by the tian’anmen massacre, in june 1989. that is understandable because deng’s main objective to introduce reforms was precisely to preserve and strengthen ccp’s grip over chinese society. in the aftermath of the tian’anmen massacre, nationalism that had long been neglected secured a place for itself again. the state played an important role in its resurgence. the general public, especially school children, students and young children were brainwashed with nationalism and a sense of pride in being chinese. the army, wherever they are, usually has a high sense of nationalism and patriotism. the switch to nationalism was relatively easy, because the chinese are traditionally known as a people who are highly chauvinistic. the success of china hosting the olympics games in 2008, was regarded as the pinnacle of the chinese government’s success in inculcate this nationalist sentiment. however, an overdose of nationalism will lead to xenophobia and could backfire. anti-foreign nationalism could turn into a mass movement against the government if the authorities are considered not "assertive" enough or seen as to be weak under foreign pressure. for example, in 40 challenges against xi jinping 1999 when the american bombers accidentally dropped bombs on the chinese embassy, mass anti-american demonstrations were staged in many major cities. american representative offices were vandalized; pelted with stones and molotov cocktails (sina news 1999). demonstrations became increasingly violent when the chinese government seemed to lack force in its protest against america. worried that the demonstrations would turn into anti-government such as those in tian’anmen in 1989, the authorities took immediate measures to stop the mass action. since then it seemed that all the mass movements were orchestrated by the government. conclusion this paper deals with series of obstacles faced by xi jinping as new chinese leader and we can conclude that there are many enormous challeges he is facing. one of the obstacles that he has to deal with is the fact, although seems to be powerful, he is still a leader emerged as the result of compromise among factions within the ccp. consequently, decision making will take more time since it has to be discussed among factions. so, how should xi jinping, as the new leader, face public pressure in china’s conflict with southeast asian countries and japan over overlapping claims in the south china sea and east china sea? in accordance with the principle of collective leadership and the principle of "consultation and consensus", in all issues, both domestic and international, he must obtain the consent of both factions holding political power today. whatever steps xi takes, he must have the blessings of all the factions and because he has only been in this new leadership, xi needs time to spread his influence among party leaders as well as the army and masses. there are opinions that the claim on the south china sea is a legacy of hu jintao. there is a custom in china for a leader stepping down to leave "a legacy" to be continued by his successor. mao’s legacy was his thoughts, deng xiaoping’s was his reforms, jiang zemin left his three representations, and hu jintao bequeath the harmonious society concept and claims over the diaoyutai (senkaku). thus, in this case xi seems to be facing a difficult choice. with the nationalist sentiment surging, especially among the youth and army, taking no compromise will put him in a difficult position. if he takes a step that is considered a compromise, he will have to answer to his own people. if he chooses confrontation, not only the will the world suffer from the consequences, but also china itself. the strategy he is using in asean is divide et impera or divide and rule. through economic aid, xi has successfully “persuaded” cambodia to dismiss the agenda to discuss the issue of overlapping claims in the south china sea at the asean summit recently. but, if this policy is maintained, neighboring countries who strongly support the agenda, especially vietnam and the philippines, will certainly turn to the us. china gain the image of a big country that wants to restore its hegemony in the southern hemisphere. a confrontational attitude would also be contrary to the principle of peaceful rising propagated since china's rise to superpower, both in terms of military and economic power. the principle states that china’sascent into a world power is to seek peace through the principle of peaceful coexistence with other countries, not to practice hegemony. the situation in china faced by xi jinping regarding the role of ideology is reflected in an ancient saying: journal of asean studies 41 nationalism can be a double-edged sword. it can be used against enemies, but it also can injure the owner. about author abdullah dahana is a professor of chinese studies within the faculty of humanities, bina nusantara university. he can be contacted at dhn705@gmail.com. kelly rosalin is a junior lecturer within department of chinese studies, bina nusantara university. references kristof, n. (2013). looking for a jump-start in china. [online] available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/06/opi nion/sunday/kristof-looking-for-a-jumpstart-in-china.html?_r=0 [accessed 24 apr. 2014]. callahan, w. (2012). who is xi jinping, and where will he lead china?. [online] opendemocracy. available at: http://www.opendemocracy.net/william -callahan/who-is-xi-jinping-and-wherewill-he-lead-china [accessed 24 apr. 2014]. news.xinhuanet.com, (2012). 习近平：人民 对美好生活的向往就是我们的奋斗目标 中国共产党第十八次全国代表大会(xi jinping: renmin dui meihao shenghuo de xiangwang jiushi women de fendou mubiao – zhongguo gongchandang di shiba ci quanquo daibiaohui). [online] available at:http://news.xinhuanet.com/18cpcnc/2 012-11/15/c_123957816.htm [accessed 24 apr. 2014]. leonard, m. (2008). what does china think?. 1st ed. united states: public affairs. mu, c. (2012). why the ccp won't abandon mao zedong thought. the diplomat. 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(2011). 辛亥革命与中华民族的觉醒 (xinhai geming yu zhonghua minzu de juexing). 1st ed. guangzhou: guangdong renmin chubanshe, pp.93. sina news, (1999). 中国驻南联盟大使馆8 日晨6时被炸 (zhongguo zhu nanlianmeng dashiguan 8ri chen 6shi bei zha. [online] available at: http://news.sina.com.cn/world/9905/050 817.html [accessed 5 jun. tyler, p. (1997). deng xiaoping: a political wizard who put china on the capitalist road. new york times. [online] available at: http://www.nytimes.com/learning/gener al/onthisday/bday/0822.html [accessed 5 jun. 2014]. mailto:dhn705@gmail.com. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/06/opi http://www.opendemocracy.net/william http://news.xinhuanet.com/18cpcnc/2 http://thediplomat.com/2012/11/whyhttp://www.chinausfocus.com/politicalhttp://books.google.co.id/books?id=ahg http://news.sina.com.cn/world/9905/050 http://www.nytimes.com/learning/gener explaining the fast-growing textile and garment industries (tgi) in vietnam (2000-2015) sukmawani bela pertiwi bina nusantara university, indonesia abstract the goal of this research is to explain the fast-growing textile and garment industries (tgi) in vietnam from 2000 to 2015. this research is important in the context of indonesia’s competition with vietnam as among top tgi exporters in the world. this research adopted gereffi’s global commodity chains (gccs) framework which situates tgi under the category of buyerdriven chains. under this category, actors, both government and industry, interested in industrial upgrading must develop both forward (marketing) and backward (production) linkages and learning process between this continuum. this research found that vietnam’s fast growing textile and garment industries from 2000-2015 has been contributed by the government’s successful industrial upgrading through its learning process in developing forward and backward linkages. following these findings, therefore, indonesia as competitor must also develop similar attitude and learning process in both linkages. key words: textile, garment, vietnam, global commodity chains, industrial upgrading journal of asean studies, vol. 5, no. 2 (2017), pp. 157-169 doi: 10.21512/jas.v5i2.4508 ©2017 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic 158 explaining the fast-growing textile and garment industries (tgi) in vietnam (2000-2015) introduction the last two decades have been a remarkable history in vietnam economy in which the country has grown from one of the least developed countries in southeast asia to one of the fastest growing nation in the region. the gdp annual growth peaked in 2007 when it reached $8.5 billion as high as singapore (asean secretariat, 2010). and, even though its economic growth was slightly down during the global financial crisis 2008-2010, the trend afterwards has been consistently increasing compared to those of china and its neighboring countries (wto, n.d.) (chi, 2016). overall, vietnam economy has grown from only us$31 billion in 2000 to us$193 billion in 2015, an increase which is more than 500% in only 15 years (wto, n.d.). its textile and garment industries (tgi) which recently has substituted crude oil and gas as the country’s primary export also experienced a tremendous growth with 20% annual growth rate from 2000 (aftex, 2010) and increased to 30% since 2005 (wto, 2011). after the financial crisis, vietnam’s tgi remains the world fastest growing industry with 17% increase from 2010-2015, far exceeding china which, despite maintained as the world largest textile and garment exporter, its annual growth stuck in the level of 6% (wto, 2016). in terms of access to the world largest markets, vietnam now ranks the second after china as the textile and garment supplier for the united states (u.s.) and japan (wits, n.d.). it is also one of the biggest ten exporters for european union (eu) market in the last decade with its export volume continues to increase considerably (vinatex, 2011). with all the above development, textile and garment industries play pivotal role for vietnam economy, not only contributing to half of its manufacture export but also to 2.5 million employments for local people (chi, 2016). this development of vietnam’s tgi has undeniably posed significant challenges to other tgi exporting countries especially indonesia which is also among 10 largest tgi exporters in the world and the second largest in the region after vietnam. however, the growth of indonesia’s tgi has been stagnant since 2010 with 0% growth in 2010-2015. vietnam’s tgi growth, in this regards, could be treated as the biggest competitor for indonesia, but at the same time also an example to learn how to survive in the tgi industry. against this backdrop, this research aimed to analyze this major development of vietnamese textile and garment industries from 2000 to 2015, particularly how the government promote this national growth of its tgi. the year 2000 is chosen because this period marked the beginning of significant growth in vietnam’ tgi, while the cutoff in 2015 is chosen to help making better observation on the object of study which would be otherwise difficult if it is conducted on the ongoing period (2018). several works have been made to study the vietnam’s growing textile and garment industries in the previous decade from 1990-2000 (tran, 1996) (nguyen & le, 2005) but the trend of development after 2000 has been very different both in term of size and factors involved. the changing international environment, particularly, has contributed to the major leap for vietnamese textile and garment industries. yet still, those studying tgi growth after 2000 focus only on particular aspect of tgi such as coloration (phong & journal of asean studies 159 thong, 2008) and particular partners countries such as comparison of vietnam’s export to the u.s., japan, and the eu (goto, natsuda, & thoburn, 2011). these studies also focus on individual companies rather than focus on the strategy conducted by vietnamese government to promote the growth of vietnamese tgi internationally, which is more useful for the purpose of giving feedback to indonesian government. it is for this reason; this study intends to fill this gap. the past research, however, has introduced basis for theoretical framework to analyze textile and garment industry which could be maintained for this research. common among the past research was the adoption of gary gereffi’s global commodity chains (gccs) (gereffi, 1999) as a tool of analysis. this framework principally looks at global economy as a commodity chain consisting of designing, producing, and marketing activities (gereffi, 1999). in gccs, the chain is divided into producer-driven chain in which the large producers have more power in influencing the chain through its large capital reserve and technological advancement and buyerdriven chain in which buyers, marketers, and retailers have more say within the chain through its value added learning process. the dominance of buyers and marketers have created pressures in reducing production costs which make the main characteristics for the latter category is its labor intensive production such as apparent in the textile and garment industry. another characteristic of this category is what he termed as ‚geographical expansion‛ or ‚multilayer source network (gereffi, 1999). this phenomenon occurs when the production in particular countries has arisen which makes buyers, marketers, and retailers shift their production to other countries with cheaper production cost. this phenomenon is what determines the dynamics in buyer driven chain and the one that enables one country to move up the ladder within the chain. this occurs because buyers, marketers, and retailers tend to retain the previous producing countries as their ‚middle men‛ in their relations with the new outsourced countries. this is the aspect from gereffi’s framework that most of the past researches have focused on. of course, this systemic cause is not the only way one country could move up the ladder of buyer-driven chain. gereffi suggests that countries aim to upgrade its industry within the chain must also develop its agency role in influencing the chain by strengthening its forward and backward linkages. the first refers to the strategy of identifying and expanding its consumer and marketing network, while the latter refers to the strategy of strengthening its production system and network. while the main actor in this chain is firms within tgi, but this theory could also be applied in the government, meaning the government could also help developing forward and backward linkages to help its domestic industry moving up the ladder of chain. this is often the case as the character of tgi, as henrik schaumburg-muller noted, ‚has hardly ever been characterized by free trade arrangements where comparative advantages would alone be the main driver for the location of production and distribution of exports‛ (schaumburg-muller, 2009). the durability of multi-fiber agreement (mfa) which set quota for trade in textile and garment from 1974 to 2005 is a telling evidence on the government intervention tendency in this industry. even though mfa has been terminated, but various 160 explaining the fast-growing textile and garment industries (tgi) in vietnam (2000-2015) individual government measures are also introduced to protect their market particularly against the competitive pressure from china’s tgi and the more open market which makes tgi in the post mfa often subject to government intervention (schaumburg-muller, 2009). in addition, the dynamics of this industry is also highly influenced by macro economy of a country particularly in relations to labor wages, therefore, the role of government is significant in tgi development of a country and it is also the reason why discussions on tgi use country as the main reference. based on this explanation, it is my contention here that the fast-growing textile and garment industry in vietnam from 2000 to 2015 cannot be separated from two major factors of vietnam industrial upgrading strategy. first, the given character of geographical expansion in this buyer-driven chain has benefited vietnam as the neighboring country when the production cost is rising in china and consumers relocate their production base. second, in addition to this advantage, vietnam also plays agency role in establishing forward and backward linkage. all these factors, in the end, contribute to the development of vietnam textile and garment industry and its industrial upgrading in the global commodity chain. methods in testing this hypothesis, this research was conducted in two stages. the first was literature study on the development of textile and garment industries in vietnam to establish context within which this study was undertaken, to demonstrate the importance of these industries to vietnam, and to illustrate the significant growth that the industries have reached in the past decade. the second stage, then, analyzed the factors underlying the rapid development of tgi in vietnam since 2000 to 2015 particularly from the side of government’s strategy in promoting this growth using the framework of global commodity chains (gccs). the gcc framework itself could be summarized using the following diagram. graph 1. vietnam’s tgi in gcc framework in collecting data on government strategy to promote tgi growth, this research primarily relied on desk study to collect both primary data provided by relevant vietnamese government websites and secondary data from scholarly literatures and media. it is the analysis of sistemic factor: geographical expansion agency factor: 1. forward linkage 2. backward linkage journal of asean studies 161 these data using the framework that will lead to conclusion. result and discussion in line with the above method, the result of this research would be divided into two parts: findings on the historical development of textile and garment industries in vietnam and analysis of the fast-growing tgi industries in vietnam using gcc framework. historical development of textile and garment industries in vietnam textile and garment are both old commodities in international trade dating back to the early silk route which interlinked traders from afro-eurasian to the eastern part of asia. yet, it was not until the industrial revolution in the late 18th century in england that the modern textile and garment industries come into existence (simones, 2005). the newly industrial countries came afterward in europe such as united kingdom, french, and the netherlands were all expanding their textile industry as the backbone of their economy throughout the world (simones, 2005). it is within this context that french, during his colonization in vietnam (1802-1945), built the first textile factory named nam dinh in the red river delta in the northern part of the country (institute of economics, 2001). as explained extensively by a.n. tran (tran, 1996), after the reunification of southern and northern vietnam under the socialist republic of vietnam in 1975, vietnam textile and garment industries were controlled by the government who exported 90% of the textile production to soviet union and eastern europe under the agreement of the so-called council for mutual economic assistance (cmea) (tran, 1996). this export which mainly in form of military uniforms were exported to pay for foreign debt and to seek assistance for the country’s development fund (tran, 1996). in the late 1980s, the government announced doi moi policy which would be the foundation for the development of the vietnam’s future economy. this policy not only opened the door of its domestic market to private and foreign investment but also redirected the country’s economy into export-oriented production. since then, thousands of private firms and foreign-owned companies were flooding vietnamese industries in terms of textile and garments (tran, 1996). nevertheless, the disintegration of soviet union which has been the only market for vietnam over the past decade has suspended the prospect for growth. the rest of 1990-2000 is the account of how the country rebuilt its textile and garment industries and its overall economy in general. tran explained that the signing of trade agreement with the eu in 1992 and the lifting of u.s. embargo have revived the textile and garment industries in vietnam by opening alternative markets outside the communist countries (tran, 1996). this trade has significantly increased the textile and garment export from 2404 million dollars in 1990 to 7000 million dollars in 1996 (tran, 1996). it should be noted, however, that in the trade with the european union, vietnam’s role was limited in manufacturing because europe still relied on their east asian partners whom they thought was more reputable in supplying material, management, and quality control (tran, 1996). from this trade, vietnam only earned 4% of the total price which still continue to decrease due to economic crisis hitting asia since 1997 (tran, 1996). 162 explaining the fast-growing textile and garment industries (tgi) in vietnam (2000-2015) graph 2. vietnam export from 2000-2015 (us$ billion) source: adopted from wits (n.d.) it is only in 2000 that the export of textile and garment in vietnam stabilized and consistently growing as shown in graph 2. the signing of bilateral free trade agreement with u.s. in 2000 which concurrent with the implementation of asean free trade area have quadrupled vietnam export from only $1.3 billion in the late 1990s to almost $4 billion in 2004. vietnam accession to wto also followed by the dramatic increase both in export and foreign direct investment which culminated in 2008. that year, vietnam export reached $9.082 billion (aftex, 2010) and the fdi scored in $10.6 billion (tran, 1996). it is only in 2009 that vietnam export decreased slightly to $9.01 billion due to global financial crisis. yet in overall, despite china still dominated the textile and garment industry; vietnam managed to be the fastest growing exporter of both commodities and its growth consistently increases from 2000-2015. gcc analysis on vietnam’s fast growing tgi from gccs point of view, the fastgrowing export of vietnamese textile and garment industries cannot be separated from the nature and activities along the global commodity chain and the government responses to those dynamics which determine the overall performance of export and import as will be explained below. the nature and activities along the chain the buyer-driven chain such as textile and garment are highly competitive. fashion world changes so quickly, and thus buyer always searches for producer who can deliver their product on time with the production cost as low as possible. as this industry is labor intensive, wages are very important element in the calculation of total production cost (simones, 2005). it is for this reason that producers are very responsive to the rising cost of production. the nature of the production which does not require a great deal of capital and technology makes journal of asean studies 163 them easy to move to other places where labors are abundant and cheap. the period of 2000 to 2015 in global textile and garment chain witnessed the primacy of china as the number one exporter of textile and garment commodity, rising from 10.4% share of the total world export to 39.3% in 2015 pushing aside the eu in the second place (wto, 2016). the end of the mfa which has previously restricted the quota of textile and garment industries from developed to developing countries, however, had dual impacts for china. in the one hand, it helped china to increase the already high export of tgi to developed markets. china, indeed, enjoy comparative advantage of abundant and cheap labor whose wages account for only 9% of those in the developed countries (wright, sahni, & zamora, 2011). in the other hand, however, it also increased china’s competitors from other developing countries who also enjoyed this new policy. the rising living cost in coastal china whose consumer price index (cpi) increased considerably 15% from 2010 to 2015 (wto, n.d.), the aging population, and the better educated young generation have contributed to the beginning of scarcity and increasing wages in china’s labor up to 20% since 2000 (wright, sahni, & zamora, 2011) and even 80% since 2010 (lomas, 2017). despite many foreign companies maintained their operations in china or moving inland where labors are cheaper, there have been many companies relocating their production base to other countries. chinese firms themselves also began to build their subsidiaries in their neighboring countries whose labor wages were less than those in china. this is definitely benefiting vietnam as the neighboring country which has been flooded by 90 companies relocating from china (china economic review, 2011). the labor productivity in vietnam, as reported by asian productivity organization, is below the labor productivity in china (apo, 2012) and other asean countries (vietnamnet, 2016). nevertheless, their wages is less than a quarter that of chinese workers (wright, sahni, & zamora, 2011) (the economist, 2015). thus, in the case of significant increase of wages in china which makes the country lost its cost advantage, it is profitable for companies to relocate or build subsidiaries in the lowercost countries such as vietnam (wright, sahni, & zamora, 2011). and compared to other southeast asian countries, vietnam is relatively stable country with government policies support the business environment (department for international trade, 2018). according to world bank’s doing business report which measures ‚the ease of doing business‛ across countries, vietnam ranks higher than indonesia, the philippines, laos, and the average of east asia & pacific (world bank, 2017). it is located in coastal area and the most important is geographically close to china. the last mentioned is particularly important for those who intend to build subsidiaries and thus minimize the transportation cost and more rapid delivery of product which are important in fashion industry. this comparative advantage as an ‘alternative to china’ has ultimately attracted many foreign investment coming to vietnam during the last decade. these fdi-invested enterprises are accounted for 25% of total textile and garment enterprises in vietnam with their export accounted for 60% of the total vietnam export on both commodities 164 explaining the fast-growing textile and garment industries (tgi) in vietnam (2000-2015) (vietnam chamber of commerce & industry, 2012). the major countries which shared the majority of these fdi-invested enterprises are korea, japan, taiwan, hong kong, malaysia, and the u.s. (vietnam chamber of commerce & industry, 2012). in addition to this international dynamic along the commodity chain which contributed to the rising vietnam textile and garment industry, the government response to those dynamics is also another importance factor affecting the performance of vietnam export. since 2000, vietnamese government has made significant effort to upgrade the position of the country in gccs both through the forward linkage and the backward linkage which also contribute substantially to the fast-growing export of textile and garment industries. forward linkage as the buyer driven chain emphasizes the importance of buyers in determining the dynamics within the production chain, forward linkage to better identify and engage the buyers are crucial for producer. in 2000, vietnam government signed bilateral free trade agreement (bta) with the u.s. which followed by bilateral agreement on textile in 2003. these two agreements have been a milestone for the subsequent development of vietnam tgi’s since the u.s. is the largest market for both commodities. this bta decreased the tariff for vietnam product to the u.s. from 40% to only 3% and thus allowing a significant increase for vietnam commodities which have long been excluded from u.s. market since the end of the war (simones, 2005). during this decade, more than 50% of vietnam textile exports are directed to the u.s. (simones, 2005) and thus it is not only that the u.s. is the first destination for vietnam export but vietnam also ranks the second textile exporter to the u.s. (vitas, 2011). this substantial rise in the trend of vietnam-u.s. trade can be seen from zero in 1997 to us$10,000 million in 2007 or in only a decade (fukase, 2012). vietnam’s export to the u.s. in merchandise alone (where tgi is part of) has increased drastically from zero to almost 35 billion usd in 2015 (martin, 2016). while the bta with the u.s. has been better explaining the fast-growing vietnam textile export in the first half of 2000s, the second half record was much contributed to the vietnam accession to wto in 2007. this membership is important in at least three ways. first, it included vietnam in the most favor nation rule where its products are no longer subject to discrimination and quota, but instead, abide to the same wto regulation (ciem, 2010). second and still related to the first, this membership opened access to major market such as u.s., china, and european union. third, the domestic adjustment made by the government in order to apply for the membership has also indirectly improved the business environment in vietnam (ciem, 2010). after its accession to wto, there are some major changes in vietnam overall performance. first, there was structural change in vietnam export commodity from the previously dominated by natural-based commodity or agriculture to manufactured based commodity (ciem, 2010). it occurred because vietnam’s entry into free trade area or nearly perfect competition market will weaken the competitiveness of any agricultural product. it is only the differentiated or value-added commodities journal of asean studies 165 such as manufacture that may benefited from this market. it is proven in case of textile and garment industries which competitiveness increased up to 80.6% after its accession to wto (ciem, 2010). second, there are widening in terms of trading partners and deepening in the terms of cooperation. it implies that there are more countries trading and investing in vietnam and that the cooperation with these countries has also increased in size. third, the fdi received by vietnam increased considerably from only $1.3 billion in 2000 to $11.8 billion in 2015 with the most significant increase in 2006–2008 where the fdi grew from us$2.4 billion to us$9.6 billion (world bank, 2018). the fact that the highest fdi peaked in 2008 demonstrated investors’ confidence on vietnam economy with its eventual accession to wto. the fdi growth rate in manufacture which composed mostly by textile and garment industries has also grown from only 1.9% in 2004 to 34.2% in 2007 (ciem, 2010). after vietnam’s accession to wto, vietnam also actively signed trade agreements under the framework of asean free trade, for example, with india, australia, new zealand, south korea, china, and japan; bilateral trade agreements in which vietnam as individual country signed with chile, japan, south korea, and eurasian economic union (vietnam news, 2017); and also regional trade arrangements such as tpp. while their specific impacts to vietnam’s tgi still need to be examined, these agreements have provided alternatives of markets for vietnam’s tgi which is very important in maintaining its forward linkages in this period. backward linkage in addition to the forward linkage to expand vietnam’s tgi market, government responds to competition also through backward linkage to enhance its supply chain. despite vietnam gained unintended benefit from china’s rising cost of production, china remains one of the major competitor for vietnam in terms of the availability of supply, technology, and production efficiency which are needed in the fashion industry. china so far remains the largest source for vietnam’s imports in its tgi accounting for almost 44% of its total tgi import (wits, 2018). it is for this reason that vietnam joined other asean members in the asean federation of textile industries which are currently focusing on how to implement regional supply chain which offers fullpackage supply under the scheme named safsa (source asean full service alliance) (invest in asean, 2018). with the establishment of asean community, goods and services are free moving among member countries. as each of them has their own comparative advantage both in terms of material and expertise, specializing in those specific areas and cooperate with others to fulfill the market demand will be better-off for all parties. for vietnam, this cooperation has increased the export of some of the most popular commodities such as synthetic filament yarn, cotton yarn and synthetic fiber yarn up to tenfold from 2002 to 2009 (aftex, 2010). for example, the export volume of the first mentioned commodity rose from $3.6 million in 2002 to $48.7 million in 2009 (aftex, 2010). apart from that, vietnam also benefited from getting better quality material from asean countries which cannot be provided by 166 explaining the fast-growing textile and garment industries (tgi) in vietnam (2000-2015) domestic producers. the asean supply for synthetic staple fiber for example increases 300-fold over seven year’s period (aftex, 2010). the supply for synthetic filament yarn also increased almost doubly from $53 million to $90 million in the same period (aftex, 2010). conclusion based on the above findings and discussion, there are at least two conclusions that could be drawn. first, the findings of this research have well supported the hypothesis of this research that vietnam’s fast-growing textile and garment industries reflects its successful industrial upgrading in the global commodity chain. however, in contrast to the dominant readings which look at this upgrading more because of the systemic factor within the gcc that is china’s increased labor wage which unavoidably prompted investors to shift their production to vietnam, this paper demonstrates that vietnamese government also has agency role in helping its tgi in expanding its forward and backward linkages. the forward linkage has been focused on capitalizing the normalization of u.s.vietnam trade under bta, vietnam’s accession to wto, and other fta and regional arrangements such as tpp and its successor. meanwhile the backward linkage has been focused on building stronger supply chain with other asean countries. this strategy not only helps vietnam meeting its demand for raw materials, but also helps it reduce its dependence on china and minimize competition with other asean countries. as the ultimate purpose of this paper is to offer insight for indonesia’s government on vietnam’s strategy in relations to its tgi, indonesia could also adopt similar strategy to develop its currently stagnant tgi growth. about the author sukmawani bela pertiwi is a lecturer and subject content coordinator for regionalism and globalization at the department of international relations, bina nusantara university. she graduated from the school of international service (sis), american university, washington, d.c. she previously worked as lecturer at the department of international relations and as researcher at the center for southeast asian social studies and institute of international relations, all in universitas gadjah mada. her research interests include regionalism, asean, international security, and maritime security. references aftex. 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https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.mktp.kd.zg?end=2015&locations=vn-cn&start=2000 journal of asean studies, vol. 11, no. 1 (2023), pp.89−109 issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic received: 9th january 2023/ revised: 5th april 2023/ accepted: 1st may 2023 institutional dynamics of halal tourism development in indonesia and malaysia budiman mahmud musthofa1, diaz pranita2, mohamad sattarrasul3, banu muhammad haidlir4 1,2vocational program universitas indonesia, depok, indonesia 3stem enculturation research center, faculty of education, universiti kebangsaan malaysia, bangi, malaysia 4faculty of economics and business, universitas indonesia, depok, indonesia b.mahmud@ui.ac.id; d.pranita@ui.ac.id; drsattar@ukm.edu.my; banu.muhammad@ui.ac.id how to cite: musthofa, b. m., pranita, d., rasul, m. s., & haidlir, m. institutional dynamics of halal tourism development in indonesia and malaysia. journal of asean studies, 11(1), 89−109. https:/doi.org/10.21512/jas.v11i1.9431 abstract in the context of southeast asia, muslim-majority nations indonesia and malaysia had pioneered the development of halal tourism. nevertheless, malaysia has outperformed indonesia in cultivating its halal tourism industry. the research sought to investigate the political economy factors contributing to this discrepancy. the research posited that the emergence of islamic identity, the intensification of islam’s politicization, and the varying degrees of capitalizing on islamic values are three crucial determinants influencing the relative success of malaysia’s halal tourism industry compared to indonesia’s. firstly, the perception of islamic identity in malaysia is less threatening compared to that in indonesia. secondly, the politicization of islam is less pronounced in malaysia than in indonesia. to examine these assertions, the research utilized a methodological blend of primary and secondary data, incorporating interviews with policymakers and stakeholders of halal tourism in both countries. in addition to identifying the critical factors shaping the development of halal tourism, the research contributed by offering several recommendations concerning the innovative aspect of halal tourism branding. it was argued that within the growth of halal tourism in a nation, debates surrounding the emergence of islamic identity in aspects of halal tourism can potentially obstruct the advancement of cultural tourism commodities. consequently, the research enhances our understanding of the complex interplay between political economy factors and the evolution of halal tourism from an academic perspective. keywords: halal tourism development, institutional dynamics, indonesia, malaysia in p re ss mailto:b.mahmud@ui.ac.id; mailto:d.pranita@ui.ac.id; mailto:drsattar@ukm.edu.my; mailto:banu.muhammad@ui.ac.id 90 institutional dynamics introduction halal tourism, an intriguing concept for muslim and non-muslim nations alike, encompasses travel activities aligned with islamic teachings and values (slamet et al., 2022; battour et al., 2018; carboni et al., 2014; oktadiana et al., 2016) and is often considered a subset of religious tourism (el-gohary, 2016). the term “halal”, denoting permissibility in islamic teachings, forms the foundation of this understanding. muslims, encouraged to travel for both pilgrimage and leisure purposes, require accommodations, food, fashion, and medical care that comply with islamic principles (battour et al., 2018). despite its potential, halal tourism remains a relatively nascent phenomenon requiring further elucidation due to the potential economic, political, societal, and cultural implications arising from variations in islamic norms and religious beliefs (rasul, 2019). nevertheless, the halal tourism sector is anticipated to experience significant growth, as demonstrated by its increasing popularity in muslimmajority and non-muslim countries such as japan, china, south korea, and thailand (yousaf & xiucheng, 2018). governments have acknowledged this trend and are actively endorsing it as a branding strategy to bolster their economies (battour et al., 2018). malaysia and indonesia have emerged as pioneers in halal tourism development in southeast asia, attributable to several factors. firstly, both countries boast sizable muslim populations, facilitating the promotion and expansion of halal tourism. secondly, the malaysian and indonesian governments have recognized halal tourism’s economic potential, implementing policies and initiatives to support its growth. for instance, malaysia established the malaysia tourism promotion board in 1991, which has been instrumental in fostering the halal tourism industry (samori, salleh, & khalid, 2016). similarly, indonesia introduced the "wonderful indonesia" campaign in 2011 to promote its tourism industry, encompassing halal tourism (slamet et al., 2022). as popular tourist destinations, these predominantly muslim nations have witnessed significant economic growth due in part to halal tourism. since 2001, malaysia has consistently attracted tourists, courtesy of its supportive islamic environment, and has emerged as a model for other countries seeking to develop halal tourism. conversely, indonesia has recently initiated its halal tourism program as a strategic maneuver to stimulate local economic activity and entice more visitors. nonetheless, challenges persist in promoting halal tourism, particularly in indonesia, where its application in certain regions is deemed inappropriate due to ethnic and religious differences (slamet et al., 2022). additionally, the term “halal tourism” may incite discrimination, prompting the suggestion of “muslim-friendly tourism” as an alternative. despite these challenges, halal tourism represents a burgeoning trend warranting further investigation, especially concerning its development across various countries. this research endeavors to explore state-society relations’ role in shaping halal tourism development in indonesia and malaysia, as well as the extent to which islamic identity influences the success of these initiatives. the research aims to offer valuable insights and recommendations for countries aspiring to utilize halal tourism as a branding strategy and in p re ss journal of asean studies 91 attract more international tourists. by scrutinizing differences in the politicization of islam and the capitalization of islamic values, this research seeks to illuminate the critical factors contributing to malaysia’s thriving halal tourism industry and the obstacles indonesia encounters in implementing its program. ultimately, this investigation can serve as an invaluable resource for policymakers and marketers endeavoring to enhance their halal tourism strategies and capitalize on this expanding trend. the research posits that several factors are instrumental in explaining malaysia’s superior success compared to indonesia in the halal tourism sector. specifically, the emergence of islamic identity, the politicization of islam, and the degree of capitalization of islamic values are argued to be crucial in this context. malaysia is suggested to exhibit lower levels of islam’s politicization compared to indonesia, and non-muslim majority countries tend to perceive halal tourism as part of the state’s responsibility in improving the political economy. by comprehending these factors, governments and countries marketing halal tourism can derive valuable insights and recommendations that can help augment the influx of international tourists. the remainder of the research is organized as to: 1) provide a literature review on halal tourism, its potential growth, and the challenges it faces; 2) outline the research methodology employed, which includes the use of primary and secondary data, as well as interviews with policymakers and stakeholders in the halal tourism industry in both indonesia and malaysia; 3) present the findings of the study, which highlights the crucial factors contributing to the development of halal tourism in these countries and the implications of islamic identity on their success; 4) discuss the results in the context of the broader literature and offers recommendations for policymakers and marketers aiming to capitalize on the growing trend of halal tourism; and 5) conclude the article by summarizing the main findings and discussing the potential avenues for future research in this domain. through this comprehensive examination of the halal tourism industry in indonesia and malaysia, the research aims to contribute to the scholarly understanding of the interplay between political economy factors, islamic identity, and the development of halal tourism. by providing practical recommendations for nations looking to promote halal tourism as part of their branding strategy, this research seeks to foster the sustainable growth of this burgeoning sector, ensuring that it remains an inclusive and accessible avenue for tourists from diverse backgrounds. literature review the nexus between halal tourism and islamic identity has piqued the interest of scholars in recent years. as a vital social institution, religion significantly influences individuals’ and society’s attitudes, values, and behavior, leading to an evident connection between religion and tourism, particularly in the context of halal tourism (el-gohary, 2016). though a relatively nascent concept, halal tourism has been the subject of extensive debate among researchers. in p re ss 92 institutional dynamics nonetheless, existing literature has established that it encompasses the provision of products and services catering to muslim tourists’ travel needs while adhering to islamic teachings and values (mohsin et al., 2016). derived from arabic, the term “halal” denotes permissible actions according to islamic teachings, whereas “haram” refers to proscribed actions. within islamic teachings, halal represents moral behavior encompassing all aspects of life, such as clothing, language, food, and drink (vargas-sánchez & moral-moral, 2018). consequently, halal tourism entails the delivery of travel products and services aligned with islamic principles and values, necessitating adherence to islamic teachings and customs during development and marketing processes (battour et al., 2018). as adherents of islam, muslims are encouraged to travel in accordance with religious teachings, extending beyond hajj or umrah to encompass recreation, socialization, and appreciation for all of god’s creation (oktadiana et al., 2016). hence, halal tourism plays a crucial role in reinforcing islamic identity and values among muslim travelers. several studies have explored the dimensions of halal tourism and its implications for destination marketing and management (henderson, 2016; samori et al., 2016). these studies have identified various challenges and opportunities for the growth of the halal tourism industry, such as the need for standardized certification processes, accommodation and food services that cater to muslim tourists, and the importance of cultural sensitivity in marketing strategies (battour & ismail, 2016; jafari & scott, 2014). furthermore, research has underscored the importance of understanding the diverse preferences and expectations of muslim tourists, who represent a heterogeneous market segment with distinct cultural, ethnic, and national backgrounds (el-gohary, 2016; oktadiana et al., 2020). in summary, the literature review indicates a robust relationship between halal tourism and islamic identity. grounded in islamic principles and values, halal tourism constitutes a vital component of the tourism industry for muslim travelers. it reinforces islamic identity and values among muslim tourists, offering them opportunities to partake in travel activities compatible with their religious teachings. this growing body of research underlines the need for further investigation into the development of halal tourism in various contexts, as well as the factors that contribute to its success or failure in different countries. islam and politicization the development of halal tourism faces various challenges, as noted in the literature. one of the primary management challenges is related to the lack of standardization and certification in the halal tourism industry. due to the absence of a universal halal certification and accreditation system, different interpretations of what constitutes halal exist, leading to confusion and distrust among muslim tourists. another management challenge is the limited availability of halal tourism products and services, which results in a lack of market diversity and ultimately reduces the appeal of halal tourism. in p re ss journal of asean studies 93 in addition to the challenges, another critical management challenge in developing halal tourism is human resource management. the success of halal tourism heavily relies on the quality of services provided to muslim travelers, which, in turn, depends on the quality of human resources available in the tourism industry. a key debate in the literature surrounding human resource management in the context of halal tourism is whether a specific set of skills or knowledge related to islamic practices and culture is necessary. some argue that specialized training and knowledge are required to cater to muslim travelers' specific needs, such as halal food preparation, prayer facilities, and appropriate dress codes. others, however, argue that the fundamental principles of good customer service and hospitality are universal and should be the main focus of human resource management in the halal tourism industry. another issue related to human resource management in halal tourism is the availability of qualified staff, particularly in muslim-minority countries. in countries where muslims are a minority, it may be challenging to find staff with the necessary knowledge and skills to cater to muslim travelers’ needs. this can be particularly difficult in areas such as food preparation, where there may be a lack of understanding of halal certification and the specific requirements of halal food production. moreover, language skills can also pose a challenge for the tourism industry in catering to muslim travelers. as the majority of muslim travelers are non-native english speakers, staff proficient in other languages, such as arabic or urdu, may be necessary to communicate effectively with these tourists. addressing these challenges in human resource management in the halal tourism industry requires a proactive approach to recruitment, training, and staff development. employers need to invest in staff training to ensure employees possess the necessary skills and knowledge to provide high-quality services to muslim travelers. additionally, recruitment efforts should target individuals with the required language and cultural skills. finally, promoting diversity and inclusivity in the tourism industry will help attract and retain qualified staff from diverse backgrounds. economic challenges in developing halal tourism are also significant. firstly, the high cost of halal certification for businesses and service providers is a substantial barrier to entry, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises (smes). secondly, the lack of investment in infrastructure and technology needed to cater to muslim tourists’ specific needs, such as halal food and prayer facilities, may reduce the attractiveness of halal tourism destinations. thirdly, halal tourism development requires considerable investment in research and development, product design, and marketing, which may not be feasible for some destinations. marketing is a significant challenge in developing halal tourism, as it requires targeting a specific niche market with unique needs and preferences. the promotion and marketing of halal tourism must focus on ensuring that the target audience is aware of the provided facilities and services, and that the destination can meet their requirements. in p re ss 94 institutional dynamics one of the main challenges in marketing halal tourism is the lack of standardization and regulation of halal tourism products and services. this leads to difficulties in promoting and marketing halal tourism products and services, as it is challenging to determine whether a particular product or service is halal or not. this challenge could potentially lead to a loss of trust and confidence in halal tourism products and services, negatively impacting the industry. another challenge in marketing halal tourism is the competition between halal tourism destinations. with the increasing demand for halal tourism, many destinations are entering the market, creating fierce competition. destinations must differentiate themselves and create a unique selling proposition to attract halal tourists. additionally, the lack of marketing expertise and funding for promoting halal tourism is a significant challenge. many countries have not yet developed the necessary marketing strategies and campaigns to effectively promote their halal tourism products and services. furthermore, due to limited resources and funding, many countries are unable to compete with other destinations in terms of marketing efforts. these factors might indeed provide an insightful explanation of the challenges in developing halal tourism. the research focuses on how the politicization of islam by the state has influenced the development of halal tourism. many muslim-majority countries have recognized the potential of halal tourism and have actively promoted it as a means of economic development. however, the state’s politicization of islam can significantly impact the development of halal tourism. in many muslim-majority countries, the state plays a crucial role in regulating and promoting halal tourism. for example, in malaysia, the government has established a halal tourism unit to oversee the development and promotion of halal tourism (arshad et al., 2019). similarly, in indonesia, the government has created a halal tourism development acceleration team to support the growth of this sector (santoso et al., 2022). these government initiatives reflect the increasing politicization of islam in these countries, where the promotion of halal tourism is seen as a way to showcase their islamic identity and strengthen their position in the global muslim community. furthermore, in many muslim-majority countries, the government has used islam as a political tool to gain legitimacy and support from the population. as a result, they have promoted the development of halal tourism as a way of attracting muslim tourists and promoting themselves as islamic states. in some cases, the state has used halal tourism as a way to promote a particular political agenda. for example, in malaysia, the government has promoted halal tourism as a means of promoting a conservative islamic identity and countering the influence of western culture. this politicization of islam can create tensions within the tourism industry and may limit the potential growth of halal tourism. furthermore, the state’s role in regulating halal tourism can also affect its development. in some cases, the state may impose strict regulations on halal tourism to maintain a certain level of religious authenticity. this can create challenges for businesses in the tourism industry, particularly those that are not based in muslim-majority countries (el-gohary, 2016). however, there are also examples of states that have successfully promoted halal tourism in p re ss journal of asean studies 95 without politicizing islam or imposing overly restrictive regulations. for example, in turkey, the government has promoted halal tourism to attract muslim tourists without promoting a specific political agenda (elaziz & kurt, 2017). this approach has allowed for the development of a thriving halal tourism industry in turkey. the politicization of islam can also have negative impacts on the development of halal tourism. halal tourism can be used as an agenda for political islam because it provides a platform for promoting islamic values and practices in the tourism industry. as halal tourism is focused on providing services and facilities that comply with islamic principles, it can be used as a means to promote a particular version of islam that political islamists favor. for example, in some countries, the strict interpretation of islamic laws can limit the development of certain types of tourism activities, such as entertainment and nightlife, which may not be considered halal. this can limit the diversity of tourism products and experiences available to muslim travelers, potentially hindering the halal tourism sector. in countries where political islam is dominant, halal tourism can be used to promote islamic values and practices to reinforce the islamic identity of society. this can lead to an increase in the use of islamic dress codes, segregation of genders, and the promotion of islamic teachings in public spaces. it can also lead to the adoption of shariah laws in the tourism industry, which can impact the behavior and practices of tourists who visit these countries. furthermore, halal tourism can be used to support the development of the local islamic economy and to promote the interests of islamic business owners, which can further reinforce the islamic identity of the society. this can also lead to the marginalization of non-muslims and the exclusion of other cultural and religious groups from the tourism industry. overall, the relationship between the state and the politicization of islam can have a significant impact on the development of halal tourism. states that are able to promote halal tourism without politicizing islam or imposing overly restrictive regulations are likely to experience the most success in this area. in conclusion, the state and politicization of islam have played a significant role in the development of halal tourism. while government initiatives have helped to promote this sector and increase its economic and social benefits, the strict interpretation of islamic laws in some countries may limit its growth potential. as the global muslim population continues to grow, the development of halal tourism is likely to remain an important area of focus for governments and tourism stakeholders around the world. in order to foster the growth of halal tourism, it is essential for governments and industry stakeholders to recognize the potential pitfalls of politicizing islam and implement strategies to promote inclusivity and diversity in the sector. this may involve creating clear and consistent guidelines for halal tourism providers, promoting cultural exchange and understanding, and ensuring that the needs of all tourists, regardless of their religious beliefs, are taken into consideration. by addressing these challenges and embracing the opportunities presented by the growing demand for halal tourism, the industry has the potential to thrive and contribute significantly to the global tourism landscape. in p re ss 96 institutional dynamics methodology the research aims to examine how the politicization of islam may hinder the development of halal tourism. in achieving the goal, the research compares the trajectories of halal tourism development in indonesia and malaysia, both predominantly muslim countries and popular halal tourism destinations. despite sharing many similarities, including the initiation of policies and activities to boost their economies and create jobs through halal tourism, the two countries exhibit differences in the reception of the concept. specifically, halal tourism faces resistance in certain regions of indonesia, while such opposition is absent in malaysia. by comparing these divergent paths, the research seeks to shed light on the ways in which the politicization of islam can impede the development of halal tourism. this research employs a qualitative comparative case study design, focusing on indonesia and malaysia. this approach enables a deeper understanding of the complex interplay between the politicization of islam and the development of halal tourism in both countries. primary data is gathered through semi-structured interviews with relevant stakeholders in indonesia and malaysia. in indonesia, we will interview informants from the ministry of tourism, as well as tourism stakeholders in jakarta, lombok, and west sumatera. in malaysia, interview is implemented with policymakers from the ministry of tourism, particularly those involved in islamic tourism, as well as representatives from tourism business associations and academics. the semi-structured interview format allows for flexibility in exploring the perceptions and experiences of the interviewees, while also maintaining a focus on key themes and topics. interviews conducted either in-person and via online platforms. in addition to the primary data, the research utilizes secondary data sources to enrich our understanding of the research topic. these sources include research articles, books, policy documents, and reports related to halal tourism and the politicization of islam in indonesia and malaysia. the data collected from the interviews are transcribed and analyzed using a thematic analysis approach. this method involves identifying, analyzing, and reporting patterns or themes within the data. the process of coding and categorizing the interview transcripts identifies key themes and sub-themes related to the politicization of islam and its impact on the development of halal tourism in both countries. the analysis is conducted in an iterative manner, allowing for constant comparison and refinement of emerging themes. to ensure the trustworthiness of our findings, the research employs strategies such as triangulation of data sources and member checking, where possible. this qualitative comparative case study seeks to provide valuable insights into the ways in which the politicization of islam can impede the development of halal tourism in indonesia and malaysia. by examining the experiences and perspectives of stakeholders in both countries, the research aims to contribute to the broader understanding of the challenges and opportunities in the halal tourism sector, and inform future policy and practice. in p re ss journal of asean studies 97 analysis halal tourism in indonesia and malaysia the tourism sector is the most important sector in the growth of the gross domestic product (gdp). therefore, it can be said that tourism has a significant role in contributing to economic growth in many countries. the expansion of the tourism sector, which became halal tourism, turned out to be the most popular in the market. hence, it is estimated that the development of the sharia tourism market segment will have the potential to continue growing in the future (keliat & sentanu, 2022). judging from the high interest in halal tourism in indonesia and malaysia, there is data to show that tourism revenues in indonesia averaged us$2334.90 million from 2010 until 2022, reaching an all-time high of us$4722.71 million in the third quarter of 2019 and a record low of us$76.94 million in the third quarter of 2021 (trading economics, 2023). in contrast, tourism revenues in malaysia averaged rm45242.76 million from 1998 until 2021, reaching an all-time high of rm86143.50 million in 2019 and a record low of rm238.73 million in 2021 (trading economics, 2023). based on the 2017 global muslim travel index, the muslim tourist travel market is declared a segment of the global travel industry that has very fast growth (slamet et al., 2022). with the rapid growth in the tourism industry, it is also estimated that the muslim population will be in the figure of 26% of the total population in the world by 2020. looking at indonesia and malaysia as pioneer countries for muslim tourist destinations and as the most visited countries, based on the 2022 global muslim travel index data, it is a fact that 2019 saw the highest record in global muslim tourist arrivals, with 160 million visiting indonesia. since the covid-19 pandemic in 2020, the number of muslim tourist visits has decreased, but it is estimated that the number of tourists visiting indonesia will reach 140 million in 2023 and return to 160 million in 2024. it is estimated that after the covid-19 pandemic, the number of global muslim tourists will continue to grow rapidly and reach 230 million in 2026 with expenditures of around us$225 billion. the malaysian government has also taken aggressive steps by targeting around 900 million muslim tourists to be able to visit malaysia after the covid-19 pandemic. based on the results of an interview with the minister of tourism, arts, and culture, datuk seri nancy shukri, the halal tourism industry had contributed to the economic sector as much as rm16.72 billion in the era before the covid-19 pandemic hit all corners of the world, with 5.3 million donations from the arrival of foreign tourists. malaysia is expected to become a country that can meet the needs of muslim tourists and there is no need to doubt its halal status, as the malaysian government has taken a bold and proactive step by targeting around 900 million muslim tourists visiting malaysia. indonesia and malaysia have successfully entered the gmti (global muslim travel index) ranking, which has named them muslim-friendly tourism destinations in the world. in p re ss 98 institutional dynamics malaysia is known as the world’s best halal tourism destination, based on the 2015 global muslim travel index (gmti) rating. being a muslim-majority country, it is recognized as a muslim-friendly country that is comparable to middle eastern countries famous for their muslim facilities. additionally, malaysia consistently instills islamic culture as a norm for the state. following the 9/11 incident, malaysia has witnessed a surge in tourism visits as it has become a popular destination for muslim tourists (samori et al., 2016). due to the strict regulations for muslim tourists visiting western countries, many of them have shifted their focus to asian countries where the majority of the population is muslim. malaysia has shown a remarkable growth rate in its muslim tourism market since 2001, which has been consistent over time. the government’s proactive approach towards promoting tourism has contributed to maintaining the number of tourist visits and has attracted muslim tourists, particularly from the middle east. the number of tourists from the middle east has created a profitable market niche for malaysia. in light of this, malaysia has been able to capitalize on the surge in tourism visits and maintain its position as a popular destination for muslim tourists. malaysia is the most popular travel destination for middle eastern countries and other countries such as turkey, owing to adequate travel facilities, prayer facilities, and halal food. the local government sustains socioeconomic status and cultural heritage to reflect that malaysia is the world’s most popular muslim tourist destination (samori et al., 2016). the malaysian government has developed strategies to satisfy the primary tourist market from the middle east. for instance, middle eastern tourists can easily find typical middle eastern food while in malaysia. there is no need to worry about language limitations, as the government encourages all tourism sectors and hotels to provide staff who can speak arabic. halal tourism in indonesia is a developing industry that has been gaining attention in recent years. indonesia, as the world’s largest muslim-majority country, has the potential to be a leader in the halal tourism industry. however, there have been challenges and controversies surrounding the development of halal tourism in the country. there is a growing market for halal tourism, with an increasing number of muslim travelers seeking destinations that cater to their religious and cultural needs. this has led to a push for the development of halal tourism in indonesia, with efforts to provide halal-certified food options, prayer facilities, and other amenities that cater to muslim travelers. the indonesian government has recognized the potential of halal tourism and has set a target to attract 5 million halal tourists by 2019. muslim travelers see indonesia as an attractive destination due to its large muslim population and the availability of halal tourism facilities and services. indonesia is the world’s largest muslim-majority country, with a population of over 270 million people, the vast majority of whom are muslims. as a result, indonesia is viewed as a natural destination for muslim travelers seeking halal-certified food, prayer facilities, and other services that cater to their religious needs. in p re ss journal of asean studies 99 in addition to the availability of halal tourism facilities, indonesia is a home to numerous cultural and natural attractions that are of interest to muslim travelers. these include historic mosques and islamic landmarks, beautiful beaches, and stunning natural landscapes. jakarta, the capital city of indonesia, has a vibrant muslim culture and is home to many mosques, halal restaurants, and other islamic attractions. in indonesia, jakarta is a popular tourist destination that attracts both domestic and international visitors, including those from the middle east, asean, asia, and europe. as reported in an interview on the jakarta moslem friendly tourism exhibition (jmfte) in 2022, muslim-friendly tourism is a key focus for indonesia and is expected to be promoted every year through events such as the jmfte. as the capital city, jakarta serves as a gateway for foreign tourists to indonesia, which is one of the largest muslim countries in the world and a leading destination for muslim-friendly tourism. to further promote the development of muslim-friendly tourism, the indonesian government is implementing various projects to attract muslim visitors to the country. one of the main efforts is to develop halal tourism destinations across different regions in indonesia, including dki jakarta, west sumatra, aceh, west nusa tenggara, west java, central java, east java, yogyakarta, riau, and south sulawesi. for instance, west sumatra has received recognition as the best halal tourism destination since 2016, while aceh and ntb have been designated as muslim-friendly tourist destinations due to their strong islamic religious background. in fact, ntb is the first province in indonesia to establish a halal tourism regulation, as reported by adinugraha et al. (2021). these efforts aim to expand the market niche of halal tourism in indonesia and cater to the specific needs and preferences of muslim tourists. the discussion highlights the emergence of the global market conditions in the tourism industry, particularly in the halal tourism segment, which has become a robust trade arena, presenting numerous opportunities for companies that can take advantage of the halalcertified product market. countries in the asian region, such as singapore, thailand, the philippines, south korea, and japan, are aware of the benefits of the development of halal products and have shown interest in the halal industrial market. however, despite the intention to build a halal industrial market in muslim minority countries, finding a restaurant with halal certification is still challenging in these countries, making it difficult for muslim tourists to find places to eat that guarantee the food is in accordance with islamic teachings. therefore, ensuring that muslim tourists feel protected and safe is a crucial consideration for both non-muslim and muslim countries. halal certification is one of the most critical factors in halal tourism resources, as it is the main key to attracting tourists to visit. authentic halal certification is usually provided by a government-controlled agency or an islamic organization that can test and certify that the product offered is legal for consumption by muslims. the halal logo on products being sold can increase their selling power, as it provides a guarantee to muslims and fosters a positive relationship between muslim tourists and the local state that cares about the needs of muslim tourists. in p re ss 100 institutional dynamics the most authoritative institution in providing halal certification in indonesia is the food, drug, and cosmetics institute of the indonesian ulema council (lppom mui), which was established in 1989 to assist the indonesian ulema council (mui) in the islamic sphere and has become the main institution in halal certification services in indonesia. this institution regulates everything related to halal certification and has the authority to grant halal certification to products and services. additionally, this institution provides guidelines and consulting services for companies and organizations that will provide muslim-friendly services, further promoting halal tourism in indonesia. in addition to indonesia, malaysia is also a leading country in halal certification for products and services. the malaysian islamic department (jakim) is the highest authority in malaysia to provide halal certification for products and services, including tourism products and services. the halal certification standard used in malaysia is the ms 1500:2004, which is based on islamic teachings and guidelines. jakim plays a crucial role in ensuring the quality of halal certification in malaysia, which is an important factor in attracting muslim tourists. with the growing demand for halal tourism, it is essential for countries to establish credible and authoritative institutions like jakim and lppom mui in indonesia to provide halal certification for products and services. this can not only attract muslim tourists but also promote trust and confidence among the local muslim communities and the broader halal industry. the concept of halal tourism, which was initially a concern for muslims, has now gained global attention, particularly in the business and industrial sectors. indonesia and malaysia, both muslim-majority countries, have recognized this tourism industry as an opportunity to increase the number of tourists. jakarta, a highly sought-after tourist destination, attracts not only domestic tourists but also visitors from the middle east, asean, asia, and europe. muslim-friendly tourism is one of indonesia’s mainstays and is expected to occur yearly, as highlighted in the 2022 jakarta moslem friendly tourism exhibition (jmfte) interview. jakarta is promoting muslim-friendly tourism through the jakarta moslem friendly tourism exhibition 2022, positioning itself as a market and a leading destination for muslim-friendly tourism. being the capital city of indonesia, jakarta serves as the gateway for foreign tourists to enter indonesia. malaysia has positioned itself as a top islamic tourist destination by offering products and services that align with islamic values (samori et al., 2016). in 2010, the country established halal certification standards for its product supply, including luxury and roadside restaurants. furthermore, the malaysian government continues to develop its facilities to provide an exceptional tourist experience. besides promoting halal certification, the government is constructing muslim-friendly hotels and prayer facilities in all shopping centers. indonesia has the potential to follow in malaysia’s footsteps in promoting halal tourism and becoming a muslim-friendly destination. the chairman of the indonesian halal tourism association (pphi), riyanto sofyan, suggests that dki jakarta, as the capital city of indonesia, can be maximized as a gateway for foreign tourists to enter indonesia. therefore, it is in p re ss journal of asean studies 101 necessary to promote jakarta as a muslim-friendly tourist destination. it should be noted that the concept of muslim-friendly tourism, formerly known as halal tourism, provides additional services and facilities for muslim tourists. however, it is essential to clarify that halal, sharia, or muslim-friendly tourism is not religious tourism. it is a travel concept that aims to cater to the needs of muslim tourists, including halal food, prayer facilities, and other cultural and religious considerations. therefore, the promotion of jakarta as a muslimfriendly destination is crucial in attracting muslim tourists and enhancing indonesia's tourism industry. despite the potential for halal tourism in indonesia, the concept is facing challenges that are not related to government regulations, unlike in malaysia. the main challenge in indonesia is the rejection of the halal tourism concept, which may be driven by the complex state-society relations in the country. in contrast, malaysia has not faced similar issues with the concept of halal tourism. the next section of this research examines the difference in statesociety relations between indonesia and malaysia, which has led to different paths in the development of halal tourism. differences in institutional and state-society aspects the emergence of halal tourism has brought attention to the rise of political islam, which positions itself as an awareness that muslims must maintain teachings that are in accordance with islamic values. this trend has gained global attention due to the economic benefits it provides. in indonesia, there are sharia regional regulations based on islamic law, which some consider a threat to the diversity and values of pancasila. the post-reform era has seen the passing of regional regulations with religious overtones at both the provincial and district/city levels. religion is a social institution that influences individuals’ attitudes, values, and behavior. previous studies viewed halal tourism as a novelty, but el-gohary (2016) views it as an old concept rooted in islamic sharia. while western countries generally separate religious beliefs from political and legal systems, this cannot be universally applied to countries where the majority of the population is muslim and where islamic law is a way of life. muslims who believe in the teachings of god or sharia are affected by political islam. halal tourism has a profound impact on the tourism industry, particularly in countries where islam is the majority religion. this trend has led to the promotion of sharia regional regulations and the rise of political islam. while some view this as a threat to diversity and values, others view it as a way to maintain islamic values and teachings. regardless, the impact of religion on society cannot be overlooked, and its influence on attitudes and behavior must be taken into account. when it comes to state-society aspects, the approaches to islam in malaysia and indonesia differ significantly. malaysia tends to take a more conservative approach towards islam. its islamic authorities have imposed restrictions on certain aspects of islamic practices in p re ss 102 institutional dynamics and beliefs, including the banning of shia islam and the promotion of a specific interpretation of sunni islam. moreover, malaysia’s approach to religious freedom is more restrictive, with laws that prohibit the propagation of non-islamic religions to muslims. on the other hand, indonesia, while being a majority muslim country, has a secular constitution and does not have islam as its official religion. the indonesian government has established the ministry of religious affairs to oversee religious affairs, including the management of hajj pilgrimage and religious education. indonesia has a unitary system of government, and each province has its own religious council to regulate religious affairs at the local level. indonesia has a more diverse and pluralistic approach to islam compared to malaysia. the country has a long history of syncretism, which is the blending of islamic, hindu, and animist beliefs and practices. the government in indonesia also promotes a moderate form of islam known as “islam nusantara,” which emphasizes tolerance, diversity, and national unity. additionally, indonesia has a more liberal approach to religious freedom, with laws that guarantee the right to freedom of religion and prohibit discrimination based on religion. in contrast to indonesia’s more diverse and pluralistic approach to islam, malaysia has a more conservative approach, with restrictions imposed on certain islamic practices and beliefs. nevertheless, both countries have undergone significant changes in the role of islam within politics and society in recent decades. a prime illustration of this evolution is the emergence of malay nationalism, which was inherently linked to islam. the malay nationalist movement emerged as a direct response to the call for liberation from colonial powers, becoming a visible presence in the early 20th century. this drive for liberation was steered by influential forces in mainstream media and literature. notably, these platforms propagated political ideologies intertwined with islamic consciousness among the malay population, further solidifying the connection between the faith and the nationalist sentiment. during the early 1900s, a surge of educated malay elites began establishing organizations centered on literature, education, and welfare. their mission was not only to inspire transformative changes within malayan society but also to cement the role of islam in these transformations (jamil & abdullah, 2022). in indonesia, the democratization process that began in 1998 has given rise to political islam, which was heavily suppressed under the authoritarian regime of president suharto. the increasing democratization of the country has allowed islamic organizations and leaders to express their views and mobilize support, while the role of islamic civil society organizations has become more prominent in shaping public discourse. decentralization of power to regional governments has also allowed local islamic leaders and organizations to gain greater influence over public policy and decision-making. in some regions, islamic political parties have been able to gain control of local governments and promote islamic values. on the other hand, the increasing influence of conservative islamic groups, such as salafis and wahhabis, has also contributed to the rise of political islam in indonesia. these in p re ss journal of asean studies 103 groups promote a strict interpretation of islamic law and reject pluralism and secularism, and have gained a foothold in indonesia through the spread of islamic education and media influence. while malaysia and indonesia have different approaches to islam, both countries have experienced changes in the role of islam in politics and society. the rise of political islam in indonesia has been influenced by factors such as democratization, the role of islamic civil society organizations, decentralization of power, and the influence of conservative islamic groups. the politicization of islam in indonesia since democratization, the political islam has also dominated the indonesian politics. such domination is increasingly evident at the sub national level. in some regions, islamic political parties have been able to gain control of local governments, allowing them to implement policies that promote islamic values. this has been particularly evident in regions with a significant muslim population, where islamic political parties have been able to mobilize support and win elections. example of the domination of political islam at the subnational level in indonesia is the province of aceh. aceh has a long history of islamic influence and was granted special autonomy in 2001, allowing it to implement sharia law in the region. the local government has established a religious police force to enforce islamic law, including dress codes and the prohibition of alcohol and gambling. the provincial government has also implemented policies that promote islamic values, such as requiring muslim civil servants to attend friday prayers and providing financial assistance for islamic education. as a result many scholars argue that indonesian democracy has been in decline (metera, 2022) the politicization is happening in many aspect of life dubbed as what scholars have termed as conservative turn. the concept of the 'conservative turn,' as it has been studied by scholars, refers to the increasing permeation of religious influence in various aspects of contemporary life. it's a phenomenon prominently seen in indonesia where islam's influence has significantly grown in social, political, and cultural spheres (saefullah, 2022). for the central government, the issue of regional regulations might hinder economic growth and not aligning with central government regulations. this has prompted president jokowi to seek their abolishment. however, this policy is limited due to the fact that many community groups use sharia regional regulations during general elections, especially in their campaigns for the presidency. despite efforts to reduce them, local sharia regulations in indonesia have actually increased during president joko widodo’s second term, and it is predicted that more will be adopted in the future. in fact, over 70% of regions in indonesia have issued regional regulations with religious nuances, including islamic sharia and the bible. the increase in sharia regulations has raised concerns among researchers at the lipi research center, who view their creation as potentially discriminatory and elitist in nature. they warn that intolerant groups may use these regulations to disrupt minorities or consolidate networks of intolerant groups. furthermore, the use of sharia regulations in in p re ss 104 institutional dynamics politics can be seen as a sign of political corruption since politicians may use their power to control religion. the politicization of religion in indonesia has also had an impact on how halal tourism is viewed, often sparking political debate rather than being discussed as an economic opportunity. the politicization of religion in indonesia, as seen in the rise of political islam and the proliferation of sharia regulations, has affected the development of halal tourism in the country. in contrast, malaysia has successfully integrated islam into its social contract, and the government and existing associations work together to support the promotion of halal tourism. the difference in approach is reflected in the number of associations involved in the development of the halal tourism model in indonesia, making it more political and hindering its progress. in muslim minority countries such as japan, south korea, and thailand, halal tourism is seen as a profitable opportunity for the economy, whereas in indonesia, despite being a muslim-majority country, the country still deals with rejection due to the politicization of religion. this highlights how the politicization of religion can impact economic development and create barriers to progress. in indonesia, the rejection of halal tourism has been observed in various tourist destinations, including bali, danau toba in north sumatra, tana toraja in south sulawesi, and labuan bajo in west nusa tenggara. interestingly, the rejection of halal tourism is more pronounced in areas where muslims are a minority, indicating that identity politics may play a role in the opposition to the concept of halal tourism (makhasi & rahimmadhi, 2020). for instance, the discourse on halal tourism by vice president candidate sandiaga uno sparked a rejection of the concept in bali in 2019. statements made by uno were met with disapproval by the governor of bali, who warned against politicizing the concept of haram and halal in bali for political gain. the head of the bali tourism office also voiced concerns that the application of halal tourism to bali’s tourist attractions could compromise the original identity of bali tourism, which is known for its cultural tourism appeal. the governor of bali suggested that the development of halal tourism could be focused on other areas that may not have been explored, to avoid diluting bali’s identity. similarly, in the lake toba region of north sumatra province, there has been hesitancy to adopt the concept of halal tourism due to concerns that it may erode local identity and culture. this is due in part to the area’s culinary dishes that are made from processed pork, creating a misunderstanding of the concept of halal tourism. however, the local government’s proposal to build halal tourism in the lake toba region is not aimed at eliminating the region’s original identity but instead hopes to coexist with local wisdom without compromising either. overall, the opposition to halal tourism in indonesia may be attributed to concerns about cultural identity and a fear of eroding local traditions. however, the politicization of the issue and the involvement of various associations compared to government agencies in the development of the halal tourism model have also hindered its progress. unlike in malaysia, where the government and existing associations work together to promote halal tourism, halal tourism in indonesia has become a tool of political contestation rather than an attempt to create a new tourism model that can benefit the country’s economy. in p re ss journal of asean studies 105 the emergence of halal tourism in indonesia has been met with significant opposition in various regions, which suggests a potential misunderstanding of the concept. the primary term used in indonesia for this type of tourism is “halal tourism,” while malaysia has opted for “muslim-friendly tourism.” according to our interview with roslan othman, minister counselor for tourism at the malaysian embassy in jakarta, using the term "muslim-friendly" may be more appropriate for countries with predominantly muslim populations since the entire country can be deemed halal. moreover, "muslim-friendly" appears to be a more flexible and accommodating term for muslim tourists' needs, whereas "halal" is more rigid due to the strict restrictions imposed by islamic sharia. nevertheless, it is noteworthy that various tourist destinations in indonesia have already started offering halal-certified food options and places of worship, which cater to the needs of muslim tourists. in indonesia, the politicization of halal tourism has caused opposition in some areas. however, in dki jakarta, the capital city, there is a process to de-politicize halal tourism. kh masduki baidlowi, the head of information and communication division of the mui, stated at a halal tourism indonesia focus group discussion (fgd) that halal tourism is more about attracting foreign visitors and offering new tourism concepts. while some still associate halal tourism with islamization, the growing number of muslim communities worldwide creates a large market niche for halal tourism, which can benefit indonesia. it is important to understand that halal tourism is not the same as religious tourism but rather an extended service and facility for muslim travelers. socialization, exhibitions, and promotions are necessary to equalize the perception of muslim-friendly tourism, particularly in jakarta. the minister of tourism and creative economy, sandiaga uno, emphasized that halal tourism is not about legalizing tourist attractions but providing additional services that meet the needs and experiences of muslim tourists. the government aims to focus on length of stay and spending rather than quantity. halal tourism with additional services provided by business actors is expected to meet the halal category. these services include halal food as a need to have, availability of toilets for muslims and muslim women as good to have, and availability of recreational facilities that are muslim and family-friendly as nice to have. by focusing on these additional services, the government hopes to provide a better experience for muslim tourists visiting indonesia. conclusions it is clear that malaysia and indonesia have been promoting their islamic identity through various means including halal tourism. however, their path in projecting their islamic identity abroad differ. malaysia has been actively promoting itself as a leading halal tourism destination and has invested in the development of halal tourism infrastructure. the government has also established various initiatives to promote islamic tourism, such as the islamic tourism centre and the malaysia halal council. malaysia has been successful in attracting muslim tourists from around the world, including from the middle east and asia, by offering halal food, prayer facilities, and muslim-friendly accommodation options. in p re ss 106 institutional dynamics on the other hand, indonesia has taken a more subtle approach to promoting its islamic identity abroad. although indonesia has a large muslim population, it also has a diverse population with a range of religious beliefs. therefore, indonesia’s approach to promoting its islamic identity has focused more on cultural and historical aspects than religion. the government has invested in promoting cultural tourism, such as the borobudur and prambanan temples, as well as traditional arts and crafts. another difference between malaysia and indonesia is their level of political islamization. while malaysia has experienced a rise in political islamization in recent years, with the growing influence of conservative islamic groups, indonesia has maintained a more moderate approach to islamization. this may reflect in their approach to projecting their islamic identity abroad. acknowledgement the authors express their gratitude to the universitas indonesia for its assistance and contribution to completing this research. this research was funded by puti (publikasi terindeks internasional) q1 research grant from the universitas indonesia with contract number: nkb-1159/un2.rst/hkp/05.00/2022. about the authors budiman mahmud musthofa is a faculty member in the program study of tourism business management, vocational education program, universitas indonesia. currently, he serves as head of department of applied social humanities. his research interests are tourism, community development, social welfare, and tourism anthropology and sociology. he has previously involved in enjoy jakarta’s islamic-friendly tourism exhibition in 2022 and some tourism village development in indonesia. diaz pranita is a faculty member in the program study of tourism business management, vocational education program and currently lead vocational corporation (vcorp) of universitas indonesia, business unit holding of the faculty. her main research topics are special interest tourism development, creative business development and community empowerment, while she is also practitioner in event business. she has previously involved in enjoy jakarta’s islamic-friendly tourism exhibition in 2022 and consultant member for urban tourism development for jakarta province, involved in some tourism village development in indonesia, and experience coordinator consultant for u20 mayors summit. mohamad sattar bin rasul is a professor in faculty of education of universiti kebangsaan malaysia. he obtained his doctor of philosophy in industrial engineering & system, at universiti putra malaysia. his research area includes tvet policy and curriculum, quality assurance, qualification and skills certification system, career development, engineering and stem education. he became project leader for two fundamental research grant scheme (frgs), knowledge transfer program (ktp) grant, cmlv (cambodia, laos, in p re ss journal of asean studies 107 myanmar and vietnam) grant and university-industrial grant, university-community grant and apec grant. he has won the community involvement/engagement award in 2015 and 2019. until now, he has published 224 articles in indexed journals, 65 proceedings, and 10 academic books. banu muhammad haidlir is a lecturer at the department of economics, faculty of economics and business universitas indonesia (feb ui). he obtained his doctoral degree from the department of social welfare, faculty of political and social science, university of indonesia. previously he gained a master of economics (me) and a bachelor of economics (be) at the department of economics in the same university. he was the director of islamic economics and business center (pebs feb ui) between 2013 and 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(2018). halal culinary and tourism marketing strategies on government websites: a preliminary analysis. tourism management, 68, 423–443. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tourman.2018.04.006 in p re ss https://doi.org/10.56529/mpr.v1i2.58 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tmp.2015.12.011 https://doi.org/10.14689/ejer.2019.81.6 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2022.e09098 https://tradingeconomics.com/malaysia/tourism-revenues https://tradingeconomics.com/malaysia/tourism-revenues https://doi.org/10.1108/tr-01-2018-0015 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tourman.2018.04.006 journal of asean studies, vol. 11, no. 1 (2023), pp.111−132 issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic received: 25th january 2023/ revised: 10th may 2023/ accepted: 11th may 2023 family business dynamics in southeast asia: a comparative study of indonesia, malaysia, singapore, and thailand nugroho sukamdani department of management, universitas sahid jakarta, indonesia nb.sukamdani@gmail.com how to cite: sukamdani, n. family business dynamics in southeast asia: a comparative study of indonesia, malaysia, singapore, and thailand. journal of asean studies, 11(1), 111−132. https:/doi.org/10.21512/jas.v11i1.9518 abstract the research discussed the literature on family business in four southeast asian countries, namely indonesia, malaysia, singapore, and thailand. the four countries were selected as case studies to contextualize the southeast asian family business context. in addition, the research perceived that the four countries have similar sociocultural characteristics, potentially providing similar attributes to how family businesses establish and grow. drawing from literature collected from the scopus database through the keywords “family business,” “indonesia,” “malaysia,” “thailand,” and “singapore,” the research provided the dynamics of knowledge production through systemic literature review. a narrative literature review was implemented to provide a high level of abstraction to the literature on family business differences and similarities. the findings show that the theme of succession was widely discussed in the literature. succession in all four countries still prioritizes members of the family as successors. however, literature in indonesia provides a more in-depth understanding of the way succession works. the research enriches the present discussion and provides insights for researchers on the research gap in family business issues. at a practical level, the research provides insight for professionals who work in the sector to gain insight into how family businesses work to maintain their entrepreneurial spirit. keywords: south east asian, family business, comparative analysis introduction family businesses are the main contributor to economic growth, especially in asian countries (fang et al., 2021). according to ho and chalam (2017), more than 75% of businesses in p re ss mailto:nb.sukamdani@gmail.com 112 family business dynamics in southeast asia are family businesses. only in china and singapore, less than half of businesses are family businesses. in malaysia, family businesses control almost 75% of the country’s economic assets, while in indonesia, family businesses are growing more than the global average. family companies in indonesia reach 40% of market capitalization and contribute more than 80% of the gross domestic product. although family business is dominant in asia, a lack of understanding remains regarding the characteristics and behavior of asian family firms (bodolica et al., 2020; yang et al., 2020). furthermore, family businesses in asian countries have different characteristics from their western counterparts regarding how they develop the business, which is closely related to the existing sociocultural context. similarly, family businesses in asian countries have a different sociocultural context from western family businesses (barkema et al., 2015). for example, in asian countries, the government’s control over society is more robust than in western countries (dinh and calabrò, 2019). it is expected that political connections among the leader of family businesses in asian countries are more vital, even though they are closely connected to the political leader. however, family businesses in western countries are controlled mainly by market orientation, which does not require strong political connections to grow and secure their businesses (franks et al., 2012). in addition, most of the literature on family businesses in asia is focused on china, taiwan, japan, and india. therefore, understanding family business in the southeast asian context is crucial to provide a sociocultural understanding of family business in general and shed light on future research directions toward the theoretical framework of family business in southeast asia. this research employs systematic literature and bibliometric analysis to compare the literature on family businesses in indonesia, malaysia, singapore, and thailand. a systematic literature review was implemented to develop a high level of abstraction on the findings. this research enriches the discussion about family business literature in southeast asia. in addition, this paper provides an in-depth comparison of family business literature among the countries studied. moreover, this work focuses on how each country’s cultural values influence succession processes in family businesses. analytical framework although the term “family business” has been discussed in various academic and nonacademic literature, there is no agreed definition (astrachan et al., 2002). even differentiating family and non-family businesses is challenging. on the one hand, scholars define family business from a historical lens (lansberg et al., 1988). on the other hand, researchers also view the establishment of a family business as part of the family’s efforts to reach prosperity and wealth (barbera, stamm, & dewitt, 2018). the family is involved in establishing the business and how it reaches its objective (ward, 2016); therefore, family moral and spiritual values are mostly represented in the corporate culture of the family business. from this point of view, scholars mostly view family businesses through three lenses. the first view is family business ownership (lansberg et al., 1988). this perspective refers to in p re ss journal of asean studies 113 the founder of the business, representing how deep the founder’s involvement is in the family business. founder involvement portrays the moral and spiritual values permeating the organization. the second lens is organizational values (barbera et al., 2018). these values are mostly related to the principles in which the family believes, guiding the way organizations solve various business challenges. that is, corporate governance is influenced by how corporate values reflect founders’ values. organizational values help the owner choose their successor, who is a family or non-family member who can absorb the founder’s values. the third lens is the succession process (barbera et al., 2018). various scholars have discussed succession, which primarily works in two models, choosing successors from a family or nonfamily member who has a good involvement within the corporation. business sustainability is closely related to an organization’s self-concept and beliefs (fletcher, melin, & gimeno, 2012). the organization’s self-concept is evolving, reflecting the founders’ historical perspective and the organization itself. the member patronage of the family business’s historical experiences is mostly internalized within the way the family business works. in other words, the founder’s entrepreneurial spirit, which is reflected in the organization’s values, helps the business maintain its sustainability. moreover, the sociopolitical environment influences family business values (dinh & calabrò, 2019). in asia, a family business has a strong connection with political leaders as the government has more control over various aspects of social life than in western society. however, in european countries, market opportunity governs how family businesses emerge and reach their objective. the historical aspects of asian family businesses can explain why they are owned mainly by ethnic chinese. in indonesia, the new order under suharto’s regime provided privileges for the chinese ethnicity to drive the country’s economy and prosperity (redding, 1986). during the post-new-order era, the sociopolitical situation changed, resulting in the growth of more non-chinese-owned family businesses, allowing them to reach their economic potential. this transition also occurred in malaysia, where most family businesses are owned by ethnic chinese. for a variety of reasons, the chinese ethnicity was spread from their homeland to various parts of the world as immigrants. their motivation as immigrants who want to reach prosperity and wealth in the destination country provides the foundation of their entrepreneurial spirit. as a diaspora, chinese immigrants must work hard to reach and maintain their prosperity. although they are disconnected from their homeland, they retain their cultural life and social connections (hertzman, 2020). those cultural ties are why the literature emphasizes how succession in chinese family businesses is related to confucianism. on the other side, local culture also plays a significant role in shaping the corporate culture of family businesses. for instance, the concept of "bapakism," a cultural phenomenon prevalent in southeast asian countries such as indonesia, emphasizes paternalistic leadership and hierarchical relationships within organizations (rademakers, 1998). bapakism refers to the practice where the "bapak," or father figure, is responsible for providing guidance, protection, and support to subordinates, who in turn show loyalty, respect, and deference to in p re ss 114 family business dynamics their leader. this cultural element influences the dynamics and decision-making processes in family businesses, fostering a sense of unity and familial loyalty while potentially limiting the scope for individual autonomy and innovation. family business serves a crucial role in the economic growth of many asian countries (fang et al., 2021). this type of business provides many jobs and contributes significantly to the gdp of many asian countries. however, there is a lack of understanding of how family business works and how the entrepreneurial spirit is inherited in the next generation of family businesses. learning from the literature, we conducted a narrative literature review to understand family business in southeast asia, particularly in four countries—indonesia, malaysia, singapore, and thailand. methodology the research employs a systematic literature review to explore patterns in the study of family businesses in southeast asia. a systematic literature review allows us to synthesize prior research and integrate the findings to gain a new understanding of family businesses, particularly from cultural, succession, and governance perspectives (perry & hammond, 2002). this research selects the scopus database for literature collection due to its extensive coverage of peer-reviewed journals, ensuring the quality and relevance of the sourced articles. the time frame of 2000-2020 was selected to provide a comprehensive overview of the research conducted on family businesses in southeast asia over the past two decades. the inclusion criteria for selecting articles were as follows: 1. articles focusing on family businesses in indonesia, malaysia, singapore, and thailand. 2. articles published between 2000 and 2020. 3. articles available in english. the research uses the keywords "family business" in combination with each of the four countries analyzed in this paper: "indonesia," "malaysia," "singapore," and "thailand." we identified 198 papers published between 2000 and 2020 that focused on family businesses in these four countries. the distribution of publications was as follows: 70 on family businesses in indonesia, 68 on family businesses in malaysia, 35 on family businesses in thailand, and 25 on family businesses in singapore. we then conducted a preliminary step to clean the data and assess the relevancy of the title and abstract. following this, we performed a literature analysis to identify the theoretical lenses and insights from the literature discussions in each country. any discrepancies in the findings were discussed and resolved through deliberation. in p re ss journal of asean studies 115 discussions this section compares research on family businesses in indonesia, thailand, malaysia, and singapore. these four countries arguably provide interesting insights into how each country’s different cultural and institutional settings constrain family businesses. the four countries also offer stark differences in how the state in southeast asia operates. while indonesia has become more mature in terms of democracy, thailand has experienced the rise and fall of its democracy. malaysia and singapore also provide interesting and different cultural settings. both countries have had relatively strong governments with slightly authoritarian tendencies since the birth of their nations. while malaysia has more affirmative action toward its disadvantaged malay population in light of the domination of the chinese minority, singapore business has been primarily dominated by the ethnic chinese who form a majority in the island country. based on the quantitative research done in indonesia, various topics are discussed in the study of indonesian family business. research on family business in indonesia also engages various theoretical viewpoints. the first theoretical lens is how family businesses compete in a free-market economy. zainal et al. (2018) found that with a sustainable competitive advantage, understanding the customer and market is the key to a successful long-term business. to better understand the customers and market, the company must have an internal focus on strategic assets and an external focus on the market. the second issue discussed is a financial concern. putri and viverita (2019) conduct research from a theoretical financial leverage view. the research found that the debt a firm acquires increases the risk faced by the firm because of the risk of default. the first generation of the family business usually takes on the debt as they are considered more business-oriented to achieve and maintain high profitability. in contrast, the next generation is more familyoriented. leaders of the more family-oriented generation would likely have a lower appetite for financial risk. that is, family firms are more risk-averse after the succession. meanwhile, augendra and bernard (2019) find that entrepreneurs prefer investing in lands and houses to improve their quality of life instead of investing in the business. this scenario creates the condition where there is a fund shortage for the business, which ends up with the smes taking loans from microfinance institutions. from a supply-chain theoretical lens, hendayani and febrianta (2020) conducts a study on the halal supply chain. it is found that there is no significant effect of technology on the efficiency of the halal supply chain. however, technology has a positive influence and relationship with the effectiveness of the halal supply chain. through a narrow theoretical lens, rizky et al. (2019) find that small technology, such as the digitalization of the data and online data sharing, would shorten the process compared to its standard time. other studies have been conducted to provide better insight into family business owners in indonesia. for instance, fendiani and tandiono (2018) find that family businesses in indonesia face an agency problem. the agency problem arises because of a misalignment between majority and minority shareholders. the research also found that managerial in p re ss 116 family business dynamics ownership creates better harmonization between managers and owners. hence, companies with high managerial ownership tend to have a lower degree of accounting conservatism. pendrian et al. (2018) discuss indonesian family business from a parenting role perspective. the findings show that firms with a corporate center that applies a strategic planning approach will positively influence the entrepreneurial orientation and strategic initiatives in business units. from a family resilience view, sunarti et al. (2021) report pls findings demonstrating that while physical, economic, social, and psychological resilience harm well-being, family factors have a favorable impact on the subjective well-being of families. although the family’s resilience increased in the six months following the accident, the family was unsatisfied with this progress. however, dissatisfaction with family fulfillment remained despite increased family resilience and elevated prospects for a brighter future. studies have also been conducted through a company performance theoretical lens. tanjung (2020) discovered that governance compliance can affect firm performance. in comparison, joni et al. (2020) found a positive association between a politically connected board and market performance, specifically, the relationship between the supervisory board. kussudyarsana et al. (2020) studied indonesian family business from a transaction cost theory view. the authors suggested that businesses adopt formal governance when there is ambiguity, as it is found that uncertainty influences the application of formal governance in indonesian family businesses. from a business management theoretical lens, quantitative and qualitative studies have been conducted. from a quantitative approach, ambarriani and purwanugraha (2012) state that for businesses to survive and grow, they must be more concerned about how their management processes support their financing activities, not merely focused on improving performance. from a qualitative approach, barral (2019) executes research regarding agroindustries related to palm oil, finding that it is possible to link agro-industries, family farming, and farming family business in a complementary way. the research finds that value is mainly derived from the agricultural frontiers where large plantations of palm oil cultivation are established (barral, 2019). one of the most highlighted topics is succession. istiatin and luhgiato (2017) announced three keys to achieving third-generation success in leading a family business: the successor characteristics, transformation, and family harmony. meanwhile, tirdasari and dhewanto (2020) report that the right time for business succession is when the predecessor is within the ages of 41–50 and the successor is within ages 19–25. regarding gender, it has been reported that chinese family businesses still maintain a confucian culture (anggadwita et al., 2020). that is, males are prioritized as the successor of the business under specific criteria, including a strong will, intention, determination, and sufficient ability to control the business (anggadwita et al., 2020). rosen et al. (2019) add that a well-thought-out succession plan and careful attention to the professional development of family members and other personnel are two ways the ceo ensures the firm’s continuity. moreover, it is critical to pinpoint the fundamental principles that will make a future leader successful. to create a successful in p re ss journal of asean studies 117 succession management program, attention must also be paid to business culture (rosen et al., 2019). from a business strategy theoretical lens, yuldinawati and oktadanio (2016) also support the findings of rosen et al. (2019). yuldinawati and oktadanio explained that family businesses can succeed if they are in charge of the company and if staff members are driven to grow the business. to develop business knowledge, mobilization can be done. knowledge mobilization improves a company’s dynamic capability (koentjoro and gunawan, 2020). meanwhile, rademakers (1998) states that when creating business strategies for external stakeholders such as suppliers, distributors, retailers, and customers, chinese family businesses embrace paternalistic values. regarding a cultural value perspective, pekerti (2008) finds that overseas chinese indonesians have been facing discrimination that hinders their professional career while they see work and career as a way to support their family. in comparison, hertzman (2020) finds that there is a filial duty serving as a part of the culture of chinese indonesians. hertzman found that parents send their children overseas to study, and once they are done with their studies, the children are called back home to continue the family business. through the theoretical lens of transgenerational entrepreneurship, tan et al. (2019) find that the mentality of the incumbents is crucial to the longevity of family businesses. the most challenging task is changing the entrepreneurial roles of the first generation into mentoring roles for their heirs. tan et al. maintain that this theory can serve as a comprehensive manual for current managers of chinese-indonesian family-owned smes as they work to carry the torch to the next generation. in that they experience less traumatic shock than incumbents, successors also appear to be cautious but less concerned with “contingency” plans. in terms of fostering peace and trust inside the family, giving ownership to important non-family individuals or even family members could be used to improve their relationship with the company. to avoid any potential conflicts between the offspring, chinese-indonesian incumbents have designated specific segments of the business or subsidiaries to a successor and his or her siblings. the incumbent typically assigns the successor to handle all of the company’s divisions or subsidiaries while concentrating on his or her own. leadership theoretical lenses have been discussed by jiing et al. (2008) and efferin and hartono (2015). jiing et al. state that paternalism is a key element of chinese capitalism, which includes authoritarianism, benevolence, and moral leadership. efferin and hartono (2015) discuss that the ability to develop a stable organizational culture within the business and the owner’s leadership traits depend on cultural congruence between the owner and the workforce. an owner is regarded to be in a stronger position than other organizational members to affect organizational culture because of his or her ownership and structural position. a leader, however, is a result of a more general societal culture. as the leader may only embrace and change the societal values that are already there in the organization, he or she is not the creator of organizational culture but merely its manager. in p re ss 118 family business dynamics from a corporate social responsibility (csr) view, sharma et al. (2012) found that the sampoerna tobacco company used partnerships to strengthen smalland medium-sized enterprises (smes) in the sampoerna case. moreover, sampoerna concentrates and continues to focus efforts on supporting local entrepreneurship and has built up a network of connections that gives it a distinct competitive advantage. the benefits of the project include increased brand recognition for sampoerna and a large number of entrepreneurs ready to work with the company. giving back to the community as part of csr suggests a good return and considerably increases shareholder pride, energizing them and enhancing the corporate brand. the reverse logistics theoretical lens has also been qualitatively examined. maheswari et al. (2020) find that many electrical device manufacturers have used reverse logistics (rl) as a strategic path toward improving performance and brand recognition in recent years, demonstrating how significant the process has become. to ensure that their rl actions do not jeopardize other interests such as the planet, people, and company reputation, the performance measurement must reference the quadruple bottom line (qbl) concept. as a result, measurement in this research combines the balanced scorecard and qbl principles and is based on the perspectives of the government. singapore although relatively scarce, singaporean family businesses have become an emerging field of study, particularly regarding cultural and social aspects. for example, using sustainability reporting as a theoretical lens, loh, thomas, and wang (2017) state that companies with sustainability reporting will be more valuable on the market than those without it. companies with higher-quality (more comprehensive) sustainability reporting will have a greater market value than those with less comprehensive sustainability reporting (lower quality of sustainability reporting). however, most of the studies engage with cultural and social issues. lerner and malach-pines (2011) conducted a study from a gender viewpoint. they find that despite having significantly different total investments required for their businesses, male and female family business owners were more similar than different in the financial investments they made (i.e., female business owners were similar to their male counterparts in both their own and their family investments). in addition to the gender study, it has been reported that family-owned businesses in singapore had the most employees and expected employees, while those in australia and brazil had the fewest employees and expected employees. family-owned enterprises in singapore had the largest number of employees. in addition, the united states was predicted to have the highest level of competition, and singapore to have the lowest. through a qualitative approach, one of the most discussed topics is cultural values. tong (2014) stated that the centripetal authority structure that distinguishes chinese businesses is a major theme. the founder and the main members of the family are at the center in p re ss journal of asean studies 119 of decision-making procedures. the low amount of delegation of authority and responsibility is a result of the informal organizational structure of chinese firms and the significance of guanxi ties in business dealings. chung (2005) finds that family businesses can diversify business risk and build a mechanism to enforce business ties across borders by spreading wealth across borders. it is also found that émigrés of china build their way up through hard work, frugality, and strong personal networks. chung (2005) also discusses the shaw studio as a family business case. the shaw studio maintained the archetypal characteristics of a traditional chinese family business and was run by family patriarchs, though incorporating the western industrial model into their operations. however, the shaw patriarchs’ longevity and the ease with which power was transferred among the four brothers was a key factor in preventing a succession crisis (and the company’s collapse). in a different paper, chung (2005) discusses that the differences in the investments that the family members select, as well as their geographical distribution and diversification, may lead to conflicts in a family business. chung also explained that traditional chinese families tend to be patriarchal and are said to have moral obligations to ancestors and descendants. therefore, the extended household serves as the economic unit rather than the individual. this arrangement gives chinese family businesses a chance to revitalize themselves (chung, 2005). kopnina (2014) states that singapore is likewise affected by the struggle involving the chinese family enterprise. singapore’s sme sector is torn between aspirations of success, which are frequently equated with growth and expansion and lauded in official discourse and rankings, and the realization of their comparative advantage of being self-sufficient, adaptable, flexible, and founded on centuries-old principles of trust and reciprocity. in that family involvement in the company is viewed as a source of both pride and shame, an expression of a lived culture, and an outmoded style of business organization, hiring practices and succession in singapore’s smes reflect this duality. through a business management theoretical lens, fock (1998) reports that the causes of conflict in a family business include the leadership style, lack of professionalism, lack of effective succession process, and chinese cultural values. meanwhile, kiong (2005) finds that the intimate ties between the family and the business in chinese society are the root of many disputes that occur within the businesses. this situation is caused in part by the informality of chinese family businesses. in addition, many old traditions and ways of conducting business in asian countries have been put to the test by changes in their political and economic surroundings. more demands are made of formal ties as a result of the requirement to conduct business with multinational corporations and the environment’s growing globalization. in this newly globalized climate, chinese businesses that are unwilling to adapt will confront more competition and issues. numerous chinese companies are going through adjustments. the younger chinese entrepreneur generation is particularly affected by these transformations. however, rather than being revolutionary, changes have typically been slow and incremental in many chinese family businesses. tong (2014) maintains that chinese businesses have been forced to adopt more “rational” management practices to stay competitive in singapore’s changing economic environment, which is also characterized by increased competition from global corporations. in p re ss 120 family business dynamics as chinese businesses expand, they adopt the “western” industries’ organizational structures. however, the fundamental structure of ownership and control—a centralized organization with control granted to a small core of family members—remains essentially the same. meanwhile, tsang (2002) argued that the concentration of strategic information gained from globalization within the family, especially the head of the family, is the result of the centralization of authority and control. the benefits of this management approach include quick decision-making and preventing competitors from learning strategic information. however, the approach is dependent on a brittle organizational memory. the sudden death of important family members can severely harm the knowledge foundation of a chinese family business. the globalization of a chinese family business is hampered by the propensity for family members to be appointed to senior management roles in overseas operations. some of these persons could lack the knowledge or cultural sensitivity needed to lead employees from other cultural backgrounds. additionally, local staff members of an overseas organization may get demotivated because they are aware that no matter how well they perform, they will never be promoted. promotions in the organization had a significant motivational impact on other chinese managers. tan and fock (2001), through a succession theoretical lens, explain that the chinese family businesses in the study were able to expand because they transitioned from one generation to the next in leadership. they also chose an entrepreneurial leader who incorporated cutting-edge management techniques while maintaining the values that made the family business thrive. malaysia in general, family business performance has been studied quantitatively in malaysia. most studies examine how factors in the family business, externally and internally, may affect or be affected by the performance of a family business. untoro et al. (2017) mentioned in their research that the company’s performance could affect who will be chosen to be the next successor, which of course, will affect the position of family members in the company. once a successor cannot manage the company unfortunately and adequately decrease the company’s performance, bod will likely choose non-family members to take over the charge. yet, it will not affect the composition of the bod. these results are in line with research by bocatto et al. (2010), which found no correlation between a large percentage of family board members and the designation of a family successor. the authors also found that corporate governance and the ownership structure may help the company in formulating ceo succession. the family ownership structure is proven to be cost-minimizing and positively affects performance (al-haj and zainuddin, 2016). this demonstrates that one of the factors boosting the performance of family businesses is ownership. theoretically, it has also been shown that businesses run by families perform better than those run by professionals (monsen, chiu, & cooley, 1968; daily & dollinger, 1992). previous research also demonstrated that when experts run the firms, the agency expenses are much greater (ang et al., 2000). in p re ss journal of asean studies 121 the findings of the previous research demonstrate a contradiction with the results of research conducted by ghazali (2014). otherwise, the percentage of government ownership and independent directors on the board have a favorable and statistically positive impact on the sample companies’ market performance. independent directors are a powerful instrument for reducing the danger of conflicts of interest (ghazali, 2014). conflict is a common occurrence in an organization that involves various interests and stakeholders. additionally, kiong (2005) discusses conflict using a qualitative approach. the intimate ties between the family and the firm, according to kiong, are a major source of disputes in chinese businesses (cohn, 1990). this conflict is caused, in part, by management issues brought on by chinese family businesses’ lack of formality and documentation. chinese family businesses have a paternalistic culture that results in a highly centralized organization with top-down communication. this structure leads to a dependency on current leaders and makes the next successor unable to enjoy their authority and legitimacy because of the attachment created with previous leaders. as supported by ghee et al. (2015), first-generation family businesses tend to have more centralized decision-making processes than secondor third-generation family businesses, which can lead to conflict when the next successor assumes leadership. consequently, it was discovered that for managing business operations, decentralized decision-making was favored over centralized decision-making. therefore, conflict resolution and management among family members need to be formalized and implemented (tang and hussin, 2020). inseparable from the discussion of succession, the attributes in succession can also affect a company’s performance level. ghee et al. (2015) analyzed how the issue and attribute of succession and its process can shape the family business performance. each of the major factors significantly impacted the levels of performance in the family business. management strategies have a substantial impact on family business performance. secondly, most successors reported having complete control over decision-making and task delegation procedures. third, successor training was discovered to significantly impact corporate performance. both family ties and work and family values produced significant values. succession concerns involving entrepreneur skills, knowledge levels, member conflicts, trust levels, etc., do hamper the growth and development of family businesses. the association between the primary factors and family company performance is completely mediated by succession experience. lastly, succession concerns mediate the link between essential factors and business performance to some extent. gender issues have also surfaced regarding how asean nations still adhere to their ancestors’ values. according to kuratko (1993), corporations want their sons to take over the business regarding succession. some family businesses in the united states still view the choice of a daughter as rather undesirable, according to de vries (1996). males are also favored over females in chinese family businesses since the male successor will carry the family name. additionally, male managers typically have wider networks and are more supportive, competitive, tough, and capable of facing competition. on the other hand, female successors are more loving and supportive at work, and they are more likely to emphasize the company’s main goals rather than the financial performance in p re ss 122 family business dynamics as a crucial factor in the survival of the business (butner & moore, 1997). even so, the relationship between female successors and fathers (as founders) tends to be better than that of their sons. son successors tend to have a higher potential for conflict with their fathers (alhaj and zainuddin, 2016; dumas, 1989; hollander and bukowitz, 1990). the daughters voluntarily took on the position of guardians for their father and the company. in the other article, zain et al. (2012) wanted to examine the business profile of womenowned smes and identify the challenges and problems they faced. competitiveness, staffing issues, and financial difficulties were the three key issues facing women-owned firms. they have battled and competed with other new and existing competitors in the market on pricing, product, and other factors. the final issues are the lack of financial capital to operate a firm, issues with financial management, and the difficulty of obtaining a loan from a bank, a private company, or the government. the education of a director harms business performance. this discovery runs counter to earlier literature. it was discovered to be significant, but in the opposite direction, in terms of successor age. it demonstrates that younger successors outperform older ones. younger managers may be more motivated and keen to impress their family members, which raises the level of corporate performance. it was alleged that younger managers tended to be more aggressive than elder proprietors (carlsson & karlsson, 1970). more senior executives also tend to be more risk-averse than younger executives (carlsson and karlsson, 1970). according to a common belief, chinese business is based on a three-generation model: the first generation works extremely hard, leads a fruitful life, invests the majority of its income, and establishes a successful company. with proper training and business acumen, the second generation significantly grows the company, raising risk and profitability. the third generation loses interest in running the company and disperses the family since they take the wealth’s tendency for granted. the founder (first generation) and the second generation of a chinese family firm must overcome the following three-generational challenges for a succession process to be successful: generation gap, communication gap, and credibility gap (tang and hussin, 2020). people who express ownership toward a company or their job are more likely to have higher psychological ownership levels and to feel more responsible for the organization (pierce et al., 2003). hence, the connection between psychological ownership toward extrarole behavior and it is shown a positive result. psychological ownership improves employee attachment, and as a result, they will develop a protective and caring attitude toward the business. work engagement, affective commitment and extra-role behaviors (bernhard and o’driscoll, 2011; sieger et al., 2011), and family chief executive officers’ stewardship behaviors have all been positively impacted by psychological ownership in family enterprises (henssen et al., 2014; ikävalko et al., 2006). family bonds are deeply ingrained in family businesses, making them special (aldrich & cliff, 2003). this causes both positive and negative family relationship issues that impact relationships at work and vice versa. continued work and family tension may be lessened with equitable participation in wl roles (greenhaus et al., 2003). interestingly, in a family in p re ss journal of asean studies 123 business, well-rounded people are actively involved in both leadership and family member positions, which have different goals for work performance. significant family business members believe that when family-related criteria are satisfied, their job satisfaction increases. therefore, the most crucial element determining job satisfaction in family enterprises is one that is tied to the family. when designing career development and advancement programs, managing and allocating human resources and related capitals, and enhancing organizational capabilities, family business management should coordinate the three wlf components. the management of human resources, which includes members who have their own family lives and will make them more significant for human resource allocation and planning, is an important factor that the business must take into account. the sustainability of a business is not only influenced by the company’s ability to handle the succession process. firms are innovating, especially for young families (cheong et al., 2015), which is a long-term investment to train the agility of young managers for when they later become successors. in addition, internationalism can help companies open and broaden new opportunities to develop their business. once again, this internationalism also has a positive relationship with innovation where innovation is influenced by knowledge, trust, and commitment (chong et al., 2019). ismail et al. (2019) also discuss the success of transgenerational enterprises. the authors found seven dimensions: a sense of belonging, family welfare priorities, construction of generational change, contextual embeddedness, attitude, informal decision-making, and a friendly working environment. the reflection of values in strategy formulation does not only occur in the chinese, who are known to hold strong values from their ancestors. muslims in malaysia are also proven to apply religious values in their company’s csr strategy (yusof et al., 2014). the phenomenon of chinese migration to various countries in asean also shows an interesting phenomenon from a family business point of view. diasporic groups that migrate to a country holding the same values turn out to reinforce their communal boundaries to enable them to survive and even thrive in foreign economies (gómez-mejía, 2007). thailand research in thailand turned out to be more varied with both qualitative and quantitative approaches. yet, chou et al. (2016) found similarities in research in malaysia that buddhism as the majority religion in thailand is also reflected in the csr strategy of the sample companies. the main focus of csr participation is kamma, one of the fundamental buddhist ideals. for csr activities aimed at internal stakeholders, managers’ interest in their workers’ well-being may act as an institutional cornerstone. the company has implemented csr efforts as a result of the owner’s sincere concern for the welfare of external stakeholders (such as customers, the community, and external organizations) motivated by buddhist ideals. it was also found that in thailand the chinese family business tends to implement their values in every aspect of their business, most of all in operations. those values are guanxi, renqi, and confucian (luechapattanaporn, 2021). in p re ss 124 family business dynamics quantitative research explores the factors of how a family business can survive. family members of an fgb should maintain and control innovation and modernization to survive during critical points (yabushita & suehiro, 2014). moreover, innovation is a significant component during strategy formulation, which has to be reflected in every part of the business, even the employee (srisathan et al., 2022). working hours (assisting in their family business) have a good link with entrepreneurship, and family businesses with entrepreneurially minded members are more likely to survive (kilenthong & rueanthip, 2018). political connections or positions that family members have are essential determinants of family profitability and the ability to outperform competitors (imai, 2006). while not avoiding the topic of succession, thailand looks at it from a different angle. due to uncertainty and the time between the founder and the successor in the post-succession era, the founder is more appreciated. this is caused by the uncertainty of the time and the intervention of the heir on the scene changes the underlying meaning of the succession of the founder. change will undoubtedly happen to a family business, whether it is during succession or expansion of a business. rodsutti and makayathorn (2005) conducted research regarding the change and the agent of change in a family business. agents of change (whether internal change movers or external consultants) specifically need to spend more time on the organizational diagnosis process because of their very significant role in dealing with change within a company. additionally, the ownership structure of a family business, which is said to positively influence performance in research in malaysia, also frequently causes many issues in corporate administration, detracting from operation and decision-making. consequently, change agents must comprehend every facet of the firm to handle changes in family businesses efficiently. not only business challenges must be examined to understand family enterprises but also other aspects of the family. additionally, the research identifies three additional factors that are crucial to thai family business diagnostics: communication, politics, and national culture. these three factors represent another aspect that can influence change management. change agents can therefore determine the degree of political and ownership power in the family by analyzing the family structure within a family business. moreover, when the family structure is identified, change agents will also be aware of the generation of the leader and the extent of their power disparity with other family members. the following issue will also include suggestions for managing change in a thai family business as well as other ideas. conclusions from the systemic literature review, the research finds that family business in southeast asia has dealt with different challenges due to various cultural and institutional setting. family business in all four countries faces relatively similar challenges. furthermore, most of these four countries’ studies primarily focus on chinese family businesses. these are expected given that most family businesses in southeast asia are dominated by ethnic chinese. the first dominant issue that was brought up is the tension between the first and second generations are the major issue, especially in family succession. the preferences of gender, the in p re ss journal of asean studies 125 deeper family involvement in the business, and different values have made succession relatively difficult. in the case of indonesia, the first generation is more of a risk taker while the second generation is more risk averse. the first generation of the family business usually takes the debt as the first generation is considered more business-oriented to achieve and maintain high profitability. in contrast, the next generation is more family-oriented. this has led to different business performances between the old and new generations. in the case of malaysia, the main issue is the paternalistic culture in malaysian chinese family businesses that results in a highly centralized organization with top-down communication. this leads to dependency on their current leaders and makes the next successor unable to enjoy their authority and legitimacy because of the attachment created with previous leaders. in the case of singapore, the chinese family business conflict in succession usually occurs due to the informal organizational structure of chinese firms and the significance of guanxi ties in business dealings. in the case of thailand, the discussion revolves around how buddhist ideals inspire the implementation of csr activities. the research has identified several key issues that significantly impact family businesses in southeast asia. prioritizing these issues is crucial for understanding their relative importance and determining the most effective strategies for addressing them. first is succession planning and generational tensions. the foremost issue facing family businesses in southeast asia is the tension between the first and second generations during the succession process. effective succession planning is vital for ensuring the long-term stability and success of family businesses. the consequences of not addressing this issue include potential conflicts, reduced business performance, and a lack of continuity in leadership. this issue is of paramount importance due to its direct influence on the survival and growth of the family business. second is cultural and institutional factors. the impact of cultural and institutional factors, such as paternalistic culture and informal organizational structures, varies across the four countries. these factors play a critical role in shaping the governance, decision-making, and communication within family businesses. addressing cultural and institutional challenges is essential for fostering a more adaptable, resilient, and innovative business environment that can better navigate the complexities of the global market. third is balancing family and business orientations. the differing attitudes towards risk and business objectives between generations highlight the need for striking a balance between family and business orientations. family businesses must prioritize this issue to ensure that the firm remains competitive and financially viable while maintaining the core values and close-knit relationships that define their identity. fourth is corporate social responsibility (csr) and ethical practices. the discussion around csr activities in thailand, as inspired by buddhist ideals, sheds light on the importance of incorporating ethical practices and social responsibility into family business in p re ss 126 family business dynamics operations. by prioritizing csr, family businesses can enhance their reputation, contribute positively to their communities, and foster a more sustainable business model. future research could be directed to understanding how discussions on family business in southeast asia relate to a broader discussion on the family business at the global level. it would be interesting to see the differences and similarities between issues faced by family businesses in southeast asia and other global south countries such as brazil, india, and south africa. acknowledgement i would like to extend my heartfelt gratitude to the editor and reviewers whose insightful feedback and constructive criticisms have significantly enhanced the quality of this article. about the authors dr. nugroho b. sukamdani, mba, bet, is a distinguished academic and current chairman of the yayasan universitas sahid. he has carved a unique path in the academic world, specializing in management studies with a distinct emphasis on family businesses. his research primarily explores the pivotal role of management strategies, leadership, and succession planning in the continuity and prosperity of family enterprises. references ambarriani, a. s., & purwanugraha, h. a. 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arviany sadi associate editors bina nusantara university, indonesia donatus k. marut university of indonesia, indonesia kiki verico bina nusantara university, indonesia lili yulyadi brawijaya university, indonesia m. faishal aminuddin university of warwick, united kingdom moch faisal karim university at albany, suny, united states mutti anggita vrije universiteit amsterdam, netherlands pamungkas a. dewanto national planning agency, republic of indonesia sumedi a. mulyo bina nusantara university, indonesia wendy a. prajuli advisory international editorial board binus business school, indonesia ahmad syamil swinburne university of technology, australia alfons palangkaraya university of indonesia, indonesia andi widjajanto sebelas maret university, indonesia andrik purwasito jana wyżykowskiego university, poland arkadiusz kotlinski airlangga university, indonesia baiq l. s. wardhani university of le havre, france darwis khudori paramadina university, indonesia dinna wisnu foreign policy community of indonesia, indonesia dino p. djalal university of hawai’i at manoa, united states ehito kimura jawaharal nehru university, india gautam k. jha bina nusantara university, indonesia harjanto prabowo ritsumeikan university, japan jun honna university of indonesia, indonesia juwono sudarsono dr. gr damodaran college of science, india k. k. ramachandran australian national university, australia lorraine elliott yunnan university, china lu guangsheng iseas-yusof ishak institute, singapore malcolm cook national university of singapore, singapore marleen dieleman ministry of foreign affairs, republic of indonesia marty natalegawa universiti teknologi malaysia, malaysia nanthakumar loganathan australian national university, australia pierre van der eng centre for strategic and international studies, indonesia rizal sukma kaohsiung seas, taiwan samuel c. y. ku budapest business school, hungary tamas novak cheng shiu university, taiwan wan-ping tai padjadjaran univeristy, indonesia yanyan m. yani journal of asean studies volume 6 number 2 2018 contents editorial tirta n. mursitama articles questioning the regional integration of higher education in asean: equality for all? 117-136 dudi heryadi, anggia utami dewi, akim, cecep hermawan, waki'ah the dynamics of paradiplomacy practices in the “frontier” areas in indonesia 137-154 ali maksum & surwandono the unbreakable relations between indonesia-vietnam under “sink the vessels” policy: a complex system approach 155-178 rusadi kantaprawira, arry bainus, indra kusumawardhana technology transfer and the promotion of technical skills from japan to southeast asia: case study of vietnam 179-191 quynh huong nguyen the (in-)visibility of taiwan-indonesia relations: indonesian students on the sideline 192-212 rangga aditya night market from h. lefebvre’s ‘space as practiced’: the case of davao city, philippines 213-230 raymundo r. pavo journal.binus.ac.id/index.php/jas http://journal.binus.ac.id/index.php/jas aim and scope the journal of asean studies (jas) is an international peer-reviewed bi-annual journal that enriches understanding of the past, current, and future issues relevant to asean and its circle of issues. the article shall address any research on theoretical and empirical questions about asean. the topics addressed within the journal include: diplomacy, political economy, trade, national development, security, geopolitics, social change, transnational movement, environment, law, business and industry, and other various related sub-fields. journal of asean studies expects the articles encourage debate, controversy, new understanding, solid theory, and reflection on asean. the articles sent should have a sharp analysis and rigorous methodologies quantitative or qualitative as well as written in an engaging and analytical style. the jas does publish original research, revi ewing research, book review, opinion pieces of current affairs. however jas does not publish journalistic or investigative style of article. the jas would not be responsible for any implied or written statements of articles published. each author would be responsible for their own writing. journal of asean studies is an international multidisciplinary journal, covering various fields of research on asean either as community, organization, process, and web of cooperation. journal of asean studies publishes the following types of manuscripts:  scholarly articles: the manuscripts should be approximately 5,000-8,000 words. the manuscripts must contain a review of the current state of knowledge on the research question(s) of interest, then share new information o r new ideas that will impact the state of theory and/or practice in area of asean studies.  review article: the manuscripts should be approximately 1,500-3,500. the manuscripts must contain the current state of understanding on a particular topic about asean by analysing and discussing research previously published by others  practice notes: these are shorter manuscripts approximately 1,500-3,500 words that are of specific interest to practitioners. these manuscripts must present new development for the asean.  research notes: similar to practice notes, these are shorter manuscripts approximately 1,500-3,500 words that have specific implications for asean. the manuscripts should employ rigorous methodology either qualitative or quantitative.  book review: the manuscripts should be approximately 1,500-4,000. the manuscripts must contain a critical evaluation of book by making argument and commentary on the particular book discussed. centre for business and diplomatic studies centre for business and diplomatic studies (cbds) is established as part of the international relations department, bina nusantara (binus) university. our aims are to undertake and promote research and deliberation on diplomacy, business, international relations and developmental issues particularly in indonesia, southeast asia and asia pacific. we also commit to build, connect and share research and others kinds of knowledge generating activities for the betterment of life of the people and earth. our immediate constituency is international relations department, binus university and the larger constituency is the broader academic community of the binus university and other universities and institutions both national and international as well as policy community. cbds publishes scholarly journal, working papers, commentaries and provides training and consultancies services in the areas of diplomatic training, negotiations, commercial diplomacy, conflict resolutions for business, business and government relations, promoting competitive local government in attracting foreign investment, and understanding impact of regional economic integration on development specifically toward asean community 2015. cbds secretariat kijang campus, binus university jl. kemanggisan ilir iii no. 45, kemanggisan / palmerah jakarta barat 11480 +62.21 534 5830 ext. 2453 +62.21 534 0244 http://ir.binus.ac.id/cbds http://ir.binus.ac.id/cbds editorial the new dynamics of regionalism in southeast asia since the establishment of european union which many refer to as marking the rise of regionalism trend in international relations, high politics have been said to be the main challenge of regional integration. in europe, states have been focusing on developing interstate relations, beginning from technical cooperation which are expected to spill over to other areas of cooperation, and in the end bring political integration slowly to the agenda. when the eu has finally signed maastricht treaty, states in other regions follow the suit. as will be clearly seen in this edition of jas, however, this trend of state-led regionalism with its dynamics of high politics have shifted. regionalism, particularly in southeast asia, and as observed by the authors in this edition, is currently driven no less by non-state actors in the process known as regionalization, and face no less serious challenges from low political issues. this new dynamics of regionalism will be presented in the unique style of our journal, beginning from that in the regional level and down to the interstate and individual state levels so that the richness of this dynamics could be well-captured. in the regional level, the phenomenon of regionalization appears in “questioning the regional integration of higher education in asean: equality for all?” written by dudy heryadi, anggia utami dewi, akim, cecep hermawan, and waki’ah. this article highlights an example of cooperation among higher education institutions in southeast asia which indirectly contributes in strengthening the main regionalism process at the intergovernmental level. it is interesting to see the continuity between articles of the same topics in our journal. article by oliver gill in our previous edition found that higher education integration in southeast asia is less successful than that in the bigger east asia region. the current article elaborates further why it is the case. the slow integration process as apparent in the exclusivity of aun memberships is only the beginning part of this integration process. being exclusive to limited members helps aun to develop faster and more effective, and thus it is expected to attract more members and strengthen the integration process. the similar logic of spillover effect remains the underlying mechanism of this integration. at the interstate level, regionalization appears in “the dynamics of paradiplomacy practices in the ‘frontier’ areas in indonesia” by ali maksum and surwandono. this article highlights the new dynamics of regionalism in the era of democratizing southeast asia in which local regions are granted access to conduct diplomacy with other parties in the region. using the case studies of riau islands and west kalimantan, this article found that paradiplomacy practices in these sampled regions in indonesia remain at the ceremonial level for the sake of fulfilling the demand of the central government. this practice, however, has not brought significant advantage to the region themselves. the interstate level also demonstrates low political issues as challenges to regionalism both in relations among states inside the region or between states from and outside the region. “the unbreakable relations between indonesia-vietnam under “sink the vessels” policy: a complex system approach” by rusadi kantaprawira, arry bainus, and indra kusumawardhana highlights the issues of illegal fishing in bilateral relations between indonesia and vietnam as an example of the first type of challenges. in the second type, “technology transfer and the promotion of technical skills from japan to southeast asia: case study of vietnam” by quynh huong nguyen and “the (in-)visibility of taiwanindonesia relations: indonesian students on the sideline” by rangga aditya present challenges in technology transfer from japan and academic cooperation with taiwan respectively. finally, at the individual state level, one interesting article adopting unique perspective from philosophy entitled “night market from h. lefebvre’s ‘space as practiced’: the case of davao city, philippines” by raymundo r. pavo highlights an example of local problems affected by the dynamics at regional and national levels. this article explains how local vendors in davao city, philippines tried to adapt themselves to the changing dynamics of economic integration and emerging security issues which affect their night market as ‘space’ where they practice their daily economic activities. with this line of rich articles in this edition, the editors would like to express the greatest appreciation and gratitude to the authors and reviewers. we are very proud that we could maintain our consistency in all aspects of our publication and a part of it, jas has been nationally accredited sinta 2 by the ministry of research, technology and higher education, republic of indonesia on november 2018. we are also very pleased to see emerging conversation among articles in our journal – a practice that we expect we could see more tangibly in our future edition. we are very delighted and excited to have prof. amitav acharya as one of our editorial board members. our warmest welcome and we believe his contribution to jas will enhance the standing of this journal into higher level in the study of international relations. last but not least, we would like to thank the indonesian association for international relations (aihii) for the continuous support for our journal. jakarta, 31 december 2018 prof. dr. tirta n. mursitama, ph.d. editor-in-chief journal of asean studies, vol. 11, no. 1 (2023), pp.1−24 issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic received: 18th december 2021/ revised: 16th july 2022/ accepted: 16th july 2022 impact of pluri-lateral free trade agreements on innovation: example of asean robert smith1*, nucharee nuchkoom smith2, mark perry3 1university of new england, school of law, armidale nsw 2351 australia 2international law at the chalermphrakiat sakon nakhon province campus, kasetsart university, thailand 3school of law, university of new england, armidale nsw 2351 australia robert@aecconsultants.asia; pulom88@hotmail.com; mperry21@une.edu.au *corresponding author how to cite: smith, r., smith, n. n., & perry, m. the implementation of plurilateral free trade agreements on the intellectual property protection of asean members. journal of asean studies, 11(1), 1−24. https:/doi.org/10.21512/jas.v11i1.7975 abstract innovation has been identified as a critical indicator for an economy to succeed in the fourth industrial revolution. historically, some members of the association of southeast asian nations have been better known for violation of intellectual rights rather than their protection. however, this is changing as their economies develop and they have been better integrated into the global economy. integration has been facilitated by their membership of the world trade organization and bilateral free trade agreements (ftas) between individual states and their trading parties. asean has entered into plurilateral ftas with some of its trade partners. a key element of these plurilateral ftas is that most dedicate a chapter on the protection of intellectual property rights. these clauses have two essential elements. firstly, they set out the obligations of the parties to protect intellectual property rights and their commitment to seek membership of intellectual property treaties. secondly, the parties undertake to assist the lesser developed members with improving their processes and procedures so that they can accede to appropriate treaties. the research analysed the impact of these multilateral ftas on the protection of patents and marks by the individual asean members. keywords: innovation; plurilateral free trade agreements; intellectual property rights; patents; trade-marks in p re ss mailto:robert@aecconsultants.asia; mailto:pulom88@hotmail.com; mailto:mperry21@une.edu.au 2 impact of pluri-lateral introduction schwab (2018) has identified four attributes for an economy to succeed in the fourth industrial revolution: resiliency, agility, innovation, and a human-centric approach. similarly, the association of southeast asian nations (asean) integration monitoring directorate identifies: innovation and technology; human capital; regulatory frameworks; infrastructure connectivity; and inclusive, sustainable growth (tijaja, 2019). a common feature of both responses is the need for an innovation pillar. a belief shared by developed and developing nations alike is that innovation is supported by intellectual property protection. it encourages individuals and companies to seek new solutions in products and services, and also, by sharing the details of the innovation through patent disclosures, allows others to learn from the disclosed ‘art’ (wipo, 2017) or as conceptualised by newton – ‘standing on the shoulders of giants’ (lingard & perry, 2016; popova, 2016). asean is an association of the ten southeast asian nations, namely: brunei darussalam, cambodia, indonesia, lao pdr, malaysia, myanmar, philippines, singapore, thailand and vietnam. of the ten members, singapore is a developed economy; cambodia, lao pdr, and myanmar are least developed countries; with the remainder developing countries (united nations, 2020). as shown in table 1, the development indicators are quite diverse, as is the wide disparity in the level of development. all ten asean members are members of the world trade organization and hence parties to the agreement on trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (trips agreement). under trips (art. 1(1)), members can meet their obligations under trips without acceding to any other intellectual property treaties. nevertheless, as discussed later in this research, asean member states are contracting parties to several world intellectual property organization (wipo) treaties. most of the asean economies rely on manufactured exports such as motor vehicles and electronics, which are assembled in-country for external manufacturers. intellectual property remains with the external manufacturers. it must be protected by the country where the vehicles are assembled. in 1995 the seven asean members signed the asean framework agreement on intellectual property cooperation. all members of asean except malaysia have ratified the agreement. the agreement has still not entered into force as all members must ratify it for this to occur (art. 8(5)). its objectives were to strengthen cooperation ‘through an open and outward-looking attitude with a view to contributing to the promotion and growth of regional and global trade liberalisation’ (art. 1(1)); explore intra-asean cooperation (art. 1(3)); explore the possibility of setting up an asean patent system (art. 1(4)) and trade-mark system (art (5));1 and consultations on creating asean standards and practices (art. 1(6)). the asean working group on intellectual property cooperation (awgipc) was established in 1996 under the asean framework agreement on intellectual property 1 it should be noted that in some jurisdictions, including australia, the term trade mark is used rather than trademark. in p re ss journal of asean studies 3 cooperation, although it had not entered into force. (asean secretariat, 2021). malaysia joined the awgipc, although it had not signed the framework agreement. the 2016-2025 action plan had four strategic goals, namely: a more robust asean ip system is developed by strengthening ip offices and building ip infrastructure; regional ip platforms and infrastructure are developed to contribute to enhancing asean; an expanded and inclusive asean ip ecosystem is developed; and regional mechanisms to promote asset creation and commercialisation, particularly geographical indications and traditional knowledge, are enhanced (asean ipr action plan 2016-2025, 2016). table 1 selected 2018 world development indicators b ru ne i d ar us sa la m c am bo di a in do ne si a l ao p d r m al ay si a m ya nm ar p hi lip pi ne s si ng ap or e t ha ila nd v ie tn am population (million) 0,43 16,0 267,1 7,11 32,4 52,7 108,6 5,64 71,3 94,9 poverty headcount at national poverty levels (% of the population) 998 5,6 16,7 9,9 6,8 poverty headcount ratio at usd 2.15 per day (% of the population) 5,4 0,0 63,0 0,0 1,2 gross national income (gni) per capita (atlas method) (current usd thousands) 29,0 1,42 3,8 2,47 16,7 1,25 3,64 88,5 6,45 9,36 primary school completion rate (%) 100 85 100 98 99 95 100 100 994 100 primary school enrolment (% of gross) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 198 100 secondary school enrolment (% of gross) 994 889 667 882 668.4 884 100 100 mobile cellular subscriptions per 100 persons 130 121 120 51,5 131 116 124 147 176 148 high technology exports (% of manufactured exports) 0 -1,4 -8,2 38 53,2 -3,6 61,3 51,6 23,7 40,8 net official development assistance received (current usd millions) 783 962 589 -34,5 1,712 547 -419 1,645 source: (world bank, 2021) values >100 are due to the calculation method. if there is no data, they are indicated by ‘-’. the actual date of collection of individual data sets varies. the action plan encouraged member states to seek accession to the madrid protocol, hague agreement and patent cooperation treaty (initiative 5). each member state should also ‘[e]ndeavour to accede to other wipo-administered international treaties (initiative 6). the awgipc was explicitly tasked with evaluating ‘protection mechanisms of gis in p re ss 4 impact of pluri-lateral [geographic indications] and assisting in protecting gis in asean and foreign market’ (initiative 18). awgipc was also tasked to promote a protection mechanism for genetic resources, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions (grtktce) (initiative 19). asean has ten dialogue partners: australia, canada, china, the european union, india, japan, republic of korea, new zealand, russia and the united states (merced, 2017). the initial focus of the relationship with the dialogue partners was on technical and economic assistance. the focus then broadened to include the promotion of two-way trade and investments. the relationship between innovation and intellectual property, particularly in frameworks for economies, has long been discussed (landes & posner, 2003). currently, the most recognised measure of innovation for nations is the annual global innovation index (gii), which is based on a detailed analysis of seven pillars: institutions, human capital & research, infrastructure, market sophistication, business sophistication, knowledge and technology outputs, and creatives output (cornell university, insead & wipo, 2020). the gii is reported as a ranking based on the overall score of the economy. the giis for the ten asean countries from 2011 to 2020 are shown in table 2. singapore is by far the best performing of the asean members. the lowest-performing countries are the three least developed countries: cambodia, lao pdr and myanmar. the philippines has shown the most significant improvement over the ten years, with thailand and vietnam showing significant improvement. malaysia has been consistent, whilst indonesia has improved but is still relatively poorly placed. table 2 global innovation indices of asean members 2011-2020 country global innovation index 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 brunei darussalam 75 53 74 88 71 67 71 71 cambodia 111 129 110 106 91 95 101 98 98 110 indonesia 99 100 85 87 97 88 87 85 85 85 lao pdr 138 113 malaysia 31 32 32 33 32 35 37 35 35 33 myanmar 140 138 129 philippines 91 95 90 100 83 74 73 73 54 50 singapore 3 3 8 7 7 6 7 5 8 8 thailand 48 57 57 48 55 52 51 44 43 44 vietnam 51 76 76 71 52 59 47 45 42 42 source: (wipo, 2021) the research looks at the role of plurilateral free-trade agreements in assisting the asean member states in developing their intellectual property frameworks. in p re ss journal of asean studies 5 analytical framework this research is based on the documentary research concept. it analyses the impact of the asean’s membership in plurilateral free trade agreements on the development of the intellectual property regime of the member countries concerning the protection of patents and marks. there are complications when translating laws from one language to another. many of our language constructs are tied to our culture and understanding. methodology the research adopts the doctrinal legal research method. the authors accessed the official repositories of the intellectual property treaty websites, including the world intellectual property organization, to access official documents, parties to the various treaties, and any reservations. a similar task was undertaken with the asean repository for asean free trade agreements. a legal analysis assessed the impact of plurilateral free-trade agreements on ip legislation of the asean member states. analysis intellectual property treaty membership of asean member states asean member states have obligations under treaties to which they are party and to agreements to which asean is a party. in the latter case, individual member states accede to the agreements following the completion of their internal approval processes. the agreements usually have a threshold number of accessions before the agreement can enter into force. the other potential state parties can accede to the agreement at any time after it enters into force and is then bound to the terms of the agreement. asean member states are contracting parties to world intellectual property organization (wipo) treaties as well as the international convention for the protection of new varieties of plants and the world trade organization agreement on trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights, which is a requirement of being a member of the world trade organization (table 3). with the more recent emphasis on the protection of intellectual property rights, the partners negotiating free trade agreements tend to include a chapter on intellectual property rights. in this case, the focus is on plurilateral-lateral free trade agreements between asean and its dialogue partners. in p re ss 6 impact of pluri-lateral table 3 asean member state membership of international patent and mark treaties (as of 14 february 2021) b ru ne i d ar us sa la m c am bo di a in do ne si a l ao p d r m al ay si a m ya nm ar p hi lip pi ne s si ng ap or e t ha ila nd v ie tn am world intellectual property convention year of accession/ ratification 1994 1995 1979 1994 1988 2001 1980 1990 1989 1975 paris convention for the protection of industrial property year of accession 2012 1998 1950* 1998 1988 1980 1994 2008 1949 patent law treaty (2000) year of accession washington treaty on intellectual property in respect of integrated circuits (1989) year of accession budapest treaty on the international recognition of the deposit of microorganisms for the purposes of patent procedure year of accession 2012 1981 1994 hague agreement concerning the international registration of industrial designs year of accession 2013 2016 2005 2019 geneva act (1999) 2013 2016 2005 2019 lisbon agreement for the protection of appellations of origin and their international registration year of accession p geneva act (2015) 2018 2020 2019 patent cooperation treaty (pct) year of accession 2012 2016 1997 2006 2006 2001 1994 2009 1992 trademark law treaty (tlt) (1994) year of accession/ ratification 1997 nice agreement year of accession/ ratification 2007 1999 singapore treaty year of accession/ ratification 2007 madrid agreement concerning the international registration of marks year of accession/ ratification 1973 madrid protocol [18] 2016 2015 2017 2015 2019 2012 2000 2017 2006 locarno agreement establishing an international classification for industrial designs year of accession 2019 strasbourg agreement concerning the international patent classification year of accession international treaty on plant genetic resources for food and agriculture (also known as itpgrfa, international seed treaty or plant treaty) contracting party p p p p p p signature only p upov convention year of accession 2018 2004 2006 agreement on trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights year of accession 1995 2004 1995 2013 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 2007 source: wipo and authors. *indonesia acceded to paris agreement as the dutch east indies. in p re ss journal of asean studies 7 patent and trade-mark clauses in plurilateral ftas to which asean is a party asean has entered into ftas with six of its ten dialogue parties: australia, china, india, japan, korea and new zealand. all sixteen countries were party to negotiations for the regional comprehensive economic partnership, which entered into force on 1 january 2022 with 12 original parties: australia, new zealand, brunei darussalam, cambodia, china, japan, laos, the republic of korea 2 , singapore, thailand and vietnam (department of foreign affairs and trade, 2021). india was not in a position to sign the rcep agreement. however, the parties left it open for india to accede to the agreement at a later date (ministers’ declaration, 2020). hong kong was not a party to the rcep negotiations. there is diversity among asean members, including their legal systems. as fta obligations require asean members to refine their laws, the significant trading fta partnerships are informative of the changes required. asean-australia-new zealand fta the objectives of the intellectual property chapter of the asean-australia-new zealand fta (aanzfta) are: each party confirms its commitment to reducing impediments to trade and investment by promoting deeper economic integration through effective and adequate creation, utilisation, protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights, taking into account the different levels of economic development and capacity and differences in national legal systems and the need to maintain an appropriate balance between the rights of intellectual property owners and the legitimate interests of users in subject matter protected by intellectual property rights. (ch 13, art. 1). each of the parties affirmed its rights and obligations to each other under the trips agreement (aanzfta, ch. 13, art. (3)). the parties must maintain a trade-mark classification system consistent with the nice agreement and that the trade-mark system may be used to protect geographical indications (aanzfta, ch. 13, art. 7). provided parties meet their international obligations; they may ‘establish appropriate measures to protect genetic resources, traditional knowledge and folklore’ (ch. 13, art. 8). the parties acknowledged significant capacity differences in the area of intellectual property (art. 9(1)). if requested, a party can assist it in implementing chapter 13 of the agreement (art. 9(2)). they also to agreed promote dialogue (art. 9(3)), cooperation (art. 9(4)), education and awareness regarding intellectual property protection and enforcement (art. 9(5)). they also agreed to cooperate on border measures to eliminate intellectual property violations (art. 9(6)). if parties intend to accede to specified patent and mark protection treaties, they can seek the cooperation of other parties in their path to accession and implementation (art. 9(7)). they can also seek support in their efforts to develop an inclusive system of trade-mark registration (art. 9(8)), subject, of course, to the availability of resources 2 for the republic of korea it will enter into force on 1 february 2022. in p re ss 8 impact of pluri-lateral (art. 9(9)). the specified treaties were patent cooperation treaty, strasbourg agreement, budapest treaty, madrid protocol, patent law treaty, upov convention, and singapore treaty. finally, the parties agreed to establish a committee on intellectual property to ‘monitor the implementation and administration’ of the intellectual property chapter. the committee will meet annually, or as required, with its program developed by the parties (art. 12(2)). asean-china framework agreement the asean-china framework agreement includes an agreement on intellectual property (art. 7(2)). in december 2009, the parties signed a memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the field of intellectual property. the parties reaffirmed ‘their commitment under treaties to which they acceded and under their respective national laws and regulations’ (art. 1). they agreed to establish a periodic heads of intellectual property offices meeting to facilitate this. the meetings would: a. share information on the latest developments and exchange views on international intellectual property issues (art. 2(1)) b. coordinate on intellectual property rights protection (art. 2(2)) c. exchange information and experiences concerning the examination of patents (art. 2(3)); d. cooperate in the development of ip automation and database (art. 2(4)); and e. ‘[e]xchange of views on major issues related to the international intellectual property systems that are under deliberation at the world intellectual property organisation and other international fora' (art 2(5)). they also agreed to recognise the contribution made by genetic resources, traditional knowledge and folklore for scientific, cultural and economic development and to improve the ‘legal system for the protection of genetic resources, traditional knowledge and folklore’ (art. 3). asean-hong kong, china fta the asean-hong kong, china fta (ahkfta) affirmed the rights and obligations of the parties to abide by their trips obligations (ch. 10, art. 1). they also agreed ‘to promote and strengthen co-operation in . . . intellectual property rights to enhance their economic and trade relations’ (ch. 10, art. 2). asean-india regional trade and investment area intellectual property rights were not included in the framework agreement for the regional trade and investment area. in p re ss journal of asean studies 9 asean-japan comprehensive economic partnership japan and asean signed a framework agreement for the asean-japan comprehensive economic partnership in 2003. japan committed to mutual cooperation and to support asean members in capacity development in the field of intellectual property rights (art. 5(1)(3)). japan would also promote accession to the related international agreement as was mentioned briefly as a field of economic cooperation in article 53 of the ajcep agreement signed in 2006 [28]. the parties entered into an agreement in 2019 for japan to provide technical assistance through the japan international cooperation agency (jica) for specific programs determined by the parties (tca-asean). asean-korea framework agreement the asean-korean framework agreement (akfta) includes a commitment to ‘explore and cooperate’ in the realm of intellectual property (art. 3.1(1)(j)). regional comprehensive economic partnership agreement the regional comprehensive economic partnership agreement has a very extensive chapter on intellectual property (ch. 11). parties may formulate or amend their laws and ‘adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to its socio-economic and technological development’ (art. 11.4(1)). they may also adopt appropriate measures ‘to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology’ (art. 11.4(2)). the legislation of a party may provide more extensive protections than required by chapter 11 but must not contravene it (art. 11.5)). the regime for the exhaustion of intellectual property rights is up to each party (art. 11.6). parties must ratify or accede to the following patent and mark protection treaties (art. 11.9(1)), namely: paris convention, pct and madrid protocol. they are also to endeavour to ratify or accede to the budapest treaty. as in the aanzfta, if a party intends to ratify or accede to the upov convention, the geneva act (1999) and the singapore treaty, they may seek support from the other parties (rcep, art. 11.9(3)). each party must maintain a trademark classification system consistent with the nice agreement and follow updated versions (rcep, art. 11.21). each party is to grant owners of registered trade-marks exclusive rights (art. 11.23). each party is to protect geographical indications through a trade-mark system, a sui generis system, or other means provided the requirements of the trips agreement [3] are met (rcep, art. 11.29). the agreement deals extensively available with the patentable subject matter whether products or processes, in all fields of technology. they must be ‘new, involve an inventive in p re ss 10 impact of pluri-lateral step, and are capable of industrial application’ regardless of the place of invention, the field of technology, and whether imported or locally produced (art. 11.36(1)). importantly: 2. a party may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within its territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health, or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment . . . 3. a party may also exclude from patentability: (a) diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals; and (b) plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes. however, each party shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof. (art. 11.36(2)-(3)). in addition, each party is to provide that a person may undertake an act for experimental purpose on a patented invention without infringing an owner’s patent (art 11.40). each party must ‘provide for protection of independently created industrial designs that are new or original’ (art. 11.49). a party, subject to its international obligation, may protect genetic resources, traditional knowledge and folklore (art. 11.53(1)). undisclosed information is to be provided protection (art. 11.56), as is the commercial use of a country name where this may mislead a consumer about the place of origin of a product (art. 11.57). enforcement provisions must include civil remedies (s. j(2)), border provisions (s. j(3)) and criminal remedies (s. j(4)). the parties also agreed to cooperate and consult (s. k). finally, the parties were able to provide a list of requests for technical assistance. four countries responded (annex 11b). cambodia requested assistance in setting up a trade-mark registration system, including new plant varieties and capacity building concerning sound marks and trade-marks. lao pdr also requested support in establishing an electronic trademark system. myanmar’s request was for support in the operation of collective management organisations, establishing an electronic trade-mark registering system, and developing a system to protect geographic indications and enforcement. finally, vietnam requested support for capacity building concerning sound marks and information technology. patent and trade-mark legislation in the asean member states each of the asean member states has an extensive patent and trade-mark legislation portfolio, as shown in tables 4 and 5. much of the legislation has been promulgated following asean members' accession to bilateral and plurilateral free trade agreements. in p re ss journal of asean studies 11 table 4 asean member state patent legislation (as of 14 february 2021) country legislation brunei darussalam emergency (industrial designs) order, 1999 emergency (layout designs) order, 1999 patents order, 2011 patents rules, 2012 industrial design (international registration) rules, 2014 plant varieties protection order, 2015 cambodia law on patents, utility models and industrial designs, 2003 law on amendments to the law on patents, utility models and industrial designs, 2017 law on seed management and plant breeder’s rights, 2008 indonesia law on patents law regarding industrial designs law regarding layout designs of integrated circuits law on plant variety protection law regarding trade secret lao pdr law on intellectual property (amended), 2017 malaysia patents act 1983 (as amended) industrial designs act 1996 (as amended) layout-designs of integrated circuits act 2000 protection of new plant varieties act 2004 myanmar patents law 2019 industrial designs law 2019 the seed law 2019 law amending the seed law 2015 seed law regulations 2016 myanmar traditional medicine council law 2019 new plant variety protection law 2019 animal health and breeding development law 2020 philippines intellectual property code (2015 edition) philippine plant variety protection act 2002 singapore patents act as amended to 2019 registered designs act as amended to 2019 plant varieties protection act as amended to 2019 thailand patent act (1979) as amended by the patent act (no. 2) (1992) and the patent act (no. 3) (1999) ministerial regulation on the application for patent protection to implement the patent treaty cooperation (2009) protection of layout-designs of integrated circuits act (2000) plant varieties protection act (1999) protection and promotion of traditional thai medicinal intelligence act, (1999) trade secrets act b.e. 2545 (2002) vietnam law on intellectual property 2005 law amending the law on intellectual property 2009 law amending the law on insurance business and the law on intellectual property 2019 law on biodiversity 2008 seed ordinance 2004 in p re ss 12 impact of pluri-lateral table 5 asean member state mark legislation (as of 14 february 2021) country legislation brunei darussalam trade marks act (rev ed 2000) emblems and names (prevention of improper use) act cambodia law concerning marks, trade names and acts of unfair competition, 2002 law on geographical indications, 2014 indonesia law on trademarks and geographical indications lao pdr law on intellectual property (amended), 2017 malaysia trade marks act 2019 geographical indications act 2000 geographical indications (amendment) act 2002 myanmar trademarks law 2019 animal health and breeding development law philippines intellectual property code (2015 edition) singapore trade marks act as amended to 2019 geographical indications act as amended to 2019] thailand trademark act (1991) (as amended up to trademark act (no. 3) (2016) protection of geographical indications act (2003) ministerial regulation of geographical indications (2003) vietnam law on intellectual property 2005 law amending the law on intellectual property 2009 law amending the law on insurance business and the law on intellectual property 2019 reviews of intellectual property rights practices of asean member states world trade organization trade policy reviews the discussion on technology and digitalization in asean started off as early as the 1990s when the shift of the traditional economy from resource-based to manufacturing emerged. over the years, southeast asia countries have derived their industry and technological advancement as part of their main force for asean economic integration despite the obvious challenges for member countries to expand their development potential (wai, 1995). in more recent years, these topics cannot be separated from globalization and advancement of information technology, industry 4.0, digitalization of finance, and the world trade organization (wto) undertakes trade policy reviews of its member, with the frequency of the review varying according to its share of world trade (wto, 2021). brunei darussalam the latest review was reported in 2015 (wto, 2015). during the period under review, the government converted the patent registry office into the brunei intellectual property office (bipo), para. 3.117). brunei's increased participation in international ip treaties is according to asean commitments for simplified and harmonised ip protection and registration in the asean economic community. the applicant may choose a local approach where local search and examination is outsourced to examiners from in p re ss journal of asean studies 13 danish, austrian, and hungarian patent offices or a foreign approach that relies on search and examination reports issued by prescribed foreign patent offices, namely: australia; canada; european patent office; japan; republic of korea; new zealand; united kingdom; and united states (para. 3.122). undisclosed information (confidential information or trade secrets) is not protected by legislation; however, provisions exist under common law (para. 3.129). cambodia the review on cambodia was issued in 2018 (wto, 2018a). it reported that: ‘cambodia attaches great importance to ipr protection to attract foreign investment and foster domestic growth’ (para. 3.121). the government drafted a national ip strategy focused on improving capacity and capability in intellectual property services in agriculture, culture, education and training, industry and commerce, and tourism. in the period under review, cambodia entered into three multinational treaties (para. 3.122). bilateral agreements on intellectual property protection and cooperation with the united states, thailand, the european patent office, and singapore; and with cooperation only with china, japan, the republic of korea and lao pdr. technical assistance was also being provided by wipo (par. 3.123). from 2012 to the time of the report, 326 patent applications had been lodged, 44 registrations of utility models and 392 applications to register industrial designs (para. 3.130). in the same period, 33,038 trade-mark registration applications were lodged, and 25,351 marks were registered (para. 3.131). indonesia – the secretariat noted that indonesia remained a net importer of intellectual property right intensive goods (wto, 2020a, para. 3.203). they reported that, during the review period, indonesia enacted a new patent act to optimise the state's ip services and align ip protections with indonesian interests whilst abiding by international principles (para. 3.209). during the review period, most of the patents were ‘overwhelming filed by, and granted to non-residents’ (para. 3.214). during the review period, new marks and geographical indications legislation entered into force (para. 3.219). lao pdr according to the secretariat, the lao ip system is an integral part of the strategy for socio-economic development (wto, 2020b, para. 3.126). during the review period, the omnibus law on intellectual property (2011) was amended to further align with international standards (para. 3.127). as of the end of march 2019, 646 patent applications had been filed (para. 3.134), whilst by early april 2019, there had been 46,452 filings for trademarks (para. 3.135). three applications for geographical indications had been registered by june 2019 (para. 3.139). there are capacity constraints on registering plant varieties hindering lao pdr's intent to join the upov (para. 3.140). malaysia – the main malaysian initiative during the review period was the launch of its ip monetisation roadmap 2015-2020, which has the aim of changing the ip mindset so that ip is viewed as an asset ‘with financial value and returns’ (wto, 2018b, para. 3.168). the roadmap has three pillars: the transformation of ip into financial assets, mobilisation of ip assets, and establishment of an ip marketplace to become a trading hub for ip. residents ‘in general made more applications for utility models’ (para. 3.179). in p re ss 14 impact of pluri-lateral myanmar during the review period culminating in its 2020 review, myanmar reformed its legislation (wto, 2020c, para. 3.115). the laws were to enter into force in 2021 (para. 3.117). geographical indications may be protected under the trademark law (para. 3.179). everything is now in a state of flux as there was a brutal military coup d'état on 1 february 2021 (human rights watch, 2021). philippines the 2018 review reported that the philippines amended its intellectual property code at the beginning of the review period (wto, 2018c, 3.129). from january to september 2017, there were 21,834 trade-mark applications, 852 industrial design applications, 1,948 patent applications and 753 utility model applications (table 3.11). singapore – during the review period, singapore adopted an ip master plan, intending to become an ip hub in asia (wto, 2016, para. 3.87), amended its patents act, plant varieties protection act, and enacted a new geographical indications (gi) law (para. 3.89). the amended patent act strengthened the patentability requirements. it ensures that they fully comply with the criteria of novelty, inventiveness, and industrial applicability (para 3.90). the geographical indications act entered into force when the eu-singapore fta [89] was ratified in november 2019 (para. 3.92). thailand the trade performance review of 2020 reported that thailand adopted a number of reforms to its ip systems during the period under review, particularly in science, technology, and innovation (wto, 2021, para. 3.221). considerable efforts were made to streamline its patent and trade-marks examination process (para. 3.222). there is increasing attention ‘to the more complex areas of its policy framework and institutional development, ict adoption, and complex skills training for its workforce, which are vital for its growing creativity and innovation capital’ (para. 3.224). there was a surge in applications for utility models, with those by thai residents being for food and cosmetics (para. 3.232). thai residents lodged the most patent applications in optics, being 13.7% of global applications in the 2015-2017 period (para. 3.239). over the review period, there was a steady growth in patent protection applications, ‘especially in human necessities, transportation, and chemistry and metallurgy’. the average examination period for a patent application is 6-8 years (para. 3.240). trade-mark applications take around 16-18 months, provided there is no opposition or appeal (para. 3.244). as of march 2020, thailand had 137 registered gis (para. 3.249). vietnam – the latest trade policy review for vietnam was reported in november 2013 and is, therefore, outdated (wto, 2013a). what was noted was the highly complex nature of the enforcement system, which is regulated by a combination of legal and administration texts (para. 3.190). ustr special section 301 report congress requires the united states trade representative (ustr) to conduct an annual review of intellectual property protection and enforcement status in the united states trading in p re ss journal of asean studies 15 partners (ustr, 2020, p. 4). in 2020 indonesia remained on the priority watch list, whilst thailand and vietnam remained on the watch list (p. 10). indonesia – was considered to have inadequate and ineffective intellectual property protection and enforcement (p. 48). the report questioned the adequacy of indonesia's 2016 patent law, geographical indications legislation, and lack of data secrecy provisions and enforcement. the main areas of improvement were in the areas of enforcement against pirated and counterfeit goods. thailand – was considered to have made progress in addressing concerns raised under the bilateral trade and investment framework agreement between the united states and thailand (tifa) [90] (ustr, 2020, p. 65). it considered that thailand needed to streamline the patent registration process, address the backlog in pending pharmaceutical patent applications, lengthy civil ip enforcement proceedings, unfair commercial use of data and inadequate secrecy provisions. the remainder of the issues related to copyright, piracy, and enforcement. thailand had been on the priority watch list for over ten years (lighthizer, 2017). it shows that thailand had serious property infringement problems like other developing countries under pressure to abide by international ip treaties and, on the other hand, the rules of the united states. vietnam –made progress during the review period by issuing a national ip strategy and continued public awareness and training activities (p. 66). administrative enforcement processes failed to deter widespread counterfeiting and piracy, and the united states was cooperating with vietnam concerning criminal enforcement of ip violations. unauthorised disclosure of test data used to obtain marketing approval of pharmaceutical products needed ‘clarification’. the report also noted that vietnam had committed to improving its ip regime through free trade agreements and international treaties. discussion and conclusion all asean members are parties to the trips treaty. and have acceded to several additional ip treaties. even cambodia, lao pdr, and myanmar, recognised as least developed countries by the united nations committee for development policy (2021), had until 1 july 2021 to meet their obligations (wto, 2013b) have entered into ip treaties. several factors have driven these developments. ideology is clearly not a reason. asean includes three democratic constitutional monarchies (cambodia, malaysia and thailand), one absolute monarchy (brunei darussalam), two presidential democracies (indonesia and the philippines), one parliamentary democracy (singapore), two communist states (lao pdr and vietnam) and at the time of writing myanmar in a state of turmoil following a brutal military coup d'état. this lack of ideology is further exemplified by the fact that four members of asean (brunei darussalam, malaysia, singapore and vietnam) were signatories to the trans-pacific partnership (tpp). when first mooted, it was driven by the united states, particularly in in p re ss 16 impact of pluri-lateral extending the protection of intellectual property rights. the tpp morphed into the comprehensive and progressive agreement for trans-pacific partnership (cptpp) [92] following the united states' withdrawal from the tpp. some of the more contentious intellectual property rights clauses from the tpp were set aside for later discussion by the parties to the cptpp (annex ii). the other 11 signatories to the tpp signed the cptpp. at the time of writing, asean members singapore and vietnam had ratified their membership, with the cptpp entering into force on 30 december 2018 (dfat, 2021b). one of the key drivers is the desire for all three of the least developed and all six developing countries to improve their intellectual property regimes so that innovation becomes a driving force in their economies. robust ip frameworks are considered a feature of developing better innovation within a jurisdiction and having better outcomes. some asean countries have a long way to go to reach an independent innovation-driven economy, whereas others, such as singapore, provide a model for development. singapore has one of the highest scores in the gii globally, with a ranking in the top ten. one of the critical foundations for its success is the long-term cooperation between asean and some of its key dialogue partners, particularly australia and new zealand. australia became asean's first dialogue partner in 1974 and was elevated to a strategic level in 2014 (asean secretariat, 2021b). new zealand became a dialogue partner in 1975, elevated to a strategic level in 2015 (asean secretariat, 2021c). over the years, both countries have collaborated and cooperated with asean and its members culminating with the entering into force of the asean-australia new-zealand free trade area in 2010. the approaches of australia and new zealand are quite different from the approach of the united states with its investigations and publication of its special 301 reports. australia and new zealand much prefer the 'collaborative' (carrot) approach as opposed to the ‘blame’ (stick) of the united states. this cooperation between asean and its dialogue parties allows the parties, on the one hand, to seek assistance and, on the other, provide assistance to enhance the capacity of asean member states in intellectual property protection regimes within their jurisdictions. acknowledgement this research is supported by an australian government research training program (rtp) scholarship to the first author. about the authors dr robert smith graduated with a bsc in 1969 and has undertaken postgraduate studies in education, engineering and law. he holds a phd in engineering and is currently a phd candidate in law at the university of new england, australia and an international development consultant working in southeast and south asia. in p re ss journal of asean studies 17 dr nucharee nuchkoom smith is an assistant professor in international law at the chalermphrakiat sakon nakhon province campus, kasetsart university, thailand. she has completed post-graduate studies in political science and law with a phd from western sydney university, australia focusing on the thailand, australia free trade agreement (tafta). she was previously a legal officer in the house of representatives, thailand. professor perry has been professor, faculty of law, university of new england, armidale, australia since 2012. he is an academic leader, legal professional and computer scientist with strong governance, management, coordination, and negotiation skills. determined and passionate professor and manager, with 30+ years’ experience in law, biotech, computer science, knowledge engineering, innovation, and intellectual property. references agreement establishing the 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(2020b). trade policy review: report by the secretariat: indonesia (4 november 2020) (wt/tpr/s/401). wto (2020c). trade policy review: report by the secretariat: myanmar (21 december 2020) (wt/tpr/s/405). wto (2021). trade policy review: report by the secretariat thailand: revision (18 january 2021) (wt/tpr/s/400/rev.1.). in p re ss journal of asean studies, vol. 7, no. 1 (2019), pp. 86-97 doi: https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v7i1.5590 ©2019 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic practice note what does asean economic community bring to older workers? examining inequality in old age in thailand’s fast-ageing society wenqian xu linköping university, sweden sikander islam linköping university, sweden abstract the asean economic community is envisaged to promote economic integration initiatives to create a single market across southeast asian member countries. it is acknowledged that the intergovernmental initiatives need to be accommodative to national and regional contexts. thailand, as a pivotal and active partnership, endeavors to facilitate economic transformation and regional integration within the asean and cope with population ageing in thai society. since thailand has been the third most rapidly ageing country in the world, demographic changes pose new challenges for how to achieve persistent economic growth, productive employment and decent work. this article is based on a qualitative approach to investigate the emergent inequality within and across age cohorts shaped by the aec structural forces, as well as utilizes reliable secondary data to formulate argumentation, including academic publications, policy analysis, scientific reports. we are particularly concerned about the heterogeneity and poverty in old age from the perspective of cumulative advantages/disadvantages. in conclusion, this article suggests policy recommendations of mitigating inequality in old age and advocates a critical lens to examine how political economic structure shapes older individuals in the labor market. key words: inequality, labor market, old age, regional integration introduction the asean economic community (aec) has been formally established in 2015 to provide an institutional framework for further promoting regional economic integration and corporation among ten member nations. as a bloc, the aec is predicted to become the 4th largest economy by 2030 after the united states, china and the european union. likewise, the aec has been featured by its populous facts, economic growth, trade and investment prospects. as shown in the aec blueprint 2015, it has been envisaged to create a single market and production base, allowing for the free movement of goods, services, investment and skilled labor within asean. it has previously been https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v7i1.5590 journal of asean studies 87 observed that the asean regional integration gave rise to a reduction in unemployment in most member states (bano & tabbada, 2017). existing research has acknowledged the critical role played by regional economic integration in the asean and investigated the trade-off between the free market and labor market using an equilibrium approach (petri, plummer & zhai, 2012; lai, 2016). nevertheless, there has been little critical analysis of how the structural forces of aec impact certain population in an integrative labor market. it is acknowledged that asean member countries have been experiencing a profound and influential demographic change with an increasingly growing number of older adults aged over 60, especially in thailand and singapore. thailand is reported as the fastest ageing country in asia (undp, 2013), and it is projected to become an aged society in 2021, with 19.8 percent of older adults aged over 60 to the overall population (nesdb, 2016). extensive research has shown that population ageing can influence economic growth, employment rates, wages of certain age cohorts in the labor market to a different extent. in this regard, dixon (2003) argues that it is crucial to maintaining the employability of older workers who would like to continue working in later life, the relevance of older workers’ skills, as well as the potential for adjusting mobility levels. practically, the aec is expected to mitigate insufficiency of the agile workforce in ageing societies by fostering labor free flows. a body of works focuses on the employability of college students within asean and their preparations for the changes during the implementation of aec measures (vicheth, 2012; barbin & nicholls, 2013; dudzik & nguyen, 2015). up to now, far too little attention has been paid to the implications of regional integration on the employment status of older adults concerning the fast-ageing context. walker (1981) accentuates that poverty in old age is a function of low socioeconomic status prior to retirement due to the access restrictions of resources and opportunities. hence, the current study critically examines the inequality of older workers rather than pensioners in thailand in terms of aec initiatives. the inquiry makes use of the secondary data produced by intergovernmental organizations to substantiate the arguments in this article. as such, it sheds light on the role of this political-economic institutional framework in challenging or reinforcing the poverty and inequality in old age. the inquiry is designed to answer the question as to what inequalities that asean economic community brings to older workers in thailand. in the following sections, this article instantiates several features about old age in relation to the employability and then suggests a set of opportunities that population ageing have in the workforce. then it introduces cumulative advantages/disadvantages (ca/d) perspective to address economic inequality across and within age groups/cohorts. in this study, we examine thai older workers’ employment situation 88 what does aec bring to older workers within the aec structural context; further, we argue that the aec might potentially increase the probability of inequality in old age by allocating recourses differently to citizens at different ages. it concludes with some remarks on how to mitigate inequality in old age at the institutional level in the last section. older workers in thailand’s fast-ageing society elderly people are often viewed as a burden to the society and the taxpayers. they are neglected in many countries around the world, even though that should not be the case. older adults in thailand are ageing, and they are ageing fast. people in later life experience all sorts of problems without any doubt. this can include body declines, health and fitness, lifestyles, education, work, as well as retirement. the body ages as one grows older, so it is possible for individuals to develop health problems. an individual’s lifestyle plays an important role as well. a healthy lifestyle and diet can keep a person active and healthy throughout their later life. an unhealthy lifestyle on the other hand can cause enormous problems in later life. this can lead to financial problems since older people are likely to work less, therefore earn less money, and have to rely on other means of wealth they have accumulated to support themselves (helpage, n.d.). healthcare is expensive because of how much science and technology is invested in it these days. doctors and medical practitioner have to spend many years in advance education to get the appropriate education to treat patients dealing with health-related issues. they spend a lot of money on their education so that one day their patients can benefit from the knowledge and practice they have gained. it is human nature to want to live a longer and healthier life. longevity is influenced by inequality of living conditions. this is significant to study on inequality in old age. poverty in later life is a function of low socioeconomic status prior to retirement (walker, 1981). usually people would have saved money from their pension, but certain circumstances to how one is brought up in certain countries does not leave them with that privilege. population ageing makes a difference the labor market. studies have found that cohort difference and life trajectories matter. in the future there is a possibility for the situation for older people to look different. it is expected to be cohorts of exchange. for example, new lifestyles can make changes into the life of the elderly. upcoming workers can have a better life if they have the means and freedom of mobility. mobility and flexibility of working and living is of utmost importance in the 21st century. upcoming workers in thailand can have access and availability to a betterand high-quality education. workers in thailand do have differences among the sector and branches. older people have more work experience and therefore it sets a standard for employment and personal fulfilment. the capabilities of elderly people are also important. age is also subjective. in the future, there are expected to be more old people. hence, journal of asean studies 89 the demands and resources will influence the economy. thailand is a fast ageing society where rights of older workers should be taken into consideration. ageing population in thailand is a significantly high issue. there needs to be a vast increase in valuable resources to society. older people in thailand share their values and culture with young people. they volunteer in communities and are a thriving resource to the thai society themselves (helpage, n.d.). thailand’s demographics as a southeast asian country are bound to change. studies have found that older thai people are able to take care of themselves. health problems are higher in older thai men in comparison to women. this creates a gender perspective. thailand was not taking much action during the past few decades on older people and how to cater their needs in thai society. recommendations by the united nations have recently started to influence thailand’s government to start taking a stronger initiative in the working and quality of life of thailand’s elderly people. if elderly people are catered with their needs, their finances can increase and they can actively participate in the thai society because they will have a high level of livelihood (knodel & chayovan, 2008). cumulative advantages/disadvantages perspective social gerontologists have investigated the inequality-generating process from the perspective of cumulative advantages/disadvantages across the life course and across ages. dannefer (2003) argues that ca/d perspective has been logically entangled with several paradigmatic theories in sociology, psychology and economics fields; hence it provides a fresh lens to examine poverty and inequality in old age and directs to in-depth analyses at multiple levels and disciplines. furthermore, dannefer delineates cumulative advantage/disadvantage in a formal manner as “the systemic tendency for inter-individual divergence in a given characteristic (e.g., money, health, or status) with the passage of time”. it is still acknowledged that the common concern of using this perspective lies in analysis on the historical interplay among individual life, structural contexts and social change (o’rand, 1996). against this backdrop, this study is particularly concerned about how the aec, as a political-economic structure, influences the resource allocation of ageing individuals in thailand’s labor market. a body of works supports that the ca/d process could be considered as a mechanism of inequality. the model of cumulative exposure and status-resource interaction was adopted to further explain between-group inequality over time (diprete & eirich, 2006). in the particular case of the workforce, the allocation of opportunities and resources in labor markets create intricate patterns of cumulative advantages/disadvantages, such as job mobility and rewards (o’rand, 1996). prior studies have empirically investigated how earlylife advantages or disadvantages lead to 90 what does aec bring to older workers later outcomes in varying degrees, as well as underlined the increasing heterogeneity and inequality with age. for instance, willson, shuey & elder (2007) suggest that socioeconomic status and economic history result in health disparities as people age in the united states. moreover, ponomarenko (2016) argues that the employment history of older europeans is associated with subjective well-being in old age; particularly the labor market inactivity negatively impacts life satisfaction. inequality has been identified within and across age groups/cohorts concerning divergent trajectories of accumulation throughout the lifespan. older adults have been accentuated as a heterogeneous population by gerontologists especially in the dimension of poverty and economic inequality. crystal and shea (1990) suggest that economic inequality is greatest among elderly people; further, a recent study found that inequality increased sharply within each cohort of older adults in the changing economic environment (crystal, shea & reyes, 2017). on the other, ca/d perspective underscores unequal resource distribution and subsequent economic stratification across ages. likewise, the unfairness of allocating opportunities across generations was addressed as generation x and later generations are projected to receive gradual increases of median wages and retirement incomes (hudson, 2016). hence, this article explicates inequality in old age within and across age groups, when it comes to implementing the aec initiatives in thailand’s labor market. inequality within age cohorts it is argued that certain social forces at different levels of social process contribute to increasing intra-cohort heterogeneity with the passage of time (dannefer, 1987). education is often seen as a vital predictor of employability and employment career and it presumably influences individuals due to the expansion of higher education during the second half of the twentieth century. mincer (1991) suggests that well-educated workers at least enjoy three basic strengths in the labor market, including superior wages, higher employment stability, greater advancements in occupation and income. individual trajectories of education and training lead to the differentials in job opportunities, employment careers and economic inequalities. given that the aec takes incentives to promote labor mobility and integration in the asean region, it has established a legal status for the mobility of skilled professionals, including mutual recognition arrangements (mras). however, the existing mras only enable the mobility of adept workers in limited profession areas which takes up 1.5% of the total asean workforce; still, several occupations are not covered and arranged by institutional agreements (vineles, 2017). language proficiency and professional expertise are conceived as journal of asean studies 91 significant qualifications of talent labors that needed to be addressed since the aec has been facilitating the free flow of skilled labor within the asean member states and across the asia-pacific area. given that the asean brings an englishmediate environment to thailand, english proficiency has become a determinant of employability of the workforce and labor interactions within asean nations. kuosuwan (2016) found that tourist professionals in bangkok are not wellprepared for entering the asean community due to their inferior english communication skills. thai students have become concerned about their career future and eager to improve their english skills to acquire better jobs in the thai labor market and even in the high-income asean member states. in the view of cumulative advantages/disadvantages perspective, inequality in education within cohorts have resulted from the unequal allocation of educational resources and structuring of opportunities in thai society. not all workforce in thailand has chances of receiving high education, with regard to the financial status of families, living areas and public or private schools. individuals with low socioeconomic status are distanced from high-quality education resources (mayer, 1997). for example, graduates from superior universities or families tend to greatly benefit from the aec initiatives and acquire employment due to their cumulative advantages of everyday networks in work and family contexts. as such, early disadvantages may increase the likelihood of persistent disadvantages, such as poor educational attainment, unfavorable occupational position and lower wages. apart from the education domain, social factors in the working life course may invoke intracohort differentiation significantly, such as working conditions and corresponding rewards (kohn & schooler, 1984). labor participation of old cohorts and occupational segregation might operate to produce economic inequality in old age. a survey conducted in 2000 suggests that 80.8 percent of thai older adults aged 50 to 59 years participated in the workforce while the rest was detached from the workforce (fujioka & thangphet, 2008). certain older adults in public sector and favorable positions may continue to work in later life while other employees in the private sector are subject to have an earlier retirement age. besides, the asean selected eleven prominent sectors to accelerate economic integration, that took up above 50% of intra-asean trade in 2003 (asean secretariat, 2004). however, 66.1 percent thai older adults worked in agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing industries (fujioka & thangphet, 2008). in this regard, older adults working in the prioritized sectors have encountered potential income increase and career prospects, which differentiates these workers from other cohort members. therefore, we argue that the aec’s sectorial approach potentially shapes and reinforces income inequality in old age. 92 what does aec bring to older workers inequality across age cohorts in the domain of education, inequality is addressed as the result of the lack of education and lack of secondchance alternatives over the life course (bar-haim & blank, 2019). individuals are committed to education investments in early life stages with regard to compulsory education. evidence suggests that inequality in educational attainment increase over the life course; besides, educational re-entry in midlife is correlated with individual resources, work pathway and early achievements in education (elman & o’rand, 1998). consequently, older cohorts tend to be disadvantaged in receiving vocational education and training. older people in korea have been found as less communication competent and less adaptive to technologies (lee, park & hwang, 2015). as compared to young employees, older adults in the labor market are inclined to be excluded from certain positions and industries, such as hi-tech sectors. in the context of transformative economies in the asean region, the aec has endeavored to embrace innovative technologies and improve digital inclusion. young generation is particularly spotlighted in ensuring digital dividends by thailand’s minister of digital economy and society (pata, 2017); while old generation is often overlooked in accelerating speedy economic growth. concerning the impacts of digital technologies in asean’s labor market, the low-skill jobs have been probably replaced, especially in the labor-intensive manufacturing and services industries (ilo, 2016). in fact, 89 percent old thais aged over 60 years work in such laborintensive sectors, such as agriculture, commerce and manufacturing (ilo, 2008), hence they would be greatly affected and vulnerable by potential large-scale job replacements. it would give rise to high risks of job losses, long-term unemployment, income deduction of thai older adults which impacts the living conditions considerably. according to the mras, the aec has been particularly facilitating labor mobility within the asean region. yet, older adults are impoverished in labor mobility since vital life events often happen at earlier stages from a life course perspective. hence, their potential for mobility dividends could not be fully achieved within the aec framework. a slightly growing number of studies investigates the determinants of labor mobility in thai industries. for example, suanmali & saengsathien (2014) suggest that stable national political-economic situation and better work rewards motivate thai engineers to work aboard; further, nobnorb & fongsuwan (2015) argue that greater skills and feasible labor policy promote labor mobility in thai rubber industry. in terms of the determinants in old age, although little is known from the present literature, a few characteristic factors should be taken into consideration, such as health conditions and social insurance system. journal of asean studies 93 thailand is a net immigration country, and the relationship between migrant and native workers has been concerned in the labor market. surprisingly, evidence reveals that migrant workers increase the paid employment rate and income per capital of native workers; besides, it does not intensify the competition between migrant and native workers (oecd/ilo, 2017). in addition, thailand has been a popular recreation country for foreign pensioners to stay owing to low living and health costs. yet, the increasing purchase and investments from foreigners lead to the rise of the local price level, which leads to unaffordable prices and supply deficits, particularly in housing and healthcare areas. conclusion the asean economic community is a political and economic framework for fostering regional economic integration and adopting a set of strategies to implement the 2025 blueprint. this structure has been argued as a function of differentiating resources and opportunities on the basis of age. individuals turn out to be structured by the aec framework and influenced by social change. older adults are vulnerable to deal with social change and fail to harness career opportunities in the thai labor market. cumulative advantage/disadvantage perspective spotlights individual life trajectories and emphasizes heterogeneity within and across age cohorts; further, it operates to produce emergent inequality in old age in the context of thailand’s population ageing. this article elaborated emergent inequality in old age within the aec framework; it suggests following policy recommendations to mitigate the abovementioned inequality in the thai labor market. first, older cohorts in the working life course need to be taken into consideration in the rapid ageing society as thai old workers are subject to laborintensive occupations. from the cumulative advantages/disadvantages perspective, this article suggests that citizens at different life stages ought to be provided with lifelong learning chances to move further up in knowledge-intensive sectors and managerial positions. advanced experience and knowledge in entire lives can be used as a sign of value to situate them into a favorable category. second, less-skilled workforce and laborintensive positions are associated with thai older workers. the mobility of older workers is isolated from skilled labor and sectoral priorities in terms of the aec’s institutional framework of economic integration. hence, this paper argues that it is vital to extend the coverage of mras and promote the free flow of workers in manufacturing, tourism and other sectors. third, the socioeconomic status of new old people should be received much attention in the thai fast-ageing society, given that individual background contributes to accumulating advantages/disadvantages and producing inequality in old age. hence, it is suggested to take a critical lens to examine 94 what does aec bring to older workers the inclusiveness of resources allocation by thai governments. about the author wenqian xu is a marie skłodowska-curie phd fellow in ageing and social change at linköping university. he is seconded to social development division at united nations escap (from november 2019 to february 2020). his research focuses on examining macro-level determinants on older adults, such as mass media, political and corporate structural forces. currently he conducts scientific research at eu funded innovative training network euro ageism. sikander islam is a mssc student in international and european relations at linköping university. his primary research interests include politics, geopolitics, and ageing research. references asean secretariat. 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(2007). cumulative advantage processes as mechanisms of inequality in life course health. american journal of sociology, 112(6), 1886-1924. journal of asean studies, vol. 3, no. 2 (2015), pp. 68-92 ©2015 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic migration between southeast asia and taiwan: trends, characteristics and implications ching-lung tsay tamkang university, taiwan abstract the migration of human resources between southeast asia and taiwan is significant, indicating a close bilateral relationship. this study takes the perspective of economic development to examine the migration flows, aiming to explore the migration impacts of differences in societal development. based on the taiwan-southeast asia relative development status, the study further theorizes the possible migration trends between the two places. empirically, the investigation focuses on major types of migration from indonesia, the philippines, thailand, and vietnam to taiwan, including contract workers, immigrant spouses, professionals and the skilled, as well as students. the taiwan to southeast asia migration covers mainly those migrants induced by taiwanese investment. according to available information, the migration between taiwan and southeast asia is rather asymmetric, with the southeast asia to taiwan flows far more important than the counter flows. this fact indicates an advantageous position for taiwan to cultivate relations with the migrant sending nations. it also provides a niche for every source country to work closely with taiwan in migration management and migrant protection, for the interests of both the places of origin and destination. keywords: international migration, migration and development, taiwan, southeast asia, asymmetric interaction introduction with the trend of globalization and the improvement in transportation and communication technology, the number of people who can afford and are willing to migrate to other countries has substantially increased. the size of international migrants in the world increased by 37 percent and reached 214 million from 1990 to 2010. the big volume of cross-border migration provided with various development opportunities to both the source and the host countries. it also brought brand-new challenges to all nations involved in this process. nowadays, the migration of population and the labour force has become a normal and permanent feature of most countries. as a result, the relationship between migration and national development has been regarded as journal of asean studies 69 highly correlated. (athukurola, 2006; iom, 2008) taking off circa mid-1960s and going through the early process of development in the 1970s, the taiwan economy entered the stage of a mature economy with the emergence of surplus capital and shortage of workers in the 1980s. consequently, taiwan has since then become a target destination for workers from neighbouring less developed nations, who were looking for overseas employment opportunities. in the meanwhile, the source countries of workers in se asia are destinations of taiwanese investment. with the investment, some capital-assisted professionals and skilled workforce such as business managers, production engineers, and market specialists, as well as their dependents were relocated to se asia. this movement represents a counter-flow of the labour migration from se asia to taiwan. since the 1990s, the international migration between se asia and taiwan has gained momentum. this is particularly true in the part of migration to taiwan, including contract workers, immigrant spouses, and foreign students. there are many significant changes in the size, composition, and characteristics of each type of migration. the trends and changes are important to se asia as a whole, and to major sending countries in particular. this fact has also received a great deal of attention from international organizations concerned about migration. following the introductory section, this paper will discuss briefly the background of migration flows between se asia and taiwan. afterwards, the presentation will focus on (1) the migration of se asians to taiwan, and (2) the migration of taiwanese to se asia. the first part includes the four groups of contract workers, immigrant spouses, students, and professionals. the second part deals mainly with the capital-assisted migrants. the paper will conclude with a summary of major findings and some discussions on the implications of human interactions, in terms of migration, for regional cooperation and integration. economic development and human migration due to differences in the level and speed of development among countries, the returns to the two major production factors (i.e., labour and capital) vary substantially from markets to markets. in order to obtain higher expected returns, the two production factors tend to move across countries. as a result, international labour migration (ilm) and foreign direct investment (fdi) have been integral parts of economic development. (tsai and tsay, 2012, 2004). as clearly indicated above, globalization is a facilitating factor of international migration of both labour and capital. in the past few decades, the accelerating movements of products (goods and services) and production factors (labour and capital) in the world represent solid evidence of globalization. both ilm and fdi are phenomena induced by the market equilibrating forces. it had been 70 migration between southeast asia and taiwan experienced by many western developed countries. similarly, the large scale of ilm and fdi movements that have been occurring in east and se asia since the mid1980s also reflects the results of the market mechanism. according to the existing literature (e.g. athukurola, 2006; perkins, 2014; tsay, 2003), japan is often taken as the leader of the east asian experience in economic development since 1960s. the first tier of followers includes the four asian dragons of south korea, taiwan, hong kong and singapore, while the asean-4 (indonesia, malaysia, the philippines, and thailand) and china are regarded as the second tier countries. vietnam could be seen as a newcomer to join the second tier. even though the level of development in vietnam remains low, its growth rate has been rather high since the open-up of the economy in 1986. the third tier followers will surely be cambodia, laos and myanmar on the mainland southeast asia. with the surge of fdi inflows, the three economies are expected to grow quickly in the near future. in the development process of east and se asian counties discussed above, the direction of fdi in the 1960s to the mid1980s was mainly from japan to the four asian dragons. from the late 1980s onward, the four dragons joined japan in investing in the asean-4 countries, china and vietnam. the fdi flows have naturally induced some capital-assisted migrants. they consist chiefly of the professionals in manufacturing production and business management as well as their accompanying dependents. in terms of labour migration, japan has been resistant in receiving unskilled workers despite the emergence of clandestine foreign labourers around 1980. the majority of foreign workforce in japan has been with the legal status of students, trainees, and japanese language learners. among the asian dragons, singapore, taiwan, and hong kong opened their labour markets to foreign workers in the late 1980s or 1990s, whereas south korea did not do so until 2000. opposite to the direction of capital flows, the migration of blue-collar workers from asean-4 (except malaysia) and vietnam to asian dragon countries is very significant. the volume is substantial and the rate of increase is high (iom, 2008; tsai and tsay, 2004; tsay 2002). in the mid 1980s, taiwan entered the stage of labour shortage due to increases in national income as well as changes in demographic and economic structures, which in turn led to the emergence of foreigners illegally working for low-skilled jobs. moreover, with the taiwanese currency (new taiwan dollar) appreciated by some 40 percent in 1985-1990, the per capita income gap between taiwan and some se asian nations reached 10-20 times, furthering the surge of se asian workers to taiwan. by the end of the 1980s, the number was estimated at 50-125 thousand (tsay, 1992). this big number of clandestine foreign workers brought great pressure to the taiwanese authority to consider various responses, including the policy option of importing workers from abroad (tsay, 2007, 1995a, 1995b). journal of asean studies 71 in the late 1980s, the completion of several major public construction projects in taiwan was seriously delayed due to lack of workers. as a result, the government granted in 1989 an ad hoc permission to import construction workers from thailand to meet the need. soon after that, the employment service act of 1992 provided the legal base for labour importation and taiwan formally started the policy of opening up its labour market to contract workers from se asia. initially, the source countries were limited to thailand, malaysia, the philippines, and indonesia. vietnam was added to the list in 1999 and quickly became an important one. in the meanwhile, the number of malaysian workers decreased rapidly to become insignificant, due to its domestic economic development. (tsay, 2007, 2002). in the following section, the presentation will be mainly on contract workers from the four major providers of indonesia, the philippines, thailand and vietnam. by the end of 2014, the total number of imported workers reached 550 thousand, not including the undocumented ones. since the mid-1980s, many taiwanese men have married se asian ladies and taken their brides to settle down in taiwan. there are of course demographic and socioeconomic factors behind this marriage migration (tsay, 2008, 2004). the majority of the immigrant spouses from se asia are young females, with high capacity and strong incentives to work in taiwan. despite the fact that they are disadvantageous in taiwan labour market, most of them are very aggressive in participating in economic activities, and willing to take the low end jobs (tsay, 2008, 2007). based on this fact, the immigrant spouses are similar to the contract workers, in the sense that they also reflect the development gap between taiwan and se asia. through marriages, the young se asian ladies are able to obtain the most direct and effective channel to have the legal status for working in taiwan. the purpose of migration is clearly to pursue better economic life conditions and to obtain higher job opportunities and pay. by this way, the immigrant spouses could realize their individual (or family) economic expectations of their migration (tsay, 2015). at the end of 2014, the number of immigrant spouse from southeast asia has reached 140 thousand. the major source countries are vietnam (2/3), indonesia, thailand, the philippines and cambodia. the first four countries are exactly the providers of contract workers to taiwan. this overlapping in places of origin indicates a high degree of similarity in the nature of the two different types of migration to taiwan. the total number of contract workers and immigrant spouses has surged to 690 thousand in 2014. not only are they important contributors to economic development in taiwan, but also are important participants in major social activities. for many aged and disabled taiwanese in particular, they are key care providers and household helpers. 72 migration between southeast asia and taiwan migration from southeast asia to taiwan contract workers in the late 1970s and the first half of 1980s, the out-migration of se asian workers was mainly from the philippines, thailand, indonesia, and malaysia, heading for the middle east countries. from the mid-1980s, however, the demand for foreign workers in the arab nations decreased substantially due to the decline of oil prices and the outbreak of the gulf war. in the meanwhile, the currencies of japan and the four east asian dragons appreciated significantly after the signature of the plaza accord in 1985. as a result, the southeast asian workers started to bound for japan and the asian dragon countries, where economic development was very impressive. among the new destinations, taiwan was particularly attractive due to the big increase in manufacturing production costs and the sharp appreciation of new taiwan dollar (tsay, 2002, 1995b; martin, mason and tsay, 1995). as shown in fig. 1a, the number of southeast asian workers in taiwan has continuously increased since the opening up of taiwanese labour market in the early 1990s. the rate of increment was relatively much higher during the periods of kuo min tang (kmt – chinese national party) government (before 2000 and after 2008) than those of the democratic progressive party (dpp) government (2000-2008). the number was 2,999 in 1992, accounting for only 0.18% of the labour force in taiwan. it jumped up quickly to 189,051 in 1995 and then almost doubled to 326,515 in 2000. in 2010, the number reached 379,653, representing for 3.7% of taiwan labour force. it is clear that southeast asia has become an important source area of human resources for taiwan. in 2000, the national composition of the contract workers reveal that thailand is the dominant country (44%), to be followed by the philippines (30%), indonesia (24%), and vietnam (2.4%). in the past decade, however, the number of indonesian workers increased sharply and continuously, as fig. 1b clearly depicted. consequently, the latest available data as of april 2015 (tables 1, 1a and 1b) reveal that indonesia has taken the lead in terms of market share (42%), vietnam was the second (28%), while the corresponding figures for the philippines and thailand dropped to 20% and 10%, respectively. as shown in tables 1, 1a and 1b, the number (stock) of southeast asian contract workers in taiwan is 572,555 at the end of april 2015. about 60 percent of them are employed in the industrial sector (with very high concentration (95%) in the manufacturing industry), while the remaining 40 percent in the service sector (table 1a). the industrial sector consists of the agriculture and fishery industry, the manufacturing industry, and the construction industry. the service sector covers mainly the health care providers for the aged and the disabled as well as a small number of household service workers. journal of asean studies 73 figure 1a: se asian contract workers in taiwan by nationality, 1991-2015 figure 1b: contract workers for individual countries, 19942015 source: ministry of labor, 2015 74 migration between southeast asia and taiwan table 1: se asian workers in taiwan by sector and nationality, april 2015 nation sector total indonesia philippines thailand vietnam total 572,555 238,298 116,960 59,021 158,270 industry sector 344,706 57,510 90,720 58,385 138,088 agr.+fishery 10,491 8,955 1,439 19 78 manufacturing 328,198 47,249 89,264 55,426 136,256 construction 6,017 1,306 17 2,940 1,745 service sector 227,849 180,788 26,240 636 20,182 health care & house services 227,849 180,788 26,240 636 20,182 source: ministry of labor, 2015 table 1a: sector composition (%) of se asian workers by nationality, april 2015 nation sector total indonesia philippines thailand vietnam sum (number) 100.0 (572,555) 100.0 (238,298) 100.0 (116,960) 100.0 (59,021) 100.0 (158,270) industry sector 60.2 24.1 77.6 98.9 87.2 agr.+fishery 1.8 3.8 1.2 0.0 0.0 manufacturing 57.3 19.8 76.3 93.9 86.1 construction 1.1 0.5 0.0 5.0 1.1 service sector 39.8 75.9 22.4 1.1 12.8 source: ministry of labor, 2015 table 1b: market share of se nations in taiwan’s foreign workers by sector, april 2015 nation sector total indonesia philippines thailand vietnam sum (number) 100.0 (572,555) 41.6 20.4 10.3 27.6 industry sector (number) 100.0 (344,706) 16.7 26.3 16.9 40.1 agr.+fishery (number) 100.0 ( 10,491) 85.3 13.7 0.2 0.7 manufacturing (number) 100.0 (328,198) 14.3 27.2 16.9 41.5 construction 100.0 21.7 0.3 48.9 29.2 journal of asean studies 75 (number) ( 6,017) service sector (number) 100.0 (227,849) 79.3 11.5 0.3 8.9 source: ministry of labor, 2015 each of the agriculture (including fishery) and construction industries employs only 1.8 and 1.1 percent of the total foreign workers. the data on sector composition of the contract workers by nationality further reveal a clear distinction for indonesian workersfrom other nationals. indonesians are highly concentrated in the service sector (76%), while workers from the other three countries are mostly engaged in the industrial employment (table 1a). for the industrial sector, the data in table 1b reveal that vietnamese is the biggest group (market share of 40%), while filipinos ranked the second (26%). each of the thai and indonesian groups accounts for only 17 percent of the foreign workers in the industrial sector. this ranking holds true when only the manufacturing industry is considered. on the contrary, indonesians dominate the market of the service sector (79%) while the market share of filipinos and vietnamese is 12 percent and 9 percent, respectively. table 2 presents the gender composition of southeast asian workers in taiwan, which is highly related to the industrial composition of the workers as discussed above. for the 572,555 se asian workers as a whole, the proportion male is 42 percent. in other words, more than a half (58%) of the total se asian workers in taiwan are females. for individual countries, the smallest group of thais has the highest percent male (83%), to be followed by the 63 percent of vietnamese, while that of the biggest group (indonesians) is the lowest (22%). when the employment sector is considered, the gender composition has changed significantly. the percentage of males is 70 percent for all the se asian workers in the industrial sector. this sector includes mainly the manufacturing industries (95%), and a small portion of the construction and fishery industries. all countries except the philippines have high male proportion ranging from 72 to 89 percent. the corresponding figure for the philippines is 46 percent due to the fact that more filipino females than males are employed in the electronic manufacturing industries. on the contrary, the service sector which consists of mainly personal care for the aged and the disabled, is highly dominated by female (99%), as expected. only minimum variation is observed among se asian countries. the number of thais working in the service sector is trivial, accounting for merely 1 percent of the total. in short, taiwan started to import contract workers from thailand in 1989 to meet the need of national public construction projects. with the employment service act of 1992, taiwan formally opened her labour market to the selected se asian countries. initially, only indonesians, malaysians, filipinos and thais were admitted to work in certain qualified industries in construction and manufacturing. however, the industrial 76 migration between southeast asia and taiwan limitation was rapidly relaxed in the 1990s. by the end of the last century, the importation schemes had covered virtually all kinds of manufacturing and construction industries (tsay, 1995b). as a result, the total number of foreign workers jumped from 3,000 in 1992 to 190,000 in 1995 and 326,000 in 2000. they took over the 3k (or 3d – dirty, difficult and dangerous) jobs left by taiwanese workers. table 2: gender composition of se workers in taiwan by nationality and employment sector, april 2015 nation sector total indonesia philippines thailand vietnam total (person) 572,555 238,298 116,960 59,021 158,270 % male 42.4 21.9 35.7 82.7 63.2 industry sector 344,706 57,510 90,720 58,385 138,088 % male 69.9 88.9 45.6 83.5 72.2 service sector 227,849 180,788 26,240 636 20,182 % female 99.2 99.4 98.4 88.1 98.7 source: ministry of labor, 2015 the number of se asian workers in taiwan was kept rather stable in the first decade of the 21st century (351,000 in 2009). however, the proportion working in the industrial sector decreased, while the percentage in the service sector increased due to the rapid population ageing in taiwan. since 2009, the size of foreign workers has surged up again probably because of the difficulties encountered by the manufacturing industries during economic downturns. it is clear that the international relations between taiwan and each of the four se asian countries have been on the rise, as evidenced by the trend of labour migration. in the meanwhile the relative importance of individual labour sending nations has changed substantially. indonesia is now the biggest provider of workers (esp. care takers) to taiwan, to be followed by vietnam and the philippines. thailand, the lead country in the 1990s, now provides only 10 percent of the total contract workers in taiwan. immigrant spouses international marriages had not been common among taiwanese until the mid-1990s. with the lift of the martial law in 1987 and the trend of economic globalization, an increasing number of taiwanese men went abroad to find brides in china and se asia, and then brought them back to settle down in taiwan (tsay, 2004). between 2001 and 2014, the taiwanese household registration data (table 3) reveal that more taiwanese men than women got married (2,008,943 v.s. 1,714,825), and more males than females married to non-taiwanese (348,576 v.s. journal of asean studies 77 54,458). as a result, the proportion female of the 403,034 immigrant spouses is as high as 86 percent. their major places of origin are china (56%) and se asia (33%). the records reflect the fact that in the past 14 years many taiwanese men married to chinese and se asian ladies. the brides tended to be much younger and less educated than grooms (tsay, 2004). in the 1990s, the inter-married males were mostly disadvantageous in terms of age, socioeconomic status, or even physical conditions. in recent years, however, the negative selectivity of grooms in the intermarriage has gradually diminished. table 3: grooms and brides registered in taiwan, 2001-2014, by nationality all nations taiwan non-taiwan china hong kong & macau se asia others total 4,126,802 3,723,768 403,034 227,141 7,026 131,632 37,235 100.0% 90.2% 9.8% 5.5% 0.2% 3.2% 0.9% grooms 2,063,401 2,008,943 54,458 10,976 3,360 9,529 30,593 100.0% 97.4% 2.6% 0.5% 0.2% 0.5% 1.5% brides 2,063,401 1,714,825 348,576 216,165 3,666 122,103 6,642 100.0% 83.1% 17.9% 10.5% 0.2% 5.9% 0.3% source: department of household registration, ministry of the interior, 2015 table 4 provides further information on the original nationality of the immigrant spouses residing in taiwan at the end of 2014. china (including mainland, hong kong and macau) accounts for about two thirds of the total immigrant spouses, while the share of se asian nations is 28 percent. among the se asian countries, vietnam is the biggest provider (65%), to be followed by indonesia (20%), and then thailand (6%), the philippines (6%), and cambodia (3%). in addition to the direct effect on the population size and composition, the immigration of foreign spouses could have various impacts on the host society of taiwan. for example, the immigrant spouses from different cultural backgrounds could have adjustment difficulties due to differences in personal life and family experiences. these impacts and problems represent one kind of holistic social fact that the immigrant spouses, their family members and the general public of taiwan have to face and deal with together. 78 migration between southeast asia and taiwan table 4: number of immigrant spouses in taiwan by nationality, end of 2014 country number % as % of se. asia total 498,368 100.00 se. asia 140,061 28.10 100.00 vietnam 91,004 18.26 64.97 indonesia 28,287 5.68 20.20 thailand 8,467 1.70 6.05 philippines 8,021 1.61 5.73 cambodia 柬埔寨 4,282 0.86 3.06 china 337,028 67.63 china mainland 323,358 64.88 hong kong & macau 13,670 2.74 others 21,279 4.27 source: information network of the ministry of the interior, 2015. the yearly data in table 5 on marriage registration and foreign spouses show some major changes during 20012014. as mentioned earlier, international marriages became more and more common in taiwan in the mid and late 1990s. before that, the percentage of inter-marriages in the total marriages was around 5 percent or less. the proportion went up rapidly in the 1990s and reached 27 percent in 2001. table 5 shows a peak of 32 percent of the proportion in 2003. it dropped to 24 percent in the next year, and then to 15.5 percent in 2010. in 2013 and 2014, only 13 percent of the total registered marriages in taiwan are with foreigners. the numbers on foreign spouses by nationality in table 5 clearly reveal that the decline in inter-marriages is due to both the decline in marriages with chinese (from around 30,000 to 10,000) and the decrease in marriages with se asians (from around 18,000 to 5,000). on the contrary, there are substantial increases in marriages with people from hong kong and macao (about 3 times) and from the rest of the world (about 50%). the declining trend of immigrant spouses indicates, at least on the surface, an evident slowdown in the hot fashion of international marriages occurred in the late 1990s and the early 2000s. nevertheless, the current level of 13 international marriages per 100 total registered marriages remains high for taiwanese as seen from the historical records in the early 1990s. the immigrant spouses, especially those females from se asia, have enhanced the existing multicultural configuration in taiwan. they also affected the processes of social reproduction and economic production, because of the closeness between the marriage market and the labour market. in the case of international journal of asean studies 79 marriages, the relationship is further influenced by the state policy and the social relation of production (huang and yeoh, 1999). the female immigrant spouses in taiwan have served not only the need of reproduction of the society, but also the need of economic production of the country. on the one hand, they gave births and played the multiple roles of wives, mothers, and daughter-in-laws. on the other hand, they filled up the gap of labour shortage in the production system. the immigrant spouses usually took jobs in the secondary labour market which are characterized with low pay and low status. at the same time, the immigrant spouses have been deep in the society and families of taiwan. they could be significant players in the human interactions between taiwan and their countries of origin. table 5: number of total marriages and foreign spouses by nationality, 2001-2014 year total marriages (a) foreign spouses foreign spouses by nationality no. (b) (b)/(a) (%) china mainland h.k. m.k. se asia others 2001 170,515 46,202 27.10 26,516 281 17,512 1,893 2002 172,655 49,013 28.39 28,603 303 18,037 2,070 2003 171,483 54,634 31.86 34,685 306 17,351 2,292 2004 131,453 31,310 23.82 10,642 330 18,103 2,235 2005 141,140 28,427 20.14 14,258 361 11,454 2,354 2006 142,669 23,930 16.77 13,964 442 6,950 2,574 2007 135,041 24,700 18.29 14,721 425 6,952 2,602 2008 154,866 21,729 14.03 12,274 498 600,9 2,948 2009 117,099 21,914 18.71 12,796 498 5,696 2,924 2010 138,819 21,501 15.49 12,807 525 5,212 2,957 2011 165,327 21,516 13.01 12,800 663 4,887 3,166 2012 143,384 206,00 14.37 12,034 679 4,784 3,103 2013 147,636 19,492 13.20 10,829 713 4,823 3,127 2014 149,287 19,701 13.20 10,044 942 5,466 3,249 source: information network of the ministry of the interior, 2015 professionals and the skilled comparing to the 570 thousand contract workers at the end of april 2015, the number of foreign professionals and the skilled in taiwan is rather small. according to the data on person-times of effective employment permits (table 6), the corresponding figure for the professionals 80 migration between southeast asia and taiwan and skilled is no more than 28,668. in terms of category of application, the biggest group is the professionals and skilled jobs (including ceo/managers of mnc and fdi companies), accounting for over 60 percent of the total. the second biggest group is teachers (mainly english) in regular and cram schools (27%). in terms of national composition of the professionals and skilled, table 7 shows a heavy concentration of japanese (29%) and americans (19%). among the se asian countries, malaysia has the largest share of 6.6 percent, to be followed by the philippines (4%). the share for each of indonesia and singapore is around 2 percent, while the proportion for thais is barely 1 percent. the fact that not many se asian professionals and the skilled are working in taiwan deserves great attention for the host country. on the demand side, taiwan as a semi-periphery country in the world system is not easy to attract professionals and technicians from other semi-periphery countries, not to mention core countries. usually, they come with fdi from their countries. yet the global fdi flows have bounded mainly for the huge market of china and the relatively low labour cost se asian nations in recent years. on the supply side, the development of higher education is still at an early stage in many southeast asian countries. for these reasons, taiwan has been working aggressively to attract se asian students to pursue advanced studies in taiwan with a hope that some of them will work as professionals in taiwan in the future. the next sub-section will further elaborate this endeavour. table 6: person-times of effective employment permits issued between april 2014 and april 2015 by category of application category of application end of apr. 2014 end of apr. 2015 ((2)-(1))/(1) (%) total 27,676 28,668 3.58 professional + skilled jobs 14,862 15,565 4.98 teachers in cram schools 5,187 5,069 2.27 teachers in schools 2,730 2,615 4.21 religion, art and performance jobs 1,408 1,825 29.62 ceo/managers of fdi companies 2,059 2,196 6.65 taking contracts 1,384 1,348 2.60 coaches + athletic jobs 46 50 8.69 source: ministry of labor, 2015. journal of asean studies 81 table 7: number of applications and employment permits of foreign professionals and the skilled by nationality, 2004-april 2015 nation cumulative application cumulative employment permits effective employment permits effective permits (country %) total 397,629 383,562 28,668 100.00 japan 90,964 88,978 8,439 29.43 usa 67,453 65,207 5,501 19.19 canada 27,688 26,712 1,165 4.06 uk 20,180 19,654 1,116 3.89 philippines 15,485 14,870 1,143 3.98 malaysia 15,622 14,551 1,884 6.57 south africa 11,721 11,299 531 1.85 korea 13,137 12,646 909 3.17 germany 11,299 11,041 449 1.57 russia 10,029 9,826 479 1.67 india 10,100 9,633 1,081 3.77 australia 7,763 7,523 422 1.47 thailand 8,404 7,833 265 0.92 hong kong 8,731 8,203 694 2.42 france 7,637 7,382 569 1.98 indonesia 6,664 6,414 632 2.20 singapore 6,213 5,909 542 1.89 others 58,239 55,881 2,847 9.93 source: ministry of labor, 2015 foreign students before the 1980s, the focus of internationalization of higher education was placed on culture and student exchanges. due to accelerating globalization and the market-oriented considerations, the internationalization of higher education started in late 1980s to take the politicaleconomic approach and to emphasize the importance of economic development and national competitiveness. at the same time, the degree of internationalization in higher education was taken as an important indicator of international competitiveness. as such, a major consideration for many countries to internationalize higher education has been on how to attract foreign students and to help these talents find employment in the host societies. 82 migration between southeast asia and taiwan the taiwan government has since 2004 adopted various policies to encourage local students to pursue higher education abroad and initiated many programs to facilitate students to be more internationalized. at the same time, the government also launched the policy of recruiting students from abroad to take higher education in taiwan. one of the major endeavours is the set up of the foundation for international cooperation in higher education of taiwan (fichet) in 2005 and its esit (elite study in taiwan) project put out in 2008. however, it is a fact that the export of higher education services is embedded in the power structure of the world system. it would be difficult for taiwan, as a semi-periphery country, to sell higher education services to the core countries, or even to other semiperiphery nations. the relatively possible destinations of the export would be the neighbouring periphery states. consequently, the education export programs of taiwan have almost completely targeted at the developing countries in se asia. there are other reasons for taiwan to focus on the se asian markets of higher education. they include: (1) low rate of enrolment in the tertiary schools (average gross rate of < 20%) in these countries, (2) geographic proximity and cultural similarity to taiwan, (3) a big number of ethnic chinese population, and (4) solid relations in economic activities with taiwan, including trade, investment, and labour migration. taiwan has been expecting to act as an international incubation center for the high-level manpower of se asia. the final aim is to be more integrated with the se asian community. for this reason, taiwan would like to strengthen the interactions with se asian countries through academic exchanges and the training of professionals and the skilled workforce. an initial step toward this end is to increase the recruitment of southeast asian students to taiwan for pursuing higher education. according to official statistics of the past ten academic years (table 8), the major source countries of se asian students in taiwan are vietnam (24,629), malaysia (18,674) and indonesia (17,841). these three countries together account for 85 percent of the total se asian students (72,464). the size of vietnamese students was below 1,000 in the first two academic years, but increased rapidly since then to be over 3,000 in the last five years. the rate of increase has also been high in the case of malaysia, while the number of indonesian students remains more stable. the increasing trends shown in table 8 reflect some results of the efforts that taiwan has made since the early 2000s in attracting students from se asia. there are, of course, still rooms for further improvement, as the numbers for some countries remain either very small or not much increasing. journal of asean studies 83 table 8: southeast asian students in taiwan by nationality, 2005~2015 year nation 2005~ 2006 2006~ 2007 2007~ 2008 2008~ 2009 2009~ 2010 2010~ 2011 2011~ 2012 2012~ 2013 2013~ 2014 2014~ 2015 total myanmar 80 57 79 47 33 17 17 14 7 47 398 cambodia 29 57 36 24 14 6 8 5 3 2 184 indonesia 1,394 1,555 1,658 2,056 1,492 1,524 1,706 1,923 2,183 2,350 17,841 laos 2 1 1 2 6 malaysia 425 671 872 1,001 1,560 1,961 2,286 2,722 3,420 3,756 18,674 philippines 164 197 252 302 313 292 336 338 411 430 3,035 singapore 22 45 71 67 103 99 122 109 140 132 910 thailand 332 379 487 549 637 760 848 814 972 1009 6,787 vietnam 671 836 1,276 1,779 2,592 3,282 3,687 3,706 3,428 3,372 24,629 total 3,117 3,797 4,731 5,825 6,744 7,943 9,011 9,631 10,565 11,100 72,464 source: department of statistics, ministry of education table 9 presents data on se asian students in taiwan by gender and area of specialization for the 2013-14 academic year. among the total 11,100 se asian students in taiwan, slightly more males (53%) than females (47%), and a quarter of the total enrolled in mandarin language programs (1,111 males and 1,701 females). the proportion of students engaged in pursuing higher education degrees is over 70 percent, representing a significant increase in the recent years. in the early 2000s and before, about a half or more of the se asian students came to taiwan mainly for learning mandarin. the higher percentage of students enrolled in degree programs means an improvement in the internationalization of higher education (huang, 2006). in other words, taiwan has made progress in the export of educational services to some developing nations in se asia. the total number of degree students (close to 8,300) is rather evenly distributed by gender, but unequally spread out in terms of area of specialization (table 9). slightly over two thirds of them major in the fields of humanities, social sciences, and business, while the rest in natural sciences and engineering. as expected, the former group is consisted of more females (58%), while the later group is more represented by males (65%). for individual countries, indonesia is distinctive in having a high percentage of non-degree language students. among the degree students, indonesians are also unique in having more studying natural sciences and engineering than studying social sciences and business. on the contrary, malaysians are 84 migration between southeast asia and taiwan characterized with a very low proportion of language students (2.3%), but a high concentration in social sciences and business among the degree students. to a less extent, degree students from vietnam are also more enrolled in the fields of social sciences and business. human migration from taiwan to southeast asia capital-assisted migration with economic globalization, taiwan has attracted a big number of migrant workers and spouses from se asia in the past two decades. the sending countries of the migrants have also been destinations of outward fdi from taiwan. in fact, taiwan started to invest substantially in the asean-4 (indonesia, malaysia, the philippines and thailand), china and vietnam in the mid-1980s. there are two important contributing factors: (1) the sharp appreciation of taiwan currency after the plaza accord of 1985, and (2) the relaxation of tight foreign exchange regulations in 1987. in 1994, 1997, and 2002, taiwan initiated three waves of ‚go-south policy‛ in order to reduce the concentration of investment in china and to avoid the over-dependence on chinese economy. table 9: number of southeast asian students in taiwan by gender and specialization, 2013~2014 academic year area of specialization country gender total mandarin language humanities + social sciences business, law, services general science, engineering life science total 11,100* 2,812 2,552 3,104 1,974 655 male 5,172* 1,111 997 1,359 1,434 271 female 5,928* 1,701 1,555 1,745 540 384 myanmar 47 42 1 2 2 %male 34.0 35.7 50.0 indonesia 2,350 976 213 445 564 155 %male 44.9 41.0 25.8 39.1 65.2 36.8 malaysia 3756 85 1619 1,180 600 262 %male 52.9 42.4 44.0 53.1 83.7 42.0 philippines 430 292 16 43 64 15 %male 52.3 51.7 50.0 41.9 65.7 40.0 singapore 132 32 76 10 5 9 %male 28.8 31.3 23.7 40.0 80.0 22.2 thailand 1,009 461 135 219 80 114 %male 34.5 35.1 30.4 26.9 48.8 41.2 vietnam 3,372 922 491 1,208 661 90 %male 44.6 36.6 33.0 39.6 72.5 53.3 note: * including 2 females from each of cambodia and laos journal of asean studies 85 source: department of statistics, ministry of education, 2015 in the meanwhile, se asian countries adopted more open policies toward fdi and provided various incentives to attract foreign capital. as a result, taiwanese investment in se asia increased significantly. with the capital flows, a certain number of management specialists and production engineers and technicians, as well as some of their dependents, moved to the capital receiving countries. they formed a counter flow of the migration of contract workers and immigrant spouses from se asia to taiwan. the size of the capital-assisted migrants from taiwan to se asia has never been clearly known. it is believed that the number became substantial around 1990 and reached 100,000 in the 1990s (wang, 2003). in 2001, it was estimated that the number of taiwanese businessmen (‚tai shang‛) in se asia is about 300,000 (chen, 2012). however a high percentage of them entered the destination countries with (short term) visitor visas. as a result, the volume of ‚tai shang‛ in se asia was estimated as small as 50 to 60 thousand (ku, 2006). the geographic distribution of the ‚tai shang‛ has significantly changed over time, reflecting the shift of investment areas. initially, malaysia and thailand were the major receiving countries, to be followed by indonesia and the philippines. in recent years, vietnam has overtaken other se asian countries due to lower wage level. indonesia and the philippines are the next important new destinations, while the number of ‚tai shang‛ in thailand and malaysia has been stabilizing. it is indeed a serious limitation in migration studies that taiwan does not have adequate data on migration of her nationals to other countries. as the constitution protects the right of free movement of the people, no information on country of destination, status of visit, and length of stay abroad can be collected after taiwanese citizens have exited taiwan. however, it is clear that the number of capital-assisted migration from taiwan to se asia is rather substantial, probably in the range of a few hundred thousand to almost a half million. with the continuing inflows of taiwanese capital, the size of the capitalassisted migration to se asia will keep growing (song, 2012; peng, 2008). student migration traditionally, the general direction of student migration is mainly from the less developed countries (ldcs) to the more developed countries (mdcs), or between mdcs. in recent years, the number of mdc students to study in ldcs has started to increase. according to the data on student visas in table 10, the number of taiwanese students going to study abroad increased from 29 thousand in 1999 to 52 thousand in 2014. however, the destination of the student migration out of taiwan in 19992014 is highly concentrated in american 86 migration between southeast asia and taiwan countries (52%), to be followed by european countries (25%), oceania (13% mainly australia and new zealand) and asia (10%, mainly japan). southeast asia accounts for only 1.3 percent of the total student migration from taiwan. among the 7,680 students went to study in se asia, singapore is the top receiving country (3,624), while the number for each of thailand (1,564) and malaysia (1,170) is much smaller. the remaining se asian countries received only a few taiwan students (vietnam and the philippines), or no students at all (e.g., indonesia). table 10: number of student visas issued to taiwanese by destination, 1999~2014 nation 1999-2003 2004-2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 total total 154,162 176,545 33,629 33,881 32,346 57,859 49,219 52,031 589,672 asia 12,027 14,334 3,912 4,313 3,963 7,192 6,948 8,964 61,653 se asia 2,808 1,708 95 150 170 273 290 2,186 7,680 philippines 418 418 singapore 2,184 1,440 3,624 thailand 206 268 95 150 170 214 214 247 1,564 malaysia 59 76 1,035 1,170 vietnam 904 904 america 80,244 93,896 17,914 18,705 16,936 28,167 26,133 24,516 306,511 europe 46,529 52,693 7,150 6,830 7,555 9,101 7,479 8,984 146,321 africa 236 111 8 21 376 oceania 15,126 15,511 4,645 4,012 3,892 13,399 8,659 9,567 74,811 source: ministry of education, 2015 table 11 presents data on student migration between taiwan and se asian countries in 1999-2014. it is evident that the taiwan-se asia interaction in terms of student migration is highly asymmetrical, with the size of se asian students in taiwan more than 11 times the number of taiwanese students in southeast asia as a whole. at the national level, all countries except singapore are characterized with net student migration to taiwan. the size of the net migration is particularly large for indonesia (26,212) and vietnam (25,326), to be followed by malaysia (18,383) and thailand (6,386). journal of asean studies 87 table 11: student migration between taiwan and southeast asian countries, 1999~2014 country se asians in taiwan taiwanese in se asia net migration myanmar 667 667 cambodia 202 202 indonesia 26,212 26,212 laos 9 9 malaysia 19,553 1,170 18,383 philippines 3,843 418 3,425 thailand 7,950 1,564 6,386 vietnam 26,230 904 25,326 singapore 1,006 3,624 -2,618 total 85,672 7,680 77,992 source: department of statistics, ministry of education, 2015. concluding remarks historically, taiwan has been a society of migrants. in many time periods, immigration was an important component of the population growth in taiwan. in the past three decades, taiwan experienced rapid social changes, economic development, political democratization, and demographic transition. as a result, taiwan entered the stage of labour shortage and attracted migrant workers from se asia. by april 2015, the total number of se asian contract workers in taiwan is 570 thousand. indonesia is the lead sending country, while vietnam, the philippines and thailand are also key providers. the workers have efficiently filled up the labour shortage and contributed significantly to the economic and social development in taiwan. their time and efforts deserve to be highly appreciated. from the mid-1990s, more and more se asian females married to taiwanese and migrated to taiwan, with the hope of getting higher standard of living and better working conditions and rewards. at the end of 2014, the number of immigrant spouses reached 140 thousand. the major source countries are vietnam (2/3) and indonesia (20%). the countries of origin of the immigrant spouses and the migrant workers are virtually the same. the female immigrant spouses mostly got married at rather young ages. they have high rates of participation in economic and family activities and contribute significantly to household work, care for children and the aged, and family business. many of them even supplement their family income by working as wage earners in the labour market. the immigrant spouses have played an important role in their own family lives as well as in the economy and society of taiwan (tsay, cheng and huang, 2012). the labour migration and the marriage migration discussed above represent important human interactions 88 migration between southeast asia and taiwan between taiwan and major se asian countries in the past 2-3 decades. the two types of migration also account for the major part of immigration to taiwan except that from china. in 2001-2010, the number of immigrants (excluding those from china) almost doubled (from 470,000 to 820,000). migrant workers (all se asians) and immigrant spouses (90% are se asians) together account for 90 percent of the total increment in population inflows to taiwan. it is clear that se asian countries have played key roles in the human interactions between taiwan and other countries. this particular relationship should be well appreciated and properly utilized. with the globalization of higher education, taiwan has made great efforts to attract student migration from se asia in the past decade. between the academic years of 2005-06 and 2014-15, the total number of se asian students in taiwan is over 72 thousand. the list of major sending countries is almost exactly the same as that of migrant workers and immigrant spouses. the student migration has just added a new key dimension to the existing interactions between taiwan and the places of origin of migrants in se asia. compared to migrant workers and immigrant spouses, or even foreign students, the number of professionals and the skilled from the whole world to taiwan has been small and stayed at slightly over 20 thousand. the proportion from se asia is only 16 percent, mainly from malaysia and the philippines while the number from each of indonesia, singapore and thailand is less than 1,000. there is plenty of room for improvement in this area. it is hoped that the recent increase in se asian students in taiwan will bring some of them to stay and work in taiwan. due to differences in the level of economic development, the human migration from taiwan to se asia is much less popular than that of the opposite direction. one major component of the taiwan-se asia migration is the capitalassisted migrants (tai shang). it is believed that the number of ‚tai shang‛ is in the range of 50 to 60 thousand. the total number of taiwanese (including dependents) in se asia could be 2 or 3 times that of ‚tai-san.‛ there are a few thousand taiwanese students in se asia, some of them are in fact dependents of ‚tai shang‛ the size of student migration from taiwan to se asia is much smaller than the flow of se asian students to taiwan. in summary, the human interactions in terms of migration between taiwan and se asia in the past 2 to 3 decades are highly asymmetrical. for each type of migration, the main flow of se asians to taiwan is much more significant than the flow of the opposite direction. the most important type is the migration of contract workers, who are admitted to taiwan based on employment. even for the marriage migration, job considerations are also often observed in various cases and mentioned by many immigrant spouses. to some extent, the marriage migration can be seen as a special type of labour migration. in taiwan, the majority of workers and spouses from se asia can realize their migration expectations. they also efficiently solved the problem of severe labour shortage in taiwan. the result is good for all parties including the individuals (workers and spouses as well as their families), the journal of asean studies 89 employers, as well as the sending and receiving countries. the asymmetry in human migration between se asia and taiwan means an advantage to taiwan in managing bilateral relations with each of the labour source countries. for example, taiwan is one of the most important host countries of outmigrants from se asian countries. taiwan receives 25-30 percent of the total number of workers sent out by vietnam. the corresponding figure for indonesia is about 20 percent while that for the philippines is 4 percent. for thailand, taiwan used to receive as high as 60 percent of the total thai labour export. with the decline of thai workers going abroad in general and to taiwan in particular, the proportion has declined to the current level of below 40 percent. the remittances that the se asian workers took back home from taiwan have contributed significantly to the improvement of economic status of their family members. the inflow of remittances is also a key component of foreign income for the labour sending countries. it is a fact that taiwan has made great efforts in improving the systems of recruiting, managing, and utilizing the contract workers from southeast asia. there are still some shortcomings, nevertheless, in the design of various programs and in their enforcement. consequently, there are still cases of illegal brokers, labour exploration, and mistreatment and abuses. there are also quite some numbers of workers running away from their contracts. these irregularities have resulted in problems of worker protection and social safety. all the difficulties could be much easier solved with appropriate cooperation between the labour sending countries and the host society of taiwan. the international community has been urging the establishment of some regional mechanisms to enhance smooth operations of international labour migration (iom, 2008). if the rights and benefits of migrants, and migrant workers in particular, could be properly protected, the cross-border movement of people would benefit individual migrants, sending and receiving countries, simultaneously. about the author ching-lung tsay is a professor at the institute of asian studies and in the department of diplomacy and international relations, tamkang university, tamsui, taiwan. with a ph.d. degree from brown university, usa, his areas of interest include development studies, international political economy, population and human resources, and southeast asian studies. the author can be contacted at: ctsay200@yahoo.com note some materials presented in this paper were utilized for a keynote speech entitled ‚growth and structural change of indonesian migration to taiwan: significance and implications‛ which was delivered by the author at the 4th icobird (international conference on business, international relations and diplomacy) on ‚migration and mobility in asia and beyond‛ held at bina nusantara university mailto:ctsay200@yahoo.com 90 migration between southeast asia and taiwan in jakarta on 3 nov. 2015. an earlier version of this paper was presented at the fourth chinese-thai strategic research seminar held at huaqiao university in xiamen, china on 27-29 july 2015. acknowledgment the author would like to express his gratitude to tamkang university for support through the 2014-15 key research project, to prof. pan-long tsai for constructive suggestions to improve the presentation, and to ms su-chin lee for excellent assistance in the whole process of research and writing. references athukoraola, prema-chandra. 2008. ‘internation labour migration and structure change in east asia: trends, patterns and policy issues.’ asian-pacific economic literature, 20 (1)：18-39. chen, hen-kuang (陳恆光). 2012. ‘research by mainland (chinese) scholars: investment by ‚tai shang‛ has been major source of fdi to se asian countries.’ (in chinese) the internet news of the central daily news (30 nov.). <http://www.cdnews.com.tw/cdnew s_site/docdetail.jsp?coluid=117&doc id=101744305>。 huang, futao. 2006. ‘internationalization of curricula in higher education institutions in comparative perspectives: case studies of china, japan and the netherlands.’ high education, 51(4): 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(in chinese) ph.d. dissertation, beijing: department of history, beijing university the evolution of southeast asian regionalism: security, economic development, and foreign power support for regional initiatives, 1947-771 sue thompson australian national university, australia abstract policy objectives for southeast asian regionalism had been evolving since the end of the second world war. economic development viewed as essential for establishing peace and stability in southeast asia and the links between development and security were evident in the elaboration of the association of southeast asian nations (asean). also evident was the second-line support provided by external powers. while asean was a regional initiative that came out of the bangkok talks to end confrontation, western governments had been formulating regional cooperation policies in southeast asia decades prior. economic development viewed as essential for containing communist influence and preventing internal insurgencies in the region. growth and prosperity would come through regional development programs with external support. this would then expand to some form of collective security led by the southeast asian nations themselves. regionalism viewed as one way of providing economic assistance to newly independent nations without the appearance of foreign interference in regional affairs. therefore, the evolution of southeast asian regionalism was a combined effort of foreign power support for asian initiatives throughout the economic development with the aim to provide security during the political transformation of the region from the post-war period into the early years of asean and the aftermath of the war in vietnam. key words: regionalism, southeast asia, economic development, security *1this article was originally presented in the fifth international conference on business, international relations, and diplomacy (icobird 2016) at bina nusantara university. journal of asean studies, vol. 5, no. 1 (2017), pp. 1-22 doi: 10.21512/jas.v5i1.4160 ©2017 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic 2 the evolution of southeast asian regionalism introduction at the end of the second world war, early efforts towards southeast asian regionalism emerged from southeast asian nations seeking to achieve peace and stability, economic development and policies of self-reliance. western governments too were pursuing their policies on regional cooperation for similar outcomes. for the united states (u.s.) especially, such agreement would provide stability for a grouping of non-communist nations without the appearance of western support, as well as a multilateral umbrella under which bilateral relationships between the west and southeast asian countries would thrive and prosper. these policies have often overlooked when tracing the post-war evolution of southeast asian regionalism as the focus of this topic has tended only to highlight the role played by the regional nations themselves. indeed, officials such as abu bakar lubis, the private secretary to indonesian foreign affairs minister adam malik, have promoted this perception, denying that formal regional cooperation was the result of an american idea or action (anwar, 1994, pp. 49-57). additionally, perceptions of the role of regional cooperation have highlighted economic and social issues, rather than any security benefits, missing the importance of regionalism as a vehicle for promoting both economic development and safety policies of regional and external powers. western governments initially sought to secure regional peace and cooperation through the united nations (un). washington was interested in collaboration among groups in the un where there was mutual interest, such as regional cooperation. australia and new zealand too saw the benefit of such an arrangement, taking the initiative to seek consultation with the u.s. on the future of the pacific region at the end of the war. britain was also supportive of the idea of regional cooperation and looked at developing a policy for its colonial areas. both the british and the australians believed that some form of regional cooperation was much preferable to a post-war mandate system (letter, evatt to johnson, 1944). securing support from the region was crucial for officials who were keen to avoid direct interference in the affairs of governing bodies, and within asia, some states also backed the idea of closer cooperation, especially those that supported decolonization, but not pro-communist independence movements. however, regional cooperation could only succeed if southeast asian nations themselves agreed that there was a need for closer relations and would work together. this need did come from the common fear of china’s domination in the region and concern for economic development, especially once western interests reduced. the creation of formal regional cooperation came with the establishment of the association of southeast asian nations (asean), a move that was only possible through regional initiatives from the founding member states. indeed, the creation of asean attributed to efforts from the countries in the region, especially asean’s conception was a direct result of the malaysian-indonesian talks that ended confrontation, the conflict between these two nations. however, western policies did contribute to the evolution of regional cooperation in southeast asia, reflecting the journal of asean studies 3 combined efforts of foreign power support for asian initiatives. early initiatives on 4 july 1949, philippine president quirino made a speech outlining the need for a ‘pacific union, a real union of peoples around the pacific on the basis for common counsel and assistance.’ quirino then sent a letter of instructions to general romulo, philippine diplomat and president of the un general assembly at the time, outlining his plans for such an organization. romulo responded and proposed that korea, the philippines, thailand, new zealand, australia, india, burma, ceylon and indonesia organize a political and economic union aimed at containing ‘russo-chinese’ communism, while also denouncing european imperialism. britain, france, the netherlands and the u.s. would at first excluded from such an organization. after some form of grouping emerged, an offer of economic cooperation with the u.s. would pursue. then, if communism could contain, a joint appeal for american military aid could be considered (memo, for butterworth and fisher, 1949). the links between economic development and security had been evident from the beginning of the un and had resulted in the establishment of some agencies such as the economic and social council (ecosoc) and the international bank for reconstruction and development (ibrd), amongst others. in early 1947, ecosoc created regional commissions to encourage development, and one of these bodies was the un economic commission for asia and the far east (ecafe), which was established on 19 march 1947. the membership of ecafe included both asian countries and non-regional members such as france, the netherlands, the soviet union, britain, and the u.s. as the cold war intensified, the australian government particularly, promoted the commission as a forum for non-communist governments and capitalist development (mitcham, 2012, p. 191 & 1930). however, washington and several other countries were cautious about philippine overtures towards the development of a pacific union. when general romulo tried to undertake preliminary discussions on the idea with various diplomatic representations at the un, several nations indicated that american policy would largely influence their position. following this, romulo attempted to secure a commitment from washington to support the participation in a southeast asian meeting. the response from the state department was that while the u.s. would be sympathetic to the principle of a southeast asian association, the success of any such group would have to be generated spontaneously within the area (memo, secretary of state and butterworth, 1950). nevertheless, the u.s. continued to promote the idea of asian regionalism to counter anti-western forces. this idea reflected in support for the development of the mekong river basin. post-war interest in developing the area came out of french-thai negotiations to settle a territorial dispute. in 1950, former office of strategic service director william donovan recommended that the administration support the development of the mekong basin as a longrange project to secure cooperation between burma, cambodia, laos, thailand, and vietnam. this concept presented to ecafe, and in 1957, the committee for the 4 the evolution of southeast asian regionalism coordination of investigations of the lower mekong basin established. in 1958, washington provided us$2 million to help finance the collection of primary data in the area. the state department viewed the mekong committee as having enormous potential for the political and economic future of the region, ‘in determining whether southeast asia remains free or comes under the control of the sino-soviet bloc’ (memo, landon to rostow, 1961). by the early 1960s, there were some regional organizations in existence, but only a few with solely asian membership. the association of southeast asia (asa) an economic and cultural organization that included malaya, the philippines, and thailand was one such organization. it founded in 1961, yet its functions limited, especially when the philippines refused to recognize the newly created federation of malaysia, because of a philippine claim to the british borneo territory of sabah. another organization was maphilindo, for malaya, the philippines, and indonesia. its purpose was to unite the malay world, and arose out of the manila agreement, a report by the foreign ministers of those countries, accepted and augmented by the three heads of government in meetings in manila in july and august 1963. they agreed that foreign bases should not undermine their independence, although maphilindo came to nothing because of the outbreak of confrontation, and manila’s claim to sabah (minute, mare to mr. samuel, 23 january 1967). american initiatives under president johnson, the department of state continued to pursue regional cooperation as a policy objective, supporting two main goals in southeast asia as interdependent: security and social and economic development (administrative history of the department of state, 1963 1969). in early 1965, state department advisers suggested to under-secretary of state george ball, that some asian development defense agency, or organization, might be initiated to replace existing groups. ball agreed to consider such an approach (conversation between ball and talbot, 1965). however, many in washington were wary that this policy would portray as american interference. in april 1965, chester l. cooper, a staff member of the national security council (nsc), suggested that washington should present to un secretary general, u thant, the idea of forming a new regional institution called, the southeast asia development association. it would be a coordinating and consultative organization with permanent staff and an executive agent for the management of multi-national capital projects, and the concept must appear to be an asian initiative and be asian (talking points for bundy from cooper). many officials felt that regional cooperation was to be an asian idea, privately washington attributed main part of its implementation to american money. johnson’s secretary of state, dean rusk, claimed that one important step towards regional cooperation was the provision of us$1 billion for economic development in asia, as outlined in a speech delivered by president johnson at johns hopkins university. another important step was directing this us$1 billion towards the establishment of the asia development bank (adb) and other regional programs (rusk to rev. dusen, 1965). journal of asean studies 5 until confrontation ended, regional security cooperation was unfeasible. however, economic development could be a means to end that dispute, and improve relations between indonesia and other southeast asian countries, especially malaysia and singapore. when washington commented favorably on maphilindo as an organization that might provide the means of promoting regional cooperation and of finding a solution to confrontation, singapore prime minister lee kuan yew, expressed his concern that the u.s. was supporting the resurrection of maphilindo. department of state officials told lee that maphilindo was an asian and not an american initiative and that the state department did not want any plans for trade and security cooperation perceived as american interference (washington to singapore, 1965). by mid-1966, some regional and subregional cooperative initiative had evolved such as the asian pacific council (aspac) – an economic and cultural alliance made up of non-communist countries within the region, the adb and the asa. state department officials believed these bodies were promising for future progress in regional and sub-regional cooperation that would, in turn, led to collective efforts at solving economic, social and security problems in asia (memo for rostow from jorden, 1966). donald d. ropa of the nsc staff stressed to national security adviser, walt rostow in april 1966 that american security interests in the pacific basin would be dependent on more regional cooperation for economic development and political cooperation for mutual security concerns. the asa or maphilindo might be able to evolve as a wider cooperative group, depending on indonesia’s participation. consideration would then have to be taken as to the form and substance of such a group, what its relationship would be with other regional organizations and in what direction would american diplomatic initiatives follow in furthering the idea (memo from ropa to rostow, 1966). continuing american interest in asian economic development and regional security cooperation continued as johnson made a trip to the region in octobernovember 1966. there he met with the heads of six nations – australia, new zealand, the philippines, the republic of korea, south vietnam and thailand – in manila on october 24-25. this meeting closed with a declaration of peace and progress in asia and the pacific and all seven heads of government declared strong support for the principle of regional cooperation (administrative history of the department of state, 1963-1969). british support and the end of confrontation london also supported regional cooperation for southeast asia, especially considering britain’s military commitments to the region. in early 1964, the british embassy in washington delivered an aide memoire to the white house posting that western withdrawal from vietnam or malaysia was inevitable and if there was any chance of stabilizing an independent southeast asia without the presence of western forces, regional cooperation was an undeniable attraction. this withdrawal was an ideal situation in the long-term, but it was not possible in the short-term, especially due to the leftist chaos of indonesia (british embassy in washington aide memoire, 6 the evolution of southeast asian regionalism 1964). however, the british did not present any ideas on how to progress this issue. in may 1965, rusk suggested to his british counterpart, michael stewart, that washington and london should do more to encourage southeast asian countries to cooperate. with the aim of reducing british or american military involvement in the region, suggesting the establishment of an organization around malaysia, the philippines, and thailand (record of discussion, rusk, and stewart, 1965). some southeast asian states supported the departure of western military bases from the region, but not all. indonesian leader, general suharto reportedly said in february 1966 that the defense of southeast asia was a matter for the countries in the area and that the british military base in singapore was a target for china’s expansionism. the malaysian and singapore governments, on the other hand, wanted the base to stay (kuala lumpur to ottawa, 1966). nevertheless, cooperation between the southeast asian nations was required. london was quite keen on the establishment of an organization like the defunct maphilindo, with the addition of singapore. however, the malaysians were less sure of resurrecting this organization. kuala lumpur’s preference was for the asa, which would include thailand. regardless of the form such an association would take, london’s position was to support any new organization that might emerge from the bangkok talks between malaysia and indonesia on ending confrontation (memo, pritchard to lord beswick, 1966). britain was uncertain whether a regional organization would discuss at these meetings; however, it instructed its missions in the region to stress its approval for some form of regional cooperation in southeast asia that would be worked out by the participating countries (london to certain missions, 1966). then london could plan for the withdrawal of its forces from singapore. while washington wanted the british military bases to stay for at least the immediate future, the hope of some u.s. officials was that out of the regional initiatives implemented in the early 1960s. the initiatives would uniquely be asian mutual security arrangements, buttressed by american power presence, which will compensate for ultimate british withdrawal (ropa to rostow, 1966). formal initiatives and the creation of asean it informally agreed at the bangkok talks that indonesia should join an asa-type body that would give a new name (kuala lumpur to london, 1966). indonesia was keen to see that foreign forces withdraw from the region and new indonesian president suharto wanted closer ties with his neighbors to help stem the spread of china’s influence in the area (jakarta to washington, 1966). he told two british members of parliament that an asian community should be responsible for the security of southeast asia (meeting, jackson mp, dalyell mp, and general suharto, 1966). thai prime minister thanom kittikachorn and malaysian prime minister tunku abdul rahman said that they were pleased that countries in the region were increasingly aware of the need for regional cooperation, and stressed their determination to make a southeast asian association work (kuala lumpur to washington, 1966). malaya had been the initiator of asa and was a participant of maphilindo, and was now, like malaysia, willing to join a regional organization that journal of asean studies 7 would include members of singapore. the australian high commission in kuala lumpur saw the possibility that a new local organization would make malaysia less dependent on its non-asian allies (kuala lumpur to canberra, 1966). malaysian finance minister tan siew sin explained to u.s. officials that the american nuclear umbrella and a southeast asian regional organization were the only two alternatives to avoid the spread of communist influence (kuala lumpur to washington, 1966). the malaysian government specifically, agreed with continued western support in southeast asia. during a meeting between malaysian deputy prime minister tun abdul razak and u.s. defense secretary robert mcnamara in washington, razak said that from malaysia’s perspective, it was important to have laos, burma, cambodia, and thailand coordinating policy to keep any pressure from china away from malaysia’s borders. mcnamara then emphasized the importance that the u.s. attached to the creation of some form of regional grouping so that american forces could eventually withdraw from the asian mainland (washington to kuala lumpur, 1966). in thailand, thai foreign minister thanat khoman had told humphrey, he wanted to gather representatives from noncommunist asian countries to promote increased regional cooperation. the japanese prime minister, eisaku sato, and the south korean president, park chunghee, backed this sentiment (letter, vicepresident to johnson, 1966). however, thanat did not want overt american support. he told rusk that he hoped regional development could have america’s discreet blessing. when the secretary of state asked if bangkok did not want u.s. support to be too obvious, thanat replied that he was sure washington would be able to determine where and when it could provide useful assistance (record of conversation between rusk and khoman, 1966). however, problems arose over whether the organization would involve itself in regional defense. malik stressed to the american ambassador in jakarta in early 1967 that the new regional group would only be an economic, cultural and technical association and that defense matters would not consider; although in time asean would take on a more political role (jakarta to canberra, 1967). however, one defense matter that was discusses was the presence of foreign military bases in the region. indonesia was opposed to such bases and wanted this reflected in the new organization’s declaration. this opposition had been an aim of the previous regime in jakarta and had been part of sukarno’s antiimperialist rhetoric during confrontation. for the apparent pro-western suharto government, the motivations for opposing foreign bases seemed less clear. however, in early 1967, officials told australian and british representatives that the indonesian military stood to gain significantly if countries in the region opted out of defense arrangements with non-regional powers and instead organized their defense plans with the participation of indonesia (nic 303(74), first draft, 1974). although, the acting director of asian regional affairs at the state department, philip manhard, also told the australians that it was difficult to determine how far malik was interested in asean taking on a security role and whether the indonesian army was pushing for this position. manhard pointed out that 8 the evolution of southeast asian regionalism in a recent speech, malik had denied that the new regional grouping would have a security role, but had then made contradictory statements, commenting that regional security had discussed amongst the five nations (washington to canberra, 1967). back in may 1967, malik asked whether proposals for the new regional organization would include a joint military security plan against communist infiltration, he replied that regional cooperation along the lines of economic, cultural and technical partnerships could interpret as a form of defense (kuala lumpur to canberra, 1967). when asean was inaugurated on 8 august 1967, the state department regarded the formation of asean as a positive move, despite the indication that member nations would not welcome any form of outside interference, and not just from china. washington was not overly concerned about the paragraph relating to foreign bases, believing the negotiations had largely avoided contentious political issues (washington to canberra, 1967). the soviets denounced asean, labelling it a new military group and china completely ignored the new organization. asean’s declaration stated that the countries in southeast asia would cooperate on economic, social and cultural development. the founding countries also declared their commitment to stabilizing and securing the region from external interference (gill, 1997, pp. 30-33). the declaration added that all foreign bases were temporary and that the countries in the region shared the main responsibility for defending southeast asia, although asean was not directly concerned with defense. of the five founding members, indonesia was the only country that did not have western forces inside its territory, and jakarta insisted on a statement reflecting the temporary nature of western bases in the region. for indonesia, the declaration must refer to the foreign bases, and stipulate that the region was responsible for its defense. however, the other four nations also did not emphasize asean as a security organization (canberra to all posts, 1967). indeed, days later, when the soviet ambassador to thailand asked thanat about the issue of bases, he responded that the military bases stationed in thailand was thai and not american and that the u.s. was only needed to use these bases in the face of north vietnamese aggression (washington to canberra, 1967). the australian government, on the other hand, seemed to view the organization as a forum to promote security in the region. a day after asean’s inauguration, australia’s minister for external affairs, paul hasluck, praised the new association and its aims at increasing cooperation amongst the member states. he added that asean not only had committed to support economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region but to also ‘promote regional peace and stability’ – objectives that had the full support of canberra (canberra to certain posts, 1967). years later, in his memoirs, lee kuan yew wrote that the unspoken objective of asean was to build strength through regional solidarity before a power vacuum was created because of the british military withdrawal from southeast asia and a possible american one later (yew, 2000, p.369). the early years of asean however, in the early years of asean, the organization was loosely journal of asean studies 9 structured, and singapore was the only member state that gained any great financial benefit. the singaporeans pushed for issues such as tourism, shipping, fishing and intraregional trade to be considered by the first meeting of the asean standing committee, hoping that these economic projects would lead to closer involvement in regional planning. however, four of the five founding members – thailand, malaysia, indonesia, philippines – had similar and competed for agricultural economies and economic nationalism was expected to be a major hurdle for the new organization. singapore was the country best suited economically to a regional arrangement. as a result, the australian government’s assessment of the benefit of asean was that it would carry more significance in the political rather than the economic sphere (canberra to all posts, 1967). indeed, this view was reflected in the outcome to internal tension within the organization through manila’s ongoing claim to sabah that caused the breakdown of philippine-malaysian diplomatic relations in 1968. asean encouraged a resolution of the crisis and indonesia was given credit for acting as an effective mediator (talking points for meeting with malik, by kissinger, 24 september 1974). however, the approach was essentially one of non-interference in member disputes, reflecting the way asean tackled both external and internal pressures through a philosophy of non-interference and consensus (tarling, 2006, p. 210). debate on the future role of asean emerged at a meeting of foreign ministers in december 1969. the opening statements from some ministers revealed emerging issues on whether the organization would deal solely with economic and cultural cooperation, or try to forge ahead into the security arena. singaporean foreign minister, s. rajaratnam, stated that his government believed asean should stay solely focused on economic cooperation in southeast asia. whereas malik referred to britain’s military withdrawal and a prospective american disengagement as cause for the member states to ‘induce us to jointly consider policies in our effort to cope with the new emerging situation.’ thanat khoman also mentioned security concerns, which was reiterated by the malaysians, stating that there was scope to work out some form of security arrangements and that member countries should take responsibility for their region following any power vacuum left by departing western forces (kuala lumpur to canberra, 1969). fueling these security concerns was the announcement in january 1968 of britain’s intention to withdraw all its military forces from southeast asia by 1971 and u.s. president nixon’s statement on the island of guam in july 1969 that the u.s. expected asian nations to assume more responsibility for their defense. america would keep all existing treaty commitments, but would not enter any new ones, unless they were vital to the interests of the u.s. in the case of internal subversion in asia, assistance from washington would not be in the form of troops, but development aid, military equipment, and training (record of meeting between wilson and nixon, 1969). later in the philippines, nixon nevertheless continued to stress the importance of economic development as a vehicle for increased stability in asia. in a statement, the american president reiterated u.s. was backing for the adb saying that he had asked congress to appropriate us$20 10 the evolution of southeast asian regionalism million for the ordinary capital of the adb and us$25 million to its special fund for the following fiscal year. he also stressed that the bank was an asian institution with its headquarters in asia and with a requirement that 60 per cent of its capital must come from asia. while the u.s. and other non-asian countries could play a role, the leadership of the bank must always come from asia (nixon statement, 1969). then, a few weeks later, secretary of state william rogers supported nixon’s position in a speech to the media in canberra. he stressed that american policy in asia would be to encourage asian leaders to meet their own internal security needs with material assistance from the u.s. and to encourage ‘rapid economic development of the area with emphasis on increasing regional cooperation’ (rogers speech, 1969). nixon publicly announced in january 1970 his proposal to ask congress to authorize a contribution of us$100 million to the adb’s special funds over a three-year period – us$25 million in the first fiscal year, and then us$35 million and us$40 million in the following two fiscal years. he stressed that since the adb’s establishment, the bank had made a major contribution to asian economic development and that it provided a ‘unique capability for acting as a catalyst for regional cooperation’ (white house press statement, 1970). however, officials american embassy in singapore warned washington that if southeast asian regionalism were to be successful, nations there must be sure that the u.s. would not abandon them (singapore to washington, 1969). kissinger too stressed this position to the american vice-president in december 1969, before spiro agnew’s proposed to visit the region. during the visit to indonesia, kissinger told agnew that he should stress that jakarta’s pursuit of regional economic policies and multilateral economic aid approaches justified america’s aid program to indonesia (memo, kissinger to agnew, 1969). indeed, by the end of 1969, the administration in washington had noticed that asian nations were starting to rely less on individual outside aid donors. the asian begin to rely more on multilateral aid organizations such as the adb and the international monetary fund (imf), and that the americans welcomed the creation of other asian organizations based on asian initiatives. therefore, while the u.s. did not want to interfere, it would be willing to assist multilateral and regional organizations where possible (memo, east asia and the pacific, 1969). the changing regional scene overall, the response of southeast asian leaders to nixon’s comments was that they viewed the so-called nixon doctrine as a warning signal that the u.s. would eventually disengage from the asian mainland and regional allies must assume greater responsibility for their security. for some regional nations, the american policy announcement was in step with current aspirations, such as bangkok’s efforts to move towards a more independent foreign policy path and manila’s wish to move beyond the traditional image as an american strategic client (acharya, 2012, p. 140). the australian embassy in manila reported that the philippines appeared to be in favor of southeast asian nations becoming more selfreliant. philippine president marcos’s proposal for an asian forum to ‘solve asian problems’ and his foreign secretary’s references to asian security arrangements indicated that manila acknowledged the journal of asean studies 11 changing role of future american involvement in southeast asia and admitted that the philippines would become more involved regionally (manila to canberra, 1970). thanat khoman told the australians that he believed china would become a more serious problem after the end of the war in vietnam and that countries in the region had only two alternatives: either submit to china or unify and develop a front, which the chinese would have to accept. a pact was not necessary for this purpose, instead of regional cooperation based on mutual understanding and self-interest was all that was needed (bangkok to canberra, 1969). however, a year later, the thai government seemed to recognize that regional cooperation alone would not provide in the immediate future any prospect of an alternative security backing. this recognition was because of the disparity of power between countries in the region, the internal instability in most asian nations and bangkok’s reluctance to accept the risks that would be involved in any new mutual security arrangement. nevertheless, regional cooperation potentially provided an opportunity for thailand to supplement its security alliance with the u.s. by underpinning political and economic ties with its neighbors (nic note 4/70, 1970). this assessment was made a few months after thailand secured additional financial assistance from washington. in august 1971, nixon directed that a us$45 million special assistance packaged negotiated with bangkok to strengthen the thai economy and defense capabilities. the americans hoped this would accelerate the improvement of thai armed forces capabilities so that they might be capable of facing any possible contingencies (memo 126, 1971). malaysia’s reaction to nixon’s declaration was to support bilateral relationships between countries of the region but without treaty ties or another institutionalization. this policy stemmed from the announcement of not just the nixon doctrine, but also the british intention to withdraw militarily. kuala lumpur’s doubts about the utility of the newly formed fivepower defence arrangements (fpda) between britain, australia, new zealand, singapore, and malaysia, as well as limited expectations of australian and new zealand assistance (kuala lumpur to canberra, 1970). singapore’s response to the changed strategic environment was to build its defense forces, but these efforts were not a direct reaction to the so-called doctrine, although singapore’s efforts for closer cooperation in defense matters with malaysia could have been encouraged by it. however, since the british announcement, singapore had been building its military due to its geographical proximity to malaysia and indonesia (singapore to canberra, 1970). the indonesians seemed to accept much of what was outlined by washington and emphasized the need for extensive foreign aid to counter the military weakness of the countries in the region. in fact, the concept of increased economic development to replace a foreign military presence suited the government in jakarta that was quick to point out that indonesia lacked the capacity to contribute to the joint defense and military security. rather its priority was economic development (jakarta, kuala lumpur, singapore to canberra, 1970). nevertheless, 12 the evolution of southeast asian regionalism indonesia became the beneficiary of an expanded u.s. military aid program when washington approved in march 1970 contributions of approximately $15 million u.s. dollars per year – an increase of $10 million from the original budget (kissinger memo for secretary of state and secretary of defense, 1970). jakarta was hoping for yet more and that the americans would not depart any earlier than 1973 and would leave no security vacuum. suharto sent general sumitro to washington in july 1970 to ask for more military aid, and during discussions with nixon’s national security adviser, henry kissinger, he stressed that indonesia was not yet a ‘real power’ and was still unable to take over the responsibility of security in southeast asia. furthermore, the indonesian government had not intended to expand its armed forces before 1973, instead deciding to concentrate on economic development and ‘sacrifice’ security for the sake of national reconstruction. jakarta was worried that its neighbors – thailand, singapore, philippines, and malaysia – lacked the military power to withstand potential internal instability, or stand up to intensive soviet diplomacy. besides, these asian nations might turn to the soviet side to counter chinese infiltration. therefore, indonesia now had to develop strong armed forces and hoped to acquire military supplies from western europe and the u.s. (memo of conversation between sumitro and kissinger, 1970). kissinger responded very positively to sumitro, stating that, ‘we recognized the indonesian role, precisely what the nixon doctrine required (memorandum of conversation between sumitro and kissinger, 1970). although the americans did not presume that indonesia’s request for more arms was out of regional altruism, jakarta was extremely keen to secure funds for six c130 planes, and an m-16 rifle factory and american officials noted that they might have used their support for and participation in regional cooperation as part of their bid. nsc staff member, john h. holdridge raised that possibility with henry kissinger, before adding that while there was still no movement towards a regional security arrangement in southeast asia, ‘the indonesians might just be able to get things going’ (memorandum, john h. holdridge to kissinger, 1970). nixon authorized an increase in military aid to indonesia to $18 million for the 1971 fiscal year (memorandum, holdridge and kennedy to kissinger, 1970). the australian government was also hopeful that jakarta would pursue a greater interest in a collective security for southeast asia, despite suharto’s preoccupation with the economy and internal disputes along with the continuation of the indonesian position of non-alignment. malik’s efforts to arrange an international conference in jakarta in 1970 on how to bring peace to cambodia was the cause of these high hopes in canberra. the officials believed that the jakarta conference on cambodia revealed the indonesian government’s willingness to take a leading role in regional security (nic 1(70), 1970). britain as well recognized the importance of indonesia as an emerging leader in southeast asia. in 1971, the british ambassador in jakarta urged the british government to acknowledge the growing importance of indonesia to regional stability. he wrote to the foreign office that the longterm security of british investments in malaysia and singapore depended on the journal of asean studies 13 fortunes of indonesia and hoped that london would steadily increase its aid program there. ambassador combs felt that the indonesians viewed their position in southeast asia, as resident guarantors of stability in the region, were keen supporters of asean and were increasingly likely to take the lead on regional policies (combs, to foreign office, 1971). in early 1969, london was providing £200 million a year on aid and technical assistance to the far east. while this support was mostly bilateral, the british placed a lot of emphasis on multilateral aid to southeast asia and the opportunities it presented for regional cooperation. in doing so had played a role in many regional bodies such as the colombo plan, the adb, the mekong committee, and the specialized institutions of the un (speech, maclehosesp, 1969). the zone of peace, freedom and neutrality as the level of american and british military involvement in southeast asia declined, the five asean countries started to pay closer attention to political and security issues. however, each of these nations had different security arrangements. thailand and the philippines were members of the southeast asia treaty organization (seato), and the philippines had a security treaty with the u.s., malaysia, and singapore were members of the fpda. indonesia had no security deals but shared joint-military arrangements with malaysia. nevertheless, there was a new attitude towards a reassessment of past policies and practices in an aim to seek more regional independence. as a result, ideas of some neutral area presented as a solution to the changed security environment in southeast asia. the malaysians proposed a neutralization concept, while the indonesians, thai, filipinos, and singaporeans showed their preference for a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality (nic 124(72), 1972). these proposals first discussed at a meeting of asean foreign ministers in kuala lumpur in november 1971. at this venue, the malaysians sought an agreement that all foreign powers should be excluded from southeast asia, that the region should not use as a theatre for international power struggles, and that the great powers – the u.s., soviet union, and china – would guarantee this. this proposal was unacceptable to the four other representatives at the meeting. they did not want to see a certain reference to ‘neutralization’ or great power guarantees. the meeting’s declaration reflected this. in the end, the meeting stated that the asean nations would make all necessary efforts to enable southeast asia to be recognized as a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality that was free from any form of interference by outside powers. the regional nations would also make every effort to increase cooperation amongst themselves (canberra to australian posts, 1972). however, each member state had different aspirations regarding security in southeast asia and their existing bilateral relationships. for the malaysians, zopfn was a means to achieve domestic security without cooperative arrangements with nonregional or regional states (nic 303(74), 1974). for the other four asean nations, external security guarantees still viewed as necessary. thailand and the philippines continued to place importance on the u.s. as their main protecting power. singapore, with an economy oriented to manufacturing and exporting, on the other, hand believed 14 the evolution of southeast asian regionalism its interests were best served by an opendoor policy for all the great powers, and not only one powerful ally. indonesia saw itself as playing an independent role in the region, which involved encouraging its neighbors to strengthen their security systems as well as practice closer regional cooperation. at the same time, jakarta also placed a lot of reliance on its relationship with the u.s. for both economic assistance and a guarantee of regional security (nic 124(72), first draft, 1972). by 1973, zopfan continued to exist as a mere statement of intent rather than any concrete framework. indonesia, especially, was in no hurry to see the implementation of the neutralization proposal because of its wish for a continued u.s. military presence (memo, kissinger to ford, 1975). singapore also supported american military presence in the region and during a visit to the u.s. in march 1973, lee kuan yew emphasized the benefits to achieving the long-term objective of a quadripartite balance between u.s., soviet union, japan and western naval forces. in turn, the neutralization concept did not appear to be a factor severely affected by the u.s. military planning in the region, nor did it halt the flow of american economic and military assistance (nic 57(73), 1973). indeed, zopfan reflected the changes taking place in southeast asia that the asean nations were unable to influence, as they were unable to agree on what would be the future role of the external powers (narine, 1998, pp. 198-201). towards the end of the decade, the malaysians had lost interest in the concept, as had the other asean member states (response to proposed parliamentary question, 1977). diversification despite the signings of zopfan, and an agreement in 1973 to establish a permanent asean secretariat in jakarta, washington felt pressure from within southeast asia. notably, thailand and the philippines, retain seato as a symbol of american presence in the region during its transitional period of disengagement (buszynsky, 1981, pp. 287-296). however, bangkok and manila did agree to abandon the military component of seato in response to australian and new zealand pressure on washington to downgrade the alliance as a price of their continued membership. the issue of a changing role for seato raised during a meeting with nixon and the seato general secretary, general sunthorn, just days before the september 1973 seato council meeting. during the former, when sunthorn suggested that seato could play a future role in supplementing bilateral aid programs in asia, nixon replied, ‘that can give meaning to the organization. the military is very important, but this is also helpful’ (memo of conversation, president nixon and general sunthorn, 1973). at the 18th seato council meeting of 28 september 1973, all delegates agreed to abolish the military structure of seato, except military exercises. canberra’s pressure to downgrade seato reflected the regional policy aims of the australian prime minister, gough whitlam. when he first came to office in 1972, whitlam endorsed proposals for neutralization of the indian ocean and southeast asia, sought to withdraw australian forces from vietnam, praised the guam doctrine and nixon’s moves towards détente with china and the soviet union, and showed little support for the fpda or journal of asean studies 15 seato. for whitlam, supporting regional cooperation would be one of the main elements of australia’s foreign policy for the 1970s with less emphasis on military pacts (briefing paper, 1974). this increased emphasis on regionalism and cooperation between the superpowers led to calls from whitlam to propose an asian and pacific organization that would eventually include china’s membership. the idea would be to bring the asia-pacific nations closer without the interference of the major powers (the hobart mercury, 1973). such an organization was not supposed to replace seato, aspac or asean, nor was it to transform these organizations. rather, whitlam attempted to propose new ideas about regional cooperation (letter, paris to canberra, 1973). the singaporeans also had visions of other regional groupings. rajaratnam told his australian counterpart during a meeting in canberra in november 1973 that while a long-term objective for his government was a larger regional group, this would come about with the assistance of the formation of some smaller sub-regional groupings. suggestions for these sub-groups were the possibility of a smaller organization made of up of indonesia, australia, new zealand and papua new guinea, and creating a group for the four commonwealth countries in the region. these groups would run alongside asean and the fpda, strengthening southeast asian unity (record of conversation, rajaratnam and willesee, 1973). the end of the war in vietnam the end of the war in vietnam and the withdrawal of american forces paved the way to closer cooperation between some southeast asian nations. during the 1975 foreign ministers’ meeting, the discussion was dominated by the implication of the political changes in indochina. ministers expressed optimism and caution and concluded that the war’s end provided hope for securing peace, progress, and stability in southeast asia and decided to initiate friendly relations with the indochina nations (draft paper, 1975). at the first meeting of heads of asean governments in bali in february 1976, members reiterated the commitment to the organization and at a subsequent meeting of economic ministers; the agreement reached on the establishment of an industry in each member country where there would be joint equity participation that would be developed to benefit the region. the philippines then suggested the establishment of an asean common market; however, this proposal was only supported by singapore. instead, discussions commenced on whether to set up a system of preferential tariffs. by the mid-1970s, asean members had also started cooperating closely in international bodies, coordinating votes at the un and representations to the european economic community (eec) on economic matters (response to proposed parliamentary question, 1977). significantly, member states obtained from the eec recognition of asean as one region and preferential access to certain commodities into eec markets, strengthening relations between the two regional blocs (jakarta to canberra, 1974). asean also pursued external economic support from wider regional states, security some joint economic cooperation projects with australia, and seeking similar cooperation with new zealand and canada. 16 the evolution of southeast asian regionalism japan also started expressing a willingness to undertake joint economic ventures with the regional group, despite earlier refusals to do so (jakarta to canberra, 1974). despite closer cooperation economically and diplomatically, asean member states continued, ten years after the association’s inauguration, to differ as for whether asean should pursue security objectives. indonesia was one of the stronger supporters of security cooperation amongst members, but even jakarta was concerned about the organization presenting an image of a defensive alliance. thus, most military cooperation in the region remained bilateral and at the 1976 asean summit in bali, leaders agreed to continue to cooperate on security matters, on a non-asean basis (memo, u.s. interests, and objectives in the asia-pacific region, 1976). independence and non-alignment were a major goal for asean members regarding security cooperation; however, relations with vietnam also shaped defense issues, as there was a consensus among the member’s states not to confirm vietnamese suspicions that asean would become the next seato. hanoi’s position was that while it was prepared to develop bilateral relations with asean member states, it was not willing to deal with asean as an association. in turn, the southeast asian member nations in asean, despite increased cooperation within the organization as well as continued aspirations for independence and nonalignment, sought continuing american involvement in their region as a deterrent to the soviet union and chinese strategic ambitions as well as japanese economic domination (fco paper, 1977). after the second summit meeting of asean heads of government in kuala lumpur on 1977, asean leaders maintained the level of cooperation in economic areas and took steps to increase cooperation in cultural and social fields. one of the most substantial areas of progress was in asean’s external relations through discussions with the prime ministers of australia, japan and new zealand on common foreign policy and especially foreign economic policy. as lee kuan yew pointed out in his closing statement at the meeting, ‘it is psychologically easier to deal with asean’s external partners than to sort out intra-regional arrangements between the partners themselves.’ these arrangements are an indication that asean nations would continue to value both cooperation within the association while maintaining their external relationships (asean information paper, 1977). conclusion policy objectives from inside the countries and outside of southeast asia towards regional cooperation and security had been developing since the end of the second world war. economic development viewed as essential for containing communist influence and preventing internal insurgencies in the region. regional cooperation was one way of providing financial assistance to newly independent nations without the appearance of foreign interference in regional affairs. the aim for many of the countries involved in southeast asian regionalism was that growth and prosperity would come through regional development programs with external support. this program would then expand to some form of collective security led by the southeast asian nations themselves. this journal of asean studies 17 policy started to gather pace during the 1950s and 1960s. by the late 1950s, the u.s. administration was strongly promoting the un economic commission for asia and the far east as one of the most important multilateral groupings in promoting regional economic and social cooperation and development. in 1950, the u.s. supported the development of the mekong basin as a long-range project to secure regional cooperation between burma, cambodia, laos, thailand, and vietnam. in the early 1960s, the u.s. tried to promote regional cooperation in asia by urging closer japanese relations with other countries in the region, initially through the association of southeast asia. key to this plan was the role that the regional nations would play themselves. for western countries, regional cooperation not only potentially provided a vehicle for containing communism in asia, but the policy presented an alternative security system in replace of western military bases. southeast asian nations themselves supported closer regional integration as a means of containing chinese communist influences and for countering the decline of western military support. the inauguration of asean paved the way for a formal regional association to bring some southeast asian nations together, and although the organization’s initial aim was claimed to be socioeconomic collaboration, political factors such as the promotion of regional peace and stability were present from the beginning. therefore, while formal regional cooperation came directly out of initiatives from southeast asian leaders, it did not end continued western financial support to local institutions, nor did it end external bilateral security relationships. in the early years of asean, asian initiatives towards economic development and security relations continued to be supported by foreign powers. about author dr. sue thompson is a senior lecturer at the national security college in the crawford school of public policy at the australian national university. her focus of research examines the history of regional cooperation in southeast asia during the cold war with a focus on foreign power influences in the post-war evolution of southeast asian regionalism. dr. thompson has conducted extensive fieldwork in north america, europe, and southeast asia and is currently working on her second soleauthored book on this topic. dr thompson completed her ph.d. from the school of oriental and african studies (soas) at the university of london in the united kingdom. she holds a master’s degree from the london school of economics and a bachelor degree with honours from the australian national university. references primary source archival material letter, h.v. evatt to nelson t. johnson, 24 february 1944, a989, 44/735/168/20, naa & cablegram, bruce to curtin, 10 november 1944, a989,44/630/5/l/11/22, national archives of australia (naa). memorandum, for butterworth and fisher, 15 july 1949, box 5, john f. melby papers, china file, publications, general, box 5, harry s. truman library (hstl). memorandum, secretary of state and butterworth, 16 january 1950, john f. 18 the evolution of southeast asian regionalism melby papers, china file, publications, general, box 5, hstl. memorandum, landon to rostow, 6 march 1961, national security files, countries, laos general, box 130, john f. kennedy library (jfkl). minute, a.j. de la mare to mr. samuel, 23 january 1967, fco 15/18 and foreign office memorandum, july 1966, fo 371/187566, the 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(2012). the making of southeast asia: international relations of a region. singapore: iseas. anwar, d. f (1994). indonesia in asean: foreign policy and regionalism. singapore: iseas. buszynsky, l. (1981). seato: why it survived until 1977 and why it was abolished. journal of southeast asian studies, 12(2), 287-296. gill, r. (1997) asean towards the 21st century: 22 the evolution of southeast asian regionalism a thirty-year review of the association of southeast asian nations. london: asean academic press. lee kuan yew, (2000). from third world to first: the singapore story: 1965-2000. singapore: singapore press holdings. mitcham, c (2012). australia and development cooperation at the united nations: towards poverty reduction. in j. cotton & d. lee (eds.), australia and the united nations. canberra: commonwealth of australia. narine, s. (1998). asean and the management of regional security. pacific affairs, 71(2), 198-201. tarling, n, (2006). regionalism in southeast asia: to foster the political will. london: routledge. the hobart mercury, 22 february 1973. environmental studies of english school: case study of forest fires in indonesia and transboundary haze in southeast asia yanyan mochamad yani padjadjaran university, indonesia verdinand robertua christian university of indonesia, indonesia abstract despite of its advantages in social dimension, english school still has limited articles on environmental issues. many global ecological crisis has been dealt with constructivism and green theory because the failure of english scholars to adopt new norms such as climate responsibility, sustainable development and environmental justice. this article would like to highlight the synthesis of the normative tensions and the regional studies within the environmental studies of english school using the case study of indonesia ratification to asean agreement on transboundary haze pollution. pluralism and solidarism will be the conceptual instruments in criticizing the blindness of environmental analysis in the english school communities and also constructing the environmental-friendly english school theory. there are two main conclusions in this article. firstly, indonesia ratification of asean agreement of transboundary haze pollution, the emergence of domestic environmental legislation and the adoption of environmental responsibility marked the end of pluralist hegemony in environmental studies. secondly, indonesia ratification of aathp is one of the foundations of regional environmental governance in southeast asia. key words: pluralism, solidarism, transboundary haze, southeast asia journal of asean studies, vol. 6, no. 1 (2018), pp. 117-135 doi: https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v6i1.3964 ©2018 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v6i1.3964 118 environmental studies of english school introduction forest fires and transboundary haze are man-made disasters in southeast asia. this disaster has been a controversial topic between asean members. asean agreement on transboundary haze pollution was signed in 2002 with the aim to collectively combat the fires using joint resources and continuous dialogue (asean, 2002). asean has many arrangements in dealing with environmental issues collectively such as asean strategic plan on environment and jakarta declaration on sustainable development with the purpose to strengthen inter-governmental cooperation in tackling and preventing regional environmental issues (elliot, 2012, p. 46). dauvergne (1998) mentioned that indonesian government was systematically destroying the forest for transmigration project, palm oil plantation and paper and pulp companies. in 1990s, suharto government escalated national economic growth through agriculture industrialization and then the need for converting the forest land was inevitable. in the suharto era, many corporations that were closed to suharto’s families received huge areas of concessions and forest fires and other clear-cutting forest method were widely used as a tool for land conversion (barber & schweithelm, 2000, p. vi). after suharto regime was toppled down, province and district government have bigger authority in many public sectors including the forest management. however, provincial leaders and district leaders of the new democratic government didn’t show their effective leadership in preventing deforestation, forest fires and transboundary haze. berenschot (2015) called this phenomenon as the haze of democracy. the worst impact of haze was happened in 1997-1998. the haze harmed people’s health and stopped public activities for weeks in indonesia and other five countries namely brunei darussalam, malaysia, singapore, thailand and the philippine (tay, 2001). indonesia suffered significant loss of human lives, forests area, endangered species and biodiversity loss, financial damage meanwhile singapore and malaysia peoples also were exposed to toxic gas. malaysia and singapore had deteriorating air quality to dangerous level. in kuching, sarawak, malaysia, pollution standard index (psi) hit to 839 (tay, 2001, p. 5). a reading of psi over 100 is considered unhealthy and above 300 is hazardous (cotton, 1999, p. 332). psi evaluated the healthiness of air based on the presence of four main elements namely sulfur dioxide, oxides of nitrogen, ozone and carbon monoxide. dauvergne (1998, p. 13) mentioned that more than 200.000 peoples in malaysia, indonesia and singapore were seeking medical treatment due to the air pollution. it is also noted that almost a quarter of indonesia’s peat forest was gone due to the fires (dauvergne, 1998, p. 13). forest fires, transboundary haze, and other ecological crises were rarely discussed within the english school communities. sanna kopra (2016) wrote a dissertation regarding china’s climate responsibility using english school and robert falkner (2017) discussed the critics toward the blindness of english school theorists toward environmental issues using pluralism-solidarism continuum and climate change politics. none of english journal of asean studies 119 school scholars spotted the urgency of building environmental studies of english school based on massive destruction of forest fires and transboundary haze in southeast asia. the absence of environmental studies in english school is a great disadvantage. jones (1981) is the first scholar giving the label of english school to the thinking of charles manning, herbert butterfield and hedley bull. the founder of english school was critical toward the domination of classical realism and focused to the importance of diplomacy, international law and international organization. english school gained revival after the incoming of new of scholars including barry buzan, richard little, andrew hurrell. they relaunched the school on a global scale and successful in attracting and inviting new scholars and english school become an established tradition in ir communities (jorgensen, 2010, p. 105). the primary reason of the revival of the school is the emphasis on the social dimension. barry buzan (2004, 1) said that “after a long period of neglect, the social (or societal dimension) of the international system is being brought back into fashion within the international relations by the upsurge of interest in constructivism”. this social emphasis enabled researcher to see the complexity and the paradox of many contradicting phenomena. the collapse of berlin wall, the break-up of soviet union, the increasing significance of multinational corporations, and global environmental crisis provided impetus for social theories of international relations. it is also evident that regional organizations have evolved significantly in their ability to do deal with complex issues as shown in the context of the european union. in his book from international society to world society, buzan (2004) devoted a special chapter urging scholars to give greater attention to regional studies. according to buzan (2004), regional studies can bring significant contribution to the diversity of ideas and concepts of english school tradition. however, there is a gap between regional studies and environmental studies. this article argued that the complexity of regional studies can be enriched with the environmental studies. a combination of environmental studies with regional studies is the aim of this article. to achieve the aforementioned goal, the authors have to tackle two main problems. firstly, english school scholars mostly focused to develop the concept of pluralism of english school (falkner, 2017; buzan, 2004). the domination of pluralism within the english school will not develop the environmental regional studies (buzan, 2004). using differentiation between thin and thick, buzan argued that english school scholars still has lack of discussion regarding the concept of solidarism of english school (buzan 2004, p. 140). solidarism is key criteria to have “thick” environmental studies of english school. secondly, there are problems of english school methodology. case-based study has great potential to theorize key concepts of english school. jackson (2009, p. 21) said: “theory is a creature of practice and not the other way about, as is often assumed”. in order to evaluate the pluralism and solidarism in english school, 120 environmental studies of english school scholars can use specific cases that are relevant to the english school theoretical development. according to jackson (2009), there are two criteria to select cases. firstly, it is pluralistic and secondly, the authors are detached. according to jackson (2009), case selection in english school theoretical development is based on pluralistic approach. pluralistic approach highlighted the key character of normative inquiry within a specific case that consisted of contradiction, paradox or dilemma. after in-depth investigation using pluralistic approach, researchers deliver their new theoretical construct. secondly, jackson emphasized that case selection should give more benefit to the theoretical development than the author’s personal values. the role of english school theorists is to provide interpretation based on reasonableness and logical consistency (jakson 2009, 26). in this article, indonesia ratification to aathp is used as the case to evaluate the domination of pluralism within english school discussion. aathp and the handling of forest fires provided a complex issue involving the conflicted interest of indonesia, singapore and malaysia. there is also a perpetual clash between palm oil industry and environmental activists regarding the clearance of forest. english school environmental blindness indonesia’s policies to pursue forestbased developmental strategy are parallel to the blindness of ir theories toward the environmental responsibility. this is anthropocentric view of international relations. scholars denied the importance of non-human nature, the needs of future generations and unfair distribution of ecological harms (eckersley, green theory, 2013, p. 267). eckersley (2013) said that the interests of future generations, the poor and the weak and the non-human nature are invisible and hidden from the global decision-making process. the hegemony of sovereignty is not balanced by other institutions such as civil society and multinational corporations. without the ecological crisis as shown by forest fires and haze, anthropocentric view of international relations will be intact. the philosophy of anthropocentric views started from the assumption that the earth can support unlimited economic growth (clapp & dauvergne, 2005, p. 5). technology and engineering can manipulate and modify the ecosystem to suit the interest of the human being. the role of governments is to enhance the advancement of science and engineering through financial support. scientific achievements have the purpose to repair and mitigate the impact of environmental problems (clapp and dauvergne 2005, 6). the environmental responsibility is then closely connected with technology. anthropocentric approach has some parallels to pluralism of english school. pluralism advised for state-centric mode of governance, the primacy of great power, and the pursuit of national interest (buzan, 2004). meanwhile solidarism prefers to embrace new ideas and values into the existing international order such as human rights, democracy and environmental responsibility. the purpose of the dichotomy of solidarism and pluralism is to uncover the complexity surrounding an issue. english journal of asean studies 121 school provided a continuum that solidarism and pluralism have equal and fair place that enabled researchers to understand the contradicting and dilemmatic situation. however, solidarism didn’t attract much attention of english school scholars which caused the failure of the school to establish its environmental studies. hedley bull is one of english school founder and supporter of pluralism. he developed international order on the basis of pluralism. according to him, there are three components of international order. firstly, there is a goal of preservation of state-centric society and the independence of states. secondly, avoidance of violence. and lastly, respects for property (bull, 1977). bull is very critical to the idea of integrating environmental responsibility to international order due to his perception that environmental justice can be serious threat to state and its independence. bull denied the importance of civil society and other non-state actors because they are not appointed through legitimate political process. if a tyrant and authoritarian regime are elected through legitimate process, then they reserved for their right to control the government. bull said: “and the idea of the rights of the individual human being raises in international politics the question of the right and duty of persons and groups other than the state to which he owes allegiance to come to his aid in the event that his rights are being disregarded the right of the western powers to protect the political rights of the citizens of eastern european countries, or of africans to protect the rights of black south africans, or of china to protect the right of chinese minorities in south-east asia. these are questions which, answered in a certain way, lead to disorder in international relations, or even to the breakdown of international society itself” (bull, 1977, p. 80). bull’s statement confirmed the immutability thesis of material structures of international relations. in the case of forest fires and transboundary haze, it is the interest of non-human nature, the poor and the indigenous peoples that has been invisible and undermined by the existing theorization of pluralism. aljazeera (2017) reported that indonesia is home to an estimated 50-70 million tribal people, but most of them do not have formal title to the forest land. pluralism neglects the interest of non-human nature, tribal groups and the normative goal of environmental responsibility. forest fires and haze are the main consequences of this inaction. buzan explained the factors of the failure of english school scholars to construct the solidarism studies. buzan said that the hierarchy of pluralism over solidarism was largely pragmatic. in buzan’s opinion, hedley bull’s support to pluralism was based on the assumption that “the state-based approach provided both the only immediately available pathway to a degree of achievable international order, and also a valuable via media between the extremes of realism and liberalism” (buzan, 2004, 36). liste (2017) argued that english school scholars can’t take the pluralism as the taken-for-granted norms. english school is also a critical movement toward the hegemony of pluralism in environmental studies of english school. there are already many evidences and phenomenon 122 environmental studies of english school indicating irrelevance of pluralism in environmental politics. the presence of various multilateral environmental agreement, public-private partnership and green global movement urged the transformation of state-based pluralism into complex governance beyond the state (hurrell, on global order: power, values and the constitution of international society, 2007). sustainable development was used as global development platform for policy-makers (bernstein, 2001). this is the main challenge for english scholars. it is important to construct solidarism that is sufficient to answer the ecological challenge such as the emergence of sustainable development. andrew hurrell (2007) mentioned that there are three ecological challenges. first challenge is related to the failure of states in dealing with global environmental crisis. secondly, states are also failed in dealing with local and national environmental problems. lastly, there are impetuses for creation of a form of nonterritorially based political identity. solidarism has immense potential in answering these challenges by borrowing the concepts environmental justice, sustainable development and climate responsibilities within the english school discourse. english school scholar sanna kopra (2016) has written about climate responsibilities and verdinand robertua (2016) has written about sustainable development. it is important to further these researches looking the relevancy of solidarism in answering environmental problems including transboundary haze and forest fires. by combining case study with theoretical framework, environmental studies of english school has a stronger foundation in international relations theories. regional environmental governance the hierarchy of pluralism over solidarism can also be seen in the construction of the concept of regional environmental governance. varkkey (2012) has developed the regionalism of environmental issues using the case studies of forest fires and transboundary haze in southeast asia. she argued that asean way was hampering the establishment of effective haze mitigation mechanism. varkkey said “this difference in emphases of sovereignty explains why environmental regionalism in europe has been successful while environmental regionalism in southeast asia has not” (varkkey 2012, 81). the inhospitality of asean way and haze prevention mechanism was happened due to the interest of indonesian palm oil industry which contributed significantly to indonesian national income. economic interest was prioritized in the southeast asia multilateral negotiation including the priority agenda of internationalization of palm oil and forestrelated products (varkkey, 2012, 77-8). southeast asia regionalism is founded on the basis of traditional market model. asean was intended to bring welfare and profit through market liberalization. integration project was evaluated on the basis of monetary value of goods and services. all states are assumed to seek material gain (miller, 2008, pp. 1819). economic integration obtained higher priority due to the perception that the economic integration will bring greater economic values to individuals (amador, journal of asean studies 123 2011). meanwhile environmental integration received lukewarm attention due to lack of economic incentives to the states. meanwhile elliot also offered similar arguments stating the ineffectiveness of asean’s regional environmental governance. she said: “regional environmental structures under asean have generally failed to offer effective channels of communication for and among a wide range of stakeholders, including local communities and subnational units. commentators have pointed to the importance of engagement with civil society for robust regional environmental governance structures and processes” (elliot, 2012: 62). the case study of the indonesia ratification to asean agreement of transboundary haze pollution is an interesting attempt to evaluate the comments above. buzan (2004) urged english scholars to devise regional analysis of english school and regional environmental governance is a promising arena for english school-based regional environmental governance. forest fires and transboundary haze in indonesia and southeast asia forest fires in indonesia and transboundary haze in southeast asia has transformed asean’s meeting into a debate forum for indonesia, singapore and malaysia. due to the forest fires, singapore had significant decrease of income on tourism industry and industrial investment. it is estimated that 1997’s fires had burdened singapore’s economy around us$ 9-10 billion with additional us$ 1.5 billion for assisting fire-fighting in indonesia (forsyth, 2014, p. 18). in a more moderate figure, varkkey (2011, p. 87) mentioned the data of singapore’s damage around us$ 97.5 million during 1997’s forest fires crisis. in 2006, singapore’s changi airport was forced to closed due to low visibility and disrupt singapore’s mega events such as f1 race and apec forum (varkkey, 2011, p. 87). due to the deadly threat of haze to human health, malaysia declared state of emergency in the state of sarawak and prepared evacuation plan for two millions of its inhabitants (barber & schweithelm, 2000, p. 20). schools and factories were closed. there were 65% increase of asthma cases and other acute respiratory cases among adults and children (barber & schweithelm, 2000, p. 20). sarawak is very close to the source of haze of kalimantan islands in indonesia. in august 1997, there were public demonstration in front of indonesian embassy office to malaysia in kuala lumpur stating their anger toward the failure of indonesian government preventing and mitigating the fires and the haze (wahyuni, 2011). in response to public demand, singapore and malaysia expressed their interest to have collective anti-haze efforts under the framework of asean. singapore government questioned the seriousness of indonesian government and offered assistance using asean’s framework. indonesian government rejected the assistance by saying that the mitigation of forest fires was the sole authority of indonesian government (nguitragool, 2011). 124 environmental studies of english school varkkey (2009) argued that indonesia’s persistence of rejecting asean framework was caused by the trauma of imf’s experience, the hand-over of indonesian’s islands to malaysia, indonesia’s vulnerability of internal conflict, and colonial history. nguitragool (2011) and dauvergne (1998) added that indonesian government had internal friction regarding the cause of the fires resulted into contradicting policies between ministry of forest and ministry of environment. former head of national committee for disaster management azwar anas stated that forest fires were due to natural phenomenon of el-nino which was hardly mitigated and prevented (nguitragool, 2011). meanwhile minister of environment sarwono kusumaatmadja complained that corporation didn’t seriously consider environmental impact of forest fires because they had political protection from suharto’s ruling family (dauvergne, 1998). however, indonesian environment minister also accused that malaysian companies were also responsible toward the forest fires. tempo (2013) reported that there were eight malaysian companies suspected of causing fires in riau and jambi. the police discovered burnings in the concessions owned by malaysian companies (tempo, 2013). the rivalry of indonesia with singapore and malaysia indicated the debate of the effectiveness of state-centric system in overcoming of the impact of environmental crisis. the absence of effective prevention mechanism of transboundary haze was partly due to the primacy of sovereign government over the interest of the nature. the persistence of sovereignty of indonesia in dealing with fires has some parallels to indonesia foreign policy toward asean. for indonesia, asean should work based on the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention including in discussing environmental problems. asean way is reflecting indonesia foreign policy that adopted a consensus, nonlegalistic binding and informal approach (acharya, 1997). for varkkey (2011), it takes longer time to solve environmental problems using asean way rather than using binding approach as used by the european union. in his comparative studies, varkkey (2011) claimed that asean way has hampered effective prevention mechanism of transboundary haze. asean way is a manifestation of pragmatic, self-interest and gradualist development of governments (acharya 1997). meanwhile the european union has built an effective cooperating institution using the convention of long range transboundary air pollution in dealing with acid rain with regional scope. moreover, the eu has authority to impose punishment for any abuse of power that leads to ecological crisis (varkkey 2011). effective prevention of haze and fires needs regional responsibility with the focus of improving commitment toward the nature, ecosystem and environment. the transboundary haze and forest fires indicated the normative tension between sovereignty and the interest of non-human nature and future generations. forest fires and transboundary haze are the main effect of indonesia’s policy to focus to exploit the natural resources and exchanged it for massive infrastructure development in health and education services as well as other public facilities such as roads, airports, and seaports. in the leader’s view, journal of asean studies 125 forests can bring financial benefits to the host states by trading the timber and converted the land into palm oil or pulp plantation. indonesian government has also distributed mass hectares of forests land to the local community through transmigration program (dauvergne, 1994). sovereignty is a primary institution of international relations and this primacy has destructive consequences on ecosystem and the earth. ozone depletion, water scarcity, air pollution and oil spill are just few disasters related to industrialization and modernization. moreover, this situation is immutable (eckersley, 2005). the recurring pattern of environmental crisis seems confirming the immutability thesis that states will not give up their national interest in exchange for ecological thought (laferrière & stoett, 1999). falk explained the factors of immutability: “a world of sovereign states is unable to cope with endangered-planet problems. each government is mainly concerned with the pursuit of national goals. these goals are defined in relation to economic growth, political stability and international prestige. the political logic of nationalism generates a system of international relations that is dominated by conflict and competition. such a system exhibits only a modest capacity for international co-operation and coordination. the distribution of power and authority, as well as the organization of human effort, is overwhelmingly guided by the selfish drive of nations” (falk, 1971, pp. 37-38). falk’s classical text above is a perfect illustration of the pessimism of powerpolitical continuum. the priority of national interest and hard power competition put the interest of the earth and the ecosystem aside. in the anarchic international system, governments can’t expect superior agency in protecting their territory and the power from external aggression. government will use diplomacy and all related instruments to protect their territory and their peoples. governments will not compromise their goal for the achieving ecological interest. asean agreement on transboundary haze pollution (aathp) the immutability of pluralism was tested after indonesia ratified asean agreement on transboundary haze pollution (aathp). it needs 13 years for indonesia to ratify the agreement. during the ratification process, many articles showed pessimism of indonesia’s commitment to ratify the agreement. nguitragool (2011) argued that aathp was seen as a threat to indonesian sovereignty meanwhile purwaningtyas (2007) claimed that indonesian parliament didn’t support aathp due to lack of short-term incentives. varkkey (2009) showed that nationalist sentiments played an important role in indonesia’s long process of ratification of aathp. aathp also provoked internal dispute between indonesian cabinet that minister of foreign affairs and minister of environment supported the ratification meanwhile ministry of forest were pessimist toward the prospect of aathp (nguitragool, 2011). the neglect of aathp within the indonesian parliament and the government’s agenda gave few reasons to develop environmental studies of english school. 126 environmental studies of english school the absence of commitment to integrate environmental responsibility into indonesian foreign policy agenda didn’t provide foundation and background to develop sustainable development, climate responsibility or environmental justice into english school discourse. however, the ratification of aathp is a surprise that negated this pessimism. from the case study of transboundary haze, indonesia’s ratification to aathp in 2015 is a symbol of importance of solidarism-based environmental studies of es. aathp has the normative ambition to realize forests as the public goods for future generations. with this kind of ambition, aathp endorsed win-win solution such as aathp fund, joint coordination on forest fires combat or asean humanitarian agency. the ratification of indonesian government of aathp is a breakthrough of the environmental studies because it changed the priority of government from high politics issues such as security and welfare toward the forestry issues. this is closely related to the new presidency of susilo bambang yudhoyono. from the beginning of his leadership, environmental issues along with anti-corruption program emerged as the priority agenda. in 2010, the president also signed the redd+ letter of intent with norwegian government by issuing moratorium for forest conversion (kompas, 2010). yudhoyono government received one billion us dollar from norwegian government for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. the bilateral agreement indicated that indonesian government are looking to change their meaning of sovereignty not based only on the narrow definition of material gain but also including environmental justice and sustainable development. yudhoyono government emphasized the importance of keeping the forest for future generations and this policy has parallel to sustainable development global developmental platform advising a “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generation to meet their own needs” (world commission on environment and development, 1987). sustainable development requires changes in patterns and levels of production and consumption, protection and promotion of biodiversity, interand intra-generational equity (baker, kousis, richardson, & young, 1997, p. 9). forest, then, is a critical element in sustainable development that it provided rich biodiversity ecosystem and resources for future generation. redd+ is a sustainable development policy as it promoted and protected forest. after published by world commission on sustainable development, sustainable development was a key concept in rio de janeiro conference in 1992 with the focus to be the platform of cooperation between developing and developed countries for addressing global environmental problems (bernstein, 2001). sustainable development was also used as main topic for johannesburg conference with the focus of inclusion of corporation and private entities in state-led regional environmental governance. multistakeholder initiative is one of the results of johannesburg negotiation and can be considered as a derivative of sustainable development (robertua, 2017). journal of asean studies 127 not only about indonesia’s ratification to aathp, environmental studies are stronger after significant change in domestic environmental legislation. president susilo bambang yudhoyono has established national climate change council in 2008 that oversee the implementation of indonesian’s climate change policy (mclellan, 2015). in 2009, the new environmental protection legislation law is signed. the law required all national, provincial and city governments to develop environmental management plans. indonesia also returned the forest to the local indigenous communities. as mentioned earlier, indonesia has 50-70 million tribal people and 8.2 million hectares of forest belong to them (aljazeera 2017). through the national law of forest in 1987, indonesian government grabbed all the land into the ownership of the state. however, indonesia’s constitutional court ruled in 2013 that the tribes have the right to manage forests and the government should return the customary lands to tribal communities (aljazeera, 2017). tribal group’s victory is not only the victory for minority but also for the solidarism pillar that advised for significant shift to adopt non-state actors in the environmental politics. indonesia’s ratification to aathp showed that the inclusion of environmental responsibility in the environmental studies of es did not obstruct the primary institution of sovereignty. the contradiction of anarchy and environmental responsibility is not necessary in the construction of solidarist environmental studies. the ratification of aathp, the emergence of domestic environmental legislation and the adoption of environmental responsibility marked the end of the immutability thesis. the attention toward new actors marked the beginning of environmental studies without avoiding the decline of states. multinational corporations and civil society are new actors in international relations because they have similar goals to the states that contributing to peace, nonviolence and property rights. in the case of transboundary haze and forest crisis, corporation and civil society are building alliance in campaigning for environmentalfriendly products by introducing the greenlabel. the alliance is monitoring whether the activities of corporations comply with the standards of environmental-friendly products. some notable examples of these alliances are rountable sustainable palm oil (rspo) and forest stewardship council (fsc). rspo and fsc are important tools in the campaign on the harmful impact of forest fires and haze. they set the environmental standards for corporation and monitoring the compliance and appreciating the achievement as well. the main purpose of rspo and fsc is to promote sustainable development and environmental responsibility for corporation beyond the narrow self-interest (moog, spicer, & bohm, 2015). as stated by falkner, stockholm conference, rio conference and johannesburg conference were empowering pro-environmental actors within government and created a complex interaction regarding treaty commitments, institutional linkages and actors networks (falkner, global environmentalism and the greening of international society, 2012, p. 128 environmental studies of english school 516). in stockholm conference, there was a rift between developed and developing which need 20 years to fix the rift. 20 years from stockholm, developed and developing countries agreed on the environmental responsibility (dauvergne, 2008, pp. 454459). there is a shift of the debate whether developed or developing countries that are responsible into the debate on the form of new global economy that supported the non-human nature and the weak groups in a society. to be able to explain the role of rspo, environmental studies of es must reject the immutability of the inhospitality between order and justice. the argument is that international order is compatible with environmental justice. therefore environmental studies of es will be inclusive combining state with non-state actors that have the same goals of preserving the ecosystem and the earth. the assumption of environmental studies is that global crisis is happening and it is the result of excessive use of natural resources. globalization accelerated the exploitation and the way forward is transformation from anthropocentric view into new global economy that promoted local wisdom, environmental justice and internationalization of non-human life (clapp & dauvergne, 2005, pp. 14-15). environmental studies of english school as mentioned earlier, the rivalry of order and justice is the main hindrance of environmental studies of es. if there is a rivalry of order and justice, it is hard to think about environmental justice, climate responsibility and sustainable development. the previous bull’s quote confirmed the victory of this argument. however, using the case study of indonesia ratification to aathp, the shift from rivalry mode to the cooperation mode is evident. environmental justice didn’t exclude sovereignty but enhanced the new meaning of sovereignty. robin eckersley said that sovereignty is not only about the territorial defender but also environmental protector, trustee or public custodian of planetary commons (eckersley, 2004, p. 209). interestingly bull has a doubt on the environmental movement itself. in the end of his book, he mentioned that: “it is obvious that if all men were as willing to co-operate in the pursuit of common goals as the crew of a spaceship, these threats to the human environment would be easier to meet than they are … first, what inhibits a common global plan for action in relation to the environment is not the existence of the system of states but the fact of human disagreement and conflict in the ecological realm itself … to avert a universal ‘tragedy of the commons’, all men in the long run may have to learn to accept limitations on their freedom to determine the size of their families, to consume energy and other resources and to pollute their environment, and a state system that cannot provide these limitation may be dysfunctional” (bull, 1977, 283). therefore, english school is not only theories of sovereignty, war, balance of power and diplomacy but also theories of environmental justice, climate responsibility and sustainable development. environmental studies of es was established by looking the interaction between these institutions. environmental studies is looking for the cooperation between these institutions. this research journal of asean studies 129 disagree that these new institutions are contradicting with bull’s primary institutions. it is possible and recommended for having cooperation between these institutions as shown in the case of indonesia ratification of aathp. aathp is followed by significant change in indonesia environmental legislation. as said before, yudhoyono government has established national climate change council and environmental protection law that have been hailed as the hallmark of indonesia’s commitment to cut the emission through preventing the forest fires. indonesia also signed letter of intent with norwegian government to reduce emission through redd+ framework. aathp has indirect impact in changing the perception of indonesian government toward more proactive in embracing environmental values. environmental studies of english school started from the assumption of the domination of pluralism. in the case of aathp, indonesia’s initial rejection to ratify aathp symbolized the hierarchy of pluralism over solidarism. however, indonesia ratification of aathp marked the end of pluralist domination in the environmental studies. it gives possibility of end of pluralism and transformation toward increasing role of solidarism in environmental studies of english school. indonesia ratification to aathp showed that european union-based regional environmental governance is not relevant to asean regional environmental governance. elliot (2012) and varkkey (2011) wanted stronger institutionalization of aathp with harsher punishment and professional secretariat. despite of the absence of direct intervention from singapore and malaysia, transboundary haze and forest fires have become important political issues for indonesia. solidarists argued that it is not necessary to have eu model in implementing regional environmental governance. solidarists defined regional environmental governance based on the cooperative relationship between sovereignty and environmental protection. in the case of aathp, the inclusion of environmental responsibility did not destruct the primary institution of sovereignty. solidarists argued that regional environmental governance consisted of state and non-state actors. from the case study of aathp, civil society and corporation are increasing their attention and effort to mitigate the forest fires and transboundary haze. aathp has inspired indonesia to build effective national haze prevention system. asean still emphasized the norm of non-intervention but adopted the norms of sustainable development and environmental responsibility. it is in line with eckersley’s inclusive sovereignty. indonesia still obtained their sovereignty but changed their legislation toward a more friendly approach toward environmental issues. eckersley said: “indeed, over the last four decades environmental organizations, movements, and citizens’ initiatives, along with progressive states and certain international organizations, have played a key role in helping to transform the mutually informing international and national discourses of legitimate state conduct in a greener direction, while also introducing a 130 environmental studies of english school new layer of domestic state functions and practices … many of these achievements are merely rhetorical in the sense that the new discourse of sustainable development outstrips the shift in actual practices, but the environmental and broader green movements have nonetheless changed public expectations and provided new standards by which state behavior is to be judged and called to account” (eckersley, 2005, p. 168). the pessimistic view of varkkey and elliot in dealing with southeast asian environmental problems was negated by indonesian people and indonesian people who wanted to stop indonesian government policies that destroy the forest and the environment. asean haze fund and asean center on transboundary haze has assisted indonesia in dealing with forest fires. asean’s commitment in enhancing national institution and network, data and information management, research and development and education and training have pressured indirectly indonesian government to seriously combat and mitigate the forest fires and haze (lian & robinson, 2002). solidarists wanted to have regional environmental governance that emphasized trust, learning and transparency. despite of the absence of punishment of violation for multilateral environmental agreement, hurrell and kingsbury (1992, 24-5) stated that there are two positive outcome of nonbinding and soft agreement. firstly, international law provided expectations that states will be involved in long-term cooperation and in a wide-range of issues. in the case of aathp, indonesia is still active in asean’s meeting regarding the haze and involved in the holistic haze prevention mechanism. secondly, international law provided means for learning and contributed to a greater degree of transparency. to conclude, this article would like to quote hurrell and kingsbury’s statement: “further, it leads to modifications in perceptions of state interests, with states coming to be more aware of the dangers of environmental degradation and the costs of non-agreement. in sum, environmental regimes facilitate co-operation because of functional benefits which they provide in form of an order based not on coercion, but on coordination of interests and of patterned expectations” (hurrell & kingsbury, 1992, pp. 24-5). conclusion hurrell and kingsbury’s statement above illustrated the solidarist approach toward the current regional environmental governance. state-led regional environmental governance provided foundation and powerful insights for building a new architecture of the future’s global environmental governance. indonesia ratification to aathp is a case confirming the shift from pluralism to solidarism. forest fires and transboundary haze are perpetual disasters in southeast asia. this man-made disaster has been topic of dispute between asean on how to mitigate the impact of forest fires. this article concluded that indonesian response toward forest fires and transboundary haze pushed the new architecture of environmental studies of english school. the domination of pluralism perspective of english school was transformed into journal of asean studies 131 solidarism in response to the contemporary roles of international environmental law. asean agreement on transboundary haze pollution and indonesia’s ratification of aathp are examples of the shifting perspective from pluralism into solidarism that more sufficient to accommodate sustainable development, climate justice and environmental ethics. it is also the foundation for regional environmental governance that marked a new importance of civil society and non-state actors in the environmental negotiation. about the author yanyan mochamad yani is a professor in international relations of padjadjaran university. his expertise is in international security studies especially non-traditional threat. verdinand robertua is a lecturer and researcher in international relations at christian university of indonesia. his expertise is in environmental studies of english 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"addressing transboundary haze through asean: singapore’s normative constraints." journal of international studies, 7(2011), 83-101. varkkey, h. 2011. "asean as a thin community: the case against adopting the eu acid rain framework for transboundary haze management in southeast asia." malaysian journal of history, politics & strategic studies 38 (2): 1-26. varkkey, h. 2009. "indonesia perspectives on managing the asean haze." jurnal sarjana 24 (1): 83-101. wahyuni, d. 2011. permasalahan kabut asap dalam hubungan indonesia dan malaysia pada periode 1997-2006. jakarta: uin press. world commission on environment and development. 1987. our common future. oxford: oxford university press. https://en.tempo.co/read/news/2013/06/24/074490897/malaysian-companies-accused-of-causing-indonesias-forest-fires https://en.tempo.co/read/news/2013/06/24/074490897/malaysian-companies-accused-of-causing-indonesias-forest-fires https://en.tempo.co/read/news/2013/06/24/074490897/malaysian-companies-accused-of-causing-indonesias-forest-fires https://en.tempo.co/read/news/2013/06/24/074490897/malaysian-companies-accused-of-causing-indonesias-forest-fires rethinking refugees as economically isolated: the rohingyas participation in informal economy in klang valley, malaysia andika ab. wahab national university of malaysia, malaysia abstract unlike economic migrants, the refugee population is often portrayed as a burden to hosting government. they are seen to be economically passive, and highly dependent on the generosity of the hosting government and international organizations. in malaysia, the refugee population including the rohingyas is not living in sprawling tents, isolated villages or any refugee settlement in remote areas. they live in semi-urban and major city areas in search of economic opportunities – to make a living while waiting for durable solutions accorded to them. the absence of the right to work, coupled with the mounting pressure to make a living forces the rohingyas to engage in informal economy, by undertaking various types of occupation and income-generating activities albeit risks of arrest and exploitation. this study aims to analyze the relationship between the rohingyas participation in informal economy and their livelihood activities in the country. resulting from two series of field works engaging the rohingyas in klang valley between 2013 and 2016, the study found that despite the absence of their right to work, the rohingya respondents persistently entered into informal labor market as temporary, unskilled and low wage workers in various sectors such as trade, services and automotive. for the selfemployed rohingya respondents, they tend to engage in small-scale and unregulated income generating activities. the active participation of the rohingya respondents in informal economy has collectively strengthened their social interactions, influenced their ways of life, and increased their contribution towards community development. this study hence argues that the rohingyas active participation in informal economy is an attempt to be independent or to be less dependent on the unhcr assistance and government generosity in order to create and maintain their livelihood activities. this debunks the misconception that the rohingya population in malaysia is physically and economically isolated from the domestic economic structure. key words: rohingya, refugees, informal economy and livelihood journal of asean studies, vol. 5, no. 1 (2017), pp. 100-118 doi: 10.21512/jas.v5i2.3664 ©2017 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic journal of asean studies 103 introduction generally, refugees in malaysia are not allowed to enter labor market in any sectors of economy. this restriction applies to all refugee population in malaysia including the rohingyas, in which majority of them (70%) are residing urban areas (equal rights trust, 2014; kassim, 2015). due to mounting pressure to make a living coupled with limited access to humanitarian aids, the rohingyas are persistently entering the informal sectors, undertaking a variety of occupations and income-generating activities – albeit risks of arrest by enforcement personnel, and various forms of exploitation by unscrupulous employers and local community (equal rights trust, 2014; wake & cheung, 2016; hoffstaedter, 2016). existing studies also indicate that due to the absence of their right to work, the rohingyas are working in hazardous, poorly paid and with no protection working environment (equal rights trust, 2014; kassim, 2015; wake & cheung, 2016; hoffstaedter, 2016). this study aims to analyze the relationship between the rohingyas participation in informal economy and their livelihood strategies. in particular, this study seeks to explain how their involvement in informal economy would enable and strengthen their livelihood activities in malaysia. prior to analyze this symbiotic relationship, it is important first to understand the rohingyas participation in informal economy. for the rohingyas who are employed in informal economy, this study aims to understand the types of occupation they engage, wages, period of employment, number of working hours, availability of social protection as well as their skills and working experience. for the rohingyas who run their own income generating activities (or self-employed rohingyas), it is important to understand the way they run their activities including the size of their business operation, sectors, income and the hiring of workers or assistants. to best address the variety of factors contributing to the rohingyas participation in informal economy and their livelihood activities, this study refers to the broad-based livelihood framework as advocated by chambers and conway (1991). research method this study adopts triangulation research method, combining three research techniques, namely a survey, an in-depth interview and a focus group discussion. the use of triangulation research method has enabled the author to crosscheck information and to relate them when analyzing the relationship between the rohingyas participation in informal economy and their livelihood. the primary findings in this study are derived from two series of field works conducted in 2013 and 2016. the first series of field work was conducted in 2013, targeting the rohingyas residing in klang valley (kuala lumpur and selangor), the central region of peninsular malaysia. klang valley is the most populated area among the rohingyas in peninsular malaysia (kassim, 2015, p. 183). a total of 48 rohingya respondents were surveyed and interviewed between 2 january 2013 and 30 april 2013. this study used purposive sampling technique to determine respondents with the assistance of rohingyas’ communitybased organizations (cbos) in klang valley. the second phase of the field work was undertaken between june and august 2016, targeting rohingya community 104 rethinking refugees as economically isolated leaders and activists in klang valley. a total of 10 interview sessions were conducted, using semi-structured interview questions. for the purpose of this study, only selected interview scripts relevant to this study were used. for security reasons and to prevent any unintended consequences, the personal details of the respondents and key informants have been kept anonymous and their names replaced. informal economy, refugees livelihood & the rohingyas in malaysia informal economy in malaysia the 1993’s resolution of the 15th international conference of labor statisticians defines that persons employed in at least one informal sector enterprises – regardless of their status of employment, and whether it was their main or second job – are considered to be in informal economy (hussmanns, 2004). according to international labor organization’s (ilo, 2015), activities in informal economy may include enterprises who are unregistered under specific forms of national legislation, small-scale in terms of workforce involved, private unincorporated enterprises, no complete accounts available, goods and services produced for sale or barter as well as engage in nonagricultural activities. in malaysia, informal economy includes informal sector enterprises that are not registered under the companies commission of malaysia (ccm), and with less than 10 workers (institute of labor market information & analysis, 2015). agricultural sector and any other activities related to agriculture that are operating for their own consumption are nevertheless excluded from the definition of informal sector in malaysia. meanwhile, informal wage employment refers to all jobs that lack contractual rights, legal status, social protection, health benefits and labor law privileges (institute of labor market information & analysis, 2015). official information on informal economy in malaysia is captured through the malaysia’s labor force survey (lfs) conducted by the department of statistics malaysia (dos) on an annual basis. it was first captured in 2012. in 2012, it was estimated that one million individuals participated in informal non-agricultural activities (undp, 2013, p. 96). the key measure for gauging employment in the informal economy is the total number (actual) of persons employed in various informal sectors, as well as in percentage of the non-agricultural employed workforce. information on informal economy can be further disaggregated by gender, age group, educational attainment, status of employment, industry, state, and strata. while these data may be further disaggregated by type of citizenship (between citizen of malaysia and noncitizen), but it cannot be disaggregated by the different types of non-citizens such as migrant workers, domestic workers and refugees – among the non-citizen participants. refugees livelihood and livelihood framework participation in informal economy is one of the very important livelihood strategies for many segments of society. yet, it is not the only aspect to consider when it comes to refugee population. crisp (2003) stressed that refugee livelihoods are the issue of their fundamental human rights, fundamental liberty and protection. in fact, human journal of asean studies 105 rights and livelihood are complementing each other (de vriese, 2006). in other words, respect for refugee rights would strengthen their livelihood. other studies also indicated that the absence of civil, social, and economic rights is the key root causes that restrict refugees to establish or maintain their livelihood (jacobsen, 2002). in many parts of the world, refugees suffer from the lack of their right to freedom of movement, freedom of speech, fair trial, decent work, and access to education and health-care treatment (de vriese, 2006). self-employment is another common livelihood strategy among the refugee population. in uganda, for instance, the provision of agricultural land to select refugee groups by the government of uganda to develop the land has resulted in refugee population become productive members of their community, and subsequently contributed in national development and poverty alleviation (sebba, 2005). in kenya, existing studies indicate that the limited freedom of movement coupled with the absence of access to agricultural land have caused many refugee population involved in informal sector (jamal, 2000; horst, 2001). the above literatures illustrate the complexity of livelihood issues facing refugees from around the world. even when refugees are legally allowed to work, it does not guarantee their employment due to poor economic conditions in certain countries. in countries where refugees are formally recognized, xenophobia and prejudice towards refugees, remoteness of refugees settlement, language barriers, lack of skills collectively impede them from meaningfully participate in the labor market (de vriese, 2006). there are existing livelihood frameworks used predominantly by development actors such as oxfam, migration policy institute (mpi) and transatlantic council on migration to study various forms of strategy used by the refugee population in order to sustain their livelihood in urban and rural settings. other intergovernmental organizations have their respective livelihood framework and strategy dealing specifically with different segments of society. the livelihood framework of the unhcr, for instance, is defined broadly to include activities that allow refugees to cope with, and to recover from stress and shocks, to maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets to provide sustainable livelihood opportunities for the next generation (de vriese, 2006, p. 3). de vriese (2006) notes that most refugee households do not limit their livelihood strategies, but rather diversify such activities attempting to make the most opportunities available to them. de vriese (2006), groups the common livelihood strategies employed by the refugee population into nine core activities, namely; (i) seeking international protection as a livelihood strategy; (ii) receiving humanitarian assistance; (iii) relying on social networks and solidarity; (iv) rural refugee livelihoods falling back on subsistence farming; (v) urban refugee livelihood; (vi) engaging in trade and services; (vii) investing in education and skills training; (viii) falling back on negative coping strategies; and (ix) adopting new gender roles. despite the growing number of literatures concerning refugee livelihoods across the globe, there is no mutually accepted livelihood framework that could be adequate given the varying 106 rethinking refugees as economically isolated circumstances and challenges facing the refugee population in different context of destination and transit countries. according to chambers and conway (1991), a sustainable livelihood means the capability of individual, or household to cope with and to recover from stress and shock; to maintain and enhance their capabilities and assets; and a means used to maintain and sustain their life. although they clearly distinguish the components of livelihood framework into three categories, namely the capability, asset and activities for a means of living – there is a potential overlap between these categories. hence, this study refers to a broad-based livelihood framework as advocated by chambers and conway (1991), without categorizing them into the three components. this serves as the conceptual guidance, and would enable the study to contextualize the issues and activities employed by the rohingyas in klang valley, resulting from their participation in informal economy. rohingya refugees in malaysia at the outset, the term ‚refugee‛ is a legally defined status in international refugee law, and as such, owing particular status and rights as enshrined in the 1951 refugee convention. according to the convention, refugee is defined as, “…owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion… is outside the country of his nationality...‛ however, as malaysia has yet to accede to the 1951 refugee convention and its 1967 protocol, the term ‘refugee’ and rights stipulated under such convention are not recognized. as a non-state party to the 1951 refugee convention, the existing national laws including the malaysian immigration act 1959/63 – do not distinguish between the undocumented immigrants (or irregular migrants) and refugees. as of the end of october 2016, a total of 150,669 refugees and asylum seekers from various countries of origin were registered by the unhcr in malaysia (unhcr, 2016). this includes a total of 54,856 rohingyas. under the immigration act 1959/63, the rohingyas and other refugee population, regardless of their refugee status are considered as ‚undocumented migrants‛, and punishable by a fine not exceeding rm10,000 (approximately us$ 2,500) and/or maximum of five years of imprisonment, and up to six strokes of cane. as a result of continued persecution and discrimination facing the rohingyas back in the arakan state of myanmar, (ullah, 2011; azharudin & azlinariah, 2012; equal rights trust, 2014), the rohingyas persistently risk their lives crossing international borders in order to seek asylum in neighboring countries such as bangladesh, thailand and malaysia. in malaysia, the historical presence of the rohingyas could be traced as early as 1970s (kassim, 2015). other studies indicated that the first rohingyas arrival may be between late 1970s and early 1980s (letchamanan, 2015; irish centre for human rights, 2010). the rohingyas are only found in peninsular malaysia, mainly in the states such as kuala lumpur, selangor and penang (kassim, 2015, p. 183). for the new arrivals of rohingyas, they tend to live in an ambulatory lifestyle, moving from one place to another in search of employment or any income generating activities. a study published by the international rescue committee (irc) in 2012 showed that arrest and detention resulting from the lack of proper travel document among refugee population in malaysia is rampant journal of asean studies 107 (smith, 2012), and that inevitably lead the rohingyas to adjust their lifestyle, social participation and appearance in public areas. the presence of unhcr office in malaysia has not always been regarded as helpful by certain groups of refugee population in the country. while some refugees view unhcr as a source of help, others tend to consider them as being unhelpful and toothless to advocate the rights of refugees (wake & cheung, 2016). such views derived partly due to the lack of access among certain groups of refugees to many unhcr services and livelihood programs such as refugee registration, resettlement program, medical services, health insurance, community grant and educational opportunity. the existing social network such as the rohingyas’ cbos plays very important role to fill the protection gaps due to the limited role of the unhcr as well as the absence of the governmental protection. in general, the rohingyas’ cbos provide informal protection, livelihood support, shelter, lending or giving money and finding informal jobs for the rohingyas in malaysia (wake & cheung, 2016). however, such voluntary services often inadequate due to financial incapability, poor administration, lack of leadership and education among the rohingya community leaders and activists. the rohingyas participation in informal economy a total of 48 rohingya refugees and asylum seekers were surveyed between 2 january 2013 and 30 april 2013. 17 respondents (35.4%) are employed and self-employed in various sectors (refer table 1). however the vast majority, 31 respondents (64.6%) are unemployed. despite the availability of many employment and income-generating opportunities in urban and semi-urban areas, this study found high rate of unemployment among the rohingyas in klang valley. the study also found that the majority of the unemployed respondents are the new arrivals of rohingyas who arrived in malaysia between one and three years (between the years 2010 and 2012). as the new arrivals, these unemployed rohingya respondents hold neither unhcr card nor asylum claim letter, and have limited ability to speak local language, making it difficult for them to find employment. given the absence of the right to work among refugees in malaysia, the rohingyas participation in all types of occupation and sectors of economy (as shown in table 1) are considered to be ‚informal employment‛, making them liable to varying penalties under various domestic laws such as immigration act 1959/63, employment act 1995 and companies act 1965. however, often enforcement personnel turned a blind eye when they receive report or encounter with the rohingyas who are illegally working, or running their unauthorized businesses, while some other unscrupulous enforcement personnel would take the opportunity to extort them. it is generally observed that public awareness and sympathy among malaysian citizens towards the rohingya population in the country has been steadily growing recently. it may be due to the extensive media coverage concerning human rights exploitation facing rohingyas in myanmar, and the influx of the rohingya boat people in various countries in the region, including malaysia. 108 rethinking refugees as economically isolated on the aspect of income, there are two key observations can be made. first, there are two rohingya respondents (12%) inform that they have received monthly income between rm500 and rm1,000 (refer table 1). this suggests that despite having the opportunity to get employed, their monthly income has not reached the minimum wage as set by the government of malaysia in 2016 (rm1,000 per month or above). secondly, all self-employed rohingya respondents (eight respondents or 47% of the total 17 respondents) have received a monthly income of rm1,500 and above. this suggests that selfemployment offers relatively higher income, well beyond minimum wage in comparison to the employed rohingyas. for most of the employed rohingya respondents, their monthly income is determined by their hard work, willingness and ability to work overtime. for example, one rohingya respondent informs that his monthly income is determined based on how many extra working hours he works during regular days, and working overtime during public holidays (rafee, personal communication, 14 july, 2013). as a kitchen assistant in a malay-owned restaurant in kuala lumpur, rafee can easily receive between rm1,400 and rm1,500 a month. apart from income, informal employment of the rohingyas in malaysia has a symbiotic relationship with other critical issues. one of them is the irregular nature of their employment. this study found that all rohingya respondents who are employed (nine respondents) – are considered to be undocumented workers given the fact that they do not possess a legally recognized travel document and working permit as required under the immigration act 1959/63. the irregular nature of their employment leads to other labour rights issues such as the absence of social benefits, compensation and protection from any forms of labour exploitation. this study also found that there are rohingya respondents (two respondents) who are employed on a seasonal or temporary basis. for instance, one rohingya respondent who works as a general cleaner at kajang municipal council (selangor) is only hired when his service is required. this type of occupation often being temporary, and lasts for a short period (between six and twelve months). majority rohingya respondents also inform that they prefer to work at a place nearby their neighborhood. they work for 12 to 14 hours a day. some rohingya respondents inform that they work overtime without proper overtime pay given to them. in addition to that, there is no social protection provided including insurance coverage and compensation in any case of injury. despite the absence of academic and vocational (technical) certificates, some rohingya respondents inform that they are hired for technical positions in sectors such as automotive and construction. their capabilities in these technical positions are built upon self-learning or their previous working experiences either in malaysia, myanmar or any transit countries such as thailand and bangladesh. this study also uncovered that s o m e s e l f e m p l o y e d r o h i n g y a respondents are involved in unregulated income generating activities, which are not legally registered with the authorities s u c h a s c o m p a n i e s c o m m i s s i o n o f malaysia (ccm) and district council s, whose portfolios are dedicated to register and provide licenses to businesses to operate within their respective territory. journal of asean studies 109 table 1. type of occupation by sector, status of employment and estimated monthly income among rohingya respondents type of occupation respondents (no. / %) by sectors status of employment* no. of respondents according to their estimated monthly income rm500 rm1,000 rm1,001 rm1,500 rm1,501 rm2,000 rm2,001 & above grocery / wet market assistant 3 (18%) trade employee 1 2 food stall / restaurant assistant 3 (18%) trade employee 1 2 general cleaner 1 (6%) service employee 1 workshop worker (small scale) 1 (6%) automotive employee 1 community worker / teacher 1 (6%) service employee 1 grass cutter 2 (12%) service self-employed 1 1 recycle items collector 3 (18%) trade self-employed 1 1 1 subcontractor 1 (6%) construction self-employed 1 informal money transfer agent 1 (6%) trade self-employed 1 grocery trader 1 (6%) trade self-employed 1 sub-total 2 (12%) 9 (53%) 2 (12%) 4 (24%) total 17 respondents (100%) source: survey 2013 110 rethinking refugees as economically isolated this study also found that there are rohingya respondents who have been renting trading license from local traders. for instance, ahmad, a rohingya refugee informs that he runs a grocery trading, and pays about rm350 per month to a malay businessman who has kindly offered his trading license for him to run his grocery shop (ahmad, personal communication, 13 july, 2013). rohingya respondents also inform that many of them involve in small-scale income generating activities. to run these economic activities, they require start-up capital sufficient to start their business. in some cases, rohingya respondents manage to access microfinance facility offered by various non-governmental organizations – in order to start their economic activities. however, majority of them borrow money from relatives and friends. for rohingya respondents who have started their smallscale economic activities, they hire between two and five workers – mostly among the rohingya refugees themselves, or other refugee groups from myanmar such as burmese muslim, as well as members of other migrant communities (for example, indonesian migrant workers). apart from providing work opportunity to the rohingyas, and other groups of migrant community, the rohingya respondents who are selfemployed also offer their goods and services well beyond the needs for the rohingya community. in other words, their end-products and end-services are offered to a larger extent of consumers consisting of other migrant groups as well as local population. for example, ahmad sells his grocery items to migrant workers from indonesia and bangladesh, as well as the members of local community who are residing nearby their neighborhood at sri kembangan, selangor (ahmad, personal communication, 13 july, 2013). another rohingya respondent informs that he has been providing his grass cutting service to the members of local community mainly in the housing areas and government facilities such as schools and government buildings in various locations such as kajang, puchong and serdang in selangor (syawal, personal communication, 27 june, 2013). rohingyas participation in informal economy and their livelihood activities the previous section has discussed the participation of rohingya respondents in informal economy. this section analyzes the relationship between their active participation in informal economy and dayto-day livelihood. by referring to the broadbased livelihood framework as advocated by chambers and conway (1991), this study found that their active participation in informal economy has strengthened social interactions (remittances, access to education for their children, administrative activities and faith-based / welfare activities), influenced their ways of life (access to healthcare, formation of family), and increased contributions towards community development (entrepreneurship). remittances the active participation of the rohingya respondents in informal economy has enabled them to support the livelihood of their parents and family members who are still in the arakan state of myanmar or in transit countries such bangladesh and thailand through remittances. many journal of asean studies 111 rohingyas in malaysia still have their parents or siblings live in the arakan state of myanmar or in other transit countries such as thailand, bangladesh and saudi arabia. the ability to remit money to their parents means they are able to maintain such relationship by supporting their parents and family members’ daily expenditure, schooling of their children and healthcare treatment. muhamad kasim, a rohingya respondent informs that he usually remits about rm5,000 on average every year, in one or two transactions (muhamad kasim, personal communication, 22 february, 2013). the money he remits will be used by his parents to purchase daily needs, medical and livestock. muhamad kasim notes that rm2,500 is sufficient to maintain his parents’ annual expenditure, unless there is a case of emergency that requires additional financial support. sending money back home is relatively safe. a few options that the rohingyas can choose to send money back home. these include remittance through informal money transfer agents (individuals), formal banking institutions (such as aya bank) and money transfer through non-banking institutions such as western union (rafique, personal communication, 23-25 july, 2016). access to education income received by the rohingya respondents has enabled them to support and maintain the informal education of their children. all refugee children in malaysia including the rohingyas are not eligible to enter formal schooling due to administrative restriction. as of january 2015, there were a total of 126 informal learning centers across peninsula malaysia (unicef, 2015). a total of 31 learning centers were dedicated for rohingya children with minimal cost of educational fee between rm20 and rm50 for each rohingya child per month. most rohingya parents send their children to rohingyas learning centers located nearby to their neighborhood for many reasons. among them is to reduce transportation cost. for rohingya parents who have more than one child, they would have to bear more educational cost for their children such as school fees, transportation, foods and other educational learning materials. according to rafique, some rohingya children has dropped out from attending learning centers after a few years of learning because parents lost their job and subsequently unable to cover the cost of their children education (rafique, personal communication, 23-25 july, 2016). hence, wages or any forms of income received by the rohingya parents are pivotal to ensure they are able to support and maintain the educational expenditure for their children in malaysia. administrative activities income received by the rohingya respondents is also used to cover their administrative expenditures in dealing with unhcr office in kuala lumpur, as well as other administrative matters with government agencies such as immigration department and royal malaysian police (rmp). generally, the rohingyas in malaysia are expected to cover the cost of various administrative matters such as registration of refugee status and interview for resettlement – which require more than one-time walk-in (physical visit) to the unhcr office in bukit petaling, kuala 112 rethinking refugees as economically isolated lumpur. however, most rohingyas in klang valley reside at the outskirt of kuala lumpur and selangor – and hence require substantive transportation costs to enable them to travel to the city center where unhcr office is located. in addition to the physical visit to unhcr office in kuala lumpur, some rohingya respondents use email and fax to apply refugee status (aslam, personal communication, 25 july, 2016). this can be done before or after their physical visit to unhcr office. if their refugee status application is not responded by the unhcr office, the rohingyas will usually bring the matter up to the attention of local ngos – majority of which are also located geographically far-off from many rohingya neighborhoods. this would require further transportation and communication costs for the rohingyas to reach out to these ngos. for the rohingya respondents who are requested for a walk-in interview at the unhcr office – as part of their resettlement requirement, they are also expected to cover their own travel expenditures to kuala lumpur city center. these expenditures are varied from one refugee to another, depending on where they are temporarily residing, their period of resettlement interview and attendance for physical resettlement courses – for which require their frequent visit to unhcr office in kuala lumpur. faith-based and welfare activities income received by the rohingya respondents is also used to enable them to participate and contribute in various faithbased and welfare activities. the rohingyas in malaysia are an active community, engaging in various types of faith-based, welfare and community activities. these activities are often organized by, and within the rohingya community itself, or in partnership with local ngos and community. the rohingyas participation in these activities would enable them to contribute to the community development and empowerment through religiousrelated events, social innovation and livelihood programs. they also utilize the same platforms to contribute financially to the rohingya community in malaysia, and in the arakan state of myanmar (rafique, personal communication, 23-25 july, 2016). some rohingya respondents take the advantage of these gatherings to share information on current issues in myanmar, expand their network and strengthen solidarity among themselves. to meaningfully contribute in these activities, the rohingyas are expected to contribute financially to the rohingyas’ cbos, community leaders or representatives for community development and welfare purposes. a rohingya respondent notes that every each rohingya in malaysia has the social responsibility, and therefore is encouraged to contribute in the creation of emergency fund for the rohingyas in the arakan state of myanmar (jamal, personal communication, 29 july, 2016). individual rohingyas are also encouraged to contribute financially to any development programs for rohingyas in malaysia in order to reduce dependency to local and international ngos to support their livelihoods in the country. hence, employment and self-employment in informal sector is pivotal in ensuring continuous contribution of the rohingyas to journal of asean studies 113 support the community development in malaysia, and their fellow rohingyas who are still trapped in poverty and human rights persecutions back in the arakan state of myanmar. access to healthcare the rohingyas active participation in informal economy has enabled them to purchase basic medicals and access healthcare treatment. accessing healthcare treatment at government premises such as general hospitals and government clinics requires proper documentation such as unhcr card or valid passport. unable to show their unhcr card or any other travel documents, rohingyas may be denied to access any form of healthcare treatment at government facilities. unlike government facilities, accessing private healthcare treatment is relatively easy for rohingyas, even without proper travel documents on the basis of ‚everyone has the right to healthcare‛. however, most rohingyas are financially incapable to access healthcare treatment from private institutions due to the higher costs of healthcare treatment at private health institutions. in 2013, the ministry of health (moh), malaysia released a circular indicating that all registered refugees with unhcr including the rohingyas are given 50% discount of healthcare treatment fee from the total fee imposed to non-nationals (http://www2.moh.gov.my/circulars). in the same circular, all refugees including the rohingyas are also given the privilege to access healthcare treatment for free, but not more than rm400 (or us$ 100). however, in this case, rohingyas are required to get permission and official letter from the unhcr prior to their visit to any government health facilities. for rohingya asylum seekers who have yet to get their refugee status from the unhcr, they are required to pay similar fee imposed to nonnationals. hence, wages and any form of income received by the rohingya respondents are important to enable them to access healthcare treatment mainly at government facilities. formation of family/marriage income received by the rohingya respondents is also pivotal to enable them to form a family through marriage especially for the rohingya males. according to kassim (kassim, 2015, p. 188), marriage among the rohingyas is a necessary union for rohingya adult, men and women, preventing them from immoral activities and sexual misadventure. many rohingyas prefer to marry within their own ethnic group especially between members of a kinship originated from the same village or districts (rafique, personal communication, 23-25 july, 2016). however, due to the lack of rohingya females in malaysia, some rohingyas are forced to spend huge amount of money in order to bring their future wife from the arakan state of myanmar, often through pre-arranged marriage by their respective family. the amount of money spent to bring a future wife from myanmar to malaysia may reach to rm20,000 (kassim, 2015, p. 188). hence, rohingyas who intend to marry rohingya women from myanmar have to work harder, undertaking more than one job at one time – in order to raise money for his marriage. worth noting that despite the ability to form a family, the rohingyas cannot http://www2.moh.gov.my/circulars 114 rethinking refugees as economically isolated register their marriage in any relevant government agencies including the religious department in malaysia. in other words, their marriage is not officially recognized by the government of malaysia. most often, rohingyas approach their respective community leaders and religious heads to proceed with their marriage, and hence issued with a marriage certificate by the rohingya community. entrepreneurship many rohingyas in malaysia aspire to be entrepreneurs. it is in their blood, and they are talented, according to a rohingya community leader (rafique, personal communication, 23-25 july, 2016). however, not all rohingyas are capable to achieve their dream to be an entrepreneur. certainly, to become entrepreneurs, these individual rohingyas need to have sufficient knowledge, skills and financial ability to enable them to run and maintain their business. in many cases, rohingya entrepreneurs (respondents) begin by working informally in various informal sectors – to enable them to keep money as start-up capital, gain experience and a variety of skills such as the ability to speak local language, determine business opportunities and create relationship with the members of the local community, before running their own business. according to rafique, the rohingyas usually think and act as entrepreneurs naturally (rafique, personal communication, 23-25 july, 2016). they have the ability to communicate the local language very well, build relationship with local people and know how to negotiate and to take advantage of any business opportunities mainly in their neighborhood. rafique adds that the good relationship between the rohingyas and the local community such as the head of villagers or members of local committees would enable them to set up and run their small businesses in the neighborhood, without much disruption by the local authority. another rohingya respondent notes that changing a career from an employee in informal sector to become an entrepreneur requires financial capability, at least an amount of start-up capital, sufficient to set up and run his business (mohd karim, personal communication, 23 february 2013). according to mohd karim, he starts his recycling business with a rm2,000 start-up capital. the start-up capital is important to enable him to buy a used motorcycle from a local teacher – whom he works closely for a community project at his neighborhood. the motorcycle is an essential asset to enable him to transport his recycling items from various locations to recycling centers. mohd karim settlings in malaysia for more than 10 years, fluent in local malay language and has good relationship with the local community mainly the head of villagers, government servants and businessmen – that collectively facilitate his business activities at his neighborhood. another rohingya respondent opens his grocery trading, with a limited start-up capital of rm3,000 in 2009 (ahmad, personal communication, 23 february 2013). in order to run a grocery trading, ahmad rents a trading license and a shop lot from a local businessman in kajang, selangor. other than the rohingyas themselves, local people from nearby neighborhood are also buying daily groceries from ahmad’s shop. therefore, it is important for ahmad to journal of asean studies 115 speak local language fluently, and build good relationship with their customers. to briefly conclude, these livelihood activities are the result of their active participation in informal economy. this study does not argue that the rohingya refugees who are unable to participate in any informal economy, would unlikely to undertake these livelihood activities. but their participation is certainly limited. additionally, this study concludes that these livelihood activities are complementary in nature, or else interlinked in a domino effect. for instance, a rohingya who wants to be an entrepreneur would need a combined knowledge and skills (as their capability) and capital (as an asset) in order to start his business. this situation fits into the broadbased livelihood framework as suggested by chambers and conway (1991) earlier in this study. conclusion the inability of the majority of the rohingya respondents to participate in informal economy is due to many factors. this includes the absence of their right to employment, lack of knowledge, skills and social interaction, as well as their migration history (for example, the rohingyas new arrivals). however, there are groups of rohingya respondents who are able to participate in informal economy, undertaking various types of occupation and income generating activities – albeit risks of legal repercussion. this study reiterates the key findings of this study that their active participation in informal economy has enabled them to pursue their various livelihood activities such sending remittances; access to education; administrative activities; faith-based and welfare activities; access to healthcare; formation of family; and entrepreneurship. these activities have collectively strengthened their social interactions, influenced their ways of life, and increased their contribution towards community development. their active participation in informal economy also suggests that these rohingya respondents are making effort to be independent, or to be less dependent on assistance from the hosting government and international organizations such as the unhcr in order to pursue their livelihood activities. this indirectly debunks the misconception that the rohingya population in malaysia is physically and economically isolated from domestic economic structure. although the rohingyas are still squeezed into communal settlements, their participation in informal economy has benefited communities beyond their very own. this also suggests that their economic contribution goes beyond safeguarding their own livelihood, but to a larger extent, domestic economy and hosting community. hence, the rohingyas can be seen as an active population that value adds to the domestic economic development as well as to meet the communal market demands. about the author andika ab. wahab is currently a project leader of business and human rights at the forest trust (tft), kuala lumpur, malaysia. he is entrusted to lead several business and human rights compliance initiatives with multinational corporations in the palm oil industry. he is also a doctoral graduate from the national 116 rethinking refugees as economically isolated university of malaysia (ukm), majoring in asean and human security studies, with particular research interest on transnational movement of migrants, and labor rights and mobility. references azharudin, m. d. & azlinariah, a. (2012). air mata kesengsaraan rohingya: identiti, penindasan dan pelarian. kuala lumpur: inteam publishing. chambers, r. & conway, g. r. (1992). sustainable rural livelihoods: practical concepts for the 21st century. retrieved from http://www.ids.ac.uk/publication/sustai nable-rural-livelihoods-practicalconcepts-for-the-21st-century. community links & the refugee council. (2011). understanding the informal economic activity of refugees in london. retrieved from http://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/asset s/0001/7060/gla_report.pdf. crisp, j. (2003). no solutions in sight: the problem of protracted refugee situations in africa. working paper (75) of the new issues in refugee research, unhcr, geneva. de vriese, m. (2006). refugee livelihoods: a review of the evidence. policy paper submitted to the unhcr, evaluation and policy analysis unit. retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/4423fe5d2.pdf. equal rights trust. (2014). equal only in name: the human rights of stateless rohingya in malaysia. retrieved from http://www.equalrightstrust.org/ertdoc umentbank/equal%20only%20in%20na me%20-%20malaysia%20%20full%20report.pdf. federal government of malaysia. (1957/63). immigration act (act 155), putrajaya: government of malaysia. hoffstaedter, g. (2016). is working legally a win-win for refugees in malaysia? pilot scheme a step in the right direction. retrieved from http://www.policyforum.net/workinglegally-win-win-refugees-malaysia/. horst, c. 2001. vital links in social security: somali refugees in the daadab camps, kenya. working paper (38) of the new issues in refugee research, unhcr, geneva. hussmanns, r. 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(2015). informal economy. retrieved from http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/emplo yment-promotion/informaleconomy/lang--en/index.htm. irish centre for human rights centre. (2010). crimes against humanity of arakan rohingya. retrieved from http://www.nuigalway.ie/irish-centrehuman-rights/. jacobsen, k. 2002. livelihoods in conflict. the pursuit of livelihoods by refugees and the impact on the human security of host communities. expert working paper (february), for the center for development research study: migration development links: evidence and policy options. jamal, a. 2000. minimum standards and essential needs in a protracted refugee situation. a review paper of the unhcr programme in kakuma, kenya submitted to epau evaluation report epau/2000/05, unhcr, geneva. kassim, a. (2015). transnational marriages among muslim refugees and their implications on their status and identity – the case of the rohingyas in malaysia. in tokoro, ikuya (ed.), islam and cultural diversity in southeast asia (pp. 175-202). tokyo: institute for languages and cultures of asia and africa (ilcaa). letchamanan, h. (2015). myanmar’s rohingya refugees in malaysia: education and the way forward. journal of international and comparative education 2(2): 86-97. sebba, k. r. 2005. land conflicts and their on refugee women’s livelihood in uganda. paper submitted for the international association for the study of forced migration conference held in sao paolo, brazil 9-13 january 2005. smith, a. (2012). in search of survival and sanctuary in the city: refugees from myanmar / burma in kuala lumpur, malaysia. bangkok, thailand: international rescue committee. ullah, a. a. (2011). rohingya refugees to bangladesh: historical exclusions and contemporary marginalization. journal of immigrant & refugee studies (9): 139161. united nations children’s fund (unicef). (2015). mapping alternative learning approaches, programs and stakeholders in malaysia. retrieved from http://www.unicef.org/malaysia/mappi ng_alternative_learning_report.pdf. united nations development program. (2013). malaysia human development report: redesigning an inclusive future. kuala lumpur: undp-malaysia. united nations high commissioner for refugees. (2016). statistical yearbook. retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c4 d6.html. http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/employment-promotion/informal-economy/lang--en/index.htm http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/employment-promotion/informal-economy/lang--en/index.htm http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/employment-promotion/informal-economy/lang--en/index.htm http://www.nuigalway.ie/irish-centre-human-rights/ http://www.nuigalway.ie/irish-centre-human-rights/ http://www.unicef.org/malaysia/mapping_alternative_learning_report.pdf http://www.unicef.org/malaysia/mapping_alternative_learning_report.pdf http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c4d6.html http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c4d6.html 118 rethinking refugees as economically isolated united nations. (1951/67). convention and protocol relating to the status of refugees, general assembly resolution 2198 (xxi), new york: united nations. wake, c. & cheung, t. 2016. livelihood strategies of rohingya refugees in malaysia: we want to live in dignity. humanitarian policy group working paper. retrieved from https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/file s/resource-documents/10649.pdf. https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/10649.pdf https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/10649.pdf journal of asean studies, vol. 2, no. 2 (2014), pp. 8-102 ©2014 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn2338-1353 electronic the importance of microfinance for development of msmes in asean: evidence from indonesia tulus tambunan trisakti university, indonesia abstract despite studies on microfinance (mf) or development of microfinance institutions (mfis) in asia developing countries, including countries as member states of the association of southeast asian nation (asean), are growing, not so much attention have been given to the role of mf in financing micro, small and medium enterprises (msmes). based on a key literature study and analysis of secondary/national data, the main aim of this study is to fill this gap. it shows that in many asean member states (ams) mf has developed to some significant degree, although the rate of growth (e.g. number of mfis, number of depositors and debtors, total loans allocated, etc.) as well as the market structure of mf vary across member states. from the indonesian case this study comes with two most interesting facts. first, majority of msmes do not have access to credit from banks and/or other formal nonbank financial institutions. second, mf services or mfis are growing fast, and the most popular mf program so far is kredit usaha rakyat (kur), or people business credit (i.e. a credit scheme without collateral), introduced during the sby period. keywords: mf, mfis, indonesia, msmes, kur, asean introduction microfinance (mf) is the provision of small-sized financial services to the poor or the low-income parts of the population and their business activities, mainly in micro, small and medium enterprises (msmes). although there is no standardized number to define different ‚micro‛ products in quantification, in its broadest sense, it covers a whole range of low value financial products, including savings, credit, insurance, transfer and payments services (wsbi, 2008). in asian developing countries, institutions providing mf services or microfinance institutions (mfis) can be categorized as: (i) formal mfis, as those subject not only to general laws and regulations, but also to banking regulation and supervision; (ii) semi-formal mfis, those that are formal as registered entities subject to all relevant general laws, including commercial laws, but informal insofar as they are, with few exceptions, not under banking regulation and supervision, such as financial non-governmental organizations (ngos), credit unions and cooperatives; and (iii) informal providers (generally not referred to as institutions), those to which neither special banking law nor general commercial law applies such as private lenders (www.cgap.org/p/site/c/template.rc/1.26.130 8). even, lapeneu and zeller (2001) ever 81 journal of asean studies conclude that the region is the most developed part of the world in terms of volume of mfi activities. their conclusion is based on their analysis of over 1,500 institutions from 85 developing countries. comparing mfis in asia with those in africa and latin america, they found that asia accounted for the majority of mfis, retained the highest volume of savings and credit, and served more members than any other continent. in some asean (association of southeast asian nations) member states (ams) e.g. indonesia, thailand, cambodia, lao pdr, viet nam, the philippines and myanmar, mf has been playing an important role; it has been long focused on serving the poor households and msmes. in these countries, as in the developing world in general, mf is often seen as an effective instrument to help low-income households take advantage of economic opportunities and improve living standards, or to reduce poverty. in indonesia, as msmes in general lack of access to credits, development of mfis has been seriously supported by the government to provide loans to these enterprises, particularly microenterprises (mies). within asean, lapeneu and zeller (2001) found that the largest number of members served by mfis and the largest loans distributed by and mobilization of savings through mfis in terms of gross national product (gnp) were in indonesia, thailand and viet nam. despite studies on mf or development of mfis in asia developing countries including in ams (except singapore) are growing, not so much attention have been given to the role of mf in financing msmes. most of available studies do not make a distinction between loans for households and those received by msmes. to fill this gap, the purpose of this study is to examine the importance of mf in financing msmes in indonesia. theoretically, the results in this study will be a starting point for more comparisons studies of the importance of mf in supporting msmes in the asean region. it will also assist policy makers in the region in supporting capacity building of mfis, which in turn it will help to increase the role of mfis in financing msmes in the asean region. this study only utilizes the available data on total credits received by msmes from commercial banks instead of the exact share of total allocated microcredit/mf that went to msmes. . msms and mf in asean in brief msmes historically, msmes have always been the main players in domestic economic activities in asean. as can be seen in table 1, in indonesia, the largest economy in the region, the latest statistics indicate that msmes constituted almost 100% of total business establishments, and contributed about 58.17% of the country's gross domestic product (gdp) and 99% of total employment, mostly women and youth. the majority of msmes are from the category of microenterprises (mies), dominated by self-employment (or own account) enterprises without wage-paid workers. in malaysia, the enterprises constituted 99.2% of total firms and 59% of total workforce, and the enterprises shared around 32% of malaysian gdp. in the philippines, msmes accounted for about 99.6% of total registered businesses, through which 63% of labor force in the country earned a living. around 35.7% of total sales and value-add in manufacturing also came from these enterprises, and they 82 the importance of microfinance for development of msmes in asean contributed around 32% of the country's total aggregate output. in thailand, the total number of enterprises at the end of 2010 was 2,924,912, of which 2,894,780 were micro and small enterprises (mses) and 18,387 mes giving a number of 2,913,167 msmes in total – accounting for 99.6% of all enterprises. the gdp value of msmes was 3,746,967 million baht in 2010 or 37.1% of the country’s gdp. as concerns employment, in 2010 the number of people employed by enterprises of all sizes totaled 13,496,173. of this number, large enterprises (les) employed 2,988,581 people and msmes 10,507,507 people, or 77.86% of overall employment. in vietnam, in 2002 there were 2,718,000 msmes from total business establishments of 2,720,000, and they had 6,483,000 workers, or about 77.3% of total employment in that year. the enterprises contributed to around 39% of the country's gdp. in lao pdr, among the least-developed member states of asean, private sector dominates the country's economy, namely around 99% of total existing enterprises and approximately 94% of total employment. there were 306 mses and 64 mes, compared to only 20 les. in cambodia, an estimated 40% to 50% of total employment can be attributed to these enterprises. the role of cambodian msmes in the private sector and economic development has become more important after the government adopted its new economic system, from a planned economy to a market economy, in the early 1990s. in brunei darussalam, the richest member state, most recent information about msmes from the department of economic planning and development estimates these enterprises constitute around 98% of all business establishments, and contributed approximately 92% to total employment in the country. in singapore, the smallest sized member state, these enterprises are estimated to account for more than 90% of all enterprises and their gdp contribution is estimated to be around 60%. finally, in myanmar, another member state with as yet a very low level of economic development, there is only official data about msmes' share in total employment, estimated at around 96%. table 1 msmes’ contributions to total enterprises, employment and gdp in asean by member state, most recent data (%) indon esia malays ia the philipp ines thailand vietna m lao pdr cambod ia brun ei singapo re myanm ar number of unit 99.9 99.2 99.6 99.6 99.9 99.98 99.0 98.5 99.0 96.0 employ ment 99.0 59.0 63.0 77.9 77.3 99.0 50.0 98.0 51.8 n.a gdp 58.2 32.0 32.0 31.7 39.0 69.0 76.7 68.4 60.0 n.a note: n.a = data not available sources: data/information collected from goh (2007); adb (2009); un-escap (2009); tambunan (2009a,b); indonesian ministry for cooperative and sme (menegkop & ukm: www.depkop.go.id); indonesian national agency of statistics (bps: www.bps.go.id); national sme development council (2011); department of trade and industry philippines (http://www.dti.gov.ph/dti/ index.php?p=321); osmep (2010); ifc (2010), asmed business portal, enterprise development agency, ministry of planning and investment viet nam 83 journal of asean studies (http://www.business.gov.vn/asmed.aspx?id=3040); souvannavong (2006), meas (2004), brudirect.com (http://www.bruneidirecthys.net/about_brunei/small_medium.html), spring singapore (http://www.spring.gov.sg/aboutus/pi/pages/performance-indicators.aspx), harvie and lee (2002), ministry of industry myanmar (http://www.myanmarindustry2.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&i d=70&lang=en), walsh and southiseng (2011), tham (2009a,b), asean (2011), win (2012), and mpi (2011). mf in many ams, microfinance has developed to some significant degree although the rates of growth (e.g. the number of mfis, the number of depositors and debtors, total loans allocated, etc.) as well as the market structure of mf vary across member states, depending on many local factors. the most important ones among those factors are the stage of financial development (including the importance of informal financial institutions and the access of people to formal conventional financial institutions), the level of economic development (including level of industrialization), level of urbanization, level of per capita income, the balance between private and public involvement in the development process of mf or mfis, and the incidence of poverty. the considerable diversity between member states in the degree to which systems of mf have emerged and in the institutional forms developed or adopted to them is also strongly related to national policy environment, especially policy towards mf. in some member states, e.g. indonesia and thailand, development of mf is an integral part of development of their national financial sectors or system. in both countries, government financial institutions have primary responsibility for mf. in indonesia and the philippines, as they are still facing a serious problem of poverty, mf is also an important element of their poverty alleviation strategies and msmes development policies. the difference in policy environment towards mf has resulted in different levels of participation of ngos in acting as mf service providers. in the philippines, mf has followed a more conventional course, based primarily on the energies of a burgeoning ngo community. especially the influence of grameen bank methods of mf service delivery has been very strong in that ngo community. although the government has a regulatory environment favorable to the operation of small regulated banks suitable for mf, the role of ngos has been encouraged to develop sustainable mf programs, and is beginning to promote the transformation of successful mf ngos into regulated financial institutions. while indonesia has adopted a model of mf service provision based very largely on the operations of regulated financial institutions, whereas ngos are of relatively limited significance. however, as will be discussed later on, indonesia also has some mass microcredit programs involving ngos and other community organizations [especially in the late new order (soeharto) era] which were politically-driven and not at all concerned with sustainability (conroy, 2003). unfortunately, recent literature on mf or development of mfis so far is only available for certain member states. therefore, this section on mf in asean only deals with these member states only, beside indonesia as the case study (to be discussed in the next section), namely malaysia, thailand and the philippines. in malaysia, for instance, as the country has 84 the importance of microfinance for development of msmes in asean considerably higher level of income per capita than either indonesia or the philippines, absolute poverty is regarded as a residual and diminishing problem which could be eliminated early in this current century. hence, mf services for people without access to conventional financial institutions have been seen within the framework of a redistributive social policy involving substantial subsidies (conroy, 2003). this country has a modern financial system with a diverse range of institutions, both private and public, including islamic banks. public institutions include development financing institutions, i.e. a development bank and an agriculture bank, as well as the credit guarantee corporation (cgc) which provides guarantees on lending by other financial institutions to msmes. at the lower end cgc has a credit guarantee scheme for hawkers and petty traders, but loan sizes for this scheme suggest it is operating at a level somewhat above conventional mf. there are also urban as well as rural credit cooperatives. essentially the only institutions engaging in mf are drawn from the ngo community, where there is one dominant mfi and a handful of minor operators (conroy, 2003). the most dominant mfi in malaysia until recently was amanah ikhtiar malaysia (aim), which was established in 1987. up to 1998 it made some 103,000 loans and disbursed a total of rm 328 million (approximately us$86 million). some 80% or more of all funds loaned were for economic purposes, the remainder for ‘social’ purposes such as healthcare and education (sukor kasim 2000). in thailand, as it is a relatively prosperous economy and has comparatively minor poverty problems (thai poverty is concentrated only in certain regions), mf is much less popular than in indonesia and the philippines (meyer and nagarajan 2000). thailand does not have specialized mf services. probably another important reason is the large outreach achieved by the state agricultural bank, i.e. bank for agriculture and agricultural cooperative (baac), with having reduced the need for specialized mfis. baac established in 1966 is the principal formal financial institution of relevance to low-income rural people in thailand (muraki, at al., 1998). cash and inkind transfer payments support the poor in affected regions, and the availability of government credit schemes may also explain the less popular microfinance in thailand (conroy 2003). nevertheless, as in other countries, there are various key players in mf in the country which can be categorized into formal and informal mfis. from the formal category: commercial banks, and government-owned specialized financial institutions (i.e. government saving bank (gsb), baac, sme development bank, and government housing bank (ghb). in the semi-formal category: cooperatives and credit union; and village and urban community fund. whereas, in the informal sector are independent and self-help community saving groups (boonlonlear, 2010). in the philippines, mf has followed a more conventional course, based primarily on the energies of a burgeoning ngo community. as non deposit-taking institutions, ngos are not subject to any prudential regulation. mf ngos, nonetheless, are required to register and submit annual financial reports to securities and exchange commission (sec). besides mf ngos, rural banks, thrift banks and credit unions or cooperatives banks are also engaged in mf operations under the supervision of the central bank of philippines. cooperatives with savings and credit services are also an important category of mfi in the country. in 2006, the 85 journal of asean studies policy action taken in the mf development program further required ngos to disclose to sec that they are engaged in the delivery of mf services (adb, 2012). like in indonesia, commercial banks in the philippines have had limited engagement with mf; only governmentowned financial institutions have had any substantial involvement. the development bank of the philippines, the land bank and the people's credit and finance corporation (pcfc) have provided wholesale loans to all the three categories of mfis for on-lending to mf clients (conroy 2003). although, the country can be considered as the most important country within asean with respect to the role of ngos in providing mf services, the rural banks appear not only to deal with somewhat higher-income clients but also to make larger loans than the ngos. however, the role of ngos has been encouraged by the government to develop sustainable mf programs, and is beginning to promote the transformation of successful mf ngos into regulated financial institutions. differently than in indonesia and malaysia, the influence of grameen bank methods of mf service delivery has been very strong in the philippines, especially in ngo community many of the ngos have adopted variants of the grameen bank model. most mf ngos are financed by foreign donors, or by domestic philanthropists or foundations (llanto, 2000, 2001; conroy, 2003). in cambodia, mf has grown rapidly over the last ten years, expanding from just us$ 3 million of outstanding loans and 50,000 borrowers in 1995, to a remarkable us$ 732 million and 1,197,722 borrowers in 2012 (liv, 2013). in the same year, a total of 54,653 poor families were supported by mfis and 58,551 individuals were granted micro credits. many mfis also provided training courses, and according to the same information source in that year 28,789 attendances at training courses (http://www.entrepreneursdumonde. org/en/nos-actions/nos-partenaires locaux/chamroeun/?gclid=cpsbwjgno78c fvu mjgodkq0azw). the country has successfully professionalized as one of the leading mf in asean (liv, 2013). as of january 2013, there are 33 operating mfi. among these, the most important ones are including amret mfi (amret), angkor mikroheranhvatho (kampuchea) co. ltd (amk), angkor ace star credits limited (angkor ace), cambodian business integrated in rural development agency (cbird), cambodia rural economic development initiatives for transformation (credit), farmer finance ltd (farmerfinance), farmer union development fund (fudf), green central mf (green), prime mfi ltd (prime), samrithisak mf limited (samrithisak), and sonatra mfi (sonatra) (http://mpsinfo. wordpress.com/2011/10/26/banks-and-mfisin-cambodia/). there are claims, however, that mfis in the country might be nearing saturation. concerns have been raised that the possibility of over-indebtedness among borrowers could undermine the social mission and the sustained healthy development of mfis (liv, 2013). in lao pdr, mf was introduced in the form of rice and livestock banks in the late 1980s. the first formal regulation of credit cooperatives was issued by bank of lao pdr (bol) in 1994. two of the credit cooperatives from this era survive today (mingboupha, 2010).although still in its infancy, mf is gaining momentum. starting from just three providers in early 2004, since then 13 new licensed mf providers have been created, totaling 16 formal mfis as of 2010. bol has licensed 5 mfis and 11 http://cma-network.org/drupal/amret http://cma-network.org/drupal/amk http://cma-network.org/drupal/amk http://cma-network.org/drupal/amk http://cma-network.org/drupal/angkorace http://cma-network.org/drupal/angkorace http://cma-network.org/drupal/angkorace http://cma-network.org/drupal/cbird http://cma-network.org/drupal/cbird http://cma-network.org/drupal/credit http://cma-network.org/drupal/credit http://cma-network.org/drupal/credit http://cma-network.org/drupal/credit http://cma-network.org/drupal/farmer http://cma-network.org/drupal/farmer http://cma-network.org/drupal/farmer http://cma-network.org/drupal/fudf http://cma-network.org/drupal/fudf http://cma-network.org/drupal/fudf http://cma-network.org/drupal/gcmf http://cma-network.org/drupal/gcmf http://cma-network.org/drupal/gcmf http://cma-network.org/drupal/prime http://cma-network.org/drupal/samrithisak http://cma-network.org/drupal/sonatra 86 the importance of microfinance for development of msmes in asean savings and credit unions to take deposits. up to recently, 5,000 semiformal village based and managed loan funds have been created. of those semi-formal providers, so far eight (8) have registered with the bol. the prime minister’s office (pmo) has explicitly mandated bol to regulate and monitor activities of mf in the country (fdc, 2010). demand for mf services in the country is immense. recent figures which are available show that rural households, which make up 80% of all households and 90% of poor households in lao pdr, demanded for credit amounted to us$500 million. whereas, mf providers serviced a combined total of a mere 6.5% of the population between 15 and 64 years old, and reached about 46% of all villages (fdc, 2010). in myanmar, mf is widely seen as a key development tool to promote financial inclusion and alleviate poverty. while cooperatives have existed in country since the early 20th century, mf was first introduced to myanmar in 1997 by undp’s human development initiative. in november 2011, the government passed the new mf law, paving the way for expansion of mf services by allowing local and foreign investors to establish wholly privately owned mfis in country. there are six kinds of providers of mf services in myanmar: 1) informal and semi-formal institutions; 2) banks; 3) cooperatives; 4) ngos; 5) specialized agricultural development companies; and 6) government organizations. based on the limited data available, duflosm, et al. (2013) have estimated that current mf outreach is 2.8 million micro-clients, with a total loan portfolio of 236 billion kyats (us$283 million). relative to the enormous demand, there are few institutions that provide mf services that have the potential to reach a large scale while providing their services in a financially sustainable and responsible way. state-owned banks, such as myanmar economic bank (meb) and myanmar agriculture development bank (madb), have a large outreach. madb provided deposit and credit to more than 1.4 million people in rural areas, but on a subsidized basis. private banks are not involved in mf, partly for regulatory reasons and partly because of a lack of interest. in vietnam, mf has its roots in government social protection measures for the poor. because the vast majority of the poor population lives in rural areas, mf has traditionally been interpreted as the market for financial services for rural households. micro-credit in particular has been interpreted as the provision of subsidized credit facilities for the poor, and quantitative ‘coverage targets’ has been promoted in response to a perceived unmet demand for credit among the rural poor. vietnam currently has 52 mfis offering microloans and other services to the impoverished. of the 52 mfis, as of 2011, only one is officially licensed by the government. however, the vietnamese mf market is characterized by the dominance in scale and depth by three formal providers: (i) the state-owned viet nam bank for agriculture and rural development (vbard or agribank), which is the largest bank in the country and by far the largest provider of the full range of financial services in rural viet nam; (ii) viet nam bank for social policy (vbsp) which was reconstituted in 2002 from the viet nam bank for the poor, and has a nationwide network, and partly subsidized by local people’s committees; and (iii) 984 people’s credit funds (bwtp, 2008). indonesian case 87 journal of asean studies development of credit for msmes total number of msmes in indonesia is growing every year. in 2012, their share in total enterprises (including large enterprises/les) was around 99%. the majority of them are from the micro and small enterprises (mse) category, which are scattered widely throughout rural areas. most mses are undertaken or set up by poor households or individuals who could not find better job elsewhere, either as their primary or secondary (supplementary) source of income. the majority of msmes are engaged in agricultural activities. within the msmes, mses are mostly agricultural-based compared to mes. the second important sector for msmes is trade, hotel and restaurants. indonesian msmes also share the same feature as msmes in other ams or in developing countries in general which is only a small percentage of the enterprises have ever obtained credits from banks or other non-bank formal financial institutions. for instance, the majority of mses in the manufacturing industry financed their operations 100% by themselves; although the ratio varies by group of industry. from those who financed their businesses also or fully from outside sources, only few borrowed money from banks (table 2). table 2. percentage of total mses in manufacturing industry by source of capital and group of industry in indonesia, 2010 group of industry total unit source of capital (% of total unit) 100% own partly own 100% outside sources. food beverages processed tobacco textile garment leather & its products, including footwear wood & its products (not including furniture) & handicraft paper & its products publishing & recording media reproduction chemical & its products pharmacy, chemical medical products & traditional medicine rubber & plastic & their products excavated non metal products basic metal metal products non-machinery and its tools computer, electronic goods and optics electrical tools machineries and their tools vehicles, trailer and semi-trailer 929910 30395 53169 234657 276548 32910 639106 7268 24305 19168 5043 13786 215558 1553 61731 434 199 1540 3488 4708 0.83 0.91 0.57 0.76 0.74 0.57 0.87 0.41 0.698 0.75 0.93 0.58 0.72 0.57 0.75 0.98 0.61 0.53 0.99 0.75 0.15 0.08 0.41 0.16 0.22 0.38 0.098 0.39 0.28 0.19 0.05 0.22 0.25 0.42 0.23 0.02 0.39 0.34 0.01 0.21 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.2 0.22 0.06 0.02 0.2 0.03 0.01 0.02 0 0 0.13 0.0014 0.04 88 the importance of microfinance for development of msmes in asean other transportation tools furniture other manufactures repairs services & machines and their tools installation total 107166 62898 7184 2732 724 0.73 0.75 0.86 0.795 0.24 0.2 0.139 0.1696 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.035 source: bps (2010) this fact is consistent with findings from the financial service survey by the international monetary fund (imf) which shows that in 2011 total outstanding loans from commercial banks was 29.64% of indonesia's total gdp, while that of msmes in the same period was only 6.17%. in 2012 the ratio was 32.85% against 6.39% (financial services survey, imf 2012; http://fas.imf.org/). it is also consistent with the 2009 enterprise survey by the world bank and international finance corporation (kushnir, et al., 2010), suggesting a positive relationship between the size of firm and the percentage of firms having bank loans. next, figure 1 presents the trend of development of msmes credit (mainly for working capital and investment) by commercial banks in indonesia overtime, and table 3 provides data on msmes credit by sector. supply of credits to msmes does increase annually, though the level or the rate of credit growth received by the enterprises vary by sector. however, in terms of percentage of total credit (business (investment and working capital) and consumption) by commercial banks, the level is much less than 30% on average per year; much lower than the percentage of credit received by large les. figure 1. total credits received by msmes and les from commercial banks in indonesia, 2011-2014 (% of total business and consumption credits) note: 2013= december; 2014=march source: ojk (2014) 89 journal of asean studies table 3. total msmes bank credits by sectors, 2011-2014 (billion rupiah) 2011 dec. 2012 dec 2013 dec 2014 march total sectors agriculture, livestock, forestry and fishery mining and quarrying manufacturing industry electricity, gas and water supply construction trade, hotel, and restaurant transport and communication financial, ownership and business services other services not identified 458,164 29,794 3,938 52,231 1,218 24,279 212,462 18,068 30,594 85,579 1 526,397 43,609 5,427 59,500 1,474 30,594 262,584 20,219 40,465 62,524 0 608,823 51,900 4,753 60,087 1,750 38,780 341,188 23,882 46,009 40,473 1 619.400 53.094 5.047 64.187 1.664 36.314 346.287 23.969 46.897 41.940 source: bi (www.bi.go.id) in financing msmes, indonesia in fact had some institutional development successes in the years up until the 1997/98 asian financial crisis. these successes included the development of a comprehensive set of institutions serving all levels of the market. but, the financial institutions concerned were less efficient and comprehensive and they faced certain difficulties even before the crisis. many of the financial institutions were financially and structurally weak, was manifest in high transactions costs and limits on their penetration of the market. as a result, the overwhelming number of mses was not served (martowijoyo, 2007). the loan portfolios of most of indonesia’s big banks are still dominated by loans to large businesses and corporate clients. as per 2012, total financing of msmes in indonesia only 20.1% of total bank credits in the country. regarding mies, only 20.7% of total msmes finance of rp 612 trillions. according to indonesian central bank (bank indonesia or bi), there are some reasons that only a small portion of total msmes in indonesia ever financed by banks are many, and two most important ones are (i) their businesses are often considered by banks or other formal non-bank financial institutions not visible, either from the market perspective, i.e their made products are not highly demanded, and from their management perspective, i.e. their minimum capability to manage their businesses professionally (especially mses are not well organized activities or businesses without a well developed structure of organization and a good management system), and (ii) lack of valuable assets to be used as collaterals (kompas, 2013). rosengard and prasetyantoko (2012) also conclude that indonesia is underbanked, meaning that people or businesses in the country have poor access to mainstream financial services normally offered by retail banks, especially for microfinance and msme finance. from six largest banks, only the portfolios of bank rakyat indonesia (bri) and bank danamon include a majority share of http://www.bi.go.id/ 90 the importance of microfinance for development of msmes in asean msme loans. they state that despite potentially lucrative unserved or underserved markets, including lowincome households and family businesses, the monetary policy and regulatory regime in indonesia set by bi have unintentionally created barriers to outreach and innovation for microfinance institutions and incentivized commercial banks to forsake msme finance in favor of consumer finance and alternative non-loan investments. during the 1997/98 asian financial crisis msmes were proved to be more resilience than their larger counterparts to the crisis, and because of them rapid increase in unemployment (caused by many bankrupted les which directly hit by the crisis) could be prevented. since then, bi has been encouraging commercial banks to lend to msmes through self-determined targets in their business plans. bi has also defined micro-credit broadly to include loans up to rp50 million (approximately us$5,450). under this broad definition, commercial banks in indonesia dominate microcredit, in which in 2007 served 48% of total borrowers with loans totaling 82.8% of the aggregate outstanding microfinance loan portfolio. bri units, which up to 2007 number nearly half of total commercial banks’ outlets, accounted for 10.8% of borrowers and 12.6% of outstanding microloans. the average micro-loan size of commercial banks was us$ 983.50 or around 85% of income per capita, as compared to us$53 for bkd (badan kredit desa or village credit institution), or approximately 5% of per capita income (martowijoyo, 2007). indonesian mf indonesia is one of the developing countries that successfully run sustainable mf in a relatively large scale. it has a long experience with the implementation of mf started since early 1970s, with bri as the key engine and the indonesian government keeps improving systems of existing microcredit schemes and strengthening their implementation process. bri unit network is now the largest and one of the most profitable rural micro-banking networks in the developing world. therefore, this makes mf in indonesia an interesting research subject from which we hope to learn some best practices in this area. indonesian government has been taking measures to improve mf, and for this aim, recently, the government has launched two new regulations/acts, namely uu no 17 2012 on cooperative (as cooperatives in indonesia are also encouraged by the government to act as a mfi), and uu no. 1 2013 about mfi. mf/micro credit is defined by bi, as a loan below rp. 50 million (us$5,373), a financial product provided by formal and semi-formal financial providers in indonesia (bramono, et al., 2013). during the suharto/'new order' era (1966-1998) there were many popular mf programs, including bimbingan massal (bimas), or mass guidance: a rice intensification program with a subsidized credit component for rice farmers, allocated through village unit credit or kredit unit desa (kud), and bri unit desa (villagebased bri) (which succeeded later on by kredit usaha tani, i.e. subsidized farming credit for small-sized farmers), and two special credit schemes for mses in agriculture, i.e. kredit investasi kecil (kik) or small investment credit, and kredit modal kerja permanen (kmkp) or permanent working capital credit, and various special credit schemes for mses in other sectors, e.g. kredit mini, kredit midi, and kupedes and kredit candak kulak (kck) allocated through kud. yet many other mf were 91 journal of asean studies implemented during that period at local level such as kredit usaha rakyat kecil (kurk), or business credit for small people/the poor, in 1984 in east java, and kredit usaha kecil (kuk), or small business credit, i.e. loans to msmes and cooperatives to fulfill banks’ credit quota of 20% of loan portfolio (martowijoyo, 2007). besides those mf schemes, during the new order era a special village-based nonbank mfi institution was established, namely lembaga dana kredit perdesaan (ldkp), or rural credit fund institution, and yet many others such as badan kredit kecamatan (bkk) in central java and south kalimantan, which are sub-district level microfinance institutions founded by the provincial government of central java in the 1970s, lembaga perkreditan kecamatan (lpk) in west java, lumbung pitih nagari (lpn) in west sumatera, and lembaga perkreditan desa (lpd) in bali (baskara, 2013). indonesia has also replicated grameen bank program. it was started in bogor, west java, by karya usaha mandiri (kum) in 1989. this initiative was followed in 1993 by mitra karya east java (mkej) in malang, east java. in sumatra, grameen bank model was replicated by yayasan pokmas mandiri (ypm) (sarumpaet, 2005) as the largest muslim country in the world, islamic finance was also introduced during the new order era as an option for the low-income people to get funds in order for them to uplift their well-being and to get themselves out of the poverty. but, only after the asian financial crisis , indonesia started to implement islamic microfinance . there are three types of islamic mf: (i) the islamic rural bank, well known as bank pembiayaan rakyat syariah (bprs); (ii) koperasi baytul maal wat tamwil (kbmt), which is a savings and credit cooperative implementing a profit and loss sharing approach; and (iii) gramen model islamic mf. these three institutions are contracted with micro takaful (micro insurance in islamic context) provider via an agent known as takaful mikro indonesia (timberg, 1999; haryadi, 2010; khadijah, et al., 2013). bprs, started in the early 1990s, is governed by bi under law no. 10, 1998. it operates under the same effective prudential regulation and supervision as commercial banks and conventional rural banks (bpr), and it focuses on micro economic activities. while both bpr and bprs are (mostly) established by wealthy local people, the owners of bpr are commercially oriented towards increasing their wealth, while the owners of bprs have a social mission, combined with the intention to at least cover their costs. in a financing transaction (loan), bprs provides financing to mainly mies either with a purchase system (murabahah), profit and loss sharing (musyarakah) or lease (ijarah). the choice of the islamic system is dependent upon the type of financing proposed by the society to the bprs. in addition, the bprs also practices islamic pawnshop (ar-rahn) run by the islamic system (haryadi, 2010; khadijah, et al., 2013). other also very important mfis are including (i) bkd (village credit institution), which has the longest history as it was among the first established mfi before the independence of the country, consisting of lumbung desa (paddy banks) and bank desa (village banks), which are mfis originating in the dutch colonial time and still operating in java and madura (and they have been awarded a bpr license); (ii) lembaga dana kredit pedesaan (ldkp), or rural credit institution, established in 1980s by then the suharto government with the main aim to grouping all existing non-bank mfis operating in all over the country, 92 the importance of microfinance for development of msmes in asean especially in java since 1970s; (iii) bkk, lpk, lpn and lpd established in the 1970s and 1980s (martowijoyo, 2007; baskara, 2013). a variety of old and new mfis exist in indonesia, including: (1) bri units; (2) bprs consisting of bkds (village credit institutions) and non-bkds (‚new‛ bprs and old mfis that have converted to bpr status); (3) non-bank non-cooperative mfis (ldkps, sub-district and village-level mfis founded by provincial/district governments); (4) cooperatives (credit cooperatives and saving and loan units, including credit unions and bmts); (5) grameen bank replicators (mostly unlicensed), and some ngos, most of which have a foundation license (martowijoyo, 2007). among those huge number of mfis, currently, the key ones in indonesia are (i) bri, which is still considered as the leading mfi; (ii) bank syariah, (iii) bpr; (iv) bpd (bank pembangunan daerah, or regional development bank) and (v) a number of commercial banks. bri and bpr have the longest experience in mf, established in early 1970s in all then 27 provinces (bri itself was established in 1896 from previously avb (algemene volkerediet bank). in addition, there are many non-bank organizations also providing mf such as cooperative and local community initiated ngos. however, according to some observers, total bank and non-bank mfi and mf services in indonesia currently are too many with overlapping regulations, coverage, and responsibilities that make the monetary authority and government not easy to evaluate and control the development of mf in the country. even according baskara (2013) finds that, for instance, in bali alone there are many formal mfis that targeted mses, including lpd; koperasi unit desa (kud) or villagebased cooperatives, i.e. multipurpose village cooperatives supported by the government; koperasi serba usaha (ksu); koperasi simpan pinjam (ksp) (like credit union) established by local community, bpr, bri (bri bri), and danamon simpan pinjam (dsp), i.e. savings and loan units of bank danamon (a private commercial bank). he also finds many locally operating mfis which are not registered officially by the monetary authority, not only in bali but also in other provinces , such as badan usaha kredit pedesaan (bukp) in yogyakarta, lembaga pembiayaan usaha kecil (lpuk) in south kalimantan, lembaga kredit pedesaan (lkp) in west nusa tenggara, and lembaga kredit kecamatan in aceh. but, many of these informal localbased mfis stopped their operations because they did in an unhealthy nonprofessional way. asian resource center for mf (arcm) indicates that almost 9,000 public rural financial institutions that are not licensed, and can be categorised as generic bprs, which include village-owned bkds of java and madura, and lembaga dana dan kredit pedesaan (ldkps) or rural fund and credit institution, owned mostly by provincial governments (or in some cases by villages) ( http://www.bwtp.org/arcm/indonesia/ i_country_ profile/indonesia_country_profile.htm). within the informal sector, a traditional and most popular mfis found throughout the country is the arisan, the indonesian rotating savings and credit association (rosca). the number of arisan is estimated to be in the millions. many people join more than one arisan for economic and social purposes, while others manage arisan as a side job. in rural areas, traders offer loans against standing crops through the tebasan and ijon systems. even 93 journal of asean studies smaller loans called mindring are provided by retail traders of clothes or household utensils. farmers also commonly get inkind loans of rice and farm inputs from traders or shopkeepers at prices higher than cash prices. commercial moneylenders are also still operating in rural areas and catering to the short-term needs of the poorest, although they are not flourishing as in the past. some moneylenders are disguising their activities under the name of cooperatives (martowijoyo, 2007). unfortunately, the exact number of mfis at this moment, especially non-banks, in indonesia is not really clear. according to a study by martowijoyo (2007) based on various sources, as of mid-2005, there were over 54,000 outlets for mf, serving over 29 million borrowers (13% of the population) and more than 43 million depositors (19% of the population). while, an article written by haryanti (2014), there are about 600,000 bank and non-bank mfis (including localbased informal institutions in all provinces), but the exact number is still being ascertained by the financial service authority (or known in indonesia as otoritas jasa keuangan or ojk). some of those mfis already had a formal legal entity such as a limited-liability company status (pt) or a cooperative, and also had legal operating license as non-bank financial institutions. nonetheless, they were still regarded as semi-formal entities. some of those mfis have proven to be effective in providing mf services to the so-called excluded or un-banked segment, such as peasants, mses, women and other economically active poor who mostly work in the informal sector, do not have assets that are valuable enough to act as collateral or probably have valuable assets but do not have legal documents protecting their assets. those mfis have offered many innovative approaches (including nourishing social capital and local wisdom to make social sanctions work effectively in replacing the function of physical collateral). annual aggregate data on micro credit are also limited. bi does have data on total distributed credits/loans (monthly, quarterly and annually) by group of banks, sector, type of credit, and region. but no specific data on micro credit; data on total distributed credits are also including micro credit. arcm which has indonesian profile with respect to mfi development in its website does not have data on total micro credits provided by all banks and formal non-bank financial institutions ( http://www.bwtp.org/arcm/ indonesia/ i_country_ profile/ indonesia_country_profile.htm). even, siregar (2014) in his presentation about mfis in indonesia only provides aggregate data for 2005 (table 4). according to his data mfis in indonesia are dominated by informal mfis which consist of 637,838 ldkp, bkd, and various mf units initiated by local community such as credit union, bmt, ngos. while based on data collected from various sources by martowijoyo (2007) combined with data from ojk (2014), a summary table of breakdown of mf by key institutions (table 5). table 4 total mfis in indonesia, 2005 institutions total units total depositors and debtors (person) bri unit desa 4,046 30,776,000 bpr 2,161 5,480,000 94 the importance of microfinance for development of msmes in asean non-bank finance institutions 7,617 2,084,000 cooperatives 6,495 6,100,000 arisan others 250,000 105,147 5,000,000 22,855,000 total 375,466 72,295,000 source: siregar (2014). table 5 mf by key institutions in indonesia institution no units/ offices borrowers (000) outstanding loans (us$ million/rp billions) depositors (000) deposits (us$ million/rp billions) commercial banks' micro loans (2006) (march 2014) -bri units (2002) (2005) (2007) (march 2014) 8,069 18,704 3,916 4,046 5,400 9,350 14,271 na 3,000 3,211 na 9,794.8 us$14,036 na rp 12,000 us$2,134 na rp27,721.1 na na 28,200 31,271 na na na rp 1,652,976 rp 23,460 us$3,288 na na rural banks (bpr): (2003) (2005) (march 2014) bkd (2002) (2005) 2,133 4,482 4,717 5,345 2,062 1,900 395 na 450 2,331 rp 7,088 us$21 rp 58.977 rp 185 us$1,380 5,100 466 na 540 5,864 rp 6,629 us$51 rp34.963 rp 25,000 us$1,223 ldkp (2005) 1,620 1,326 us$45 na us$42 credit cooperative (2004) -credit unions (2004) 1,596 1,041 885 na us116 us958 481 480 us$33 us$0.94 s&l units (2004) -bmt (2004) 36,466 3,038 10,524 1,200 us$1,349 us$20 5,016 na us$145 us$26 grameen bank replicators (2007) 21 20 us$0.52 20 us$0.30 sources: martowijoyo (2007) and ojk (2014). alternatively, information on micro credit should be collected from individual mf providing banks (e.g. bri, bpr, etc) and other non-bank organizations. one organization which is doing this way is mixmarket organisation. it has a unique database sourced from more than 15,000 mfi data submissions over the past 10 years covering more than 2,100 mfis in over 110 countries, including indonesia. some data from selected mfis in indonesia are presented in table 6 (for more data: http://www.mixmarket.org/microfinancedata#ixzz 34pl8lam6). 95 journal of asean studies table 6: profiles of selected mfis in indonesia in 2011 onwards mfi report year loans (us$) number of borrowers deposits (us$) number of depositors amartha microfinance 2013 205,890 2,612 26,143 2,617 bina artha 2012 2,041,313 21,397 na na bina artha 2012 2,041,313 21,397 na na bmt sanama 2012 452,733 188 55,748 342 bpr ak 2011 5,739,431 7,841 3,156,576 30,852 bpr dmg 2011 920,710 525 904,781 1,910 bpr hitamajaya 2011 2,117,364 2,344 1,111,037 7,565 bpr nbp 2 2011 5,119,451 6,302 2,525,500 20,817 bpr nsi 2011 4,587,175 14,523 1,052,444 9,242 bpr pinang artha 2012 5,470,846 3,683 5,813,842 33,241 bpr surya yudha kencana 2011 70,274,699 35,530 50,295,139 74,679 bri 2012 10,897,400, 395 na 12,918,433,25 7 na cu sawiran 2012 5,470,846 3,683 5,813,842 33,241 dian mandiri 2013 2,709,156 44,276 819,459 na komida 2011 5,583,754 68,278 530,937 45,518 koperasi sk 2012 5,470,846 3,683 5,813,842 33,241 mbk ventura 201454,721,534 369,738 na na mitra usaha 2010 489,684 5,277 389,627 4,664 tlm 2013 12,597,849 32,407 13,836,030 na wkp 2011 87,086 684 17,579 na mbk ventura 2014 54,721,534 369,738 na na source: mixmarket organization (http://www.mixmarket.org/mfi/country/indonesia#ixzz34pjrzgcz). probably the most important or the most famous mf scheme in indonesia after the suharto era is kredit usaha rakyat (kur), or people/community business credit, launched by president susilo bambang yudhoyono (sby) in november 2007. the main aim of kur is to help financing feasible but not bankable mses, which is known as credit without collateral. it is loan for working capital and investment capital for individual producers/owners of productive mses and cooperatives with credit upper limit up to rp 500 million. the scheme is 100% financed by national commercial banks, i.e. bri, bank negara indonesia (bni), bank mandiri, bank tabungan negara (btn), bank syariah mandiri (bsm), bank bukopin, and bank negara indonesia syariah (table 7) and since 2012 all bpd in all provinces in indonesia are also playing an important role in allocating kur. while, non-bank http://www.mixmarket.org/mfi/bina-artha http://www.mixmarket.org/mfi/bina-artha http://www.mixmarket.org/mfi/bmt-sanama http://www.mixmarket.org/mfi/bpr-ak http://www.mixmarket.org/mfi/bpr-dmg http://www.mixmarket.org/mfi/bpr-hitamajaya http://www.mixmarket.org/mfi/bpr-nbp-2 http://www.mixmarket.org/mfi/bpr-nsi http://www.mixmarket.org/mfi/bpr-pinang-artha http://www.mixmarket.org/mfi/bpr-pinang-artha http://www.mixmarket.org/mfi/bpr-surya-yudha-kencana http://www.mixmarket.org/mfi/bpr-surya-yudha-kencana http://www.mixmarket.org/mfi/bri http://www.mixmarket.org/mfi/cu-sawiran http://www.mixmarket.org/mfi/dian-mandiri http://www.mixmarket.org/mfi/komida http://www.mixmarket.org/mfi/koperasi-sk http://www.mixmarket.org/mfi/mbk-ventura http://www.mixmarket.org/mfi/mitra-usaha http://www.mixmarket.org/mfi/tlm http://www.mixmarket.org/mfi/wkp http://www.mixmarket.org/mfi/mbk-ventura http://www.mixmarket.org/mfi/country/indonesia#ixzz34pjrzgcz 96 the importance of microfinance for development of msmes in asean financial institutions are not involved in this program. table 7 realized kur by national banks (31 march 2014) no bank realized kur plafond outstanding total debtors average per debtor (rp million) (rp million) (rp million) 1 bni 14,336,912 3,904,556 205,550 69.7 2 bri (ritel kur) 18,045,443 7,077,418 103,993 173.5 3 bri (micro kur) 75,789,311 20,643,642 9,690,827 7.8 4 bank mandiri 14,945,991 6,525,545 315,432 47.4 5 btn 4,368,962 1,918,574 24,238 180.3 6 bukopin 1,795,455 605,849 12,011 149.5 7 bank syariah mandiri 3,658,132 1,387,260 52,019 70.3 8 bni syariah 245,784 109,897 1,256 195.7 total 133,185,989 42,172,743 10,405,326 12.8 source: komite kredit usaha rakyat, ministry for economic coordination (http://komitekur.com/article-95-sebaran-penyaluran-kredit-usaha-rakyat-periode-november-2007-maret2014.asp) kur received by mses is guaranted (70 percent) by two insurance companies, i.e. pt. asuransi kredit indonesia (pt. askrindo) and perusahaan umum jaminan kredit indonesia (perum jamkrindo) and other companies which are voluntary joined the program. pt askindro provides two types of services: (1) credit guarantee: bank and non-bank credit guarantee, counter bank guarantee, and regional credit guarantee; and (2) credit insurance: trade credit insurance, surety bond, customs bond, and reinsurance. pt jamkrindo with the main aim to provide credit guarantee services to mses including government program and commercial credit, has various mses credit guarantee products: micro credit guarantee, guarantee for construction, goods and services procurement loans, commercial credit guarantee, counter bank guarantee, multipurpose credit guarantee, guarantee for distribution, islamic financial guarantee (kafalah), loan program credit guarantee (kur). pt jamkrindo has various products: micro and small credit guarantee, multipurpose credit guarantee, credit guarantee for construction, and goods and services procurement, contra bank guarantee. among the eight national banks providing kur, bri is the leading one, which has three main objectives: (i) increasing financing access of mses and cooperatives to banks; (ii) lessons learned for mses in becoming a bankable debtor which can therefore be served in accordance with banking commercial terms in general (as an embryo of commercial debtor); and (iii) it is expected that the financed business can grow and develop continuously. bri has two types of kur: (i) micro kur for an individual running a feasible productive business (mies) with length of business of 6 months at the minimum, and (ii) retail kur for an individual (individual person/legal entity) or cooperative running a feasible productive business with length of business of 6 months at the minimum. for micro kur, credit upper limit of rp 20 97 journal of asean studies million at the maximum with effective interest rate of 22% per year, and for retail kur, credit upper limit of rp 100 at the maximum with effective interest rate of with the interest rate 14% per year. credit types are working capital credit with maximum 3 years (in case of renewal, suppletion, restructuring: maximum 6 years) and investment credit with maximum 5 years (in case of renewal, suppletion, restructuring: maximum 10 years). with respect to allocation of kur by productive sector (as the main target of this scheme), trade (which is integrated with upward sectors) revealed as the dominant sector in getting kur with the proportion of 50.79%. whereas, agriculture and fishery received 13.7%, and industry manufacturing 2.6%. by accumulating the amount, the allocation of kur to upward sectors covering agriculture, maritime, fishery, forestry, and industry have the share of 31.4% from total kur allocated to all sectors (muis and sipayung, 2013). tabel 8. realised kur by sector of economy (31 maret 2014) no sector total plafond (rp million) outstanding (rp million) total debtors 1 agriculture 25,220,484 9,959,299 1,659,144 2 fishery 837,614 213,788 11,695 3 mining 117,323 50,191 3,729 4 manufacturing industry 4,066,523 1,673,872 216,945 5 electricity, gas and clean water 74,599 32,094 2,400 6 construction 2,066,813 580,478 11,390 7 trade 82,368,475 27,716,357 6,972,338 8 accommodation supplying 1,050,399 328,918 41,337 9 transportation 2,018,075 957,995 51,466 10 financing services 1,032,825 300,719 7,008 11 rental 6,768,982 2,869,136 350,437 12 government administration 33,741 22,648 1,694 13 education service 87,212 28,436 716 14 health care service 383,267 103,885 3,120 15 community services 4,277,720 1,128,842 113,235 16 individual services 145,269 53,835 1,232 17 other 16,662,958 1,971,239 1,134,644 total 147,212,280 47,991,733 10,582,530 source: komite kredit usaha rakyat, ministry for economic coordination (http://komitekur.com/article-95-sebaran-penyaluran-kredit-usaha-rakyat-periode-november-2007-maret2014.asp) many people assessed kur as a successful mf program for mses. even, president sby was highly appreciated by international micro finance community for his successful in implementing kur in particular and microfinance in indonesia in general by awarding him 'letter of recognition' in october 2012. the success of kur is indeed not unrelated with the well 98 the importance of microfinance for development of msmes in asean internationally recognized successful of indonesia, bri particularly, in implementing microfinance. therefore, indonesia has been mentioned as the potential world laboratory for microfinance. key challenges although indonesia has a long experience with the implementation of mf started since early 1970s, and the country is considered as one among only few developing countries that successfully run sustainable microfinance in a relatively large scale, still many challenges the country has to face. according to an evaluation made by arcm (http://www.bwtp. org/arcm/ indonesia/i_ country_profile/indonesia_country_ profile.htm), the key challenges are the followings. first, several studies have demonstrated that there is still an unmet demand for mf in indonesia, as a majority of rural households still do not have access to a source of funds from a semi-formal or formal institution. the key mf providers, i.e. bri units and bprs, tends to cover mostly the upper levels of msmes in district capitals, sub-district towns and economically active regions (e.g. java and bali) with loans of more than rp.3 million (us$320), while ngos, cooperatives, and bkds reach a lower end of the market (rural mies) but still have a limited outreach in rural areas. bri units expansion seems constrained by the ‘cash cow’ status it has within the bank. bprs mostly operate in affluent, urban areas of java and bali. their expansion is limited by the high capital requirements to open new branches or operate outside a specific district. second, the supply-led subsidized microcredit programs initiated by the government do not provide an conducive environment where sustainable mf providers can operate. third, there is a lack of awareness and application of basic mf principles among government agencies, semi-formal organizations and some commercial banks that have entered the mf recently. there is still no central mf training provider in indonesia. fourth, technical assistance and capacity building support to mf providers have been limited by the diversity and geographical spread, and only few organizations have benefited from non-financial support; although bi has recently tried to address this problem. fifth, there is no formal credit bureau in indonesia, which could be used to prevent risks of over-indebtedness in areas of strong competition (cities and main districts towns). banks involved in mf, such as bri units and bprs exchange information on their clients on an informal basis. conclusion and policy recommendation as already explained in the beginning, this study has one limitation: it could not come with strong empirical evidence on the role of mf/mfis in financing msmes due to lack of data on total micro credits allocated to these enterprises. nevertheless, this study has at least two (2) reasons to conclude that mf in indonesia is important for msmes, namely (i) total commercial credits (which may also included micro credits) received by msmes increased every year, and the absorption rate of kud by mses is not only high but also tends to grow every year. after the asian financial crisis, indonesia has adopted financial inclusion strategy as part of its 'inclusive national development policy' with the objective to increase economic growth and welfare of the population. this new strategy includes strategies to improve the effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and health development of mf services in indonesia. indeed, despite the fact that indonesia has a long experience with mf, and within 99 journal of asean studies asean, it is the most successful country in implementing mf programs or in the development of mfis, the country still need to deal with various problems. first, there is lack of awareness of sound principles of mf within the implementing organizations in indonesia. one way to solve this problem, there should be centralized training centers in all parts of the country where the different players in mf can go and get additional training and support. second, most of the mf programs/schemes that have been relatively successful have been located in java and sumatra, and the bulk of the mfis and programs in indonesia are located in the urban area. so, the coverage should be expanded into other parts of the country, and more attention and energy should be given to develop effective mf programs in regions outside java and sumatera, especially rural community or those living in rather less developed/isolated regions and in border regions like in papua and kalimantan. to achieve this, two actions should be taken by the government: (i) to establish credit information (including information on exiting mf programs and mfis) and bureau with offices in all cities and main districts towns in all provinces, which could be used by community to find mfis that can provide mf services they need and also to prevent risks of overindebtedness in areas of strong competition among mfis. third, there are many (or even too many) mfis (including in the informal sector) with overlapping target, coverage and regulations beyond the control of the monetary authority. therefore, the monetary authority or government should have a fully control of the growing number of especially nonbank and informal mfis and their ways of operations. the monetary authority should reorganize all mfis still operating not only at national level but also at regional level. fourth, many mfis, especially non-bank institutions are operating inefficiently and too dependent on continued government financial supports. therefore, in order to have sustainable successful mf programs or activities in indonesia, all implementing mfis need to improve their management and operation capacity in order to operate efficiently and independently. fourth, unfriendly business environment, caused by among other factors lacks of security and certainty, is still problem in the country. so, the government should provide an conducive environment that should be backed by law enforcement for mfis to be able to operate smoothly and efficiently. in overall, however, the successful of mf programs or development of mfis in indonesia will strongly depend on two key factors: supply-side factors and demandside factors. the supply-side factors are a group of factors affecting the efficiency and capacity of mfis, whereas, the demandside factors are a group of factors affecting the demand for mf services including the capacity of micro borrowers to payback their credit on time (or zero nonperforming loan). references adb (2009), key indicators for asia and thepacific 2009, manila: asian development bank. adb (2012), "philippines: microfinance development program", performance evaluation report, december, manila: asian development bank. asean (2011), directory of outstanding asean smes 2011, jakarta: asean secretariat. baskara, i gde kajeng (2013), "lembaga keuangan mikro di indonesia", jurnal buletin studi ekonomi, 18(2), august. 100 the 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(2009a), sme in asian developing countries, london: palgrave macmillan publisher. tambunan, tulus t.h. (2009b), development of smes in asean countries, 102 the importance of microfinance for development of msmes in asean readworthy publications, ltd, new delhi tham, s. (2009a), "smes gather strength with improved registration", vientiane times, issue 251:8 (http://hrdme.wordpress.com) tham, s. (2009b), "lao smes needs more support", vientiane times, issue 251:8 (http://hrdme.wordpress.com). timberg, ta (1999), "islamic banking in indonesia", proceedings of bri international seminar on micro banking system, december, jakarta: bank rakyat indonesia. un-escap (2009), globalization of production and the competitiveness of small and medium-sized enterprises in asia and the pacific:trends and prospects, studies in trade and investment 65, bangkok: united nations. walsh, john and nittana southiseng (2011), " understanding and strengthening the health of family businesses in laos", information management and business review, 2(1): 12-18. win, zaw min (2012), "smes in myanmar", power point presentation, the republic of the union of myanmar federations of chambers of commerce and industry (umfcci) (http://www.thaichamber.org/9951a92 f-e5ef-41e8-860a94918cce6d85/finaldownload/downl oadided5cf8fd565288744101515e87cc8f51 /9951a92f-e5ef-41e8-860a94918cce6d85/userfiles/file/myanmar _u%20zaw%20min%20win.pdf) wsbi (2008), " overview of microfinance in asia/pacific and selected experiences from wsbi members", october, brussels: world savings banks institute (www.wsbi.org). range!a1:e22 range!a4 in p re ss journal of asean studies, vol. 11, no. 1 (2023), pp. 133−157 issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic received: 01st march 2023/ revised: 21st june 2023/ accepted: 15th july 2023 harmonizing halal in asean: analysis of halal food guidelines under the asean way approach eva johan1, maria jose plana-casado2 1,2wageningen university & research, netherlands eva.johan@wur.nl; maria-jose.planacasado@wur.nl how to cite: johan, e., & plana-casado, m. j. harmonizing halal in asean: analysis of halal food guidelines under the asean way approach. journal of asean studies, 11(1), 133−157. https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v11i1.9682 abstract the research examined how asean is moving towards legislative harmonization in the key economic sector of halal foods. the research investigated how asean has promoted economic integration by building regional consensus regarding controversial issues, such as the definition of halal food, and discuss the role of other international instruments in building regional consensus – the “asean” way. qualitative methodology was used by integrating a historical, doctrinal, and comparative approach. the first analysis was on the process leading to adopting asean halal food guidelines, which constitute the most concrete output of regional efforts to bring domestic standards closer. the following procedures were to compare and contrast these instruments substantively to identify the areas where new consensus has been found and those where disagreements persist. finally, the research examined the potential influence of the guidelines adopted by the codex alimentarius commission, the organization of islamic cooperation, and mabims in drafting asean instruments. the research concludes that despite of lengthy and difficult road to gaining consensus through the asean way mechanism, member states have successfully agreed on some elements of halal standards. however, the guidelines require member states’ legislation to achieve full harmonization in addition to asean soft law. moreover, international initiatives have impacted asean’s halal standards in important ways. some issues regarding harmonization remain, such as mutual recognition and labelling, and require further investigation. keywords: asean, codex alimentarius, economic integration, halal, legal harmonization mailto:eva.johan@wur.nl mailto:maria-jose.planacasado@wur.nl in p re ss 134 harmonizing halal in asean introduction the association of southeast asian nations is an intergovernmental organization with a legal personality (asean, 2008). the organization has a mission to, among others, create a “highly competitive and economically integrated” (asean, 2008) “single market” (pelkmans, 2016) of goods, services, and investment within the region. since adopting its current charter in 2008, the organization has taken many steps to advance toward this goal, including creating the asean economic community (asean, 2003). to this aim, aminuddin and purnomo (2017) emphasizes the importance of connectivity between economic actors as alternative to political diplomacy to strengthen the asean’s work and to develop common understanding and collaboration in achieving regional single market. however, the asean single market is far from becoming a reality. one of the key reasons for this is asean’s extremely limited decision-making powers: its current charter does not give asean supranational legislative powers to adopt secondary legislation to harmonize domestic product standards. rather, any “asean decision” (regardless of its nature) must be adopted using consultation (first step) and consensus (second step) procedures (asean, 2008). the importance of consensus in the asean way is such that, there has been “no single legal instrument signed without consensus, even in the economic pillar” (fukunaga, 2021). additionally, the charter (or any other asean legal instrument) does not include a “proper set of rules or a mechanism for [the] authoritative drafting, adoption, interpretation, and implementation” (desierto & cohen, 2020) of regional decisions. this approach to regional decision-making is known as the “asean way,” which is said to originate “from the antilegal domestic decision-making culture of many asean members” (kahler, 2000). the asean way refers to a model for regional integration that emphasizes informality and intensive consultation to identify common interests and lead to consensus in making collective decisions and prioritizes noninterference with its members’ internal affairs. according to koesrianti (2016), the asean way operates in a way that not to lose everyone’s face, and consent among members, and does not bother with the internal affair of each other. this reality accommodates the fact that asean members consider harmonization politically tricky and heavy-handed (severino, 2007; yoshimatsu, 2006). still, the asean way is said to have consistently influenced regional developments, as it helped create a forum for the discussion of strategic issues for the region by relying on trust and familiarity among its members (davidson, 2008; leviter, 2010). this article tests whether such a claim can be extended to the regulation of halal foods. promoting legislative harmonization of halal food rules within the region has been repeatedly identified as a key goal of asean (asean, 2015). bringing halal food legislation closer would facilitate regional cooperation and consequently move the region forward regarding economic integration. indeed, the economic relevance of the halal food market within asean is paramount: the asean halal food market constitutes almost a fourth of the global halal market, which was valued at us$ 4.7 trillion in 2021 and is projected to grow to us$ 6 trillion by 2024 (sesric, 2021). in p re ss journal of asean studies 135 the definition of halal food has historically controversial, and the lack of agreement at the international level has resulted in significant differences within countries’ legislation governing halal food products. these differences are such that national standards have been considered non-tariff barriers to halal food trade among asean partners and at the international level (asian trade center, 2019; johan & schebesta, 2022; yan et al., 2017) and an obstacle in the process of economic integration (asean, 2009). at least four types of trade barriers have been identified: regulation around halal stunning and slaughtering rules, halal certification, halal labelling regime, and mutual recognition mechanisms (asean, 2021). these barriers have created tension among asean member states. for instance, in 2013, the thai government publicly complained about the fact that frozen chicken products could not be exported to brunei darussalam because of differences in the technical regulations set for those products (teanravisitsagool, 2013). similarly, industry actors has repeatedly raised the same issue; differences in members’ national halal food certification rules are the main obstacles to marketing their products across the region (asian trade center, 2019; narjoko, 2015). the asean halal guidelines have developed in order to harmonize halal standard in the region. the guidelines are an essential element in building an integrated market for halal food in asean. in 2019, asean achieved a consensus on halal food standards. the asean halal guidelines are part of a larger plan of action, that aims for halal food cooperation by 2025. this article investigates the harmonization of halal food by asean, by first, looking at the initial regional regulatory initiatives regarding halal to recognize the asean body in charge of halal decision-making. we then outline the decision-making process under the asean way framework and identify what standards were agreed upon in the 2019 halal guidelines, including whether these comply with relevant international standards or global halal standard initiatives to accommodate the need for the global halal market. analytical framework the institutional framework governing halal food harmonization efforts in asean is characterized by the fact that asean bodies are composed of staff, which are representatives of its member states. this reality has led some scholars to consider asean as “a regional tool to maximize sovereignty and national interests” (vandoren, 2005). furthermore, members’ unwillingness to transfer sovereignty, even on a partial basis, to a supranational organization can be considered proof of asean’s low-level ambition (vandoren, 2005). the asean path towards greater integration relies strongly on member states’ acceptance and implementation of its decisions. soft law instruments have been widely used in asean legal framework to carry out what has been described as “asean’s soft law approach based on horizontal integration” (hsieh & mercurio, 2019). guzman and meyer remark that different definitions of soft law exists. according to the mainstream definition, “soft law consists of law-like promises or statements that fall short of hard law, is more widely used, but some writers define soft law in p re ss 136 harmonizing halal in asean differently. rather than focusing on the doctrinal question of whether a rule is binding on states, they focus on the extent to which the obligations imposed are clear or whether the various aspects of an agreement are otherwise likely to constrain state behavior" (guzman & meyer, 2010). although soft law mechanisms are considered dynamic and are accepted especially in international law (schwarcz, 2020), in the case of asean, they are often regarded as a key factor stalling its success (mahaseth & subramaniam, 2021). proponents of the approach argue that it can be “gradually realized through the promotion of public awareness, social-economic development, and domestic legislation” (xue, 2009) of member states. later, such network effects can push the “adoption and compliance” of a soft law, which in turn can be “strategically exploited to stimulate legal harmonization” (druzin, 2017). asean regional cooperation is based on fundamental principles that constitute “the asean way”. the latter might be seen as unclear because the approach enshrines informality rather than formal institutions, consensus rather than majority voting, and non-intervention rather than coercion. despite its ‘incompleteness’, the asean way has contributed to managing the risk of conflict in the region. however, more than this approach is needed, because the real challenge for economic integration is on the implementation of policies and agreements that have been made under the asean way principle (permatasari, 2020). the urgency to have a ‘more rules-based system’ in asean arises particularly in economic cooperation to foster market integration. economic activities in the region are subject to the international trade system, which is rules-based under the global legal framework. in this regard, asean needs a regulatory harmonization system that can ensure legal certainty and guarantee legal rights. in regard to harmonizing regulations, asean has developed some regulatory regimes, for instance, for medical device products (asean, 2015b), and cosmetic products (asean, 2003b). such harmonized regulatory regimes are a first step to reducing technical trade barriers and standardizing regional product requirements. regulatory harmonization akin to these three regimes could be an opportunity for achieving asean halal food harmonization. methodology this research employs a qualitative methodology to analyze harmonization initiatives of halal food in asean and how the decision-making process for halal food under the asean institutional framework is achieved. content-based comparative analyses are used to analyze policy documents and authoritative texts related to halal standards. alongside, doctrinal analysis is applied to legal documents. data is collected from primary sources, the asean halal guidelines, member states regulations and secondary sources. this study is designed in three steps: first, we investigate a chronological overview of harmonization halal food initiatives in asean by tracing document policy inside and outside asean institutions. the result is to capture and update information on how far halal food harmonization has worked under the asean institutions. second, we look into the institutional framework on how the consensus regarding halal food is achieved, the bodies in p re ss journal of asean studies 137 involved, and how the asean way mechanism has been implemented for halal food. it describes the process leading to the adoption of the 2019 asean guidelines for halal food, which is a milestone for halal food regulation at the regional level. in the third step, we analyze and compare the adoption of the asean 1999 and 2019 regional halal food guidelines to bring domestic standards closer to facilitating the intra-asean trade of such goods. we analyze asean guidelines in terms of substance, comparing the latest version of the document to its predecessor. in particular, we identify the areas in which a new consensus has been found and where consensus remains elusive, including discussing the role that similar instruments adopted in other international fora. to understand the critical changes and consensus achieved under asean institutional framework within member states, this study creates two datasets based on two comparative analyses. first, a comparative analysis of the 1999 and 2019 asean halal guidelines. second, a comparative analysis of some critical subjects in halal standards from four asean member states: indonesia, malaysia, brunei, and singapore. the current research design could be expanded and strengthened but for reasons of practical feasibility were excluded from the scope of the present research. specifically, we believe that future research should consider supplementing our data with interview data. the covid-19 pandemic limited our possibilities for doing so but interview with representatives of halal working groups. another challenge, which is likely to persist, is the access to reliable data from the asean website due to limited access and an outdated file depository. analysis historical overview of halal food harmonization initiatives the term halal indicates that a product is permissible (or allowed), as opposed to haram, which means forbidden (or not allowed), according to islamic law (tieman & hassan, 2015). over the last few decades, private and public rules defining what constitutes halal foods have evolved. within asean, many governments have adopted domestic legislation regulating elements ranging from primary production to certifying foods marketed as halal (abdallah et al., 2021). the harmonization of the legal requirements governing the halal market has been on the agenda for at least 20 years but remains a challenge (sesric, 2021). through the use of a historical perspective, we are eager to examine how the asean way has been utilized to synchronize asean member better states’ legislation governing the halal food market and then, through the institutional framework, identify the role that member states and bodies of the regional organization have played in the adoption process. the path leading to the adoption of the asean 2019 guidelines (asean, 2019)started more than two decades ago: asean member states placed the harmonization of halal in p re ss 138 harmonizing halal in asean standards on the international agenda as early as the late seventies (table 1 for an illustrated summary of the key milestones of the process). table 1 asean’s initiatives to harmonize halal food standards year level initiatives 1979 fao-codex committee for coordination asia. proposed specific labelling with regard to islamic religion requirements. 1993 faocodex committee for food labelling. agreed to study the petition made in 1979. 1995 asean establishment of the asean ad-hoc working group on halal food. 1997 • fao-codex committee • issued codex alimentarius guideline for the use of the term halal. • asean • ad-hoc working group on halal food (wghf) finalized the draft and recommended the asean halal guideline. 1999 asean som-amaf meeting adopted the first asean halal guidelines. 2000 asean asean established asean working group on halal food (awghf). 2015 asean asean adopted the aec blueprint 2025. 2017 asean amaf meeting adopted the poa asean cooperation on halal food 1017-2020. 2019 asean amaf meeting adopted the new asean guidelines on halal food. 2020 asean amaf meeting adopted the poa asean cooperation on halal food 2021-2025. source: authors from fao and asean documents specifically, in 1979, malaysia proposed to the members of the international codex alimentarius commission (cac), established under a joint food standards programme of the food and agriculture organization (fao) and the world health organization (who), the adoption of international guidelines regarding the labeling of halal meat products (fao, 1979). however, it was not until 1993 that the codex alimentarius commission moved forward with the malayan initiative (fao, 1993), which led to the agreement, in 1997, of the first codex alimentarius general guidelines for the use of the term halal (fao, 1997b). the codex guidelines provide a definition of the term “halal”, identify lawful sources for the preparation of halal food and drink, and establish basic requirements for the lawful slaughtering of animals. the brevity of the document (in terms of the length of the document and its limited provisions) illustrates the difficulty of reaching an agreement about what constitutes halal food at the international level. the codex rule of 1997 has not been replaced or amended by any other codex initiative. the codex alimentarius commission is explicitly recognized under the sanitaryand phytosanitary (sps) agreement of the world trade in p re ss journal of asean studies 139 organization (wto), and compliance with international standards grants a presumption of legality under wto law. therefore, the codex alimentarius commission has become one of the main normative references for halal food regulation in international economic law (wto, 1994a; wto, 1994b). in 1995, building on the momentum generated by the activities at the codex alimentarius commission, asean started its own path to promote the regional harmonization of halal food requirements. it first created the asean ad hoc working group on halal food guidelines, whose mission was to negotiate the drafting of regional guidelines that would serve as a practical guide for the food industry and would provide basic criteria for the accreditation of halal food processing establishments (asean, 1999; fao, 1997b). the ad hoc working group finalized the drafting of the guidelines in 1997. it was no coincidence that this timeline aligned with the adoption of the codex instrument: most of the participants of the asean working group were, in fact, also members of the codex committee drafting the international guidelines (fao, 1997b). two years after the publication of the initial draft, the first asean guidelines for halal foods were adopted. they are formally referred to as the asean’s “1999 general guidelines on preparation and handling of halal food” (hereinafter referred to as the 1999 guidelines) (asean, 1999). the adoption of this instrument did not end asean’s efforts to bring its members’ legislation on halal food closer. in fact, it led to the institutionalization of asean members’ cooperation in halal food matters, with the establishment of the asean working group on halal food (awghf) in 2000. this new working group had a broader mandate than its predecessor: in addition to working on bringing asean member states’ halal food laws closer by negotiating a second (more ambitious) version of the guidelines, it was to help create channels to exchange information and to promote regional capacity building regarding halal food regulation (asean, 2005) and to launch the process to draft an asean scheme for the accreditation of halal food establishments. the next significant effort towards harmonization came in 2015, with the adoption of asean’s 2025 blueprint, which identified “further enhanc[ing] cooperation in production and promotion of halal food and products” (asean, 2015a) as one of the key targets for the regional organization for the next decade. in accordance with the blueprint, asean’s 20172020 plan of action on asean cooperation on halal food (asean, 2017) was adopted. the 2017 poa included a “strategic thrust” to identify actions favoring regional standard-setting for halal foods. in addition, the 2017 poa did not limit its scope to legislative harmonisation issues. it also covered topics such as halal food production, food security, and food safety in a halal context, and among other actions, delineated several programs designed to facilitate small producers and businesses of halal food to meet global standards (asean, 2017). yet again, it renovated the working group’s mandate to update the 1999 asean guidelines to negotiate the regional accreditation scheme for halal establishments already proposed in 2000. in addition, it proposed launching the negotiation of a similar instrument governing halal food certification. in fact, the 2017 poa was ambitious to the point that, for the first time, it in p re ss 140 harmonizing halal in asean indicated that mutual recognition agreements within asean could be the way forward to facilitate the trade of halal foods. however, at the time of writing this article, only the efforts to update the 1999 guidelines have been successful-negotiations of accreditation and certification schemes have yet to be launched. in 2019 – less than two years after the adoption of the first poa in 2017, and two decades after the adoption of the 1999 asean guidelines – the revamped asean general guidelines on halal food were adopted (asean, 2019). the 2019 guidelines constitute the most recent output of regional efforts to bring domestic standards closer. this version will likely remain in force for some time, as the 2020 poa on halal cooperation has excluded guideline renegotiation from the working group’s mandate (asean, 2020). institutional framework of halal food as our chronological overview illustrates, regional harmonization is being promoted using the “asean way,” a diplomatic approach that uses informal discussions to facilitate consensus-based decisions, allowing member states to determine areas of agreement and isolate contentious topics (leviter, 2010). within this framework, both the regional organization and its members have a role to play: asean bodies serve as forums for discussion, but the power to make the decisions remains in the hands of its member states. specifically, we have identified that several asean bodies are involved in the governance regional halal food policy (see figure 2). initial political leadership comes from the asean summit, which is asean’s “supreme policy-making body,” comprised of the heads of state or government of asean member states (asean, 2008). this body sets the organization’s priorities for the halal food market in its asean economic community blueprints. the more recent blueprint was adopted in 2015 and is known as the “2025 blueprint.” this blueprint indicates that strategic measures to promote deeper economic integration within the region should include the enhancement of regional cooperation regarding halal food and drink (asean, 2015a). asean’s economic community council (aec) is in charge of leading and coordinating all asean initiatives toward greater economic integration and reporting to the asean summit (asean, 2008). the aec is also comprised of representatives of asean member states. under the aec, specific “sectoral ministerial bodies” are in charge of designing and leading implementation activities. the sectoral ministerial bodies implement the decisions adopted by the summit within their respective field, and are in charge of strengthening cooperation within asean members. they report to a specific community council (asean, 2008). in the case of halal foods, the relevant ministerial body is the annual asean meeting of ministers of agriculture and forestry (amaf). the amaf divides its activities into individual policy actions, which are spearheaded by the “special senior officials meeting of the asean ministers of agriculture and forestry” (som-amaf), which is composed of senior officials of asean member states. som-amaf creates and monitors the activities of the halal food working group. it was this body, therefore, that greenlighted the draft of the in p re ss journal of asean studies 141 2019 halal guidelines and sent them for adoption by the amaf (afsn, 2003). finally, it must be noted that national governments are also present at the working-group level via their own asean-based “national focal point,” which is responsible for promoting coordination and communication about national-level implementation. according to pasierbiak, integration into the asean common market is more complex than european integration due to the many divergences between member countries, across their economies, politics, religions, and languages. the asean way is an accepted strategy practiced in negotiations between member states. the approach considers the domestic interest as essential than the asean, slowing the asean’s common market. the existing barriers show it (pasierbiak, 2018). therefore, any accomplishment achieved by asean is a steppingstone to another step of the market integration goal. as such, consensus on halal food standards can lead to harmonizing regional halal policy. figure 1 institutional framework for halal food in asean. source: author’s modification from asean secretariat asean’s new consensus on halal food guidelines material scope asean’s 1999 and 2019 general guidelines establish the basic requirements that food products should meet in order to be marketed as halal in intra-asean trade. although the wording of these asean instruments causes them to resemble secondary legislation in p re ss 142 harmonizing halal in asean (asean, 1999), the guidelines are not legal instruments generating legal rights and/or obligations for businesses, public authorities or third parties (davinia, aziz, & dehousse, 2016). the 1999 guidelines explicitly indicated that they were formally adopted to provide the food industry and halal food accreditation bodies with guidance on what foods could be marketed as ‘halal’ for intra-asean trade. by contrast, the 2019 version of the guidelines does not include such a specific statement, avoiding the identification of any specific addressee (public bodies, businesses, or third parties). the guidelines cannot force its member states to adopt (or revise) domestic legislation governing market requirements (asean, 1999). still, they do represent a high level of consensus in that specific matter and aim to nudge asean member states into revising their domestic standards to reflect the consensus reached the regional level and crystalized in the guidelines, to in turn facilitate the development of the regional halal food market. in light of the potential role of the guidelines as agents for legislative harmonization, the next sections of this paper explore the guidelines in substantive terms to identify the areas in which asean members have been able to build new consensus regarding what characterizes halal foods and where consensus remains elusive. the asean guidelines for halal food define key concepts and identify the characteristics that must be met by a food product to be lawfully labeled as “halal” within asean. this focus on food labeling was made abundantly clear in the first version of the guidelines: the 1999 text explicitly indicated that it governed “the use of the term ‘halal’ by the country’s islamic authority on the label of products” and even designed asean’s halal food logo to be used on the labels of such foods an element that was dropped in the newest version of the guidelines (asean, 1999). the key difference between the two versions is that the 2019 guidelines are much more detailed. this increased level of detail is clear when looking at the table of contents and length of both documents. the 1999 guidelines (which had nine sections and two annexes) provided a definition of shariah law ) and “halal” (asean, 1999), a general description of what was to be considered “najs” (asean, 1999) (unlawful, as opposed to halal, which means lawful), the main categories of sources for lawful food and drink (asean, 1999), and the basic requirements for lawful slaughtering (asean, 1999) and manufacturing of lawful products. by contrast, the 2019 guidelines (a document comprised of 12 sections and four annexes, and being almost double the length of the 1999 document) go into much further detail when it comes to providing working definitions for key concepts, detailing the basic requirements for the “receiving, preparation, processing, sorting, determination, packaging, labeling, marking, controlling, handling, transportation, distribution, storage, and service of halal” (asean, 2019). for example, while the 1999 guidelines only defined the terms “shariah law,” “halal,” and “najs,” the 2019 guidelines also provide working definitions for other concepts relevant to the categorization of certain animal sources of food as lawful or unlawful (touching upon, among others, the categorization of amphibious animals, aquatic animals, and genetically modified foods) as well as working definitions relevant to the use of the document itself (defining competent authority, food additives, food chains, food safety, etc). the summary of a comparative study on asean halal guidelines 2019 and 1999 can be seen in table 2. in p re ss journal of asean studies 143 table 2 comparative study on asean halal guidelines source: authors, with 2019 halal guidelines from asean secretariat note: (*): point that is not written in the 1999 guidelines consensus building regarding the halal status of certain sources the concept of “najs” literally means “unclean” and is key to identifying unlawful foods and food sources under shariah law. in the 1999 guidelines, najs was defined in article 4 of the document as follows: according to shariah law, najs are: a. things that are themselves filthy and cannot be cleaned or cleansed such as pork, blood, and carrion; b. lawful foods that are contaminated by filth (*); and c. lawful food that come into contact with filth (*). (*) the term filth is to be interpreted according to shariah law. provision comparison (2019 to 1999) the 2019 guidelines is an adoption and modification of the oic/smiic 2011 halal food guidelines. scope (art.1) ‘who’ and ‘which stage.’ definition (art.3) detailed on any terms, expand (e.g., amphibious animals, safe food, food not containing human parts) stunning (art.4.3.5, annex b) not recommend unless necessary, unclear, only allow electrical stunning machinery, utensils, production lines (art.7)* very detailed identification and traceability (art.10)* clearer packaging and labelling (art.11)* strict rules, certification coo legal requirements (art.12)* comply with national regulation najs (art.3.11, annex a) definition provision, precise explanation sources of food and drinks (art.4.1-3)* complete, complex explanation: source of food, drinks, and rules of slaughtering the general requirement for slaughtering (art.4.3.1-6) goes stricter and very specific in technical slaughtering procedure (art.4.3.6, annex c) pre-, during, and post product and service (art.5)* halal status based on products product processing (art.6) relatively similar, added safety storage, display, service (art.8) likely the same, added transport aspect hygiene, sanitation and food safety (art.9, annex d) stricter, annex method ritual cleansing in p re ss 144 harmonizing halal in asean this definition (using the loose concept of “filth” as the key to identifying najs, with pork, blood, and carrion examples of potential filth sources) left room for varied interpretations regarding what was lawful or not. just as loosely, the 1999 document provided a simple categorization of lawful sources of food and drink (merely breaking sources into animal, plant, and drinks) (asean, 1999). this choice reflected several differences among asean member states, as much as among islamic schools of thought, regarding what constitutes lawful food sources. we can find these differences in the implementation of a halal standard. for example, malaysia’s halal standard is mainly based on shafie madhab; meanwhile, indonesia’s halal standard follows shafie but also considers other madhabs of hanafi, maliki, and hanbali (azam, moha, & abdullah, 2021). this issue has historically been of paramount importance, to the point that the 1997 codex alimentarius’ guidelines on halal food to this day still include a brief foreword stating that the codex alimentarius commission accepted “that there may be minor differences in opinion in the interpretation of lawful and unlawful animals and in the slaughter act, according to the different islamic schools of thought;” and that, “as such, these general guidelines are subjected to the interpretation of the appropriate authorities of the importing countries” (fao, 1997a). in the 2019 guidelines, the definition of najs provides a much more precise explanation of the concept. in particular, this indicates that any food products coming from dogs and pigs and their descendants, any liquid or object discharged from the orifices of human beings or animals (such as urine, blood, vomitus, and excrement), halal foods that are contaminated or come into direct contact with things that are non-halal, animals that are not slaughtered according to shariah law, food and drink considered, containing or mixed with khamr are to be considered najs (asean, 2019). another important consensus related to najs was the decision regarding ritual cleansing. the cleansing method has different rules in which the countries follow the school of thought. the 1999 guidelines do not specify how ritual cleansing is practiced to clean najs. it happens because, in the guidelines, the definition of unclean material is interpreted as filth, which member states can interpret differently depending on the madhab they follow. in the 2019 version, the unclean materials have agreed upon the terminology of najs, followed by a ritual cleansing method in accordance with shariah law. asean member states consent to adopt the shafie madhab cleansing requirements (asean, 2019). it is questionable to adopt it with codex requirements. the religious method requires water mixed with soil to get purity of materials according to religious point of view. therefore, the cleansing method needs to be done by people who know and understand the practice of halal ritual cleansing, so they will not be misled to exercise and contradict the codex. the asean member states reached a consent in identification and traceability mechanism for halal food, which it does not arrange in the 1999 guidelines. the 2019 guidelines set the rules that halal food shall be easily identified and traced/tracked throughout the production process. the guidelines require the producer to be responsible for providing “suitable means” to identify halal food’s status. the producer must control and record this “unique identification” of the halal product to guarantee the traceability of halalness (asean, 2019). in p re ss journal of asean studies 145 in addition, the categorization of food and drink sources as lawful/unlawful is much more detailed, extending to the halal status of processed foods. in a nutshell, the asean guidelines in both 1999 and 2019 require that the product and its ingredients/components are prepared, processed, or manufactured using equipment and facilities “that are free from contamination with non-halal materials” and are at all times kept separate from non-halal products. they both indicate that, in order to be considered halal, a product must come from a lawful source (as described in the previous section) and comply with additional requirements described in the guidelines themselves, among others, to the handling, processing, and manufacturing of the food product. while the 1999 guidelines did not go into any additional detail, the 2019 version into further specifications for the more varied elements. for example, it indicates that oil or other materials in contact with machines and utensils shall be food grade and not made of non-halal materials, while the 1999 version did not include any specification for food contact materials at all. the 2019 guidelines illustrate the additional consensus of asean member states on the status of certain food sources. several pages of the 2019 version of the guidelines are dedicated to exploring the sources of lawful food and drink. they indicate that the source of halal food of animal origin is divided into halal and non-halal animals. it then describes which animals are considered non-halal, including the exception of aquatic animal substances derived from non-halal animals. additionally, it indicates that all types of blood and its products are nonhalal, including any liquid and objects discharged from the orifices of human beings and animals, such as urine, excrement, vomit, and pus. regarding the lawful sources of drinks, it dictates that all kinds of water and non-alcoholic beverages are halal (asean, 2019). most importantly, the 2019 guidelines reveal that some consensus was built regarding the halal status of genetically modified foods (gmf). whereas the 1999 guidelines did not mention genetical modification, the 2019 version provides a working definition of what constitutes a gmf (asean, 2019) and clarifies that gmf is considered halal when made using “genetic materials” (animals or plants) that are themselves considered halal based on the rules set in article 4 about the sources of halal food and drinks (asean, 2019) . this new provision reflects that, by the time of adopting the new asean guidelines, some members had similar views on gmf. indeed, the national halal standards of malaysia, brunei darussalam, indonesia, and singapore provide virtually the same definition for gmf (deuraseh & brunei darussalam, 2020; department of standards malaysia, 2009; mui, 2013). the differences between the two versions of the asean guidelines also show how consensus was built regarding the rules on slaughtering and stunning animals to be used to prepare halal foods. in the 1999 version, the agreement was limited: in brief, manual slaughtering was set as a general rule, provided a relatively detailed description of the process for mechanical slaughtering for poultry (using mechanical knives), and included basic rules for electrical and mechanical stunning. the 2019 sections on the rules of slaughtering and stunning are far more detailed, even including the description of stunning mechanisms, slaughtering premises conditions, and certification of the slaughterer. for example, regarding lawful animal stunning, the 1999 guidelines ruled that equipment used for stunning was to be “under the control of a muslim supervisor or trained muslim slaughterman or halal in p re ss 146 harmonizing halal in asean certification authority.” for electrical stunning, “the strength of current used to be controlled by the certification authority” (asean, 2019). the 2019 version goes into detail to the point that it also includes explicit parameters for electrical stunning for different types of animals by detailing the ampere that should be used and the duration (asean, 2019). areas where lack of consensus remains a comparison between both versions of the guidelines is also useful for identifying areas of regulation of halal foods that remain contentious among asean member states. one of the controversial issues is the regulation of the use of alcohol in “halal” prowhich is said to originate “from the antilegal domestic decision-making culture of many asean members” (kahler, 2000). it frames a model for regional integration that emphasizes informality and intensive consultation to identify common interests and lead to consensus in making collectducts. indeed, asean members follow different fatwa (ruzulan et al., 2020) on “khamr,” (pauzi et al., 2019), a concept referring to substances able to intoxicate the mind deuraseh, 2003) , such as most alcoholic products. most members allow “(non-khamr) ethanol/alcohol in food and beverages” (mansur et al., 2022) within certain limits, with the notable exception of brunei darussalam (deuraseh, 2003). the general rule is that alcohol is allowed in food and beverages if it is present naturally or produced unintentionally, as long as the final presentation of alcohol in the food or drinks is not intoxicating and remains below 1% of alcoholic volume, and as long as the sources for its creation are themselves halal. still, some differences in alcohol regulation exist among asean countries. for example, in singapore (muis, 2020) and malaysia (jakim, 2011)) alcohol can be used in flavor and color additives at less than 0.5% volume as a stabilizer if it is not derived from the winemaking process. in indonesia, alcohol can be used at less than 1% per volume in food and beverages(mui, 2020). the lack of consensus has made it so that asean guidelines do not include an identification of the percentage of the alcoholic volume that is intoxicating. in fact, the guidelines avoid defining the concept of khamr altogether. this is not a minor issue, as products that contain khamr ingredients are automatically considered unlawful. still, by indicating that products considered khamr are unlawful instead of saying that any product containing alcohol is unlawful, the asean guidelines do not automatically classify alcohol as najs. one might still consider it unclear whether there is an emergent consensus regarding stunning. the 1999 guidelines permit two methods of stunning, electrical and mechanical. the 2019 version only set rules and parameters for electrical stunning. the 2019 version does not recommend animal stunning unless necessary(asean, 2019), and indicates that electrical stunning should be an option only for large animals under specific procedures and mechanisms by considering animal’s type and weight (asean, 2019). the 2019 version does not clearly state whether mechanical stunning is forbidden or simply unrecommended under these guidelines. however, none of the provisions related to stunning prohibits mechanical stunning. mechanical practice is considered riskier in terms of fulfilling halal requirements. in p re ss journal of asean studies 147 improper mechanical stunning can cause the animal not to recover fully or risk death, which means it breaks shariah rules. halal slaughtering requires animals to remain alive at the slaughtering moment rather than carrion (najs/unlawful) (riaz et al., 2021). annex b of the 2019 guidelines indicates that the guidelines implement a ‘reversible stunning’ approach that claims to promote harmlessness to animals, which the guidelines accordingly consider compatible with the islamic ethic (chao, 2022)). there is uncertainty and as consequence, a lack of consensus, about whether the 2019 guidelines restrict mechanical stunning or allow it for specific techniques used. the issue in which the lack of consensus is clearest is that of the potential adoption of a regional halal labeling scheme (and its corresponding certification and accreditation scheme agreed upon at the regional level). the promotion of common halal labeling was the main objective of the 1999 guidelines, which specifically indicated that they were “to serve as a basic requirement for accreditation of food processing establishments for intra-asean trade in halal food” (asean, 1999) and to guide the countries’ islamic authority on the use of the term “halal” on the label of products for intra-asean trade (asean, 1999). accordingly, the 1999 guidelines included the design of a regional “asean halal logo” to be used in the label of the foods (or the premises of food establishments) (asean, 1999), the certification of which was to be carried out by third-party certification bodies accredited for such task based on an accreditation scheme established at the member state level but based on a regional standard. it was within the mandate of the halal food working group to draft regional guidelines designing these certification and accreditation rules(fao, 2004). the common asean halal logo was never implemented, and there is no mention of this in the 2019 version of the guidelines. so far, it has been reported that the working group has failed to find room for consensus in this regard (international trade centre, 2015). legal implementation and enforcement of the guidelines in national law is essential. the 1999 version did not consider how to place the asean halal guidelines in the domestic legal system. experience has shown that asean member states proved reluctant to adopt and implement the 1999 asean halal guidelines. however, the 2019 guidelines guarantees that the application of the guidelines will not conflict with domestic halal regulations by emphasizing that halal products shall also comply with relevant requirements or rules at the national level(asean, 2019). therefore, this provision can only force asean members to reach a consensus to adopt and implement the 2019 guidelines as a reference for domestic halal guidelines if members are willing to do so. predictably, referencing the asean halal guideline will therefore be more advantageous for asean member states with less developed halal standards than for members with established halal standards and frameworks. international influences on the asean halal food guidelines the drafting in p re ss 148 harmonizing halal in asean the regulatory choices in the asean guidelines cannot be fully understood without examining the role that international instruments developed outside of asean have played in forging a new consensus about what constitutes halal food at the regional level and whether an effective implementation of the basic requirements set in the 2019 guidelines is possible. therefore, we next examine how similar initiatives adopted in other international fora have influenced the drafting of the asean guidelines and identify international instruments that are normative references for the correct implementation of the asean guidelines. there are a multitude of halal standards used in international trade (abdallah et al., 2021). therefore, asean did not start from scratch when drafting its guidelines: the two versions of the guidelines are based on existing guidelines negotiated in different international fora, with modifications. the first asean guidelines were “based on and in line with” the unofficial meetings of religious ministers in brunei darussalam, indonesia, malaysia, and singapore (mabimsidb, 2017). guidelines for preparation of food and drink for muslims and the codex general guidelines for use of the term “halal” (asean, 1999). the role of codex standards is unsurprising, as the 1999 version of the guidelines was drafted in parallel to the drafting of the 1997 codex standard on halal foods by a group of participants that had (mostly) also been part of the working group drafting the codex standard(fao, 1997b). mabims’ influence in asean regulation was also predictable, given that mabims guidelines or reports are often used to reference halal harmonization in asean (asean, 1999; mabims-idb, 2017). the codex alimentarius standard on halal is limited to issues of the term halal. this leaves out halalness throughout the entire food chain and excludes some halal requirements under sharia law, for instance, regarding zabihah/slaughtering, stunning, traceability, and packaging materials. a relatively strong consensus is that a uniform global halal standard will be nearly impossible to achieve. in the context of the codex alimentarius, egypt made efforts to push for harmonized guidance on halal products; to date, this initiative is stranded(fao, 2019). therefore, regional harmonization of a halal standard that references international islamic organizations might be an alternative in this respect. the updated guidelines of 2019 identify a different source for the drafting of the revised basic requirements for halal food: they are a modified adoption of the (oic/smiic) 1:2001 standard of the organization of islamic cooperation/standards and metrology institute for islamic countries(smiic, 2017). in fact, the 2019 asean guidelines can be considered a regional adaptation of the oic standard, where definitions and rules are amended, improved, or further explained to obtain a more detailed rule that matches asean member states’ positions. for example, the asean version replaces all mentions of “islamic rules” in the smiic rule with “shariah law” and replaces references to the “adult muslim” with “a practicing muslim who is mentally sound (aqil) and of age (baligh)”. it also makes several modifications concerning the substantive elements of the rules: for instance, it amends specific slaughtering requirements and provides a more detailed identification of lawful sources for halal food and drink (asean, 2019). in p re ss journal of asean studies 149 the fact that both guidelines build on consensus already reached in international fora for muslim countries reflects the fact that such organizations (where membership is based on shared religious belief instead of geography) create opportunities for asean members to discuss controversial issues by providing a different forum that is isolated from controversies that may arise in regional discussions. work such as the smiic is a valuable way of defining halal standards that are demonstrably backed by a large part of the islamic community. smiic standard develops toward existing standards by considering all schools of thought (azam et al., 2021). the application: international law as normative reference the 1999 asean guidelines explicitly state that they are to be “used together with” national and international instruments governing the food market (asean, 1999). this generic statement is reaffirmed in a more concrete manner further in the document, which provides that all foods shall be prepared, processed, packaged, transported, and stored in such a manner that they comply with the hygiene and sanitary requirements of each member country and codex general principles on food hygiene and other relevant codex standards(asean, 1999). this statement might suggest that the instruments adopted by the codex alimentarius commission were to be considered normative references for the asean guidelines. in practice, controversy arose in the region regarding whether codex rules were to be considered to complement asean requirements, as the 1999 guidelines did not identify codex rules individually (by name or number), but simply indicated that foods should comply with ‘relevant’ codex standards (asean, 1999). as a soft law instrument, the halal food guidelines are not enforceable by asean. rather they confirmed its members’ consensus on certain issues. as such, the guidelines should apply together with the individual legislation and existing national halal requirements. the products produced in asean should comply with domestic and regional harmonization standards. the adoption of codex rules is significant. in the words of the fao, “[a]lthough codex rules lack legal force, it has been an integral part of international trade framework to prevent and assist trade dispute” (fao, 2016). codex is used as a reference by the wto court to determine standards for specific foods. codex can “scientifically justify norms” (fao, 2016) of technical assessment in the sps and tbt agreement. in order to clarify the situation, the 2019 version of the asean guidelines includes a specific section on applicable other legal norms, which states the following: the following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of this guideline. the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. cxs 1-1985, general standard for the labeling of prepacked foods; cxc 1-1969, general principles of food hygiene; and in p re ss 150 harmonizing halal in asean cxc 58-2005, code of hygienic practice for meat. additionally, the 2019 guidelines explicitly identify that codex rules are to be applied together with the asean guidelines regarding three different issues: first, regarding the safety assessment of gmf, the updated guidelines indicate that “the assessment of safety of the gmo should be done in accordance with relevant codex guidelines or equivalence” (asean, 2019) . in specific, the reference is pointing to codex guideline for the conduct of food safety assessment of foods derived from recombinant-dna plants (cxg 45-2003), codex guideline for the conduct of food safety assessment of foods produced using recombinant-dna microorganisms (cxg 46-2003), and codex guideline for the conduct of food safety assessment of foods derived from recombinant-dna animals (cxg 68-2008) (asean, 2019), the guidelines hold that halal food shall comply with the hygiene and sanitary requirements of “codex cac/rcp 1 and other relevant codex code of practices”. the references include but are not limited to the general principles of food hygiene (cxc 11969) and code of hygienic practice for meat (cxc 58-2006), as mentioned above. third, the 2019 guidelines indicate that cac/rcp 1 is also relevant to determining “the principles and specifies basic requirements for the design and implementation of a food traceability system for halal food” (asean, 2019). the 2019 guidelines adopted three international standards to ensure product design and traceability during the halal production process. they are general standard for the labelling of prepacked food (cxs 1-1985), the standard for requirements for any organization in the food chain of food safety management systems (iso 22000), and general principles and basic requirements for system design and implementation for traceability in the feed and food chain (iso 2205) (asean, 2019). the 1999 guidelines did not provide a specific reference to the codex rules on traceability. in regards to hygiene and sanitary requirements, for example, the animal slaughter must comply with standard cxc 58-2005, and the condition of the slaughtering premises must satisfy minimum requirements of international standard cxc 1-1969. in addition, packaging, labeling, and transportation must comply with relevant codex standards, including general guidelines on claims (cxg 1-1979) and cxs 1-1985. for example, labeling information must be on the container for pre-packaged or accompanying halal food documents for non-retail containers (asean, 2019)at the distribution and transportation stage. in contrast, the 1999 guidelines did not cover packaging materials and design standards. by listing relevant codex standards, asean clarifies that those details that are not included in the regional guidelines are to be considered regulated in accordance with codex law. this is a choice that not only nudges member states into making sure that their domestic standards are aligned with codex but also conveys to the international community that the asean regional requirements meet international standards. in p re ss journal of asean studies 151 conclusions this paper examines how asean has been working towards an economically integrated halal food market, “the asean way.” the process described in this paper illustrates how asean’s decision-making works in matters of timeline, parties involved, and the nature of the output. we find that the asean way decision-making is characterized by (i) a lengthy and intensive consultation process carried out at the regional level but controlled by member states, (ii) which results in the adoption (by consensus) of soft-law instruments defining regional requirements for halal foods, (iii) without an enforcement mechanism. the analysis also shows that initiatives at the international level, which are negotiated outside of asean, have been key to achieving asean milestones: asean did not commit resources to work on their guidelines until the codex alimentarius commission launched the negotiation of its codex rule for halal foods. the two versions of the asean guidelines are based on and complemented by codex rules and similar documents negotiated and adopted in other international fora (specifically, mabims and the oic). we conclude that the evolution of the asean guidelines shows how the asean way can facilitate consensus-building regarding controversial areas of halal food regulation. however, this progress partially depends on international developments in other fora close to asean. substantively, the most relevant developments between the two versions of the guidelines include the advances made regarding the categorization of different sources of food and drink, the technical requirements applying to the lawful stunning and slaughter of animals, and the clarifications regarding the presence of khamr in food and drink. the later examples also show that regional guidelines build on similarities in interpretation of islamic law, even in areas where full agreement is not yet possible. additionally, a key success of the negotiation process is clarifying the role that international instruments (particularly codex standards) play in implementing the guidelines. the clarification of the role of codex law is not a minor accomplishment, as the use of codex references as international trade standards is key to penetrating the global halal food market; hence, the guidelines are a vehicle for asean-made halal products to enter the global halal food market. notwithstanding these successes, our analysis shows that fundamental differences regarding halal food regulation remain, particularly regarding the design of a regional halal labeling and a certification and accreditation scheme. in this context, the current asean poa for halal foods recommends exploring the potential of bilateral mutual recognition agreements as a hard-law tool to facilitate regional trade. considering this, it may be argued that asean may have hit the end of the road regarding promoting legislative harmonization in the halal food market using soft-law tools. this is an important avenue for future research. conceptually, harmonizing halal standards promotes greater unity and cooperation among asean member states. it helps establish a common understanding and approach in p re ss 152 harmonizing halal in asean towards halal certification, which in turn can facilitate trade and investment within the region. practically, harmonizing halal standards can also have significant economic benefits. with the halal market growing rapidly worldwide, asean members adopting harmonized halal standards can tap into this lucrative market more effectively. additionally, harmonized halal standards can help to reduce costs and enhance efficiency for businesses operating in the region. studying harmonizing halal in the asean framework under asean way is a worthwhile endeavour with conceptually and practically significant benefits. it is an important step towards greater unity and cooperation in the asean region and can help to unlock new economic opportunities for member states. acknowledgment the author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers, the asean secretary coordinator of the asean ministers on agriculture and forestry (amaf), and the members of wageningen university’s law group for their input and recommendations. this research was funded by the islamic development bank (isdb) in cooperation with the ministry of education, republic of indonesia. about the authors eva johan is phd candidate at the law group of wageningen university in the netherlands and a lecturer at the law faculty of universitas sultan ageng tirtayasa (untirta), banten, indonesia. her research interest includes international law, international economic law, wto law, and asean law. maría josé plana-casado is an assistant professor of law at the law group of wageningen university in the netherlands and a board member of the bioethics & law observatory of the university of barcelona. her main research 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(2006). collective action problems and regional integration in asean. contemporary southeast asia, 28(1), 115–140. https://doi.org/10.1355/cs28-lf https://www.wto.org/english%e2%80%8c/docs_e/legal_e/%e2%80%8c17-tbt.pdf https://www.wto.org/english%e2%80%8c/docs_e/legal_e/%e2%80%8c17-tbt.pdf https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03380-3_17 https://www.eria.org/uploads/media/rpr_fy2015_no.1.pdf https://doi.org/10.1355/cs28-lf journal of asean studies, vol. 6, no. 2 (2018), pp. 213-230 doi: 10.21512/jas.v6i2.4946.g3492 ©2018 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic night market from h. lefebvre’s ‘space as practiced’: the case of davao city, philippines raymundo r. pavo university of the philippines mindanao abstract guided by lefebvre’s (1991) notion of space as practiced, the night market is a result of actual and evolving activities of street vendors as they subsist in the area for their livelihood, as they interpret and apply the governing rules set by the local government unit (lgu), and as they respond to emerging events in the areas such as the bomb blast which happened in 2016. with such experiences and responses, the narratives of the vendors reveal that as they occupy their spaces within the night market, they maximize the limited lot which the lgu has accorded to them, invent some rules which do not violate the policies set by the lgu so vendors can extend their stay in the place after the three-month rule, and capitalize on the potential of their experiences after the bombing incident by redefining themselves as survivors and as symbols of resilience in the city. it is through these actuations and positions that the vendors’ manifest their strength and capacity to rise above structures and situations that regulate and confront the roxas night market. thus, the experiences of the street vendors when gleaned from the perspective of lefebvre’s space as practiced stand for an intent to convert or transform the night market into an arena of practice where their agency, identities, and quest for survival interface. when further appraised using foucault’s (1977) lens on power, such experiences also mean that the vendors articulate their participation in inventing and reinventing the stories and meaning of the roxas night market as a locus of transcendence and discipline. key words: roxas night market, space as practiced, lefebvre, foucault, power introduction as part of a growing list of activities in the evening and night time economy (ente), night markets are created to extend the day-time economic activities (hadfield, 2014). this can be recognized in cities across the country which attempt to make urban evening life more interesting for the locales and its tourists by creating night spots such as night markets. as a growing urban phenomenon, few researches, however, have been done to describe and understand the socio-cultural meanings of night markets – why it exists, and thrives, and the accounts of vendors as they subsist in the area. in the country, milgram’s (2014) study of the harrison road night market in baguio city to date stands as an example of a night market study which uses the social science perspective in 214 night market from h. lefebvre’s analyzing and interpreting its social meaning. while milgram’s work has its strengths, the work primarily looked into the interface between legality and illegalities in the night market, which occasion other areas and interest that are wanting of attention. for instance, there is a need to study the night market from the point of view of social space, and from the perspective of the vendors themselves. with the opportunity to contribute to night market studies, this paper aims to gather the stories of select street vendors, and the interpretation of such stories shall be taking-off from lefebvre’s concept of space as practiced (1991). this means that this study is interested to know the way street vendors manage and maximize their stall-sites, the manner by which they use their spaces as their interpretation of the rules set by the local government unit (lgu), and their assertions over their spaces as response to incidents that have transpired within the night market with the bomb blast as the specific point of concern. as a short background to roxas night market, this site has been existing since 2014, and its creation was conditioned by a city ordinance which was approved by the city legislators of davao city in december 2013. as livelihood space, it is composed of four units: (1) food section, (2) ukay-ukay (second hand items), (3) massage section, and (4) accessories section. for the food section, each vendor is provided with 1.8 x 3 meters, and 1.5 x 2.1 meters is allotted for the accessories and ukay-ukay sections. in the massage section, eight organizations of massage therapists are accommodated. this means that each organization is allowed to put up tents not exceeding 5 x 4 meters. given the spatial limitation, space use and maximization are primary interest for the 350 vendors. moreover, the limitation in space is coupled with a limitation in time. as a livelihood space, vending can only take place between 5pm to 1am on weekdays and 4pm to 1pm on weekends. considering the three-month rule of the lgu, vendors can only avail and access such spaces in the night market for three months. as a consequence, four batches of vendors can access the area in a year resulting in an estimate of 1,400 vendors in the area. the constraints with regard to space and time have conditioned the way vendors manage their spaces. from the interviews conducted, this research focuses on four narratives representing each of the four sections – massage, ukayukay, food and accessories. the key informants were selected based on these qualifications: (1) vendors in the night market for at least one year, (2) have experienced the three-month vending rule of the lgu, and (3) was in the area when the bomb blast happened. with these parameters, the informants can narrate their experiences and reflections with the nodes in the life of the night market hoping that their accounts will serve as microcosm on how vendors in the roxas night market make the most of their timebound and space-bound areas as new rules of the lgu and unexpected journal of asean studies 215 incidents emerge in the story of the night market. methodology this study upholds the qualitative research frame in the social sciences. the specific methods used include key informant interviews, observations, onsite mapping, and participant observations, which help provide thick descriptions from which themes or patterns unfold (peralta, 1996). for the interviews, the conversations revolve around the following concerns: (1) the processes involved in bringing their goods to roxas avenue, (2) the steps followed to assemble their vending stations, (3) the actual/concrete ways of managing their small vending spaces, (4) how vendors sell their goods to costumers, or invite potential clients for a massage for the massage therapists, and (5) eventually how vendors pack their goods, stalls and stations as they fold-up and close their livelihood space for the evening. since space as practiced means staying in the field from start to finish, this approach required at least experiencing the entire duration or cycle from 4pm to 1am. this method is needed to document the practices of the vendors as they go the rounds of operating and managing their stalls. with regard to participant observation, this was done in the stall of ricky – an ukay-ukay (second hand clothes) vendor. this means filling the role of the vendor, entertaining the questions of potential buyers, and arranging the shoes in his shoe stall. this experience facilitated observations on how vendors maximize their lots, address the questions of on-lookers, and the intersecting concerns of vendors, since at times, they receive calls or messages from family members. for the mapping of space stalls, maps were drawn on-site which was followed by comments from the vendors themselves. after the descriptive section of the study, the analysis part ensues. the spatial aspect of the vendors’ accounts will be magnified and interpreted using the lens of lefebvre (1991), and this will be critically appraised through foucault’s notion of power (1977). in so doing, the productive relation between the narratives of the vendors on their practices within the night market as social space, and the meaning of the roxas night market as space as practiced will be occasioned and critically looked into. theoretical framework this study is guided by lefebvre’s notion of space as practiced which refers to daily routines within the context of urban realities. more to the point lefebvre holds that “the spatial practice of a society secretes that society’s space; it propounds and presupposes it, in a dialectical interaction; it produces it slowly and surely as it masters and appropriates it. from the analytic standpoint, the spatial practice of a society is revealed through the deciphering of its space” (lefebvre, 1991). this means that through the practices of individuals, social spaces or areas are created, re-created or transformed into locations of meanings. while these meanings may form 216 night market from h. lefebvre’s contradictions, this notion of space as practiced admits that there is this built-in tension in space-making which ensures or guarantees that there is room for exchange of influence, change, accommodation, opposition that condition and regulate the dynamism in social spaces. in the case of the roxas night market, its meaning as a social space is cultivated and formed by the practices of vendors, by their intentions as they make the most of their limited time and space, and by their responses to emerging changes such as the imposition of new rules, and the unfortunate bomb blast. with these combined conditions, the presence, experiences and agency of vendors in the area shape or form the meaning of the night market as a practiced space. this conversely means that in the absence of street vendors, the night market will lose its meaning as space as practiced. such critical component of the study is also enriched when coupled with foucault’s take on power, noting that power is comparable to a capacity to govern, or “to structure the possible field of action of others” (1977). since power takes place and makes manifest its bearing in a social relation, foucault adds that power only makes sense within the context of the possibility of resistance. he adds that because of such nature, “the relation between power as the capacity to inform-influence, and to resist – to simultaneously challenge, question, modify the influence, points to the peculiar nature of power” (1977). hence, with foucault’s stance on power, the practices of vendors within their limited spaces in the night market can be construed as questions, or as their way of asking the lgu if the night market itself will suffice to give them opportunities to improve their conditions, or the condition of the informal sector such as street vending in the city. results and discussions narratives the following narratives were selected to help describe the roxas night market as space as practiced: (1) dhoy as massage therapist. dhoy is from lake cebu, south cotabato. he started working as massage therapist in the night market in 2013 after he inquired with ate fely – massage therapist in the area, on how one can become part of the group. this inquiry, however, has been conditioned by his prior observations on how massage therapists go about their work and engage their customers, since he was first part of the night market as assistant to the stall of his elder brother in the accessories section. given his curiosity, dhoy wondered how he could possibly become a massage therapist. when asked for his motivation to work, he shared that he has a child in south cotabato. despite having no clear knowledge on how to do proper massage, he enrolled himself in a training, since he saw the potential of having better income with massage in a busy place like roxas night market. up to this day, he shares that “makalingaw ang massage ug makahatag pud ug income” (giving massage is fun and interesting, and it can provide income). journal of asean studies 217 with regard to income, dhoy recalls that in 2013, he used to earn php 700 per night when there were fewer massage therapists. since he is already a member of a massage therapist organization, dhoy also needs to allocate 5% for every massage service to the organization and php 10.00 for the rental fee for the chair he is using. for instance, if he gives whole body massage which costs php 200.00, he needs to give php 20.00 to the organization as part of his contribution to the monthly space fee which the organization needs to settle. when asked if such rates burden him, dhoy mentioned that the rates and fees are reasonable and necessary so the organization of massage therapists can address it obligations to the lgu. how do you compare your present income to your income in 2013? dhoy laments that today, he can only bring home around php 300 to 400 a day. he explains that the decrease in income is attributed to the increased number of massage therapists, and that fewer people avail of the massage service especially as a result of the bombing incident. in order to survive and deal with the pressing constraint, dhoy has become keen in keeping track of the cellphone number of his clients for home massage services, and he has upped his tools of the trade by investing on a good selection of oils, and scents, and even buying a comfortable pillow for clients who may have back pain. since i also experience some difficulties with my lower back, i tried his personalized service and even observed the reaction of other massage therapists in the vicinity. when dhoy, opened his kit, and inquired if i prefer lotion, oil or powder, i felt privileged that such options are offered especially that massage therapists will only just usually use coconut oil. having an element of surprise to his options, i also realized how dhoy values hygiene as he underscored the fact that he always uses clean towels for every client. equipped with options, his fellow massage therapists expressed that the tool kit has been dhoy’s trademark in the area. since he brings clean towels every night, dhoy also shared that after his work, he needs to soak all the used towels which he needs to wash in the following day. this is part of the cycle that he has to observe and at time endure especially if he feels unwell. dhoy knows that he needs to maintain such edge so he can keep the interest of clients and perhaps attract more in landscape of increasing and competing number of therapists. when there is no client, dhoy also stands near the entrance of the massage area or at the exit point of the food section to greet possible customers or entice them for a massage for the evening. this is the part of his work which reminds him of the uncertainty of his work, especially if its rainy season, and now, when the night market is slowly overcoming the scars caused by the bombing incident. given that dhoy has a child to support in south cotabato, and now, he needs to take care of his ailing mother, he just hopes that he will not have health problems so he can fulfill his 218 night market from h. lefebvre’s responsibilities to his family. when sick, do you also avail of the massage service from your colleagues? dhoy said that he has a group of friends whom he can request if there is a need for him to receive a massage therapy. he notes, however, that such service is not for free. knowing the kind of strength exerted in giving a massage, dhoy still pays his friend. but this time, instead of paying php 200.00 for a whole-body massage, he just gives php 100.00. what about a signature massage? is a massage therapist keen to developing his own massage style? dhoy remarked that having your own massage style is a key element. this is something which a massage therapist needs to discover or develop. dhoy also realized that having a group of massage therapists with various signature massage approach will also be good for the organization as a whole. (2) ricky as ukay-ukay vendor. being an ukay-ukay shoe vendor, has allowed me to do participant observation in his work space. i asked him if i can be his assistant for the evening as we install, and sell the items in his rack. after installing the make-shift post, and hanging the shoes, ricky explained that unlike other shoe vendors, he does not lump all shoes so as to maximize the small space that each stall has. ricky has a different concept of maximizing space. he explains that after his years of experience displaying shoes, he realized that customers prefer to stay longer in a stall if each shoe displayed has sufficient space for it to stand out. “dili kinahanglan itapok gyud tanan” (it is not necessary to lump everything). noting that in a shoe sack – which he bought for php 3,000.00, he selects and sorts the good quality shoe pairs from the rest. explaining that a good quality shoe can be sold for php 1,500.00, he thinks that it will be faster for him to recover his capital if he pays special attention to such type of shoes. this is the reason why ricky will only hang the quality shoes in his rack and leave the rest at the back of his stall. since i was there to participate for the entire evening, i started to believe in what ricky was explaining, since we were flocked by a group of four to five potential buyers who stayed longer than usual. for ricky, giving his costumers reasons to stay longer to assess his goods increases the chance that they will end up buying a pair of shoes. as his assistant, i also realized that such approach also makes the life of ricky easier, since he can almost memorize the features of his select shoe pairs. having such information and mastery is crucial especially for customers who have an eye for good items in the ukay-ukay section. ricky is aware of the presence of some buyers who will try to find a few good buys which they will resell over the internet. these were the kinds of concerns that ricky had as he patiently shared to me some of his realizations on the kinds of customers that visit the ukay-ukay section in the night market. in between the folding beds, ricky also allocates a space so his buyers can have an area to move around. this space also helps ricky, since it allows him to move freely at the rear part of his stall where some of his items are kept in sacks. with ricky’s understanding of his work space and the kind of goods that he journal of asean studies 219 has been selling for years now, ricky does not worry with the other shoes that he will no longer display in his stall. he specified that he will simply bring the other shoes in a fiesta in a far-flung area and sell the shoes at a very cheap price. ricky notes that such approach has always worked for him, since people will no longer think twice buying a pair of shoes for php 100.00 or even for php 50.00. what about the three-month rule of the lgu? how does one prepare for the end of one’s contract in the night market and the possibility of re-gaining the space after 3 or 6 months? to such question, ricky shared that he plans of sharing a space with another vendor in the ukay-ukay section. at this point, ricky expressed that he has been in talks with his brother-in-law over such possibility, and shared that his inlaw is amenable to such arrangement. “lahi ra man gud kung naa ka diri sa roxas.” (it is just different when you are here in roxas selling). this was ricky’s driving point in stressing how the night market has made his life easier and better in terms of having more reliable and steady income compared to the other posts in the city which he has previously explored. “kami na man guy adtuan diri” (it is the people who come to us in this area). he is also not worried over the legality of the proposed arrangement, since there is no policy that states that sharing of space is not allowed. moreover, the person who will be selected during the draw lots will also be in the stall physically – in this case, ricky’s brother-in-law would need to be in the night market every time the presence or attendance of vendors is checked. after the draw lots, however, ricky was no longer part of the night market after i surveyed the place two nights after the drawing of lots was concluded. his absence may mean two things: (a) his brother-in-law was not drawn, or (2) his proposed arrangement with his brother-in-law did not push through. his absence also implies that i would need to wait for another three months or so to see if ricky will be in action in one of the spaces in the ukay-ukay section of the roxas night market in the near future. in closing the evening, ricky started picking up the empty sacks which were hidden beneath the folding beds. in doing this routine, ricky was quick to identify which shoes should be grouped together in a sack. when this sorting was done, he then removed the wood frame of his stalls, tie them together, and kept them in a corner. he also made sure that his area is clean, and that it is litter free. once the entire stall is dis-assembled and folded, and the space is cleared of any garbage, ricky texted somebody who soon arrived with a tricycle. this is where ricky lodged his tools of the trade, and informed me that his items are kept in a nearby house which has then served as repository for the items and good owned and sold by the ukay-ukay vendors. the following day, i walked around the vicinity of roxas avenue and i discovered three houses which were converted into ukay-ukay housing stations. 220 night market from h. lefebvre’s (3) nur’s eatery. unlike the massage area and the ukay-ukay section, a different type of space and time use maximization unfolds in the food section in the night market. nur occupies a stall in the food section of the night market. during the first round of selection of vendors after the closure of the night market as ordered by the city mayor, she was one of the few who were lucky enough to continue in their enterprise. nur also recalls how the other vendors who were not selected cried and expressed their dismay over the new system of the lgu in the selection process. but contrary to what people expect, nur was actually not happy that her name was called. it can be recalled that she is the only vendor whom i discovered who was hesitant with her new space, since she preferred to vend near her home where she can take care of her only daughter. nur complains that with the schedule of the night market, she always finds her daughter playing video games near their residence she worries over her daughter’s safety including the kind of food that her daughter eats. with her selection, she is now obliged to be in the night market on a daily basis. sharing the stall with her sisters, she now has a laminated id which shall serve as the inspector’s basis in checking if the person in their list is actually on site. in managing her stall, the space where nur is stationed is divided according to the following: grilling station, display section of chicken liver, chicken barbeque which she sells for php 65.00. she also offers pastil for php 20.00 which is a local muslim food and plain rice for php 10.00. in the stall, bottled water is also available for php 15.00. given the different items sold in her vending space, nur is stationed at the pastil and bottled area. this is also the place where i frequently eat so i can observe how nur proceeds with her tasks, and manages the entire stall. given the multitude of people who wait for their barbeque and pastil, nur shared her team can only start eating around 11pm when the number of people eventually decreases. this also means that they would need to first bear-with hunger, since they need to attend to their customers. interestingly, the rear section of the bike in nur’s stall has been converted into a grilling station. this is one of the creative and practical maximization of space in the area, which many of the vendors in the food section also have. the bike-grilling station after the night market operation will then resume with its role as mode of transportation as the vendors pile up their tables, things, and bring back their makeshift vending stall to their homes. this is also the reason why nur works with his male nephew so he can take charge of the delivery of goods and items to the vending site and bring back such items to their residence. since nur chose to sell barbeque, she also shared her difficulty in preparing the chicken liver, barbeque and pastil. this is the day-time job that many of the night market vendors need to do in preparation for the night market operations. when asked as to how she manages the income of her stall, she quipped that she simply takes note of her journal of asean studies 221 expenses and daily income. with her busy schedule, she also cited some instances when she no longer can properly record her expenses. on this point, i thought of the need for vendors to have basic financial literacy which may be of help in assessing the purchasing, preparations, and vending process and identify which section is in need of intervention. since her tables were marked by a local soy sauce brand, i inquired if such tables were provided by the said company. nur noted that some companies actually offer such items as long as the vendors will patronize their products. for nur, such arrangement is acceptable, since it is a win-win situation for vendors and the company. she added that most of the sauces in the night market are also tied-up to a brand, or company which offered them tents, tables and discounts in purchasing the select products. when compared to the other sections in the night market, it is the food section which also appears to have better condition in terms of tents, and tables, since private companies already made their presence felt via their concept of corporate social responsibility. map of nur’s vending station with its different functions in this map, the small vending space is maximized by incorporating various elements which facilitate the transactions with the vendors. also, the persons in nur’s stall are assigned to fulfill different roles: (a) for grilling, (b) selling, (c) in-charge of rice, and (d) another is tasked to clean and arrange the tables. these are the roles that figure in a vending stall to conform with the preconceived functions with a stall. in this stall, nur is responsible for the 222 night market from h. lefebvre’s preparation and distribution of rice and pastil. (4) sohaya in the accessories section. sohaya is in the accessories section of the night market, since her friend offered to her half of the space or stall-site. since there are two of them in this stall, sohaya contributes half of the monthly dues and fees for the electricity use. in her work space, one can observe that sohaya only has one long table, since the other half will be occupied by the items owned by her good friend. in this respect, sohaya would need to contend with the small space available to her, and she adds that their location also makes its more challenging for them to sell, since the stall is near the section of the canal where customers seldom visit. if given the choice, sohaya prefers to sell in the adjacent lane near the free pass area, since it is where the visitors of the night market walk through. despite the limitations of her location, sohaya just hopes that something can be done to improve the access of customers to their space. since sohaya and friend were not drawn in the next round of vendors, sohaya may take notice of the fact that today, the lgu has broadened the space between the two lanes so more vendors will pass through the stalls near the canal section of the roxas avenue. this concern has been addressed since the space between stalls were expanded to encourage more patrons of the night market to visit the stalls near the canal area. in the course of our conversation, i also asked if she plans of selling other goods in the night market area. she opined that she prefers selling accessories, since it requires lesser capital when compared with the food, and ukay-ukay sections. sohaya adds that she also does not worry with the storage of her goods and she need not concern herself with expiry dates. when asked if sohaya has a source for her accessories, she said that many of her items are from uyanguren street which is also the china town of the city. this is an instance which supports my hypothesis that the roxas night market can also be considered as an extension of china town, and is china town’s evening economic sibling. especially with the accessories section, most of the goods on display can actually be seen and bought in china town, which, however, closes at around 5pm. it is on this note that the roxas night market can be considered as an extension of the economic fervor in china town at day-time, and is also contributory to the vigor of the china town in davao city. is sohaya aware of such point? she said that the chinese business people in uyanguren are lucky, since their goods are still sold even at night time through the presence of the roxas night market. on the day of the interview, rain unfortunately poured which meant having lesser income for the evening. this also means having to immediately put-up a huge plastic cover so their goods will not be drenched. since the rain continued, sohaya called it a night as she decided to put back all her items – such as socks, handkerchief, and other accessories, back to her huge rainbow-colored plastic bag. journal of asean studies 223 this action also meant that it was time to also wrap-up our conversation, since sohaya was already looking at the tricycle which will ferry her goods back to their house. unfolding themes from the narratives from the narratives of the informants, the following themes emerged: (1) working for the family, (2) practical innovations, (3) contingency plans, and (4) family concerns. (1) working for the family. the limited space and time that a vendor in the night market deals with have conditioned their efforts to make the most of what such delimitations can offer. this is a common approach that intersects in the four different yet interrelate accounts of space and time use. also, this is where the structuring role of space and time figures in the experience of the vendors (giddens, 1979). an important approach that can be observed is how the individual’s efforts intersect with the need to work with a group of people, family, or with other vendors. if this point is made pronounced, each stall in the night can be reckoned as an effort of a community of individuals (nirathron, 2006). this means that the motivation for work, the efforts to maximize space and time, and the importance of upholding the rules set by lgu suggest the varied concerns that each stall in the night market considers, deals with or tries to acknowledge or respect. this is the reason why dhoy, for instance, reminds himself of the need to work better as a massage therapist for his child, and now, for his ailing mother. his desire to be better brings him back to the reasons why he wants to make his chances of finding clients improve. the motivation to help the family is also true for ricky, sohaya and nur. despite the varied circumstances, they all agree with dhoy that their efforts will hopefully bear meaning in the lives of the family members who in one way or another depend on them for their economic sustenance. in order to make a difference in the lives of loved ones, the narratives suggest that in practicing one’s creativity and resilience in the accorded space also means working well with others, or finding a sense of refuge from the opportunities which others may want to share (nirathron, 2006). this is the clear case of sohaya who was able to find in her friend the generosity to partition half of her space so they can both continue in their economic endeavors in the roxas night market. without her friend, i, too, would not be able to meet sohaya who can be considered as an example of a young vendor who may as well change the kind of vendors in the future – educated and willing to find a balance between formal and informal work. (2) practical innovations. converting the rear part of a bicycle into a grilling area is a viable manifestation of an innovative output of vendors in the food section in the night market. a closer look at their ways and means as they operate their makeshift stalls condition the need to make the most of what a limited space and time has to offer (low, 2017; dovey, 224 night market from h. lefebvre’s 1999). this creative tactic was also demonstrated by dhoy who did not want to settle with the usual practices of fellow massage therapists. by preparing and investing his own version of his tools of the trade, he can always claim in the massage area that his approach to his work is reflective and sincere. the idea emerged because of his keenness in observing practices surrounding his area. through observation, he was able to initiate himself into the world of massage therapists, and through other rounds of observation he imagined what his customers need to make their stay as clients of massage services unique and physically rewarding. another strategy that ricky projected and which sohaya used is to navigate themselves in the rules stipulated by the lgu. by having a shared vending space, both ricky and sohaya give themselves more chances of extending their stay in the night market. this is a practice that is also done by other vendors in the area, and for them, it is acceptable as long it will not cause trouble to other vendors. nur also demonstrated that she actually needs to share her space so she can sell more, and perhaps add more to her savings. will the government allow such approach if everyone will adapt such method? from a critical lens, such disposition is also conditioned by the necessity to fight the constraints and difficulties brought about by poverty (nirathron, 2006). moreover, the critical perspective is reminiscent of bourdieu’s habitus (1990), the night market as space as practiced also points to the vendors’ mastery of their spaces. while the confined space gives the impression that it should require less mastery, it is the other way around, since the small space is saturated with various elements that need to work together. this mastery or cognitive map has also become intuitive for the vendors. the accounts of ricky and dhoy, for example affirm such points, since they have already started innovating and distinguishing themselves from the other practices of vendors. for ricky, he has learned that it is better to prioritize quality shoes in the display section, and the small spaces where the potential buyers can navigate with; while dhoy knows that giving customers options and showcasing a tool box sets him apart from the other massage therapists. such insight has been conditioned by his years of experience and work, and some observations with his fellow therapists. this is why up to this day, dhoy still manages to survive and support the needs of her child in cotabato city. this is where vendors also showcase their mastery of the logic or principle behind vending as a social and entrepreneurial activity. (3) contingency plans. nur is a good example for this theme. while admitting that she prefers to work near her abode, she also underscores her capacity to work and vend elsewhere if it so happens that she will no longer be selected, or her sisters in the next round of the drawing of lots. the kind of preparedness that she has speaks of the journal of asean studies 225 ready plan, or plan b if in case, the night market will no longer be accessible for another three months or so. the same spirit of readiness can also be seen in the narratives of ricky, sohaya and dhoy who have been into vending services and goods for years. the experience has provided them options in case some of their goods will not be sold in the night market, as in the case of ricky, or the accessories of sohaya can still be sold in other parts of the city which sohaya has done even when she still in her elementary years, or dhoy’s effort to beefup his relation with clients who can just text or call him for home service type of massage. given these options that they have created as they practice their skills and craft in their spaces in the night market, the vendors in the roxas night market can be said to have the laid down contingency plans so they can still survive, or outlive the challenges that may ensue in the process of finding a sense of permanence in the time-bound and spacebound structures of the night market. (4) family of vendors. vending is a family enterprise. as family, this also expands to relatives and even close friends. this is the reason why nur was still in the night market despite hoping that her name will not be drawn during the first batch of vendors. when i visited her stall, and ate at her vending site, she was surrounded by her relatives who also sold food and were assigned to fulfill specific functions in their stall-site. the scene made me understand why nur decided to vend still, since it means giving economic opportunities to her relatives. like sohaya, she was also fortunate to have a close friend generous enough to share a space with her. this also explains why sohaya shared that if her name will be drawn, her friend can also vend with her. this seemingly working partnership means that vending is not an individual activity. it involves the family, relatives and friends. ricky, in the management of his vending stall, applies the same logic. the socio-cultural nature of vending in the night market means that it embodies certain community values and expectations. these values and expectations assume even greater depth when gleaned within the context of the family (nirathron, 2006). since many of the vendors are migrants, their shared stories and experiences mean that it will be difficult, if not anti-thetical for them to not consider the benefits of working together. this also explains why the context and concept of a family is a crucial element in understanding the space-use practices of vendors. analysis: space as practiced as locus of meaning when gleaned from the perspective of lefebvre’s space as practiced (1991), the vendors have articulated their capacities to convert or transform the night market into an arena of practice where their agency, identities, and quest for survival interface. this ability is conditioned by their mastery of street vending as an enterprise, a way of life, and coupled with the necessity to live and take advantage of the night market as livelihood opportunity. such is the case 226 night market from h. lefebvre’s since the vendors have decided to face the difficulties that they regularly encounter as they continue to street vend. it is because of such commitment or assertion that the night market can be taken to mean as an expression of their effort and struggles to survive and decently live. the changes and changing arrangements in the night market which is generally a characteristic in urban landscapes (low, 2017) have somehow helped shape the way street vendors deal with their vending spaces. as changes in urbanity increase, the street vendors also find themselves in changing situations that force them to respond as part of the process of survival. a concrete example of such unexpected change is the three-month rule imposed by the lgu. when the rule was implemented, the street vendors were initially distraught by the news. they were initially unconvinced by the seemingly anti-poor stance of the lgu. noting how the city mayor was serious in addressing the violations of some street vendors, the other vendors who were not remiss with their obligations complained of the blanket punishment. it is this seemingly inherent contradiction in space as practiced that lets lefebvre argue that space making or space production subsists or grows from such types of tension. in the absence of this dialectical spirit, space will only be produced by a privileged vantage point such as the lgu’s and it will purposely impose its position to other entities who can also be agents of space production. noting the patterns in the logic of practiced space, lefebvre adds that what accounts as the obvious day to day practices are fulfillments of the plan or design created the planners. in the case of the night market, the lgu expects its plan to be visible which is its measure of success. but from the lens of the street vendors, such design also stands as in invitation for innovation. take the case of sohaya who invoked her choice to share her space with a friend to increase her chance of staying in the night market for at least another three months. this plan manifests the inherent dialectics in space making. in space as practiced, what seems to be good and acceptable to the planners or designers may be reinvented along the way. also noting how practicing agents come from different perspectives and backgrounds, the evident practices in the night market can also be compared to the tip of the iceberg. this means that underneath the visible practices, less visible actuations, dispositions and negotiations emerge and come-in and redefine the logic of practice in the area. more so if the street vendors think of the changes in the governance of the place as a test of their capacities to survive or make the most of emerging situations. given that such is the disposition of the street vendors, it can be inferred that the street vendors will always have a say in how the night market as a practiced space will take shape. this is actually the undertone of the two themes that emerged from the narratives of the vendors: practical innovations and contingency plans. journal of asean studies 227 the practices and dispositions of the vendors when the bomb blast happened in the area also revealed the way the street vendors managed the night market as practiced space. dealing with the least expected and terrifying situation, the vendors took the challenge to assist the lgu in reclaiming the area from fear and insecurities. how did this ensue? showing their strength in confronting their fears with the terror brought about by the incident, and recalling their experience with bombing incidents from where they were originally from, the vendors helped the city, and not just the lgu in retrieving the sense of security and safety in the area which the bomb blast dislodged. making sense of lefebvre’s notion of space as practiced which is also fueled by the aspiration for ‘a firmly grounded everyday life’, such account points to the vendors’ intent to decipher the incident not as a moment of retreat or surrender but as a case where they can communicate their stance that they will hold-on to the livelihood spaces. this show of commitment further shows strength in their identity as vendors, the urgency to resume in their livelihood engagement to earn again, and the meaning of the night market in their lives as a space which have productively and uniquely interfaced with their day to day practice. although a critical stance may point out that such commitment to the night market is a result of an absence of better options in the city, the decision to reclaim the night market also underscores the point that for the vendors, the night market is a space that belongs to them. despite knowing that they will be losing their spaces after three-months to other street vendors, they still put premium to the possibility of returning to roxas night market in the near future, and their contribution to some street vendors whom they also know and have become friends with. in relation to foucault’s notion of power, the vendors’ position to decipher and reinterpret the events in the life of the night market can also be taken to mean as the vendors’ re-appropriation of the night market as a space where they demonstrate two interrelated sides of power which foucault (1977) refers to as transcendence and discipline. for instance, the vendors’ power as transcendence is revealed in the way they treat their working space armed with a sense of flexibility and possibility. as the lgu imposed the three-month rule, the vendors pushed the boundaries of their imagination as their limited spaces where further confined by the rule. as time asserted its hold on space, the vendors realized that such change should be met with strategies. this is where the transcendental capacities of the street vendors are showcased. knowing that the lgu exercises a governing power, the vendors elected to make use of their imagination through their practical innovations. as they also take lessons from their efforts and experiences in street vending in the past, one clear position that they have argued is that one should not succumb or yield to unfolding structures that aim to delimit options. but despite such efforts to remain defiant, this question should still be 228 night market from h. lefebvre’s considered: will vendors eventually accede to the limitations in space and time as their access to the night market is consistently challenged? this is a question which the lgu should also consider as a point of reflection given that the lgu has always asserted its power over informal work such as street vending. also, will the contract between two vendors agreeing to share their spaces be eventually prohibited given that such innovation is not yet considered violative of any rule set by the lgu? recognizing the importance of immediately confronting the terror which the bomb blast has sown, the lgu – in an indirect fashion, sought the help of the vendors in reclaiming the night market from fear by encouraging them to go back to their post. this is where the lgu recognized that the street vendors are also in possession of a transcendental power. knowing that the lgu cannot reclaim that night market on its own, its request to the street vendors to immediately resume vending means that the lgu also displayed its vulnerability. this is confirmed by the vendors’ remark that they were shocked to note that it was the first time that they were being requested to vend again. in previous engagements with the lgu, the vendors have always been in a defensive mode fearing that they will be evicted or blacklisted. recalling that the vendors where once disciplined as an entire group when the lgu decided to have the night market closed for 13-days due to violations of a few vendors, they remembered how they were dispersed and found themselves unsure of their immediate future. despite such experience, the street vendors still recognized and appreciated how the lgu officials approached and invited them to continue vending in the area after the bombing episode. noting foucault’s concept of discipline, this is where the vendors helped discipline two things: (1) the terror that emerge from the occurrence, and (2) the lgu as street vendors demonstrated how they can assist the lgu and the city deal with the effects of the terrorist attack and regain the city’s over-all sense of courage. will the night market be closed once more in the future? given how the vendors helped the city deal with the effects of terrorism, the vendors hope that the night market will remain, that night market as a vending space will be made more accessible by increasing the number of vendors each quarter, and that the lgu will not forget the vendors’ contribution in helping the city move-on from the terrorist incident. more to the point, the construction of the memorial marker will hopefully serve as the reminder that the street vendors have helped in the healing process of the city as a whole. since the marker has assumed a symbolic value, will the lgu continue to acknowledge the assistance that it has received from the street vendors in reclaiming davao city’s secure and peaceful aura or mantle? or, will the memorial marker be a remembrance of how the people of davao together with the lgu joint forces to squarely deal with the effects of the terrorist attack? there are other queries journal of asean studies 229 which the vendors hope will not slip into oblivion to help discipline or influence the lgu’s decision with regard to the fate of the night market in the city’s future urban landscape. conclusion the roxas night market as practiced space gleaned from lefebvre’s position of the production of space speaks of a rhythm which the street vendors have created as response to the governing rules implemented and imposed by the lgu. this rhythm, when closely looked at, is made possible by the vendors unique take of the vending spaces, and their assertion of their right to claim the livelihood spaces legitimized by the lgu, and the vendors’ commitment to express their stamp on the role and meaning of the night market in relation to the city’s story of rebuilding itself from the terror caused by the bombing incident. although difficulties arose due to the rules imposed by the lgu, the street vendors decided to maximize the limited vending time and space. it is this commitment to ensure that the night market stays where the street vendors locate and propose their interpretation of the night market as space as practiced. the logic of practice that permeates the night market is further nuanced by the transcending and disciplining sides of the vendors seen through the lens of foucault (1977). this means that the experiences and situations of the vendors when seen from such lens inform and enforce daily habits which make-up the fabric of the roxas night market as space as practiced (lefebvre, 1991). hence, the practices of vendors in the night market, their interpretation of their spaces along the rules set by the lgu, the vendors’ relations with their family and fellow members, and their reflections with the bombing incident have contributed to the conditioning of actions and decisions that uniquely subsists in roxas night market. in construing the night market as practiced space, the street vendors have shown that the place is a site of learning new skills, testing old abilities, and carving identities within the shifting and changing urban landscapes of the city. about the author prof. raymundo r. pavo is a currently the head of the department of social sciences, university of the philippines mindanao. he graduated with an ab philosophy degree from the university of san carlos, cebu city (magna cum laude), and obtained an ma in philosophy from katholieke universiteit leuven, belgium (cum laude). he also finished his phd in development studies from the university of the philippines los baños. in development work, he is a member of the national gender resource pool (ngrp) of the philippine commission on women (pcw). references bourdieu, p. (1977). outline of a theory of practice. (r. nice, trans.). new 230 night market from h. lefebvre’s york, ny: cambridge university press. dovey, k. (1999). framing places: mediating power in built form. new york, ny: routledge. foucault, m. (1977). discipline and punish: the birth of prison. (a. sheridan, trans.). new york, ny: vintage books. giddens, a. (1979). central problems in social theory: action, structure and contradiction in social analysis. los angeles, ca: university of california press. hadfield, p. (2014). the night-time city. four modes of exclusion: reflections on the urban studies. urban studies, 1–11. doi: 10.1177/0042098014552934 lefebvre, h. (2014). the production of space (1991). in j. j. gieseking, w. mangold, c. katz, s. low, & s. saegert (eds.), the people, place, and space reader (pp. 289–294). new york, ny: routledge. low, s. (2017). spatializing culture: the ethnography of space and place. new york, ny: routledge. milgram, l. b. (2014). remapping the edge: informality and legality in the harrison road night market, baguio city, philippines. city and society, 26(2), 153–174. retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1111/ciso.12038 nirathron, n. (2006). fighting poverty from the street: a survey of street food vendors in bangkok. bangkok, thailand: international labour office. peralta, j. t. (1996). ethnography field manual. quezon, manila: national commission for culture and the arts https://doi.org/10.1111/ciso.12038 forced migrants, media, and securitization: making sense of the changing representations of transit asylum seekers in indonesian print media1 antony lee kompas newspaper, indonesia abstract this paper aims to explain how and why the representations of transit forced migrants in indonesian major print media had significantly shifted in two timespans: (1) during the arrivals of the indochinese refugees in 1975-1996 and (2) in the period of the new generations of refugees from middle eastern and south asian countries in 1997-2013. using media content analysis of 216 news articles from three major print media in indonesia, this study has found out that the indochinese refugees were given positive labels and they were mainly discussed in connection with the non-security themes. in contrast, the new generations of forced migrants were portrayed negatively, given labels such as ‘illegal immigrants’ and they were framed as security threats. grounded within securitization theory, this paper thus argues that the changing representations were likely caused by the securitizing moves made by specialized agencies in indonesia. key words: transit forced migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, media representations, securitization theory, indonesia *1 this paper is originally a summary of some parts of the author’s master thesis at lund university, sweden, entitled ‚securitization of transit forced migrants: an analysis of the changing representation of refugees and asylum seekers in indonesian major print media‛. journal of asean studies, vol. 5, no. 2 (2017), pp. 75-101 doi: 10.21512/jas.v5i2.3923 ©2017 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic 76 forced migrants, media, and securitization introduction in the midst of the indochinese refugee crisis in july 1979, the indonesian minister of foreign affairs mochtar kusumaatmadja when interviewed by reporters said, ‚if asean countries refuse to provide protection for refugees then the third countries will use it as an excuse for not receiving the refugees‛ (kompas, 14 july 1979). the minister used the term ‘refugees’ to represent people who flee their home country due to political instability and conflict. in line with this label, the government also discussed the issue of protection. decades later, commenting on refugees stranded at the sea border between indonesia and australia – which created diplomatic tension between the two states – the indonesian minister of foreign affairs hasan wirajuda said, ‚they are illegal immigrants. should we let them come in, even when our law does not allow it?‛ (tempo magazine, 9 september 2001). unlike the first statement, the second statement shows how the recent forced migrants were labeled as ‘illegal immigrants’. thus, their attempt to anchor their boats in indonesian soil should be prohibited. the changes in the way the forced migrants are discussed within those two timespans are very striking, which consequently leads to questions of how and why the changes happened? how immigrants are perceived in the receiving or transit countries has become a central issue in the academic world as well as in the realm of immigration policy. categorizing immigrants contributes to different treatments among them as the different terms have social and political implications for people who are labeled within those categorizations (brun, 2010, pp. 337-355). moreover, ‘refugees’ and ‘asylum seekers’ have different meanings compared to ‘illegal migrants’, with the last term usually associated with crimes (koser, 2006, p. 44). previous studies on how refugees and asylum seekers are perceived negatively by hosting countries have been conducted mainly in relation to western countries. those studies predominantly discuss how media and government represent refugees and asylum seekers negatively – as a security threat (esses, medianu & lawson, 2013, pp. 518-536; gilbert, 2013, pp. 827-843). khosravinik (2009) shows that the representations of refugees and asylum seekers can change in different socio-historical settings, though he does not intend to explain the crucial problem of why representations of forced migrants change. studying the changes can contribute to knowledge on the possible socio-political drives behind the changes, thus providing a more comprehensive picture on the nexus between media representations and transit forced migrants. this paper will try to fill this gap not only by analyzing how the representations have changed but also by seeking explanations on the causes of these changes. journal of asean studies 77 additionally, this study will also fill out another research gap, which is the representation of forced migrants in a transit state – since issues of border controls, asylum seekers management, and immigration policies’ transfers from australia to indonesia have otherwise been dominating studies on refugees and asylum seekers in indonesia (missbach, 2013, pp. 281-306; kneebone, 2014, pp. 596-618; nethery & gordyn, 2014, pp. 177-193). this paper discusses how transit forced migrants2 were portrayed differently in indonesian print media within two different socio-political settings – during the arrivals of indochinese migrants in 19751996 and during the influxes of new generations of international migrants in 1997-2013. this study uses media content analysis in order to see the patterns of forced migrants’ representations. the results show that the forced migrants were portrayed differently. indochinese migrants were labeled mainly with the positive term such as refugees, while the new generations of refugees were portrayed with more 2 the transit forced migrants in the context of this paper means that the migrants did not actually intend to stay in indonesia, but rather used indonesia as a stepping-stone while awaiting their resettlement in a developed country, such as australia. additionally, indonesia still has not ratified the 1951 united nations convention on refugees, which means that the indonesian government will not grant refugee status for foreign applicants and also will not offer permanent settlements for refugees. however, the indonesian government allows united nations high commissioner for refugees (unhcr) to open an office in indonesia and take care of refugees’ applications. negative labels, such as illegal immigrants. securitization theory is utilized in order to shed some light on the possible explanations behind the changing representations. the paper is structured as follows. the first part provides a brief explanation on the arrivals of international forced migrant in indonesia. the second part discusses the theoretical framework of this study, which is followed by a section discussing methods and data collections. the fourth part discusses the research result, while the fifth part is discussion section that will be followed by the last section – conclusion. international transit refugees in indonesia the end of vietnam war in 1975 was marked by the victory of the communist regime that caused massive outflows of vietnamese-chinese descendants who resisted the communist ideology. thailand, malaysia, and indonesia were three countries in southeast asia that received the biggest number of vietnamese refugees (see table 1). those countries were considered a transit location for the refugees who intended to stay in developed countries. according to an indonesian historian, asvi marwan adam, the inflows of indochinese refugees to indonesia can be divided into three periods (swastiwi, 2012). first, the period of 1975-1978, which was marked by the use of refugee camps on several indonesian islands. second, the period of 78 forced migrants, media, and securitization 1979-1989 which was marked by the establishment of a refugee camp on galang island. additionally, this period was also characterized by the leniency in granting refugee status. lastly, the period of 19891996, where forced migrants had to face stricter screening processes. missbach (2013, p. 292) notes that after june 1989, refugee status, while initially granted to all of the indochinese forced migrants, started to become assessed on an individual basis. in this sense, each asylum seeker had to provide evidence of his/her claim. a person who failed to provide substantial evidence would face repatriation. the first group of indochinese forced migrants that used indonesia as transit country was recorded on 19th may 1975, when a group of 92 people arrived and then continued their journey to singapore (fandik, 2013). on 22 may 1975, a boat that carried 25 refugees anchored at north natuna island, indonesia (ismayawati, 2013). in the first quarter of 1979, the arrival of refugees to indonesia rocketed to about 40,000 people. in comparison, however, the number of indochinese refugees in indonesia was a mere 2,800 people in 1978 (ismayawati, 2013). table 1. indochinese refugees’ arrivals by boat in countries of first asylum 1975-1995 countries 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1995 accumulation malaysia 124,103 76,205 52,860 1,327 254,495 hong kong 79,906 28,975 59,518 27,434 195,833 indonesia 51,156 36,208 19,070 15,274 121,708 thailand* 25,723 52,468 29,850 9,280 117,321 others 30,538 48,139 25,200 3,076 106,953 total 311,426 241,995 186,498 56,391 796,310 source: unhcr (2000: 98) *thailand received higher overland indochinese refugees that reached 640,246 people in total from 19751995 during the same year, the indonesian government also offered galang island as a refugee processing camp. the idea was warmly welcomed by those states in the international community who ended up donating money for the establishment and operational costs of the processing camp. this movement resulted in the international community applauding the ‘humanistic’ approach of the indonesian government towards the transit forced migrants (kompas, 19 june 1996). initially, galang island refugees´ camp was proposed to only last for 2-3 years from the first time it was established in 1979 (kompas, 24 july 1981). however, it took 17 years before the indonesian government closed the camp in august 1996. from the 121,708 journal of asean studies 79 refugees using indonesia as transit location, 111,876 of them were resettled in third countries – with the vast majority of the refugees being resettled in the usa (ismayawati, 2013). not too long after having dealt with the influx episode of the indochinese forced migrants, indonesia started to receive new generations of forced migrants who mainly came from some countries in the middle east, central asia, and south asia, such as afghanistan, iran, iraq, and sri lanka. the first inflow of forced migrants from afghanistan and iran that arrived in indonesia was recorded in 1996, 12 of which traveled by air (missbach, 2013). unlike the indochinese refugees who gained widespread public attention within indonesia due to their significant volume in 1979, the new waves of forced migrants only began receiving attention after the mv tampa incident at the end of august 2001. the australian conservative government rejected a request by mv tampa – a norwegian ship – to dock in australia. this was due to the ship having rescued 438 forced migrants that sought for an asylum in australia. these migrants were initially onboard of an indonesian ship that had sunk in the sea (mckay et al., 2011, pp. 607-626). this incident created diplomatic tension between australia and indonesia because both countries refused to receive the forced migrants. table 2. refugees and asylum seekers in indonesia 2006-2013 year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 refugees 301 315 369 798 811 1,006 1,819 3,206 asylum seekers 265 211 353 1,769 2,071 3,233 6,126 7,110 returned refugees 0 0 1 311 0 0 35 0 others 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 people on concern 566 526 726 2,878 2,882 4,239 7,980 10,316 source: unhcr (2007-2014) unlike the indochinese refugees who were accommodated on galang island, the ‘new generations’ of forced migrants live in several cities in indonesia. some of them have to stay in immigration detention centers while others can stay in cheap hotels or rent rooms or houses from local residents. the majority of forced migrants that are allowed to live in open detention centers stay in bogor, west java, in riau, sumatera island, or in makassar, sulawesi island. the international organization for 80 forced migrants, media, and securitization migration (iom) provides funding for food for refugees and asylum seekers who are detained in immigration detention centers at a cost of idr 15,000-25,000 (usd 1.5 to 2.5) per person per day (nethery et al., 2012, p. 102). forced migrants living outside the immigration detention center also get a monthly living allowance from the iom or from other international organizations. refugees and asylum seekers have to sign a certificate declaring their compliance before they are allowed to live outside immigration detention centers. the declaration consists of five points, including: ‚the refugees should stay within specific area designated by the directorate general of immigration; refugees are not allowed to be at the airport or seaport unless accompanied by an immigration officer, *…+ and refugees should report to immigration every two weeks for purposes of registering their presence‛ (peraturan direktur jenderal imigrasi nomor imi1489.um.08.05, 2010). theoretical frameworks this section discusses the nexus between media representations and securitization of transit forced migrants. establishing the link between those issues is critical in order to provide a theoretical foundation to answer the questions of: how and why the portrayal of forced migrants in indonesian major print media was different within two different time spans. this section is divided into two correlated parts. the first part explains media representation theory that provides an explanation on what media representation means and how this, in turn, affects the forced migrants’ changing portrayals in media. the second part discusses securitization theory: key concepts, and how this theory can be useful in this study. media representations the way media portrays social groups, whether in connection with their sexes, races, religions or origins, is the primary concern of media representation theory (levinsen & wien, 2011). according to chavez (2001), media representation is closely connected to the construction of meaning. referring to hall’s notion of representation, he underlines that people ‚use symbols to communicate, or represent what we want to say about our feelings, beliefs, concept, plans, etc‛ (chavez, 2001, p. 34). in this sense, the news articles do not merely consist of passive or neutral symbols or words; rather, they actively produce and convey ‘messages’. how media represent forced migrants has implications on the public perception of who forced migrants and thus, how to treat them. on the one hand, public ‚discourse‛ influences media; on the other hand, media, in turn, influences the public through its role in reconstructing and developing ‚discourse‛ (petersson, 2006, p. 41). the former argument is in line with geraghty’s (2000, p. 368) point of view on the importance of the media´s role in making journal of asean studies 81 ‚realistic representations‛. geraghty furthermore argues that the representations will only work when they go along with the audience’s understanding of the object being represented. in a very extreme example, when the media represent a pigeon as a dangerous and deadly animal, the audience might refuse to accept those representations if society, in general, perceives the pigeon as a friendly and adorable animal. however, when the audience, hypothetically speaking, already believes in the possibility of the pigeon as a vector of avian influenza – a deadly virus – they might accept the representations of the pigeon as a dangerous animal. media representations of a particular social group do not reflect the ‚true nature‛ of the group being portrayed since media representations are inevitable social constructions. moreover, edgar and sedgwick (2002) argue that representations have nothing to do with the interests of the represented groups or how the groups expect to be portrayed. a group, according to these scholars, "can be represented in a manner that might be conceived as stereotyping them" (edgar & sedgwick, 2002, p. 339). this argument fits well into the context of transit forced migrants. it is not in the interests of forced migrants to be represented as ‘outsiders’ or ‘illegal immigrants’. instead, those representations are put forth as stereotypes that might jeopardize migrants’ interests. therefore, what triggers media to represent something as they represent it? does it reflect society’s understanding of certain realities? krzyzanowski and wodak (2009) as cited in busch and krzyzanowski (2012, p. 279) argue that several studies have shown the connection between media representations and political agenda on the issue of migration and asylum seekers. the argument is based on the concept of ‚chain of recontextualizations‛ in which the media and politics have dual directional relations. first, political discourses are taken by media through politicians’ statements or speeches. second, discourses in the media are used by politicians (bernstein, 1990; wodak, 2000; cited in busch & krzyzanowski, 2012, p. 279). securitization theory the previous section in this part has led to two understandings: what is represented in the media is the construction of reality, and the media representations can arguably be influenced by political agendas which can construct an issue as a security problem. in that regard, securitization theory is helpful for this study in two ways: (1) it enables one to situate the issue of transit forced migrants in the realm of either security or nonsecurity, and (2) it allows one to identify when an issue has or has not been securitized. securitization has become one of the prominent theories of security studies in the last few decades. this theory is closely 82 forced migrants, media, and securitization associated with a group of scholars referred to as the ‘copenhagen school’, which consists of buzan, waever, and several others (columba & vaughan-williams, 2010, p. 75). the theory provides for the possibility of widening the concept of security. this is possible because securitization theory does not subscribe to the understanding of security by objectivist’s who assumes the existence of ‚objective‛ threats is outside of their social construction. for several decades, the realist-traditionalist’s understanding of security has dominated security studies. this view presupposes the state as the most important aspect of security and thus situates the military sector as the main response to security concerns (sheehan, 2005). in contrast, securitization theory – grounded in a constructivist paradigm – challenges the objectivist understanding of security by arguing that security is socially constructed. however, the copenhagen school does not offer a subjective construction of security that lies upon personal perspectives of threats because this might result in a radical relativist’s way of understanding security. instead, the copenhagen school proposes a middle ground between objective-positivist and subjective-relativist. they highlight an ‚inter-subjective process‛ of the construction of security (buzan et al., 1998, p. 30). according to hansen (2000, p. 288), the ‚inter-subjective‛ understanding paves the way for the widening of the security concept but is also able to hinder ‚unlimited expansion‛ that can make the security concept become meaningless. before further discussing the key concepts of securitization theory, i would like to highlight a crucial concept from the copenhagen school that is central to this paper, which is ‚the spectrum of public issues‛. according to buzan et al. (1998), public issues can be understood from a spectrum consisting of non-politicized, politicized, and securitized issues. the first point refers to an issue that is not debated publicly and therefore, the state has no involvement in the issue. when the issue is politicized, the state will have a role in it and the issue will receive public attention, which will then lead to debate. a securitized issue means that the issue is perceived as an existential threat to a particular object. thus, an extraordinary response is employed (buzan et al., 1998, pp. 23-24). concerning the process of how an issue becomes a security concern, ole waever (1995, p. 55) argues that ‚security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real: the utterance itself is the act‛. his claim is based on the concept stating that security could be regarded as speech acts, where declaring something as a security issue is an act. it means that an issue or social groups can be securitized if actors enunciate to certain audiences that the intended issue poses an existential threat to one or more particular referent journal of asean studies 83 objects and that therefore, in order to handle the issue, extraordinary measures need to be taken immediately (waever, 1995, p. 55; buzan et al., 1998, p. 21). it is the dynamics of those components: actors, existential threats, referent objects, extraordinary measure, and audiences that are central to securitization theory. an existential threat generates a sense of urgency and therefore locates an issue on the top of the priority list that needs to be handled immediately, often using unusual measures. the securitization can only work if the object being presented is currently under threat or is considered as something fundamentally important (buzan et al., 1998). however, ‘speech acts’ – the epistemology of securitization theory – has mainly become the object of criticism by other scholars working with the widening of the security concept. balzacq (2005, p. 181) claims that speech acts focus too much on the ‚internal‛ nature of threats, but negate ‚external threats‛ that have nothing to do with the discursive strategy of speech acts. in contrast, he argues that language influences people´s perception of reality, but language does not construct it. in other words, language plays a role in the construction of meaning, but it is not the only thing that matters. his epistemological stance allegedly differs from that of the copenhagen school, which buzan et al. (1998, p. 204) claim as ‚radically constructivist‛. drawing upon the case of securitization of migration in greece, karyotis (2012) underlines a relatively similar problem on the inability of the ‘speech acts’ approach to illuminate the non-discursive process of the securitization of migration. as the consequence, he argues that speech acts fail ‚to capture the full dynamic of the complex process through which issues are raised on the security agenda‛ (karyotis, 2012, p. 392). huysmans (2000) provides a suitable alternative theory that can illuminate the ‚complex process‛ of the securitization of migration presented in this paper. huysmans highlights that ‘speech acts’ can impose securitization, but it is not the only possible way. securitization can also be imposed through ‚restrictive policy and policing‛ (huysmans, 2000, p. 751). the latter argument is developed to tackle the ‚weak‛ point of the discursive approach – that speech acts that only focus on political speeches in the public domain inevitably belittle the less visible, but still influential, works of ‚security experts‛, such as the police (huysmans, 2006, p. 8). in that context, i find the concept of ‚security continuum‛ that huysmans developed from didier bigo to be useful for this paper. security continuum is ‚an institutionalized mode of policymaking that allows for the transfer of the security connotations of terrorism, drug trafficking and money-laundering to the area of migration,‛ (husymans, 2000, p. 760; huysmans, 2006, p. 71). huysmans further explains that the transfer of security concern 84 forced migrants, media, and securitization to the migration issue will work in the way that it would change people’s perception on the initial meaning of migration issue or refugees´ issue. hammerstad (2014, pp. 268269) also shares a similar idea to huysmans by arguing that in many cases, refugees and asylum seekers are not directly referred to as ‚threats or enemies‛, but ‚they were lumped together with other more traditional scary trends such as international crime‛. in this paper, i include other types of crimes that, according to previous studies, are regularly connected to migrants, such as people smuggling, arms smuggling, human trafficking, global mafias, and arms smuggling (sorensen, 2012; curley, 2008). in a nutshell, the theory is useful for this study in two ways. first, almost all public issues can be securitized, thus the way the media represent refugees and asylum seekers can contribute to securitization or it can also be a tool to analyze whether an issue is securitized or is not. second, securitization can take the form of direct labeling to migrants as existential threats (buzan et al., 1998). it can also take the form of lumping the migration issue together with frightening crimes (hammerstad, 2014). methods and data collections this study uses media content analysis as an analyzing tool. media content analysis is a ‚message-centered methodology‛ (neuendorf, 2002, p. 9, cited in macnamara, 2005, p. 1) that is useful in the analysis of a broad range of texts, from the contents of newspapers or newsmagazines to the content of films and television programs (macnamara, 2005, p. 1). hansen et al. (1998, p. 95) argue that this method is ‚by definition a quantitative method‛ due to its emphasis on identifying and counting topics or communication symbols in texts under scrutiny. this method is chosen for this study because it provides patterns of media portrayal over time on particular issues in large corpuses (berelson, 1952; gunter, 2000, cited in levinsen & wien, 2011, p. 842). in this sense, content analysis is used to establish representation patterns of the transit forced migrants in indonesian major print media over the period of 38 years. before i designed my research, i first conducted a pilot test with small samples. this pilot test was intended to see whether this study is worth doing in the first place. the samples were kompas newspaper articles with the distribution of 54 articles representing the period of the indochinese refugees’ arrivals, and 63 articles representing the period of the new generations of forced migrants. in that sense, the results shall be the basis for the overall design of this research. in utilizing content analysis, this study subscribes to the procedure of hansen et al. (1998, p. 98-99); (1) formulating research questions, (2) choosing samples, (3) constructing categories, (4) developing coding schedule, (5) testing the journal of asean studies 85 coding schedule in small scale and readjusting it, and (6) conducting the full coding and thus analyzing the data. all of the steps are performed in a sequential order. the categories and the coding schedule are developed in parallel to one another by consulting to the pilot study, the literature review and also to the theoretical framework. the news samples were taken from three prominent and influential media houses in indonesia. two of them are newspapers, namely kompas and tempo, while the other one is a newsmagazine named tempo. there are some reasons as to why these three print media sources were chosen. first, two out of the three media sources were established before the arrivals of indochinese refugees in 1975. kompas newspaper was founded in 1965 while tempo magazine was established in 1971. tempo newspaper was established in 2001, but since it is under similar editorial management, it can be argued that the reports of tempo magazine during the arrival of indochinese refugees are somewhat comparable to the news articles of tempo newspaper. this enables this study to access continuous reports on refugees from different time spans. second, these three media sources are also the highest ranked indonesian media in terms of their circulation. additionally, those media also have an expansive national distribution, as well as nation-wide news coverage. third, these media houses have high reputations for their good quality in indonesia. when the selection of media sources and time periods were completed, the next step taken was to select news samples in accordance with ‚relevant content‛ (hansen et al., 1998, p. 104). the samples were chosen through relevant sampling design, with the use of certain keywords. internal search engines from kompas and tempo were used since indonesia does not have an integrated media archive. searching for articles on vietnamese refugees, the keyword combinations used were those of pengungsi (refugees), vietnam, imigran gelap (illegal immigrants), indocina (indochinese). for the recent waves of refugees, the keywords were imigran gelap (illegal immigrants), transit, indonesia, pengungsi (refugees), suaka (asylum). as many as 256 entries were found in the data selection through relevant keywords for the indochinese refugees and 298 entries for the time after the arrival of indochinese refugees. in order to find samples that serve the purpose of this research, all of those articles were read and reselected. for the articles that only mentioned indonesia, but no indonesian sources were mentioned, the items were omitted. in total, there were 216 relevant samples3 that were coded for this study, with distributions of 129 articles from kompas newspaper, 37 articles from tempo magazine, and 50 articles from tempo 3 other studies that used media content analysis had various numbers of samples, ranging from 203 articles (nolan et al., 2011) to 1,174 articles (levinsen & wien, 2011). 86 forced migrants, media, and securitization newspaper. for the articles distribution which was based upon the time span, 123 articles were published in time span of new waves of forced migrants (1997-2013), while 93 articles were published during the indochinese forced migrants’ arrival (19751996). results the results show that the way transit forced immigrants were labeled and discussed in one period evidently changed in the other. the content analysis of the labels was conducted at the level of the entire article. each article was only coded once. during the period of the arrival of the indochinese refugees, the vast majority of the sample used positive labels. the label of ‘refugees’ appeared in 72 percent of the news samples. in total, the combination of positive representations such as ‘refugees’, ‘mix-positive’ and ‘boat people’ reached 89 percent. mix-positive contains a combination of two or more of the positively connoted labels, such as ‘refugees’, ‘boat people’,4 and ‘asylum seekers’. the use of negative terms, such as ‘illegal immigrants’, was very low. there was no single article that solely used ‘illegal immigrants’ to represent the migrants. 4 in this study, i categorized ‚boat people‛ as a positive label. i was aware that it might be problematic to categorize ‚boat people‛ as a positive label since in developed countries, it has negative connotation. however, for indonesians, ‚boat people‛ shows the plight of the forced migrants that had to leave their country on an unsafe vessels and with limited resources. therefore, it evoked local people’s sympathy. instead ‘illegal immigrants’ was always used together with a positive label like ‘refugees’ (see table 3 for details). in contrast, the uses of labels dramatically changed in the second time span; negative labels dominated the major print media´s representation of the transit forced migrants. the ‘illegal immigrants’ label appeared in 60 percent of all news samples, while the combination of positive labels – ‘refugees’, ‘asylum seekers’, and ‘mix positive’ – appeared only in 5 percent of the samples (see table 3). changing themes the content analysis also scrutinizes the way transit forced migrants were discussed in the media reports. in this study, the unit of analysis was at the level of an actor´s statement. each actor´s statement in a report was coded only once. in total, there were 209 statements coded from 93 articles in the period of indochinese refugees and 278 statements coded from 123 articles in the second period. the number of statements is the same as the number of actors making the statement. journal of asean studies 87 table 3. representations of transit forced migrants in indonesian print media labels indochinese (1975-1996) post-indochinese (1997-2013) frequency (%) frequency (%) refugees 67 72 2 2 mix positive 14 15 3 2 mix positive-negative 8 9 40 33 fugitive 2 2 0 0 boat people 2 2 0 0 illegal immigrants 0 0 74 60 immigrants 0 0 2 2 mix negative 0 0 1 1 asylum seekers 0 0 1 1 total 93 100 123 100 n = 216 table 4. themes of transit forced migrants discussion themes indochinese post-indochinese frequency (%) frequency (%) non-security 186 89 41 15 security 22 11 179 64 non-conclusive 1 0 58 21 grand total 209 100 278 100 table 4 shows that the themes of the statements in the two timespans were very different. in the period of indochinese refugees, the non-security theme was dominant, contributing to 89 percent of 209 statements. this theme incorporates discussion on the plight of refugees, living conditions, and solutions. in contrast, in the time span of the new generation of forced migrants, the security issue dominated the statements, with the frequency of 64 percent of 278 statements. the non-security themes dropped to 15 percent. changing actors regarding the actors who made the statements, the indonesian government officials appeared most frequently within 88 forced migrants, media, and securitization both time spans. in the period of the indochinese refugees’ arrivals, the government officials’ statements contributed to 48.3 percent of 209 statements. various international actors appeared at 28.7 percent. the category of ‘refugees’ statements’ was in the third place with 11 percent (see table 5). the domination of the government officials increased significantly in the second timespan. in the period of the new waves of forced migrants, the indonesian government officials contributed to 70 percent of the overall statements (see table 6). in this time span, the presence of international actors reduced to third place, with the forced migrants’ voices increasing to the second place. table 5. actors in the period of indochinese refugees influx actors total (%) indonesian government 101 48.3 ministry of foreign affairs 43 20.6 ministry of defense/military 29 13.9 local government 6 2.9 police 4 1.9 president 3 1.4 members of parliament 8 3.8 ministry of information 3 1.4 other government officials 1 0.5 immigration 2 1.0 ministry of social affairs 1 0.5 port authority 1 0.5 refugees 23 11.0 local people 15 7.2 international actors 60 28.7 unhcr 15 7.2 vietnam 11 5.3 australia 10 4.8 the usa 8 3.8 others 7 3.3 asean (collective) 2 1.0 malaysia 6 2.9 iom 1 0.5 media 8 3.8 others 2 1.0 total 209 100.0 journal of asean studies 89 although the statements by the indonesian government were dominant in both time spans, there were some shifts in sub-categories within the indonesian government category. during the time of indochinese refugees’ arrival, the ministry of foreign affairs and the ministry of defense/military were the two most dominant institutions. the ministry of foreign affairs contributed to 20.6 percent of the overall statements, while the ministry of defense contributed to 13.6 percent. these compositions changed drastically in the second time span. those two institutions dropped to third and fourth place respectively during the time of the new waves of forced migrants. their roles were replaced by dgi and inp. the dgi voices in the media reached 27.3 percent, while the inp contributed to 26.3 percent of the overall 278 statements. in addition, changes in compositions also occurred in the international actors´ category. during the indochinese refugees’ arrival, unhcr, vietnam, australia, and the usa voiced concerns regarding the care of indochinese refugees. in the period of the new waves of forced migrants, the usa’s voices disappeared. in contrast, australia’s voices became dominant. table 6. actors in the period of post-indochinese refugees actors total (%) indonesian government 195 70.1 immigration 76 27.3 police 73 26.3 ministry of foreign affairs 17 6.1 ministry of defense/military 17 6.1 local government 4 1.4 members of parliament 2 0.7 others government officials 2 0.7 port authority 2 0.7 president 1 0.4 ministry of social affairs 1 0.4 refugees 33 11.9 international actors 25 9.0 australia 11 4.0 unhcr 7 2.5 iom 5 1.8 others international actors 2 0.7 local people 7 2.5 media 7 2.5 academician/experts 6 2.2 others 4 1.4 smugglers 1 0.4 total 278 100.0 90 forced migrants, media, and securitization discussion using media content analysis, this study has identified different representations of the transit forced migrants in indonesia within two different time spans. they were labeled differently and the themes of the discussions also changed. those changes led to one major question: why were the indochinese refugees portrayed with positive labels and were discussed in non-security theme, while the newer generations of forced migrants were represented with negative labels and thus framed as security threats? the theoretical framework chapter has provided tools for answering the question. referring to buzan et al.’s (1998) spectrum of public issues, this paper can argue that the different representations were because of the issues being situated at different points of the spectrum. during the indochinese refugees’ arrival, transit forced migrants were allegedly situated in the zone of a politicized issue. in contrast, the issue of the new generation of forced migrants was in the process of moving from the politicized zone to the securitized zone. this section will further establish empirical evidence to support these arguments. the issue of the indochinese refugees was discussed widely in the print media, and thus, the government regulated the migrants (buzan et al., 1998). in 1979, the indonesian government established a refugee processing camp in galang island. within the same year, the indonesian president suharto issued a presidential decree number 38/1979 concerning the coordination for solving the vietnamese refugees problem in indonesia (keputusan presiden ri 38/1979). the decree becomes the only presidential decree to regulate international refugees transiting in indonesia (taylor & rafferty-brown, 2010, p. 144). content analysis in the previous sections has shown that in the period of the indochinese forced migrants, almost 90 percent of the samples show the use of positive labels towards the migrants. in addition, about 89 percent of 209 statements made by the actors in the samples of news articles can be grouped into the category of non-security issues. it means that even though the issue was debated in the public sphere, the migrants were not securitized. graph 1 shows that almost 60 percent out of 186 statements with the non-security theme in the period of indochinese forced migrants’ arrivals discussed refugees in relation to an effort to solve the problem. this theme includes the establishment of a refugee processing camp, their resettlement, repatriation, and international cooperation in handling refugees. the second most common theme was the humanity theme incorporating the living condition of the forced migrants, the refugees´ plight while in the journey to indonesia, the refugees´ basic needs, and their waiting time in journal of asean studies 91 indonesia. the opportunistic behavior of refugees5 was in third place. the newer generations of forced migrants that came from middle eastern countries and south asian countries were labeled mainly with negative terms, such as ‚illegal immigrants‛. labeling transit forced migrants as ‚illegal migrants‛ cannot be separated from states’ efforts to govern migration as it is not only a matter of categorizations (scheel & squire, 2014) – it represents an underlying way of the states’ thinking that inevitably contributes to why the refugees and asylum seekers are handled through tougher measures. furthermore, the previous section shows that 64 percent of 278 statements in the period of post-indochinese refugees’ arrivals discussed refugees along with security concerns. in arguing that these changes serve as signs that the issue has been securitized, it is necessary to answer the following questions (buzan et al., 1998; waever, 1995): what existential threats are associated with the transit forced migrants? who are the actors? what extraordinary measures are available to deal with the threats? in regards to threats and extraordinary measures, this study, as mentioned in the theoretical chapter, also takes into account 5 this theme of opportunistic behavior was not categorized under ‘security issues’ because it was mainly statements from the vietnamese authority saying that the refugees fled their country due to their failure to adapt with the communism’ style of life. it was not considered a threat for indonesians who are also against the communist ideology. the argument which states that forced migrants do not need to be directly referred to as threats, but to associate them with traditional or transnational crimes (huysmans, 2000; hammerstad, 2014). graph 2 provides empirical evidence for the aforementioned argument. approximately 57 percent of 179 statements – categorized as security theme – discussed the migrants along with a transnational crime theme. the crimes include people smuggling, human trafficking, and drugs trafficking. the second security issue associated with forced migrants was the illegal status of their presence in indonesia. about 25.7 percent of the statements contributed to this discussion. in total, those two threats contribute to 148 of 179 statements. in general, the transnational crimes and the illegal statuses of migrants can be categorized under traditional physical threats (innes, 2010). 92 forced migrants, media, and securitization graph 1. details in non-security issue, indochinese refugees’ arrivals graph 2. threats associated to transit forced migrants however, the societal and economic threats that appeared quite frequently in developed countries (innes, 2010) evidently are not the case in indonesia. it can be due to the fact that indonesia is a very diverse nation consisting of hundreds of ethnicities, languages, and cultures. all of those ethnicities are united by the political solution oriented, 59% humanity, 34% opportunistic behavior, 4% others, 3% solution oriented humanity opportunistic behavior others total: 186 transnational crimes, 57.00% illegal status , 25.70% territory and sovereignty , 9.50% bad rapport with local people, 2.80% fraud documents, 1.70% costing money, 1.70% refugees as potential criminals, 1.10% terrorism , 0.60% total: 179 statements journal of asean studies 93 ideology of pancasila6 – the five principles – that also includes the idea of multiculturalism. in a sense, there is no homogenous identity of ‘being indonesian’ that might be harmed by the presence of these forced migrants in transit. furthermore, the economic threat is apparently insignificant because of two reasons. first, the basic needs of the forced migrants are provided by international organizations such as iom and unhcr – not by the indonesian government. second, while waiting in indonesia, the refugees and asylum seekers are not allowed to work, which means that they cannot compete in the local job market (peraturan direktur jenderal imigrasi imi1489.um.08.05, 2010). regarding the actors who make the securitizing moves, huysmans (2000, p. 758) argues that in the european union context, the securitization of migration includes ‚multiple actors such as national governments, grass roots, european transnational police network, and the media‛. i, too, agree that securitization is a complex process. therefore, it might be problematic to refer the actors of the securitization of migration to particular persons or institutions. however, the 6 pancasila is the indonesian national ideology consisting of five principles, respectively: (1) belief in one god, (2) just and civilized humanity, (3) indonesian unity, (4) democracy under the wise guidance of representative consultations (5) social justice for all the peoples of indonesia. i borrowed a translation of the five principles from encyclopedia britannica http://global.britannica.com/ebchecked/topic/440932/ pancasila empirical materials of this study provide evidence that inp and dgi7 were the two dominant securitizing actors, making the most frequent statements in the media (see table 6). moreover, table 7 shows those two actors were mainly giving statements concerning the illegality of transit forced migrants’ statuses and other statements that linked transit forced migrants with transnational crimes. in total, those two institutions contributed to 104 statements of the overall 148 statements referring to transnational crimes and illegal statuses of the migrants. police and immigration officials gain legitimacy in securitizing the issue due to their nature of being ‚specialized agencies‛ (watson, 2009) or ‚security professional‛ (huysmans, 2000). according to watson, their main audiences – who need to be convinced on the nature of the threats and the solutions that need to be taken – are ‚the governing elites‛ (watson, 2009, p. 20). in that sense, their statements in the media shall be understood as not to get public approval of the securitizing move, but rather, they will be seen as part of ‚symbolic measures‛ (bigo, 1998, p. 158) in order to establish an image that they have done something to handle the refugees´ issue, although they do not have to 7 inp and dgi consist of various individual actors from national, provincial, and district levels. the reason for lumping them together as actors at the institutional level is due to the chain of command nature of those two institutions. it is unlikely for police officials to show dissenting opinion about transit forced migrants against their institutional policy. http://global.britannica.com/ebchecked/topic/440932/pancasila http://global.britannica.com/ebchecked/topic/440932/pancasila 94 forced migrants, media, and securitization necessarily solve the problem. in other words, the aim is to gain ‚moral support‛ from the public, while they achieve ‚formal support‛ from the elites (balzacq, 2005, p. 184). table 7. actors and the security framing of transit forced migrants actors total percentage police 58 55.8% transnational crimes 48 46.2% illegality status 10 9.6% immigration 46 44.2% transnational crimes 19 18.3% illegality status 27 26.0% total 104 100.0% the arguments thus relate to the extraordinary measures they offer. in graph 3, from 179 statements on threats associated with transit forced migrants, the vast majority offer no concrete solutions. in addition, 22.9 percent suggest severe law enforcement as a way to deal with the threats. this includes investigation into the smuggling cases and also the idea to increase punishment for people who are involved in the smuggling process. the idea of severe punishment has been implemented after the indonesian government issued a revision of the immigration law in 2011. people who are involved in the smuggling process, whether ‘directly’ or ‘indirectly’ can be convicted to 5 to 15 years in prison (article 120 of law number 6 of 2011,). the law has a massive impact on refugees and asylum seekers in transit in indonesia. with the new regulation, any kind of assistance given in connection with an alleged peoplesmuggling network can lead to imprisonment. this part has offered securitization as an explanation to understand the different representations of transit forced migrants in indonesian print media within the two timespans. yet, the argument still has a big ‚hole‛. immediate questions would be revolving around: why were the indochinese refugees not securitized? and why were the new generations of refugees securitized? journal of asean studies 95 graph 3. solutions offered to handle the migrants’ threats even though the copenhagen school is clear in providing the operationalization framework on the process of securitization, they fail to offer a comprehensive tool to analyze the reasons why an issue is securitized, while other issues are not. further analysis using additional theoretical guidance other than securitization theory is needed to scrutinize the actors’ decision to securitize or not to securitize the migrants. in this context, studies conducted by karyotis (2012) can be useful. he argues that the motivation of actors to securitize or not to securitize transit forced migrants can be explained through the notions of subconscious drives and cost-benefit calculations. additional reading towards the materials using the concepts of subconscious drives and cost-benefit calculations, combined with some domestic and global political constellations, might provide some possible explanations. the materials suggest that the decision to not securitize the indochinese forced migrants was to provide a good image of indonesia in the international community after the indonesian military invasion of east timor in 1976. ever since the invasion, indonesia had been seen by the international community as an abuser of human rights. in addition, it was also intended to attract resources and maintain legitimacy, which was possible because it corresponded to the global perception of the forced migrants. during the 1970’s the international community showed willingness to provide financial aids as well as to accept refugees. the subconscious drive was allegedly connected to the hatred of communism in indonesia after the 1965 failed coup, for which the communist party non-conclusive, 36.90% severe law enforcement, 22.90% detention, 8.90% international cooperation, 8.90% raids and arrests, 5.60% border control, 5.60% increasing resources, 3.90% deportation, 3.40% increasing surveillances , 2.20% people’s informants, 1.70% total: 179 statements 96 forced migrants, media, and securitization was accused of being the mastermind behind it. therefore, the indochinese refugees were seen as the victims of the communist regime in vietnam that deserve assistance from indonesians. the next generations of forced migrants coming to indonesia had no connection to communist regimes. in addition, the experiences of handling the indochinese refugees contributed to the understanding that following a ‘soft’ approach might cost too much while securitizing the migrants can instead attract more resources. again, this was in line with global or regional perceptions on the issue of forced migration. states have been more reluctant to accept forced migrants. additionally, securitizing forced migrants can also serve to maintain legitimacy by showing to the public that the government conducted harsh policies to deal with the aliens. still, these plausible explanations need to be explored more. conclusion drawing upon the indonesian case, the paper shows how the representations of transit forced migrants at the time of indochinese refugees in 1975-1996 were remarkably different compared to that of the new generations of refugees from middle eastern and south asian countries that came to indonesia in 1997-2013. the former were portrayed with positive labels and discussed with a non-security approach, whereas the latter, by contrast, were framed as a security threat. i have shown the different portrayals of forced migrants using media content analysis on 216 articles from indonesian major print media. this paper thus places the different media portrayals within the spectrum of public issues from the copenhagen school. this paper establishes the argument that the indochinese refugees were situated as a politicized issue, but they were not securitized. therefore, the portrayals of refugees at that time were still positive. even though they were considered a humanitarian burden, they were not framed as threats. in contrast, the new generations of forced migrants were shown as being lumped together with transnational crimes. they were also often labeled as ‘illegal immigrants’. in this sense, i argue that the issue had been securitized. even though this paper has tried to answer not only ‚how‛ the issue was portrayed differently but also ‚why‛ it was portrayed differently, further research is still necessary. the ‚why‛ aspect is still worth scrutinizing more by exploring the reasons why the actors decided to not securitize indochinese migrants and decided to securitize new waves of forced migrants. at the end of the discussion part, this paper suggests possible explanations by exploring domestic and global political constellations. however, the arguments still need to be explored more using different theory and methods. one of the weaknesses this paper appears to have is that it has not been able journal of asean studies 97 to dig deeper on the implications of moving the issue from the realm of a politicized issue into the realm of a securitized issue. did it actually solve the problem – or was the securitization of forced migration only a ‚symbolic‛ gesture? only through further research can we gain more knowledge by answering this question. in addition, this study only divides the period of over 30 years into two-time spans simplifying the complex nature of media representations. however, in each timespan, there were also different dynamics, which cannot simply be explained through the spectrum of the public issue. for example, the label that was generally used in the period of 1975-1996 was consistent, with almost no mention of ‚illegal immigrants‛. however, in the 1990’s the way it was discussed was a little different, with more emphasis on repatriation efforts. about the author antony lee is a political journalist working for kompas newspaper in jakarta. he has joined kompas newspaper soon after he finished his bachelor degree from international relations department, universitas pembangunan nasional ‚veteran‛ yogyakarta in 2006. thanks to financial support from the swedish institute, he finished his master of science in global studies at lund university, sweden in 2015. antony can be contacted through antony.lee@kompas.com and antony_lee2000@yahoo.com. acknowledgement since this paper is originally a summary of some parts of the author’s master thesis at lund university, sweden, the author thanks his supervisor from the department of political science, lund university, erik ringmar for his insightful inputs and also his examiner, katarina jönsson, for her encouraging and constructive comments. references balzacq, t. 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(2009). the securitization of humanitarian migration: digging moats and sinking boats. routledge. http://www.unhcr.org/3ebf9bad0.html http://www.unhcr.org/3ebf9bad0.html http://www.unhcr.org/478ce34a2.html http://www.unhcr.org/478ce34a2.html http://www.unhcr.org/4981c3dc2.html http://www.unhcr.org/4981c3dc2.html http://www.unhcr.org/4bcc5c9f9.html http://www.unhcr.org/4bcc5c9f9.html http://www.unhcr.org/4ce5327f9.html http://www.unhcr.org/4ce5327f9.html http://www.unhcr.org/4ef9c7269.html http://www.unhcr.org/4ef9c7269.html http://www.unhcr.org/51628f589.html http://www.unhcr.org/51628f589.html http://www.unhcr.org/52a723f89.html http://www.unhcr.org/52a723f89.html http://www.unhcr.org/54cf9bc29.html http://www.unhcr.org/54cf9bc29.html journal of asean studies, vol. 11, no. 1 (2023), pp.63−87 issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic received: 10th june 2022/ revised: 16th december 2022/ accepted: 5th may 2023 going back with glee: a case study of indonesian migrant workers engaging in circular migration erna setijaningrum1, asiyah kassim2, rochyati triana3, reza dzulfikri4 1,3,4department of public administration at universitas airlangga, surabaya, indonesia 2faculty of administrative science & policy studies, universiti teknologi mara, shah alam, malaysia erna.setijaningrum@fisip.unair.ac.id; asiyah@uitm.edu.my; rochyati_wahyuni@fisip.unair.ac.id; mrezadzul@gmail.com how to cite: setijaningrum, e., kassim, a., triana, r., & dzulfikri, r. going back with glee: a case study of indonesian migrant workers engaging in circular migration. journal of asean studies, 11(1), 63−87. https:/doi.org/10.21512/jas.v11i1.8610 abstract driven by a wide range of social and cultural forces, circular migration has become a prominent phenomenon in the contemporary world, and it is especially common among indonesian migrant workers. the research delved into what pushes indonesian migrant workers to going back to host countries for employment after returning to their home country. a case study approach was employed by which a total of 24 semi-structured interviews were conducted with indonesian migrant workers from blitar, malang, ponorogo, and tulungagung in east java, indonesia. the research reveals that non-monetary incentives such as supportive and amicable workplace environments, including the possibility of career advancements and adequate accommodations, as well as productive and familyoriented communities, act as important motivators for indonesian migrant workers to go back to host countries. furthermore, the research adds to the widening topography of migration studies by which it provides a broader picture in painting the “human” rationality behind circular migration in global south. keywords: case study, circular migration, indonesia, migrant workers, migration introduction migration-facilitated notion has been widely explored from many different angles, with particular attention paid to issues such as how lower incomes and education levels are associated with higher migration rates (majid et al., 2020; meng et al., 2020; shamsuddin, katsaiti, & el anshashy, 2022). with both low aspects of incomes and education levels in p re ss mailto:erna.setijaningrum@fisip.unair.ac.id mailto:asiyah@uitm.edu.my mailto:rochyati_wahyuni@fisip.unair.ac.id mailto:mrezadzul@gmail.com 64 going back translating as the overriding factor for rural populations to engage in migration and seek employments abroad (stark, micevska, & mycielski, 2009), the profession of migrant workers has morphed into a tenet of ensuring a better future for many of them. whether to the host and home countries or for the migrant workers themselves, the positive implications of these migration activities are substantial, including the amelioration of social and economic conditions (sayono, utami, & ayundasari, 2018), the alleviation of poverty (harkins & lindgren, 2018), and the acquisition of new knowledge, skills, and abilities by means of qualifying work trainings and acquiring adequate certifications. although there are many benefits of working abroad, such as higher pay and wider job opportunities, there are also considerable drawbacks, including health-related issues, social discrimination, exploitation and abuse. the health and safety concerns, for instance, are just one of the many repercussions of working abroad (mucci et al., 2019), mainly due to heavy workloads, long working hours, and limited resting hours that migrant workers are subjected to on the job (moyce & schenker, 2018). moreover, migrant workers are susceptible to workplace bullying (cheo, 2017) and even racial discrimination (stevens, hussein, & manthorpe, 2011) due to, for example, visible social markers such as skin color and ethnicity that induced discriminatory behaviors by employers or colleagues. importantly, the exploitation and abuse experienced by migrant worker (sherry, 2004; jureidini, 2010; sonmez et al., 2011; brennan, 2014) further lay out the pervasiveness of labor rights violations that continues to occur in many parts of the world where migration takes place. notwithstanding the struggles that plague this trend, a number of driving forces continue to contribute to this phenomenon of “circular migration,” or migrant workers returning back to the previous countries in which they were employed. in addition to the hopes of earning higher wages in the country of destination (witte & guedes auditor, 2021), factors such as employment standing and age have a significant impact on the decisions of a former migrant worker to relocate to the country from which they perceived to have obtained better jobs (thomas, 2019). similarly, the earnings that migrant workers remit to their relatives in their home countries is typically used to pay off the debts that have been incurred by either (or both) the migrant workers and their families (bylander, 2020; guérin & venkatasubramanian, 2020; hoang, 2020; lainez, 2020); and this is very likely to drive migrant workers to re-migrate as both migrant workers and their families are (in many cases) solely dependent on remittances as a means of financial support (chowdhury & chakraborty, 2021; mas’udah, 2020). in a more specific case, the phenomenon of debt-induced and debt-financed labor migration has become more visible and widespread, leading to the emergence of one of the most exploitative migration industries in the world. as a result, migrant workers’ meagre earnings often become a failed investment in long-term income-generating activities, limiting their families’ potential for social mobility because of the debt that accompanied and exacerbated migrant workers’ own poverty (hoang, 2020). circular migration is an occurrence for which there is extensive empirical and theoretical knowledge in its scholarships, and many have further speculated that it may just be more widespread than outward migration (constant et al., 2013). circular migration can be defined as the systematic and regular movement of migrants between their home countries and host countries as they look for work (constant, 2020; constant et al., 2013). it is a strategy in p re ss journal of asean studies 65 to maximize the benefits from both worlds. circular migration has been touted as a “win-winwin” situation, in which resources are efficiently allocated. it is a win for host countries by alleviating labor shortages, it guarantees remittances for development in the home countries, and improve the lives of the migrants. gfmd (2007) characterize circular migration as “the fluid movement of people between countries, including temporary or permanent movement of which, when it occurs voluntarily and is linked to labor needs of countries of origin and destination, can be beneficial to all involved”. through this study, we place a significant emphasis on the issue of why migrant workers continue to engage in circular migration, as well as the question of what incentives push them to return to host countries after returning to their home country. the research explores the underlying reasons behind the trends of indonesian migrant workers returning to their host countries after coming back to indonesia. despite the fact that various research has been conducted on the subject of why migrant workers continue to migrate despite the risks and dwindling returns, there is surprisingly little addressing the phenomenon in the indonesian context. putting that in mind, we seek to fill this gap. literature review the phenomenon of migration has been in existence for centuries and, among others, is driven mostly by economic and social-political factors, natural disasters, conflicts, urbanization, as well as population issues (urbański, 2022). to better understand the phenomenon, it is important to look into relevant theories. zanabazar, kho, and jigjiddorj (2021) elaborate that there are various pull and push factors that influence migration around the globe. the pull factors to migration involve various aspects that attract people to certain destinations. migration-classified pull factors can be categorized into economic, social, and political. economic factors that pull migrants include indices such as hope for better employment, better shelter, more income and food, and higher living standards. similarly, various social and political factors contribute to the pulling of migrants to other countries. social factors such as religious tolerance and better career and educational opportunities in some countries contribute to the pull of migrants. the push factors on the other hand are the factors influencing migration based on the conditions that force individuals to leave their homes. similar with pull factors, the push factors influencing migration can also be categorized into economic, social, and political factors. the economic factors influencing migration include lack of employment. ibrahim et al. (2021) claim that few jobs and overpopulation of many developing countries including indonesia contribute to push migration. low living standards are another factor that drives migration. the other economic factors contributing to migration include natural disasters such as floods that devastate the means of income. the pull and push migration factor theory are inevitable to underpin the study. most occurrences of international labor migration take place when the rate of population growth outpaces the rate at which there is an increase in work opportunities. therefore, migrating abroad can be a viable option for (especially rural) populations from in p re ss 66 going back less-developed regions to support their families financially. because of the significant wage differential between and across nations, a section of the working-age population migrates or relocates overseas, particularly to asian countries, owing to the disparity between domestic and foreign incomes (jain & oommen, 2016; piper & roces, 2004; shah, 2013). in example, it is often stated that the availability and offering of a broader and wider range of work possibilities that are in low or no demand among local employees also act as reasons for migrating abroad (boustan et al., 2010). further, in addition to securing employment, another motivation for labour migration abroad is the accumulation of financial capital (or cushion) that can be invested in the establishment of a business in the country of origin upon the migrant workers’ return home (piracha & vadean, 2010). according to martyn (2018), because migrant workers earn more earnings outside of their home country than they do in their home country, they are able to save money for investments in their home country’s economy as well as for day-to-day necessities in their home country. in this, wickramasekara (2008) asserts that former migrant workers possess a greater propensity to stimulate economic growth in their home countries, leading to the creation of new employment opportunities; nevertheless, the ideal conditions are not always reached in practice. in many real-world situations, former indonesian migrant workers who are expected to produce at least one job for themselves are frequently compelled to migrate again when their businesses run out of funds and unable to develop. therefore, those who are shut out of the economy typically seek employment prospects in other countries when they are unable to find work in their home country. moreover, while it is normative that migrant workers would return home upon completion of their employment contract in the destination nation; also, this is not always the situation today. uhlendorff and zimmermann (2014) found that some former migrant workers who had returned to their home countries in search of employment subsequently remigrated again. as the study found, there are a number of dominant causes for this phenomenon, including the fact that the income earned while working abroad is insufficient to meet daily necessities; the difficulty of finding a job in the country of origin and the fact that even if you do, the income earned is lower than abroad; and the existence of social networks that facilitate re-migration. as per triandafyllidou and marchetti (2013), money and employment status are factors that act as motivations for frequent migration. supported by konstantinou (2019), the decision to return overseas is highly influenced by five factors: age, employment status, remittances, length of education, and type of provider. as zewdu (2018) also observes, the primary motivations for migrant workers’ migration are income, profits, length of employment, investment, and location of the host country. in this, it is becoming increasingly common for migrant workers to opt to remain in their countries of employment for a lengthy period of time. in the event that they do return home, it will most likely be for the sole purpose of completing paperwork-related administrative tasks or making a short visit with family. indeed, migration is a strategy adopted by many populations in an effort to better their economic conditions due to the immense economic benefits it can afford. indeed, there are a variety of fundamental variables that encourages and pushes migrant workers to return to work abroad. in this, the objective of our study is to delve deeper into the factors that push migrant workers to re-migrate and engage in frequent international mobility in the particular context of indonesia. in p re ss journal of asean studies 67 methodology a typical perspective of qualitative research (denzin & lincoln, 2005; maxwell, 2008; neuman & robson, 2014; creswell & poth, 2016) is that it is most beneficial at the “case” (e.g., a program, a policy, a project; see, for example, yin, 2006; stake, 2010) level, where themes and linkages can be identified using a variety of interpretative techniques (oun & bach, 2014). case study focuses on the subject of what can be learn precisely about a case (stake, 2005), and it is most effective “when research aims to produce a firsthand understanding of a case” (yin, 2006). theoretically, much of case study rests on the belief that social phenomena, human challenges, and the characters of instances are context-dependent (guba and lincoln, 2005; stake, 2005). the research uses a case study methodology to inquire into the push factors that act as incentives for indonesian migrant workers to going back to employment overseas after returning to indonesia. using an interview protocol consisting of five open-ended questions (see appendix 1), the research draws on a collection of 24 semi-structured, one-on-one interviews with selfidentified indonesian migrant workers (14 male and 10 female participants) in east java. the province of east java, one of the most major departure ports in indonesia, is responsible for transporting the biggest number of migrant workers to countries outside of indonesia. according to the indonesian migrant workers protection agency (bp2mi or badan perlindungan pekerja migran indonesia), east java is one of the provinces in indonesia with the highest number of migrant workers in 2021, with a total of approximately 360 thousand workers leaving the country between 2015 and 2021. during the same time frame, more than 185 thousand migrant workers from east java chose to return to indonesia; nonetheless, it is possible for these migrant workers to going back to their countries of destination and so engaging in circular migration. in this, the province of east java was selected because it sets out as a setting at which the population of migrant workers are reputed as much prevalent than in any other regions in indonesia. the recruitment was done through the use of purposive sampling (non-probabilistic identification of participants) and convenience or snowballing sampling techniques (parker, scott, & geddes, 2019), with important community actors, such as the district village apparatus, as well as personal contacts and familial ties between participants, played a significant connecting role in the initial recruitment process. it is important to note, however, that the district village apparatus only supplied information of a list on their villages’ migrant workers for the purpose of our initial recruitment procedure. therefore, with the entire participant recruitment being autonomously conducted by us, we were able to minimize potential selection biases (such as village heads’ vested interests with informal, non-registered recruiters or agents) as participants were recruited on the basis of their interests in participating in the study. that is, without any interference from the village officials, we were able to derive our study’s findings strictly from the answers given by informants. furthermore, the informants were aware that the information obtained from them would be used solely for research purposes prior to providing their consents to participate in the research. it is assumed that the informants have established at least some level of trust towards in p re ss 68 going back us as the researcher, thereby reducing the likelihood that they would conceal or withhold real stories from us. our interviews were performed through whatsapp given our informants’ unwillingness to speak over the phone, their hectic work schedules, and the time difference between indonesia and the countries where they are currently employed. that being the case, the personal information of the informants is kept confidential through which each of them was given a pseudonym and other identifying characteristics were fictionalized. with a total of 24 informants (table 1), 70% of them had returned to work overseas once, while 30% had returned to work abroad twice or more. the informants were locals of the east java cities of blitar, malang, ponorogo, and tulungagung, and they are currently employed in greece, hong kong, malaysia, new zealand, saudi arabia, south korea, and taiwan. the ages of the informants ranged from 24 to 65, 13% had completed junior high school and 87% had completed senior high school, 75% had been married, 21% had been single, and 4% had been divorced, and their monthly income ranged from rp 7 million ($463.20) to rp 35 million ($2,316.02). indeed, it is worth nothing that our informants’ earnings are far higher than the average wage of migrant workers, which was at least rp 3,7 million in 2017 numbers. irrespective of the overarching assumptions that inform our sample’s representation, we consider it is important to acknowledge the sociodemographic factors that contribute to explaining this, such as the fact that our informants are returning migrant workers with an extensive experience who have returned to their countries of destination multiple times. secondary data collection, including non-participant observation and documentation of relevant literature sources, as well as information from relevant village offices, were incorporated to corroborate the findings from the interviews. in accordance with the suggestions made by miles, huberman, and saldaña (2018), data are processed by selecting, simplifying, and separating data that encompasses the full textual section in the form of interview transcripts with resource individuals, relevant documents, and other empirical materials. following this process, the research conducts data presentation steps, during which we condensed and refined the collected data in order to arrive at a conclusion. this stage entails evaluating data from the beginning of data collection to data presentation, as well as identifying patterns and providing explanations. the act of drawing a conclusion is evidence that study was carried out, and within this study, data triangulation approach was used to ensure the validity of its data by checking data from a variety of sources and at a variety of times in order to assess the reliability of the data in this method. in p re ss journal of asean studies 69 table 1 participants’ sociodemographic characteristics no pseudonym gender age education level marital status monthly income (idr; million) occupation country of destination 1 sukar male 40 senior high school married 10 factory worker taiwan 2 rohmah female 35 senior high school married 9 migrant domestic worker taiwan 3 marzuki male 35 senior high school married 10 factory worker taiwan 4 heri male 37 senior high school married 8 gardener taiwan 5 basuki male 65 senior high school married 10 gardener malaysia 6 ismail male 40 senior high school married 10 contractor worker malaysia 7 diah female 40 senior high school married 12 migrant domestic worker greece 8 nisa female 30 senior high school married 10 migrant domestic worker taiwan 9 anam male 35 senior high school married 10 factory workers taiwan 10 ghoni male 45 senior high school married 12 gardener new zealand 11 amelia female 45 senior high school married 9 migrant domestic worker saudi arabia 12 indra male 32 senior high school not married yet 12 janitor new zealand 13 endar male 35 senior high school married 10 factory worker taiwan 14 anton male 30 senior high school not married yet 5 miner malaysia 15 isna female 40 junior high school married 8 migrant domestic worker hong kong 16 nana female 37 senior high school married 8 migrant domestic worker hong kong 17 rudi male 29 junior high school married 35 manufacturing worker south korea 18 luluk female 41 senior high school married 7 migrant domestic worker hong kong 19 fahrul male 47 senior high school married 7 plantation worker malaysia 20 lusy female 30 senior high school not married yet 10 babysitter taiwan 21 rika female 24 senior high school not married yet 7 migrant domestic worker hong kong 22 melati female 44 junior high school married 8 migrant domestic worker hong kong 23 budi male 39 senior high school not married yet 7,2 construction worker malaysia 24 dani male 51 senior high school divorced 12 factory worker taiwan source: authors’ own processed data in p re ss 70 going back analysis one of the countries that is responsible for sending a large number of migrant workers to other countries is indonesia. according to the world bank group (2017) report entitled “migrating to opportunity”, indonesia was ranked second as the country with the largest number of migrant workers in southeast asia, with an estimated 18% (or over 1.2 out of a total of 6.5 million workers) and around rp 125.2 trillion in remittances in 2015. as per the data collected by indonesian migrant workers protection agency (bp2mi or badan perlindungan pekerja migran indonesia) for the period 2015-2021, there are a total of approximately 1.5 million indonesian migrant workers, with 75% of these migrant workers exited the country through unofficial or illegal methods, while only 25% of them exited the country through official or legal means. however, the figures offered do not even begin to account for the full magnitude of indonesian migrant workers currently employed abroad. the research findings is presented by focusing on the motivating rationalities influencing indonesian migrant workers’ decisions to going back to their countries of employment and thereby engaging in circular migration. “i feel at home here”: work environment, career development, and accommodation. there are also two distinct types of working environments that migrant workers may encounter when working in a foreign country: unpleasant and pleasant. regarding the lack of comfort (and/or unpleasantness) of working environments, sterud et al. (2018) conclude that migrant workers in many host countries are more likely to be exposed to dangerous working circumstances and to develop health problems, especially those relating to their mental health. indeed, many migrant workers are more likely to have been involved in some sort of mishaps or suffered an injury while working in a foreign country, and this is particularly true for migrant workers who are employed in the fields of agriculture, industry, and construction (fitzgerald et al., 2013; hargreaves et al., 2019; moyce & schenker, 2018). moreover, the lack of access to adequate medical care and other crucial public services that migrant workers can secure in their country of destination can further contribute to an uncomfortable working environment (caxaj & cohen, 2019). similarly, many migrant workers face a variety of challenges in the workplace, such as racial discrimination, harassment, and threats (akay & ahmadi, 2022), workplace intimidation (weine et al., 2013), unsupportive human resources and a lack of control over the environment (harvey et al., 2020), and poor relationships with co-workers (lowe et al., 2020); for which these issues are exacerbated by barriers of cultural and linguistic differences (luksyte, spitzmueller, & rivera-minaya, 2014). on the other hand, migrant workers can also be offered the opportunities to have the experiences of working in a setting that is both comfortable and supportive (janta et al., 2011), which for ravasi, salamin, and davoine (2015), one of the requirements necessitates them in having a reliable employer for the migrant workers. the research finds that migrant workers who return to their countries of employment are supported by a positive and encouraging work environment characterized by a number of variables, such as a strong sense of kinship between co-workers and employers, promising career developments, and having adequate accommodations. in p re ss journal of asean studies 71 a strong kinship between co-workers and employers. reports from several interview sources indicate that there is a rather strong sense of kinship present in respondents’ respective locations of employment. this holds true not only between co-workers but also with employers, through which the interview results with several migrant workers provide credence to this claim. for example, according to rohmah, a migrant domestic worker in a taiwanese family, shared that “my work atmosphere is quite comfortable, because my employer treats me like i am a family, and i have been invited out with my employer’s family on multiple occasions.” even marzuki, another migrant worker in taiwan, attributes his decision to stay and re-migrate back to taiwan to the warmth and acceptance he found at his workplace, noting, “we have a sense that we are far away from home, which contributes to our heightened sense of unity.” two other migrant workers in taiwan, ahmad and anam, indicated that their “pleasant” and “very good in comparison to indonesia” work environment drives them to return to taiwan instead of remaining in indonesia. due to his employer’s kindness and personal connections with him, ahmad underlined the feeling of being at home (“i feel at home here”) since “i am considered a member of the family here” and “i do not feel as though i am in a foreign country, but at home.” anam felt similarly, linking to ahmad’s example with his co-workers that he also fostered a sense of belonging and made him “especially at ease working in taiwan.” amelia, a saudi arabian migrant worker, could also identify to the feeling of belonging to a family, as she described her experiences as follows: the place where i work is wonderful, and my employer genuinely cares about me, since i am frequently given the option to take time off each year. the fact that the employer’s family considers me a member of their family is a major factor in my decision to continue working here. (amelia, saudi arabia) in addition to the strong sense of kinship amongst migrant workers themselves, informants see decent and compassionate supervisors or employers as a significant element that pushes them to return to work abroad. excerpts below are a few examples that offer presentations on the generosity of their employers: the workplace is pretty accommodating. the employer is courteous, not impolite and bossy. there are occasionally employers that enjoy giving orders and exercising control. but my employer is really kind, as they do not ask me to work while i am on vacation. they recognize that i am on vacation, so they allow me to relax or meet up with friends. (luluk, hong kong) my work atmosphere is excellent, my employer is very attentive, my pay is never late, and i am permitted time off. the job here meets all of my needs. (nana, hong kong) the workplace has friendly and enjoyable environment. and thank god, i have never had a negative or unpleasant experience while working. also, my employer is kind. consequently, i feel content and comfortable working there. (melati, hong kong) in p re ss 72 going back as seen by those excerpts, several informants experienced a sense of comfort at their place of employment as a direct result of the strong sense of kinships that existed between their employers as well as among the co-workers themselves. moreover, and especially in the case of migrant domestic workers, where their employers treat them as if they were members of the family, it is also consistent with prior research (farashah & blomquist, 2019; mackenzie & forde, 2009), which suggests that the familial-like bond between migrant workers and their employers can have a significant impact on their level of motivation. indeed, every migrant worker expects the expectation that their prospective employer will be kind, given their belief that it is critical to develop positive relationships with the employer’s family. in this, pleasant and mutually beneficial interactions between migrant workers and their employers can foster a strong sense of obligation on the part of migrant workers towards their employers. in addition to having a healthy relationship with the employers, the presence of a work environment that encourages migrant workers to feel as though they have close friends who live nearby also adds to the development of a strong sense of proximity to their homes (tabuga, 2018; timonen & doyle, 2010; wanninayake, 2016). a promising career development and opportunities for self-growth. the extensive career developments and employment opportunities offered to migrant workers contribute to the creation of a working environment that is more accommodating to their needs. several sources claim that it is easier to locate employment opportunities and advance one’s career outside of rather than within indonesia. according to sukar, a migrant worker in taiwan, “not only do i get to interact with a great number of people, but my company also fosters my professional development.” in point of fact, for many of the informants, having a job profession does not only translate as, as ismail in malaysia exactly put it, “already being in a profitable position,” but being “given a lot of responsibility by my supervisor made me feel important because in indonesia, i am only a seller of bamboo pottery” contributes more significantly to a sense of self-improvement, self-esteem, and self-growth. basuki, another migrant worker in malaysia, mentioned that his relatively pleasant work environment as a gardener in his employer’s home was not only a significant factor in his decision to stay and return, but that his employer’s request that he to help take care of the plantation the employer owns has made him feel useful and important, and he believes that his current position is sufficient to realise his potential. nisa in taiwan also remarked, “the working climate in taiwan is undeniably superior to that in indonesia, especially in terms of standards and finances.” she added that, despite her inability to find job in indonesia, she was delighted to have been offered a position as a migrant domestic worker in taiwan, for which she would receive a monthly salary. thus far, we have been able to deduce the following: a large number of migrant workers leave their home countries in search of better employment opportunities and higher earnings. these workers often prosper in their new environments, increasing the likelihood of returning to work abroad in the future. furthermore, many sources also revealed that they had worked at the same location for an extended period of time and that their employers had placed a high level of trust in them, which prompted informants to compare their experiences working in indonesia and abroad, with the latter implying a higher quality of work and environment. according to earlier research (forde & mackenzie, 2009; lan, 2001; wanninayake, 2016), in p re ss journal of asean studies 73 migrant workers’ access to career developments is strongly influenced by the companies or employers for which they work. if a more open-minded and inclusive attitudes prevails at the workplace, migrant workers will have a better chance of advancing in their (rajendran et al., 2020). employers’ trust in their migrant workers serves as not only a kind of psychological capital but also as a source of inspiration and hope, empowering them to face and triumph over the hardships of their new home and workplace. that is, migrant workers are likely to remain with their existing employers if they are given opportunities to take charge of their careers and improve personally and professionally (le, jiang, & nielsen, 2018). it is inevitable, however, that migrant workers will choose to work abroad and engage in circular migration due to the inaccessibility of labour market and the difficulty of finding work in rural areas of indonesia (martyn, 2018), as well as the possibility of salaries abroad that are higher than in indonesia (zid et al., 2020). adequate accommodations that fulfil basic living needs. having a sense of familial-like relationships and promising career developments are important, but so is providing adequate accommodations for migrant workers to do their jobs. such comfort can be accomplished in a variety of ways, for example, such as reassuring migrant workers that the company or employer cares about them by meeting basic necessities like providing them with a safe place to live and nutritious food to eat. rohmah in taiwan, for example, went on to remark, “if all goes well, my employer will provide for both my physical and spiritual needs.” ghoni, who is currently located in new zealand, commented, “when compared to indonesia, the facilities at work here in new zealand are, of course, superior.” luluk in hong kong has described her work environment as “incredibly nice” because she is provided meals three times per day and the cost of these meals are not deducted from her salary. a large number of sources also receives paid vacation time during which they can relax and refuel. in the context of the covid-19 pandemic, many also reported receiving lodging, registration, and transportation to clinics in order to obtain the covid-19 vaccine. in fact, hospitable conditions are among the incentives that encourage informants to remain and work in migrant workers’ host countries (dewen, fang, & guoqing, 2010; koh, 2020; loganathan et al., 2019). basuki, who resides to work in malaysia, noted similarly, “here, the employer’s family has placed their trust in me, and as a result, i have been provided with a separate room with a variety of suitable and better facilities. indeed, many informants reported feeling comfortable and secure, with their rights being respected and appreciated, and their incomes and general quality of life being greatly enhanced compared to their experiences in indonesia. furthermore, the fact that both the company and the employer offer genuine compassion and care for migrant workers and fulfil their responsibilities to provide them with the essential working conditions they need to perform their jobs, such as the right to food and shelter and the ability to receive vaccinations, demonstrates how the availability of adequate accommodations at the place of employment encourages informants’ sense of comfort to remain. “… like a family”: a welcoming community in p re ss 74 going back while there are many elements at play, blumenstock, chi, and tan (2019) argue that a solid social network is a major motivator for migrant workers to remain in their host country. kiranantika (2021) lists that trust, social engagement, and reciprocity are the three pillars of survival strategies in countries that host migrant workers. informants in this study were found to congregate in local groups and communities; these connections are important to informants as they offer a space where they are able to trust one another and lean on one another for emotional support while they are far from home and their families for work. informants further reported that being a part of these groups enabled them to feel safe since it allows them an opportunity to unwind and socialize with others who understood them and their experiences as minorities, as well as provides opportunities for networking and mutual support. networking to foster relationships and connections. according to the responses of the majority of the informants, the opportunity to make new connections is a major draw to participating in online communities and a key factor in their decision to do so. rudi, a migrant worker in south korea, spoke about his experiences in this subject as follows. i am a member of a variety of communities, including soccer communities, religious communities, regional communities, and many others. there are other communities, but owing to time and energy constraints, i only follow these. joining a community is one way, in my opinion, to meet new people who come from all over the world and come from a variety of different backgrounds. (rudi, south korea) the presence of these communities has a number of positive effects on the network, including the production of new knowledge that might not have been acquired had informants focused just on seeking employment. sukar in taiwan has talked about how he wants to become more involved in the local community because of the positive effects it has on his life and provides him with opportunities he would not otherwise have, such as unique experiences that would be hard to come by in the profession. he explained that the people in his circle are from all walks of life and work in places all over the world, so he can learn about new things from them, such as how to do certain occupations or what it is like to live in places he has not seen before. in the same vein, anam in taiwan shared his insights gained through being an active member of his local community. i am a member of a group of professionals who assist migrant workers with their concerns. for instance, if there is an issue with the factory where i work, this community will guide and direct me on how to address it and the process that must be followed. herein i get new information particularly regarding better understanding of the employment agreements (contracts). (anam, taiwan) the benefits of engaging with local communities, such as receiving new knowledge from a vast network, are sufficient to make informants feel secure and drive them to return to work abroad; hence, it is one of the most essential considerations for many informants to remain in host countries. according to garip and asad (2016), migrant networks facilitate in p re ss journal of asean studies 75 migration because they provide access to migrant social capital. the term “migrant social capital” refers to the knowledge and support migrants provide one another to minimize migration's expenses and maximize its benefits. in fact, as dolfin and genicot (2010) highlight, the size of a person’s network has a direct correlation with the likelihood that they will migrate and engage in yet another instance of circular migration. a sense of togetherness for mutual support. the creation of a strong and deep sense of support and mutual solidarity is another advantage of informants being members of certain communities. because of this, our informants feel as if they have a safe place to call home and are aware of whom to contact if they encounter any issues when working abroad. melati, who works in hong kong, said that “people in the indonesian migrant worker community that i follow are like family” because they look out for one another and plan get-togethers, which brings her joy and makes her feel at peace. she went on to explain that if one of the members of the community is having a difficult time or has a problem, the rest of the community will rally around them and do anything they can to help, no matter how small. indra, a new zealand-based worker, reiterated this sentiment, stating that the indonesian migrant worker community he has come to know and respect in new zealand is more concerned with supporting its own members in times of need. in his word, “if someone is in need of assistance, they are able to post their request straight on social media groups, where their other friends can then respond and offer their help.” one more perk was revealed by rudi in south korea, who elaborated on the benefits of his community by saying, “we discuss with one another what it is like to live in a foreign country, and based on our various life experiences, the members of the group are able to assist one another and offer one appropriate help.” comparing his personal perspective to that of rudi, anam in taiwan made the following attempts at communication: the worker community that i am a part of here provides assistance to indonesian migrant workers who are employed in this manufacturing facility. when there is an issue with the plant, the community will step in, particularly in things connected to the contracts that are being negotiated. in the event that there is a violation of the contract, the community will work together to find a solution to the issue. (anam, taiwan) sukar in taiwan agrees, stating that another advantage of belonging to a community is having friends who are like siblings because migrant workers work so far away, so “they do not feel alone, and we can back each other up” in times of hardship. due to the community’s closeness and mutual support, informants can retain a higher level of living while working abroad. having close friends and family is a big motivator for informants to return to their host countries. hombrados-mendieta et al. (2019) also noted that among migrant workers, family and native friend networks, as well as community integration, have significant influencers on immigrants’ ability to attain life contentment. similar points are offered by munshi (2014), who also contends that such ties might provide social and emotional support. a community as a means of relaxation. almost all informants also noted the demanding schedule, tough time management, and complex responsibilities associated with their work in p re ss 76 going back abroad. as a result, one way they believe that they can relieve stress on the weekends and holidays is by being active in a community. although the informants did email us with some documentations while traveling or celebrating holidays with their community, we decided against including it in this study to protect the informants’ identities. some informants have shared their thoughts on the topic in the following ways: following communities abroad is pretty helpful to prevent us from being stressed out by the demands of work. for instance, if we spend our vacation time to do anything other than rest in the dormitory, we occasionally go for a stroll with our community buddies. (rudi, south korea) on occasion, while we are on vacation, our community friends visit tourist spots with us, however not usually on holidays or weekends because we also need to spend more money. but it was quite useful in enhancing my own enjoyment after a long day of work. (luluk, hong kong) it is simple; in this neighbourhood, we frequently come together to relax by going to simple restaurants or dining at our residences. it is a good way to alleviate weariness as a result of my co-workers’ [friends of the community] presence. (anam, taiwan) in short, the interviews infer that informants consider they have a place to recuperate from exhaustion in a country with a different work culture than indonesia. as a result, when informants choose to return to their host countries, they are less likely to be concerned about the taxing demands of their work because they have a very supportive community. strengthening religious fervour (faiths) through communities. because of the nature of their jobs, some informants must learn to adapt to the traditions and customs of countries other than their own. as a result, those who were once in the majority in indonesia will now be in the minority at their places of employment, especially when it comes to religious practices. in this, by participating in local communities, those who must work away from their families can gain a sense of belonging and renewed drive to complete their tasks, where they feel like they have a second family among other members of the community who share their indonesian heritage and religious beliefs. occasionally, these communities conduct events with the express intention of reminding migrant workers of customs that are ubiquitous in indonesia but are less so in other parts of the world. one example is described by luluk, a hong kong-based worker, who related her community’s experience of arranging a monthly islamic congregational prayer (known as a yasinan). even though we live in a region where the vast majority of people do not practice islam, we are able to maintain our identity as muslims with the help of this program. that is to say, we are able to continue to worship in accordance with the tenets of our religion and the traditions that we followed while we were in indonesia. (luluk, hong kong) melati went on to say that through her muslim indonesian migrant community, she is able to draw closer to god and cure her familial longings in accordance with her religious in p re ss journal of asean studies 77 beliefs. she explained, “every week, we gather to pray together. it is comforting to live here, even though it is distant from home, because it feels near and has a family-like atmosphere. in addition to making a living, one of the reasons for returning to work here is that i am quite comfortable with the community.” sukar shared his thoughts with the people in his humanitarian communities, stating that his faith not only supports him spiritually but also provides him with the steadiness he needs to maintain his beliefs and see them through, even if others do not. he sought to illustrate by saying, “during the month of ramadan, we also share iftar and sahoor with others.” ghoni in new zealand felt particularly linked to this subject since he lived and worked in a country where the majority of people did not share his religion and values. i am a member of the indonesian migrant worker community in new zealand. the purpose of this community is to provide migrant workers with a sense of belonging so that they feel comfortable working here. in addition, our community frequently engages in charitable endeavours, such as the distribution of meals to the needy. in remembrance of indonesian traditions throughout the last month of ramadan, we prepared an iftar and sahur menu featuring indonesian foods such as ketupat, chicken opor, and many others. (ghoni, new zealand) indra, who is also in new zealand, has an almost same experience. my neighbourhood frequently hosts charitable events such as food drives and fundraisers for the homeless. in addition to this, people regularly assemble to worship or do kajian (islamic discussions). (indra, new zealand) as can be seen from the findings of the interviews, indonesian migrant workers abroad are able to fulfill their religious commitments despite being a religious minority in their place of employment. they are able to feel less isolated and more accepted as individuals when they are with this community of people who have similar experiences and perspectives. as a result, informants are more likely to go back to work abroad, even if it means moving away from their families and the country of their origin or becoming a minority in the country where they are employed. conclusions as reported by the world bank (2017), indonesia is one of the largest contributors of migrant workers in southeast asia, with some of its migrant workers migrating abroad on multiple occasions for a variety of different, multifaceted reasons. this research seeks to identify what push factors encourage indonesian migrant workers to return to their country of designation after returning to indonesia, and so engaging in circular migration. previous research has demonstrated that migrant workers are frequently subjected to exploitation and abuse (digidiki & bhabha, 2018; gallagher, 2015; miller et al., 2015), lending credence to the assumption that they will not re-migrate as migrant workers. however, as in p re ss 78 going back ollus (2016) argues, migrant workers are positioned in “forced flexibility” where “they have limited options other than to agree to working on poor and exploitative terms”. as acharya (2020) also highlights, migrant workers are rendered with no bargaining power due to the “chronic underemployment at their place of origin, persistent precariousness, and informality of migrant workers in the unorganized sectors”. even further, as many migrant workers often fund their (debt-financed) migration by taking out loans at exorbitant interest rates, selling off valuable land for quick cash, mortgaging productive assets, and spending down limited reserves (moniruzzaman & walton-roberts, 2018), it is hardly surprising that migrationrelated activities is overburdened with debt and tragically, can take the whole migration episode to service the debt itself. that is, many migrant workers consider that irrespective of the negative aspects of migration and the risks they must face, many continue to migrate and even re-migrate due to both internal and external factors beyond their control. this research, however, points out a different line of story. while also acknowledging that migrant workers are (often unavoidably and unfortunately) subjected to the negative features of migration and are strongly compelled to re-migrate as workers in their pursuit of economic factors (“money”), as sorauren (2000) notes, “there are (and must be) more reasons to work than just to earn money. and these other reasons can be promoted to motivate people to work hard as well as to mitigate the conflict of interests”. relative to the research findings, supportive and amicable workplace environments (including the possibility of career advancements and adequate accommodations) as well as productive and family-oriented communities are two non-monetary incentives in enticing indonesian migrant workers to going back to countries of destination after returning to indonesia. by contrast to previous studies that concluded economic factors to be the primary driving force for migrant workers returning to work overseas (borras et al., 2022; spitzer & piper, 2014; sricharoen, 2020; zid et al., 2020), our study sheds light on the “human” side of the reasons migrant workers return to employment overseas. from exploring the perspectives and experiences of indonesian migrant workers, our study looks at the incentives that influenced their decisions to going back to host countries for employment after returning to home countries. while many previous research has shown that migrant workers are frequently exploited and subjected to cases of abuse, and that many migrants continue to re-migrate despite the terrible conditions they are subjected to in their quest for better jobs, income, and means of subsistence; our study offers a different side of the story by elucidating that migrant workers are driven to return to work abroad for not only “monetary” reasons but also for “human” (non-monetary) reasons. while it is irrational within our argument to assert that migrant workers will return to employment overseas solely for these non-monetary incentives, especially considering their personal circumstances back in indonesia such as (for example) debt-financed migration or their workplace-related situations in host countries (including abuses and exploitations), it is still considered that these “human”, non-monetary incentives to be fundamental relative to the key causes that push migrant workers to going back to countries of destination. that is, by prescribing the normative changes of migrant workers re-migrating with pleasure, or in other words, “going back with glee”, and positioning their rights and welfares as well-protected and wellaccommodated, as opposed to being in instances of exploitation, abuse, and debt-facilitated in p re ss journal of asean studies 79 migration, the research contributes as a key point of departure for future studies to explore the non-monetary incentives for migrant workers to re-migrate and engage in circular migration. acknowledgement we would like to thank the directorate of research and community service, deputy for research and development strengthening, ministry of research and technology/national research and innovation agency for their financial support towards this research. about the authors dr. erna setijaningrum is a senior lecturer in the department of public administration at universitas airlangga, surabaya, indonesia. currently (2020-present), she is also the coordinator for the master of public policy program at the same university. her research interests include marginalized groups such as the eldery, people with disabilities, people with mental health problems, and migrant workers. she is also experienced with research projects surrounding human resources development and public services. dr. asiyah kassim is a senior lecturer in the faculty of administrative science & policy studies, universiti teknologi mara, shah alam. her current research focusses on the challenges of implementing collaborative approaches to policy, governance, and action for sustainable development. her area of expertise among others includes community development, sociology of risk and disaster, environmental governance, environmental diplomacy, urban governance, social work and disability, environmental and so forth. dr. rochyati triana is a senior lecturer in the department of public administration at universitas airlangga, surabaya, indonesia. her reseach expertise includes human development issues and rural/urban development planning. muhammad reza dzulfikri earned his master’s degree in public policy from universitas airlangga, surabaya, indonesia. his research interests focus in public service innovation and public policy implementation. references acharya, a. k. 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indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic a value chain approach to support southeast asia economic regionalism craig a. m. jones argosy university, hawaii abstract this article includes an exploration of the economic data sets of the association of southeast asian nations (asean) statistics, the world bank, and the international monetary fund, as well as primary regional economic initiatives and agreements to assess the strategic indicators of economic regionalism using thematic analysis. the aim of this research is to determine how southeast asian regionalism can circumvent vulnerabilities to another economic crisis in north america and the european union. to correct such financial vulnerabilities, asean has significantly remolded the region into a single market consisting of a 10-nation integrated production base. the asean economic community’s main pillars are the establishment of a regional economic foundation based on comprehensive investment initiatives; the liberalization of capital markets, tariffs, and professional labor; infrastructure connectivity; regional policy integration; and free trade agreements to create a regional value chain as part of a single market and production base. the more attainable this comprehensive value-capture-andintegration process becomes, the more attractive it will appear to the global economic investment community and for business opportunities to establish a robust regional foundation. although the process appears straightforward, capturing value is not a single phenomenon or method, but rather a multifaceted phenomenon, as explored in this study. the regional integration model seeks profitability within effective cross-border production networks and regional liberalization. key words: regional economic integration, multilateral trade agreements, asean single market, capital liberalization introduction in a determined effort to counter the disastrous economic damage wrought by the 1997 asian financial crisis and the 2008 global financial crisis, asian countries collaboratively constructed comprehensive financial and economic bulwarks to protect themselves from similar future catastrophes (das, 2012; erkens, hung, & matos, 2012; jones, 2016; reinhart & rogoff, 2013). the asean socioeconomic alliance, which consists of brunei, cambodia, indonesia, laos, malaysia, myanmar, philippines, singapore, thailand, and vietnam, has been a central player in a protection construction project. all asian nations that critically suffered from the 1997 and 2008 crises studied them and reflected on their journal of asean studies 41 imprudent and costly interactions with the powerful international monetary fund. asean nations have drawn new financial wisdom from past misguided securitization activities with asset-backed securities concerning unbiased credit ratings and undervalued assets. proactively, asean stakeholders developed the chiang mai initiative (cmi) and the asian bond market initiative (abmi) to amass more foreign exchange reserves to act as asean’s own savings account to handle its future financial problems internally. asean stakeholders also sought better vetted, fair foreign direct investment (fdi) at the same time. these cumulative initiatives reinforce and strengthen current efforts to develop the asean economic community to combat regional inequality between asean member states such as cambodia, laos, myanmar, and vietnam (clmv) versus indonesia, malaysia, singapore, and thailand by focusing on financial development and economic regionalism within the boundaries of asean. the 10-nation asean approach to economic regionalism constitutes a targeted multilateral methodology that involves employing a rapidly growing electronic/digital collaborative trade facilitation infrastructure to integrate itself into a single trading bloc to prevent past mistakes of high-interest borrowing, extended credit, insufficient financial liquidity, and overvalued asset-backed securities (jones, 2016). the biggest building block for this protective shield is the cmi, created in 2000, which consists of usd 120 billion that is available for regional liquidity relief as an emergency safety tool to use in a currency or liquidity crisis within any asean member state (capannelli, 2011a, 2011b; chin, 2012, 2014). the goal is to reduce the vulnerability of asean member states to foreign financial opportunistic entities that would conspire to exploit an asean member state in a weak financial position. the cmi is highly structured to fund itself and help its regional members. table 1 shows how participating countries of the cmi contribute capital to the regional trust fund, the borrowing arrangements, and the voting power directly correlated to financial contributions (capannelli, 2011a, 2011b). objective and methodology the objective of this research is to explore asean’s value chain approach to establishing an integrated regional economic framework that inoculates it against the effects of unexpected internal and external financial crises. analyzing the regional single market model entailed deductive scrutiny of economic data sets from asean statistics, the world bank, and the international monetary fund and data regarding regional economic initiatives and agreements. the research looked for real economic growth markers, primarily using the thematic analysis methodology and subsequently predictive analytics (data modeling) by exploring two important variables. the first variable is the impact of the ongoing asean regional economic integration activities based on trending data from the data sets mentioned above, corresponding 42 a value chain approach table 1. the multilateral chiang mai initiative financial contributions borrowing arrangements voting power members $ billion % share multiplier quota ($ billion) no. of basic votes no. of votes based on contributions total no. votes % share china 38.40 32.00 40.00 28.51 people’s republic of china 34.40 28.50 0.50 17.10 1.60 34.20 35.80 25.43 hong kong 4.20 3.50 2.50 10.50 0.00 4.20 4.20 2.98 japan 38.40 32.00 0.50 19.20 1.60 38.40 40.00 28.41 republic of korea 19.20 16.00 1.00 19.20 1.60 19.20 20.80 14.77 +3 countries 96.00 80.00 4.80 96.00 100.80 71.59 brunei darussalam 0.03 0.03 5.00 0.20 1.60 0.03 1.63 1.16 cambodia 0.12 0.10 5.00 0.60 1.60 0.12 1.72 1.22 indonesia 4.55 3.79 2.50 11.36 1.60 4.55 6.15 4.37 laos 0.03 0.03 5.00 0.20 1.60 0.03 1.63 1.16 malaysia 4.55 3.79 2.50 11.36 1.60 4.55 6.15 4.37 myanmar 0.06 0.05 5.00 0.30 1.60 0.06 1.66 1.18 philippines 4.55 3.79 2.50 11.36 1.60 4.55 6.15 4.37 singapore 4.55 3.79 2.50 11.36 1.60 4.55 6.15 4.37 thailand 4.55 3.79 2.50 11.36 1.60 4.55 6.15 4.37 vietnam 1.00 0.83 5.00 5.00 1.60 1.00 2.60 1.85 asean 24.00 20.00 16.00 24.00 40.00 28.41 asean+3 120.00 100.00 20.80 120.00 140.80 100.00 source: capannelli (2011a, 2011b). initiatives, and agreements. the second variable is the potential for the successful integration of intra-regional trade activity to adopt a multilateral approach to regional economic growth based on key economic indicators, is assessed. both variables were carefully analyzed and assessed. similar studies by capanelli (2011a, 2011b), chin (2012, 2014) and kabir and salim (2014) have been conducted based on innovative economic integration techniques and the complex barriers confronted by asean seeking regional economic cooperation. importantly, this study distinguishes itself from other studies by utilizing the most recent trending data to provide updated findings. such a comprehensive review of these two macro-economic variables that emphasize themes across data sets and journal of asean studies 43 other applicable data is the basis of this thematic analysis. the coding to unlock the findings of this analysis was generated using nvivo qualitative data analysis software. this coding process developed an audit trail (codebook) in support of current comprehensive findings. themes and patterns were identified using thematic analysis (a 6-phase data review process) where phase 1 consists of gaining familiarization with the data. phase 2 consists of generating initial descriptive codes based on the deconstruction of the target data. phase 3 consists of developing a thematic framework capturing core categories based on phase 2 codes and sub-codes in order to establish themes and context related to the aims of this study. phase 4 consists of reviewing themes and synthesizing data to execute phase 5 which is the defining of themes and eventually phase 6 which produces the findings found in this study. thematic analysis methodology was employed for this study because it was the most relevant and appropriate method. willig (2014) and jones (2016) described thematic analysis as primarily a qualitative process of identifying themes and patterns in data that capture meaning relevant to the overarching incipient question under exploration. this particular research involved using recognized data themes to determine relevant meaning, findings, and conclusions. table 2 portrays some of the core categories established through thematic analysis. table 2. thematic framework core categories 1. economic performance indicators 2. comprehensive investment initiatives 3. economic data sets 4. regional trade initiatives ~ liberalization of capital markets 5. regional policy integration to further enhance the thematic findings of this study a relational data model was developed using microsoft excel to create a range of relationships that correspond to the themes and patterns identified via nvivo as demonstrated in the indicative graphs and charts illustrated throughout this study. such relationships between data were transcribed as a pivot table that functions similar to a database providing an insightful correlation of findings identified using nvivo and thematic analysis. it is this process that lends strong confidence in the findings of this study as the data from the newly produced pivot table using countries as the common relationship captures foreign direct investment (fdi), chiang mai initiative (cmi), asian bond market initiative (abmi), foreign exchange reserves (fer), gross domestic product (gdp), asean-sits (statistics on international trade in services), and other related regional data via this data model. the abmi: increasing regional financial solidarity adding to the collective economic tool kit of strategies, the abmi offers stable regional investment vehicles that 44 a value chain approach foster an increased regionalist approach to economic stability (capannelli, 2011a, 2011b). as a tool developed by the region’s central bankers, the abmi uses only local currencies, thereby recycling local investments back into the southeast asian regional market. in the past, the unwitting employment of the u.s. dollar, euro, or yen produced everything from uncertainty to disaster. the purpose of establishing the abmi is to diversify financial sourcing to counter the overdependence of asian economies on commercial banking for domestic financing (bhattacharyay, 2012). this bond initiative was developed because the underdeveloped bond market exposed a lack of needed financial intermediaries such as insurance companies, retirement pension funds, and reliable and credible credit rating platforms for asian companies (calvopardo, freund, & ornelas, 2011). similar to the cmi, developing the abmi was critical to facilitate regional financial and economic integration to withstand any global crisis. establishing effective policy coupled with massive asian financial resources provided the foundation for developing region-backed bonds. in 2009, usd 46 million of fdi flowed into the asean region (asean secretariat, 2012, 2013b; masron & nor, 2012). this welcome influx of foreign investment was a result of the solid foundation and doorway created by the abmi. in 2010, the infusion of fdi into the asean region rose to usd 108 million (asean secretariat, 2013b; masron & nor, 2012). by 2012, asean’s total fdi reached usd 117 million and approximately 75% (usd 87,840,000) originated outside the southeast asian region (asean secretariat, 2012, 2013b). although it was initially welcome, this exorbitant amount of fdi was also worrisome, as the non-asian fdi outweighs intra-asian investments by too much. economists warned that this situation underscores southeast asia’s financial dependency on external funds and its exposure to the vulnerability of north american and european union markets. historically, these non-asian markets would have been highly rated and prized, but after the u.s.-precipitated global recession in 2008–2009, the markets were noted to be indisputably fragile (das, 2012; erkens et al., 2012; reinhart & rogoff, 2013). the cmi and the abmi were established because of this fragility (capannelli, 2011a, 2011b; chin, 2012, 2014). since this period, more regional integration efforts have been underway to attract external fdi in the form of public– private partnerships (ppps) that can support diversified growth of the financial infrastructure while transferring risk to external investors. figure 1 depicts asean’s fdi from 1995 to 2016. in addition to the actual asean fdi graph, the linear trend estimation portrays a regression analysis by calculating a straight line based on the actual fdi values from 1995 to 2016 and then forecasting them through 2020. the fidelity of this calculation is represented as journal of asean studies 45 r2 = .7477, which portrays an accuracy measurement of the trend line that is the quality of the trend prediction. exponential growth is portrayed as a consistent rate of growth over a period of time, which in this case is until 2020. as shown in figure 1, the inward fdi outlook for asean appears positive over time. figure 1. inward fdi in asean from 1995 to 2016; the estimated linear trend through 2020 and exponential growth through 2020 sources: asean secretariat (2007, 2013, 2017); aseanstats (2017); united nations conference on trade and development (2017) the asean member states have shown resilience, elasticity, and forwardlooking ingenuity following two decades of financial turmoil. fdi declined in 2016, but overall the region attracted 3.4 times more investment than the 1995 peak (asean secretariat, 2017). the cohesive resilience among multiple nations justifies regional economic integration to tailor investments focusing on cross-border financial transactions amid efforts to reinforce intra-asean trade, thereby fostering a regional development environment. the argument against this intraregional approach is that increasing capital mobility might cause cross-border financial contamination from neighboring countries. therefore, diversity must be the focus of integration. if a diversity model is properly implemented, economic integration in asia has an excellent opportunity to fuel the asean economic community, especially considering this region holds the majority of the world’s foreign exchange reserves. figure 2 displays the countries with the highest currency composition of official foreign exchange reserves in the world; notably, china has reserves over usd 3 trillion and japan has reserves over usd 1 trillion (world bank, 2018). as they are far exceeding debt requirements, countries in asia are looking to reinvest these reserves through note. monetary figures are in usd millions 46 a value chain approach intraregional transactions that yield high returns and foster regionalist protections. other financial indicators that show asean as a good candidate for implementing regional economic protection measures besides maintaining extremely large foreign exchange reserves in asia are templating regional economic successes found throughout the region. mirroring the lessons learned in highly industrialized countries such as singapore and malaysia provide even more intraasean successes. developing countries such as clmv serve as ideal candidates to prosper from income distribution, liberalization of regional labor, liberalization of trade, and infrastructure development. figure 2. global ranking of foreign exchange reserves 2017 total reserves includes gold, current usd source: world bank (2018). if fully implemented to counter future crises, asean+3 (china, japan, and south korea) could create the world’s largest free-trade area, thereby potentially changing the future global economy (calvo-pardo et al., 2011; petri, plummer, & zhai, 2012). the potential scope of this project can be visualized by studying the combined southeast asian regional gross domestic product (gdp) of usd 2.9 trillion projected for 2018, with real economic growth of about 5.1% (asean secretariat, 2017; asian development note. monetary figures are usd billions journal of asean studies 47 bank, 2017). it is widely forecasted that the rate of economic growth in asean is poised to increase to 5.4% by 2023 based on strong economic spending in the region (international monetary fund, 2018). this trend shows that asean is one of the world’s fastest growing regional economies, with cambodia, laos, and myanmar leading the southeast asia region for the foreseeable future while the philippines and vietnam are expected to lead economic growth among the asean5 (indonesia, malaysia, philippines, thailand, and vietnam; organisation for economic co-operation and development [oecd], 2018). figure 3 depicts the real gdp growth by annual percentage change for southeast asia and projected trends through 2020 for southeast asia. figure 3. asean’s regional real gross domestic product growth by annual percentage change from 2008 to 2017 and exponential growth through 2020 source: international monetary fund (2018) including the neighboring economies of china, japan, and south korea with asean nations’ regional gdp values profoundly alters the character of any future global financial crises. historically, the devastating financial/economic crises were precipitated by burdensome financial ties with europe and the united states, but a more financially protected asean may have the best opportunity to implement a successful economic community. key factors for this prediction include elevated foreign exchange reserves, regional trust funds, expanding regional bond markets, a solid market-driven economy, and the capability to integrate goods and trade via more streamlined trade policies, 48 a value chain approach cooperation, and digital collaboration. all these factors reduce tariffs and comply with the asean trade in goods agreement in support of the asean single window (asw). asean single window: a trade facilitation catalyst in a specific effort to facilitate economic growth and competitiveness within the boundaries of asean, this article also explores the asw initiative that seeks to exponentially expedite trade facilitation, both regionally and internationally. the asw is primarily based on singapore’s successful national single window (nsw), tradenet, implemented in 1989. figure 4 demonstrates the efficiency behind the nsw based on a digitized network for the electronic submission of customs documents, electronic payments, and government and business collaboration to become a competitive regional and global supply chain player to increase efficient trade flows. 1989. figure 4 demonstrates the efficiency behind the nsw based on a digitized network for the electronic submission of customs documents, electronic payments, and government and business collaboration to become a competitive regional and global supply chain player to increase efficient trade flows. figure 4. sample efficiency of the national single window process source: adapted from crimsonlogic (2010); jones (2016) the asw is an environment in which 10 nsws of individual asean member countries collaborate with the private sector to design, operate, maintain, manage, finance, and integrate infrastructure projects in support of the world’s first digitally integrated regional trade facilitation platform (chia, 2013; japan association for simplification of international trade procedures, 2012; jones, 2016; kabir & salim, 2014; neufeld, 2014). the asw is a critical success factor for the regional integration of trade and services supported by multilateral tariff elimination, the harmonization of best business practices, and a common information and communication technologies infrastructure aimed at journal of asean studies 49 augmenting digital connectivity, business capacity, and the free flow of goods in the global supply chain. key economic elements funding the asw are fdi, composition of official foreign exchange reserves, and gdp. one key factor is the implementation of nontariff barriers designed to overcome trade barriers such as licensing and excessive cargo fees to better facilitate regional economic stability. table 3 identifies the initial trade facilitation goals for asean that will create and capture economic value through regional collaboration. table 3. initial asean single window goals 1. reduce the number of documents required to import and export among the asean member states 2. reasonably reduce the physical inspection rate of goods 3. complete the full roll out of the nsw project by 2018 (excluding cambodia, laos, and myanmar) 4. sign protocol supporting the asean customs transit system, eliminate double taxation, and eliminate nontariff barriers against import and export goods (liberalization of regional transportation) 5. fully implement the national trade repositories and the asean trade repository 6. substantially restructure business processes for enhanced streamlining and simplification 7. accelerate standardization of data requirements and data exchanges to facilitate trade across regional borders; establish technical integration standards 8. establish asw technical working groups to facilitate regional information processing and sharing 9. harmonize capital flow for import and export of cross border goods (standardized electronic payments) 10. develop regional cooperation in infrastructure development to promote electronic commerce and transactions that provide the foundation for enhanced free trade agreements with other countries outside asean 11. increase global supply competitiveness, narrow the regional development gap, and foster financial stability against another financial crisis source: intal, dionisius, & fukunaga (2012) figure 5 portrays a simplified view of redundant connectivity via each asean member state’s nsw infrastructure. the implied requirement to facilitate this digitized economic approach to regionalization is a robust and collaborative infrastructure along with harmonized formatting of shared data to mitigate cross-border challenges and increase intra-asean trade growth (jones, 2016). the live exchange of harmonized data such as a certificate of origin when digitized is for use in completing the electronic asean trade in goods agreement form d that aligns with collaborative regional policy requirements to identify preferential tariff treatment. this digital integration across regional customs authorities is destined to 50 a value chain approach significantly minimize hard-copy transactions and enhance business process and transaction management, along with other optimization opportunities based on supportive regional policies. figure 5. asean single window system engineering conceptual design for the electronic transmission of harmonized data source: jones (2016) these regional infrastructure integration policies will enhance communication, financial transactions, and supply chain risk management specifically in laos, myanmar, indonesia, and cambodia who currently have the lowest levels of internet use in the region (oecd, 2018). such techniques are key to reducing the digital divide among asean member states, facilitating e-commerce growth, and increasing individual information and communication technologies skills. the overarching goal of the asw environment is to support a regional single market and production base with five core elements: (a) free flow of goods, (b) free flow of services, (c) free flow of investment, (d) free flow of capital, and (e) free flow of skilled labor (chia, 2013; japan association for simplification of international trade procedures, 2012; jones, 2016; kabir & salim, 2014). another critical aspect of regionalism is collaboration and cooperation through tariff liberalization. as of january 2010, brunei darussalam, indonesia, malaysia, the philippines, singapore, and thailand journal of asean studies 51 (asean-6) eliminated intra-asean import duties on 99.86% of tariff lines. clmv senior leaders reduced their import duties between 0% and 5% on 98.86% of their tariff lines (asean secretariat, 2012; hwang & lee, 2015; petri et al., 2012). progress across the region remains disparate due to differing national capabilities, despite striving for the same end state. conceptual framework: collaborative infrastructure and policy growth constructing an asw was, and still is, a sophisticated and complex project involving intricate computer engineering and high-level financial instruments. having implemented the world’s first digital collaborative trade facilitation system for singapore in 1989 (crimsonlogic, 2010) based on the principle of a ppp facilitates a risk transfer of financial debt in exchange for long-term corporate profits. such a risk gap concept is preferred where economic conditions are fragile, although conceptualized integration must be achieved to create economic stability and stimulate future growth. therefore, many asean member states have turned to such best practices as establishing nsws (trade facilitation systems) to develop similar techniques and procedures relative to each asean nation. the key assumption is that government-to-business and business-togovernment are perhaps the most relevant instruments for overcoming known financial, technological, economic, trade, and regulatory barriers related to implementing national trade facilitation systems, which is a government-tobusiness practice that singapore was able to establish using a design, build, operate, and maintain model (jones, 2016). therefore, ppps are considered a critical principle for attaining the asw objective, especially for the clmv nations. as consumer purchasing power increases in line with regional economic growth, the result is an increase in jobs, living wages, standard of living, and quality health care options. but key to the success of various branches of regional integration is constructing solid policy agreements that hold intact the central focus areas and thematic engagements to overcome regional challenges, and strengthen capacity (oecd, 2018). such steadfast willingness to standardize complex regional policies is a prime indicator of potential success. in its simplest form, regional policy integration is a systems approach to planning. the interdependencies of the integrating focus areas, which include financial, economic, infrastructure connectivity, trade, and regional policy integration, infer that a change in one of the risk factors may have a serious effect on at least one of the other risk factors (hartono, sulistyo, praftiwi, & hasmoro, 2014; jones, 2016; mccann, 2013; project management institute, 2013; sebestyén & tóth, 2014; zhang & fan, 2014). therefore, even minimal changes can lead to economic disruptions (oecd, 2018). it is therefore imperative that a comprehensively regulated digital 52 a value chain approach economy tying collaborative national infrastructures together demands a strategic and dynamic outlook, as demonstrated in figure 6. with the regional focus areas of economic integration including a digital single market, financial integration, policy integration, and infrastructure connectivity listed in figure 6, integrating to achieve equitable economic growth based on multitrack efforts includes participating in other multilateral free trade agreements in the asia pacific region that are also emerging. one of these is the regional comprehensive economic partnership (rcep), which encompasses australia, brunei, cambodia, china, india, indonesia, japan, laos, malaysia, myanmar, new zealand, the philippines, singapore, south korea, thailand, and vietnam. the united states, under the trump presidency, has disengaged from the trans pacific partnership (tpp), which provides greater opportunity to create the comprehensive and progressive agreement for trans pacific partnership (cptpp), a modified version of the original tpp. despite some changes in partnership, the digitized asw, asean free trade area, rcep, and cpttp continue to progress. if ratified and implemented, the cptpp economic model will represent approximately 13.5% of global gdp or usd 147 billion in global income gains (goodman, 2018; ji, rana, chia, & li, 2018) and expands liberalizing trade with other participating countries in the pacific region such as australia, canada, and japan. this expansion will significantly improve market access for emerging market countries such as clmv. thus, emerging market countries should reap the new benefits and stabilize economic equity in the region with more fair market access based on projected macroeconomic effects (ji et al., 2018). through an increase in regional opportunities, the rcep represented approximately 31.4% of global gdp in 2016, or usd 23.8 trillion, and converging these aforementioned agreements into a free trade area of the asia pacific with other regional partners represented 59.7% of global gdp in 2016 or usd 45.1 trillion (ji et al., 2018). although the united states has disengaged from participating in multilateral free trade agreements such as the tpp thereby lowering initial economic cooperation predictions, the asia pacific block of nations continue to support multilateralism and regional cross-border trade. the ability to participate in the asw and other free trade agreements widens the trading bloc and fundamentally supports the theory of regionalism as participating in multiple multilateral trade agreements and offering more economic opportunities while minimizing economic risk (oecd, 2018). data from 2010 shows a pattern of imbalance exists in intra-asean import and export trade in services (see tables 4 and 5). despite hopes for quicker panregional trade equity, asean import and export trade data from 2016 showed only marginal overall growth, with the longstanding gaps between the different nations remaining constant. this is also journal of asean studies 53 true for intra-asean import and export trade in goods. figure 6. venn diagram of integrated thematic focus areas therefore, similar to the cmi and abmi economic tools established to support investments internally in the asean region, regional free trade agreements with common access benefits such as nontariff barriers are anticipated to even the disparity via updated integration policies and infrastructures. good trade agreements are necessary and work.before the tpp was modified to the cptpp, it was projected to be the largest regional trade agreement (petri & plummer, 2016). regardless of the modifications to the cptpp, gains are projected to be significant upon ratification. table 4. 2010 and 2016 asean import trade in services by reporting countries in usd million country sum of 2010 imports sum of 2016 imports brunei darussalam $1,267.30 $1,644.60 cambodia $980.24 $1,951.65 indonesia $26,460.99 $30,521.33 laos $263.12 $619.17 malaysia $31,833.54 $39,872.59 myanmar $729.20 $2,899.50 philippines $12,017.00 $24,232.73 singapore $101,212.69 $155,585.88 thailand $41,333.32 $42,778.43 vietnam $9,857.00 $16,477.00 grand total $225,954.40 $316,582.89 source: aseanstats (2017) 54 a value chain approach table 5. 2010 and 2016 asean export trade in services by reporting countries in usd million country sum of 2010 exports sum of 2016 exports brunei darussalam $460.50 $530.50 cambodia $2,028.46 $4,458.29 indonesia $16,670.51 $23,478.20 laos $511.00 $830.97 malaysia $33,822.79 $35,270.61 myanmar $350.70 $3,779.40 philippines $17,782.00 $31,357.24 singapore $100,832.20 $149,647.12 thailand $34,339.83 $65,244.58 vietnam $7,417.00 $12,228.00 grand total $214,214.98 $326,824.92 source: aseanstats (2017) although economic disparity decidedly exists across the 10 asean member states, continued multination collaboration and integration will gradually reduce the most severe disparities over time. understandably, achieving pan-asean economic parity remains a complex and challenging endeavor. however, an overall unified asean economic community will, according to reliable data signs, increase in strength and serve the region with effective strategies for collective economic prosperity otherwise referred to as economic regionalism. conclusion from analyzing the most pertinent data sets tracking the machinations of asean’s single market model, regionalism, it appears it is proving to be a feasible, viable, visionary three-pronged plan successfully establishing: a) a protective financial bulwark against both unexpected and/or targeted financial interruptions from non-asian states, b) financial instruments to protect itself from internal financial difficulties and, c) a much more robust and integrated regional economy. naturally, the more integrated the trading platforms become, the increasingly greater and more successful regionalism becomes. these platforms include multilateral intraand extraasean collaborative trade relationships, the asw’s sophisticated digital trade platform, expedited payment platforms for business-government/governmentbusiness transactions and integrated governmental infrastructures. these are the gears, nuts and bolts that engineer the single market regional model and have to date manifested tangible, recordable increased regional profitability and heightened financial security and resiliency. the growing success of the regionalism model makes it more trusted and valuable as a trading partner and attractive to non-asian global traders and investors. however, the model has not yet had to be tested by a crisis such as the 1997 asian financial crisis or the north american 2007/2008 financial crisis. until it survives a storm of those magnitudes, the model is not a proven risk-free entity. but, for now, the trajectory for this model is on a positive course delivering greater fiscal safety and resiliency as well as increased profitability for the asean single market region. this portfolio of regional economic integration activities and growth initiatives was demonstrated in figure 1 (fdi) linear inward trends, journal of asean studies 55 figure 2 (fer) asian reserves, figure 3 (gdp) regional annual growth, table 4 &5 (trade) annual growth in services and goods signifying asean’s value chain approach to economic regionalism. about the author craig a. m. jones is an adjunct professor at the graduate school of business and management, argosy university, honolulu, hawaii. he received a doctorate of business administration in international business, summa cum laude and wrote a dissertation in which he addressed business strategies concerning import and export trade facilitation in southeast asia as a partnership between asean and the private business sector to bring about strategic economic change. he received his master of business administration in international business, magna cum laude, and a bachelor of arts in french language and literature. references asean secretariat. 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(2014). an optimization method for selecting project risk response strategies. international journal of project management, 32, 412-422. journal of asean studies, vol. 6, no. 2 (2018), pp. 137-154 doi: 10.21512/jas.v6i2.5160.g3496 ©2018 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic the dynamics of paradiplomacy practices in the “frontier” areas in indonesia ali maksum universitas muhammadiyah yogyakarta surwandono universitas muhammadiyah yogyakarta abstract paradiplomacy has been commonly conducted by local governments in indonesia since the collapse of the centralized new order regime. decentralization as one of the post new order political reform demands local government to be more active in managing their own region. the vast opportunity to boost international partner under this new system has paved the way to the practice of paradiplomacy including that in the frontier areas in indonesia. this qualitative research aims to understand paradiplomacy practices notably in the frontier areas in indonesia that are characteristically vulnerable to separatism. using discourse analysis, this research focuses on two important areas in the frontier indonesia namely, riau island and west kalimantan. this research found that “ceremonial” paradiplomacy has been blatantly practiced amid of the tighten and bureaucratic barrier including obstacles on the budget implementation. key words: paradiplomacy, investment, central government, local government, authority introduction issues in international relations have shifted from the previously dominating high political issues centred on the question of war and peace to bigger proportion of low political issues such as economic cooperation and identity. in this context, a comprehensive strategy is needed to defend national interests. effective communication is one of the main factors during negotiations which is often referred to as diplomacy. george kennan defines diplomacy as "an art and international manifestation in a universal context". nicolson clarifies the definition of diplomacy to include "(a) the internal management of negotiation, (b) the method is adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys, (c) the business diplomats, and (d) skill or address in the conduct of international intercourse and negotiation. diplomacy is in short could be defined as a way of communication with the selection of words and sentences carried out by various parties including negotiation between acknowledged representatives to achieve state’s interests. thus, diplomacy is a state effort through a good way of communicating with elected representatives to reach national interests in a peaceful manner (fathun, 2016, p. 76). 138 the dynamics of paradiplomacy practices there are three paradigms of diplomacy. firstly, trans-border paradiplomacy, which refers to institutional, formal and informal relations by different sub-national governments but directly borders geographically. second, transregional paradiplomacy, which refers to diplomatic relations carried out by different subnational governments who do not have direct borders, but still located in one region. the third type is global paradiplomacy, which refers to relations by sub-national governments from different regions, from various parts of the world. these three forms of diplomacy are very likely to develop and contribute to the performance of the country's diplomacy as a whole (damayanti, 2012, p. 2). however, this only occurs if paradiplomacy is managed properly by the central government. yet, along with the increasingly blurring boundaries between regional and global issues, domestic and international issues, while international relations is more accessible to sub-state actors, it is not impossible that foreign relation activities by sub-national actors develop toward proto-diplomacy, that is diplomacy by sub-national government that leads to the search for support for separatist activities. (damayanti, 2012, p. 4). since the collapse of suharto regime in 1998 followed by political transformation in indonesia, paradiplomacy became a new model for local government to boost economy through international network. this is because of the drastic changes in indonesian government notably on the local and central government relations that will be elaborated more in the next section. further, local government has been given more power and authority to manage assets and resources including in the frontier areas. riau island and west kalimantan are the two critical frontiers areas for indonesia since both provinces directly have land and sea borders with neighbouring countries. therefore, this is important to examine how the practice of paradiplomacy in both provinces that geographically attractive for investment and international trade. the situation is also challenging to both provinces amid of the high demand on clean, transparency, and good governance. the objective of this article is thus 1) to examine paradiplomacy practices in riau island and west kalimantan in general, and 2) to examine the local government response on paradiplomacy vis-à-vis central government and the new regulations in the post-decentralisation amid of the ceremonial and formality cultures inside the local governments. methodology this study a is qualitative research using content analysis. this research attempts to offer analysis based on secondary data from the provided documents such as government reports, press release, media coverage, books and journals. the authors also have worked through specific regulations pertaining journal of asean studies 139 paradiplomacy and local government laws in both provinces such as: 1. indonesian law no. 22/1999 on regional autonomy. 2. indonesian law no. 32/2004 on local government. 3. indonesian law no. 33/2004 on fiscal balance between local and central governments. 4. indonesian law no. 23/2014 on local government (amended of indonesian law no.32/2004). 5. government regulation no.46 / 2007 for batam kpbpb (kawasan perdagangan bebas dan pelabuhan bebas). 6. government law no.47/2007 for bintan kpbpb. 7. government law no.48/2007 for karimun kpbpb. 8. indonesia-malaysia agreement on cross-border trade on 24 august 1970. 9. indonesia-malaysia agreement on cross-border activities on 12 may 1984. 10. indonesian law no. 10/1995 on customs. 11. ministry of trade decree no. 36/kp/iii/1995 on cross-border trade through cross-border security checkpoint in entikong (pplb, pos pemeriksaan lintas batas) in west kalimantan. 12. ministry of finance decree no. 490/kmk 0.5/1996 on management of import, passengers, carrier crew, cross-borders, and shipping. 13. directorate general of custom decree no. kep-78/bc/1997 on manual guide for luggage of passengers for carrier crew, crossborders, and shipping. meanwhile, both provinces namely riau island and west kalimantan were selected due to the strategic location of the provinces. compared to other regions in the frontier areas in indonesia, riau island and west kalimantan have at least two critical aspects. first, both provinces are strategically important for national security since they have direct land and seas borders. riau provinces for instance has direct borders with singapore, malaysia, thailand, and vietnam as well as with the “hot spot area” of the south china sea. at the same time, west kalimantan also has land and sea borders directly with malaysian state of sarawak. second, riau island and west kalimantan are economically located in the most growing economy in the world involving countries namely singapore, malaysia and thailand (ngoc, 2015; litsareva, 2017). paradiplomacy and ceremonial paradiplomacy paradiplomacy is the diplomacy conducted by sub-national, regional, or local institutions (not the central government) for their interests. local government has the opportunity to promote trade, investment, and various potential cooperation with parties that previously dominated by state's jurisdiction. paradiplomacy that has been commonly implemented by regional governments in indonesia includes sister city, investment, joint projects, and staff exchange. 140 the dynamics of paradiplomacy practices the 'paradiplomacy' phenomenon actually emerged in europe, but currently it has become a common symptom in the midst of transnational interactions of the world community, including in indonesia. many autonomous regions or provincial/ regency/ municipal governments actively engage in foreign cooperation with foreign parties in the form of 'memorandum of understanding' or other forms of international agreements. the strongest motivation behind the emergence of regional desire to carry out diplomacy activities is economic factors. the aim of the region to carry out the diplomacy in this case is to attract foreign investment, attract multinational companies to its territory, and target new export markets. its function is solely to compete at the global level, so that it has no political factors at all. among issues that must be observed in the implementation of this paradigm in indonesia is whether state regulation has covered this practice comprehensively, how foreign cooperation by the autonomous region be developed to national level, and how the integration gaps can be carefully anticipated (mukti, 2015, p. 86). paradiplomacy must be carefully used as it is different from the other concept known as ceremonial paradiplomacy. according to tavares (2016), it is related to the paradigm of formalities developed especially among asian countries with nascent democracy. in this case, ceremonial paradiplomacy is conducted in response to the demands for the implementation of paradiplomacy promoted by the central government. thus, various collaborations that have been established are nothing more than ceremonial and formality in order to fulfil performance as a government. in indonesia, ceremonial politics has become a common activity in various government agencies. generally, this is also influenced by the increasingly rampant culture of political formalities after 1998 political reform. politics of formalities usually carried out as a form of accountability for government programs to the public (tobirin, 2013). in addition, the public knows the performance of the government even though it is only ceremonial. paradiplomacy in indonesian law historically, before the enactment of law number 32/2004, the authority for local government to conduct international cooperation had begun since the enactment of the law on regional government in 1999, better known as undang-undang otonomi daerah (regional autonomy law). in the context of law no. 22/1999, the authority to enter into foreign cooperation is included in the category of authority that is not obligatory for the regions. article 88, paragraph (1) declares that “regions can establish mutually beneficial cooperation with institutions/agencies abroad, which are governed by joint decisions, except those concerning the authority of the government, as stipulated in article 7”. in law no. 32/2004, the authority of the autonomous region to carry out journal of asean studies 141 foreign cooperation is reinfornced as provided in article 42 paragraph 1 mentioned that dewan perwakilan rakyat daerah (dprd or local house) has the duty and authority to give approval to plan for international cooperation carried out by local government. further, in the context of sister city/province, local government could also make technical cooperation agreements including humanitarian assistance, cooperation in loans/grants, cooperation in capital participation and other cooperation in accordance with the laws and regulations (mukti, 2013, pp. 34). there have been experiences where bureaucrats in the provincial, regency and city administrations which previously had almost never been in touch with foreign diplomacy between nations experience many difficulties both related to diplomatic skills and practical experience in dealing with foreign parties. this is so as implementing paradiplomacy requires sufficient capacity such as mastery of laws and codes of ethics for relations between nations. lacking these skills will influence the quality of the product of cooperation with various foreign parties, and thus it is not optimal in pushing the pace of regional development, or perhaps it will be counterproductive as it will only waste regional budget or anggaran pendapatan dan belanja daerah (apbd, local government budget) because officials often travel overseas. in this context, dprd's oversight on the implementation of international cooperation is very important because the emergence of new authority for autonomous regions will automatically have an impact on regional budgeting. this supervision is important not only to prevent the emergence of wasteful regional budgets, but also to keep foreign parties from complying with the agreements (mukti, 2013, pp. 6-7). paradiplomacy in riau island in the context of riau islands, the discussion of paradiplomacy is related to what is referred to as free trade and free ports (kpbpb, kawasan perdagangan bebas dan pelabuhan bebas). kpbpb batam, bintan, karimun is located on an international shipping crossing of the malacca strait. this area is directly on the opposite of the neighbouring singapore and malaysia (south johor). domestically, it is adjacent to the city of pekanbaru and passed by the pelni line. kpbpb batam, bintan, karimun is administratively managed under the riau islands province, together with batam city, bintan regency, tanjung pinang city and karimun regency. however, not all of these administrative areas are designated as kpbpb. in the national context, kpbpb batam, bintan, karimun (bbk) is one of the national strategic areas (ksn) and special economic zone (kek). regarding the development of this region, it was initially emerged from an economic cooperation agreement between the government of indonesia and singapore. the cooperation agreement 142 the dynamics of paradiplomacy practices was then followed up with the establishment of kpbpb development locations through government regulation no.46 / 2007 for batam kpbpb, pp no.47 / 2007 for bintan kpbpb and pp no.48 / 2007 for karimun kpbpb. in its operationalization, presidential regulation no. 9, 10, and 11 of 2008 was issued to provide legal institutional framework for kpbpb batam, bintan, karimun zone council. the idea of developing kpbpb bbk as special economic zones was originally modelled after the establishment of special economic zones carried out by china which divide a region itu economic, trade and tourism areas. therefore, in the areas of bbk, the implementation of special economic zones is also divided into several special zones as follows: 1. special trade zone in lagoi bintan 2. special industrial zone at the lobam batam 3. special mining zone (special mining zone) in bintan and karimun. (indra pahlawan, 2014, pp. 2-3). in executing this idea, the government of indonesia has cooperated with the government of singapore. this cooperation has been formulated in a draft collaboration between indonesia and singapore on june 25, 2006. president susilo bambang yudhoyono from indonesia and prime minister lee hsien loong from singapore witnessed the signing of the economic mou for the bbk region. the sez agreement itself was signed by coordinating minister for economy boediono and singapore minister of trade & industry lim hing kiang in nongsa point marina batam. a joint steering committee was formed to follow up this agreement. the committee was chaired by indonesian coordinating minister for economic affairs boediono and singapore's economy minister lim hing kiang. the implementation of the special economic zone itself was carried out by a joint working committee chaired by the indonesian minister of trade maria elka pangestu and chair of singapore economic development mr. lim siong guan. within the deadline of four months, the committee must have inventoried the problems faced by entrepreneurs from the two countries and the results were reported to indonesian president and singapore prime minister. if we look at the investment side up to 2014, the total amount of all investments was us $ 27.7 billion with the ratio of investment from private sector and from the government amounting to 79.73% compared to 20.27% respectively. however, one of the main objective of the sez is to attract foreign investment (fdi). from the development of economic cooperation between indonesia and singapore in the formation and development of sez in 2009, the effort to attract foreign direct investment (fdi) was not optimal. this is proven from domestic private investment that is greater or more dominant than foreign investment, that is, 52.42% compared to 47.58% respectively. an sez development can be said to be journal of asean studies 143 more successful if foreign investment is 79.73% (arjuna, 2016, p. 7). in 2016, the realisation of foreign investment (pma) in batam city amounted to rp 6.26 trillion (71 projects), an increase of 46.6% compared to the previous period in 2015 which only reached rp 4.27 trillion (63 projects). the realisation of this fdi is generally dominated by transportation and other transportation industry sectors, as well as non-metallic mineral industry and basic chemical industry. the realisation of domestic investment (pmdn) in 2016, however, amounted to rp 489.5 billion (75 projects), which means a significant increase of 13 times from 2015 of rp 34.7 billion (77 projects). this increase was contributed by the increase in investment projects in oil and natural gas mining and property projects in batam city in 2016 (bkpm, 2017). it was only in 2017 that the trend has changed. according to the head of licensing division of the one-stop integrated investment and services agency (bpmptsp), throughout 2017, the total investment value entering the bintan regency, riau islands, reached idr 14 trillion. "a total of 27 foreign investment companies (pma) have invested as much as usd 921 million or equivalent to idr 12.3 trillion. meanwhile, the type of domestic investment (pmdn) there were eight companies with investment value reaching rp1.7 trillion. foreign investment in this year surpassed the domestic investment. among foreign companies investing in this region were gallant venture group from singapore focusing on hospitality and resort tourism, namely pt gallant lagoi phenomenon of usd 20 million, pt gallant lagoi inti usd 18 million, pt gallant lagoi abadi usd 16 million, pt gallant lagoi damai is usd 26 million, and pt gallant lagoi jaya is usd 22 million. other companies include pt gallant lagoi gemilang, pt gallant lagoi harmoni, pt gallant lagoi elok, pt lagoi berjaya, pt gallant lagoi cemerlang, pt gallant onbase resort, and several other foreign companies. meanwhile, for investments from national companies include melia bintan hotel with investment value as much as idr 500 billion, and several other companies (rofik, 2018). nevertheless, this study found that even though paradiplomacy has been carried out in the free trade area especially in batam, bintan, karimun, the official mou between local governments with foreign companies was rare. this is due to the existence of two authoritative agencies namely batam indonesia free zone authority (bifza, badan pengusahaan batam) and batam city government. in addition, there is still lack of trust and integration between both parties bifza and batam city government due to miss-coordination among departments. in the context of paradiplomacy, riau island has got some achievements from investment sectors. nonetheless, ceremonial paradiplomacy 144 the dynamics of paradiplomacy practices still exists since local government faces difficulties in budget expenditure. the last mentioned has been particularly becoming a serious debate in the local house of representatives (dprd) of riau island province following the calculation of foreign visit budget. the local government expressed the disappointment on the policy. according to the house member, “it is better if the budget is used to maximize service performance to the people. for instance, one-way budget reaches rp 900 million. this is very wasteful and not useful if you just spend only for overseas trip.” he added that “hundreds of millions of moneys is also public money which will be more useful if it is used for the people” (tanjung pinang pos, 2011). the governor of riau island also received critics following his plan to visit germany and the netherland. his trip was expected to promote free trade zone in riau island, yet remain controversial among the people (tribun batam, 2012). this is a strong indication, how paradiplomacy still have obstacles especially among local apparatus. the “ceremonial” culture exists including that in riau island. paradiplomacy in west kalimantan different from paradiplomacy in riau province, paradiplomacy in west kalimantan relates to mining investment in the region. in 2010-2015, major investment in west kalimantan was in the field of non-ferrous metal (smelter) and downstream mining industries with a total of 15 projects consisting of 13 foreign investment projects. investors in this region are from various countries such as japan, singapore, malaysia, hong kong, the people's republic of china (prc) and the british virgin island (the tanjungpura times, 2016). in 2016, west kalimantan province was ranked as the top 10 foreign investment location in indonesia. it was ranked number 6 with investment value us $ 1.2 billion, only one below east kalimantan in number five with us $ 1.3 billion foreign investments. all foreign investment targets in west kalimantan in 2015 were well achieved. the biggest foreign investment in west kalimantan comes from japan, singapore, malaysia, hong kong, prc (tribun pontianak, 2016). the realisation of investment in west kalimantan during 2017 also achieved impressive results with a value of rp 19.96 trillion or exceeding the target set by west kalimantan provincial government at rp 18.61 trillion. this number include foreign direct investment as much as rp 7.58 trillion and domestic investment as much as rp 12.38 trillion. in additions, there are 413 additional projects from domestic investment and 838 reports from foreign investment. of the 413 domestic investment project, food crops and plantation businesses are accounted for 135 project reports with an investment value of rp.8.83 trillion. meanwhile, 636 projects from the foreign investment are predominantly dominated by business sectors in food crops, 196 projects in journal of asean studies 145 plantations and 176 project in business fields. the combined value of these investment is rp.5.59 trillion. overall, west kalimantan fdi is the 17th highest compared other regions in indonesia (viodeogo, 2018). following are some foreign investor companies in west kalimantan: a. pt. indonesia chemical alumina (ica) pt. ica was established on february 26, 2007 and its ownership is 80% of pt. antam (persero) tbk and 20% of showa denko kk. showa denko kk is a foreign company from japan that creates excellent individual products through interconnection of non-organic, aluminium and organic chemical technologies (showa denko, 2018). pt. ica is the pioneer of the chemical grade alumina (cga) industry in indonesia and occupies the fifth position in the asia pacific region together with japan, china, australia and korea in processing bauxite into cga. pt ica is a pioneer in fulfilling the requirements of the indonesian mining law in terms of processing raw materials domestically. it will also be the driver for the development of competitiveness and added value of the alumina-based industry in indonesia in the future. the cga generally refers to chemical products in the form of aluminium hydroxide and alumina which are used for various industrial applications except the aluminium industry. aluminium hydroxide is a semifinished product that can be used for water purification. while alumina can be used to produce electronic supporting components. some products that use cga include refractoriness (abrasive materials), abrasive, assembled products, integrated circuit (ic), and basic materials for lcd screens (pt. indonesia chemical alumina, 2014). in the case of pt ica, the workflow begin with tayan cga factory as a foreign factory which produces more than 100 types of alumina hydrates and alumina products. to produce this product, the production process at tayan will be carried out in a factory architecture based on "process bayer" technology owned by showa denko, japan, which has more than 70 years of experience in operating the plant in yokohama. alumina processing is specifically done by grinding, mixing, processing, and many others. products packaged in paper bags, jumbo bags, and bulk bags are stored in warehouses before being sent to the market. product delivery will be carried out via barges from tayan port to pontianak and continued loading to ships to be delivered to the destination. pt. ica in carrying out its production activities always applies the safety-first principle contained in the occupational health safety (k3) guideline and conducts supervision, monitoring and prevention of environmental impacts. pt. ica gives high priority to community development programs to help improve the living standards of the surrounding community through several program 146 the dynamics of paradiplomacy practices areas such as improving the quality of public health and the environment, education, economic empowerment, socio-culture, and strengthening community & government institutional capacity. for pt. ica, this program is an inseparable part in realizing the success of the company (pontianak post, 2016). b. pt. well harvest winning alumina refinery (whw ar) pt. whw ar is a processing and refining company of bauxite into alumina that produces high-quality smelter grade alumina (sga) with levels > 98.6% in kendawangan district, ketapang regency, west kalimantan. whw ar is the largest refining and processing company in southeast asia and indonesia that will serve the needs of sga in the domestic (indonesian) market, china, india and the middle east. pt whw ar is a local and chinese investment joint venture. local investors by pt cita mineral investindo tbk (cita) hold the 25% stake and the remainder is by china hongqiao limited group (60%), winning investment (hk) company limited (10%), and pt danpac resources kalbar (5%) (pontianak post, 2016). pt. whw ar was established in 2012 and completed processing of plants and refining bauxite into phase i alumina with a production capacity of 1 million tons on may 21, 2016. the establishment of pt. whw ar is intended to respond to the enactment of law no. 4 of 2009 concerning minerals and coal and the minister of energy and mineral resources no. 7 of 2012. the two regulations encourage programs to increase the added value of mining products and the obligation to process and purify minerals within the country. the investment value of the construction of this plant is us$ 1 billion (around rp 9.8 trillion) with a production capacity of 2 million tons of alumina per year. the realisation of the investment value was divided into two stages, namely in 2013 until the plant is established in 2015 with a capacity of 1 million tons of alumina. the other half is in 2016, when the factory has been operating for one year (pt. whw ar, 2017). in its investment activity, pt. whw ar has cooperated with west kalimantan provincial government. pt. whw ar, for example, has helped accelerating regional economic growth which contributed to the opening of employment opportunities for local communities and thus, reduce unemployment and poverty. in addition, the cooperation dictates that both parties can work together in maintaining the security of the west kalimantan region, especially in kendawangan, ketapang district and in increasing the development of border areas and infrastructure facilities (west kalimantan provincial government, 2016). in the pre-reconstruction period, there were 125 workers who joined the management training program in china, specifically for learning about technology (tribun ketapang, 2017). other cooperation carried out by pt. whw ar with the government is in the national journal of asean studies 147 aluminium industry sector. pt whw ar is a bauxite processing plant and is becoming the first alumina company in indonesia and southeast asia. c. jembatan pak kasih tayan pak kasih tayan bridge is the southern axis that connects between west kalimantan and central kalimantan. this river crosses over the kapuas river, sanggau regency and is the longest bridge in kalimantan and number two in indonesia. the tomb of the pak tayan pack has an overall length of 1,440 meters and a width of 11 meters. the bridge was built in 2011 and finished in february 2016 and was inaugurated by president joko widodo on march 22, 2016. the pak kasih tayan bridge project spent a total cost of rp 1.038 trillion with chinese loans of 90% and state budget 10 %. this bridge was built in collaboration with the chinese government (road and bridge corporation) and pt. wijaya karta tbk, indonesia (tribun ketapang, 2017). behind its main function as a connecting hub for kalimantan (west kalimantan, central kalimantan and east kalimantan and south kalimantan) which is cut off by the kapuas river in tayan hilir, the pak kasih tayan bridge will also become a new tourist attraction for sanggau regency, west kalimantan. in addition, the ornaments and panoramas of the kapuas river are attractive for tourists. the pak kasih tayan bridge is also the longest bridge in kalimantan. the bridge has two main spans, the first is 430 meters long and the second is 1,330 meters and is 112 km from pontianak, the provincial capital of west kalimantan (detiktravel.com, 2016). d. pt wilmar international limited wilmar international limited was founded in 1991 and headquartered in singapore. pt. wilmar international limited is a leading agribusiness company in asia. wilmar is ranked among the largest companies listed based on market capitalization on the singapore stock exchange. wilmar's business activities include palm plantations, oil seed extraction, vegetable oil refining, sugar milling and refining, consumer product manufacturing, oleo chemical specialty fats, biodiesel and fertilizers and flour and rice mills. the core of wilmar's strategy is an integrated agribusiness model that covers the entire value chain of agricultural commodity businesses, starting from the cultivation, processing, manufacturing, to selling various kinds of agricultural products. wilmar has more than 500 factories and extensive distribution networks such as china, india, indonesia and around 40 other countries. pt. wilmar international limited has a multinational workforce of around 90,000 people (pt. wilmar international limited, 2018). in west kalimantan there are seven foreign investments that invest their capital in oil palm plantations, while domestic investment has only six companies. the area of oil palm plantations in west kalimantan as of october 2009 was 499,548 hectares, still far from the target of 1.5 million heirs. while data from sawit watch a local ngo 148 the dynamics of paradiplomacy practices mentioned of 50 of oil palm plantation companies or 7.8 million hectares is foreign-owned property. among them are entrepreneurs from malaysia, singapore, us, uk, and belgium. this occurred due to “political game” at the local decisionmaking level concerning to business permission. overall, oil palm plantations are controlled by 30 groups and around 700 subsidiaries. in just five years from 1999 to 2004 the rate of planting of oil palm plantations reached 400 thousand hectares per year. director general of plantations, ministry of industry of indonesia, achmad manggabarani said indonesia remained focused on efforts to achieve the target of producing 40 million tons of crude palm oil (cpo) by 2020 (ministry of industry, 2016). foreign cooperation of west kalimantan a. socio-economic cooperation on socio economic between west kalimantan-sarawak state the malaysia-indonesia (malindo) socio-economic cooperation between government of west kalimantan and sarawak's domestic affairs has actually been established for a long time. the forms of cooperation based on the result of the meeting are: 1) strengthening hr capacity at the border 2) increased access and security 3) building interconnection and interinstitutional operability 4) strengthening border hdi 5) building a pattern of border management and land and maritime borders 6) environmental management and border sda source: (arindapraja, 2015). the committee’s tasks are as follows: 1. to determine socio-economic development projects. 2. to supervise the implementation of socio-economic development and border areas. 3. to carry out information exchange regarding socio-economic development in the joint border region. source: (arindapraja, 2015). b. cooperation on interconnectedelectricity between west kalimantan-sarawak state electricity interconnection cooperation projects between state of sarawak and west kalimantan have completed. the 275kv transmissions between the two regions on the indonesiamalaysia border have even been synchronized since january 20, 2016 (secretariat of riau province, 2017). the development of the us $ 118 billion project was also discussed in a bilateral meeting between the minister of energy and mineral resources dr. sudirman said and malaysian minister of energy, green and water technology (ttha), datuk seri dr. maximus ongkili, in kuala lumpur on january 2016. based on the electricity cooperation under the asean power journal of asean studies 149 grid, the indonesian national electricity company (pln) will import 50 mw of electricity after the peak load time (lwbp) and a maximum of 230 mw during peak load time (wbp) with free of charge. furthermore, this electricity exchange will be carried out according to the commercial scheme. this cooperation is still within the framework of the asean power grid, specifically the joint project of the pln and sesco malaysia to connect seabed cables between riau and malaka. another collaborative project that is still ongoing is the sabah-north kalimantan project (harefa & badaruddin, 2016; sinambela, 2017). this cooperation also refers to the agreement in power exchange agreement (pea) in which pln indonesia and sesco malaysia agreed to buy and sell (export-import) electricity for 25 years. in addition, in this pea agreement, pln builds a 275 kv extra high voltage transmission (ehvt) and 2 82 km circuits from extra high voltage sub-station of bengkayang to the border in serikin, in state of serawak, so that the total length of (ehvt) is 127 km. at that time, the west kalimantan system suffered an electricity deficit of 30 mw with a capable power of 240 mw. electricity imports from malaysia are part of the business of west kalimantan in the context of overcoming blackouts that have long occurred in the west kalimantan region, especially in the equatorial system in the last two years. in addition, pln of west kalimantan is expected to export electricity to sarawak, malaysia through the same ehvt network. this electricity import will potentially savings more than 3.5 billion per day. it will also improve cost of production from the previous rp2,700 / kwh to rp1,700 / kwh (koran sindo, 2016). c. cooperation on tourism between west kalimantan-sarawak state one of the results of the 28th prepanel session of the malaysia-indonesia (malindo) socio-economic cooperation between government of west kalimantan and sarawak's domestic affairs is the tourism and cultural cooperation. there are a number of issues under discussion such as the "joint tourism development and promotion", "joint notice board", "joint exit survey", and tourism/tourism activities notice. in addition, cooperation in ecotourism, museums, culture and arts, history and cultural values, and cooperation in antiques/cultural heritage objects are also elaborated. both parties agreed to design joint tour packages and tourism information exchange, and to publish standard operating procedures of tourism transport vehicles across national borders (antara kalbar, 2012). furthermore, for the joint exit survey, it was agreed to be continued on entikong and tebedu borders and only involved custom, immigration, quarantine, and security (ciqs) where the results of the survey would be exchanged between the two countries. west kalimantan and sarawak also agreed that each city/district in the two regions would notify all invitations related to culture and tourism events. particularly for ecotourism cooperation, one of the points 150 the dynamics of paradiplomacy practices agreed is the cooperation of the regions concerning batang ai national park in sarawak, betung kerihun national park in west kalimantan, and danau sentarum national park. d. cooperation on business sector between west kalimantansarawak state the business forum was held at mega mall ayani pontianak, april 2018 in order to strengthen business relations between sarawak and west kalimantan. this is the second time of business forum held in pontianak between the two parties. the first event was held in 2011, where it had been seven years of collaboration. this exhibition is a followup of the memorandum of understanding between sarawak business federation (sbf) and indonesian chamber of commerce and industry (kadin) in september 2017 (kilas kalbar, 2018). the business mission is to open opportunities for the private sector to be promoted in both countries, malaysia and indonesia. in addition to the business sector, sbf also exhibits a service sector specifically related to health services. cooperation between sarawak-west kalimantan manifests in both parties introducing each superior product in exploring the potential of the two regions. this sbf and kadin collaboration also addresses the challenges of doing business. the obstacles faced by entrepreneurs will then be conveyed to the government of both parties. among west kalimantan products that have been marketed to neighboring countries are processed foods. in addition, product skills such as weaving are also promoted (kilas kalbar, 2018). based on above explanation, west kalimantan have received huge foreign investments and have collaborated intensively with the closest neighbour state of sarawak, malaysia. west kalimantan have attracted many foreign investments in various sectors especially on energy. while cooperation with state of sarawak was seen more deeper than expectation. nevertheless, there still some issues pertaining “controvercial overseas trips” among local government apparatus. like in riau island, local apparatus also under strong criticism due to overseas trip for “budget cleaning” ahead of end of year budget. for instance, deputy local house in west kalimantan said that: “kita sudah mendengar selentingan dari masyarakat, mereka bertanya-tanya kenapa disaat anggaran defisit, masih saja mau melaksanakan perjalanan dinas ke luar negeri. seolah-olah mau jalan-jalan saja [we have heard rumors from the public, they wonder why when the budget deficit, they still want to carry out official trips abroad. their trip is just for fun]. (netizen media, 2018). this also a strong indication that even in the region which statistically high reputation on paradiplomacy, still have problems with ceremonial paradiplomacy. public still questioning about the local government apparatus attitudes that tend journal of asean studies 151 to spend a lot of money for overseas trip amid of local financial difficulties. conclusion paradiplomacy in the frontier areas in indonesia especially in riau island and west kalimantan has been relatively sucessful. this can be investigated in the investment achievement of the two regions. in addition, the stakeholders are also varied among local government apparatus, businessman, mncs, and individuals. yet, most of the cooperation were conducted by local elites. in contrast to this, people’s empowerment is still left behind. the high number of foreign investments in both provinces has significantly influenced the local economic developments. nevertheless, there was a serious challenge among local apparatus. the “ceremonial paradiplomacy” is still intensively practiced and is usually implemented through “overseas visit” which led to the rise of public controversy. about the author ali maksum is assistant professor in international relations, universitas muhammadiyah yogyakarta. his expertise is in international relations in southeast asia especially migration studies. surwandono is associate professor in international relations, universitas muhammadiyah yogyakarta. his expertise is in diplomacy and international relations in islamic perspective. references antara kalbar. 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http://pontianak.tribunnews.com/2017/11/13/pt-whw-ar-ketapang-ujung-tombak-perusahaan-asing-di-indonesia http://pontianak.tribunnews.com/2016/01/24/investasi-asing-di-kalbar-masuk-10-besar http://pontianak.tribunnews.com/2016/01/24/investasi-asing-di-kalbar-masuk-10-besar http://pontianak.tribunnews.com/2016/01/24/investasi-asing-di-kalbar-masuk-10-besar http://kalimantan.bisnis.com/read/20180703/407/812457/ekspor-kalbar-mei-2018-naik-2252 http://kalimantan.bisnis.com/read/20180703/407/812457/ekspor-kalbar-mei-2018-naik-2252 http://kalimantan.bisnis.com/read/20180703/407/812457/ekspor-kalbar-mei-2018-naik-2252 journal of asean studies, vol. 2, no. 1 (2014), pp. 42–48 © 2014 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn2338-1353 electronic japan’s renaissance and its effect to asean syafril hidayat padjadjaran university, indonesia abstract japan has developed a new security policy against china in east china sea, which has increased tension in that region. japan’s new leadership under shinzo abe, who has conservative political view, has unbeatable policy against china’s hegemony. abe revised japan self-defence forces role in the japanese constitution by making critical amendments on particular articles, which should be seen as japan’s bargaining power against china. the two major powers in east china sea can be seen as security dilemma of other states. pursuit of power and hegemony will influence other major actors in the global world system and also small states. japan’s new security policy is as a renaissance of japan’s hegemony or pursuit of power in east china sea. by using bargaining model of war, japan’s security policy will determine overall situation in south china sea or particularly in east china sea: whether it will remain of high threat or balance of threat rather than balance of power, or it will face possible conflict in the future. keywords: japan, shinzo abe, china, bargaining model, asean. introduction china’s airspace claim over the senkaku/diaoyu islands in the east china sea has raised political tensions in the region. china showed off its existence as a country that was at odds with japan and the west. seeing china’s offensive pursuit of power in the region, japan quickly responded to the situation by taking various strategic measures in order to balance. japan performed a symbolic diplomatic step with japanese prime minister shinzo abe’s historical visit to the yasukuni shrine. yasukuni shrine is the final resting place of japanese wartime heroes, including fourteen key figures who took responsibility for world war ii. this step alone had boiled relations with china and its allies, which could be seen in the kcna editorial that called abe 'asian hitler' and rodong sinmun editorial that called abe 'maniac militarists' (kompas, february 6, 2012, p.10). abe’s visit to the shrine also raised us’s and uk’s responses. both countries paid more respect to china than japan about the political impact of visit to the yasukuni shrine. british's ambassador to japan suggested abe not to visit the shrine. american ambassador to japan also suggested japan not to exacerbate the situation which could further raise tensions in east asia. furthermore, japan had also set up a special panel headed by shunji yanai, former japanese ambassador to us, which discussed about the japan self-defence forces role in the japanese constitution. journal of asean studies 43 japan had been avoiding collective defence after the world war ii. however, the current draft proposed that japan could provide assistance to its allies. it was a major strategic change of japanese foreign policy, particularly related to the east china sea, and might be expanded to other regions such as southeast asian because japan’s huge investments and donations in the region. even though china and japan (with the us) seemed to be at enmity with each other, uniquely the us as japan’s ally also continued to provide assistance to china as well as to japan. the us had been provided assistance that led to environmental improvement, tibet issue, and democratization on china’s continent. usaid assistance had been channeled directly to the citizens of china. facing the east china sea conflict, japan also had to pay such a large order to buy the senkaku/diaoyu islands. the advantage was the economic growth that japan had targeted by its expansion in asia. besides, japan is also seeking to maintain its trade transactions using yen exchange rate. by promoting the growth of the japanese economy, this policy will benefit greatly in terms of influence and us support. similarly, japan will provide an opportunity to renew the role and posture of its military. on the other hand, china will make efforts to expand its military role and growing influence of its ideology to maintain its national interests. relations between japan and china, however, remain a game of utilizing bargaining power. therefore, it is the most proper to examine using bargaining model to measure rivalry between those states. conceptual theory: bargaining model bargaining model can be said as a new model in the analysis of politics and war. although politics and war are two different things, but carl von by clausewitz had expressed that “war is politics by other means”. the bargaining model is an analytical model that is still being debated and still requires interdisciplinary enrichment. this model also still needs to be tested primarily related to the ability estimates, the completion estimates, and the exchange of interests between the two rival groups (reiter, 2003). the bargaining model is traditionally linked closely to the economic behaviour in trade. the bargaining process is carried out by at least two actors in order to reach agreement on a treaty (kennan & wilson, 1993). the bargaining model itself in politics and war is a new alternative in the analysis. the bargaining model focuses on the analysis of the causes, prosecution, termination and the consequences in a war as a process of theoretical consistency (reiter, 2003). all factors are debated scientifically, as an integral part altogether or separately. some researchers believe there are possibly two, or one, factors in a single case. schelling (1960) focused on the causes, while kecskemeti (1958), ikle (1991), and pillar (1983) focused on the termination. blainey (1973) studied on the causes and consequences (reiter, 2003). those point of views explain conflicts in europe and western colonization of africa and asia. thomas schelling (1960) stated that conflict situations are essentially bargaining situations. so this model is increasingly constructed and applied in the dynamics of government and legislators in some countries (reiter, 2003). this model still requires ongoing enrichment from the disciplines of war, international relations, psychology, public policy, etc. the 44 japan’s renaissance and its effect to asean conceptual theory of bargaining model can be applied in examining japanese foreign policy reconstruction under shinzo abe’s administration. in the bargaining model, the causes of war rest on three conditions, explicitly: 1) the absence of an agreement between the warring parties, 2) the lack of agreement to avoid battle in the future, and 3) inability of bargaining to prevent war if the disputed items remain unresolved (fearon, 1995, 1998). to look at abe’s conservative policy, it is more appropriate to use the realist perspective in the study of international relations, in which a state perceives other states as threats. thus, states try to achieve balance of power in the international system to survive in the midst of the magnitude of the pressure / interest of other states. the absence of an agreement between japan and china the cause of japan’s renaissance was the absence of an agreement between china and japan over the senkaku/diaoyu islands after world war ii. china had never wanted this issue to be resolved through international institutions. even though japan had bought the region, the aerial territorial boundaries claimed by japan and china are overlapping. on another topic, china has continuously been demanding for prosecution of japanese war crimes. but japan considered that the wartime japanese soldiers and officers had been prosecuted for their war crimes. implicitly, japanese protest against china’s and other countries’ psychological distress was symbolized by abe’s visit to the yasukuni shrine. prosecutions, in bargaining model, are made since war or conflict justified by the forces involved. when the forces try to reach one or more tasks such as the destruction of the opponents’ will, destruction of civilian property and others, it is justification of war. in the case of between japan and china, occupation of senkaku/diaoyu islands unilaterally by china or japan can be seen as justification of war and bargaining model is applied. thus the military had been used as part of the bargaining process to achieve the goals. even though open conflict between japan and china has never happened yet, the abe’s administration concerns regarding china had raised the steps taken by japan leading to a new balance of power. abe’s concerns were well-founded as a result of the fact that china had been arresting fishermen in the senkaku/diaoyu islands and installing its flag on the paracel and spratly islands. in the bargaining model, termination is achieved when: 1) the troops reached a total occupation or destruction of the enemy that cannot survive as a total of victory achievement, and 2) forces can reduce uncertainty about the abilities or the destruction of the opponent. those two factors have materialized in the form of china’s air defense identification zone (adiz) over the senkaku/diaoyu. japan assumed that china would expand its territory. abe finally seeked to reposition over military and defence policy by trying to gradually amend the japanese constitution’s article 9 relating to the role of the japan self-defence forces by calling for a revision of article 96 specifying the process for making amendments. it can lead to a new perspective on the pacific constitution that has prevailed so far. thus the senkaku/diaoyu islands seem like hotspot for both japan and china and remain having overlapping claim over it. in the bargaining model, consequences focus more on post-war stability required. the longer a war lasts, the longer the peace created will last (smith & stam, 2002). yet this stage has not happened until now. journal of asean studies 45 retrospective war wounds between the two countries had led to no absolute agreement over the victims of violence due to war between chinese and japanese. after war, japan has also been claiming to be a victim of war crimes. war may occur as a result of lack of agreement to avoid battle in the future foreign policy depends on who holds power (yanyan, 2007:3; mas’oed, 1994:184). during his visit to washington, shinzo abe stated that “japan is back”. with great support from the liberal democratic party (ldp), abe has a large curiosity to revise the japanese constitution’s article 96 to revise article 9 in the pacific constitution. public who support the right wing groups have high expectations of the japan self-defence forces reformation. the japanese constitution has been perceived as abnormal amidst the complexity of the dynamics in the east china sea and the role of the japanese self-defence forces globally (cooney, 2002). abe acted to increase japanese nationalism by reforming school education law. furthermore, abe will also upgrade defense institution into a ministry level. ultimately, abe will revise the pacific constitution. aside from these changes, the ldp had also submitted a draft of changes that could be considered exceeding security issues, which were freedom of the press, return of the emperor as head of state, and japanese nationalism regarding japanese flag and national anthem. these can be seen as a form of return to the meiji restoration era (1930). this policy resulted in the emergence of japanese fascism a decade later in southeast asia, especially as the prologue of world war ii in east asia and southeast asia. the symbols of resurrection and japanese intentions were manifested in abe’s visit to the yasukuni shrine. as a reminder, japan had stated that the first step of foreign relations with asean was based on good intentions and heart-toheart relations which had been conducted since 1974 and marked by 1977 visit by japanese then prime minister takeo fukuda to some asean countries (green, 2001:170). fukuda built confidence that the japan-asean relations would be conducted without any desire to restore japan's past hegemony in the region (green, 2001). bargaining cannot prevent war if the disputed items remain unresolved abe got high support of around 72% votes in the last election. indeed, it showed the amount of japanese people’s interests and expectations on his term. abe programs in the field of economics known as 'abenomics' had shown progress and gained the trust of the japanese public. the program was not only related to economic growth but also provided continuation of japan's strategic steps to overcome deflation, which previously raised difficulty for japan’s economic growth. the deflation brought abe’s administration to execute three arrows policy in economy sector, namely: increasing efforts to prevent inflation by providing grants amounting up to $1.4 billion; injecting funds amounting up to $116 billion (this policy affected japan’s economic growth positively by 4.1% in the first quarter of abe’s term as prime minister); and developing economic growth strategies with emphasis on technology development, media, and enhancement of the role of female workers. current abe’s economic policy had been predicted earlier. japan had many difficulties in determining the right choice 46 japan’s renaissance and its effect to asean over domestic economic policy and postcold war foreign policy. japan's global economic power had been very efficient and it becomes the second largest economic power in the world, but its domestic economic policies had remained inefficiency (cooney, 2002: chapter 4). on the other hand, japanese chief secretary of cabinet, yoshihide suga, had demonstrated a rejection to abe’s policy that was considered to be able to shake japan's foreign relations and the situation over the east asian region. departing from the bargaining model, japan will then seek to increase its bargaining power in the eyes of china and north korea. the us had granted political support by flying a b-52 aircraft over the senkaku/diaoyu islands. this showed the us’s seriousness in supporting its partners in east asia. this is the beginning of the operation procedure to prepare if an escalation of the current conflict increases. the us had been supporting japan's efforts to strengthen its self-defense forces and raised its defense budget. furthermore, the us and japan will follow further military cooperation. implications for southeast asia several important figures had warned against abe’s policty. rene l. pattiradjawane, as quoted in kompas, february 5, 2014. p.10, said that abe’s efforts to increase the defense budget and his visit to the yasukuni shrine would have counterproductive impact on japan. china was not a force to worry because of its untested and largely outdated military equipments. surely this worry would disappear gradually because of the support from the ultra-right japanese conservatives to abe’s leadership. the view of this group is not only aimed at japanese nationalism but will also have implications for japanese pacifist constitution. japan's efforts for the reconciliation of the japanese-korean war victims also had an influence on its relations with south korea and the us. this reconciliation brought japan to establish diplomatic relations with north korea. however, the us is still containing china limited to its allies, such as north korea. amid many pressures from other states, especially china, japan desires for survival in order to maintain its sovereignty, integrity, and national interests. china and north korea's demands for prosecution of japanese war crimes in the 1950’s japankorean war and the 1930’s sino-japanese war and the provision of comfort women (geisha) for japanese troops had given psychological pressures for japan in international relations. even though japan had given compensation, the issues remained a burden in its interaction with those countries. this situation led japan to prepare for its bargaining position internationally. southeast asia countries are looking forward to cooperation with japan, especially in the economic field. the asean countries have economic interests in japan’s assistance to spur investment and development in their respective countries as part of comprehensive relations between japan and asean (green, 2001:168). with the asean regional forum (arf), consisting of southeast and east asian countries with the possibility of northeast asian countries to join in the future, japan has an opportunity to discuss the security dialogue with the partner countries in the southeast asia region. as this region does not have a regional great power, asean is easier for japan to conduct international relations with compared with other regions. in addition, in another region discussions about economic and security interests are also journal of asean studies 47 high. this makes japan prefers partnership with asean. the establishment warm asean—japan relation has given positive impacts on the efforts to suppress chinese hegemony in the region. furthermore, the presence of arf confidence building measures will boost regional stability. the downside is that the arf and asean are not a pact / military alliance and that co-operation in the face of all the worst possibilities in this region has not been tested. asean does not have cooperation in security issues. co-operation among asean countries, china, japan, and south korea also gives rise to competition between japan’s and china’s investments in southeast asia. japan’s investment value in this region is relatively stable while south korea’s has decreased although not significantly. southeast asia is an attractive region for investment of those two major powers. japan is in need for the market in an effort to invigorate the domestic japanese economy. however, in the 2011 asean summit in bali, china announced plan to increase its investment to reach $500 billion by 2015. china had also established supporting devices for its plan by making the aseanchina free trade zone (ftz) and aseanchina trade centre in beijing. china is also providing $10 billion for transportation infrastructures in asean countries. on the other hand, the value of japan's trade transactions with asean countries is still rather large, reaching $160 billion annually, and will also influence the region's relations with japan. those two major powers have increased “influence-race” instead of arms race in southeast asia. asean is so attractive but needs to maintain neutrality over the influence of the two great powers. the diversity of asean members’ political dissent and national interests requires its members the seriousness of the role play amidst the rise of japan, which essentially japan’s renaissance is done more or less to counter chinese hegemony. asean will progress in the middle of storms, waves, and cliffs. thus it requires toughness in building its bargaining position. asean can also prepare for the possibility of future conflicts in the east china sea and south china sea. conclusion clausewitz stated that “war is the continuation of policy by other means”. japan's domestic political developments has resulted in a changing conservative orientations and estimates of other state actors, especially those in the east china sea and in general in the south china sea region and asia-pacific. long historical background of japanese fascism in asia-pacific region will lead to the effort of balance of power. states will naturally pursue power by combining, separating, or non-aligning with the existing great powers. it will be possible to form alliances or group or another pact. abe still has strong desire to restore japan by amending its self-defence forces roles. japan’s policy in security issues will remain a major focus for countries in the asia-pacific, especially southeast asia. with the diversity of political views of each stateactor in southeast asia, there will be reconfiguration into groups of liberaldemocratic, socialist-communist, and nonaligned states. whether this situation will lead back to a cold war-like situation or ‘little cold war’ in asia-pacific region is still a wait and see. we still have to wait for better further developments. 48 japan’s renaissance and its effect to asean about author safril hidayat, m.sc. is currently a doctoral postgraduate student at the padjadjaran university. he graduated from indonesian military academy and received his master’s degree in defence and strategic studies from university of madras and defence and services staff college, wellington. he can be contacted at safrilhidayat95@yahoo.com. references blainey, g. 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(1984). ilmu hubungan internasional: disiplin dan metodologi. jakarta: lp3es. michael howard and peter paret (eds). (1976 ). carl von clausewitz "on war" translation. princeton: princeton university press. pattiradjawane, rene l. 2013. pax tiongkokisasi: kalkulasi strategi keamanan asia. harian kompas tanggal 2 desember 2013. hal. 10. pillar, p. r. (1983). negotiating peace: war termination as a bargaining process. princeton: princeton university press. reiter, d. (2003). exploring the bargaining model of war. vol.1 no.1. schelling, t. c. (1960). the strategy of conflict. cambridge: harvard university press. smith, alastair, and stam, allan c. (2002). bargaining and the nature of war. new york: new york university press. yanyan, m. yani. article “politik luar negeri” through: <http://pustaka.unpad.ac.id/wpcontent/uploads/2010/01/politik_lu ar_negeri.pdf> tanggal [3/12/2013] harian kompas, 6 pebruari 2012. p.10. mailto:safrilhidayat95@yahoo.com. http://pustaka.unpad.ac.id/wp editorial enhancing global ir knowledge production in southeast asia through quality publications moch faisal karim, tirta nugraha mursitama, lili yulyadi arnakim international relations department, faculty of humanities, bina nusantara university, jakarta, indonesia, 11480. mkarim@binus.edu, tmursitama@binus.edu, lili.yulyadi@binus.edu how to cite: karim, m. f., mursitama, t. n., & arnakim, l.y.& (2022). enhancing global ir knowledge production in southeast asia through quality publications. journal of asean studies, 10(2), https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v10i2.9442 keywords: knowledge production, global ir, southeast asia, publication introduction since the call for non-western international relations (ir) theory (acharya & buzan, 2009), there has been a growing movement within the ir discipline to engage more non-western experiences to enhance debate within ir literature. this results in the advancement of global ir aimed to transform ir into a genuinely global discipline engaging ideas, approaches, and experiences of both western and non-western societies (hurrell, 2016; jones, 2021). this movement is not only trying to voice non-western ideas but also breaking the hegemony of euro-centrism in analyzing global issues. however, almost a decade into the movement, such a premise to enhance the global ir movement might still be limited. wicaksana and santoso (2022) show how indonesian ir is primarily dominated by western scholarship, especially constructivism and realism. moreover, indonesian ir scholars tend to focus on empirically based and policy-oriented than conceptual ones. this resulted in the lack of indonesian contributions towards debate in ir mailto:lili.yulyadi@binus.edu https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v10i2.9442 literature. not to mention that due to the neo-liberalization of education, ir courses tend to be designed to meet the demands of the job market rather than to address the debates in the discipline. in this editorial, we would like to examine further the knowledge production in international relations as a field of study in southeast asia, especially indonesia. as the only ir journal based in indonesia, we are interested in being part of the global ir movement. understanding the current state of the field in our region would allow us to focus our attention on how to energize the field in this region. to do so, a bibliometric analysis of the state of ir is conducted as a field of study. asean in ir knowledge production: a bibliometric analysis bibliometric analysis is conducted to understand the position of asean in the field of ir. we utilize scopus as our database, given its broad collections of scholarly publications. we need to reiterate, however, that this database is highly skewed toward english publications and might be biased toward english-speaking countries. however, scopus has been used by many institutions both in the global north and south as an instrument for evaluating research outcomes. using keywords relevant to the study of international relations in general, we gather around 61.687 articles from 2000 (see table 1). table 1 keywords for ir and ipe corpus types keywords relevant keywords for ir corpus (title-abs-key ( {international relations} ) or titleabs-key ( {foreign policy} ) or title-abs-key ( {global governance} ) or title-abs-key ( {international security} ) or title-abs-key ( {middle power} ) or title-abs-key ( {power transition} ) or title-abskey ( {cross-border regionalism} ) or title-abs-key ( {international political economy} ) or title-abs-key ( {global political economy} ) or title-abs-key ( {international institution} ) ) relevant keywords for ipe corpus (title-abs-key ( {international political economy} ) or title-abs-key ( {political economy} ) and title-abskey ( international ) or title-abs-key ( global ) or title-abs-key ( transnational ) or title-abs-key ( globalization ) ) these lists can be a corpus for knowledge production in international relations. as expected, the top four countries publishing about international relations are all anglo-saxon countries such as the us, uk, canada, and australia, followed by the russian federation, germany, and china, respectively. these anglo-saxon countries dominate ir studies with 31,436 or more than 50%. the us alone published around 25% of ir scholarships. furthermore, the top twenty most productive countries in ir knowledge production are dominated by western countries, with more than 70% of publications published in these countries. non-western countries such as russia, china, india, japan, brazil, and turkey account for only 14% of ir publications. this suggests that the us and western countries dominate ir scholarship (see table 2). table 2 ir publication by country from 2000-2022 no country number of publications 1 united states 15.689 2 united kingdom 9.749 3 canada 3.075 4 australia 2.923 5 russian federation 2.897 6 germany 2.887 7 china 1.694 8 netherland 1.386 9 italy 1.326 10 france 1.289 11 turkey 1.248 12 india 1.038 13 sweden 982 14 brazil 924 15 japan 897 16 spain 895 17 belgium 871 18 switzerland 831 19 norway 798 20 denmark 789 source: scopus database where is the position of southeast asia in general and indonesia in particular in regard to this knowledge production? all southeast asian countries combined have only produced 2% of ir scholarships since 2000. singapore is ranked number 1 as a country that has made ir scholarship in asean with 635 publications. despite being the largest country in asean and a supposedly important player, indonesia has produced only 240 publications since 2000 and placed second, followed by malaysia and thailand in third and fourth place with 217 and 105 publications, respectively. arguably, singapore has become a hub in knowledge production in ir. singapore’s two leading institutions, nanyang technological university and the national university of singapore, arguably have become hub for ir knowledge production in asean, publishing 426 and 352 publications, respectively, higher than all indonesian academic institutions’ productivity combined (see table 3). singapore is also superior in terms of the quality of the publication. most of the publications are published in highly-ranked journals. other than singapore, indonesia and malaysia followed. there are six indonesian institutions, six malaysian institutions, two philippines institutions, two thai institutions, and one vietnam institution in the top twenty most productive institutions in ir knowledge production (see table 4). table 3 ir publications in southeast asia from 2000-2022 no country world ranking number of publications 1 singapore 23 635 2 indonesia 37 240 3 malaysia 40 217 4 thailand 55 105 5 philippines 56 103 6 vietnam 58 90 7 cambodia 108 9 8 brunei 112 7 9 laos 128 4 10 myanmar 129 4 source: scopus database table 4 publications by university in southeast asia from 2000-2022 no institutions number of publication country 1 nanyang technological university 426 singapore 2 national university of singapore 352 singapore 3 universiti malaya 50 malaysia 4 de la salle university 44 philippines 5 universiti kebangsaan malaysia 41 malaysia 6 thammasat university 32 thailand singapore management university 29 singapore 7 bina nusantara university 29 indonesia 8 universitas indonesia 27 indonesia 9 university of the philippines diliman 26 philippines 10 universiti sains malaysia 20 malaysia 11 chulalongkorn university 19 thailand 12 universitas airlangga 19 indonesia 13 diplomatic academy of vietnam 18 vietnam 14 international islamic university malaysia 17 malaysia 15 universitas muhammadiyah yogyakarta 16 indonesia 16 universitas diponegoro 14 indonesia 17 universitas padjadjaran 14 indonesia 18 universitas putra malaysia 12 malaysia 19 universiti sultan zainal abidin 12 malaysia 20 universiti utara malaysia 11 malaysia source: scopus database for indonesia, knowledge production is highly diversified. bina nusantara university has become the most productive in terms of ir knowledge production with 29 publications (12%), followed by universitas indonesia with 27 (11%), universitas airlangga with 19 publications (7,8%), and universitas muhammadiyah yogyakarta with 16 publications (6,6%). unlike indonesia, philippines ir knowledge production is primarily dominated by two universities, de la salle university and the university of the philippines diliman, representing almost 70% of the total publications (see table 5). table 5 publications by universities in indonesia from 2000-2022 no institutions number of publication 1 bina nusantara university 29 2 universitas indonesia 28 3 universitas airlangga 19 4 universitas muhammadiyah yogyakarta 16 5 universitas diponegoro 14 6 universitas padjajaran 14 7 hasanuddin university 11 8 universitas gajah mada 9 9 lipi 9 10 centre for strategic and international studies 6 source: scopus database the fate of the ir subfield, indonesian knowledge production in international political economy, an ir subfield is even worse. from 12.470 documents with relevant ipe keywords, indonesian-based scholars only produced 51 publications. only one article published by indonesian-based scholars was published in review of international political economy, the most prominent journal in the field of international political economy. overall, southeast asian-based scholars produce only 308 journal publications or 2,25%. singaporean-based institutions dominate knowledge production with 141 publications, or more than 45% of all publications from southeast asian institutions. the united states still dominates most knowledge production in the field of international political economy with 3.660 publications, the united kingdom with 2.879 publications, canada with 949 publications, australia with 817 publications, and germany with 621 publications. in southeast asia, singapore ranked first with 141 publications followed by indonesia in second place with 51 publication, malaysia with 48 publications, thailand with 35 publications, and the philippines with 22 publications (see table 6). the question, then, is where indonesian ir academic scholars publish. building upon available data of indonesian ir scholars in the scopus database, we can gather around 149 indonesian ir scholars. these 149 scholars have generated 697 publications or 4,6 publications on average per scholar. however, the prevalence of indonesian ir scholars published in proceedings is higher than average. for instance, there were only 792 publications in proceeding out of 61.687 publications in ir or about 1,2%. in the case of indonesia, there are 118 publications in proceedings or almost 17% of all total publications by indonesian scholars. publishing in proceedings indicates a low-quality paper, given the nature of proceeding, that has weak or no peer review (see table 7). table 6 ipe publication by country from 2000-2022 no country world ranking number of publications 1 united states 1 3,660 2 united kingdom 2 2,879 3 canada 3 949 4 australia 4 821 5 germany 5 626 6 netherland 6 367 7 italy 7 294 8 south africa 8 278 9 china 9 271 10 france 10 264 11 singapore 21 141 12 indonesia 38 51 13 malaysia 39 48 14 thailand 43 35 15 philippines 50 22 source: scopus database table 7 top ten journal outlets by indonesia-based ir scholars no name type focus number 1 iop conference series earth and environmental science proceeding/ discontinued non-ir journal 73 2 review of international geographical education online journal/ discontinued non-ir journal 31 3 international journal of innovation creativity and change journal/ discontinued non-ir journal 26 4 central european journal of international and security studies journal ir journal 21 5 journal of advanced research in dynamical and control systems journal/ discontinued non-ir journal 17 6 international journal of energy economics and policy journal non-ir journal 13 7 international journal of supply chain management journal/ discontinued non-ir journal 12 8 revista unisci journal ir journal 12 9 journal of physics conference series proceeding non-ir journal 11 10 international journal of scientific and technology research journal/ discontinued non-ir journal 9 source: scopus database furthermore, indonesian ir scholars do not publish in ir or political science specific journals. the top ten outlets where indonesian ir scholars publish were primarily dominated by science and management-related journals. this indicates that indonesian ir scholars tend to publish in predatory journals or low-rank journals even though it is not part of the scholarly field. this also shows the academic environment in indonesia seems to prioritize quantity and fast publication where proceedings can cater for such needs. as a comparison, around 59 academics based in singapore has generated about 977 publications or 16 publications on average per person. singapore academics published only seven conference proceedings. most of the academics in singapore published in reputable ir journals focusing on the asia pacific (see table 8). indeed the low-quality publication by indonesian scholars by no means indicates the lower quality of indonesian scholars. many variables explain the seemingly low-quality publications by indonesian scholars. many ir academics in indonesia or some in southeast asia are busy and occupied with administrative or structural activities (rakhmani, 2021). this is considering the condition of the higher education environment in indonesia, which focuses on bureaucratic jobs. second, the process of neoliberalization of education keeps lecturers busy in the teaching process with a large number of classes and a lot of workloads so that lecturers do not have time to do research. this, of course, really depends on each institution’s policy (rosser, 2023). third, given the unique position of academics in indonesia, many lecturers enjoy the role of activists or observers. the phenomenon of academic pragmatism, where lecturers interact more often with the public, makes publication activities irrelevant to some academics. table 8 top ten journal outlets by singapore-based ir scholars no name number of publication 1 pacific review 32 2 contemporary southeast asia 14 3 asian survey 12 4 intellectual discourse 12 5 asia policy 11 6 asian security 11 7 review of international studies 11 8 asian journal of political science 10 9 australian journal of international affairs 10 10 asian journal of comparative politics 8 11 cambridge review of international affairs 8 12 european journal of international relations 8 13 international affairs 8 14 journal of strategic studies 8 source: scopus database our bibliometric analysis shows that the west primarily dominates international relations knowledge production. in the case of southeast asia, the hub for knowledge production is singapore. specifically for indonesia, the picture is even grimmer when we look at the quality of publications by indonesian ir scholars. not only is there a gender gap in terms of publication by indonesian ir scholars (prihatini & prajuli, 2022), but there is a quality gap in publications. it is then challenging to contribute for indonesian ir to have a distinct view that allows them to contribute toward global ir. there is a need for further enhancement of the indonesian ir epistemic community. enhancing ir in southeast asia this current jas issue aims to address such limitations in enhancing how indonesian scholars, in particular, and southeast asian scholars, in general, can contribute towards the global ir. this edition is special because it marks the tenth anniversary of the journal of asean studies. seven articles in this issue, in some ways, address the concern on how southeast asian-based scholars can contribute to the ir debate. to do so, we examine the trajectories and trends of research that engage southeast asia as empirical grounds. the first article by andrew rosser, titled “beyond the crisis: re-energizing southeast asian studies”, discusses the decline of southeast asia as area studies. rosser (2022) suggests several strategies to enhance southeast asian studies to be more relevant to debates in the disciplines. this is important because jas, although it claims to be an ir journal, focuses on southeast asia and asean as its empirical issues. we publish articles that engage in the issue of transnational environmental governance in southeast asia (varkkey, 2021), domestic issues of particular asean member countries such as the president public speech (tyson & apresian, 2021), to comparative analysis of two asean member states focusing on how states policing cyberspace (talamayan, 2020). however, we expect that such area studies could contribute to the particular debate. we hope jas could be a platform for linking area studies with debates in disciplines. the second article written by i gede wahyu wicaksana and moch faisal karim, titled “approaches to indonesia’s foreign policy: area studies, fpa theory, and global ir”, examines the evolution of indonesia’s foreign policy studies, highlighting the major theoretical and methodological trends that have shaped their current form. wicaksana and karim (2022) show that indonesian scholars focusing on foreign policy analysis (fpa) has engaged in more diverse theory-driven inquiries. many recent studies on indonesia’s foreign policy engage in role theory (karim, 2021) and family state (wicaksana, 2019). this could be an important trend for indonesia to contribute to the global ir, specifically in the sub-field of fpa. jas has also published a variety study on indonesia’s foreign policy, especially on indonesia’s international leadership (jemadu & lantang, 2021), indonesia’s foreign policy toward asean, and the interaction between domestic politics and indonesia’s foreign policy toward south pacific (lantang & tambunan, 2020). we hope that jas could produce more theory-driven fpa focusing on indonesia and comparative studies of asean member states. the third and fourth articles focus on southeast asia’s international political economy (ipe) trends. miranda tahalele et al. (2022), in their article titled “the trajectory and trend of international political economy in southeast asia authors”, explores the studies of southeast asia’s political economy that have stimulated the debate over the past years and its future trends. they show how issues on climate change and the environment, the importance of subregional in asean integration, and digitalization and technological advancement could be a trend that emerged within the policy discussion and academic forums. hence, we encourage southeast asian-based scholars to engage in these issues to contribute to conceptual development that enriches ipe in southeast asia. the fourth article is by kyunghoon kim, titled “key features of indonesia’s state capitalism under jokowi”. in this article, kim (2022) analyses how state capitalism has expanded rapidly since president joko widodo came into power in 2014. he shows, however, state capitalism’s resurgence has not translated into the government decidedly turning its back on the market. this type of study is important for the growing study of ipe in southeast asia, given the distinct nature of state-market relations that might shed light on general debates in ipe. the fifth and sixth articles focus on trends in contemporary media issues of southeast asia, especially the debate regarding democratization and the rise of authoritarianism. the article by athiqah nur alami et al. (2022) examines how the digital sphere may or may not support inclusive and deliberative democracy in the region. they find that digital space has created different outcomes for democratization in southeast asia. digital space can be instrumental in harassing dissent or jailing opposition members in countries like the philippines and vietnam. at the same time, using technology offers an opportunity that has prospects for nurturing deliberative and more inclusive democracy in indonesia and malaysia. in their article titled “journalism in the age of digital autocracy: a comparative asean perspective”, aim sinpeng and youngjoon koh (2022) survey how digital news organizations survive and thrive in this increasingly repressive environment where governments are seeking innovative ways to monitor, surveil, censor and persecute government critics, activists and journalists. they find that digital authoritarianism does not exert downward pressure on critical journalism. last but not least, our seventh article is written by tangguh chairil et al., titled “road to asean political-security community vision 2025: understanding convergence and divergence in asean voting behaviors in the unga”. chairil et al. (2022) examine asean cohesion and how it aligns with the institution’s community-building project by looking at the pattern of divergence and convergence in asean voting behaviour across security issues discussed in the un general assembly. they find that asean member states’ voting highly converges on colonialism, the law of the sea, the mediterranean region, military expenditures, outer space, peace, and transnational crimes. editorial team, moch faisal karim tirta nugraha mursitama lili yulyadi arnakim references acharya, a., & buzan, b. (2009). non-western international relations theory: perspectives on and beyond asia. routledge. alami, a. n., luong, d. n. a., prihatini, e., ramadhani, e., go, j. r. r., hafidzah, n., & atiyah, u. (2022). democratization in the digital era: experience from southeast asia. jas (journal of asean studies), 10(2), 227-246. https://journal.binus.ac.id/index.php/ jas/article/view/9361 chairil, t., putri, r. a. a. k., & pertiwi, s. b. 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(2022). promoting global ir under the dominance of mainstream theories and the liberalization of universities: reflections from indonesia. contemporary southeast asia: a journal of international and strategic affairs, 44(2), 207– 229. https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2021.2010120 https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2021.2010120 https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v10i2.9162 https://journal.binus.ac.id/index.php/jas/article/view/9184 https://journal.binus.ac.id/index.php/jas/article/view/9184 https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v8i2.6769 https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v8i2.6769 https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v9i2.7318 https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v9i2.7757 https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2019.1686997 https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v10i2.9059 journal of asean studies, vol. 10, no. 1 (2022), pp. 129−149 issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic received: 30th april 2022/ revised: 24th july 2022/ accepted: 01st august 2022 journey to justice: the united nations declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples in the context of west papua ani widyani soetjipto department of international relations, university of indonesia ani.soetjipto@gmail.com how to cite: soetjipto, a. w. (2022). journey to justice: the united nations declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples in the context of west papua. journal of asean studies, 10(1), 129−149. https:/doi.org/ 10.21512/jas.v10i1.8491 abstract this article aimed to examine the implementation of the united nations declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples (undrip), focusing on the rights of the indigenous papuan people in the indonesian provinces on the western half of the island of new guinea, commonly referred to in english as papua or west papua. by drawing on the theory of norm diffusion in the study of international relations, this article argues that despite adopting a declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples, the indonesian government seems to find fulfilling the rights of indigenous papuans challenging due to obfuscation and lack of political will. this article finds that the implementation of special autonomy in papua has been a failure, as the human rights situation has deteriorated and the fundamental rights of indigenous papuans remain unfulfilled. keywords: undrip, indigenous rights, west papua indonesia, special autonomy, norm diffusion introduction after a long process, the united nations (un) general assembly adopted the landmark un declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples (undrip) in 2007. the declaration is significant for indigenous peoples because it is the first universal instrument to protect indigenous people's rights, including the right of self-determination (isa, 2019). unfortunately, although many countries have adopted and implemented undrip, its implementation is unsatisfactory and there is no consensus on policy of indegenous people of some commonwealth countries (lenzerini, 2019, whall 2003). one argument that helps explain the limited progress is states’ suspicion around the right of self-determination. many mailto:ani.soetjipto@gmail.com 130 journey to justice states worry that the recognition of self-determination rights will threaten the state's own sovereignty. the basic principle of self-determination is to accommodate the participation of indigenous peoples in decision-making processes that affect them (cambou, 2019). lenzerini (2019) argues that the implementation has varied significantly around the world, ranging from full acceptance to modification and even outright rejection. in recent decades, states around the globe have increasingly given rise to illiberal norms (glasius, schalk, & de lange, 2020). introducing new restrictions against non-governmental organisations (ngos) is particularly common. such restrictions are problematic because civil society has an essential role in educating the public and providing information, especially in terms of transnational community and advocacy networks (soetjipto & yuliestiana, 2020). civil society campaigns on specific issues, strategies, and tactics have a real impact on international relations. however, although ngos contribute positively to transnational advocacy, their advocacy is not always successful. one of the keys to the success or failure of advocacy is political opportunity. this is how domestic groups usually attempt to bring domestic issues onto the international agenda (soetjipto & yuliestiana, 2020). on the other hand, it should be noted that the state – as one of the main advocacy targets – is not passive in the situation. rather, states may actively strive against ngos by restricting foreign funding and constraining the space for external support for domestic civil society (poppe & wolff, 2017; glasius et al., 2020). in other words, keck & sikkink (1998) argue that transnational advocacy networks will always succeed is not necessarily accurate. de almagro (2018) analyses internal power dynamics inside transnational advocacy campaigns by using case studies. he finds that the process of norm diffusion is not always linear, as stated by finemore and sikkink (1998). in contrast with previous literature, current studies and research on norm diffusion shows that there are many possibilities of norm diffusion due to norm clashes and shifting during this process (zimmermann, 2014). for example, the adoption and implementation of undrip in peru (alva-arévalo, 2019), canada (robinson, 2020), and various africa nations (mitchell & yuzdepski, 2019; claridge, 2019) has had varying challenges and results. effective implementation depends on domestic structure and culture. in africa, mitchell and yuzdepski (2019) argue that undrip could potentially create conflicts in the future, so all governments and stakeholders must be careful in the development of land policies. meanwhile in canada, the country’s constitution does not fulfil canada's undrip obligations. if canada wants to assure the rights of indigenous peoples, the government must not rely upon the courts to implement their undrip obligations (robinson, 2020). a different and more successful result has been observed in peru, which is now seen as a model for other countries in latin america to implement undrip through legislation (alva-arévalo, 2019). the previous studies highlight and focus on the diffusion and implementation of undrip in several countries around the world. this research attempts to enrich the study of norm diffusion of the rights of indigenous papuans in indonesia. indonesia’s central government has tried an array of different approaches to resolve the ongoing low-level conflict in papua. none have been successful so far. the most recent journal of asean studies 131 approach has been a prosperity approach, using special autonomy (otonomi khusus or otsus) policies alongside the establishment of new provinces (through what is known as pemekaran or proliferation of new administrative regions). indonesia has been unable to handle the issues in papua due to a lack of serious engagement with human rights, which is reflected in the government’s repeated denial of allegations of human rights violations in the region (karim, 2020, p. 10; wangge & lawson, 2021). recognizing the rights of indigenous peoples is the key to bringing peaceful and inclusive societies for development. in practice, both otsus and pemekaran have created more complex social problems in papua, such as horizontal conflict, because these policies have been trapped in technical and administrative issues and have not been adapted to the social context in papua. the indonesian government’s reliance on such policies and the continuous failure to address human rights violations, violence, and racial abuse, especially against indigenous papuans, has been causing significant problems in papua for decades without resolution. in december 2021, the un special rapporteur on the rights of indigenous people, along with the special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary execution and the special rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons, raised the issue with the indonesian government regarding the use of excessive force against indigenous papuans. allegations from the un special rapporteurs, based on various reports, indicate extrajudicial killings, including of young children, enforced disappearance, torture and inhuman treatment, and the forced displacement of at least 5000 indigenous papuans by security forces between april and november 2021 (ochcr, 2022). the deterioration in papua's human rights situation was previously raised by the un high commissioner for human rights, michelle bachelet, in 2019 after a series of protests and riots across papua and indonesia in response to physical and racial abuse of indigenous papuans by authorities (septiari, 2019; icp & the westpapua-netzwerk, 2021). to defuse the tension, the indonesian government responded by blocking internet access across papua, allegedly in the name of state security, but in fact an appalling attack on people's right to freedom of expression (lantang & tambunan, 2020). civil society groups heavily criticised and condemned the indonesian authorities’ actions. the research aims to examine the rights of indigenous people and the fulfilment of these rights in papua. the article argues that despite achieving some progress in providing more opportunities for papua, including giving special autonomy and becoming a signatory to undrip, the indonesian government has not realised the rights of indigenous papuans. it is due to distrust between indigenous papuans and the indonesian government, development strategies that lack socio-cultural dimensions, and unresolved long-term conflict and violence. theoretical framework understanding the process of norm diffusion in the study of international relations 132 journey to justice to understand the failure of the implementation of undrip in the case of papua, the article mobilises the notion of norm diffusion. norm diffusion allows us to understand why despite ratifying undrip, indonesia is reluctant to implement the provisions. when discussing norm diffusion, finnemore and sikkink (1998) are the key thinkers behind this prominent theory in international relations. they argue that norms are integral to the study of international politics. the academic discipline has transformed to acknowledge the empirical research on the role of norms in advocating and creating political change. finnemore and sikkink, then, introduces the theory of the ‘norm life-cycle’, which moves from norm emergence into norm cascade and finally into internalisation. constructivist scholars believe that norms cannot be applied without the involvement of agents or actors advocating for them. it means that 'norm entrepreneurs' are essential in the dissemination and even the creation of issues. in this case, following the first stage of the norm life-cycle – norm emergence – indigenous movements play an essential role as norm entrepreneurs to put forward and advocate for the rights of indigenous peoples globally. they seek international allies to work on pressuring state actors and international organisations to achieve their goals. it was in 1982 that indigenous peoples came together, forming the working group on indigenous populations (wgip). wgip became a prominent forum for indigenous peoples from around the world, working primarily to advocate for indigenous peoples' rights and fundamental freedoms (sanders, 1989). however, networks of indigenous movements have had to take political opportunities thoughtfully to “secure the support of state actors to endorse their norms and make norm socialization a part of their agenda” (finnemore & sikkink, 2019). following the establishment of wgip, the international labour organization (ilo) issued the indigenous and tribal peoples convention in 1989, also popularly known as ilo convention 169 or c169. in 2000, the united nations permanent forum on indigenous issues (unpfii) was established, and it was only in 2007 that the united nations declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples (undrip) was adopted. even though australia, canada, new zealand, and the united states voted against undrip, 144 member states voted in favour, including indonesia (united nations, 2007). this can be said to be the first stage of norm diffusion: norm emergence. in the second stage, the global norm has become more institutionalised (norm cascade) in persuading state actors to adopt the norm progressively. at the highest or more advanced level, the norm is widely internalised by signatories. they “take for granted” the ability to transform global norms into domestic politics (finnemore & sikkink, 1998). although the theory of norm life-cycle offers an effective approach to understanding norm diffusion in the study of international relations, this model is unlikely to be able to capture “when norms clash or shift during norm diffusion” (soetjipto & yuliestiana, 2020). moreover, norm diffusion cannot be simplified as a linear process toward changes in politics and human rights (setiawan & spires, 2021). therefore, the article utilises a more critical approach to examine the implementation of undrip as a global norm at the domestic level in indonesia, and specifically to understand main issues in the region of papua. in this context, journal of asean studies 133 the indonesian government is the actor that plays an essential role in the implementation of undrip, along with civil society in advocating the rights of indigenous papuans. methods the research aims to provide a deeper examination of the dynamics of the implementation of the rights of indigenous papuans by using case selection (klotz & prakash, 2008). the research design draws on an interpretive approach and uses a critical perspective toward traditional theories in international relations, scrutinising the failure of liberal constructivism in understanding historical and political context (cultural relativism) (schippers, 2018). research for this article was conducted between march and april 2022 in jakarta. the discussions are based on a semi-structured interview approach, with meetings held virtually through zoom. participants are from the papuan customary council (dewan adat papua/dap), academia, civil society organisations, the indonesian national human rights commission (komisi nasional ham/komnas ham), and the directorate for human rights and humanitarian affairs in the ministry of foreign affairs republic of indonesia (mofa ri). the research also utilises data from previous field research conducted in papua in 2017, updating several findings based on the 2022 interviews. in addition to being more contentious than the previous research, this research synthesises the literature to enable new theoretical frameworks and perspectives to emerge (torraco, 2005; snyder, 2019). analysis sovereignty is central how we understand the state system. it is a fundamental principle enunciated in the charter of the united nations (croxton, 1999; musgrave, 2015). this traditional paradigm in international relations has led to the broad subjugation of indigenous peoples around the world, which means that conventional theory is unable to address the root problem of identity or indigeneity in this context (elisabeth, 2017; krause, 2015). the act of free choice (pepera), held in papua in 1969, gave papuans the option of remaining a member of indonesia or declaring independence. however, the implementation was contentious, leading to the choice to remain as part of indonesia. (chauvel & bhakti, 2004; situmorang, 2010; king & johnson, 2018; heryanto, 2018; chao, 2021). since then, the struggle for selfdetermination in papua has been largely dismissed by the indonesian government. in other words, indigenous papuans have not been able to exercise a genuine act of self-determination. since papua was legally incorporated into indonesia as a result of the 1969 act, the journey to justice for the rights of the indigenous papuans has been a long and arduous one. even the term ‘indigenous’ itself is highly controversial in indonesia. hadiprayitno (2017) argues that “the [indonesian] government believes that indonesia is a nation that has no indigenous peoples, or that all indonesians are equally indigenous”. however, this claim is problematic since it seems remarkably phlegmatic to acknowledge the rights of indigenous 134 journey to justice peoples. for that reason, indigenous papuans set up international fora in an attempt to create a ‘compulsory power’. compulsory power here refers to the concept coined by baldwin (2002) and barnett and duvall (2005). it means that power is a relationship of interaction of direct control by one actor over another. compulsory power is not only limited to material resources as it also entails symbolic and normative resources. by exercising the concept of compulsory power, activists in indigenous transnational networks may construct cognitive frames through immaterial forces (baldwin, 2002; barnett & duvall, 2005). doing so has achieved the networks’ goals of influencing the international community to adopt a new norm on indigenous rights, leading to the development of undrip in 2007. this global norm provides a shared scheme to create a better world and a more sustainable future for indigenous peoples’ survival, dignity, and well-being worldwide (cambou, 2019). nevertheless, in indonesia, even though the indonesian government has pledged to adopt undrip into domestic law, the government still tends to obfuscate when identifying the concept of indigenous peoples. debates over terminology in the indonesian language, terminology used to refer to indigenous peoples is unclear and often confusing. multiple terms are commonly used, including masyarakat [hukum] adat (‘customary [law] societies’), orang asli (literally ‘native people’), and penduduk suku asli (‘native ethnic inhabitants’) (li, t., 2000, p. 155). unlike its neighbour, the philippines, indonesia does not have legislation on indigenous people's rights. a draft law has been proposed in parliament, but limited progress has been made. part of the issue is that, in indonesia, the rights of indigenous peoples overlap with other legal issues such as the existing forestry and agrarian laws. aman (aliansi masyarakat adat nusantara/alliance of indigenous people of the archipelago) is indonesia’s peak indigenous civil society organisation. at their national congress on 17 march 1999, aman defined indigenous peoples by referring to undrip and ilo 169, as “a community that lives based on ancestral origins from generation to generation over a customary area that has sovereignty over land and natural wealth, socio-cultural life, which is regulated by customary law and customary institutions that manage the sustainability of human life” (aman, 2021). aman argues that the indonesian government needs to establish a definition for indigenous peoples, but so far, the ministry of foreign affairs does not want to have a dialogue on the meaning of indigenous peoples in indonesia. in aman's view, the indonesian government, which supports undrip, believes this norm will not apply, as they argue that indonesia does not have any indigenous peoples (nababan, interview, 2022). according to the indonesian government, the definition of indigenous peoples cannot be determined permanently. ellen tambunan, the coordinator of the civil and political rights function in the directorate of human rights and humanity, directorate general of multilateral cooperation, ministry of foreign affairs, states that the concept of indigenous peoples is not applicable in indonesia. ellen gave an example of how the definition of journal of asean studies 135 indigenous peoples appears in ilo convention 169, relating to tribal communities and indigenous peoples. therefore, even though indonesia has agreed to undrip, indonesia acknowledges terms such as masyarakat adat and masyarakat hukum adat to promote and consider ethnically diverse cultures and societies in indonesia (tambunan, interview, 2022; join communication ref. no. al idn 11/2021). adat itself can be translated as 'custom, tradition, or customary law’. under dutch colonial rules, customs and traditions were codified and associated with ethnic groups across the archipelago. in response to a critical report on papua before the united nations permanent forum on indigenous issues (unpfii) in 2004, indonesia rejected criticism of its refusal to attribute the status of indigenous to papuan peoples. as a matter of principle, indonesia regards all of its more than 500 ethnic groups as equally indigenous, therefore arguing that a reference in the forum report was irrelevant (bertrand, 2011). the government of indonesia reiterated this position in its 2006 report to the united nations committee on the elimination of racial discrimination (uncerd). instead, indonesia offered four principles to determine indigenous ethnic groups (masyarakat adat): names, language, environment, and customs. the report also mentioned new legislation that made no distinction between indigenous and other groups, and differentiated masyarakat adat terpencil (isolated or remote ethnic groups) from the broader category of masyarakat adat (uncerd, 2006). the struggle for indigenous papuans rights transnational advocacy on the rights of indigenous papuans began internationally in the 1980s. advocacy conducted by an ngo named elsam papua at both national and international fora created alliances with other self-identified indigenous groups to put pressure on the state for recognition and rights. to advocate for the case of papua, advocates allied with the melanesian spearhead group because of its ethnic similarity (melanesian) with papua, and began engaging in international fora and trying to sustain state attention (lawson, 2016; blades, 2020). leonard imbiri from dap, the papuan customary council, acknowledges that international lobbying and advocacy has been beneficial for advancing the struggle for indigenous papuans' rights. in an interview with researchers, imbiri (2022) states that this framework is used to help encourage the government to act fairly because domestic voices are not being heard. this framework shows how indigenous papuans use international fora to strengthen coalitions to encourage fulfilling the rights of indigenous papuans. furthermore, through struggles in international fora such as the united nations, indigenous peoples' groups can negotiate with representatives of the indonesian government and other countries to provide support, especially regarding these countries’ cooperation with the indonesian government (imbiri, 2022). during the authoritarian regime of president suharto, the struggles of indigenous people in indonesia to obtain their rights were arduous. the situation was similar across the 136 journey to justice entire asian region due to the absence of a clear distinction between indigenous and nonindigenous in domestic political situations and policies. it was only when the suharto regime fell in 1998, that the following period of regime change and state vulnerability led to a decision of accommodation in response to the papuan demand of self-determination, culminating in the introduction of a special autonomy policy in 2001 (special autonomy law no 1/2001). in the end, most asian states including indonesia began paying attention to the indigenous movement when it entered the un system in the 1980s and 1990s, culminating in the majority signing undrip upon its creation. indonesia itself formally recognised ilo convention 169 in 1989, before signing undrip in 2007. after being integrated into indonesia in 1969, papua was restructured to conform to indonesia's political and administrative structure, obtaining the status of province. its territory was subdivided into regencies, districts, and villages as specified in the regional autonomy law (law no. 5 of 1974 concerning the principles of regional government). no modifications were made to consider the different socio-economic, political, and cultural differences that distinguished the area from the rest of indonesia. crucially, the government imposed restrictions on papua cultural expression. indonesian was adopted as the sole language of education, and the national curriculum was imposed on papua with no local content (widjojo, 2009; gietzelt, 1989). the central government also controlled the management of land and national resources. under the indonesian constitution of 1945, natural resources are part of the public domain and can be exploited according to policies set by the central government in jakarta. indeed, one of the most controversial issues in papua is mining, particularly the freeport-mcmoran mine in mimika, which is frequently a target for protests due to its failure to benefit indigenous papuans (icp & the westpapua-netzwerk, 2021). since the 1980s, indigenous papuans have used international fora by sending representatives to the working group for indigenous people (wgip) in the hope of pressuring the indonesian government to recognise them as indigenous people. in their first appearance, they contested the legitimacy of the 1969 act of free choice and the united nations’ support for papua’s integration into indonesia. significant emphasis was placed on the disappearances and alleged killings perpetrated against papuans by the indonesian armed forces, the repression of papua culture, the seizure of land for mining, and the indonesian government’s policy of transmigration (kluge, 2020; bertrand, 2011). after the fall of the suharto regime in 1998, papuans increased their networking internationally, particularly in indigenous peoples fora. legal aid organisation elsam papua tapped the international human rights network to present the papuan case at wgip (elsam, 2003). after 2002, the newly created dap, composed of representatives of all 253 papuan tribal groups, assumed papua's leadership role in international fora (mandowen, 2005). by casting all its people as indigenous, indonesia supports undrip without recognising its applicability within indonesia. in indonesia, the coalition of indigenous peoples have attempted to connect adat with indigenous people's rights but has failed to gain journal of asean studies 137 much traction. papuan peoples, as a result, have continued their dual strategy and made some gains as a sub-state nation (province) but few as indigenous peoples. special autonomy law and political compromise despite being a signatory of undrip, indonesia is not fully committed to the declaration. it has been mentioned that the indonesian government argues that the concept of indigenous peoples is not applicable in indonesia, as the country has more than 500 ethnic groups. in the eyes of the indonesian government, all indonesians are indigenous and thus have the same rights (tambunan, interview, 2022; aman, 2017). the same argument also applies in papua: the government simply views papuan peoples as part of indonesia's 500 ethnic groups. this overlooks the fact that indonesia has already recognised the existence of indigenous peoples in article 18 b of the 1945 constitution, implicitly including indigenous papuans. moreover, indonesia also did not support the recommendation to ratify ilo convention 169 (ilo 169) on indigenous and tribal peoples in independent countries. ilo 169 is the major binding international convention concerning indigenous and tribal peoples, and is the forerunner of undrip. the objective of this convention is to protect indigenous peoples’ lands and resources. this means it could disrupt a nation’s desire to exploit its natural resources for economic development. as a result, indonesia still has not ratified ilo 169 because it could potentially allow millions of indonesians to self-govern their own resources and lands (bedner & van huis, 2008). indonesia’s robust economic development relies heavily on natural resource extraction, making the ratification of ilo 169 unlikely. papua is incredibly rich with natural resources, especially forests, mineral deposits, oil, and gas. this has made the region become a fundamental source of revenue for the indonesian government. the largest mining operation is the freeport-mcmoran mine in mimika, run under the indonesian company pt freeport indonesia. in 2020, the company reported total production of 0.8 billion pounds of copper and 0.8 million ounces of gold (freeport-mcmoran, 2020). this makes the mine one of the world's largest copper and gold mines for freeportmcmoran. with this in the background, special autonomy (otsus) is thus seen as a compromise between the indonesian government and indigenous papuans in the fraught space of political contestation over west papua's place within the nation. there are various literature to analyze special autonomy law of 2001 (macleod, 2007; 2011; aspinall & fealy, 2004), all agreed that the policy is an avenue for indonesia central government to preserve papua within the indonesian nation. otsus is, therefore, a way for the indonesian government to deal with the main causes of conflict in papua but still within the framework of the indonesian state. in preambular paragraph (f), the special autonomy law stipulates that “the administration and development of the papua province has not complied with the feeling of justification, has not yet achieved prosperity for the whole community, has not yet fully supported legal enforcement and has not yet shown respect to human rights in papua province, in particular 138 journey to justice the papua community”. in other words, otsus was adopted to respond to the sense of injustice felt by indigenous papuans. on the other hand, otsus can be seen as a partial implementation of undrip. the special autonomy law was drafted by papuan leaders and intellectuals, denoting a new indonesian approach toward papua and marking a new stage of the papuan struggle for their rights (mcgibbon, 2004; macleod, 2007; 2011). the law gave papua special authority, political, cultural, economic, and special revenue. additionally, through otsus, indonesia has recognised the terms ‘orang asli papua' (‘original papuan people’) and ‘masyarakat adat’ (‘customary societies’) in article 1 of the special autonomy law, meaning the government explicitly recognises indigenous papuans' existence and rights. the indonesian government and papuan peoples have different interpretations of the concept of indigenous peoples. for indigenous papuans, adat and the representation of adat communities (specifically orang asli papua [oap] in the papuan people’s assembly [majelis rakyat papua or mrp], the institution which oversees the implementation of special autonomy in papua), as stated in the special autonomy law in articles 19-25, accommodates the papuan peoples’ demands for sovereignty and recognition of their identities as indigenous papuans. in contrast, although the indonesian government indeed gave increased recognition and accommodation for papuan identity, this was only seen as a way of strengthening indigenous papuans’ trust in the state (ruhyanto, 2016; macleod 2007; 2011). these differing interpretations lead to the indonesian government and the papuan peoples’ holding different ideas on how to fulfil the rights of indigenous papuans, especially since the power held by the mrp is ambiguous and restricted, it requires consultation and approval from government on issues dealing with customary rights (imbiri, 2022). the special autonomy package was designed to support greater papuan self-rule but within the framework of the indonesian state. under special autonomy, tax revenue generated by resource projects that previously went to the central government in jakarta was supposed to return to the provincial government in papua. the special autonomy law also allowed papuan symbols, such as the morning star flag, previously associated with independence movement and banned by the government, to be displayed, while structural mechanisms such as the mrp were instituted to facilitate a measure of papuan self-rule. however, the implementation of special autonomy has not been especially successful. this is for several reasons, including the lack of capacity within civil service in papua, endemic corruption by local government leaders at the district and regency levels, and the failure of the central and provincial governments to implement various legal mechanisms that would enable policy to be operationalised. progress toward self-rule has also been hampered by disunity and fragmentation among the people of papua, and although the non-violent movement for self-determination and independence continues, competition and factionalism among resistance organisations have mitigated against success (macleod, 2007). a culture of impunity, ongoing human rights violations by indonesian police and military, and a confusing and contradictory policy mix eventually led to jakarta’s decision to divide the territory into two separate provinces in 2013 and again in 2022, bringing the total journal of asean studies 139 number of papuan provinces to five. papuans have been profoundly disappointed and frustrated with the splitting up of the region into additional administrative areas, mainly because the government has not entered into genuine dialogue with them on the issues. in 1999, the then-province of irian jaya (which changed its name to papua province in 2000) only had nine regencies. by 2012, papua was made up of two provinces (papua and west papua) and 42 regencies/cities. now in 2022, the indonesian parliament has agreed on a bill to further sub-divide the region, adding three new provinces: south papua, central papua, and highland papua. suppose the bill passes next year, after pemekaran (proliferation of administrative regions). in that case, the total number of provinces in papua will be seven and more than 72 regency/cities with a total population of only 3.6 million people (asmara, cnbc indonesia, 2022). despite these changes, papuans have obtained no power to manage key issues such as transmigration or mining and development that threatens their livelihoods, lands, and natural resources. ultimately, special autonomy has failed to address the underlying causes of injustice in papua. the government must move beyond ad hoc policy development in responding to papuan issues and cease relying on the armed forces to sustain control in papua. by drawing the contested concept of special autonomy between the indonesian government and papuans, we illustrate that undrip is very challenging to implement. in addition, it proves that undrip is too vague, so the government interprets undrip based on their own interests. the conception of indigenous peoples in undrip is, therefore, unable to represent indigenous peoples comprehensively. marginalisation, impoverishment, and depopulation of indigenous papuans since papua's integration to indonesia in 1963, and especially followed by the act of free choice in 1969, the composition of the region's population has significantly altered with the influx of indonesian migrants. there are two types of migrants coming to papua. first are the migrants brought into papua by the indonesian government under the transmigration program. from 1964 to 1999, nearly 250,000 households (over 500,000 people) have settled in papua in 200 settlements or villages built by the government (scott & tebay, 2006). for the indonesian government, transmigration is pursued to reduce poverty and undertake social engineering around promoting the indonesian identity. however, the transmigration program has failed to alleviate poverty and strengthen nationalism. conversely, this program marginalised indigenous papuans and created economic disparities between migrants and local papuan (mcgibbon, 2006; elmslie, webb-gannon, & king, 2015). for papuan people, the transmigration program also means the presence of a larger military force, increased deforestation, a large number of settlements for non-papuan migrants, and land grabbing (mcgibbon, 2006). the second type of migrant is those who migrate of their own accord and using their own means. the majority are better educated and have more skills than the local papuans, and quickly come to play a dominant role in papuan society. they excel in trading, services, 140 journey to justice construction, and contracting, and all government offices and private companies in papua are now dominated by migrants. as a result of migration, papuans are becoming strangers in their land, with tens of thousands of migrants coming to the region every year. according to the 2010 census, papua’s population was 3.6 million: 2.83 million in papua province and 760,000 in west papua province. based on historical growth rates, it is estimated that the 2010 population consisted of 52% indigenous papuans and 48% non-papuans. elmslie (2010) stated that papuans are becoming a minority in towns and urban areas of papua, with the non-papuan urban population in excess of 70%, while in rural and remote areas, papuans remain the majority. similarly, ananta, utami, and handayani (2016) found that ethnic heterogeneity in the province of papua and west papua is very high (0.91), although the ethnic polarisation index is low (0.29). as in many other regions in indonesia where migration is high, resentment toward migrants is widespread in papua. the phenomenon of depopulation is also triggered by difficulties experienced by indigenous papuans to effectively access national development programs. as previously mentioned, civil servant positions in papua are dominated by non-papuans, and even the provincial houses of representatives are filled by non-papuans. meanwhile, migrants easily adapt and readily participate in the massive development activities taking place in papua, in comparison with indigenous papuans, who are not prepared for the large inflow of investment into papua. finally, indigenous papuans are further marginalised because their customary council is weakened by the government. the indonesian government only recognises the papua indigenous peoples’ institution (lembaga masyarakat adat papua), a government-controlled institution, and have rejected the dap (kusumaryati, 2019). this has triggered horizontal conflict among papuan peoples within the scramble for natural resources, positions, and funds. land grabbing, and the violation of the free, prior and informed consent principle free, prior, and informed consent (fpic) is a principle recognised by both undrip and ilo 169. the principle has become the legal foundation for indigenous peoples to negotiate projects that affect their rights to land, livelihoods, social traditions, natural resources, and so on (fao, 2016). hence, fpic is an essential tool to protect the rights of indigenous peoples. the 2011 special autonomy law stipulates in article 43 that companies are required to reach agreement with indigenous papuans if they try to access indigenous communal land (tanah ulayat). in practice, however, legal procedures are not in line with the fpic principles (icp & the westpapua-netzwerk, 2021). as a result, land rights violations are rampant in papua and have been documented across the region. the majority relate to plantation companies running their business operations on indigenous communal land, and some natural resource companies in papua even reportedly obtained their operational licenses before receiving the fpic of the local indigenous communities (icp & the westpapuajournal of asean studies 141 netzwerk, 2021). fpic is required before the approval and/or beginning of any project to ensure the collective rights of papuan peoples to self-determination and to their lands, territories, natural resources, and other rights. logging, mining, and plantation companies are valuable to the indonesian government because they contribute significantly to national revenue and create labour opportunities in remote areas. in papua, these operations are often under the protection of security forces, who consider the investment as vital assets for the state. accordingly, security forces often act in the company’s interests and readily resort to repressive acts when conflict between local communities and the company occurs. as of 2020, the government has approved concessions for 1,080,1961 hectares across papua and west papua provinces, prior to the decision to further split the area into three additional provinces (icp & the westpapua-netzwerk, 2021). currently, there are 60 agricultural companies with operational licenses in papua (al rahab, interview, 2022). the number of requests is expected to increase in the coming years as the central government continues to support mega projects such as the merauke integrated food estate enterprise in the southern part of the island. major issues associated with private companies are broken promises, fraud, and inadequate compensation for land. companies frequently fail to keep their promises to provide jobs, improve infrastructure, and build health care and education facilities. if communities decide to claim their rights, the local government and its responsible institutions often fail to take a neutral position. the same applies to the police and military, who are among the most critical stakeholders in land rights conflicts in papua. land grabbing in the region is the primary motive for the state to exploit natural resources. since the ratification of law no. 11 of 1967 concerning mining and law no. 1 of 1967 concerning foreign investment, profits from land grabs were not only obtained by the central government but also by multinational corporations such as pt freeport indonesia in papua. however, the economic development logic pushed by the central government does not always work successfully for local governments and communities in papua. for example, in 2021, the government of west papua province revoked permits for 12 oil palm concessions in five districts, covering a total of 267,857 hectares (jong, 2021). this step was taken after an audit was taken of the winning bidding company for the oil palm concession. the audit found administrative and legal violations, such as the lack of necessary permits and abandoned lands. the action of the west papua government led to protests by various indigenous groups in west papua because it can threaten the sustainability of forests that related to indigenous papuans life. indigenous papuans are fighting for the recognition of land rights and defending their territory against natural resource companies. on that account, it can be concluded that the state's approach to extract papua's natural resources is not in line with the needs of the local government nor the indigenous people. 142 journey to justice conclusions the research analyses how, even though the indonesian government supports undrip, the human rights situation in papua has continued to deteriorate and the fulfilment of fundamental rights of indigenous papuans has declined. the problem of uncontrolled migration, absence of the rule of law, and extreme level of corruption remains widespread across papua. the indonesian government’s development strategy lacks an indigenous perspective and, as a result, causes continued conflict and human rights violations. in the implementation of undrip, there is a condition that can be called the “asian controversy”, where many countries, especially in the asian region, agree with and ratify undrip, yet do not recognise the existence of indigenous peoples in their homelands. this controversy can be explained in several arguments. first, the rejection of the concept of indigenous peoples arose from states who claimed that all their people are indigenous peoples who have long lived in the territory of the country, so this norm is not applicable. second, the incompatibility of definitions of indigenous people with the country's constitutions, with the exception for a small part of the population who are immigrants. third, the implementation of undrip is not inappropriate with the countries’ internal policies. therefore, for some scholars, undrip is considered as a counter-productive human rights instrument (merlan, 2009). this argument is based on the fact that undrip has a progressive agenda that attempts to prioritise implementing human rights for indigenous peoples, yet the debate over the concept of indigenous peoples has led to some states only agreeing to recognise the norm without implementing it. this controversy corresponds to indonesia’s condition, where the government has refused to recognize the special needs of groups who identify themselves as indigenous peoples. however, the issue of special autonomy law for papuans can be interpreted as that the indonesian government has a strong interest in accommodating the basic rights of indigenous peoples in papua. it is driven by the state's institutionalization of the customary council (anderson, 2015), their basic rules, as well prioritization of indigenous papuans to fulfil the fundamental rights in their territory. the research analyses the situation in papua in an attempt to bridge a small part of undrip's vision with the objectives of the special autonomy law. it finds that the political will of the state still has a large influence on the implementation of special autonomy, which is a legal product of the central government to resolve the conflict in papua. therefore, any action to accommodate the rights and welfare of indigenous papuans can be interpreted as efforts by the central government to minimise potential conflict. in conclusion, the struggle for indigenous rights in papua requires building and strengthening effective and accountable institutions at all levels. however, the continued failure to uphold the promotion and protection by the revolutionised concept of understanding human rights is, in addition to (lack of) political will, a significant obstacle. this concept argues that human rights are indivisible, interdependent, and interrelated. journal of asean studies 143 furthermore, although liberal constructivism provides a better theoretical framework regarding the importance of re-defining world politics and challenges of the nation-state system, this perspective is inadequate for broadening understanding of historical, cultural, and political context. in brief, it is argued that further research beyond the liberal constructivism approach is required to understand the concept of indigenous people fully. acknowledgments i want to thank muhammad iqbal yunazwardi, arivia dara yuliestiana, irvan aladip mahfuddin for handy comments on the original draft of this article. i extend my gratitude to amirrudin ar rahab (the indonesian national human rights commission komnas ham), abdon nababan (aliansi masyarakat adat nusantara/aman the alliance of indigenous people of the archipelago), leonard imbiri (dewan adat papua/dap papua traditional council), ibu elleanora tambunan (koordinator fungsi hak sipil dan politik, direktorat ham dan kemanusiaan ditjen kerjasama multilateral, kementerian luar negeri republik indonesia coordinator of the civil and political rights function, directorate of human rights and humanity, directorate general of multilateral cooperation, ministry of foreign affairs of the republic of 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(2014). same same or different? norm diffusion between resistance, compliance, and localization in post-conflict states. international studies perspectives, 17(1), 98-115. https://doi.org/10.1111/insp.12080 https://doi.org/10.1080/0035853032000150645 https://doi.org/10.1080/0035853032000150645 https://doi.org/10.1080/0035853032000150645 https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/09/04/un-human-rights-chief-calls-for-dialogue-with-papuans.html https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/09/04/un-human-rights-chief-calls-for-dialogue-with-papuans.html https://doi.org/10.1111/insp.12080 https://doi.org/10.1111/insp.12080 the key factors of economic integration in southeast asia: case of indonesia, malaysia, and thailand kiki verico university of indonesia, indonesia abstract the major aim of economic integration in southeast asia is to shift economic integration from intra-regional trade to intra-regional investment before it achieves the common market. this article attempts to analyze the two essential factors in southeast asia’s economic integration: intra-regional trade and an economic community. in the first analysis, this article observes three selected countries: indonesia, malaysia, and thailand; while in the second analysis it focuses on indonesia as a case study. findings from this article showed that free trade agreement is effective to increase intra-regional trade but not effective to attract investment; therefore suggesting that southeast asia needs to amplify its open-regionalism principle. this article also found that the private sector is ready for the economic community; therefore the asean economic community (aec) is fit for southeast asia’s economic integration exemplary. key words: economic integration, international investment (long-term capital-fdi inflows), asean free trade area (afta), bilateral free trade agreements (bfta), asian noodle bowl phenomenon introduction the association of southeast asian nations (asean) is committed to transform southeast asia’s economic integration in trade, which allows free flows of goods to free flows of investment and services. the latter is known as an economic community and has started since the end of 2015. this agreement was implemented through the asean economic community (aec).1 the key factor for this transformation process is in its intraregional trade because it connects intraregional trade and intra-regional 1 for further detail, refer to http://www.aseansec.org/18757.htm. investment. intra-regional trade is affected by its regional trade agreement known as the asean free trade area (afta), while its impact is expected to attract long-run investment inflows of foreign direct investment (fdi). as intra-regional trade analysis is essential for southeast asia’s economic integration, this article attempts to observe both the impact of free trade agreement to intra-regional trade and the impact of intra-regional trade to fdi inflows. it is followed by a second observation on the economic community as this is the next stage to intra-regional trade. previous studies show that intraregional trade is directly affected by the implementation of afta through the journal of asean studies, vol. 4, no. 2 (2016), pp. 107-126 doi: 10.21512/jas.v4i2.887.g1736 ©2016 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic http://www.aseansec.org/18757.htm 108 the key factors of economic integration in southeast asia reduction of tariff barriers among its members (braga and bannister, 1994; ravenhill, 1995; menon, 1996; bowles and maclean, 1996). a high intra-regional trade indicates that the welfare-enhancing, trade-creating effects outweigh its welfare-reducing, trade-diverting effects (viner, 1950). an increasing intra-regional trade within members is expected to attract long-run investment creation of fdi inflows. theoretically, intra-regional trade affects fdi inflows in two ways: (1) an increase in horizontal fdi inflows from non-members which avoid trade impediments as a result of discrimination from regional trade policies (markusen, 1984), and (2) an increase in vertical fdi inflows from members due to the increasing benefits from intra-regional trade following the implementation of regional discriminative trade policies (helpman, 1984). previous studies find that intraregional trade increases fdi inflows. applying generalized method of moments analysis to european union (eu) member states in 1989-2001, baltagi, egger, and pfaffermayr (2005) find that the increase of intra-regional trade significantly increased fdi inflows. dunning (1990) finds that the acceleration of the united states’ fdi inflows in europe, which occurred in the late 1950s, was affected by the eu’s discriminative trade policy towards non-member states. using fixed effects panel data of gravity model on 55 organisation for economic co-operation and development (oecd) countries in 1982-1997, mac dermott (2006) finds that intra-trade integration encourages total fdi inflows in north america (north american free trade area). in addition, to analyze the impact of afta on fdi inflows, this article adopts another type of agreements titled the direct bilateral free trade agreement (bfta) as a factor to fdi inflows. bfta directly connects asean member states to non-member states. some previous studies show that bfta has been considered as a shortcut for member states to attract fdi inflows from non-member states alongside regional trade agreements (menon, 2006). bfta is not prohibited in asean; therefore there is a potential risk that bfta can infringe the objectives of afta. in asia, this glitch is known as the ‘asian noodle bowl phenomenon.’ in order to complete a model analysis of the factors and impacts of the southeast asia’s intra-regional trade, this article observes the economic community in southeast asia by finding the perceptions of firms, from both the manufacturing and service sectors, on the aec. the analysis uses primary data based on a field survey of the uppermiddle level firms in indonesia. the primary data is adopted from a survey titled ‘monitoring of investment climate,’ of which one of its coverage in 2014 was the firms’ perceptions on the aec 2015. this method is necessary to evaluate the perceptions of firms on the economic community, the next stage factor for economic integration in southeast asia after the intra-regional trade. objective based on the background, this article attempts to conduct three analyses. first, the factors that affect intra-regional trade. this is a proxy for trade creation effect. this objective is achieved by adopting and testing two time dummy variables: (1) the afta that is expected to create positive impact on southeast asia’s intra-regional trade and (2) the direct journal of asean studies 109 bfta that is expected to do the opposite: create negative impact on asean’s intraregional trade. this article uses bfta as a proxy to prove the existence of the ‘asian noodle bowl’ in southeast asia. this phenomenon is a major problem for enhancing intra-regional trade in southeast asia. second, the impact of intraregional trade on fdi inflows as a proxy of investment creation in southeast asia. this article adopts two dummy variables of afta and bfta as they are the factors for intra-regional trade of trade creation and intra-regional trade is a factor of fdi inflows of investment creation. for these two objectives, given several considerations, the observed countries in this article are limited to the asean’s founding members, in particular indonesia, malaysia, and thailand. third, the perceptions of firms on the aec 2015 from both the manufacturing and service sector. these perceptions are obtained from the field survey conducted in the biggest asean member state in terms of gross domestic product (gdp) and population size, indonesia. the field survey had been conducted in six big cities around indonesia in 2014. in order to achieve this objective, this article designs questions that are related to the theory of economic community for respondents from uppermiddle level classification. model, variable, hypothesis, and method secondary data analysis: case of indonesia, malaysia, and thailand this article chooses the time dummy of afta of year 19992 and, with the purpose of sterilizing from global economic crises in 2008, this article limits the time series up to year 2008. in order to have a balanced time series span, this article selects the first time dummy of year 1988. therefore, finally this article has 21 years (1988-2008) of time series analysis. in order to make a connection between the factors and impact of intraregional trade, this article has formulated two equations as a system. the first equation uses intra-regional trade as a dependent variable while the second one uses fdi inflows. this article has adopted trade arrangements (afta and bfta) as the factors affecting intra-regional trade of southeast asia that is complemented by other macroeconomic variables as control variables given that trade arrangements are not the sole factor affecting intraregional trade. these trade agreements are treated as time dummy variables. the time dummy for bfta is its first time of agreement among the observed countries, which was 2004. (indonesia signed its first bfta in 2006, malaysia in 2005, and thailand in 2004.) this article assumes that afta directly affects intra-regional trade and intra-regional trade directly affects fdi inflows.3 this assumption is also based on 2 according to nesadurai (2003), the afta processes have three stages of negotiations: identification (1992-1995), expansion (19961998), and implementation that began in 1999. 3 indirect impact of afta to fdi inflows follows the preposition by ravenhill (1995) and bowles and maclean (1996). 110 the key factors of economic integration in southeast asia the empirical facts that afta was designed to boost southeast asia’s intraregional trade while, for attracting fdi inflows, asean offered asean investment area (aia) policy. as for the impact of intra-regional trade to fdi inflows, this article adopts selected variables that hypothetically affect fdi inflows from previous studies of nominal value of gdp, economic growth and number of population,4 value of consumption,5 employment,6 electricity capacity,7 degree of openness,8 productivity of labors and their level of education,9 as well as exchange rate.10 exchange rate (er) effects on fdi inflows in southeast asia are essential to be observed. during southeast asia’s economic crises, exchange rates incurred unanticipated depreciation leading to devaluation.11 exchange rate also represents the cost of service link. this means that countries with high exchange rate volatility will be difficult to cooperate with other countries under a production network as their exchange rate volatility endangers the entire network. according to the relative value of wealth approach, the more depreciated the local currency of a developing country host, the more incentive for the investors 4 for more details, see sethi, guisinger, phelan, and berg (2003). 5 for more details, see walz (1997). 6 for more details, see hejazi and pauly (2003). 7 for more details, see foster (2000). 8 for more details, see park and park (2008). 9 for more details, see hejazi and safarian (1999). 10 for more details, see barrell and pain (1996). 11 hayakawa and kimura (2008)’s study finds that exchange rate is the most important variable to describe economic uncertainty and competitiveness within production blocks in the regional production networks. in home of developed countries to invest.12 regarding that, this article uses nominal exchange rate as local home currency per local host currency; therefore, the increasing er generates disincentive for the investors to invest fdi inflows in host countries. this article proposes a new exogenous variable: fdi profit. this variable is adopted from the global financial development data of the world bank.13 the data is part of resource flows, at which the data set form is on yearly basis. this article adopts this data as a proxy for the profit for the home county of fdi. variables such as corruption index, political stability, distance, and english proficiency however are not observed due to either limited data availability or irrelevance to the article’s hypothesis. the selected variables, their expected signs of hypothesis, and sources of data are described in table 1. the methodology is built to find the most significant variables that explain the effect of trade agreements at the regional and bilateral levels in southeast asia (afta and bfta) on investment creation (fdi). the trade agreements in question are accompanied by other macroeconomic variables, because fdi flows are affected not only by trade policies but also by macroeconomic variables. 12 previous study shows that exchange rate volatility has significant negative impact to fdi inflows in east asian countries (kiyota and urata, 2004). 13 the world bank defines it as the form of value of profit remittance of fdi in us$ which explained in details as ‚payments of direct investment income (debit side) which consist of income on equity (dividends, branch profits, and reinvested earnings) and income on the intercompany debt (interest).‛ journal of asean studies 111 table 1. selected variables and hypothesis dependent variables independent variables expected sign sources of data aggregate fdi inflows for testing the impact of afta on investment creation (adb statistics and the world bank global financial development data) intra-regional trade (irt) for testing the impact of afta on trade creation (aric adb and journal of efi, 2007) 1. value of gdp (gdp) + 1. adb statistics 2. value of consumption (cons) + 2. adb statistics 3. percentage of economic growth (gr) + 3. adb statistics 4. number of population (pop) + 4. adb statistics 5. number of employed worker (empl) + 5. adb statistics 6. government expenditure on education (edu) + 6. the world bank world development indicators (wdi) 7. electricity consumption (elecons) + 7. the world bank world development indicators (wdi) 8. degree of openness (doo) + 8. wto statistics 9. real wage (rw) + 9. adb statistics 10. exchange rate (er) 10. adb statistics and imf country economic outlook 11. fdi profit (fdiprofit) + 11. the world bank global financial development: profit remittance on fdi in us$ 12. intra-regional trade + 12. wto statistics 13. dummy afta + 13. year of effectiveness of afta (1999) 14. dummy bfta + 14. year of first signature of bfta (malaysia: 2004; thailand: 2005, indonesia: 2006). the first year was 2004 source: various articles in academic journals and author’s own proposed proxy and time dummy variables fdi inflow is affected by intraregional trade (motta and norman, 1996). this article constructs this logical framework as follows: intra-regional trade is directly affected by regional free trade areas (fta), such as afta, and bilateral fta (bfta), and simultaneously affects fdi inflows. this simultaneous relation needs system equation of econometrics to find the connections. in order to provide a comparative picture, this article presents both the intraregional trade (%) of asean from the asia regional integration center asian development bank (aric adb) data of 2010 and the observed country’s share of that intra-regional trade of indonesia, malaysia, and thailand, which is calculated based on adb statistical data. these patterns are illustrated in figure 1. 112 the key factors of economic integration in southeast asia figure 1. intra-regional trade in asean and observed countries (indonesia, malaysia, and thailand), 1988-2008 source: asean intra-regional trade adopted from aric, adb; observed countries intra regional trade is own calculation based on wto statistic this figure describes that the patterns of aggregate intra-regional trade of indonesia, malaysia, and thailand are similar to that of asean as a whole. on average, in 1988 to 2008 the share of intraregional trade of indonesia, malaysia, and thailand to that of asean was around 49.8 per cent. this shows that these three countries play an important role in forming southeast asia’s intra-regional trade. as mentioned in the background, the impact of intra-regional trade is limited to fdi inflows and, based on the models and previous studies, the impact of intra-regional trade on fdi inflows is proposed as follows: rtrtrtrtrtrtrttr eduemplpopergrconsgdpcfdi .7.6.5.4.3.2.1   rtrtrt rtrtrt eintrarw doofdiprofitelecons   .12.11 .10.9.8   …………(1) this article adopts total value of fdi inflows due to data limitation on both country and sector levels. the data is collected from adb statistical data for direct investment value, which originates from the world bank’s global financial development data. the pattern of aggregate fdi inflows of these three observed countries is described in figure 2. intra regional trade asean, imt (%) 1988 2008 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 19 88 19 89 19 90 19 91 19 92 19 93 19 94 19 95 19 96 19 97 19 98 19 99 20 00 20 01 20 02 20 03 20 04 20 05 20 06 20 07 20 08 imt's intra-regional trade share asean's intra-regional trade share (aric) journal of asean studies 113 figure 2. aggregate fdi inflows for indonesia, malaysia, and thailand, 1988-2008 source: data based on global development finance, world bank this figure shows that the trend of fdi inflows at aggregate level of indonesia, malaysia, and thailand decreased during the asian financial crisis from 1997 to 2001, but then increased after 2002. this figure shows that the fdi flows required a 5 year adjustment period due to the asian financial crisis. based on the basic assumption of this article that afta directly affects intraregional trade and intra-regional trade directly affects fdi inflows, therefore this article implements a twostep procedure. the first step estimates the factors of intra-regional trade, and then the second step estimates the impact of intra-regional trade to fdi inflows. as explained in the basic equation above, this article implements system equation models of two-stage least squares with instrumental variable (tsls-iv), seemingly unrelated regressions (sur) estimator, and simultaneous equations model (sem) estimator. these system equations are explained below. a. tsls-iv analysis this estimator applies a generalized least squares (gls) system with instrumental variable (iv) estimators. this method runs the equation without needing the first-step estimation for intratrade. the equation has been estimated using the gls estimator with the tsls option and the selected instrumental variables. instrumental variables are correlated with explanatory variables, but independently distributed with disturbance terms. this means that the instrumental variables are exogenous. instrumental variables can be adopted from existing exogenous variables with a lagged form (vogelvang, 2005). this estimator uses all of the exogenous variables as instrumental variables; therefore the variables that are not utilized 0 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000 14,000 16,000 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 imt 114 the key factors of economic integration in southeast asia as instrumental variables are intraregional trade and fdi inflows. b. seemingly unrelated regressions (sur) estimator this estimator is chosen due to the possibility that the two equation errors are correlated. error correlation occurs because of their covariance (efdi,eintra) ≠ 0 then rafdi int 22   . the two equations need to be written in one system with a sur estimator. correlation between disturbance terms of these two equations can be affected by the identical unsystematic factors like regional market sentiment, regional production network, etc. this estimator assumes that non-zero correlation exists among the two disturbance errors. the system uses a gls instead of the regular ordinary least squares (ols) because the gls efficiently estimates parameters and generates smaller standard errors. it runs equation one and two under one system that has unrelated errors (sur). c. simultaneous equations model (sem) estimator this estimator is chosen because one of the exogenous variables in equation 1 can be affected by the endogenous dependent variable. it opens up the probability that fdi influences intraregional trade variable. it needs to put the fdi variable as an exogenous in equation one. if the t-statistic of this parameter is smaller than the t-table, then hypothesis (h0), which states that fdi affects intratrade, is rejected. similar to sur, this estimator requires two equations to be estimated in one system and follows reduced form methods. it runs equation one and two under one system that fdi inflow is expected to affect intra-trade. the relation between intra-trade and fdi is reciprocal; therefore equation two has an additional variable (fdi). trtrt ufdibftaaftacintra  .3.2..1 ………… (2) primary data analysis: field survey in indonesia this article adopts a survey findings conducted by the institute for economic and social research at the university of indonesia (lpem feb ui) in 2014. this survey covers the perceptions and experiences of firms in relation to investment climate factors and was conducted on manufacturing and services sector firms in six big cities in indonesia: medan, greater jakarta, bandung, semarang, surabaya, and makassar. the survey covers 500 manufacturing firms, each of which has 100 or more workers, adopted from the indonesia manufacturing statistics 2010 data provided by indonesian central bureau of statistics (bps) and 200 service sector firms, each of which has 25 or more employees, adopted from indonesia 2006 economic census data provided by the bps as well. the field survey was conducted from august to december 2014. beside its original panel questionnaires, this 2014 survey covers a special subject of the aec 2015 with specific questions. these questions are designed to figure out the perceptions of these firms on the aec 2015. journal of asean studies 115 analysis based on regression results and field survey findings the factors and impact of the intraregional trade the factors of intra-regional trade (trade creation) based on the method used, this article concludes the reduced form model for both the factors and the impact of intra-regional trade. calculation of intraregional trade is customized from intraregional trade model of frankel (1997). this article constructs intra-regional trade as follows: wtwtwtwt rtrtrtrt wmrwxr rmrrxr rt in ,, ,,    ; xrt,rrt is the value of export (country-based) from region to region ; mrt,rrt is the value of import (country-based) from region to region ; xwt,wwt is the value of export from region to world ; mwt,wwt is the value of import of region from the world the regression result for the factors that affect intra-regional trade in southeast asia is presented in model 1. dependent variable: intra-regional trade (imt) tsls sur (system) simultan (system) r-squared durbin-watson f-stat 0.74 1.99 11.36 0.69 1.88 0.74 1.99 coefficient t-stat constant 0.12*** 21.11 constant 0.11*** 23.46 constant 0.12*** 21.12 coefficient t-stat coefficient t-stat gdp 5.85e-14*** 3.78 gdp 6.02e-14*** 4.13 gdp 5.85e-14*** 4.34 afta 0.01** 2.01 afta 0.008* 1.74 afta 0.01** 2.3 coefficient t-stat bfta -0.009 -1.43 bfta -0.01* -1.81 bfta -0.009* -1.64 coefficient t-stat fdi -8.00e-07* -1.69 none fdi -8.00e-07* -1.93 source: author’s own calculation, *p<0.1**p<0.05***p<0.01 116 the key factors of economic integration in southeast asia all of the system estimators (tsls, sur, and sem) show that gdp generates positive impact on intra-regional trade. gdp is significant at 1 per cent for all regression methods. all the estimators show that increasing the economic size of member countries stimulates trade relations within asean member states. this confirms the ‘horizontal integration’ thesis that argues that the higher gdp size of member states, the higher incentive to increase intra-regional trade (helpman and krugman, 1985). yet, increasing intraregional trade could also occur between high-income non-member states and lowincome member states, known as ‘vertical integration.’ this includes the regional production network led by japan; the flying geese model (akamatsu, 1944). both horizontal and vertical integration have the same essential factor, which is the gdp. all of the system estimators (tsls, sur, and sem) indicate that afta generates positive impact on intraregional trade of aggregate of indonesia, malaysia, and thailand. sem and tsls give 5 per cent significance level while sur gives 10 per cent significance level. this confirms that afta positively affects intra-regional trade in southeast asia, proving that afta is effective for trade creation. survey of japanese-affiliated firms in asia and oceania (fy 2009) released in march 2010 by the overseas research department of japan external trade organization (jetro) also confirms that afta is effective for trade (export and import). jetro’s survey respondents involve the manufacturing industry, which conducts export and import in indonesia, malaysia, and thailand. empirical data below shows that asean’s intra-trade share significantly increased over twofold from 12 per cent in 1990 to 24.5 per cent in 2009 as described in table 2. table 2. intra-regional trade in some regional integration organization, 1990 and latest data per cent asean eu nafta mercosur 1990 12 per cent 66 per cent 43 per cent 9 per cent latest 24.5 per cent (2008-9) 67 per cent (2003) 55 per cent (2000) 17 per cent (2000) source: eu, nafta, and mercosur data sources are various, asean: www.aseansec.org this table shows that southeast asia’s intra-regional trade increased after the implementation of afta. sem model indicates that fdi inflows affect intraregional trade at a 10 per cent significance level. this finding confirms that the sem estimator is the most representative models in describing the economic relations between asean intra-regional trade and fdi inflows. both estimator systems (sur and sem) show that bfta with non-members give a negative effect on intra-regional trade. even as the obtained t-statistic is not relatively high at significance at 10 per cent, the results have indicated that bftas weaken intra-regional trade. the negative sign of bftas confirms that bftas generate a leakage for southeast asia’s economic integration as it gives a journal of asean studies 117 negative impact on intra-regional trade of southeast asia. this finding proves the existence of the ‘asian noodle bowl phenomenon’ (panagariya, 2000; tumbarello, 2007; kawai and wignaraja, 2009) in southeast asia. in addition, bfta creates a prisoner’s dilemma for asean member states because bfta forces other asean members who are actually inadequate for bfta to enter such agreements, so that they can minimize the cost of being excluded from others’ bfta benefits. this effect is called ‘snowballing effect of bfta’ (baldwin, 2006). in sum, bfta makes trade agreements in southeast asia become complicated and this increases the economic gap among members as only advanced economic members can gain benefit from such direct bftas. the impact of intra-regional trade on fdi inflows (investment creation) after running the reduced form model from general to specific principle, this article finds that aside from intraregional trade being the independent variable affecting fdi, there are four other significant variables: consumption, population, labor productivity (real wage as a proxy), and exchange rates. the final result of the impact of intra-regional trade on fdi inflows can be described in model 2. model 2. the impacts of intra-regional trade and selected macroeconomic variables on fdi inflows (investment creation) in southeast asia (observed countries) dependent variable: fdi inflows aggregate level r-squared durbin-watson f-statistic tsls-iv cons(-1) ; pop ; rw(-1); er(-1) 0.67 1.56 5.66 sur (system) 0.66 1.69 simultaneous (system) 0.67 1.57 coefficient t-stat constant -55,403** -2.17 constant -55,219* -1.84 constant -55,403* -1.84 coefficient t-stat consumption -2.43e-08** -2.74 consumption -2.37e-08** -1.99 consumption -2.43e-08** -2.02 coefficient t-stat population 302*** 3.05 population 318** 2.66 population 302** 2.5 coefficient t-stat rw(-1) 4.24*** 4.81 rw(-1) 4.4*** 4.7 rw(-1) 4.25*** 4.26 coefficient t-stat intra-regional trade -178,100*** -3.16 intra-regional trade -214,257*** -3.55 intra-regional trade -178,100*** -2.91 coefficient t-stat er -3.39** -2.6 er -3.58** -2.46 er -3.39** -2.31 source: author’s own calculation, *p<0.1 **p<0.05***p<0.01 118 the key factors of economic integration in southeast asia all of the estimators (tsls-iv, sur, and sem) show that consumption value has a negative relation to fdi. all system models show that the consumption affects fdi inflows at the 5 per cent level of significance with no time lag. the negative sign indicates that increasing consumption will decrease regional fdi inflows. this can be explained as follows: increasing consumption means an increase in demand for products, including imports. the absence of a customs union due to unregulated external tariff barriers between member states and non-member states create a ‘trade deflection’ in southeast asia, at which, in order to fulfill total increasing demand, non-members prefer to export through the lowest tariff (most favored nation) of member state than to invest their fdi. therefore, regional economic cooperation such as afta faces the issue of country of origin due to possibilities of re-exportation from those low-tariff members in the region. in sum, the increasing consumption in southeast asia encourages non-member state investors (outside asean) to do trade rather than invest fdi. the estimators of tsls, sur, and sem show a 5 per cent significance level, while tsls-iv shows a 1 per cent significance level for the effect of population size to fdi inflows. this means that all estimators show that population size significantly encourages investors to invest as it reflects the size of demand for goods and supply of labor. all of the estimators show that labor productivity of mpl=rw has a positive impact on fdi inflows. this confirms that investors take production efficiency as an essential factor. this variable is significant at a 1 per cent level of significance for all estimators. in affecting investment creation, all the equation systems show that the independent labor productivity of real wages as a proxy requires a one-year lag. this shows that foreign investors make investment decisions in southeast asia based on last year indonesia, malaysia, and thailand’s labor productivity of real wage (rw). in this model, intra-regional trade generates negative impact on investment creation. all the system models show that intra-regional trade affects fdi inflows at 1 per cent significance level, while the tsls is proven at 10 per cent significance level. the negative relation between intraregional trade and fdi inflows can be interpreted as follows: (1) the increasing intra-regional trade does not increase investment creation in southeast asia; (2) trade diversion effect is not significant in southeast asia, unlike found in eu and mercosur. similarly, asian regional economic integration has more ‘trade creation effect’ than ‘trade diversion effect.’ in terms of attracting long-run investment at the regional level in southeast asia, asean formulated several policies aside from afta, such as the asean industrial projects (aips) that supports each member state to build projects with all member states as stakeholders; asean industrial complementation scheme (aics) that provides preferential tariffs for trade of complementary goods in the same industrial sector within members; and asean industrial joint venture scheme (aijvs) that provides preferential tariffs for trade of goods between joint venture firms with at least 51 per cent equity owned by the asean member firm. yet, journal of asean studies 119 all of these policies have not effectively succeeded in achieving asean’s objective to attract investment and enhance regional production networks among its member states (bowles and maclean, 1996). furthermore, asean also established asean industrial cooperation scheme (aico) and asean investment area (aia). these establishments confirm that not only asean covers trade or demand-side issues, but it also covers supply-side issues. aico was established after the japanese automotive company revealed their plan in 1996 to enlarge production networks and production volume in southeast asia; while aia was established in 1999 to focus on investment liberalization, human resources development, information and communication technology (ict), and infrastructure developments. however, aico received complaints from private companies because of its unprepared administrative procedures (yoshimatsu, 2002), while the aia’s impact on asean’s long-run investment creation remains unclear. in addition, most studies on investment perception in asia show that investors take into regard the internal factors of doing business than the existence of the regional free trade agreements. these internal factors include required procedures to start a business, profit tax, number of documents to export and import, ease of doing business index, and others. during the 1998 southeast and east asia economic crisis, the local currencies of the observed countries were significantly depreciated. in this article, exchange rate is described as the value of local currency to international currency of us$. all of the estimators indicate that exchange rate (er) has negative relation with net value of fdi flows. all of the system equations (sur, sem, and tsls-iv) indicate that er shows a 5 per cent significance level while the tsls estimator shows er at 1 per cent significance level. the negative relation between er and fdi shows that depreciation or devaluation of a national currency tends to lessen the incentive for fdi inflows. this confirms the ‘j-curve phenomenon.’ currency depreciation does not necessarily boost exports or reduce imports. at the beginning, it generates the opposite effect: increasing imports and decreasing exports due to the producer-consumer lag. it creates a negative trade balance and serves as a ‘disincentive to invest.’ in contrast, the relative value of wealth finds that the more depreciated the local currency of host developing country, the more incentive for the investor in home developed country to invest; while other studies find that the ‘volatility’ of exchange rate affects fdi inflows rather than ‘level’ of the exchange rate. for example, ‘exchange rate volatility’ has a significant negative relation to japanese fdi in east asian countries (kiyota and urata, 2004). this article proves that afta has a positive effect only on trade creation of model 1, but intra-regional trade has a negative effect on investment creation of model 2. this shows the relation between a value of fdi inflows of investment creation and intra-regional trade of trade creation is negative. this means that asean regional trade agreement of afta is only effective to increase intraregional trade from trade creation, but ineffective to attract fdi inflows of investment creation. this finding confirms that preferential trading area (pta) such 120 the key factors of economic integration in southeast asia as afta practically generates trade creation; even basically its main objective is to attract fdi inflows from its trade diversion (grossman and helpman, 1995). field survey on aec 2015: case of indonesia this survey has succeeded to interview 522 out of the targeted 700 firms, or around 75 per cent of realization rate. the firms consist of 343 manufacturing firms and 179 service firms. this survey finds that the dominant firms in the manufacturing and service sectors know about aec 2015: about 56 per cent of manufacturing firms know about aec 2015 and 60 per cent of service firms know it. (details in figure 3.) figure 3. percentage of firms that ‘know’ aec 2015 source: lpem feb ui’s field survey on manufacturing and service firms based on the ‘yes’ answer on whether the firms know about aec 2015, next question is whether they are ready for aec 2015 and the answer options are ‘yes’ or ‘no’. based on those who replied ‘yes,’ this survey further finds that the manufacturing firms are more ‘ready’ for aec compared to those in the service sector; 84 per cent and 77 per cent respectively. (details in figure 4.) journal of asean studies 121 figure 4. percentage of firms that reply ‘ready’ towards aec 2015 source: lpem feb ui’s field survey on manufacturing and service firms the 2014 survey also asks the perceptions of the firms on the potential impacts of aec 2015 and identifies their perceived impact of the aec of 2015. there are six factors that this survey asks the firms: (1) whether intra-asean investment from asean members will increase (yes or no), (2) whether extraasean investment from non-asean members will increase (yes or no), (3) whether non-competitive members will face the cost of aec (yes or no), (4) whether competitive non-member states will enjoy the benefit of aec (yes or no), (5) whether service-related trade will be liberalized (yes or no), and (6) whether the service sector in general will be liberalized (yes or no). the results provide detailed information about the patterns of potential impacts of aec 2015 from the perceptions of the firms on it. (details in figure 5.) the result in this pattern is interesting, even the firms have no initial academic information based on the theory of economic community yet their perceptions show that given their empirical experiences on the trade and investment relations between countries in southeast asia under asean economic cooperation, most firm’s patterns of knowledge on the aec are close to theory of which top three patterns are: one, intrainvestment is expected to increase; two, extra investment is predicted to increase; three, competitive non-member state (i.e. china) will enjoy more benefit while four, non-competitive member states will face the cost; and five, service sector will be liberalized from trade related service sector to service sector in general due to the harmonization of service sector in asean. 122 the key factors of economic integration in southeast asia figure 5. perceptions of the expected impacts of aec 2015 as percentage of respondents who replied the particular question source: lpem feb ui’s field survey on manufacturing and service firms conclusion system equations are appropriate in making connection between the factors and impact of intra-regional trade. as for the factors of intra-regional trade, a reduced form model finds that intraregional trade in southeast asia is affected by the value of nominal gdp as a proxy for economic size and time dummy variable of trade agreements of afta and bfta. nominal gdp gives a positive impact on intra-regional trade. this proves that the higher the economic level of a member country (gdp), the higher its trade relation within southeast asian. this confirms the ‘horizontal integration’: the higher the gdp, the higher the intraregional trade among countries. afta generates positive impact on intraregional trade (aggregate of indonesia, malaysia, and thailand). this confirms that afta positively affects intra-regional trade in southeast asia, thus proving its effectiveness in trade creation. bfta plays as a ‘stumbling block’ instead of a ‘building block’ towards intra-regional trade. all of the model estimators prove that bfta generates a negative impact on intra-regional trade. this confirms that bfta has the potential to weaken regional trade policy of asean due to its nondiscriminative tendency towards nonasean members. this result also confirms that ‘asian noodle bowl phenomenon’ exists in southeast asia since bfta generated a ‘leakage’ to the intra-regional trade of asean. as for the impact, intra-regional trade generates a negative impact on longrun investment creation (fdi inflows). furthermore, sem estimator proves that fdi inflows also generate a negative impact on intra-regional trade. this indicates that, in southeast asia, intraregional trade and long-run investment weaken each other. this article finds that journal of asean studies 123 sem is the most appropriate system equation model to describe the relation between intra-regional trade and fdi inflows because it proves interdependent relation between intra-regional trade and fdi inflows. in addition to intra-regional trade, fdi inflows are affected by the value of consumption, the size of population, the marginal productivity of labor (real wage), and the exchange rate. for consumption, this article indicates the existence of ‘trade deflection’ as the higher of consumption value, the lower the fdi inflows. for the population, this article finds that population size gives a positive impact on fdi inflows. as for marginal productivity of labor, this article finds that the higher productivity (one-year lag), the higher the fdi inflows. while for the exchange rate, this article finds that local currency depreciation gives a negative impact on fdi inflows. the field survey finds that the perceptions of firms on aec 2015 are positive and optimistic. they are positive as more than 50 per cent of the firms know that southeast asia enters an economic community named aec since early 2016; the proportions are 56 per cent manufacturing firms and 60 per cent service firms. from those who replied ‘yes’ on whether the firms know about aec 2015, more than 70 per cent say that they are ‘ready’ to compete in aec; the proportions are 84 per cent manufacturing firms and 77 per cent service firms. furthermore, this survey finds that both manufacturing and service firms have close knowledge patterns to the theory of economic community; in particular, its major expected impacts. from the highest to the lowest impacts, they include increase of intra-investment from member states, extra-investment from non-member states, benefit for competitive nonmember states, cost for non-competitive member states, and liberalization of service-related trade and service sector in general due to the harmonization process at the regional level. policy implication currently, southeast asia is still focusing on the first step of regional economic integration, which is trade liberalization among its members. this article finds that through asean, the three countries have not been effective in enhancing its regional economic cooperation achievement from intraregional trade to regional investment integration. southeast asia needs more comprehensive and open regional economic cooperation scheme to enlarge its regional economic integration from trade to investment. this needs enlargement of southeast asia economic cooperation with non-member states. each country in southeast asia is free to have direct bilateral agreements with nonmember states (bfta). yet, if a country in southeast asia opens bilateral trade with non-member states, sooner or later the other members will do the same regardless its readiness for the agreements. it is named the bandwagon effect of bfta. member states that are suitable for direct bilateral agreements will get benefit from them, while those that are incapable will only get cost from them. this will increase the economic gap among members and, at the end, harm southeast asia’s economic integration purpose. the best way for the southeast asian region in enlarging the regional economic integration from trade to investment creation is under the ‘asean umbrella.’ given the divergence of economic level among members, the most advanced economic member should 124 the key factors of economic integration in southeast asia tolerate other weaker members. asean’s soft decision-making process will make this enlargement take longer time than that of bilateral agreements; yet it is more secure and fairer for all the members. therefore, aec 2015 is the best choice for asean. in addition, given that southeast asia does not have a custom union alongside aec, southeast asia can utilize its ‘open and soft regionalism principle’ through the implementation of the asean plus frameworks, afta plus one, and regional comprehensive economic partnership (rcep). aec can be a substitute for the absence of a custom union in southeast asia as it is similar to the european economic community (eec). hypothetically, the necessary and sufficient condition for the custom union of a solid trade and investment integration will be achieved through the implementation of the aec and the asean plus frameworks. field survey in indonesia finds that both firms of manufacturing and service sectors are expressing positive and optimistic response towards implementation of aec 2015. it is needed to keep the vision and mission of enhancing the economic community in southeast asia. there will always be cost occurring from the economic community’s implementation, but the potential benefit is expectedly higher than the cost; 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(2021). revisiting asean legislation and its impact on regional governance. journal of asean studies, 9(2), https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v9i2.8116 keywords: regional governance, foreign policy, transnational issue introduction the founding members of asean signed the treaty of amity and cooperation in southeast asia (tac) in 1976 during the first asean summit meeting in bali. the treaty contained some fundamental principles that reflect the peaceful coexistence and friendly cooperation among states in the region of southeast asia and beyond (medina, 2020). article 2 of the treaty, for example, mentioned that all parties to the treaty are guided by: “…a. mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations; b. the right of every state to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion; c. non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; d. settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means; e. renunciation of the threat or use of force; f. effective cooperation among themselves” (secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs, 2012). the treaty further stated that conflicting parties shall refrain from using force when disputes arise and resort to friendly negotiations instead. dispute settlement should be performed through mediation, inquiry or conciliation in order to prevent the dispute from worsening (secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs, 2012). despite its growing signatories, many argued that the tac has been nothing but symbolic, as the region has not experienced any severe incident or dispute that could challenge its regional peace. in fact, asean member states in the past had brought their disputes to the international court of justice (icj) to reach a settlement (yamakage, 2017). furthermore, tac was only seen suitable for political and security disputes (naldi, 2014). meanwhile, the vientiane protocol on enhanced dispute settlement procedure 2004 or known as enhanced dispute settlement mechanism (esdm), exists to settle disputes related to economic and trade agreements between member states. esdm was strengthened as members of asean embarked on deepening their economic integration under the asean economic community (naldi, 2014). asean member states may opt to request the senior economic officials meeting (seom), which acts as a panel to examine or assess a specific matter and then develop a binding report containing findings and recommendations. nonetheless, this body has been proven ineffective and weak. the member states are still firmly upholding the asean way for protecting national sovereignty, the norms of non-criticism and noninterference that comes first before everything else. the nature of this mechanism is also optional or voluntary (shah, 2017). since its establishment, asean has adhered to the so-called “asean way” to solve any differences between the member states, including those related to trade. basic aspects of the asean way includes: “firstly, a desire to not lose face in public or to make other members lose face. secondly, a preference for consensus rather than confrontation. thirdly, a rejection of the notion without consent in the internal affairs of other states” (koesrianti, 2016). eventually, these principles of the asean way were included in the asean charter that asean leaders adopted at the 13th asean summit in singapore in november 2007. article 20 of the asean charter states: “decision-making shall be based on consultation and consensus. where consensus cannot be achieved, the asean summit may decide how a specific decision can be made. in the case of a serious breach of the charter or non-compliance, the matter shall be referred to the asean summit for decision” (asean charter, 2007). this shows that decisions shall be made based on consensus among member states, and any breach of the charter shall be brought to the asean summit for settlement. dispute settlement shall be solved through the use of peaceful means such as dialogue, consultation and negotiation. as article 22 mentions: “member states shall endeavour to resolve peacefully all disputed in a timely manner through dialogue, consultation and negotiation” (asean charter, 2007). furthermore, conflicting parties may refer to the chairman or the secretary-general of asean to help resolve the conflict by providing them good offices, conciliation or mediation. as article 23 states: “parties to dispute may request the chairman of asean or the secretary-general of asean, acting in an ex-officio capacity, to provide good offices, conciliation or mediation.” (asean charter, 2007). hence, it can be said that asean summit becomes a dispute settlement organ besides being the highest policymaking body of asean. as the region enters the era of digitalization, the internet has become widely accessible, and the number of social media users are increasing each day. this development has a price to pay, particularly the rise of fake news. fake news or hoax is not only detrimental to society’s cohesiveness, but it may also destabilize the government. the asean ministers responsible for information (amri) held a roundtable discussion on 9 september 2017 to specifically talk about the proliferation of fake news in the region. the ministers agreed that there is a need for a multi-sectoral approach involving private sectors, media companies, and educational sectors to help combatting this problem (asean, 2017). a year later, asean adopted a framework and joint declaration to minimise the harmful effects of fake news to promote cybersecurity awareness and better counter the spread of fake online information (eria, 2021). in the framework, the leaders agreed that the member states shall take notice of several key points: firstly, there is a need to improve digital literacy. secondly, strengthen national capacity to detect and respond to fake news. thirdly, encourage stakeholders to build on the existing anti-fake news norms and guides. lastly, share best practices and experience among member states as being discussed by smith, perry, and smith in this volume. all of these have to be carried out by observing national sovereignty. the spread of fake news became more alarming during the covid-19 outbreak. southeast asian countries have been challenged with press freedom and more rigid censorship (mursitama, karim, and arnakim, 2021). the limited information from the government had urged the people to seek information from the media (both conventional and non-conventional) and civil society (lee and natalegawa, 2021). many governments feel that the spread of fake news in the media is threatening public order, and thus they have to take down and limit the availability of information (chairil, 2021). asean cooperation in the field of environment is envisioned in the ascc blueprint 2025 and further outlined in the asean strategic plan on environment (aspen). one of the key result areas is the “conservation and sustainable management of biodiversity and natural resources”. the organs to monitor the implementation of asean cooperation on the environment include the asean ministerial meeting on the environment (amme), asean senior officials on the environment (asoen), which are supported by several working groups (asean, 2017b). the haze problem in southeast asia has been in place for years, with the worst case occurring in 1997 and more recently in 2015. the origin of this toxic smog is indonesia’s forests located mainly in sumatra and kalimantan. illegal land clearing for palm plantations is common in indonesia. this is no surprise as the country reigns as the world’s biggest palm oil producer (index mundi, as cited in indonesia investments, 2016). the huge forest fires have produced hazardous air pollutants that cross the national border, reaching singapore and malaysia almost yearly. malaysia and singapore reported the haze issue as one of the main external challenges to their national security (guan, 2016; er, 2016). following the transboundary haze problem, asean formed an agreement on transboundary haze pollution (thp), containing areas of regional cooperation in “monitoring and assessment, prevention, preparedness, national and joint emergency response, procedures for deployment of people, materials and equipment across borders, and technical cooperation and scientific research” (asean, 2015b). all of these have been further reiterated in a roadmap on regional cooperation to tackle the transboundary haze problem in southeast asia adopted by member states of asean to achieve a “haze-free region by 2020” (hamdan, 2016). some of the key strategies under the roadmap include: “1. implementation of the asean agreement on transboundary haze pollution (aathp); 2. sustainable management of peatlands for peatland fires prevention.; 3. sustainable management of agricultural land and forest for large scale forest and/or land fires prevention; 4 strengthening policies, laws, regulations, and their implementations including to facilitate exchange of experience and relevant information among enforcement authorities of the parties in accordance with the aathp article 16 (f); 5. enhancing cooperation, exchange of information and technology, and strengthening of capacity of institutions at all levels; 6. enhancing public awareness and cross-sectoral and stakeholders participation; 7. securing adequate resources from multi-stakeholders for transboundary haze prevention; 8. reducing health and environmental risks and protection of global environment.” (asean, 2017b). the asean way, which famously upholds the principle of state sovereignty and noninterference, has been accused of the ineffectiveness of regional cooperation on transboundary environmental issues (dorman and olsen, 2019). for instance, in 2016, singapore requested six indonesian companies to provide information related to the forest fires on their lands as the country acts in conformation with their national law on transboundary haze and pollution act 2014. only a few answered the summons. commenting on the failure of these companies to turn up for investigation, indonesia’s environment and forestry minister argued that singapore has intervened in indonesia’s domestic problem and that it hurt the state’s sovereignty (channel news asia, 2016a; lian, 2016). as long as there is no legal basis and enforcement procedure for regional agreements, a country would always be able to defend itself under the principle of sovereignty and non-intervention. as indonesia has been considered the most frequent original country that causes the transboundary haze in southeast asia and a more reluctant country to deal with regional agreements, indonesia needs to have more initiatives. as such, indonesia, under sby’s presidency, helped the country boost its prominence on the international stage, especially in the realm of democracy and human rights (karim, 2020). sby adopted his “million friends and zero enemies” foreign policy outlook and acted accordingly by freely exercising policies in all directions (piccone & yusman, 2014). indonesia played a role as a regional leader, mediator, conflict manager among asean member countries, and architect of asean institutions and norms (karim, 2021). he was actively engaged in matters related to asean by being a mediator and conflict manager. during sby’s leadership, indonesia placed asean within its innermost foreign policy circle (anwar, as cited in purnama & mahyudin, 2018). moreover, playing a role as a dialogue partner for myanmar over its struggle for democratization amidst the strong pressure from two great powers, i.e. china and the united states, was one of the illustrations of indonesia’s strong influence in southeast asia. indonesia’s role as a mediator was also visible in the south china sea (scs) issue. indonesia plays an important role in maintaining stability in the region and avoiding conflicts internally within the region and from outside power (widiatmaja & albab, 2019). in the issue of terrorism, sby promoted indonesia as the world’s largest islamic country that is against acts of terrorism and denounced all forms of extremism (widiatmaja & albab, 2019). he participated in many global anti-terrorism forums, became the chairman of the asiapacific economic cooperation (apec) counter-terrorism task force, and also established communication with non-islamic countries to build trust in islam (widiatmaja & albab, 2019). furthermore, indonesia was the one who “initiated the architecture of asean's political and security cooperation”. indonesia was known to maintain close cooperation with its neighbouring countries. the country became a host to the annual asia-pacific forum in democracy, took part in the g-20 summits, co-chaired the un secretary general’s 27 member high-level panel on the post-2015 (millennium development goals) development agenda, and many others (piccone & yusman, 2014). as opposed to sby, president joko widodo is seen to adopt an inward-looking policy style. jokowi implements down-to-earth or pro-people diplomacy, which means that all foreign policies should act to represent the domestic interests or benefit the indonesians. indonesia under joko widodo is not too focused on shaping a positive image in the international arena like his predecessor. this was shown when the government performed a crackdown on illegal fishers or what some called the “shock therapy” campaign by capturing and “blowing up and sinking” illegal fishing vessels found in indonesian waters (weatherby, 2014). under jokowi, indonesia is not as dominant in asean as it was under sby. there was an argument that claimed “jokowi sees asean only through profit logic,” or in other words, indonesia acts based on what profit will be obtained from its involvement in asean related matters (yahya, as cited in rosyidin and pattipeilohy, 2020). as the last volume of the editorial section examines the asean’s challenges and opportunities during the pandemic (mursitama, karim, and arnakim, 2021), this volume revisits asean legislation and its impact on regional governance. coincided with the above phenomena, we are pleased to present volume 9 no. 2, 2021, which discusses several issues related to asean legislation and its impact on regional governance from dispute settlement on trade and fake news to environmental issues, from asean countries business governance to country studies on indonesian leadership contestation in foreign policy. this volume is comprised of seven articles. the first part is on asean legislation, especially on dispute settlement mechanism, fake news management, and transboundary environmental issues. the first article by intan soeparna analyses whether the role of the asean summit can be a solution for the post-adjudication issue in the asean edsm. intan soeparna inserts that the intervention of the asean summit to the post-adjudication of asean edsm is likely to apply political solutions that would, in turn, make legal decisions subject to politically driven scrutiny. however, asean commits that any economic disputes must be resolved to ensure economic stability in the asean. this has been followed on legal review based on the documentary research concept by comparing the development of legislative responses to fake news spread in southeast asia by smith, perry and smith. they analyse anti-fake news legislation, which focuses on the transmission of information by electronic means than print media. the authors suggest it would be better to develop anti-fake news legislation as either a standalone statute or a specific amendment to existing legislation than include fake news in omnibus legislation. except in the most severe cases, creating, publishing, or distributing fake news illegality should be reduced from a criminal offence to an administrative offence, where the police issue a fine. given the documented publishing and spreading of disinformation by state actors, their servants and agents, there should be an explicit “fake news” offence associated with the action of such persons. the third contribution was on transboundary environmental governance, especially contestation hybridity in the biofuels and palm oil regimes between the eu and asean by helena varkkey. she argues that it has never been more important to take a transboundary approach to address complex environmental problems. however, it has been argued that hybrid transboundary environmental governance may undermine sustainable development and environmental justice objectives. this paper addresses the complexities of the european union’s renewable energy directives (eu red and red ii), contextualizing them within the southeast asian palm oil sector. palm oil is a significant source of biofuel, and the eu is the second-largest importer of palm oil in southeast asia. helena concludes that this transboundary market approach to biofuels and palm oil should be regarded with caution, as it (1) lowers regulatory quality within the biofuels sustainability regime, (2) undermines the sustainable palm oil market, and (3) indirectly bolsters unsustainable practices outside the palm oil sector. the second part of the volume discusses on good governance of the business. jonathan, moch. doddy ariefianto, and rindang widuri examine the role of financial structure, business drive, and business environment that resulted in external audit service adoption in small and mediumsized enterprises (smes) within asean countries. the authors indicated a significant positive correlation between sales, ownership structure (partnership vs sole proprietorship), and external audit adoption for smes. from a country-of-origin perspective, they conclude that audit adoption is significantly higher in malaysia and the philippines than in vietnam. however, audit adoption in indonesia is significantly lower than in vietnam, both in terms of awareness and implementation. other points of interest can be seen in the interaction regression between countries, which indicates the degree of complexity associated with audit adoption when country of origin is taken into account. one significant policy implication is that sme's can better leverage external auditor services to support their growth and, in turn, the economy of the corresponding country. moreover, mohd jaffri abu bakar, nanthakumar loganathan, asan ali golam hassan and tirta nugraha mursitama examine this asymmetric effect between the interrelationship of the interbank rate on the external competitiveness purchasing power represented by the real effective exchange rate for malaysia and thailand using monthly data covering the period of 1994 until 2020. their empirical findings confirmed an asymmetric effect between the interbank rate and real effective exchange rate based on the nonlinear autoregressive distributed lag estimates. this study also found a unidirectional asymmetric causal relationship running from real effective exchange rate on interbank rate thailand, which indicate the monetary policy has a direct relationship on interbank rate volatility. while in malaysia, there is no causality between both variables since the country has proposed several soft monetary policies and concentrates more on short-term borrowing by improving the tight money supply circulation based on domestic inflation, global economic, and financial market volatility. therefore, the authors recommend there is a specific need for a monetary stabilizer policy to stabilize both countries’ currencies and put more effort to liberalize the foreign exchange rate system in a globalized economy. the final part of the country study presents contested interpretations of indonesia’s international leadership in foreign policy between presidents susilo bambang yudhoyono and joko widodo. aleksius jemadu and floranesia lantang examine indonesia’s international leadership on foreign policy throughout the period of president susilo bambang yudhoyono and president joko widodo, who have developed different conceptualizations of foreign policy. the authors argue that while president susilo bambang yudhoyono tends to make indonesia’s international leadership an essential part of his rigorous effort to build a postauthoritarian identity for a democratic and stable nation, president joko widodo prefers to make his foreign policy serve the accomplishment of his domestic priorities. as such, they argue that indonesia’s international leadership is much contingent upon the individual preferences of the presidents in both formulating their policies as well as the implementation. the last part of the country study analyses indonesian president joko widodo’s public speeches from 2017 to 2018 by adam tyson and stanislaus apresian. the authors examine the rhetorical style and political priorities in indonesian president joko widodo’s public speeches during his first term in office. their analysis shows that the president’s passion extends beyond bureaucratic reform and into contentious political topics, where selective attempts at disruptive truth-telling are made. lili yulyadi arnakim moch faisal karim tirta nugraha mursitama references asean (2017a). asean to cooperate on fighting fake news in the region. https://asean.org/asean-to-cooperate-on-fighting-fake-news-in-the-region/ asean (2017b). asean cooperation on environment at a glance. https://asean.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/02/50.-december-2017-asean-cooperation-on-environmentat-a-glance.pdf asean charter (2007). retrieved from https://kemlu.go.id/download/l3npdgvzl3b1c2f0l0rvy3vtzw50cy9bu0vbti1 dagfydgvylnbkzg== chairil, t. 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(2014). indonesia’s global maritime nexus: implications for illegal fishing. stimson. retrieved may 25, 2017, from https://www.stimson.org/content/indonesiasweather-forecast-hazy-with-achance-of-clear-skies https://www.csis.org/blogs/new-perspectives-asia/fake-news-crackdowns-do-damage-across-southeast-asia-during-pandemic https://www.csis.org/blogs/new-perspectives-asia/fake-news-crackdowns-do-damage-across-southeast-asia-during-pandemic https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v9i1.7648 https://asc.fisipol.ugm.ac.id/2017/10/30/asean-enhanced-disputes-settlement-mechanism-edsm-functional-economic-growth-protecting-national-sovereignty/ https://asc.fisipol.ugm.ac.id/2017/10/30/asean-enhanced-disputes-settlement-mechanism-edsm-functional-economic-growth-protecting-national-sovereignty/ widiatmaja, a. & albab, u. (2019). indonesia under susilo bambang yudhoyono (sby) and joko widodo: foreign policy in the middle of regional strategic environment dynamics. politica vol. 10 no. 1 mei 2019 journal of asean studies, vol. 7, no. 1 (2019), pp. 58-72 doi: https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v7i1.5748 ©2019 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic repositioning indonesia – thoughts on the indopacific anthony milner university of malaya, malaysia; university of melbourne; australian national university, australia abstract indonesia's growth has stimulated new strategic ambitions. one example is the conceptualization of a new 'indo-pacific' regional structure reaching beyond asean. this essay seeks to describe the changing regional and global environment which indonesia today confronts stressing the faltering of globalization and the 'return of history' and then goes on to examine in some detail current indonesian thinking on the 'indo-pacific'. what are the strengths and weaknesses of this exercise of transformative leadership? while acknowledging that asean has begun to employ the term officially in june 2019, there are reasons for caution in further developing an 'indo-pacific' vision. it is already entangled with attempts to counter china, and also with risky proposals for a new regional architecture. commentators on asean have tended to underestimate the creativity with which asean has already incorporated the large northeast asian states together with india, the united states and russia in its institutions. there is danger that 'indo-pacific' aspirations might damage asean centrality and, as a result, provoke a greater contest for leadership between the major states. asean-led institutions which have emerged organically reflect the current complexity of the region. they have also served indonesia well and require strong indonesian backing. key words: indo-pacific, the return of history, regional architecture, asean centrality, and globalization. introduction before considering how best to reposition indonesia in the world – and i will be looking, in particular, at indonesia’s current indo-pacific initiative we need to ask how the world itself has been repositioned. one issue must concern the progress of globalization. until the mid-20th-century the entire asian region was either under european colonial rule or strong western imperial influence. that is how the region was structured – with the great centers of power in london, paris, the hague and washington. after the extraordinary conquests by japan, which effectively ended the western imperial project, asia was quickly drawn into the cold war. countries lined up as communist or anticommunist, and some tried to sustain a degree of neutrality or equidistance. journal of asean studies 59 at the end of the cold war, in the last decade or so of the 20th-century, as is often commented, there was a unipolar moment – an america-dominated world with a sense of globalization not merely being economic, but also a globalization of ideas. one commentator wrote of the ‘end of history’ – the us had won, he suggested, with its liberal democratic ideology. communism had been annihilated, and western liberalism had the ‘wind in its hair’. this said, there were still objections. dr mahathir in malaysia and a number of bright foreign ministry intellectuals in singapore spoke of ‘asian values’. they said you had to understand these values to explain the great economic transformation taking place in asian countries – and there was also a need to acknowledge asian values in the political arena, and not just insist that all societies must develop in the same way. the democracy, human rights, and other supposed responsibilities of government which westerners have tended to advocate, so it was argued, are not necessarily universal norms. mahathir even pushed the idea of an east asian economic group in 1990, saying that if europeans could have their european regionalism, surely asians could have theirs. he was advocating the concept of ‘asia’ or ‘asian unity’, which had been developed by indian and japanese thinkers from the late 19th century. in 1990, however, the western influence was too strong for the mahathir proposal: advocates of apec (asia pacific economic cooperation), which had begun in 1989, and was an ‘asia pacific’ not ‘asian’ organization – and one dominated by the united states – pushed the mahathir proposal aside. what is more, in 1997-1998 parts of asia, including indonesia, entered a terrible financial crisis – and, as a result, faced an element of ridicule from some western commentators. where are your asian values now? was the tone of these comments. japan and australia assisted during this crisis – but so did china, especially by maintaining the value of its currency against the us dollar. apec, for all its promise, was not seen to be helpful, and by the end of the 1990s asean countries were joining china, japan and south korea in a new east asian grouping similar to the mahathir concept of a decade earlier and termed ‘asean plus three’. asian countries, in the wake of the crisis, had decided to help one another in an ‘asian’ not us-dominated ‘asia pacific’ organization. in a sense, the asean plus three initiative was a triumph for the century-old ‘asia’ movement. it could be viewed as well as a setback for the process of us-led globalization, and an instance of a renewed potency of historical forces. the return of history in the decades after the asian financial crisis, china has been rising in wealth and confidence, with the united states in relative decline – and the competition between these powers has been the preoccupation of international relations commentary. the change underway, however, has concerned far more than a shift in power. in one area 60 repositioning indonesia after another we have been witnessing a ‘return of history’ which counters the flow of globalization. the prospects of a more or less homogenous world appear to be increasingly weak, and the likelihood of developing turmoil is growing. president trump, in rejecting “globalism”, has seen the alternative as the “doctrine of patriotism” (sachs, 2018) – but there are many other possibilities. one consequence of the return of history, it might be argued, is that it brings into question established ways of thinking about international relations issues. the framework that is so often employed, of course, was designed for a western world. it assumes a society of numerous states, locked in struggle with one another, and driven by more or less the same motives – particularly the quest for power. seldom do western analysts of foreign relations factor in history – or religious and philosophic drivers. in a recent book, bilahari kausikan the former head of the singapore foreign ministry – explained that he had studied international relations but after being a diplomat for thirty years decided that this training was not useful. its theory, he said, was too mechanical – and he found “history, literature and philosophy” were “better preparations for understanding international affairs” (kausikan, 2016). in asia today, the analyst certainly needs to be able to deal with philosophic and sociological developments. to speak of history in today’s asian region is not to insist that the times are static, or backward-looking – rather, historical processes seem to be working their way forward, drawing from the past but tackling current issues and challenging dominant ideas. in indonesia, for instance, religious processes in the 18th and 19th centuries – salafi processes described by azyumardi azra (azra, 2014) and merle ricklefs (ricklefs, 2006) promoted a strengthening of religious observance and the specific role of islamic law. these developments were hindered or moderated in the dutch colonial period – as islamization was also resisted by the british on the malay peninsula – and one aspect of the return of history has been the revival of the salafi movement in recent years, as western influence has waned in southeast asia. the growing demand today for reforming indonesian society on religious grounds has in particular entailed trenchant criticism of liberal values. the salafi movement is intensely modern, not only in the matters it addresses, but also in the way it harnesses the internet and social media. research by indonesia’s state islamic university has indicated that jakarta tweets more than any other city in the world, and the rise of islamic religiosity benefits from this technological development (lindsey, 2018, pp. 87). in what ways, one must begin to ask, will changing demands from the islamic community begin to influence more sharply how indonesia – or malaysia – will behave in the international sphere? is it possible that islamic concepts will eventually damage the primacy of the journal of asean studies 61 nation state – the man-made, dutchcolonial-influenced state or at least the character of that state? students of ‘international’ relations might find they need to look beyond the state-to-state structure when examining future developments in the southeast asian region. in particular, they will need to know how religious beliefs may foster forms of community and identity that do not sit comfortably in national categories. to take another example of history’s possible role in reconfiguring the asian region, foreign affairs analysts are also being challenged by developments in the south china sea – and, more broadly, in southeast asia-china relations. faced with a rising china, some commentators have assumed that southeast asian countries will seek ways to balance against that power – that is, they will seek allies, such as the united states, japan and australia, to help them. they are assumed to wish to form an anti-china alliance. if they do not act in this way – so the analysis proceeds then their other option is to appease or bandwagon with china, conceding what china wants. balance or bandwagon – these are the stark options in this international relations, western realist, view of the world. but other types of approach to inter-state relations are also possible – some rooted in historical experience. there are indications, for instance, that present-day southeast asia-china interaction may be being shadowed by an older form of inter-state relations in asia – one offering an alternative to the postwestphalian equal-sovereignty structure that arose in europe and was imposed across asia. although at one level the countries of the region today behave as sovereign states in an international community, at another level both china and southeast asian countries are influenced by pre-modern ideas, particularly relating to hierarchy. given the experience of a hierarchical asian world in which many malay archipelago states looked up to china and other major powers, it may be that modern asean countries are unusually comfortable today in the face of a rising china. the way prime minister mahathir – in his august 2018 visit to china – not only negotiated hard with china over economic matters, but also talked of malaysia being only a “small” country and expressed respect for china’s regional role (mahathir, 2018), is representative of this relaxed approach. in southeast asia, on the one hand, there does not seem to be an automatic reaction to balance against china; and, on the other, there is no obvious, passive acceptance of chinese demands no subservient band wagoning. these countries, it would seem, do not want intervention in their domestic affairs on the part of china or any other major power. they do not want to be attacked militarily by china on their islets or rocks in the south china sea. but they are open to negotiation. they look at the whole range of dimensions in their china relationship – and seek not to push china back, but to embrace china, attempting also to soften its demands. in a sense, these countries aim to bring china closer 62 repositioning indonesia to southeast asia, engaging it in ways that will bring benefit to southeast asia. as they have done for centuries, the southeast asian leaders seem to be seeking a ‘smart accommodation’ with china. embrace not push-back, working with hierarchy not insisting on sovereign equality – these are old indonesian/malay foreign-relations preferences, and they do not fit comfortably into the usual international relations way of viewing things (milner, 2017b; milner, 2017c). let me mention one more case of the potency of historical forces in this time of structural as well as power transition. this is the particular manner in which asean has been developing. i stress this theme partly because i intend to come back to asean when i arrive at the question of exactly how indonesia might best position itself in the world. asean has much in common with other regional organizations – and one feature of recent decades is the growing role of regions, and not just states, as players in the global community. certain features of asean, however, have a local or indigenous character. at one level the creation of asean was just a sensible, practical initiative – an initiative that helped bring stability to southeast asia, and also to foster prosperity. at another level, asean is the product of specific, asian historic processes – including the late 19thcentury attempts to promote a sense of pan-asian community. even in the 1940s, some southeast asian leaders saw the promotion of unity in their immediate region as a step toward creating a larger asian community. another local factor was highlighted by the malaysian foreign policy leader, ghazali shafie. he argued that the concept of berkampung or ‘togetherness’ was deeply rooted in malay/indonesian societies. he suggested too that the bamboo plant had long reinforced this value – a single reed, he reminded his readers, can be broken by a “single gust” of wind, but growing in a cluster bamboo can stand firm (shafie, 2000, pp. 205-206, 220, 355). asean has sought to be such a cluster – and was, in part, a result of this seeming instinct for uniting together, for gaining strength through community-building. another indigenous, historical dimension of asean behavior has been the assumption – again, almost an instinct – that it is appropriate to build friendships in any and every direction, and regardless of differences in culture and ideology (nazrin, 2018). there is plenty of evidence in the early history of the malay archipelago of rulers doing this – seeking to be open, balanced and friendly to all sides (milner, 2015) and in the case of asean it helps to explain why the original non-communist asean countries were so willing to incorporate the communist countries, vietnam, cambodia and laos, into the grouping. in europe, there were different foreign relations traditions, so that today the eu remains strongly at odds with russia. a third local feature of asean concerns the handling of major powers in general, and not just china. seemingly journal of asean studies 63 comfortable in acknowledging their weakness with respect to such countries, the asean states find ways to maintain their autonomy, their room for maneuver (and their independence in domestic affairs). it is here we see the quest for smart accommodation in the region’s hierarchy diplomacy. in the old writings of the region, the image conveyed by this diplomatic ingenuity is that of the wily mousedeer (pelandok jenaka), who employs all types of tactic to survive among the big animals of the forest (milner, 2016, pp. 3336). this ‘small state’ imperative in southeast asia has been noted by bilahari kausikan, explaining that the “preferred strategy for the countries of southeast asia [has been] to maximize autonomy by keeping options open and maintaining the best possible relationship with all the major powers” (kausikan, 2017). in this mousedeer ambition, southeast asian countries seek an “omnidirectional state of equilibrium between all major powers that allows the countries of the region maximal room to maneuver and autonomy” (kausikan, 2017). summing up, i am suggesting that the asian region is not only in flux because of shifts in power, especially the relative decline of the united states and the great growth of china. despite all that was once thought about the likely influence of globalization and the coming dominance of western liberal (including post-westphalian) thought, the region is now also being destabilized by a return of history influencing in complex ways the behavior of different regional states. it is not that the region is moving backward; rather, historical forces are impacting on state behavior, moving that behavior beyond the familiar nation-state and interstate structure – underpinned as it has been by liberal values, and established by western powers primarily in the 19th century. the emerging reconfiguration of asia is unlikely to replicate closely prewestern structures; still, it will probably entail the working out of historical forces that go far more deeply than dutch, british and united states influence. the change underway in asia today, therefore, can be expected to be about the ‘rules of the game’ – the way the region is structured, the manner in which the different players are constituted, and the changing preferences and anxieties of the players. we might ask what exactly ‘asean’ might mean in 30 years, or how a china-centered region might operate – or even how ‘indonesia’, ‘malaysia’ or even ‘china’ itself might be understood as units in the regional and global configuration. one thing is clear, this is a time to think very carefully about policy innovation, considering carefully all possible implications or consequences. the positioning of indonesia having set this scene, let us return to the positioning of indonesia. in the midst of all this change, indonesian leaders – as one might expect – have been doing some hard thinking. noting that indonesia has been growing steadily – with predictions that the country will become a major world economy in the next couple of decades – some in the country’s leadership have been tempted to 64 repositioning indonesia see indonesia’s future lying beyond asean. there has been talk of asean not as ‘the’ cornerstone of indonesian foreign policy (as it continues to be in malaysia’s case), but as ‘a’ cornerstone (natalegawa, 2018, pp. 108, 149). also, the government has come up with the idea of indonesia as a “global maritime fulcrum”. exactly what is meant by a ‘global maritime fulcrum’ remains somewhat unclear. it does highlight the large maritime dimension of the indonesian state – of indonesia’s national territory – but it also suggests an ambition for indonesia to exercise strategic weight beyond southeast asia. such weight, of course, would require the development – the substantial development – of indonesian naval power (white, 2018, pp. 18). another way in which indonesia has been reaching beyond asean is in the focus being given in recent years to the ‘indo-pacific’ idea – a term relatively new to the region and one which, after much hesitation, has begun to be employed in asean meetings. this ‘indo-pacific’ focus is of added interest right now because of the importance the concept is being given in united states, japanese, indian and australian strategic deliberations. in indonesia, the current president and foreign minister have been thinking aloud about what ‘indo-pacific’ might mean, and former foreign minister marty natalegawa, in a recent and thoughtful book (natalegawa, 2018) has reminded the international affairs commentariat that indonesia has been developing an ‘indo-pacific’ agenda from a relatively early date – at least since 2004. there are problems, however, with the indo-pacific project including in terms of indonesian interests – and these suggest it may be unwise to re-position indonesia in this direction. according to marty, the indopacific idea was an aspiration when indonesia lobbied to involve india – and also australia and new zealand – in the east asia summit (eas), which first met in 2005 (natalegawa, 2018, pp. 89). by contrast, malaysia and some other states wished to keep the summit to east asian countries (china, japan and south korea), in addition to asean countries. marty has also written about his efforts to create an ‘indo-pacific treaty’ – an agreement, a set of rules for the indo-pacific region. true, he says it would be influenced by asean’s long-established treaty of amity and cooperation (tac) the treaty which every country participating in the eas has to sign and also by the 2011 eas bali principles, with their stress on peaceful settlement of disputes (natalegawa, 2018, pp. 154). nevertheless, having a specific indo-pacific treaty, in marty’s analysis, would move relations among the region’s states beyond the current asean ‘hub and spokes’ structure – the asean plus x, y and z structure. an indo-pacific treaty would be more than an agreement between asean and each of these external countries. it would be an independent code for the whole indo-pacific region. (amitav, 2014, pp. 12-13). this does not mean explicitly that indonesia would be journal of asean studies 65 pioneering a new regional organization, a new community – standing separately from asean, and larger than asean or even than asean plus three. nevertheless, having such a treaty, a code, it seems to me, could be seen as the basis for a new ambitious grouping – and a grouping, it must be said, in which asean centrality might be seriously threatened. statements from the current indonesian administration do strengthen the view that a new regional architecture is being seriously considered. the president referred to an “indo-pacific regional architecture” when in india in february 2018 (laksamana, 2018). his government has also highlighted the aspiration of an “indo-pacific cooperation umbrella” (foreign minister retno masurdi in laksamana, 2018). a djakarta post article referred to the “new regional grouping concept” (13 april 2018). the indo-pacific concept there are several reasons for caution regarding the indo-pacific project – and they suggest that it may not be the right concept for this era. first, the indopacific initiative has been hijacked by the united states and others, and this will be hard to reverse. the ‘indo-pacific’ can easily be decoded as an anti-china move – partly because of the way it is deployed in the 2017 us national security strategy, and also the fact that the american naval command in the region is now the ‘indopacific’ not ‘pacific’ command. the indopacific has also been linked to the socalled quadrilateral, the moves toward security cooperation between india, japan, australia and the united states a cooperation said to be based on a common commitment to democratic values (wanandi, 2018; bowie, 2918). some commentators have been quite frank about the indo-pacific’s potential china diluting power (heydarian, 2018). one difficulty with this strategic, china-encircling concept of indo-pacific is that it is currently uncertain just how strongly committed the lead quadrilateral countries happen to be. the united states leadership, as has often been observed, has made clear that it cannot be trusted to commit to any mediumor long-term international engagement. india has certainly displayed interest in the quad, but is known to look in many directions, exploring one possibility after another. at present, it is not just contemplating the china-led shanghai cooperation organization but has actually joined as a full member. also, the structure of india’s armed forces does not suggest the country has a strong maritime indo-pacific capacity. as for japan, there has clearly been progress in working relations with china, and optimism as well about prospects for the three-cornered – china, japan, south korea – meetings. so, it is not clear how seriously japan would now commit to an anti-china alliance. another difficulty with the strategic construction of the us indopacific project is that it is so antagonistic toward china that some southeast asians countries and others have become anxious about undermining relations with their 66 repositioning indonesia leading trading partner. it does not help that the trading importance of the united states tends to have been much diminished over the last two decades. as noted already, southeast asian countries have a very long history of engaging effectively – of seeking smart accommodation with china, and it would seem that they can live with the idea of china being at the top of a regional hierarchy, so long as chinese demands do not become oppressive. in this sense, the return of history which i have discussed above with respect to hierarchical (and mousedeer) diplomacy does not mesh comfortably with the idea of supporting a balance-of-power alliance against china. furthermore, it is quite against asean tradition – as also noted above – to form alliances on an ideological basis. having made these points, it must be acknowledged that indonesian proponents of the indo-pacific see some of this danger. the president has insisted that ‘indo-pacific cooperation’ would include not exclude china (shekhar, 2018). also, marty – certainly among the leading ideas-formulators in modern southeast asia has made clear that he seeks only a “dynamic equilibrium” and “common security in the indivisibility of peace”, not cold war-type efforts to contain china (natalegawa, 2017). despite these reassurances, however, it may be difficult in the developing international discourse to rescue the indo-pacific idea – to gain priority for the indonesian inclusive conceptualization and succeed in disentangling the idea from united states strategic ambitions. a second reason for caution regarding the indo-pacific idea is that creating a new architecture or grouping would open up the question of regional leadership – an issue that the asean hub-and-spokes framework was brilliantly successful in setting aside, and in many ways to the advantage of the major as well as minor states. a debate over leadership could make the indopacific an arena for contest rather than trust-building; the asean-led institutions, frustrating as they can sometimes be for those who prefer decisive action, have actually provided a forum for peaceful and often collaborative deliberation. the insistence that it is asean that provides leadership has helped overcome the danger of regional architecture exacerbating rather than softening inter-state tension. the threat to asean a third reason to be wary of the indo-pacific concerns the interests of asean itself. an obvious problem with the indo-pacific initiative – even in its specific indonesian formulation – is the damage it might do to asean. marty has sought to allay such fears. he insists that the indo-pacific had its origin in asean processes, and emphasizes that an indopacific treaty would be based on asean principles (cook, 2018) he and others also argue that the indo-pacific should be asean-led, (wanandi, 2018; cook, 2018), and marty insists the indo-pacific is in fact an opportunity for asean to display much-needed “transformative” leadership (natalegawa, 2018, pp. 233-234). the journal of asean studies 67 ambition, evidently, is to have asean continue to be the force that sets the rules in the asian – or rather, indo-pacific region. but in moving beyond the asean hub-spoke asean plus structure, would asean leadership perhaps become less not more secure? the indopacific meetings would be likely in the long run to replace the east asia summit, and as a result this equal-footed, treatybased indo-pacific cooperation could sound the death-knell of asean-centered regionalism? in an indo-pacific grouping with its own “framework” – even if that framework is based on asean principles, an asean rule-code – asean as a regional player is highly likely to lose its pre-eminence in competition with one or more major powers. an indo-pacific treaty which in effect gives “countries of the wider region”, the indo-pacific region (natalegawa, 2018, pp. 234), independence from asean, and forms the foundation of an ‘indo-pacific architecture’ or ‘indo-pacific cooperation’, could lead to the peripheralizing of relatively weak states such as the member states of asean, including indonesia. marty states his long-held view that “power dynamics between the member countries” of “an enlarged nonasean eas” would “gravitate towards ‘equilibrium’, with asean as its core constantly working to maintain the equilibrium” (natalegawa, 2018, pp. 90). in fact, it can be claimed that the current regional architecture – asean, asean plus three, the asean-led east asia summit and so forth – has been remarkable in giving asean a degree of leadership in a wide region of megapowers, some of which are vastly stronger than any asean country. marty writes powerfully about the need for asean to demonstrate leadership, and with a “transformative outlook” (natalegawa, 2018, pp. 232) and he is right to note that such an outlook has been evident in the past. asean’s record, however, needs much highlighting. international relations analysis often gives too little attention to the complexity of the task of region– building. even in the case of the concept of ‘europe’ it is necessary to explore in depth the different forms of influence, experimentation and dialogue – over many centuries that helped forge the ‘european union’ as it is today (pagden, 2002). for the weaker states of southeast asia, to have led in the formation of a regional architecture – and a regional code of inter-state behavior that now not only covers the whole of east asia but also engages india, the united states, russia and others, is an immense achievement; and marty himself has been a very significant player in the asean leadership. the asean architecture has almost been a sleight of hand. in the best tradition of asean small-power, mousedeer diplomacy it has helped to give the relatively weaker southeast asian countries a significant degree of strategic ‘space’ (as marty has put it), or ‘autonomy’ (to use the term bilahari kausikan has been employing). 68 repositioning indonesia asean has moved gradually, step by step, sensitive to historical and cultural forces, drawing in some ways on the spirit of ‘asia’ promoted over the last century. it has paid attention not only to the functional dimension of regionalism – the establishing of practical cooperation in security and economic areas – but also to the identity aspect of regionalism. its leaders have been working to create a ‘people-centered asean’ and have spoken of asean “coursing through our veins” (milner, 2016, pp. 16). they want asean to have meaning for the people it encompasses. this is an organic understanding of regional community – and one which invokes indigenous thinking about inter-polity relations (including ghazali shafie’s identifying of the bamboo cluster as a powerful metaphor). such an organic understanding is influential in the asian region. even the local vocabulary of regionalism – the precise asian-language terms used for regional ‘association’ or ‘community’ – tend to convey this emotive quality. here we encounter a fourth reason for hesitation regarding the indopacific project – that is the problem that the indo-pacific seems to project no emotive value. it has proved hard enough to foster an ‘asia’ or ‘asean’ sentiment, and still harder to win emotive support for the ‘asia pacific’ (lee & milner, 2014, pp. 209-228; milner, 2017a, pp. 39-48). the idea of ‘indo-pacific’ happens to be one further remove from the experienced reality of most people living in the asian region. it is not just its geographical and historical reach – seeking to incorporate a range of societies that have very little in common. ‘indo-pacific’ also possesses no historical authenticity whatsoever. as jusuf wanandi has pointed out, the term actually excludes the word ‘asia’ – which covers “the most important part of the region” (wanandi, 2018). the idea of ‘asia’, as we have seen, is itself a construct – though one that has been developed carefully over a century and more – and ‘indo-pacific’, highlighting only two oceans, merely drowns out this historical process. this is an affront to the many asian thought leaders – not merely in china but across the region – who have taken seriously the concept of ‘asia’ and ‘asian’ priorities. ‘indo-pacific’, it could be argued, is a project more suited to an earlier era – a time when globalization seemed to be able to sweep aside local, indigenous and history-based sentiment, and when political leaders felt few limitations when formulating new visions. it tended to be accepted at that time that we all live in ‘imagined communities’ (to use benedict anderson’s phrase) and that the potential for imagination is almost endless. today, as i suggested in the opening section of this chapter, we are witnessing the development of chinese, islamic and southeast asian experiments that do not deny – but rather respond to or build upon a range of historical (including religious) perspectives. with an eye to those current ideational developments in the asian region – the growing attack on liberalism, journal of asean studies 69 the questioning of the secular state, the apparent willingness to accept some form of beijing-centered hierarchy, the apparent transcending of balance-of-power imperatives, and so forth – a final caution regarding the indo-pacific concerns whether a specifically ‘indo-pacific’ forum is likely to be the best venue for deliberating such matters. will the urgent issues to be faced in the asian region – grounded as they are in local as well as global dynamics – be handled effectively in a regional structure that could well be preoccupied with united states reactions to chinese or russian challenges? furthermore, as argued above, some current thinking about foreign relations in the asian region is not only shaped by local imperatives but actually challenges the conceptual categories employed so often by western analysts. such clashes of understanding as well as aspiration might best be handled in the patient processes of asean-led bodies, cultivated over many decades. in an indo-pacific architecture – which might potentially operate more or less independently of asean, and probably be dominated by rivalry between global powers discussion of current issues, shaped by the return of history, might be characterized by frustration, confusion and irritation. marty argues that to “remain relevant and central” asean should support the indo-pacific initiative (wanandi, 2018; cook, 2018). in fact, there is a possibility that doing so could undermine the delicate region-building which asean has been undertaking since 1967 – a type of regionalism that may, in fact, be more appropriate in the current era. putting aside the ultimate merits or otherwise of the indo-pacific vision, the task of implementing it may itself have the potential to divide asean – something which the organization has taken such pains to avoid. discomfort with the indopacific idea was certainly expressed in a number of asean quarters over the last year – for instance, at the asean summits with india and australia (chongkittavorn, 2018; bowie, 2018). in june 2019, asean – after much prevarication, pressure and hesitation” decided to “acknowledge the ‘indopacific’”, while insisting that it merely “reinforces the asean-centered regional architecture” (thu, 2019). to go beyond acknowledgement and develop the concept in detail is likely to inspire further debate within asean, along lines suggested above – and marty himself has highlighted the need to maintain asean “unity and cohesion” (natalegawa, 2018, pp. 229) the bamboo clump, it needs to be recalled, must be truly a ‘clump’. conclusion getting back to the title of this essay, ‘repositioning indonesia’, my conclusion is that in this time of regional transition – a transition not just of power but of ways of thinking about the regional order, and a transition to some extent running against globalization – the best option for indonesia might not be to ‘reposition’. what could be more 70 repositioning indonesia appropriate in this era is to reaffirm indonesian commitment to asean unity, and to asean-centered regional projects. marty is subtle in portraying the indopacific as consistent with the search for ‘dynamic equilibrium’ – which is not the same as “containment of a particular power” but the indo-pacific project has been hijacked to a large extent by western policy-makers, driven by balance-ofpower calculations, and is in any case a concept of region far removed from current, everyday experience in the asian region. indo-pacific architecture, in fact, might turn out to be better suited to the late 20thcentury, not the 21stcentury. the leaders of asean have been working hard to develop a meaningful regionalism – and have also harnessed that regionalism to the task of giving southeast asians at least some centrality in the wider asia. focusing sharply on the asean project might still be the best option for indonesia. finally, the idea that indonesia could be better off acting independently of asean – is difficult to take seriously. true, indonesia is growing fast, but in economic and military terms it is still far behind the united states, china, japan and india. operating alone, indonesia would be less likely than it is now – working as the lead member of asean – to maintain some pre-eminence in an indo-pacific forum. helping to give transformative leadership to asean – helping to maintain the momentum of asean’s relationship-building endeavors from india right across to russia and the united states, might be indonesia’s best option in this region, and this particular age. about the author anthony milner is visiting professor at the asia europe institute at the university of malaya. he also holds appointments at the university of melbourne and the australian national university. in 2014-2015 he was tun hussein onn chair at the institute of strategic and international studies (isis malaysia). his publications include (for the last five years) the ‘regionalism in asia’ entry for the annual routledge publication, the far east and the malays published by wiley-blackwell, 2011. references amitav, a. 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(2019, june 29). the long and winding way to the indo-pacific. the strategist. wanandi, j. (2018, may 24). asean deserves central role in indopacific cooperation. jakarta post. white, h. (2018). the jakarta switch. australian foreign affairs, 3. https://www.msnbc.com/morning-joe/watch/jeffrey-sachs-looks-to-a-new-foreign-policy-1334670915895 https://www.msnbc.com/morning-joe/watch/jeffrey-sachs-looks-to-a-new-foreign-policy-1334670915895 https://www.msnbc.com/morning-joe/watch/jeffrey-sachs-looks-to-a-new-foreign-policy-1334670915895 journal of asean studies, vol. 10, no. 1 (2022), pp. 107−127 issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic received: 16th february 2022/ revised: 22nd june 2022/ accepted: 24th june 2022 conflict potential of the rohingya people in bangladesh and beyond md rafiqul islam1* and umme wara2 1department of peace and conflict studies, university of dhaka, dhaka-1000, bangladesh 2department of criminology, university of dhaka, dhaka-1000, bangladesh *corresponding author *rislampacs@du.ac.bd; wara.criminology@du.ac.bd how to cite: islam, m. r. & wara, u. (2022). conflict potential of the rohingya people in bangladesh and beyond. journal of asean studies, 10(1), 107−127. https:/doi.org/10.21512/jas.v10i1.8215 abstract the article addresses how myanmar's rohingya conflict could generate a potential for conflict within the borders of bangladesh and beyond. the conflict in myanmar due to the rohingyas being deprived of their national citizenship had led to the mass exodus in 2017 to bangladeshi land and the subsequent conflict in the host place. it was referred to various situations, including disputes, killing, abduction, and tensions between the refuges and host people. based on existing theories of ‘exporting conflict’ such as displacing conflict and spill over effect of ethnic conflict, the article attempted to show how the rohingya conflict originated in myanmar lead to serious conflicts taking place in bangladesh. the theoretical basis proposed in the article had been supported with reliable secondary sources of information and published expert opinions on the contemporary situation of the temporary rohingya settlements in bangladesh with regards to their sheltering, refugee management, and progress towards their repatriation process to myanmar. the article argued that myanmar's civil conflict had spilled over into bangladesh's borders due to a sequence of events starting from when myanmar's civil conflict erupted from its national citizenship act. findings suggest that the myanmar conflict has been displaced to bangladesh through many refugee settlements that puts bangladesh's population in midst of a host of issues concerning livelihood, safety, and security. this has been done while touching upon bangladesh's position as a host country to millions of rohingya refugees and shouldering issues already stemming from the temporary shelter of rohingya people within its borders. keywords: rohingya, myanmar, displacement, conflict, bangladesh mailto:rislampacs@du.ac.bd mailto:wara.criminology@du.ac.bd 108 conflict potential introduction bangladesh is now hosting the highest number of over 1,1 million rohingya1 people who have been brutally tortured and persecuted by the myanmar army (bakali & wasty, 2020; alam, 2019). this large number of displaced people are living in temporary relocation facilities in the cox's bazar region of bangladesh, with additional measures for their relocation taking place in the bhasan char island near the coast of the bay of bengal (islam et al., 2021). effectively stateless, the development of the rohingya refugees2 in bangladesh over the years may prove to be critical for bangladesh as a host country for these displaced people. with its shortage of resources and high unemployment rates, and refusing to become full signatories to the international conventions for protecting refugees, bangladesh is in a unique and complex position with its displaced rohingya population (chowdhury, 2019; bhattacharya & biswas, 2020). indeed, the rohingya people have not been idle within their camps in cox's bazar. their high birth rates and long duration of stay within the borders of bangladesh have led to entire generations being raised in the camps (milton et al. 2017). moreover, their efforts to persist and mobilize to regain what they have lost have led to sprawling economies being born within these settlements as they cope with the reality of their longterm statelessness (crabtree, 2010), and not always of the lawful kind of economies. drug trafficking has spiralled to the point that this now bustling economy is threatening to destabilize the cox's bazar region (banerjee, 2019). moreover, rohingya women are falling victims to organized large-scale trafficking networks with connections in nearby countries. these trafficking syndicates have spawned to take advantage of helpless rohingya women with false promises of having better lives in countries such as thailand, india, and malaysia, and have even promised as such in their home country myanmar, where rohingyas have still not been guaranteed proper human rights assurances (routray, 2019). when these factors are taken into account, other issues such as how this growing population of stateless people can affect bangladesh as a host country, in the long run, can also influence the existing problems of aid delivery and healthcare assurances for the rohingya population. although it cannot be denied that ensuring proper aid to the rohingya taking refuge in the country is of significant importance to bangladesh as well as the broader international community until their repatriation succeeds, it is not the only set of issues that require attention. moreover, the potential for conflict from hosting this particular stateless community may prove to be detrimental to bangladesh in the long run or even in the near future, as the reportedly high criminality of the rohingya population in bangladesh may indicate (uddin, 2015). with rising environmental costs in the back and refugee management costs and housing logistical dilemmas at the forefront, bangladesh may be at further risk from 1 the rohingya population in bangladesh have not been given an official refugee status, since bangladesh is not an official signatory to the international instruments that protect the rights of refugees. instead, their official status is officially stated by the government of bangladesh as forcefully displaced myanmar nationals (fdmn) (roy, 2020). 2 although the government of bangladesh does not officially recognize the rohingya people taking shelter within its borders as refugees, they are mentioned as such in this article for strictly academic purposes. journal of asean studies 109 spill over effects from myanmar's own civil strife (farzana, 2021). the article seeks to bring attention to this particular side of the rohingya refugee crisis, which is how myanmar's rohingya conflict can generate a significant potential for conflict within the borders of bangladesh. briefly touching upon the background of the rohingya exodus and its reasons, the article goes over the sheltering of the rohingya people in bangladesh and the contemporary status of their post-settlement situation in bangladesh. the article provides a review of relevant literature from reliable sources to discuss theories of conflict displacement, civil war and spill over effects, a concern of neighbouring states of a country's ongoing civil war, refugee flow, refugee sheltering and management, refugee repatriation, and the crisis and stresses a host state experiences from hosting refugee populations. afterwards, the article critically analyses bangladesh's position as a host country for rohingya people to discuss areas of bangladesh that is affected due to this position and the conflict potential that this position entails for the country. a summary analysis providing a bird's eye view of the critical aspects proceeds the article with some concluding remarks. rohingya settlement in bangladesh: background and effects the rohingya people principally reside in the arakan province, also known as the rakhine state of myanmar from 788 to 810 ad (rahman, 2010). the rohingyas are predominantly muslim descendants of immigrants from the middle east and later of bengalis during the fifteenth to the seventeenth century (milton et al., 2017). it has been argued that the british occupation before myanmar's independence in 1948 is the precursor to the rohingya crisis that is prevalent in bangladesh and in some other parts of the world today. with the 'divide and rule' policy of the british colonial powers, the seeds of dissent were sown in myanmar's fragmented ethnic diaspora of predominantly buddhist burmese populations (i.e., over 87%) (ansar, 2020). after the independence of burma, the military-backed government used their legislative authority to fully remove the citizenship rights of the rohingya minority people in 1982. the infamous myanmar citizenship act of this year officially recognizes 135 ethnic groups as part of myanmar's ethnic population, and this list does not include the rohingyas (parashar & alam, 2019). this has led to the apparent stateless status of the rohingya population and has given myanmar's military apparatus free reign to violently prosecute this community in their own ancestral lands. the rohingyas faced persecution at the level seen in systematic genocides, with first their movements restricted by laws and legal obstructions, and their identity compromised via mandatory identification checks at designated checkpoints in the rakhine region, and fines and property confiscation from their now compromised identification documents (uddin, 2019). the flow of rohingya refugees to bangladesh started in the 1970s despite them arriving in larger groups in the early 1990s. the cause behind the first influx of rohingya refugees that had led to around 200,000 coming into bangladesh due to oppression, discrimination, violence, and forced labour practices by the myanmar authorities (uddin, 2019). since then, from around 600,000 rohingya refugee people in bangladesh during 2017 (milton et al., 2017) has swelled up to an estimated 800.000 rohingyas or more in the following year (martin, margesson, & vaughn, 2018), with the latest exodus in 2017 alone bringing in 700,000 110 conflict potential rohingyas (rahman et al., 2020). now with over 1,1 million rohingyas taking refuge in bangladesh as of 2020, it has become increasingly difficult for the country to assist this growing population (islam, inan, & islam, 2020). the rohingya people are taking shelter in camps in ukhiya and teknaf areas of bangladesh, located in the cox's bazar district in the south-east corner of the country (imtiaz, 2018). bangladesh has been heavily involved in properly sheltering this large rohingya population within its borders and seeing to their necessities with helps from international and local non-governmental organizations (ngos) despite not being directly affiliated with the international legal instruments such as the convention relating to the status of refugees or its protocols (milton et al., 2017; mia et al., 2021). the presence of a large number of rohingyas has led to many security complications for the gob and the rohingya population in the form of human rights violations by organized crime groups, a thriving black market economy of narcotics, contrabands, and small arms and light weapons (salw) (taufiq, 2019), and health complication for the rohingyas in the forms of malnutrition, outbreaks of contagious diseases, declining material health, and poor family planning (chowdhury et al., 2018; islam & nuzhath, 2018; islam et al., 2020). the initial acceptance of the local host community has waned at present, with tensions escalating in various issues ranging from speedy environmental degradation, health risks, challenges concerning national security and negative impacts on the economy, food security, employment, and tourism of bangladesh (mia et al., 2021). the population problems of the rohingya population, and the criminal activities involving drugs and human trafficking of the rohingyas alongside the resource competition has further contributed to insecurity and conflict between the rohingya people and the host community (banerjee, 2019). this insecurity and conflict can be considered as a precursor to further changes in the relationship among these communities in the near future, with lasting changes in bilateral relations between bangladesh and myanmar. the exodus of rohingyas to bangladesh is a direct result of the conflict taking place within myanmar, and the literature can be perused to effectively argue that the potential for further and more intense results of this conflict remains to be seen in bangladesh. existing literature on migration and displacement induced conflict migration and displacement induced conflict in the host place has been a nascent topic with the increasing number of migrants and displaced people across the world. thus, different theories are used to analyse how conflict of the country may affect the neighbouring one through population migration and spill over effects. the review of literature concerns primarily findings related to the theories of conflict displacement and civil war spill over effects. the discussion moves on to neighbouring state's concerns regarding an ongoing civil war in a country. the discussion brings the context of bangladesh and its position as a neighbouring country to myanmar. journal of asean studies 111 displacing the conflict theory displacement as a result of conflict has been studied for decades and is prominently known as 'conflict-induced displacement' (swain, 1996; muggah, 2000). established literature on the topic agrees that the threat created from war or outbreak of violence can cause people to make difficult decision to leave their homes behind and move on to elsewhere (edwards, 2009). there is debate on the minimum scale and scope of a conflict to force people to migrate away from their homes, but studies show that violence from either government or rebel forces can force migration (davenport, moore, & poe, 2003). large-n analyses have also shown that economic opportunity in origin and destination countries are related to forced migration if measured in terms of economic development and poverty levels. there have been mixed results for other factors that force people to migrate outside their country of origin, but it suggests that people tend to migrate from their country of origin only when their threat to life outweighs the economic security they lose by leaving their homes and localities, and the attachment and belongingness they feel towards their homes (adhikari, 2012). for the rohingya crisis in myanmar, the causes of migration, according to the records of activities of myanmar's military wing in the arakan region, involve state-sponsored violence and oppression, and severe threats to the lives of rohingyas in the region. civil wars and spill over effect civil war in a country and the resulting possible spill over effects onto other countries have been discussed extensively in the literature on civil wars and their impacts. an empirical study regarding what types of civil wars tend to spill over to other countries (i.e., to spill over international boundaries) by bosker and de ree (2014) strongly indicates that only civil wars involving ethnic conflicts (i.e., ethnic wars) have such a tendency (salehyan, 2010; bosker & de ree, 2014). from the point of myanmar's civil war, and the ethnic divide that the national citizenship act has legally brought to the forefront, this is particularly relevant. another finding regarding the spill over effects of a country's civil war indicates that neighbouring states are more likely to increase their military expenditure as a result of an erupting or ongoing civil war in a neighbouring state (phillips, 2014). this is explained as resulting from a perception of a possible future threat by the neighbouring states embroiled in a civil war. bangladesh's military expenditure, on the other hand, has alternated between slight rises and declines in their military expenditure as a percentage of the country's gdp in the years after 2010 (sipri, 2021). the latest military expenditure of the country in 2020 is also less than the previous year (i.e., 2019). another finding regarding the spill over effects of civil wars indicates that states that are fragile (i.e., when the state has the weak capacity and weak state legitimacy and is unable to deliver the fundamental state functions to its people) are more prone to be affected by civil wars in neighbouring states, as is seen for countries in africa which are deemed as fragile states. the effects on these neighbouring fragile states have been found to be even greater than the state where the civil conflict originated (dunne & tian, 2019). a very relevant findings in the case of spill over effects of conflicts suggest that influx of refugees and intentional (i.e., 'artificial') separation of ethnic groups explain a part of the 112 conflict potential spill over effect of civil wars in neighbouring states observed in sub-saharan africa (carmignani & kler, 2016). these spill over effects are primarily measured in terms of economic changes and triggering civil wars in neighbouring states. this leads to the discussion on if states should be concerned of other effects besides a full-fledged civil war or serious economic problems if a neighbouring state is embroiled in a civil war. civil war and neighboring states' concerns the findings by carmignani and kler (2016) also observe that in the middle east, nigeria, kenya and somalia, spill over effects can be in the form of terrorism and/or other forms of violence. these instances of violence can lead to social destabilization in neighbouring states even if they are not directly classified as civil wars. this has been reflected in another work on the spill over effects of the syrian war where the islamic state in iraq and syria (isis) threat and the changing nature of the kurdish insurgency led to political and security issues for neighbouring turkey. the open support of the turkish government of the syrian oppositional regime, and the armed insurgency of isis and the democratic union party (pyd or partiya yekîtiya demokrat)-peoples protection units (yekîneyên parastina gel or ypg)/kurdistan workers party (partiya karkerên kurdistanê or pkk) led to heavy political, economic and security problems for turkey (dal, 2016). this is very pertinent to the concerns of bangladesh in terms of the ongoing civil conflict in myanmar, a crucial starting point of which is the segregation and denial of citizenship of a segment of myanmar's population. this concern stems from the notion that its spill over effects would hamper international peace and security. not only has the rohingya crisis led to more than 700.000 displaced rohingyas fleeing to bangladesh's border after 2017, but fighting in the kokang region in 2015 forced about 30.000 refugees to enter china while thailand had still been hosting 120.000 war-victims by that year (belkania, 2020). for bangladesh, the civil war in myanmar has already become costly as it manages a very large portion of now what it terms as forcefully displaced myanmar nationals (fdmn). the issue of whether third party states intervene when a civil war is ongoing in a state within a particular region has been looked into by kathman (2011) where it has been found that only when countries and their interests are linked to the region where a state is experiencing a civil war or to that state itself, they are more likely to intervene. this is different to the concern of neighbouring states wherein the interveners are third parties not directly adjacent or close to the state/s that experience civil wars. the article shows that third parties are increasingly likely to intervene in states experiencing a civil war when the effects of the war threaten to spill over to neighbouring states and threaten regional destabilization and to that end, threaten the regional interests of the third parties (kathman, 2011). this indicates how civil wars, being international events, concern entities outside the immediate regional proximity of the state/s experiencing a civil war precisely because they can have a tendency to disperse and spill over to its surrounding region and affect parties outside of the said region. the logical framework, as seen in figure 1, can be formed for analysing the conflict potential in bangladesh due to the rohingya presence. journal of asean studies 113 figure 1. theoretical framework source: developed by the author by reviewing literature the framework starts with the onset of civil war and internal disturbance within a state. this leads to migration and/or displacement either within the borders of a country where the civil war manifested, or it can take place beyond its borders (reuveny, 2007; o’malley, 2018; bohnet, cottier, & hug, 2018). when it is the latter, these displaced populations take refuge in host countries. for survival, these displaced populations, sometimes recognized as refugee populations in the host countries settle in, capture resources and compete for them with the host population as they become increasingly scarce (homer-dixon, 2010). this leads to social unrest, restrictions on livelihood for both the displaced and the nearby host community, and decreasing livelihood standards as resources become scarce and market prices increase with the decreasing supply (homer-dixon, 2010; ghimire, ferreira, & dorfman, 2015). this leads to the livelihood standards where the displaced populations reside to drop for both the displaced and host communities. the social unrest can stem from these disruptions in livelihood, or they can arise from differences in ideology, origin, or any form of difference that can be seen as a distinct feature of any of the displaced or host communities (khal, 2006; amusan, abegunde, & akinyemi, 2017). furthermore, such changes in the host society can then lead to deprivation of resources and livelihood opportunities for both displaced and host communities (brzoska & fröhlich, 2016). moreover, this deprivation combined with the exploitation of the displaced populations by interest groups can lead to an identity crisis where distinct in-groups and out-groups can take shape between the displaced and host communities, even where initial differences were minimal and the initial responses from the host community were positive (salehyan, 2010). the result is a conflict with the host community and/or country depending on the level of incompatibility between the two 114 conflict potential communities. the article has used some important aspects of this framework, such as competition over resources and conflict, livelihood and conflict relationship, and deprivation and conflict formation, for answering the research question. the presence of many the rohingyas have already put pressure on resources, jobs, and the environment which have strong connections and potentials for conflict formation in the host areas in bangladesh. the available data on the situation in bangladesh hosting the rohingya people will be analysed in various sections, starting with how the situation changed over time for the host country after the displacement. methods the article is written based on qualitative methodology using mixed data of secondary information and published opinion and arguments of the relevant experts. secondary information, opinion, and interviews of the relevant experts published in discussion forums and webinars have been scrutinized and assessed for constructing the arguments. during the covid-19 pandemic, seminars and symposiums over the issue of the rohingya crisis in bangladesh have been organised using online platform. some of the seminars are available online for public use. for example, the bangladesh institute of international and strategic studies (biiss) and center for policy dialogue (cpd) have made available the opinion and interviews of the participants of seminars online. the policy briefs have also been published in their websites. the article uses the published opinion and interviews of the participants and experts in various seminars organized by the relevant organisations in bangladesh. such methods are suitable to collect data and information regarding the topic of security and conflict potential of the rohingya issue during the pandemic period. moreover, relevant literature has been assessed for constructing a framework and supporting the arguments. moreover, different newspapers, articles and opinions of experts published in periodicals have also been examined for analysing how the rohingya conflict in myanmar has the potential to generate a new form of conflict in bangladesh after the mass exodus in 2017. analysis analysis of conflict potentials in bangladesh the crises and stresses experienced by people in the host place can be separated into the experiences of the rohingya population and the experiences of the host population. the experiences of the rohingya population in the host place range from issues of livelihood and economy to socio-political and security issues. the conflict potentials of the rohingya refugees to the host society is a complex issue that can be illustrated based on existing literature, findings, perceptions of the experts and media reports. journal of asean studies 115 non-traditional security issues (livelihood, health, and environment) the rohingya people in bangladesh receive aid from government subsidized programs and relief from aid agencies such as care, irc, unhcr, and wash, among many others. these combined efforts to support the rohingyas in the host country are often inadequate to meet their basic needs (karin et al., 2020). these people then look to other economic activities to gather enough resources and income to compensate for their gap in basic necessities. the livelihood strategies that the rohingya population engage in for income generation involve engaging in day labour, selling products in local markets, receiving the aid of friends and relatives of registered camps (for the many unregistered rohingyas), and receiving remittances from family and relatives abroad (as a study shows that 39% of the households have at least one member abroad in a third country), selling relief in exchange for money or other necessities, and a limited form of self-employment via services (crabtree, 2010; rieger, 2020; momem, 2021). these alternative methods and channels of income have the side-effect of being particularly uncertain and unsustainable, leading to long delays between work, businesses, and receiving money and help from relatives (momem, 2021). moreover, the livelihood options for the unregistered rohingya people (which are well over 200.000 of the rohingya refugees in bangladesh) primarily consist of working with the forest resources in the hilly areas of cox's bazar, which contributes greatly to disforestation and the destruction of the local ecosystem, thereby exposing the rohingya and the host community to extreme weather events (mowla & hossain, 2021; rahman, 2021). furthermore, the overall unsanitary conditions within the cramped camps have generally been prone to contagious diseases, and the covid-19 pandemic that began in 2019 hit the area quite severely. the drop in overall maternal health and child nutrition has been alarming among the rohingya population at the onslaught of this recent pandemic, notwithstanding how it also greatly affected the livelihoods of the rohingya people in the process, thus leaving the populations vulnerable (hossain, 2021). the host community alongside the rohingya refugee population feel the decrease of food and the drop in employment opportunities. nearly half of the families in the host community have suffered from a decrease in income (i.e., 49,5%) (bhatia, et al., 2018; zaman et al., 2020). it is considered that there are still a few and limited field studies conducted on the host community in cox's bazar regarding the impact upon their collective lives for hosting the rohingya population. however, all previous research share a collective picture, which there are both positive and negative outcomes due to the rohingya influx and their subsequent refuge in the host place, and that the positive impacts are outweighed by the negative impact on the host community from the rohingya population in the host place. businesses, hotels, students working part-time jobs and people who own houses in the region for rent are part of the host community that have benefitted from the rohingya influx and their refuge (siddique, 2019). on the other hand, low-wage labourers and educational institutions are part of the host community that have been negatively impacted from the rohingya influx and their refuge. moreover, shortage of food and daily goods such as fish and vegetables, shortage of land for housing, deforestation of hilly areas in the region, a lack of low-skill jobs for the local population, and the blanket security restrictions imposed upon 116 conflict potential the people in the area due to the rampant crime and drug trade, have led to a decrease in the quality of life for the host community significantly (bhatia, et al., 2018; zaman, sammonds, ahmed, & rahman, 2020). furthermore, the presence of the rohingya population in the host place has led to complications in the overall health of the host community in the case of a significant spread of contagious diseases such as covid-19 (lopez-pena et al., 2020), water-borne diseases such as cholera and diarrhoea (faruque et al., 2021) among the general host population, and noncommunicable diseases such as heart diseases, arthritis, diabetes among the elderly (i.e., geriatric) people within the host community (begum et al., 2021). the widespread of these diseases have been attributed to the decrease in the quality of life for people in the cox's bazar, which is a direct result of the changes that have started from the rohingya influx over the years (siddique, 2019; lopez-pena et al., 2020). national security the national security issues that myanmar's conflict has caused for bangladesh as a host country can lead to the host country adopting drastic measures to protect its national interests. the organized crime groups that have been increasingly active in the cox's bazar region thrive because of the dense population within the rohingya camps. the black market of small arms and light weapons, contraband, and narcotics have led to a sprawling black-market economy in the area. although the rohingya refugee population in bangladesh are in many ways becoming victims of such organized crime, the host country can see it as an issue that requires unavoidable preventive measures on a large scale. the consequences of guerrilla warfare conducted by organized rebel forces operating in bangladesh's rohingya camps can decrease the credibility of bangladesh as a host country while giving avenues for myanmar to indefinitely prolong its rohingya rehabilitation measures, thus raising the costs upon bangladesh for hosting the rohingya population. for the rohingya community, this can lead to a forced dependence of organized criminal groups and black-market economies for their livelihoods and survival. as succinctly mentioned in a pertinent discussion between people of three think tanks: “rohingyas are highly vulnerable to transnational crimes like human and drug trafficking, radicalization, and other dangerous ventures which could generate trickledown effects on the regional security status,” (azad, 2021)3. if the host country, in this case, utilizes its security forces in a more significant capacity to counter the security deficits in the cox's bazar and its surrounding region, the resulting 3 this quote is from the segment delivered by major general md emdad ul bari, ndc, psc, te, director of the bangladesh institute of international and strategic studies (biiss). the other two think tanks form the cited seminar video are the bangabandhu centre for bangladesh studies, canada (bcbs), and the center for genocide studies (cgs), bangladesh. journal of asean studies 117 scenario mat proves to be detrimental for the local host community as well as the rohingya community, while deteriorating bangladesh-myanmar relations to a significant degree. social cohesion the social cohesion between the host and rohingya community in cox's bazar have already begun to deteriorate, particularly since the 2017 exodus. the worsening social cohesion can lead to an unwanted change in attitudes and behaviour from both the host and the rohingya community in the region. the decreasing levels of trust from both communities as competitions for resources become more and more intense, can lead to increasing levels of dispute between the two communities. the security measures to prevent any catastrophic event in the region will lead to more stringent blanket security measures, which will only increase tension between the two communities in cox's bazar. ellis et al. (2016) have explored the decreasing social cohesion due to refugee populations in a host state, and their findings indicate a concerning conclusion. the finding is consistent with previous research showing that exposure to violence and adversity was associated with greater support for both legal and illegal political activism (ellis et al. 2016). when these activities are linked with traumatic past events that have a lasting effect on the present conditions of the refugee populations, then a lack of progress in repatriation can worsen the social cohesion as the displaced populations become increasingly engaged in violent activism. if the host community sees the rohingya population as being increasingly detrimental to the very well-being of the host community, it can lead to collective action from the host community to socially restrict the rohingyas from any forms of opportunities for their livelihood. this in turn may result in a countermeasure where the alienated rohingya community are forced to increasingly fall back on the unlawful channels of revenue generation with increasing support from the rohingya community in bangladesh as a whole. while this can be taken by the rohingyas to prevent the possibilities of their collective exploitation by the host community, such a situation can only exacerbate the tensions in the host country. safety and security of the host community the safety and security of the host community will be increasingly put in jeopardy as the security of the region deteriorates from the organized crime and unlawful drug and weapons trade. the host community's security can be viewed as an increasingly important case at the expense of the safety and security of the rohingya refugee population. the lack of official refugee status of the rohingya population may accelerate increasingly harsher security measures on the rohingya population, but the lack of such measures can prove detrimental for the host community in return. with regards to this security risk, major general md emdad ul bari, ndc, psc, te, director of the bangladesh institute of international and strategic studies (biiss), has mentioned that, 118 conflict potential “different reports said that the rohingya have shown a tendency to flare up conflicts and threaten both social and national security at both transit and destination countries,” (gazi md abul kalam azad, 2021). if the host community does not see government interventions to raise the security of the region as satisfactory, then collective measures from the host community outside government involvement to make the region more secure (e.g., through the local government and law enforcement, active exclusion from income opportunities) can lead to civil unrest and a communal divide between the host and the rohingya community in the region. impacts on natural resources a reduction of natural resources in the form of deforestation and destruction of natural hilly terrain can lead to severe long terms negative consequences for the region of cox's bazar. not only are events such as landslides and flash floods more common, but such extreme weather events along with cyclones and storm surges hit the area with increasing intensity. such extreme weather events greatly decrease the quality of life with people from both the host and the rohingya community losing their lives as a result. the reduction of forest resources can lead to a decrease in optimal weather for the host country while decreasing soil fertility and contributing to global warming in the region. moreover, the destruction of hilly ecosystems as a result can lead to a decrease in endemic wildlife and fauna. the resource conflicts that can stem from this situation as natural resources become increasingly scarce in the area can have severe consequences for the overall stability of the region. conflict potential of the rohingya people in the south and south-east asian regions the conflict potential of the rohingya people and its widespread implications within the borders of bangladesh have already been discussed. the discussion shows the enormous pressure it puts on the government of bangladesh and its administration as well as on the lives of the citizens of bangladesh. however, this has far reached consequences outside of its borders as well. the over 1,4 million rohingya people living across the 34 camps in the cox's bazar area of bangladesh can in time be a grave concern within the south and south-east asian region. it is to be noted that the rohingya people in the camps of cox's bazar have frequently attempted to leave the confines of their camps and migrate to other countries, notably to indonesia, malaysia, and thailand. these journeys have often been taken via risky routes and more often via human traffickers (routray, 2019). it does not only put the desperate rohingyas themselves at risk, but also poses serious concern for the host countries they are moving to as the numbers of such migrants increase. even around 10,000 rohingya people have become a serious concern for the people in india, leading to social tensions among the local indian and rohingya populations (basavapatna, 2018), and such numbers can be seen in these south-east asian nations if this issue continues to be overlooked. journal of asean studies 119 moreover, the rohingya have consistently shown to have a strong national identity, which becomes the reason that they continue to pursue insurgent endeavours to regain their place in their home country in myanmar. these insurgent endeavours have taken place from the peripheral areas of myanmar, involving a varied level of support from rohingya people across the south and south-east asian region (fair, 2018). although their efforts may be justified on moral grounds due to their continued long-standing oppression by myanmar's government, the process itself compromises the countries that are hosting the rohingya refugees and migrants. through limiting the bilateral and multilateral negotiating capabilities of these host states in the long run by being indirectly implicated of hosting 'insurgents' (chaijaroenwatana & haque, 2020), host states can become compromised in international relations. this has already been observed in the case of bangladesh and to a very limited extent in thailand (banerjee, 2019; chaijaroenwatana & haque, 2020). insurgent tendencies of the rohingya populations in host countries can be seen as a very limited concern when compared to the social tensions their presence can create. as their populations continue to flee their country and to other states in south and south-east asia, their stateless situation remains unresolved and pressures on myanmar's government to take a positive stance on the matter remain little to non-existent. this over time can become a more serious regional issue across countries of south and south-east asia. this issues, in turn, can not only impact individual states negatively, but can also deteriorate the bilateral and multilateral arrangements of the existing prominent regional coalitions and organizations such as the associate for south-east asian nations (asean), the south asian association for regional cooperation (saarc), or the bay of bengal initiative for multi-sectoral technical and economic cooperation (bimstec). it is believed that only speedy collective actions in resolving this issue can prevent it from becoming a disastrous regional conflict for the south and south-east asian regions. discussion and conclusion the article has discussed how the rohingya people living in bangladesh after the persecution are complicating the local environment and putting pressure on the local people. the start of the civil war in myanmar stemming from an ethnic conflict between the burmese government and the rohingyas community has led to the migration of the rohingya populations in large numbers to bangladesh. the rohingya population have started to occupy increasingly scarce land resources and their consumption of forest resources and competition for livelihood with the local population have led to social unrest within the settlement area. this unrest comes with a host of other issues that involve decreasing livelihood standards and decreasing availability of desirable income opportunities for both the displaced community that seek to adjust to the new lifestyle and the host society that have received the displaced rohingya community. the situation coincides with the conflict displacement theory where a conflict in a neighbouring state leads to populations being displaced in the host country, bringing with them several issues of concern for the host government (homer-dixon, 2010; reuveny, 2007; ghimire et al., 2015). 120 conflict potential the resulting deprivation of being delegated an fdmn status with reduced rights and opportunities, as well as the less than optimal livelihood standards for the rohingya refugee population leads to an identity crisis where they seek to raise their own position at the cost of the host society, with alternative channels of revenue and guerrilla initiatives to return to their home country with the rights and opportunities they have lost in the civil war (milton et al., 2017; elis et al., 2016). this opens up this displaced community to exploitation as organized crime groups take advantage of the rohingya people to further their own interests and involve them in crimes such as human trafficking, drug trade, and illegal importation of small arms and light weapons across the border and inside the host country. this raises concerns for the host government even further. as per the theory of conflict spill over, the civil war in myanmar now becomes an interlinked issue for the host country bangladesh as the displaced populations create a significant security issue for it (salehyan, 2010). this leads to the conflict to shift from the displaced population and the origin state to between the displaced population and the host state and its society. myanmar's civil conflict involving the rohingya population has affected the host country bangladesh in a myriad of ways. the positive effects of introducing income opportunities and revenues from aid and relief are overshadowed by the negative consequences the conflict has brought to the area (karin et al., 2020). from national security concerns to issues regarding the safety and stability of the region, the conflict in myanmar can lead to a manifestation of intractable conflict in bangladesh. this can, in turn, lead to the host community being gravely affected by a fall in overall security in the area while putting the rohingya community at risk of further exploitation by organized crime groups and myanmar's government. the conflict potential in the host society due to myanmar's civil conflict can lead to an overall drop in the security within the cox's bazar and its surrounding region (rahman, 2010; taufiq, 2019). actions undertaken by the host government to protect its national interests by preventing organized crime and illegal trade in the area can lead to a more hard-line approach from these organized groups to protect their own interests, thus putting the rohingya population and the host community at risk. the decrease in social cohesion between the host and the rohingya community can lead to the rohingya community being alienated and looking for alternative sources for their survival in illegal channels. it will cause social cohesion to further decrease and cause instability of the cox's bazar and its surrounding region. moreover, the safety and security of the host community can lead to the host community adopting harsher security measures which can exclude the rohingya community from income and livelihood opportunities through proper channels, thus forcing them to become dependent on unlawful channels of income and livelihood. the natural resources of the region are decreasing at a rapid pace due to the high dependence on forestry and land, which leads to harsher weather events in the region that decrease the overall quality of life for the people. this can lead to a resource conflict in the near future where the stability of the region can be at risk. the theories and case studies conducted on conflict displacement and conflict spill over effects are believed to coincide with the data from the rohingya situation in bangladesh. the conflict displacement has led to myanmar's civil conflict generating conflict potentials in journal of asean studies 121 bangladesh by negatively impacting available livelihood opportunities for the host population, and by lowering the security of the region through the heavy involvement of rohingya refugee populations in organized crime at both intrastate and transborder levels. however, if further studies are conducted in-depth to explore how exactly the conflict displacement and the conflict spill over that have taken place in the host country bangladesh, particularly with the help of some primary data, then that would provide an even more concrete and robust foundation where a case can be made in support of the host country and the displaced rohingya refugees. therefore, the foundation can pave the way for a more reliable approach to the repatriation of the rohingya displaced people with the full extent of their rights and opportunities and thus effective action towards proper conflict resolution in both myanmar and in bangladesh. the rohingya community have been prosecuted for over half a century by this point in time, and their situations remain to be improved, while their plight remains to be unanswered. for the host community, however, the possible conflict looming in the near future should not be overlooked. the rohingya community, being destitute are prone to be exploited by organized groups for their own purposes. it is a pressing need for the host country to act in favour of facilitating smooth repatriation for the rohingya community while tackling the ongoing issues that myanmar's conflict has spilled over within its borders. acknowledgment this article acknowledges the centennial research grant (crg) provided by the university of dhaka in observance of her 100 years of birth anniversary. about the authors md rafiqul islam phd has been teaching at the department of peace and conflict studies, university of dhaka, dhaka-1000, bangladesh. graduating from the university of dhaka, the most premier university of bangladesh, and united nations mandated university for peace, costa rica, dr islam took up teaching at the university of dhaka by choice. dr. islam loves teaching and articleing in the area of climate change, migration, refugees, security and conflict issues. currently, dr. islam has been engaged in article and investigation on the rohingya issue which is a crucial problem for bangladesh and the region. email: rislampacs@du.ac.bd umme wara is an assistant professor, department of criminology, university of dhaka. she did three masters from university of dhaka, university of wollongong and university of torino specialized on crime and prevention. her article interests are on refugee and migration, peace and conflict, gender-based violence, international crimes etc. email: wara.criminology@du.ac.bd mailto:rislampacs@du.ac.bd mailto:wara.criminology@du.ac.bd 122 conflict potential references adhikari, p. 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(2020). disaster risk reduction in conflict contexts: lessons learned from the lived experiences of rohingya refugees in cox's bazar, bangladesh. international journal of disaster risk reduction, 50. https://doi.org/ 10.1016/j.ijdrr.2020.101694 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2020.101694 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2020.101694 journal of asean studies, vol. 3, no. 2 (2015), pp. 116-132 ©2015 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic indonesia rejoining opec: dynamics of the oil importer and exporter countries muhammad badaruddin bakrie university abstract reactivation of indonesia’s full membership to the organization of the petroleum exporting countries (opec) triggered discussion surrounding global petroleum governance. the country which decided to suspend its full membership at the end of 2008, currently labelled as net oil importer. however, in opec terms indonesia never really left, instead of the organization termed it as a "suspension”. departing from the abovementioned context and perspectives, purpose of this essay is to answer the questions about the significance of the indonesia’s membership reactivation to opec, and the strategic context of the reactivation in the current global oil market. in answering these questions, this article draws the dynamics of the relation of indonesia and opec through the history in the first part and explores indonesia’s interests in rejoining opec in the second one. in the third part, this essay will explore the possible benefit for opec as an organization as well as for its member countries could achieve by approving indonesia’s request to reactivate its membership, despite its status as a net oil importer. key words: international oil trade, oil exporting countries, opec, global petroleum governance introduction the submission of indonesia’s official request to reactivate its full membership to the organization of the petroleum exporting countries (opec) triggered discussion surrounding global petroleum governance. the country which joined opec in 1962, then decided to suspend its full membership at the end of 2008 mostly because of declining its oil production and rising domestic consumption. indonesia has submitted the request to rejoin opec at september 8, 2105 and opec has formally reactivate indonesia’s full membership at the opec meeting in vienna on friday, december 4, 2015. in a statement before the vienna meeting, opec official said that ‚this will include the formalities of reactivating indonesia’s membership of the organization… indonesia has contributed much to opec’s history. we welcome its return‛ (chilkoti & raval, 2015). however, the improvement is not a great surprise as in opec terms indonesia never really left, instead of the organization termed it as a "suspension‛. since, before the case happened with indonesia, the precedent has been made while ecuador reactivates its opec membership in 2007, for a return from suspension. opec officials made clear the 117 journal of asean studies door was always open. despite indonesia's current status as net oil importer had raised the question of whether the country would return as a full member given that opec's statute says any country with a "substantial net export of crude petroleum" may become a full member (lawler & suroyo, 2015). opec expects that the indonesia’s membership reactivation would add almost three percent to the organization's petroleum production, which already close to the peak. currently, indonesia has an oil output target of about 825,000 barrels a day in 2015, roughly half of its peak production in the early 1990s (chilkoti & raval, 2015). indonesia would also be the fourth-smallest producer among opec’s member before of libya, ecuador and qatar, and bring the number of membership to 13 countries. moreover, the important thing regarding opec’s global representation is the fact that indonesia was the only asian member for 46 years before leaving the organization at the end of 2008, while oil prices reached its peak and the country turned into a net oil importer. it was the period while other oil exporting countries enjoyed the peak price and indonesia suffered with its import, then evaluation of its opec membership made sense. literature review global petroleum governance and energy security the ‘global struggle’ for energy has made the oil markets naturally crossborder and inevitably framed by the politically defined rules of the game. ‚politics and power plays a big role with regard to how markets are organized,‛ goldthau & witte (2010) argued. goldthau & witte frame the global energy issues into two focuses; the first is on ‘global energy governance’ that concentrates on markets and institutions that structure them. by this focus, energy becomes a multi-dimensional policy arena in which, as stanislaw (2004: 17) sees, the issue is ‚not who is winning the battle *for access], but rather how the market can accommodate the divergent needs of the individual players and encourage the cooperation that has become more prevalent in recent years.‛ nevertheless, goldthau and witte (2010) see the predominant issues are on the second focus, which pay more attention on the ‚competition among states to secure the energy supply that provides the key to continued prosperity and state power.‛ this zero-sum perspective maintains a paradigm that energy security is an exercise in geopolitical scheming and competition, and brings concerns to the balance of power among the actors. chevalier (2009: 19-20) sees the geopolitics of energy is associated with ‘the appropriation of oil money and its allocation through political decisions’ for the exporting countries; and ‘the security of supply’ for the importing countries. according to chevalier, the geopolitics of energy embraces energy policy, foreign policy and sometimes military action, because of three main reasons: first, the large consuming areas do not correspond to the large producing areas; second, oil production and consumption generate huge amounts of money; and third, the exporting countries which is grouping in opec have key role in determining the oil price and as the main benchmark for world energy 118 indonesia rejoining opec pricing. moreover, for some particular cases, opec member countries also exercise oil as an instrument for political measure. debates between the ‘global governance’ approach and ‘geopolitics and security’ approach largely mirror the liberal versus realist debate. ziegler (in guo and hua, 2007: 197) sees the liberals would argue that the growing interdependence might motivate the consumer nations to rely on the international oil market as well as transnational organizations. the liberal arguments should eventually lead to broadened regional and global cooperation, rather than conflict. markets dynamics are structured by the inter-states-created institutions that are certainly very political. a governance approach is far from neglecting the state and the role of governments in energy sector. on the other side, the states’ role is crucial in determining the quantity of energy supply at affordable prices and securing their investment in energy. goldthau & witte see this condition as a fact where the ‘governance’ perspective and the ‘geopolitics’ approaches actually intersect. discussing global petroleum governance, we could not go through without concerning dynamics inside the most significant player in the global oil market, which is opec. moreover, gordon (in maza, 2015) views that ‚opec is in the center of this paradigm shift.‛ the condition happened while opec as the organization of oil exporter countries reactivate indonesia’s full membership in opec, despite indonesia is currently labelled as net importer country. however, deborah gordon, director of the energy and climate program at the carnegie endowment for international peace explains that ‚the idea of nations that are oil exporters and others that are sheer oil importers is becoming fuzzy.‛ she gives the us as an example, despite the oil boom, the country remains an oil importer, yet the us export a tremendous amount of refined product. departing from the abovementioned context and perspectives, purpose of this essay is to answer the questions about the significance of the indonesia’s membership reactivation to opec, and the strategic context of the reactivation in the global oil market. in answering these questions, i will draw the dynamics of the relation of indonesia and opec through the history in the first part and explore indonesia’s interests in rejoining opec in the second one. in the third part, i will explore the possible benefit which opec as an organization and for its member countries could achieve by approving indonesia’s request to reactivate its membership, despite its status as the net oil importer. indonesia and opec’s key figures indonesia was an early producer of oil started in the 1870s. up to the second world war, indonesia produced 148,000 barrels of oil per day. the energy industry boosted indonesia’s economic growth during the 1970s and 1980s by accounting around 80% of the country’s annual exports and 70% of the central government’s annual revenues (rosser, 2007). lng is also indonesia’s most significant energy export and has been its largest foreign exchange earner (stott, 2008). indonesia had been the largest lng exporter for nearly three decades since 119 journal of asean studies 1977 to 2005, and its peak export was in 1998 for around 36.1 billion cubic meters (nugroho, 2010). indonesia has estimated reserves of around 9 billion barrels of proven and potential crude oil and 182 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, according to energy ministry data (ali, 2007). in order to draw the real condition of indonesia’s oil production and consumption, the chart from bp statistical review below (figure 1) describes that indonesia’s oil production reached its top in 1991 at 1.67 million barrels per day and has declined steadily since then. meanwhile, domestic consumption reached a high of 1.64 million barrels per day in 2014. we also could see that year 2003 was the turning point when consumption began to surpass production, then indonesia left opec by the end of 2008. from 2004 to 2014, the average gap between production and consumption has been 438,000 barrels per day. by comparison, from 1990 to 2000, indonesia produced on average 674,000 barrels per day more than it consumed (ashton, 2015). figure 1. indonesia crude oil profile source: bp statistical review of world energy 2015 another condition that makes indonesia stand out relative to other opec members is the amount of its crude oil reserves. chart from bp statistical review below (figure 2) shows the diverging trend between indonesia’s reserves and the reserves of opec as a whole from 1980 to 2014. in 1980, indonesia accounted for 2.73% of opec’s total crude oil reserves, which is not a very large number, but certainly more than the insufficient 0.30% it has in 2015. so even with indonesia’s involvement to opec, it is coming back as a much less significant member than in years past (ashton, 2015). figure 2. total proved oil reserves source: bp statistical review of world energy 2015 despite that perspective, indonesia had been playing important role in the global oil and gas industry. particularly before its domestic production has declined over the past decade as producing oilfields have matured and investment and exploration have fallen 120 indonesia rejoining opec short. the country is now the world’s 20th largest oil producer, accounting for just over one percent of global oil production (chilkoti & raval, 2015). in terms of export capability, indonesian government’s data (pusdatin esdm, 2014) informs that indonesia exported 117 million barrels in 2013, which was dropped about 47 percent compare to its export in 2000. meanwhile, according to the bp statistical review of world energy 2015, indonesia’s imports over the same period rose about 50 percent to 118 million barrels. indonesia depended on overseas shipment to meet nearly one-third of its domestic oil demand in 2012. in terms of proved oil reserves, at the end of 2014 indonesia has stood at 3.7 billion barrels, compared with 267 billion in saudi arabia and 103 billion in russia (wulandari, 2015). indonesia’s interests to rejoin opec indeed, the most interesting part in discussing this case study is to analyze reasons, purpose, or interests behind indonesia’s reactivation of its full membership in opec. this part will explore about what interests are could be achieved by indonesia as results of its effort to rejoin opec. indonesia’s economic development some analysts see that the reactivation of indonesia’s membership in opec seems as a sensible strategy of the indonesian government to secure its economic development program in the future. especially since indonesia’s gdp growth rate has been increasing and it is projected to accelerate in the next couple years. as described by chart from the international monetary fund (imf) below about indonesia’s economic growth expectations for the next few years. figure 3. gdp growth rate of four asean countries source: international monetary fund (imf) from the above projection data, the imf also expects other countries in southeast asia region to have broadly stable growth rates. aston (2015) analyses some countries such as both malaysia and thailand are projected to have grown at around 5% and 4%, respectively, while the imf forecasts that the philippines’s growth will slow slightly from 6.7% in 2015 to 6% by 2018. in the meantime, indonesia will be one of the only countries with accelerating gdp growth, rising from 5.2% in 2015 to 6% in 2018. this economic growth will require much more resources, especially energy. set of statistical data from bp statistical review (bp, 2015) shows how energy demand in these four economies has changed over the last 14 years. ashton (2015) also estimates that indonesia has always had a higher energy requirement, causing the country’s primary energy consumption to pull further away from 121 journal of asean studies malaysia and the philippines. he claims that it is easier to understand reason behind indonesian government’s eagerness to rejoin opec, despite the fact that indonesia doesn't need to export oil to restore relations with its fellow oil exporting countries. figure 4. primary energy consumption of four asean countries source: bp statistical review (2015) on the other side, as global oil prices dropped, indonesian government won acclaims for cutting expensive fuel subsidies and promising to redirect government spending to more productive infrastructure projects. however the sharp drop of oil price is not unambiguously positive for the indonesian economy, given the large domestic oil consumption and the government’s obligation to cover the oil price subsidy. as indonesia’s status is net oil importer, finally the net impact for the country should be positive. sacha winzenried, an analyst in jakarta says that ‚the problem is at the state budgets, government still generates significant revenue from oil sales… clearly [the industry is] still a significant employer and a very significant taxpayer‛ (chilkoti & raval, 2015). securing source of oil supply as net oil importer, indonesia strategically needs to secure source of oil supply from other exporting countries in order to guarantee its economic development. it is clearly stated by the newly-appointed indonesian governor for opec, widhyawan prawiraatmadja who explains that reactivation of indonesia’s membership in opec would help jakarta to strengthen relations with large exporter countries which are also indonesia’s traditional friends in the oil trading. prawiraatmadja confidently stated about indonesia’s formal involvement within opec ‚gives us a lot of benefit‛ (chilkoti & raval, 2015). another analyst, berndt (2015) is sure that indonesia itself will gain maximum benefits from reactivation of its opec membership. she says that ‚indonesia is well aware of the challenges inherent in a growing, urbanizing population. having guaranteed energy suppliers among opec nations will increase overall energy security, and indonesia will benefit by shoring up relationships while opec nations are frantic for consumer markets.‛ therefore, ashton (2015) sees that indonesia's main drive to reactivate its opec full membership is more about building bridges to crude oil suppliers than it is about being part of an oil exporting organization. it is reasonable that since indonesia has not been an oil exporter, it appears to be looking to access the group’s network to ‘help’ the other members offload their oil supply. practically, indonesia has been importing oil from other opec members, such as saudi arabia and nigeria to fulfill its rising domestic oil consumption. the 122 indonesia rejoining opec chart below from the us energy information administration (eia) draws that indonesia imports its oil supply mostly from saudi arabia, nigeria and azerbaijan. figure 5. indonesia crude oil imports by source, 2013. source: us energy information agency, 2013 however, another analyst sees that the opec’s approval for indonesia’s proposal to rejoin the organization is confusing. an analyst on the oil and gas sector from a jakarta-based wood mackenzie sees that ‚to have good contacts, which membership of opec would give them, would help them in procuring or negotiating competitive deals.‛ despite, the analyst sees that opec member’s decision to allow indonesia back in was ‚perplexing‛, because it will give a significant buyer of crude oil a window into discussions on production and pricing (chilkoti & raval, 2015). with the reactivation, indonesia is believed to gain biggest benefits from the closer relation with other 12 opec member countries. indonesia will be securing a guaranteed energy supply from any other opec countries that will also increase overall energy security. indonesia could also play its position as the importer country by tighten up relationships while opec nations are desperate for consumer markets. berndt (2015) suggests that indonesia urgently needs opec technological expertise and investment to develop its domestic resources. indonesia’s aging energy infrastructure is desperately in need of modernization and the risky business environment has historically discouraged foreign investment. then ashton (2015) continue to analyze that despite on the surface, the market seems to expect indonesia’s return to opec to lead to increased output, adding to the surplus in the global crude oil supply. instead, it seems that the country’s return to opec actually represents a series of ‘shifting loyalties’ to ensure security of supply and procure the crude oil needed to fuel its future economic growth. the resulting impact on markets is likely to surprise when it is realized that indonesia’s rejoin to opec is more than just being in the exporting group of countries. investment for the domestic petroleum industry it has widely known that indonesia’s problem is not only about its demand of crude oil supply from other countries, but also problem with its lack capability to refine its domestic crude oil production. indonesia is very dependent in importing refined oil from its small neighbor country, singapore. because of that, berndt (2015) analyzes that indonesia needs opec countries’ 123 journal of asean studies investment and their technological expertise to develop its domestic oil industry. the country’s aging petroleum industry infrastructure is desperately in need of renovation and the risky business environment has historically discouraged foreign investment. in solving the abovementioned problem, the indonesian ministry of energy targets to increase its oil refining capacity to 1.73 million barrels a day by 2025. it is a ten year-target that indonesia will start in 2016 by gaining about 1.23 million barrels a day of refined product. the ten-year target will require investment of $23.6 billion which will include construction of two new refineries. edward morse, citigroup inc.’s global head for commodity research, analyzes that with plans to expand refineries faster than it can increase crude output, demand for imported oil, and financing for the new plants, is set to rise further. he suggests that ‚the most likely place they’re going to get refinery investment is going to come from middle east producer. they’re keenly aware of competition for market share by middle east producers. they can enhance that competition by having their nose under that tent‛ (wulandari, 2015). in order to realize indonesia’s interest to build more oil refineries, saudi arabia is the foremost country to make an agreement to build indonesia and saudi’s first jointly owned refinery in the southeast asia. the indonesia’s energy minister sudirman said explains that the refinery is tentatively planned to have capacity of 300,000 barrels a day, although he declined to give a cost estimate. additionally, minister said expected that the refinery could be the first outcome of indonesia’s formal acceptance as a member of the opec. the expectation is on its way to be implemented, while the indonesian state oil producer pt. pertamina agreed with saudi arabian oil company and jx nippon oil & energy corporation to upgrade two existing pertamina’s refineries. pertamina president director, dwi soetjipto calculated that the proposals are requiring $5 billion of investments for each upgrading project (mahdi & sergie, 2015). furthermore, minister said acclaims that saudi aramco will be potentially handle one of the projects because it is already involved in a cilacap revamping project with pertamina, and the saudi ‚has promised crude oil supply and investment in the petrochemical industry.‛ minister said was referring to a recent deal by saudi aramco and pertamina to team up and improve the capacity of the cilacap refinery, with an estimated investment total of us$5.5 billion (cahyafitri, 2015). indonesia’s plan to develop refinery facility through its state owned company pertamina, has also been attracting some petroleum companies mostly from opec member countries as strategic partners. pertamina invites them to participate in its rdmp (refinery development master plan) projects to upgrade and expand five existing domestic refineries (cilacap; balongan; dumai; plaju; and balikpapan) from 820 mbd of aggregate processing capacity to 1,680 mbd. especially for aramco, pertamina designated the saudi company as biggest partner by involving in three of the five refineries, which are cilacap and balongan in java; and dumai in sumatra. 124 indonesia rejoining opec as saudi aramco website (2015) describe that particularly for the cilacap refinery upgrade will facilitate to process more sour crudes, produce refined oil with specifications of euro iv standard. the cilacap will expand its capacity into 370 mbd of refined products, beside that it is also produce lubricant base oils and petrochemicals. and the most important thing for indonesia’s energy security is about the agreement that includes a longterm supply agreement for arabian crudes to cilacap refinery. from the saudi’s point of view, the saudi aramco explains that their participation in the pertamina’s long term program –which is called as ‘refinery development master plan’ (rdmp)— will benefit the company with a major growth component which is in line with their portfolio ambition to expand their downstream business globally. moreover, saudi aramco is also account their join project with pertamina as part of their expansion strategy with the ambition to improve saudi aramco as world leading and integrated energy and chemicals company. the investment would take place within a high growth petroleum demand in south east asia which has been reserved in the company’s downstream strategy. involvement in the opec policy making process with indonesia’s formal membership, gives the country ticket to involve in the decision making process inside opec. despite such a condition will also raise such a dilemma on the opec decision making table that they should listen to any other essentially different interest. because with indonesia’s status as net importer country, the country will prefer to decrease crude oil price in order to get cheaper crude oil in the global market. but, at the same time, the other twelve exporting countries will tend to push opec to make decision that conducive for higher crude oil price. in this context, indonesia’s involvement inside opec will also be potentially creates a new variable of conflict inside the organization. the potential conflict will be appeared especially when opec comes to a discussion to decide the amount of oil production quota that will affect the total supply and demand in the global oil market. according to rahman (2015) in an interview with author, this kind of opec’s internal dynamics frequently happened along the organization’s history, particularly when they come to decide the accumulative opec’s production quota and specific production quota for each member countries. indonesia’s membership reactivation in opec will affect most of its member countries, moreover in an era of unprofitable production. however, berndt (2015) analyzes that for saudi arabia, the indonesia’s reactivation is incrementally align with the strategic goal to expand its market share. however, some opec member will not be pleased by the addition of another different voice to the bargaining table. the tight oil export-depending countries like venezuela, nigeria, and other struggling nations have long been pressuring saudi arabia to cut production, and will now meet an incoming member with very different priorities. berndt (2015) further analyzes that while opec’s struggling producers have structured their economy around high oil prices, indonesia will 125 journal of asean studies continue to remain a net oil importer with its own interest to keep oil prices low, to accelerate its domestic growth. indonesia has a challenging road ahead to regain influence among opec’s disgruntled members, especially after its seven years absent. however, indonesia’s position regarding how to manage oil production quota inside the opec is quite moderate. this position was reflected from the country’s new-appointed governor for opec, widhyawan prawiraatmadja’s statement that the collapse of crude oil price will give negative impact in the overall energy industry. the consequences will not only suffer for the exporting countries, but also for the importer countries. prawiraatmadja further warns that the collapse of crude oil prices has worsened an ‚increasingly unappealing‛ energy investment climate and dependence on foreign oil grows. he says ‚our interest is to keep prices from rising too high and from falling too low… if indonesia is a part of opec, we can be sure that opec’s policy is in line with our interests‛ (wulandari, 2015). opec’s interests to receive indonesia in the condition of rock-bottom oil prices, adding more amount of supply to the global energy surplus through the integration of an additional member appears counter-productive. as berndt (2015) analyzes that reactivation of indonesia’s membership seems as inviting new problem into the exporting countries group. however, it is an impossible for the oil exporter organization to open their door for a net importer country without any benefit that they want to achieve. in this part, we are going to explore interests behind opec’s decision to allow indonesia to rejoin as full member of opec, despite with the country’s status as a net oil importer. representativeness of opec membership while indonesia returns to join opec, the country become the fourthsmallest producer in the organization before libya, ecuador and qatar, and it brings the number of participants become 13 countries. despite indonesia’s oil production is not as big as most of opec member countries, indonesia has been playing significant position in the global petroleum market. indonesia could also position itself as the country which could fill in the ‘blank spot’ of ‘global representativeness’ of opec. as the only asian country which involve in the oil exporter group, indonesia could symbolize the opec’s representation beside middle eastern countries’ dominance. global representativeness is quite important for opec for the sake of getting recognition as an international organization. this is concurring with analysis of an energy and foreign policy specialist from georgetown university, brenda shaffer that ‚indonesia is opec’s only member in asia, and jakarta’s return extends opec’s global coverage‛ (maza, 2105). moreover, with the shifting of global economic epicenter from the western countries into asia, global oil market players have been going to pay more attention into the region. this phenomenon is growing alongside with the rising economic power of the asian countries. opec countries need to maintain their link to the asian petroleum market, as it is also has been the most growing oil market compare to any other 126 indonesia rejoining opec regions. therefore, involvement of a country which has significant political and economic position in the region is very important. moreover, indonesia is currently also recognized as third largest democracy in the world, which also has been liberalizing its economy, and according to the world bank (2014), it is positioned as the tenth largest economy in the world these set of political and economic status of indonesia, bring more representative identity that make opec seems friendlier to the global liberal market. the indonesia’s global status could be compared to any other opec member countries that have not embrace liberal democracy and market economy as practiced by indonesia yet. these set of global political and economic status, are positioned indonesia in the better relation among countries with the liberal or market economy, which are mostly grouped at the organization of economic cooperation and development (oecd). to be sure, control over the global oil market is still a looked-for significance of indonesia’s reentry into opec. maza (2015) analyzes that saudi arabia has a lot to gain from obtaining a grip in asia. regional stability in asia, where the oil exporter organization could benefit from a growing demand for refined products, is important for the organization in the long run. consequently, it is in opec’s interest to promote economic stability in the region and to incorporate indonesia, which despite being a net importer, is still an important player in the global oil market. securing sustainable demand for oil in the time of economic slowdown, supply and demand conditions of oil in the global market become imbalance. the emerging economies which should be the locomotive of the global economy are decreasing their demand for oil, as a consequence of the shortage of order to generate their production machines. moreover with the increasing production of the shale oil by the united states, total supply of oil in the global petroleum market become much higher compare to the demand. the condition generates tensions among opec member countries, as struggle over market share and increasing concerns following economic slowdown in china as the largest oil importer in the world. amid the condition, chilkoti & raval (2015) analyze that most of oil exporting countries in the opec, especially saudi arabia –as the organization’s de facto leader and largest producer— have been courting consumer countries in asia such as china, india and indonesia to secure buyers for crude during the global oil surplus. they explain that opec countries are desperately looking for markets and retaining market share and there is a fit for them getting convenient with indonesia. analyses that the exporting countries, especially saudi arabia is very eager to expand its market in asia, especially in indonesia, are supported by statement of the president and ceo of saudi aramco, amin h. al-nasser that ‚indonesia is a rising powerhouse in the global economy, and has long deep rooted trade and cultural ties with saudi arabia. its refining sector has enormous potential, and with indonesia’s fast-growing demand for refined products‛ said the president of the saudi’s petroleum 127 journal of asean studies company. furthermore, al-nasser continued to explain the saudi’s intention to involve deeper in indonesia, "indonesia is an important country for saudi arabia, a rising global economy, we would like to be a part of the growth of indonesia" (asmarini, 2015b). furthermore, berndt (2015) analyzes that the reasons behind saudi arabia’s latest strategy to support the indonesia’s reintegration into opec is both market-driven and geopolitical. with the abundance of the us shale and the slowing of china’s economy, opec is increasingly driven to view new energy customers. as opec’s suspended member for seven year, indonesia has high population and enormous growth potential will demand greater energy resources over the next few decades. indonesia is also home to the world’s fourth largest population beside it is also the world’s tenth largest economy with a projection to have high growth over the next few decades. indonesia’s potential is very advantageous for the oil exporting organization to market their surplus of oil. moreover, referring to the international energy agency (2015), the projected energy consumption of the entire southeast asia region is estimated to rise 80 percent by the year 2040. among these total consumption of southeast asian countries, international energy agency (2015) also predicts indonesia will import 40 percent of its oil consumptions by 2018. that is why indonesia’s economic potential is very prospective for opec member countries, as the group of oil exporter are getting the net oil importer country in their midst. mediation to the consumer countries (iea of oecd) as a suspended member of opec and currently become net importer country, indeed indonesia has unique position when the country rejoined to opec. besides that, indonesia also has another unique position while in the same time the country could successfully reactivate its full membership into the group of oil exporting countries, on the other side indonesia has also received an approval to become a part of the group of oil importer countries. as already announced, indonesia currently has also been formally join to the international energy agency (iea), the organization which dedicated to serve interests of the oil importer countries, particularly within the organization for economic cooperation and development (oecd). the process of indonesia’s entrance into the iea was taking place while indonesia received an offering as new member of the international energy agency (iea) during the g20 energy minister meeting in istanbul, turkey at early october 2015. the offering was delivered directly by director of iea, fatih birol to the indonesian minister of energy and mineral resources, sudirman said. the document of the joint ministerial declaration of the 2015 iea ministerial meeting (2015b) stated that indonesia received an approval together with other countries such as china and thailand and was officiated as associated member during the iea meeting in paris, november 18 2015. the indonesia’s two positions both in the group of exporter and the group of importer, potentially equip indonesia to play better role in the two sides of the 128 indonesia rejoining opec market players. some officials in the opec analyze that indonesia’s involvement inside the oil exporter organization will provide insight from the point of view of oil consumers (tan, 2015). rahman (2015) also analyze that opec could gain benefit from indonesia’s position as net importer country and also member of the iea to provide view from the oil importer perspective. furthermore in the interview, rahman (2015) also explain that indonesia could also become a ‘bridge’ between oil exporter group and oil consumer group. by viewing from the ‘bridging’ perspective that could be acted by indonesia, opec and iea or oecd could utilize indonesia as a ‘liaison party’ that could convey views from one side to the other. geopolitical interest in malacca strait one more strategic thing that could also beneficial for opec by reactivating indonesia’s membership is related to the country’s geopolitical position. berndt (2015) analyzes that as the sole asian member of opec, indonesia could serve as a geopolitical gateway into southeast asian and east asian markets. moreover, indonesia’s strategic position become actual when indonesia could supervises the malacca strait, which plays as one of the most important choke points through which 15.2 million barrels of oil passage every day from global suppliers to consumers in fast growing economic region of asia. this condition will benefit more for opec, while its member at the controls of one of the world’s major oil transportation routes that could improve the security of opec supplies to the most growing oil market in the world. an energy and foreign policy analyst, brenda shaffer confirms this perspective that indonesia also straddles the malacca strait, a major global oil transit waterway that is likely to see increased traffic as asian energy demand grows. that is why shaffer importantly notes that indonesia’s opec membership reactivation not only meaningful for the economic interests but also gives opec more control over the transport of oil from core producers to core consumers, which is also beneficial in terms of geopolitical perspectives (maza, 2105). conclusion the reactivation of indonesia’s membership to opec gives benefit not only for indonesia, but also for opec. since indonesia became net oil importer and therefore it decided to suspend its full membership at the end of 2008, the country positioned itself as oil consumer which creates a diametric gap from the group of oil exporter. however, after about seven years of membership suspension, indonesia decided to reactivate its full membership in opec, despite its oil production has been decreasing and it has to import more oil. on the other side, opec also welcomes indonesia’s intention to rejoin the group of oil exporting countries. the condition seems presenting such an inconsistency in the opec’s maneuver responding the decrease of oil demand in the global market. however the view is refused by deborah gordon, who explains that ‚the idea of nations that are oil exporters and others that are sheer oil importers is becoming fuzzy.‛ she takes the us as an example that despite the oil boom, the country still remains as an oil importer, but in the same time it also exports a big amount of refined 129 journal of asean studies product. gordon argues that globalization has been changing the character of oil market and industry, and she views that opec is currently in the center of the paradigm changing process. concluding from the above analysis, we could see that the article presents indonesia’s interests in rejoining opec, which are providing sufficient demand of oil in order to support the fast growing of indonesia’s economic development, the second one is about the mission to secure the external supply of oil that should be imported from the global oil market, the third is about the need to look for foreign investment and technological support in order to modernize petroleum industry in indonesia, especially to develop the refinery facility. and the fourth is about the need to be involved in discussing global petroleum dynamics inside the decision making process in the opec. on the other side, this paper also tries to identify interests of opec in accepting indonesia to reactivate its full membership in opec, which are the global representation of opec membership, the second one is to strengthen direct access into indonesia as a potential market that has fast growing demand of the imported oil, the third one is to gain important views from indonesia as it is could bring the consumer perspectives into the opec decision making process and also to play bridging with the group oil importer countries (iea or oecd), which indonesia is also member of it, and the fourth one is about geopolitical motive that related to interest in malacca strait as indonesia could serve as a geopolitical gateway into southeast asian and east asian markets. about the author muhammad badaruddin is director of the center for politics and governance studies as well as senior lecturer at universitas bakrie. he is lecturing global political economy, state market and society, politics of energy and natural resources, among any other courses. he is interested to do and to supervise student’s research surrounding emerging powers, international trade, energy security, energy and resources governance, global political economy of energy and resources. he is currently doing doctoral research on international relations at universitas padjadjaran. the author can be reached at: muhammad.badaruddin@bakrie.ac.id references interview rahman, m. 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http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-04/indonesia-can-return-to-opec-but-can-t-escape-aging-oil-fields http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-04/indonesia-can-return-to-opec-but-can-t-escape-aging-oil-fields http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-04/indonesia-can-return-to-opec-but-can-t-escape-aging-oil-fields journal of asean studies, vol. 4, no. 1 (2016), pp. 61-78 ©2016 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic cybersecurity policy and its implementation in indonesia muhamad rizal universitas padjadjaran, indonesia yanyan m. yani universitas padjadjaran, indonesia abstract the purpose of state defense is to protect and to save the integrity of the unitary state of the republic of indonesia, the sovereignty of the state, as well as its security from all kinds of threats, whether they are military or non-military ones. one of the nonmilitary threats that potentially threatens the sovereignty and security of the nationstate is the misuse of technology and information in cyberspace. the threat of irresponsible cyber attacks can be initiated by both state and non-state actors. the actors may be an individual, a group of people, a faction, an organization, or even a country. therefore, the government needs to anticipate cyber threats by formulating cyber security strategies and determining comprehensive steps to defend against cyber attacks; its types and the scale of counter-measures, as well as devising the rules of law. keywords: cyber-attacks threats, cyber security strategies introduction in the era of globalization, cyberspace has become a staple of human life, and it connects people regardless the distance. cyberspace is a new world brought forward by the internet (mahzar, 1999, p. 9). paul wagner (2010) argues that cyberspace is beyond every computer system that’s connected by wire. cyberspace also includes:  isolated networks (private, corporate military);  laptops and other personal pcs connected some of the time (wireless, modems);  industrial control machinery, including programmable logic controllers (plcs);  industrial robots (connected to plcs or directly to computers);  home control equipment (home appliances and their control units);  mobile devices (smartphones, pdas); and  usb and other storage devices. cyberspace displays reality, albeit not a tangible one. it is a virtual world, virtual reality, a world without borders. this is what is meant by the borderless world in a way that cyberspace does not recognize state borders, and it eliminates the dimension of space, time and place (purbo, 2000, p. 50). it enables its citizens to connect with anyone anywhere as bruce sterling (1992) argues: cyber security policy and its implementation in indonesia 62 although it is not exactly "real," "cyberspace" is a genuine place. things happen there that have very genuine consequences. this "place" is not "real," but it is serious, it is earnest. tens of thousands of people have dedicated their lives to it, to the public service of public communication by wire and electronics. the concept of cybernation sparks the hope of bringing convenience, happiness, and endless opportunities to people. however, it comes with a price. cyber security is a real and urgent necessity since its effects could potentially damage or disrupt people’s lives, states, and even the whole world (piliang, 1999, p. 14-15). the urgency of cybersecurity is the more urgent because the internet has a particular darker side, e.g. it is widely considered to provide access almost exclusively to pornography. a recent well-publicized survey suggested that over 80% of the pictures on the internet were pornographic. while the survey result itself was found to be entirely erroneous, the observation that the internet can and does contain illicit, objectionable or downright illegal material is perfectly valid. it also supports fraudulent traders, terrorist information exchanges, pedophiles, software pirate, computer hackers and much more (barrett, 1997, p. 21). the world has long been concerned with cybercrime. in fact, one of the topics discussed at the 10th united nations congress on the prevention of crime and the treatment of offenders in vienna, austria, 2000 was crimes related to computer network. however, not every state has cybercrime laws, and not all of them are considerably concerned about this issue (only developed countries and some developing countries are). this depends on how well-developed a state law is and how much it is concerned with the advancement of technology. this was revealed at the un congress in vienna: reasons for the lack of attention to cyber crimes may include relatively low levels of participation in international electronic communication, low levels of law-enforcement experience and low estimations of the damage to society expected to occur from electronic crimes (united nations office on drugs and crime, 2000). as a developing country, indonesia is a little left behind in keeping up with the development of information technology (nur, 1998, p. 34), as a result of an improper strategy of technology development that ignores scientific and technology research. consequently, the technology transfer from developed industrial countries is not followed by the mastery of the technology itself that turns indonesia into a non-technological-based country. alternatively, as muhammad nur (1998, p. 5-6) puts it, “indonesia is a new pseudo-industrializing country.” research questions and methodology the fact that the indonesia is still left behind in information technology raises the question of the condition of the implementation of cyber security policy in indonesia. therefore, this research seeks to discuss this problem. the object of this research is cyber security in the context of law and national defense. the aspects of this discussion include law, national defense, and international relations perspectives. we will use realism theory as the analytical knife to see how indonesia reacts to this international phenomenon. realism is a school of thought that assumes that states compete for power. in international journal of asean studies 63 relations studies, power is one of the most used concepts (a mainstream concept) as well as the most controversial and hard to define (perwita & yani, 2006, p. 13). in this article, the authors discuss the following questions: 1. how the cyber security policy and regulations implemented in indonesia and what are the obstacles? 2. how is the implementation of cyber security-related policy and regulations in indonesian in anticipating cyber attacks? 3. what steps should be taken by the government of indonesia to anticipate cyber threats and attacks? this research uses a multidisciplinary as well as interdisciplinary research design with a descriptive analytical method to describe the situation, condition, and all problems by using literature study to get a deeper understanding. this article is structured into two parts: the first discusses the concepts related to cyber security, while the second analyzes the cyber security policy and its implementation in indonesia. the first part talks about the shapes of cyber threats and attacks, then argues about the role of cyber security in national security. the second part discusses cyber security governance, related legislations and regulations, current policy, and related obstacles in indonesia, then analyzes the development of cyber defense, the implementation of cyber security regulations, and three steps to strengthen cyber security in indonesia. the shapes of cyber threats and attacks on 6 september 2007, syria’s nuclear power development facility was bombarded by israel’s aircraft. one of the issues that became the news was syria’s inability to prevent or operate its armed forces against such attack. there were many opinions and analysis on this. one of them said that it was because israel had “disarmed” syria’s radar and military force by using information technology. in other words, syria experienced a cyber attack (clarke & knake, 2010, p. 5). the significant development of information technology has changed the world’s face and shifted our understanding on what’s understood as a nation’s power, as well as showing us a diffusion of that understanding (nye jr, 2011, p. 1). a nation’s power is neither just about how big the economy is nor how strong the military is, but it is also about the values it offers to the world, and one of them is its mastery of technology. in the 21st century, almost all activities, from personal ones to official ones, rely on the use of information technology. israel’s attack on syria was one of the examples of the advanced use of information technology to support military activities. the use of information technology for destructive purposes is a threat to a country’s national defense. the threats can either be military or non-military ones. military threats to national defense are threats to defense and security, while nonmilitary threats to national defense are threats to the ideological, political, economic, social, and cultural resilience of a country. sooner or later, the advance of technology will affect our cultural convention, socio-cultural institutions and (from socio-political perspective) our cyber security policy and its implementation in indonesia 64 government’s decision-making patterns (sudarsono, 1992, p. 4). legal scholar ari purwadi (1993, p. 234) confirms this when saying that he believes technology represents a certain value system because it is a product of people’s socio-culture. in general, the elements that can be identified as potential sources of threats consist of internal and external sources, intelligence activities, disruption, investigation, extremist organizations, hacktivists, organized crime groups, rivalry, hostility and conflicts, as well as technology (the ministry of defense of the republic of indonesia, 2013, p. 24). almost every country believes that science and technology are two important factors in supporting the growth and progress of a country. in the context of economic development, technology can act as an engine of economic growth (frame, 1983, p. 7). countries that do not have and master science and technology will be left behind. science and technology are now glorified and have become an ideology. some people worship technology so much and treat it as if it was the only way to welfare, prosperity, and justice. in addition, a developed technology has created a new cult, a consumer society (jacob, 1993, p. 13). therefore, the use of information technology and the internet as a way to fight in cyber warfare, which threatens national defense and security, has become a common thing. in addition to being one of the aspects that endanger national security, there is an urgency to understand the aspects of legal regulations, particularly in the context of cyber law. cybercrime is a cross-border crime. since it crosses borders and involves many countries, cybercrime is considered as an extraordinary crime. thus, it is important to have multilateral agreements to tackle it, both in regional and international levels. the use of military force should be the last option. this is because a state cannot simply use a military force to carry out an attack or to start a battle. there are a lot of things to consider such as costs and budgets. the state should build a digital-technologybased cyber defense soon. some of the common forms of cyber threats today are as follow (the ministry of defense of the republic of indonesia, 2013, p. 25): 1. advanced persistent threats (apt), denial-of-service (dos), and distributed denial-of-service (ddos) attacks are usually done by overloading a system capacity and preventing legitimate users to access and use the targeted system or resources. these attacks are dangerous threats to organizations that rely almost entirely on the internet's ability to run their activities; 2. defacement attacks are carried out by replacing a victim's web page with a forged one, where the type of the contents depends on the criminal’s motives (can be either pornography or politics); 3. malware attacks are malicious programs or codes that can be used to disrupt the normal operation of a computer system. usually, a malware program is designed to get financial profits or other benefits; 4. cyber infiltrations can attack a system through the identification journal of asean studies 65 of legitimate users and connection parameters such as passwords. these attacks are done by exploiting vulnerabilities that exist in the system. the main methods used to get access to the system are: 1) guessing very obvious passwords, such as one’s user name, the name of one’s spouse or child, a date of birth or things which are important and related to someone or his family, so it is easy to guess and find out; 2) exploiting unprotected accounts. users can also make mistakes, by not entering a password or giving their password to others; 3) fraud and social engineering. for example, the offender may claim and act as an administrator and ask for the password for some technical reasons; 4) listening to data communication traffic. a tapper will listen to unencrypted data transmitted over the network via a communication protocol; 5) trojan horse, a specific spy program and a highly dangerous spyware. it can secretly record parameters used to connect to a remote system. 6) exploiting the authentication system. all users’ passwords should be stored on a server. a hacker will access the file that stores all users’ encrypted passwords and then open it with tools available on the network; 7) testing all the possible permutations that can be the key to cracking passwords, if a cracker knows cipher algorithm; 8) spying. this is done by recording their connection parameters using software, spyware or multimedia devices, such as video cameras and microphones, to capture confidential information, such as passwords to access a protected system; 5. spamming and phishing. spamming is the sending of undesired mass emails to: 1) get publicity or for commercial purposes; 2) introduce malicious software, such as malware and firmware into a system; 3) in the worst case scenario, spam may resemble a bomb attack, with the results of overloaded mail servers, full users’ mailboxes and it could create a great discomfort in the email management. in the past, spam was only cyber security policy and its implementation in indonesia 66 considered as a nuisance, but today, spam is a real threat. it has become a special vector for the spread of viruses, worms, trojan horses, spyware, and phishing attempts; 6. abuse of communication protocol. a spoofing attack of transmission control protocol (tcp) relies on the fact that the tcp establishes a logical connection between systems to support the exchange of data. this allows it to get through a firewall and establish a secure connection between two entities, a hacker, and a target. in addition to the above cyber threats, there are other types of cyber attacks. these cyber attacks can be categorized into (carr, 2009): 1. hardware threats. these threats are caused by the installation of certain equipment that serves to perform certain activities in a system. therefore, the equipment is a disruption to the network system and other hardware. for example, jamming and network intrusion; 2. software threats. these threats are caused by the software of which functions are to steal information, to destruct information/system, to manipulate information (information corruption) in a system, and others. 3. data/information threats. these threats are caused by the spread of certain data/information for a certain motive. what is done in information warfare is considered propaganda. cyber security role in national security a weak cyber defense may create tensions among countries and disrupt the stability of security, create social, economic, and environmental impacts, as well as disrupt the relationship among countries (ghernaouti-hélie, 2009, p. 24). cyber security has two key words: cyber and security. talking about cyber means talking about information, connections (telecommunications, networks), gateways (computers, devices, users), rooms, or spaces, and it is about involving, using, or relating to computers, networks, and the internet. meanwhile, security is usually related to assets and assets protection. security is protecting the asset, protecting computers, networks, programs and data from unintended or unauthorized access, change or destruction, protecting information and systems from major cyber threats (ghernaouti-hélie, 2009, p. 28). computer security, cyber security, or it security is information security applied to a computer or a network. computer security aims to help users prevent fraud or detect any attempts of fraud in an information-based system. the information itself is non-physical. cyber security is an effort to protect information from cyber attacks. cyber attacks in information operation mean all deliberate actions to disrupt the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information. this action can be in a form of physical disruption or a disruption of the logical flow of information system. a cyber attack is an attempt to disrupt information which focuses on the logical flow of information system. national cyber security is a term used for cyber security that is related to the assets/resources of a country (boisot, journal of asean studies 67 1998, p. 18). the objective of national cyber security is the protection, domination, and control of data and information. national cyber security is closely related to information operation, which involves various parties such as the military, the government, state-owned enterprises, academia, private sectors, individuals, and the international world. the continuity of information operation does not only rely on cyber security itself, it also depends on physical security, which is related to all physical elements such as data center buildings, disaster recovery system, and transmission media. cyber security governance in indonesia in terms of cyber security, indonesia already has a system and strategy of cyber security conducted by government agencies and also the official community. cyber security policy is coordinated by the ministry of communication and informatics (mci). there are three government organizations involved in cyber security in indonesia, which are information security coordination team, directorate of information security, and indonesia security incident response team on internet infrastructure (id-sirtii). the information security coordination team was formed in april 2010 to coordinate cyber security, focusing on the expertise and the practice in the field of information and technology. the directorate of information security has the tasks of policy formulation and implementation, training, monitoring, evaluation and reporting in the field of information security governance. lastly, id-sirtii was established by the government based on regulation of the minister of communication and informatics no. 8 of 2012 to handle security on internet infrastructure. meanwhile, there are two community organizations involved in cyber security in indonesia. acting as a supporting institution, indonesia communication emergency response team (id-cert) is an organization that works with the government in special cases to support the development of cyber security in indonesia. in addition, idcert also functions as a supporting institution for government organizations (setiadi, sucahyo, & hasibuan, 2012, p. 111) such as the id-sirtii. another community organization is the indonesia academic computer security incident response team (id-acad-csirt), the organization for the universities that want to focus on the development of security in indonesia. id-acad-csirt currently has 40 members of academic csirt universities. cyber security policy and its implementation in indonesia 68 figure 1. organizational structure of cyber security governance in indonesia source: setiadi, sucahyo, & hasibuan (2012), p. 111 cyber security-related legislations and regulations in indonesia the government of indonesia has created a policy concerning the implementation of cyber security in its legislation based on the law no. 11 of 2008 on electronic information and transaction (ite). there are several other laws that are indirectly related to the policy, but related to such information, such as the law no. 36 of 1999 on telecommunication, and the law no. 14 of 2008 on the openness of public information. in addition, the following are the laws supporting the implementation of cyber security: 1. law no. 8 of 1999 on consumer protection, 2. law no. 2 of 2002 on state police of the republic of indonesia, 3. law no. 3 of 2002 on state defense, 4. law no. 15 of 2003 on the enactment of government regulation in lieu of law no. 1 of 2002 on terrorism and crime eradication as a law, 5. law no. 34 of 2004, on indonesian national armed forces, and 6. law no. 25 of 2009 on public service. journal of asean studies 69 up to now, the government regulation as law enforcement, which supports the implementation of national information security policy, is still being processed by the mci. however, some presidential regulations have become a reference in the implementation of national information security policy. some of the regulations are: 1. presidential instruction no. 3 of 2003 on the national policy on egovernment development, 2. presidential regulation no. 20 of 2006 on national board of information and communication technology (ict), and 3. presidential regulation no. 41 of 2010 on general policy on state defense year 2010–2014. meanwhile, the mci as the ict regulator has released some regulations as implementation guidelines, such as: 1. the regulation of the minister of communication and informatics no. 29 of 2006 on the certification authority implementation guidelines, 2. the regulation of the minister of communication and informatics no. 28 of 2006 on the use of go.id domain name for all central and local government’s official websites, 3. the regulation of the minister of communication and informatics no. 30 of 2006 on the watchdog committee of certification authority, 4. the regulation of the minister of communication and informatics no. 41 of 2007 on the general guidelines of national ict governance, 5. ministerial decree of the minister of communication and informatics no. 57 of 2003 on the guidelines to the making of institution’s e-government development master plan. to optimize the implementation efforts, the issued regulations require additional materials and elaborations on implementation strategies, cooperation model, and organization. in addition, implementing national cyber defense needs cross-institutional coordination (the ministry of defense of the republic of indonesia, 2013, p. 35). current cyber security policy in indonesia indonesian cyber security policy was initiated back in 2007, following the release of the regulation of the minister of communication and informatics no. 26/per/m.kominfo/5/2007 on the security of the use of internet-protocol-based telecommunication network, which was later replaced by the regulation of the minister of communication and informatics no. 16/per/m.kominfo/10/2010. this was then updated with the regulation of the minister of communication and informatics no. 29/per/m.kominfo/12/2010. an important aspect in the regulation is the establishment of id-sirtii. the minister of communication and informatics assigned the team to help control the security of internet-protocol-based telecommunication network. id-sirtii’s functions and tasks are to watch and to detect early and warn when any disruptions on the network cyber security policy and its implementation in indonesia 70 occur. the team also coordinates with related parties at home and abroad when it needs to secure the network. the team also provides information when threats and disruptions come up. finally, idsirtii also works on devising work plans (article 9 of the regulation of the minister of communication and informatics no. no.29/per/m.kominfo/12/2010). according to hasyim gautama, the framework of cyber security law in indonesia was based on law no. 11 of 2008 on electronic information and transaction, government regulation no. 82 of 2012 on the implementation of electronic system and transactions, as well as ministerial circulation letters and minister regulations (ardiyanti, 2014). aside from the initiation of cyber security-related legislations, to ensure legal certainty in the development of cyber security, the government enacts the cyber security national framework. however, the legal framework for cybercrime-handling is still weak. despite the existence of the law that forbids any forms of attacks or vitiation to the electronic system, no law that specifically regulates and contains cybercrime is available. meanwhile, cybercrime evolves and takes place rapidly, making it hard for the law enforcers to handle it. the cyber security-related obstacles to deal with according to hasyim gautama, there are several obstacles that we have to deal with concerning cyber security development on a national scale, such as (ardiyanti, 2014): 1. state administrators that have weak understanding of cyber security issues, 2. some internet services that have servers located abroad, 3. lack of a secure system in indonesia, 4. the absence of law that specifically addresses and regulates attacks in cyber world, 5. the frequent happenings of cyber crime that render it hard to handle, 6. the issues with the governance of national cyber security institutions, 7. weak awareness of international threats of cyber attacks that can paralyze a state’s vital infrastructures, and 8. lack of industries that produce and develop it-related hardware to strengthen our defense in the cyber world. the handling of cybercrime is partial and its nature tends to be scattered due to the absence of a standard coordination. it is substantially dangerous because cyber attacks can paralyze a state’s vital infrastructures. for example, soekarno-hatta international airport’s radar system has been disrupted a couple of times. it is always possible that cyber attacks do such things to a country’s vital infrastructure. indonesia needs a policy that regulates all elements related to cyber security. in all policies that regulate ict system, the communication used includes all regulations that need a standard document as a reference to run all information-security-related processes. this infrastructure standard has to meet the international standard to face a cyber war. it needs to have proper perimeter defense and a network monitoring system. journal of asean studies 71 in addition, the policy governing the ict system requires an information system and event management which can monitor security incidents on the network. it also needs network security assessment that controls and measures security. the development of cyber defense in indonesia the law no. 3 of 2002 on state defense states that the purpose of state defense is to protect and save the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the republic of indonesia and the safety of the nation from all kinds of threats, whether military or non-military ones. indonesia needs to improve its soft and smart power in defense to anticipate cyber war through deterrence strategy as well as through the prosecution and recovery of cyber defense. this will support cyber security national strategy as promoted by the mci (ardiyanti, 2014, p. 1). law no. 11 of 2008 on electronic information and transaction states that the use of information technology has to be secure in order to keep the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information. in that law, electronic information is legally acknowledged and any related actions are done by a law enforcer or a user has a legal responsibility (ardiyanti, 2014, p. 1). the above two laws give a mandate to government agencies, including to the ministry of defense (mod), to take necessary steps to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of republic of indonesia and the safety of the nation, as well as the safety of cyberspace, where the electronic system works and benefits people. along with the mod, the mci as the leading government agency in telecommunication and informatics has five cyber security policy agendas in developing a secure cyber environment. they are doing it by implementing “endsways-means” strategy model, which focuses on targets, priorities, and measured actions. the five policies are (ardiyanti, 2014, p. 2): 1. capacity building, 2. policy and legal framework, 3. organizational structure, 4. technical and operational measures, and 5. international cooperation. the ministry functions as the national information security regulator and the policies implemented will become a reference in formulating the national strategy’s road map of cyber security. in dealing with national interests, the mod needs to understand, study, measure, anticipate and prepare actions needed to deal with things happen in the cyber world, which might come as threats to the state defense. technology has transformed the shape of threats, from a conventional one to a virtual and asymmetrical one. these virtual threats exist, and their impacts are real. the threats might be small, ignorant of the existing law, coming from inside and outside the country with different modes and motives; yet, it can be destructive. this is why the minority can defeat the majority (ardiyanti, 2014, p. 2). in this globalization era, the implementation of public service highly depends on the availability, integrity, and confidentiality of information in cyberspace. in order to ensure a safe cyberspace for the sake of national cyber security policy and its implementation in indonesia 72 security, we need to realize that attacks in cyberspace may directly affect our state defense. therefore, there should be a agreement that security in cyberspace is not just some computer security technical issues. in fact, it covers ideological, political, economic, social and cultural aspects as well as national security (ardiyanti, 2014, p. 2). security issues in cyberspace are also national policy issues. attacks in cyberspace may interfere with people’s lives and national interests, such as economy, infrastructures, public health, national security, and safety, as well as state defense. the state needs to create a secure condition in cyberspace in order to ensure that indonesian citizens and their homeland have a good social life, economy, state order, and protection. this agenda will be one of the main references in formulating cyber policies. the utilization and mastery of technology, including information technology, shall accelerate, simplify, and ensure the solving of the state’s strategic problems, not the other way around. thus, the cyber defense cannot be done sporadically and on a case-by-case basis. it needs to be systematic, coordinated, and integrated. up to this day, the implementation of cyber defense in indonesia has not been a coordinated national initiative. the implementation steps are still sectoral, and it highly relies on each of the sectors’ interests and capability. the capability, deterrence, and countermeasures of cyber defense are very weak and vulnerable to massive attacks. there have been some initiatives by some institutions and business entities in implementing cyber defense, such as (ardiyanti, 2014, p. 36): 1. government agencies/institutions: 1) the mci established idsirtii in 2007, 2) the national cipher agency (lemsaneg) has a unit specialized in the security of ict resources, especially those related to signals intelligence, 3) the state intelligence agency and the strategic intelligence agency also have special units on the security of ict resources which are related to signals intelligence, 4) the mod and the indonesian national armed forces have the initiative to build their internal cyber defense forces, run by the mod’s center for data and information (pusdatin), the armed forces’ center for information and data processing (pusinfolahta), and the service branches’ offices for information and data processing (disinfolahta), which are continuously being developed; 2. education institutions and communities: 1) an indonesian ict community, which worked with communication emergency response teams (certs) in some universities, established the id-cert, journal of asean studies 73 2) institut teknologi bandung, universitas indonesia, universitas gajah mada, and institut teknologi surabaya have started building and applying ict security in their academic environment; 3. business entities: 1) the telecommunication industry, pioneered by pt telekomunikasi indonesia (telkom) as the owner and regulator of information and communication infrastructure, has set the standard to secure information and communication networks, which would then be applied to meet iso 27001 standards, 2) the banking industry, under the guidance of bank indonesia, has implemented a security system on banking information infrastructure by following the guidelines of bank indonesia regulation and international ict security standards, 3) the gas and petroleum industry has also implemented the ict security standards in each of their fields. the role of inter-institutional coordination, to implement a national cyber defense, has not been done optimally by relevant agencies. the mci has just started coordinating the security of information resources through idsirti. in addition to domestic anticipation, the role of international cooperation is indispensable in order to support a successful implementation of cyber defense. to date, the role of international cooperation is still carried out sectorally by agencies, communities, and entities, in accordance with their own interests. they do this by joining international associations and parents of organizational institutions. one of indonesia’s strategic alliances in cyber security policy is by cooperating with association of southeast asian nations (asean) to deal with cyber security. it is one of indonesia’s commitments to realize asean’s three pillars, namely the asean economic community, the asean socio-cultural community, and the asean politicalsecurity community. another commitment is to have a stronger cooperation with arf to support the three pillars. indonesia was also one of the countries that initiated the treaty of amity and cooperation (tac). substantially, the fellow member states do not attack each other and resolve conflicts in a peaceful manner (the department of defense of the republic of indonesia, 2008, p. 6, 42, 58). indonesia has also been consistently partnering with asean in cyber security sector, because of the prominence of malaysia’s and singapore’s cyber security development. malaysia has prepared cyber security supporting policies, institutions, infrastructures, and programs and the effort has been discussed in international cooperation forums. the institution in-charge that runs cyber security functions in malaysia cyber security policy and its implementation in indonesia 74 is called siberoc, which coordinates with malaysia’s information security institutions such as malaysian computer emergency response team (mycert). meanwhile, singapore excels in its human resources, having the highest number of information security experts in asean (the ministry of defense of the republic of indonesia, 2013, p. 17). indonesia and asean have been consistently partnering in security sector because asean has given some contribution to indonesia to deal with cyber threats. in asean regional forum (arf), indonesia and asean work together in tackling cybercrime by improving security level in states’ cyber sector. indonesia has been doing its part in cyber security by establishing bilateral and multilateral cooperation in international regional organizations, such as asean. in 2006, the arf focused on cybercrime threats and the meeting’s theme was “statement on cooperation in fighting cyber attack and terrorist misuse of cyber space”. a workshop on this was held during a meeting in vietnam in 2012 (asean secretariat, 2013). previously, in a conference held in kuala lumpur, malaysia, on january 13th14th, 2011, the attendants agreed to form a community to improve cyber security in south east asia region. as a result, asean-cert was established. in a conference in mactan cebu, philippines, on november 15th-16th, 2012, they all agreed to continue the development of cert and to support its tasks (asean secretariat, 2013). consequently, along with other asean countries, indonesia was committed to develop its cyber security and would consistently do so until the beginning of asean community in 2015. the implementation of cyber security regulations in indonesia the way cyber security is handled in the framework of state defense is still sectoral, not well-coordinated nor integrated yet. as the mod general secretary eris herryanto (2011) explained, the cyber defense concept that was implemented by the mod and the indonesian national armed forces is still sectoral, not comprehensive as a unity (herryanto, 2012). therefore, the mod established a cyber defense operation center team to tackle cyber crime as well as to secure and to protect the nation in the cyber world. the establishment of cyber defense operation center in the national cyber security policy is intended to build a universal defense system, which involved all citizens, territory, and other national resources, and to uphold the state’s sovereignty, as well as to protect the territory integrity and the security of the entire nation from cyber threats. one of the alternative policies is to put cyber security in defense context. some policies that have been implemented are in defense context, as well. the cyber defense operation center, as has been explained above, is one of them. the center has a working team established in 2010 that composed a plan to form an information security incident management team. three steps to strengthen cyber security in order to strengthen cyber security, the indonesian government shall adopt the following three steps: journal of asean studies 75 1. capacity building training programs and courses to upgrade cybersecurity skills should be conducted in coordination with defense cyber operations centre. training for human resources on the importance of cyber security should be held to improve the understanding of preventive measures to prevent any acts of cybercrime. in order to develop human resources’ skills to deal with cyber security, the indonesian national armed forces has conducted cooperation with some stakeholders who are highly skilled in information technology field. one of the stakeholders is institut teknologi del (it del), north sumatera. this cooperation was planned to last for three years, from 2014 to 2017, with three programs: the preparation of cyber warfare model, seminars on military cyber intelligence and cyber operations, and cyber camp or cyber weekend (jpnn.com, 2014). 2. international cooperation the next step is to do international cooperation with regional and international organizations in order to tackle cybercrime. indonesia has conducted cooperation to tackle cybercrime by becoming a member of asean network security action council and international telecommunication union (itu), becoming the steering committee of asia pacific computer emergency response and security (apcert), and doing bilateral cooperation in the cyber security field with japan, united kingdom, and other countries. indonesia also plays an active role in global cybersecurity agenda (gsa), which was launched in the 2007 world telecommunication and information society day. the gsa is an international cooperation of which main goal is to create a strategy and a solution to boost trust and improve security in the information society (broto, 2008). 3. legal certainty in a legal context, cyber security development means the availability of security policy document as the standard document people refer to when running the whole information-security-related processes. the development and the strengthening of cyber security policy in indonesia should be integrated with a national strategy to build a national cyber security ecosystem, which has been prepared by the government. the national strategy includes legal efforts and technical efforts, such as operational standards of organization structuring, cyber security management institutes, human resource capacity building and the effort to improve international cooperation. conclusion indonesia has already had some policies that regulate cyber security; however, the nature of such policies is general (lex generalis, and therefore not specific (lex specialis). as a result, the implementation of cyber security has not been effective. in order to make them effective, the government needs to make them specific and, along with all of the stakeholders, continuously socialize them. in addition, the government needs to take the implementation of cyber security more seriously to anticipate cyber attacks. singapore and malaysia, among asean members, have already had specific cyber cyber security policy and its implementation in indonesia 76 security policies, and this is in accordance with potential threats. indonesia, on the other hand, does not have a special institution with full authority to manage and deal with cyber security, yet. however, even without a special institution, the government should still be able to assign one of its structures or institutions to become a leading sector. this shows us that the implementation of cyber security is dispersed and that the government’s role in the cyber defense is minor. there are individuals who try to break the norms and the laws, violate rules and regulations, or take control over information security as well as physical assets in order to get material or nonmaterial benefits. therefore, the government needs to make some serious efforts to anticipate cyber threats and attacks and save indonesian cyber defense from being a target of irresponsible parties. about the author muhammad rizal is a senior lecturer at the department of business administration, universitas padjadjaran. one of his research interests is on cyber security law. yanyan mochamad yani is a professor in international relations of universitas padjadjaran. his expertise is in international security studies especially 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(2010). computer security and cyberwarfare. retrieved from department of computer science, university of wisconsin-eau claire: www.cs.uwec.edu/~wagnerpj/talk s/cyberwar.ppt 1 redefining asean way redefining asean way: democratization and intergovernmental relations in southeast asia1 m. faishal aminuddin university of brawijaya, indonesia joko purnomo university of brawijaya, indonesia abstract this paper reviews inter-state relations in southeast asia countries. regionalism in southeast asia has been criticized on its limited achievement in political development, political development in this region focuses more on nation’s interests than regional interests. added to this, there is a lack of political channel outside formal government relations hinders political connectivity among southeast asian people. the aim of this paper is threefold. firstly, to analyze the pattern of political development in southeast asian region. secondly, to assess the implication of using non-interference principle for maintaining political relations in southeast asian region and its contribution to the lack of political awareness regionally. thirdly, to propose new political diplomacy concerned with promoting political awareness regionally. this paper ends by providing an alternative type of political diplomacy by combining formal diplomacy actions done by state institution and informal diplomacy actions done by non-government actors. we point out an alternative strategy to promote political awareness in southeast asian community in the future. first, open policy to connecting the diplomatic based community. second, optimize the regional cooperation with more concern with democracy and human rights issue. third, building and institutionalizing political awareness through people participation. key words: regional cooperation, non-interference principal, political awareness, communitarian 1this article was originally presented in the third international conference on southeast asia (iconsea 2009) at the university of malaya by m. faishal aminuddin in the form of a paper entitled, “political awareness: building inter-government relation in southeast asia countries.” journal of asean studies, vol. 5, no. 1 (2017), pp. 23-36 doi: 10.21512/jas.v5i1.962 ©2017 by cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic 24 redefining asean way introduction regionalism in southeast asia is dominantly related to asean. since it was established over 50 years ago, it appears that strategical position of asean has not been able to bring the significant form of mutual understanding among the members. the positive achievement in terms of economic development within this region contributes a minor progress in narrowing inequalities between countries. previously, economic growth within this region was followed by certain reduction of inequalities between countries. there was also some progress in term of poverty alleviation. after the 1990s, however, economic growth only facilitates the increase in inequalities between southeast asia countries. interestingly, inequality within country shows different pattern. inequality trends have diverged, with inequality rising in indonesia and falling in thailand, malaysia, and the philippines; in part due to policy efforts (jain-chandra et al., 2016). in terms of internal mobility within this region, there is an intriguing interaction between people in southeast asia countries. a study shows that 97 per cent of the 6.5 million internal migration in 2013 only circulates in three countries: thailand, malaysia, and singapore. in a more specific scale, of a total of 88 per cent of internal migration, connecting eight corridors (ilo & adb, 2014). in the context of social and political matters, however, connectivity among southeast asian people is very limited. this circumstance exists because there is a lack of political channel caused by straight government policy. in the study of bti (2016), there are two processes that are taking place in asia. first, political processes fail to build democracy as in south korea and taiwan and enforces consolidated autocracies in china, laos, singapore, and vietnam. second, there is unstable autocracies occurred in afghanistan, cambodia, malaysia, pakistan, and thailand. added to this, civil society organizations get significant pressure from autocratic power and only a few among those organizations who have political representation. bti (2016) also found that countries with high economic growth, such as singapore and vietnam showed that political stability, strong government institutions, and tight administration control are factors contribute to economic transformation. hence, there is a little progress in flourishing democratization at the regional level. the studies noted that the concept of asean way is a passive response and it tends to hinder the progress of democratization. the asean way is going into the debate and still unclear, hence, it needs to get a more extensive explanation (haacke, 1999; acharya, 2001). other study cited that the asean way may represent the collective identity of asean crystallized in the principle of non-intervention or silent diplomacy (rüland, 2000; nischalke, 2000). in some cases, however, the asean way is more than just the principle of nonintervention. some evidence depicts the success in the intervention of domestic conflicts such as in cambodia (goh, 2003). unfortunately, weak political intervention to foster democratization in this region only facilitates a hijack of the asean way led by autocratic power. these are caused by the inclination of the state sovereignty and journal of asean studies 25 policy priorities in maintaining domestic stability (katsumata, 2003). moreover, the achievement of economic growth is not always followed by an increase in regional exchange to share democratic values. studies on democratization showed findings varied. in malaysia and singapore, democracy runs within the strong-state authority, where the stability of the regime occurs due to its strong control over political activities (slater, 2012). on the other side, democratization in indonesia successfully reduces state authority but it also facilitates the rise of oligarch (hadiz & richard robinson, 2013). in general, there is no single factor that causes stagnant democratization in this region. specific explanation of the difficulties of democracy establishment relies on the tradition of the political elites who have a concern to dominate the political system. thus, democracy merely produces "elected autocrat" (kurlantzick, 2012). this paper will answer the question of: to what the extent the redefinition of asean way should able to solve regional politics problem? we offer normative assessment based on the cultural approach to undertaking the ideal type of intergovernmental relationships in this region. we use the interpretive analysis on the concepts of forming the asean cooperation and undertake the theoretical review to explain the compatibility of democracy in this region. this paper consists of three discussions, namely: 1) restrictive conceptions on intergovernmental relations analysis to obtain the possibility or probability for interconnectivity amongst governments in politically sensitive issues; 2) explanation on the extension of the boundaries of regionalism towards democratization pressure to create open regionalism; 3) designing the model of political awareness as an active concept of non-intervention. scoping government interaction the intergovernmental relationship in southeast asian region comes into dynamics situation. it attracts scholars to contribute to the theoretical discussion on regionalism perspective. generally, regionalism is interpreted as a policy and a tremendous project where some actors from state or non-state engage in cooperative and coordinate their common good for the region. krasner (1983), stated that some aspects have necessarily to be identified related to some norms, rules, and procedures which may be met to the expectation of some different actors. we argue that regionalism in asean is viewed as an interplay between political development, pseudo-nationalism, and closed regionalism. the important variable needs to be explored in the discussion of regionalism is political development. even though there are variations of political development within this region, but there is a tendency for centralizing political power as a model of political development. it can be seen in malaysia, thailand, singapore. the government authority had dominant control in public life even though citizen is still given political space if not considered as national stability threat. we argue that centralistic government-style with significant political power is intended to create political subsistence aimed to ensure the stability of the domestic economy. hence, political development in this region only focused 26 redefining asean way merely on country’s interests rather than regional interests. this pattern of political development continued until the early of the 1990s. afterward, regionalism became a wellknown issue which discussed since the shifting of worldwide power constellation. asean regionalism was reconstructed to become tether of expectation for strengthening government control capacity. the expansion form of asean consultation with other state or regional cooperation counterpart had significance only to improve regional economic development. by the expansion of japan and china, it had a possibility to transform larger regional economic agenda, namely asian economic agenda. this kind of action, however, is inadequate for developing the democratic pattern in southeast asian region. two explanations on this matter. firstly, southeast asian economic actors do not have any specific interest to ensure the establishment of democracy because they are more interested to expand their business outside southeast asian region due to its economic advantages. secondly, china and japan also have limited attention on the political matter during its economic expansion in southeast asian region. china has strong desire to become the center of regional corporation in asia (wunderlich, 2008). the tendency to secure its energy security and market expansion, however, makes china does not put significant attention to political development in asia. southeast asian region has an opportunity to increase political development rapidly. it can be ignored that there are difficulties to maintain its political development related to the problem of establishing democratization. democratization, however, may contribute to the structural political change in each country. moreover, it also gives adequate influenced pressure for the pattern of regional relationship, especially interpolitical agencies. democratization provides a great opportunity for replacing state-centric model that puts the state as a center for all the interaction. ideally, democratization within regionalism becomes a part of the political commitment to fight against authoritarian style in domestic politics whether by self-modality based on domestic capacity and capability or by using stronger power from the outside. state-centric model came from the definition extended by weberian that gave larger space for the optimization of state authority. general view concerning the role of the state puts the government as the superior political agency. to control extensively, the authority requires the existence of internal loyalty and external acknowledgment. hence, the state should not only act for their interest but should also represent the interest of others outside the government. it can be stated that decision making process within the state is an arena of many interests and the results represent the dynamic interaction amongst them (moravcsik, 1999). from this perspective, the model of state authority influences the behavior of its governmental regime. governmental behavior has its scope and can be divided into bilateral and multilateral. a bilateral relationship is developed both with countries within region and countries outside regions. while a multilateral relationship is developed both with regional countries and different regional countries. both of those stages become natural fence journal of asean studies 27 which indicates that the government has limited scope for territory and sovereignty. another variable which needs to be observed is the “network establishment” in the regional cooperation. domestic regime commonly brings function as motivator or catalyst for strengthening relationship within the jurisdictional region. the pattern of organized network provides sufficient stability which indicates non-hierarchical and interdependent attitude. moreover, it is also connecting various actors who share high mutual interest and trust as a sign of togetherness. this kind of cooperation with collective purpose achievement considered as an ideal type of regionalism (börzel, 1997). hence, regionalism should be viewed as a complex and multi-facet process involving both formal and informal integration supported by networks from government and society. democratization and regionalism: a crossing boundaries regionalism has limited attention to integrating the regional interest with the promotion of democracy. regional integration tends to consider more on economic, social and cultural aspects and has a limited action to bring the spirit of democracy when dealing with domestic politics. it is very important to change the essence of regionalism where economic interests are superior than commitment on democratization. added to this, asean gives limited interest to strengthen the intercitizen relationship to spread democratic values. consequently, asean has lost its opportunity to create reciprocal dialogue to broader political issues. it is not surprise that asean is viewed as an elite integration rather than people integration. hence, it is highly obvious that the type of regional integration only concerns with institutional policy and behavior, but it has less connected with people’s interests, namely democratization with specific values embedded within asean society. the concept of regionalism in asia needs to be viewed as a representation of asean value, namely communitarian. moreover, democratization is considered as specific value embedded in asean society. domestic politics that becomes a threat to the institutionalization of democracy is important to get an attention. undoubtedly, there are some countries who had an unsteady political situation. the process of democratization faces significant challenges as it can be seen in kampuchea, laos, and vietnam. on these countries, build the commitment for integrating democracy with domestic politics is not an easy task to be done. we argue that the participation of asean in the process of democratization in their members will give significant contribution to the deepening democratic spirit in that countries. moreover, it can reduce the participation of external actors such the united states or european countries to involve in domestic politics within asean countries. we need to consider that there is no homogeneous political culture in the region. as it can be seen from the polarization of state political institution that is divided in the form of absolute monarch, constitutional monarch, republic, socialist and junta military. meanwhile, governmental structure is also varied, namely: presidential, parliamentary, leninist, and military dictator. clark neher and ross marlay (1995) classify this region into four categories in term of democratic scales: semi28 redefining asean way democracy, semi-authoritarian, authoritarian based on citizen participation, electoral competition and civil freedom. democratic implementation which has electoral competition and civil freedom is relatively well known in indonesia, philippines, and thailand. even though some countries show positive performance to accept the democracy, it does not mean that there are limited political obstacles in those countries. attempts of the military coup, political competition among elites, local resistances and separatism are among potential problems faced by countries such as indonesia, philippine, and thailand. in other words, serious political problems still exist, even though democracy is also flourishing. with this circumstance, it gives relevance for asean to strengthen its contributions to democracy with the spirit of asean: communitarianism. expanding spectrum of democratization will bring a better consequence for the intergovernmental process of negotiation. democratization model is not homogenous. it needs to represent and accommodate political tradition. hence, it allows variety of domestic political management in each country. one good example is what happened in myanmar. the crisis was handled by two things: regional cooperation through asean participation and public awareness regarding humanitarian issues. the act of regional institution combined with people awareness and participation are potentially reducing the crisis. democratization with asian values may be used as a moral reference that is formed by the characteristic of social structure and kinship containing a set of mutual share principle and doing something for a community (inoguchi, 1998). political culture in the southeast asia is closely related to kinship system that influences the shape of interaction or inter-institutional relationship. personal figure is very important for the whole process for taking decision. fukuyama (1995) described an example like in china which strictly develops the greatness of family. specifically, in the southeast asia, it seems that the personal trust exceeds social trust. it needs a new formulation where the combination between colleague trust and formal regulation of political institution is established. regional integration needs to take into accounts the urgency of using the basic value of society when establishing regional policy and behavior. marsh (ed. 2006) mentioned that malaya cultural background is less influence compared to china cultural background to governmental behavior. on the contrary, other aspects such as ideology, whether it is liberal democracy or authoritarian, influences more (blondel, sinnott, & svensson, 1998). hence, establishing connectivity by strengthening colleague trust as a manifestation of cultural values as an important aspect of developing regional policy and behavior is very important action to be done. the design of communitarian democracy that is accommodating local values is essential for asean. communitarian democracy differs with western liberal democracy in terms of providing space for local wisdom-cultural values, instead of abandoning these values. it is expected that by using local wisdomcultural values that embrace the sense of communitarian, democratization in region journal of asean studies 29 and promoting regional-based conflict resolution for any political dispute within asean are truly established. the sense of communitarian among people will develop substantially if connectivity does exist. to be on that stage, we need to consider, what we call, “political awareness”. asean community needs to consider opening more extensive opportunity for instituting political instruments, where the regional political institutions may be used for supporting the design of political awareness. civilian also has a good experience to manage a better integration, not only in the economic field but also in sociopolitical policy and regional security (bersick & pasch, 2007). designing political awareness we view the concept of political awareness as an awareness of citizens to accept a concept of political action and the results of the political process. political awareness has a direct impact on certain aspects such as the political action of citizens and their political behavior which is dependent on the intake and supply of political information (zaller, 1990). political awareness is an urgent agenda needed to be strengthened in asean. there are reasons for it. first, each government tends to strengthen regional diplomacy by not having interfered with domestic problems faced by other asean members as an act of implementing the principle of non-interference. human rights violation in papua, rohingya persecution in myanmar, and the arrest of pro-democracy activists in malaysia, as examples, did not bring significant political attention regionally. consequently, attention between asean members toward some political issues occurred in one country becomes very minimum, even though the political issues may affect other countries or regional stability. this kind of diplomacy leads to political ignorance between asean members and it reduces mutual understanding between countries. we cannot ignore that non-interference principal is chosen by considering sociocultural aspects embedded in southeast asian society. the implementation of this principal, however, should also consider the importance of responsiveness among others about the political problems that can significantly influence regional politics. second, the regional intercommunity relationship has already been formed but limited action has been done to foster this society relationship to strengthen regional connectivity among asean people. domestically, network of non-government organization (ngos) is flourishing. regionally, the connectivity between ngos tends to focus on specific issues related to the concern of ngos but it gives less attention to strengthen political awareness and political dialogues. in other words, a potential asset that already exists between civil society to create connectivity among civil society is ignored. third, the regional corporation that strongly relies on non-interference principal provides complexity when defining which problems needed to tackle domestically and which problems that needs regional attention and actions. this complexity gives dis-incentive for asean to maintain regional interest and become important actors within regions. as a result, asean does not use the opportunity to foster intercountry relationship by using its unique 30 redefining asean way cultural and traditional asean values to tackle domestic problems. political issues slant southeast asian countries can compare into two scales. it particularly appears during the last second decade, facilitated by the increase of worldwide political escalation and the spread of these issues through transnational channels. the first scale is regional issue, which emerges as the effect of global interaction. after the 9/11, this region takes a significant attention to war against terrorism programs sponsored by the usa under president george w. bush. this agenda results to the domino effect toward the existence of transcultural communities within this region due to the idea of polarization and stigmatization between radical and non-radical community or terrorist and non-terrorist organization. the second scale is domestic government issue contributing to the regional stability. there is a fluctuation relationship among countries in southeast asian region, especially when it comes to the bilateral relationship. pursuing its national interests rather than promoting mutual understanding among asean member is becoming the picture of the bilateral relationship. moreover, there is a tendency of conducting political ignorance when it comes to the political issues of one country. separatist issue occurred in pattani, southern thailand; papua, indonesia; and moro, philippines is only viewed as internal matters and does not bring more attention to build regional collaborative act to solve the problems. asean is seen to do anything but ignorance. it can be stated that asean provides limited incentives for bringing truly intergovernmental interaction in the political matter. on the other side, no country has the courage to bring domestic political issues to become regional political issues. the problem is that this situation is worsened by the increase in political cooperation between asean state members and external actors such as developed country and other multilateral cooperation beyond the regional boundary. thus, regional politics in this region is picturized by political ignorance and political dependence into external actor outside the region such as china, usa, and russia. this article tries to bring the attention of the limited political awareness among asean member. moreover, this article also reviews the recent political value of this region that too much rely on non-interfere principal. specific attention is given to the issue of political awareness between countries which is politically abandoned. there is an urgent need to emphasize political awareness in the way asean members construct their diplomacy. it is an urgent action to put political awareness as a spirit of cultural and political diplomacy. the concept of political awareness refers to the establishment of space for mutual understanding among countries which are not only concentrated on domestic issues but also extend to some issues across the country in logical reason and boundary. political awareness insists to each country for having an equal responsibility in a mutual understanding frame, concerning with the need of promoting and protecting regional democratization. thus, a mutual controlling dynamic for each country may have maximum power to put the position of each country as balancing force against political unstableness. using a case of spratley archipelago, a territorial dispute between some asean journal of asean studies 31 countries and china, we can see that the maintenance of political stability in this region is ignoring the importance of seeking a solution by maximizing the role of asean to involve actively in regional politics. in the positive side, the involvement of external actor outside asean gives contribution for problem resolution by forming partner for dialogue. while from the negative side, the external environment affects cohesion of asean policy itself (yoshimatsu, 2006). more importantly, the role of asean is dominated by the active role of external actors. hence, political stability in this region at some degree has significant dependency on external actors rather than internal actors. important assessment regarding this issue came from emmers (2003), he evaluated that asean had its own way in resolving its different problems in every case and for each member. there is no legal mechanism which allow to approach each problem by using dialogue effort for achieving collective consensus. the main frame for this consensus is national sovereignty and noninference politics in the domestic matter. consequently, the desire to maintain their domestic interests rather than regional interests is obvious. with this situation, each country does not want to be politically tied, thus, they become an unpredictable agent. we are emphasizing alternative pathways to strengthen the work of asean. first, develop the network among non-state actors. civil societies in southeast asian region need to strengthen its communication and collaboration regionally. cultural bonding as an asian people can be used to strengthen solidarity and trust among asian people. this network can be expected to perform the significant collaborative action to solve regional problems instead of invite actors from outside region. eliminating external pressure and infiltration will be additional benefits from this action. second, facilitate the connectivity between economic actors, especially to maximize regional market. regional market within asean country provides benefits mainly for big corporations especially when each economic actor only focuses in their own domestic market. asean corporations tend to choose international market than develop market within asean territory due to economic advantage’s consideration. a new type of regional economic connectivity, especially done by small and medium enterprises could bring positive progress not only in terms of economic benefits but also social benefits. connectivity between economic actors will develop a better understanding of others led to the collaborative work for maximizing regional market for asean’s economic actors. third, build a stronger altruism spirit. we cannot ignore that each country has domestic problems that potentially becomes regional problems. abu sayyaf group in philippine, as an example, tends to be viewed as the domestic problem in philippine rather than an embryo for regional problems faced by all asean member. being selfish and ignore each other as the best action of the asean way-, however, is only postpone the development of problems. it needs urgent attitude change among countries to put concern for the other interests. fourth, reduce the dependency to external actors outside asean to solving local or regional problems. there is a tendency where involving external actors, mainly powerful countries, is the first 32 redefining asean way reaction among asean countries rather than relying on inviting asean to solve domestic problems. terrorism, illegal migration, drug trafficking problems, and territory dispute as it is shown at south china sea are some examples of that tendency. strengthen trust and commitment among asean countries and between asean countries with other counterparts to settle problems using peaceful and durable solution as it already undertakes when announcing the declaration on the conduct of parties in the south china sea (doc) be implemented seriously. neighboring partnership has government realized what they should do in neighboring life? this simple question has a significant implication for the improvement of regional cooperation, whether it is represented by asean as regional cooperation institution or another initiative in the relationship of intergovernmental. focused on asean, the issue of well-neighboring concept is still problematic. pursuing their internal benefits when conducting diplomatic matters rather than regional benefits is one explanation for this situation. moreover, asean country tends to choose bilateral relationship to gain expected benefits due to its less complexity than regional relationship. bilateral relationship that always emphasizes more on internal benefits among two countries conducted relationship is an advantage behind that choice. one of the basic things strictly observed is that conflict resolution model in asean is less powerful. the cause relates to the very strong nationalist politics in each country. hence, the intergovernmental organization such regional organization play less significant role. a new form of approach needs to be offered. asean members need to be pushed to create a closer cooperation and formulate policy collectively. as happened in kampuchea in the 1980s or asean reconciliation mission in east timor, both change political mindset, particularly in the concept of autonomy and selfgovernment (vatikiotis, 2006). the regional issue needs to be resolved by considering the expectation of the people in this region. cooperation and consultation which bring mutual benefit among the countries involved in the issues may influence the type of solution. cultural similarity in asean community is commonly considered have a significant power in searching for the solution. one example for this is in the effective conflict resolution based on cooperative principle. it might be traced from what was stated by the indonesian ex-minister of foreign affairs in 1979 concerning with communicatively conflict resolution (anwar, 1994). the same thing may be known from ghazali shafi’e who commented in malaysia that collective cultural inheritance was spirit of togetherness in a big kampong (village/country) of southeast asia. estrella solidum from the philippines underlined asean way is consistent with the cultural elements that every member of asean has. asean way is viewed as process of taking policy based on consultation and consensus, informally, non-confrontation and collective benefit (acharya, 2001). indeed, the establishment of supranational organization in southeast asia has limited prospect or better future. there are three main reasons for that. first, historically, there is no political authority that dominantly governs to this region. the journal of asean studies 33 second is ideological reason, where nationalism becomes the main trigger to the emergence of resistance against colonialism. hence, nationalism exceeds regionalism. lastly, until now there is no country who wants to play powerfully as regional leaders. asean form which is static and with no political integrated orientation should be tested for the next further period. political dynamics of intercountry relationship in this region is extremely influenced by external pressure. on the other side, the accumulation of domestic issues in this region until now does not come up with an effective resolution, yet. a space for discussing various kind of governmental interest, not only in the case of giving protection for the citizen but also for national interest, maybe accommodated in special diplomatic action which is considering another country as part of strategic partnership cooperation. strategic partnership cooperation is needed to be strengthened to gain better understanding and perception among countries. another framework which has better opportunity in the context of regional cooperation is a neighboring partnership. philosophical background of this framework comes from some positive elements in closer social life. neighbor is a part of someone closer life. in southeast asian society tradition, collectivity becomes a foundation of interfamily interaction, however, it has not hit the boundary of privacy for each territory. implementation of neighborhood partnership needs a precondition that should be fulfilled by each country. low trust among countries within asean is needed to be minimalized due to its impacts on reducing in consensus’s effectiveness. without that, well-established cooperation and the optimization of the result of cooperation among asean members will be far away to be reached. a legal and formal cooperative framework is extremely needed. international law should also need to become compulsory. consensual and political approaches in regional relationship within asean, however, must be strengthened to maintain positive achievement. it is functioned for covering the impasse of formal diplomatic line or limited negotiation toward some exertions or services that are involving the interest of country beyond the region. collectivity and caring one with another should not be considered as part of one’s aggressiveness toward each other. with this new understanding, involving in one country’s matter should not be viewed as an act of interfering with the domestic issue of one country. on the other side, proactive offer should also be provided in the incidental cases that need urgent responses. conclusion asean is unique regional cooperation. there is some achievement in economic development in this region, however, regional integration provides little benefits in terms of political development. the principle of non-interference as a code of conduct for maintaining regional diplomacy reduces significantly a political awareness to the political matters. therefore, political connectivity among southeast asian countries is limited. 34 redefining asean way this paper has opened a space for further discussion as an attempt to design both formal and informal field for intercountry regional relationship. a significant recommendation from this article is to review non-interference concept of asean since it only results to a deferment of conflict explosion. in addition, future agenda on implementing democracy based on communitarian tradition must be the principal regional agenda to support the implementation of neighborhood partnership model. with this proposal, it is expected that political awareness among people in southeast asian region replaces political ignorance embedded within noninterference principle. connectivity, that is the heart of regional integration, then, is no longer an illusion. about the authors m. faishal aminuddin is a lecturer at the department of politics, government, and international relation (dpgir) at university of brawijaya. currently, he serves as director of portsmouth-brawijaya centre for global health, population, and policy (pb centre), an indonesia-u.k. research institution based in university of portsmouth (u.k.) and university of brawijaya. he studied political science at the universität heidelberg, germany. his research focuses on comparative politics and democratization in emerging countries. joko purnomo is a lecturer at the department of politics, government, and international relations (dpgir) university of brawijaya. since 2017, he serves as head of government studies program at dpgir, univesity of brawijaya. he got his master’s degree in international development from flinders university, australia in 2008. his research focuses on globalization and international development. currently, he conducts research related to border affairs within southeast asia region. references acharya, a. 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(1990). political awareness, elite opinion leadership, and the mass survey response. social cognition, 8(1), 125-153. journal of asean studies, vol. 10, no. 1 (2022), pp. 1−19 issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic received: 21st november 2021/ revised: 10th february 2022/ accepted: 10th february 2022 asean centrality: comparative case study of indonesia leadership ratih indraswari department international relations, parahyangan catholic university, bandung, indonesia ratih.indraswari@unpar.ac.id department of political science and diplomacy, ewha womans university, seoul, south kore ratih@ewhain.net how to cite: indraswari, r. (2022). asean centrality: comparative case study of indonesia leadership. journal of asean studies, 10(1), 1−19. https:/doi.org/10.21512/jas.v10i1.7906 abstract for almost 60 years of establishment, asean has received praises and disdain from institutional scholars. it is heralded as the only regionalism in southeast asia able to manage regional order through its normative power, but also criticized for the same power. asean once again faces a challenge with the looming of myanmar crisis. the research aimed to find out whether asean centrality, the primacy of asean in addressing regional issues, is still strong enough amidst the crisis. the research provided an analysis on asean centrality by adopting an individual-state leadership concept portrayed by indonesia as a de facto leader of asean. the research methods employed qualitative explorative research by focusing on comparative case studies on the preah vihear and myanmar cases. the research finds that in both cases, asean centrality prevails. however, its strength varies as indonesia's leadership depends on mutually inclusive variables. these determining variables are institutional mandates, the domestic interest of followers, and external pressures. keywords: centrality, indonesia, leadership, asean introduction the discourse on the primacy of asean in setting the regional tone evolves along with the concept of asean centrality. within this framework, asean has provided exemplary mediation mechanisms and inclusive engagement in network buildings. it assumes a central role in this network of states, creating a regional architecture that is centered on asean. its mailto:ratih.indraswari@unpar.ac.id 2 asean centrality centrality thus has become the contested ‘reputation’ asean has to uphold in ensuring its relevance (damayanti, 2018; kassim, 2019; mueller, 2019; tsjeng, 2016). asean faces a constant challenge on its centrality conception. recently with the looming myanmar crisis, is asean centrality, the primacy of asean in addressing regional issues, still strong enough? the research provides an analysis on asean centrality by adopting an individual-state leadership concept portrayed by indonesia as a de facto leader of asean (emmers, 2014; kurus, 1993; tan, 2015). indonesian leadership is analyzed due to the assumed undebatable role provided by its strategic geopolitical position, large population, and natural resources. especially under the soeharto regime, indonesia plays an enabling force allowing asean to grow and develop as a regional organization. in return, indonesia’s leadership has gained acknowledgment not only by asean member state (ams) but also by external parties who wish to engage with asean. despite receiving criticism, researchers and policymakers second the notion that indonesia’s leadership is indispensable in asean regionalism (anwar, 1994; agastia & perwita, 2015; emmers, 2014; rattanasevee, 2014; smith, 2022 ). the research finds that asean centrality prevails, yet its strength varied in each case as individual leadership depends on mutually inclusive variables; competencies to exercise leadership, the domestic interest of followers, and external pressures. furthermore, asean institutional framework is salient in determining leadership competency, as asean institutional mandate can either constraint or boost states’ ability to exercise leadership. analytical framework what is asean centrality: rowing behind legal construct and elite endorsements what is asean centrality? first reference towards the concept enshrined in asean institutional documents. the asean charter article 1.15 stated that the main aim of asean is “to maintain the centrality and proactive role of asean as the primary driving force in its relations and cooperation with its external partners in a regional architecture that is open, transparent and inclusive” (asean, 2008). it is accepted as a principle of asean in which needing "the centrality of asean in external political, economic, social and cultural relations while remaining actively engaged, outward-looking, inclusive and non-discriminatory” (article 2.m) (asean, 2008). another mention of centrality is captured on its external relations behavior, in which “asean shall be the primary force in regional arrangements that it initiates and maintains its centrality in regional cooperation and community building” (article 41.3) (asean, 2008). this written concept is further seconded by asean leaders. during the 17th asean in hanoi chairman’s statement defines asean centrality as “a regional architecture based on multiple existing regional frameworks which are mutually supporting and reinforcing with asean as the primary driving force” (vietnam chairmanship, 2010). it also highlighted that asean centrality is pursuing a two-pronged approach that gives priority to the acceleration of asean integration while intensifying asean’s external relation (vietnam chairmanship, 2010). the latter understanding exemplified the concept of asean centrality takes place on journal of asean studies 3 two levels. first is the level of internal integration and second is the level of external cooperation. boost towards asean centrality is also reiterated by indonesia, the de facto leaders of asean. in his speech, susilo bambang yudhoyono (sby) emphasized that as the chair of asean, indonesia's priorities one among others is, the “maintaining the centrality of asean” (yudhoyono, 2011). a similar endorsement was given by external power. president obama's pivot to asia increases the region's importance by signing the tac (treaty of amity and cooperation), sending a us permanent mission to asean, and decided to attend the east asia summit in 2011 hosted by indonesia (clinton, 2011). although trump’s administration showed a disregard for asean centrality by skipping all east asia summit, biden’s administration showed a rapprochement gesture. in a contested issue of quad, the leaders joint statement endorsed asean centrality that “we reaffirm our strong support for asean’s unity and centrality as well as the asean outlook on the indo-pacific” (“quad leaders’ joint statement”, 2021). support was also provided by china, during the asean-china summit in 2019, premier li keqiang said that china will stay firmly committed to supporting asean centrality in east asian cooperation on the issues of coc (code of conduct) on the south china sea and harmonization of bri (belt road initiative) and mpac (master plan on asean connectivity) (lai, 2019). asean centrality is especially important amidst the recent heightened tension between china and the united states. as argued by singapore's foreign minister vivian balakrishnan, “when i say centre, i don’t just mean that we are geographically at the centre, but philosophically, diplomatically and strategically, asean remains at the centre of indo-pacific area” (kassim, 2019). prominent scholars understand asean centrality in line with leaders’ views, yet argue that asean centrality has yet been defined in a unified manner. the research highlights three main understandings on centrality in explaining the utilization of this framework within this research. first, centrality is understood as having two main purposes. strategic purpose in the sense that centrality is benefiting asean’s position. by putting asean at the core of the regional order, asean’s relevance is secured. normative purpose in the sense of asean centrality is understood in the primacy of the asean core beliefs and identity. its principles of inclusivity, openness allows for the generation of shared understanding, thus positioning asean as a neutral and safe platform in negotiating regional order (acharya, 2017). second, asean centrality is argued interchangeably with that of leadership. historically, the conception of leadership comes from the realist branch of hegemon; a single powerful state controlled or dominated the other (gilpin, 1981). leadership is obtained through the possession of material power, such as economic and military, to dictate others. however, a hegemonic relationship is not a one-directional force to shape other behavior but a consensual hegemony in which the hegemon assumes its position because it was permitted to do so (goh, 2013). therefore, the relationship between that of leader and its follower in which 'leadership is conferred by the follower' (gardner, 1990, pg 24; cerami, 2013 pg 20) can be argued highlighted the aspect of consensual leadership. in this sense, power must then be understood in terms of not only material but also ideational power (social power). 4 asean centrality since asean is not a hegemon, it is essential to know the kind of leadership quality it possesses. given its lack of hard power, asean possesses an entrepreneurial leadership able to bring ‘willing parties together’ to achieve mutual benefit. asean also possesses intellectual leadership that makes use of “the power of ideas to shape” how regional issues are understood (young, 1991). asean’s normative power can persuade others to display a certain behavior. this normative power created a perception that asean is not a threat for anyone, thus building asean reservoir of trust in which asean can transform the southeast asia region from trust deficit to strategic trust (natalegawa, 2018). leadership can be generated through social power. social power defines what asean can do by depicting asean as an important node within a social structure. centrality is understood in the closeness and cohesiveness of nodes that lend to asean’s increased influence through resource access, agenda-setting, and framing debate (beckfield, 2003). social network theory explains asean centrality further by looking at how closely connected it is with the networks in the wider east asia institutional framework; the position of asean as ‘a node in bridging the different networks’ together (caballero-anthony, 2014). its closeness and connection with others allow asean to utilize the web of networks to advance its interests. the network is manifested through various meetings in which asean drives the agenda within the regional multilateral platforms. by setting the agenda asean is able to maintain and retain its centrality and as a consequence amplifying asean's capacity to shape the regional order. this influence leads to the leadership role that is inherent to asean's position in the structural web of networks (caballero-anthony, 2014). to understand asean centrality from a leadership approach, it must be seen in asean ability to take the initiative in solving problems, the willingness to shoulder the leadership role, and the cooperation of follower states in the actions that are taken (stubbs, 2014). third, centrality is most often portrayed as asean relationship vis a vis another major or great external power. however, this one side portrayal failed to acknowledge that the centrality of asean is also taking place when asean is dealing with issues within the southeast asia region. asean centrality is a two-pronged approach “starting ,with strengthening centrality within asean, followed by maintaining its centrality within the dense cluster of networks in the regional arena” (caballero-anthony, 2014). this argument then translated to what is called asean ‘centrality within’ and ‘centrality of’. leadership in both levels, therefore “entails one state, or a group of states, proposing, executing and getting others to agree on a course of action to deal with a specific problem or challenge” (stubbs, 2014). figure 1 illustrates the relationship between asean centrality and individual leadership exercised by ams. asean centrality can be analyzed through the individual leadership of ams (stubbs, 2014). furthermore, borrowing from caballero-anthony’s twopronged approaches, asean centrality is applied on two levels; one is claimed as ‘centrality within’ asean and the other is projected externally as ‘centrality of’ asean (caballeroanthony, 2014). to investigate asean centrality within this framework, the research takes individual leadership of indonesia toward its projection internally, in relation with the rest of ams, and externally, in response to external stimulus. journal of asean studies 5 figure 1. relationship between asean centrality and individual leadership hence, as leadership can be projected by one state or a group of states, analyzing asean centrality in the light of regional conflict shows different dynamics. it is argued that leadership can be seen from three main aspects, the ability to take initiative, taking responsibility, and support from other members (stubbs, 2014). however, support from other members towards asean leadership is influenced by the domestic interests of each member state. furthermore, asean is not immune from external pressure although the impact varies. therefore, in analyzing asean centrality, the research proposes a new set of indicators cultivated from the previous framework involving individual country competencies to exercise leadership, the domestic interest of followers, and external pressures. research methods the adopted research methodology is structured and elaborated. first, as centrality can be exercised through leadership, the research scrutinizes indonesia's leadership in asean. this is done by looking at indonesia's ability to take initiative, responsibility and gain support from other members. as support from other members towards asean leadership is highly influenced by the domestic interests of each member state, an analysis of ams interests is provided. however, it is beyond the aim of research to contest leadership quality between ams leadership. instead, the research focuses on the constituting variables that affects indonesian leadership to uphold asean centrality. second, the research employs secondary data qualitative explorative research by focusing on comparative case studies. two case studies are presented: 1) preah vihear's (thaicambodia conflict) and 2) myanmar case, an ongoing conflict. the research acknowledges that preah vihaer and myanmar cases constitute a different set of domestic build-ups. even so, to minimize random selection trap, the research opts to select a comparative approach based on the variation of explanatory variables. it means that contradictory cases are selected to understand the extent of indonesia’s leadership. one case exhibits strong leadership and the other case shows weak leadership. the analyses then proceed to investigate the explanation of the differences (kaarbo & beasley, 1999). however, a degree of comparability is presented. both cases show the extent of indonesian leadership in solving the crisis. thai6 asean centrality cambodia conflict is treated as the base for a reference toward indonesia’s leadership in taking the initiative and responsibility for asean’s internal problem and as it lies ‘the methodology for dealing with future disputes’(international crisis group, 2011). at the same time, both case studies are chosen on the premise that conflicts are an internal asean issue that also received attention from the international public. additionally, the research acknowledges the limitation of the myanmar case as a non-past factum and suggests that future events will impact current analyses. nevertheless, by following the myanmar case the research is able to provide insight to the discussion on asean centrality in which indonesian leadership is constrained. third, the analyses take on two levels; the ‘centrality within’ and ‘centrality of’. the first level refers to indonesia, an individual asean state, exercising its internal leadership amongst its fellows ams. as asean is not immune from external pressure, the second level assesses indonesia's leadership in responding to external pressures and defending the unity of ams against it. results and discussions leadership quality: indonesia 'appropriate engagement' and institutional constraints clashes between cambodia and thailand over the preah vihear temple rose when in 2008 unesco gave the world heritage site to the cambodian government. tension already erupted since, however, it is in 2011 the firefighters become noticeable. the then secretarygeneral surin pitsuwan argued that the clash is 'open conflict' (wagener, 2011) even the unsc (united nations security council) has weighed into the conflict. issue of preah vihear was happening a few days before the 41st asean ministerial meeting (amm) in 2008 but the meeting failed to address the crisis. cambodia then proposed the creation of the asean inter-ministerial group to singapore as the chairman of asean (phan, 2015). singapore chairmanship offered to establish a contact group to help the effort in finding a peaceful solution to the issues, but it was rejected by thailand (“statement by minister for foreign”, 2012). when cambodia asked vietnam as asean chair to mediate in 2010, it was also rejected by thailand (wagener, 2011). any attempt was hindered because of the basic disagreement over the dispute settlement mechanism. thailand sought to address the dispute bilaterally while cambodia preferred a multilateral mechanism, involving the un and asean in the process. after the inaction for the past two years and upon the clashes that took place in february 4th and 5th 2011, indonesia who just resumed its position as asean chair in january 2011, took immediate actions. in ensuring asean ‘centrality within’ in the case of preah vihear, indonesia exhibited leadership quality by taking initiatives, assuming responsibilities, and was followed by other asean member states (ams). indonesia as asean chairman under foreign ministers (fm) marty natalegawa took the initiatives by first contacting conflicting parties, asean fms, and journal of asean studies 7 asean secretary-general in february 5th and 6th 2011 and followed immediately by a visit to each capital, bangkok and phnom penh, in february 7th and 8th 2011 for shuttle diplomacy. the shuttle diplomacy is important for several reasons: 1) to open a diplomatic window to solidify direct asean engagement, 2) to show asean's timely support towards the conflicting parties thus securing their confidence toward asean objectiveness under indonesia’s leadership, 3) to find a shared common ground for conflict management leading to dispute settlements, and 4) to prepare for a unified asean stance and cohesion on the issues (natalegawa, 2018). thus indonesia proposed 'appropriate engagement' referring to the comfortable middle way in between cambodia's preferences of multilateralism and thailand's reluctant (natalegawa, 2018). the result of the shuttle diplomacy was then consulted to all ams highlighting that despite the disagreement, both parties agreed to seek a peaceful settlement of the dispute and welcomed the willingness of indonesia to take responsibility as a 'hotline’ bridge between the two parties. the conclusion is well received by ams thus legitimizing indonesia’s leadership in the process. february 1st marks the start of the worsening condition in myanmar, in which myanmar’s military force has acquired full control of the country’s government in a coup d’état. the military managed to detain aung san suu kyi, myanmar’s civilian leader, and her national league for democracy (nld) party members. at the moment, min aung hlaing, who served as chairman of the state administration council of myanmar, is considered the country’s de facto leader as of february 2nd. though myanmar has gone back and forth between military and civilian leadership over the years, it is still considered to be a large step back for myanmar from fully democratizing the country or simply having a stable government. since 2011, the military has started to govern alongside and coexist with suu kyi's administration. however, during the november 2020 election, suu kyi has further advocated and campaigned for additional restrictions for the military's role in governing the country. seen as a high threat, especially since she succeeded to win 83% of the body's available seats, generals accused the election to be a sham. citing the 2008 constitution, the military declared a national emergency, allowing them to remain in power for a year long. the country's infrastructure was fully controlled and seized by the military, which results in: 1) broadcasts suspended, 2) domestic and international flights canceled, 3) suspension of phone and internet access, and 4) closure of stock markets and commercial banks. this worsening condition has turned peaceful protests by civilians into violent and deadly when two unarmed protesters were killed by security forces on february 20th. responding to the protests and civilian strikes, the armed forces have subsequently responded by violent means as well, by killing, assaulting, detaining, or torturing groups of civilians (goldman, 2021). indonesia has led the effort to come up with a peaceful solution to the myanmar crisis. it has given its best endeavors to rally up asean response through shuttle diplomacy in the series of informal asean ministerial meetings led by indonesian fm retno marsudi (“singapore, indonesia says asean”, 2021). upon the escalation of the conflict, indonesia proposed an initiative to hold the extraordinary asean leader's meeting (alm) (strangio, 8 asean centrality 2021). the alm was actually realized on 24th april 2021 in jakarta, five weeks after indonesian president, joko widodo, called for an asean special summit (drajat, 2021). jokowi sent a rather assertive response in which he referred to the development in myanmar as “unacceptable and cannot be continued” (“asean leaders’ meeting”, 2021). he pressed for myanmar’s commitment on a few fronts including the cessation of violence, initiation of inclusive dialogue process, and lastly the opening up access to humanitarian aid from asean. indonesia took the opportunity to host the alm meeting in asean secretariat, as brunei darussalam has declined to host the leaders meeting due to its limited diplomatic capacity and concern about the pandemic (bland, 2021). by inviting general min aung hlaing instead of aung su kyi, to alm asean is criticized for its acknowledgment of the junta as the official ruler. nevertheless, indonesia managed to bring general min aung hlaing, the top person of myanmar’s junta, to the alm in jakarta. it highlights indonesia's competence as a provider of good offices. it was also able to agree on the quite ambitious five points of consensus at the present of myanmar delegation. the five-point consensus is an asean collective response that highlight important follow-up states including; (1) there shall be an immediate cessation of violence in myanmar and all parties shall exercise utmost restraint, (2) constructive dialogue among all parties concerned shall commence to seek a peaceful solution in the interests of the people, (3) a special envoy of the asean chair shall facilitate mediation of the dialogue process, with the assistance of the secretary-general of asean, (4) asean shall provide humanitarian assistance through the aha centre, (5) the special envoy and delegation shall visit myanmar to meet with all parties concerned (asean secretariat, 2021). certainly, the meeting was heralded as a success of asean in addressing an urgent crisis. indonesia once again shows its experiences and leadership in managing the regional conflict. however, further scrutiny shows that indonesia’s role is limited in following up the 5 points of consensus due to further development. first, a tension on envoy election was taking place. the selected special envoys must have the qualification and experience to deliver mediation services and conflict management. to be legitimate, the special envoy must also have the confidence from myanmar and the rest of the members. indonesia preferred a single envoy and proposed hassan wirajuda, an experienced diplomat and the former indonesia foreign minister who has been involved during the preah vihear conflict. however, thailand was keener on sending a group of envoys further stressing the dissents amongst ams (“the failed mission”, 2021). second, as the chair of asean, brunei was entrusted to pick the special envoy, yet it failed to overcome the bureaucratic hindrances and resulted in a delay for more than a month since the five-point consensus agreed on alm (“asean, hurry up”, 2021). the delay was further when myanmar junta seems to back down its commitment arguing that “only after we achieve a certain level of security and stability, we will cooperate regarding that envoy" (septiari, 2021). indonesia's frustration was expressed by retno marsudi, indonesian foreign minister arguing that the delay ‘does asean no good’ as for months after the declaration of five-points consensus nothing is developed (allard & costa, 2021). journal of asean studies 9 third, on the 4th of june senior general min aung hlaing, met with brunei's second minister for foreign affairs erywan pehin yusof and the secretary-general of asean, lim jock hoi, in myanmar's capital, naypyitaw (“myanmar's junta chief”, 2021). the meeting was not handled well as yusof's visit was done without prior notification to fellow asean foreign ministers. what was more disappointing was that upon returning there were no briefings shared with the rest of the bloc (“the failed mission”, 2021). myanmar case, therefore, showed the limited role of indonesia’s leadership. asean centrality within in preah vihear case is strong due to the leadership portrayed by indonesia in taking the initiative and responsibility. however, the myanmar case shows the extent of indonesian leadership within asean. although indonesia has accumulated experience in providing good offices and even took initiatives to solve the problem, the lack of institutional mandate, being not the chairman, limits how far indonesia can exercise its leadership. indonesia did not encounter an obstacle in initiating the moves. however, its influence is seriously limited in following up the initiative and taking responsibility for the process of mediation when it stalled. domestic interests; rallying support or easing dissent in the preah vihear case, indonesia as the asean chair was finally able to achieve the first milestone in addressing the conflict. on the informal meeting of the asean fms in jakarta, february 2011, indonesia managed to broker an agreement that bangkok and pnomphen promised to take measures to prevent military clashes, welcome the dispatch of indonesian observer group to the further area, and resume bilateral talk with indonesia assistances (padden, 2011). in the 18th asean summit in jakarta, the cambodian and thailand government agreed on the term of reference of the indonesian observer team (iot) (asean secretariat, 2011). this is further supported by the head of government (hog) meeting between president sby, prime minister (pm) hun sen, and pm abhisit vejjajiva to reaffirm the ministerial summit decisions. further investigation reveals that the preah vihear temple conflict was driven by thailand's domestic interests (international crisis group, 2011). the cambodian decision to register the preah vihear temple to unesco was initially received as a non-threatening move. however, democratization caused the military to lose its power following the election of thaksin shinawatra. due to the competition within thailand yellow shirt vs redshirt factions, the issue has been developed into a national narrative to undermine thaksin's power. thaksin’s administration under pm samak sundaravey was accused of selling ‘the motherland’ as part of his business interest despite the policy having been previously supported by the military-installed administration (pongphisoot, 2011). other asean countries were not happy with the border tension between cambodia and thailand. yet they show an unresponsive attitude and inaction both during singapore and vietnam chairmanships. cambodia's attempts to seek mediation from asean secretary general both in 2008 and 2010 were without avail. ams was basing its inaction under the asean’s non-intervention policy. yet this behavior changes along with indonesia’s shuttle 10 asean centrality diplomacy and constructive engagement. through this approach indonesia manages to rally support from ams, creating a unified stance on the need to solve the border conflict immediately and in return giving indonesia legitimacy. quite contrary in the myanmar case dissents within ams have been already apparent since the start of the issues. each ams has different views, in which indonesia, malaysia, singapore are pushing more to stop the use of force against unarmed civilians, while thailand and vietnam supported by cambodia and laos have somehow accepted junta myanmar based on non-interference principles (anu editorial board, 2021). brunei's response to myanmar is in line with its capacity as asean chair. singapore expressed grave concern. pm lee hsien loong argued the use of violence was 'not acceptable' and 'disastrous' (aradhana, 2021).fm vivian balakrishnan denounced the armed forces for using lethal weapons against citizens but opposed sanctions to be imposed on myanmar, arguing that widespread measures would only hurt ordinary citizens instead of the military (“singapore says myanmar situation”, 2021). malaysia prime minister (pm) muhyiddin yassin stated that the asean's principle of non-interference should not lead to inaction if a domestic situation "jeopardizes the peace, security, and stability of asean and the wider region” (karmini, 2021). both singapore and malaysia governments have been supportive of indonesian efforts to create an asean collective response. on the other side, thailand avoided criticizing the coup and evoked the noninterference principle calling the coup an internal affair. however, this move is highly influenced by its junta rise making thailand the closest friend of myanmar military power (johnson & thepgumpanat, 2021). its leader even opted out of alm in april 2021 but instead sent thailand foreign minister (fm) to attend the meeting. the philippines' stance is in limbo. the government has condemned the military coup but also refused similar scrutiny towards its human rights record by the un. it admitted the unifying role of aung san suu kyi but also rejected the un statement which called upon the release (palatino, 2021). president duterte has not attended the alm in april, instead of sending his foreign minister. cambodia and laos take a similar stance with thailand by calling the coup an internal affair. president hun sen even stated that “cambodia does not comment on the internal affairs of any country at all, either within the asean (association of southeast asian nations) framework or any other country” (“cambodian leader hun sen”, 2021). laos abode the asean principles and sought to cooperate with asean (phonevilay, 2021), but it failed to send its leader to the alm in jakarta. vietnam did send its leader to attend the alm, but it was restrained in calling out to the myanmar junta leader. however, vietnam has reiterated that the country is ‘seriously concerned about the development in myanmar and seeks cooperation with asean' (“vn ‘seriously concerned’ about”, 2021). asean centrality in the case of indonesia’s leadership in preah vihear was strong. marty natalegawa was astute in his understanding that leadership quality requires support from another member. asean's good office under indonesia's presidency was only possible if it enjoyed the trust and confidence of the affected parties especially in terms of impartiality and objectivity (natalegawa, 2018). ams shows support and follows indonesia’s leadership. journal of asean studies 11 ams preferred to lean on its non-interferences policy and primacy of sovereignty but this only can be changed through a strong leadership portrayed by indonesia. while in the myanmar case, indonesia was only able to ease basic dissent by providing the first venue of mediation through the alm. further development showed that the stark dissent of ams's stance toward myanmar junta lends to the un-employability of any leaderfollower leadership framework. external pressures: undermining asean unity vs boosting confidences indonesia was portraying its leadership further by assuming responsibility in its role as chair of asean to keep the issue of preah vihear within a regional jurisdiction of asean. the issue of preah vihear was first brought to the united nations security council (unsc) by cambodia in 2008 when indonesia was seated as part of the council at that time. yet, there was no unified stance of asean (natalegawa, 2018). considering this, indonesia was firmed to further sustain asean centrality. several considerations drove indonesia's ambitions. first, it was very important not to turn the peaceful region into a war-ridden region. second, in line with asean’s fear of intervention and indonesia’s ‘bebas-aktif’ foreign policy, indonesia sought to avoid that the issue will be taken to an international setting. based on unsc article 8, conflict situation is brought to the unsc in the absence of regional-level conflict resolution. such a situation if happened will undermine asean further. third, indonesia has been a supporter of advancing regional organization roles in conflict prevention, management, and resolution. as, natalegawa argued, “to ensure asean becomes a ‘net contributor’ to international peace and security, principally by demonstrating its capacity to maintain the peace and stability of its immediate region” (natalegawa, 2018). forth, acknowledging the asean's effort to solve the issues is an example of subsidiarity principles that boost asean's credibility. as suspected, an invitation from unsc came in during a special meeting on the 14th of february for indonesia, as asean chairman under article 39 of unsc provisional procedure. indonesia was consulted on the issue at stake and was able to present unified agreements of asean. unsc was supportive of the asean role and appreciated indonesia’s mediating effort as asean chair (putra et al., 2013; unsc, 2011). the document further specifying the reference of indonesia as ‘current chair of asean’ was seen as a boost toward indonesia’s credibility. another support on asean’s primacy was given by the icj, when in july 2011 acknowledged rendered its provisional measures to both cambodia and thailand should cooperate with asean (phan, 2015). in the case of myanmar, international pressure is palpable. the united states labelled the takeover as a coup. us secretary of state, blinken accuses the security forces as a “reign of terror” (“myanmar coup,” 2021). biden administration imposed sanctions, freezing assistance directed to the burmese government but will maintain support to the people (“biden-harris administration”, 2021). there european union has prepared a third sanction for myanmar, even though the efficacy of sanctions has been in question as it has yet shown an obvious impact on the military regime (“asean diplomacy in myanmar”, 2021). while 12 asean centrality china argued that the situation in myanmar is "absolutely not what china wants to see” (“asean leaders to visit myanmar”, 2021), but still blocked unsc’s statement condemning the coup. therefore, united national will be largely ‘toothless’ (anu editorial board, 2021) in dealing with myanmar. despite their grave concern, major powers have left the issue of myanmar to asean to handle (poling, 2021). european union like other external power endorsed its support to asean. foreign affairs chief josep borrell emphasized that “to find a political solution for the myanmar situation belongs to asean” (“asean diplomacy in myanmar”, 2021). it further reaffirms asean primacy in solving the myanmar issues. in april liechtenstein with the support of 48 countries, drafted a unga resolution to apply arms embargo to myanmar, “calling for an immediate suspension of the direct and indirect supply, sale or transfer of all weapons, munitions and other military-related equipment to myanmar” (“asean makes half-hearted”, 2021). this resolution was opposed through a letter from the nine remaining ams. asean comes in defend of the myanmar junta regime has met with criticism (taylor & westfall, 2021), but further scrutiny reveals that it is in line with asean principles. the limiting norms of non-interference and the fear of external intervention have led asean to forge a united front amidst external pressure. although being postponed due to not having enough support to pass, the resolution is finally adopted in june when unga passed its resolution; 119 in favors, 36 abstains, and 1 against. indonesia, malaysia, singapore with philippines and vietnam support in favors of the passing, while cambodia, laos, and thailand vote against it. brunei darussalam as asean chair voted against the resolution (unifeed, 2021). although the resolution was criticized due to its failure in including the arms embargo, it shows dissents within asean member states in the external platform and the lack of internal regional leadership. the latest development shows a unifying stance within ams to exclude myanmar junta from the asean summit. instead, asean chooses to invite the non-political figure to the annual summit (geddie, 2021). asean centrality of asean on both issues prevails in which international organization, un in both case and icj (international court of justice) in preah vihear conflict lend its support to asean. un and icj's confidence in asean to manage the problem strengthened under the principle of subsidiarity. although to a different degree, major powers were also show their preferences on leaving things to asean in both cases. however, indonesia delivered its leadership differently. in the preah vihear case, indonesia’s strong leadership supports asean centrality. however, indonesia's leadership in myanmar’s case against the international community has yet on par with the preah vihear temple case. asean shows its unity by successfully toning down the un resolution drafting to exclude the arms embargo, but the final vote shows a divided asean. indonesia is followed by malaysia and singapore, as well philippines and vietnam. while brunei as the chair of asean vetoed against along with thailand, a strong supporter of junta myanmar as well fellow cmlv countries, laos and cambodia. adrift between the mainland and continental asean was apparent in the myanmar case. however, this drift does not stay long as asean fm has decided to exclude junta myanmar to attend its asean summit. institutional journal of asean studies 13 mandate has proven influential in assessing indonesia's leadership in maintaining asean unity against external pressure. conclusions the research finds that in both cases, asean centrality varies as indonesia leadership depends on mutually inclusive variables. the three main variables influencing asean centrality are individual country competencies to exercise leadership especially the institutional mandate they received, the domestic interest of followers, and prevailing external pressures. in the discussed cases, indonesia acts in line with the asean charter in its efforts as both asean chair and individual member to address the issues. despite having experiences in conflict management and mediation as well as providing good offices. the asean institutional mandate becomes a determining variable in ensuring how far indonesia can extend its leadership. due to the sensitive nature of the asean political bloc, any attempt of dispute settlement must be carefully weaved to produce the intended results. domestic interests are projected regionally. the higher the gap within ams, the lower the chance to produce a unified stance. more than often states use the asean charter principles involving the respect for independence and sovereignty and non-interference as a shield. thus, enhanced consultation on matters seriously affecting an individual country is crucial in any leadership. external pressure is a constant variable in asean regional building. asean was created in response to it and this historical legacy stays intact until the present times. a combination of those three variables determines asean centrality. as shown in the case of preah vihear, indonesia's leadership was strong since it received support not only from external powers but also internally as the domestic stance is unified. while in the case of myanmar, indonesia’s leadership is weak even though external powers lend their support towards the asean mechanism, individual domestic dissent further complicates the process. finally, this dissent spills over to the international platforms creating a vague cohesion. additionally, the research finds that a single sub-variable of the institutional mandate has a significant impact on the strong-week pendulum of asean centrality. in the case of the preah vihear temple, indonesia has been able to defend asean centrality through its leadership as asean chairs. meanwhile, in the myanmar case, indonesia’s leadership has been constrained and limited due to the absence of the mandate as a chair. however, the research disagrees that institutional mandate is the sole indicator that can determine the strength of asean centrality as leadership quality comprises beyond only a mandate. the finding also contradicts the general confidence in indonesia’s natural leadership in asean. instead, the research shows that the exercise of leadership within an established institution is constrained by the very institutional framework. however, due to the limited scope of analysis presented here, it is beyond the aim of research to extrapolate the extent of 14 asean centrality the institutional constraints. further comparative research across the asean presidency and how their leadership affects asean centrality is encouraged to provide the answer to this question. in conclusion, whether asean centrality remains strong or eroded in the coming years depends on the leadership exercised by its member states. however, leadership requires not only competency and quality of individual ams but also support from the rest of the member amidst external power influences. table 1. comparative of indonesia leadership asean centrality leadership quality domestic interest of followers external pressure preah vihear • indonesia’s role as the asean chair is strong as it took initiative, held responsibilities and its actions were supported by the other ams. • indonesia gain supports from its institutional mandate as the asean chair. • the domestic interest of ams was quite unanimous, preferring the stability in the region. hence resulted in support to indonesia’s leadership. • external pressure was apparent. • subsidiarity principle was keptun and icj giving asean the responsibility to address its regional problem. • indonesia shows a bigger role in its capacity as asean chair myanmar • indonesia’s role was limited because it has no institutional authority: not the asean chair. • it can take initiative but facing challenges to follow up the initiative. • domestic interest is varied. • support to junta comes from thailand due to its own experiences. • other ams has reservations as fear of intervention is high, even though official endorsement on asean mechanism is given, albeit somehow vaguely. • external pressure was apparent. • asean shows a degree of collective vs • fragmentation. • indonesia's leadership is limited, specific to the ‘like-minded’. • the absence of institutional mandates. about the authors ratih indraswari is a faculty member at parahyangan catholic university bandung and currently a doctoral student at ewha womans university, seoul. journal of asean studies 15 references 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cbds bina nusantara university and indonesian association for international relations issn 2338-11361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic women on the steering wheel: identifying the potentials of women in improving the protection of indonesian women migrant workers sylvia yazid parahyangan catholic university, indonesia elisabeth s. dewi parahyangan catholic university, indonesia abstract this paper is based on a research that looked into the potentials of women as stakeholders in improving the protection of indonesian women migrant workers abroad. it was designed based on the assumptions that an identification of the potentials of women at various levels and in different institutions may positively contribute to the efforts of finding solutions for the problems faced by women migrant workers. rather than being seen merely as victims, women should be seen as actors who can actively participate in addressing the problems. this paper analyzes efforts made by a number of indonesian women who are publicly recognized for their works in promoting the protection of indonesian women migrant workers, both as state and non-state actors in the context of policy making. the focus is on how these women perceive the extent to which their efforts have been able to influence the policy making process. the discussion also includes how the women responded to the challenges and opportunities that they encounter as part of their learning process. the data for this paper was gathered through interviews with six prominent woman figures who are known for their work on the issue of women migrant workers. while confirming that as actors outside the government these women have made efforts to influence the policy making process, this paper showcases that the actual impact of their efforts is highly determined by the policy environment. keywords: women, policy actors, policy making, protection of women migrant workers introduction the research for this paper is underpinned by two main issues,the first being the high number of indonesian women working abroad in the informal sector doing temporary, contract based, and informal works and the second being the potentials of indonesian women themselves in improving the protection of their fellow women citizens who are working abroad. the first stage of the research was focused on identifying the women public figure in indonesia’s labour migration system, perceived to be potential in improving the protection for the women migrant workers. the initial findings was presented in tu dortmund, germany and published in jurnal global & strategis (yazid 2015). the research was then continued by actually journal of asean studies 103 interviewing a number of selected respondents at the national level. this second stage of the research was framed by concepts frompolicy studies with the focus on how actors outside the government can influence the making of policies on migrant workers. the first publication has highlighted the development of labour migration from indonesia and the feminization of this type of migration. although the data on labour migration from indonesia is very much limited and unreliable, particularly as it does not include undocumented migrants ones, the general trend of the placement of indonesian workers abroad can be seen in figure 1 below: figure 1. placement of indonesian workers abroad based on gender 19942014 source: created based on the data from bnp2tki ( 2015) the above chart shows how the numbers of female migrant workers are continuously above those of male. this has contributed to the growing attention toward the feminization of labour migration. other contributing factors are the micro and macro economic significance of the remittances they bring into the country and the problematic characteristic of their work, particularly of those working in informal sector.1 a number of study (chant 1992; yamanaka and piper 2005; ball and piper 2006; loveband 2006; young 2006) has made feminization of labour migration as their focus, or at least as a major element. however, in most of those studies, women are mainly seen as ‚victims‛ of malpractices in the labour migration process. our paper writing departs from an assumption that it is crucial to see women not only as ‚passive actors‛ in the context of labour migration. therefore, it focuses on the potentials of female stakeholders, other than the migrant women workers themselves such as activists, politicians, parliamentarians and other women stakeholders – in addressing the problems faced indonesian women migrant workers. it particularly looks at the relative positions of the women stakeholders vis-a-vis the formulation of policies on the protection of indonesian workers abroad; what they have done while they are or were in those positions and the opportunities they have been using and the challenges they are facing. it is expected that by doing so, this paper will contribute to the efforts of formulating and implementing a better protecting mechanism for indonesian women migrant workers by identifying the efforts worth making by specific actors. this research uses the arguments from policy studies because it is assumed that it is the official state policies that can have wide impact and be legally binding. thus, if the aim is to formulate more pro women migrant workers policies, it is 1 a discussion on the problems commonly faced by indonesian women migrant workers at each stage of their migration process – pre-departure, departure, during employment, and post-employment – can be seen in yazid, s., 2013, indonesia’s civil society in the age of democratization: ngo responses on the issue of labour migration, baden-baden: nomos. 104 women on the steering wheel necessary to identify the existence and potentials of women who are involved in the labour migration process to maximize their contribution to the improvement of the protection of women migrant workers. for those reasons, this research uses the concept of policy process from policy studies. although in practice it is almost impossible to draw a clear line between each stage of the policy proses and the stages do not always occur in sequence, in general the policy process involves agenda-setting, when an issue become the focus of attention of the government; policy formulation, when policy options are formulated by the government; decision making, when the government choose to act or not; policy implementation, when the policy is implemented; and policy evaluation, when the result or impact of the policy implementation is monitored by the government and other actors in the society and the result will trigger the start of the next policy cycle (howlett, perl and ramesh 2003, p. 11). this research analyzes what certain women stakeholders can do at each stage of the policy process to ensure that the policies made and implemented can ensure the protection for women migrant workers. it looks into both domestic and foreign policies due to the crossing national borders characteristic of labor migration. as mentioned in the first publication (yazid 2015), the focus on identifying the position of women and what they have done and could dois inspired by the work of cynthiaenloe (2000), bananas, beaches and bases: making feminist sense of international politics. therefore, this research portrays indonesian women in the way that enloe (2000, p. 15) calls as‚beyond the global victim‛. moving beyond the continuous discussion on how women became victims in the problematic migration process andstarting to identify women with various positions and potentials within the labour migration system will provide deeper understanding of the problems and contribute to the effort of providing protection for indonesian women migrant workers abroad. literatures on public policy have identified actors perceived to be determining the process of making, implementing, and monitoring public policy. simon (2007), for example, has identified the main actors in the formulation of policies. he also specifically identified them in the field of like defence, public health, education, etc. however, the discussion is still dominated by formal actors who are in the executive and legislative institutions. interest groups are already mentioned but only referring to formal institutions that actually have access to the policy process. therefore, this research aims to contribute to the policy studies with its focus on individual stakeholders. in 1984, john w. kingdon published a book titled agendas, alternatives, and public policies, which has been up-dated and re-published several times since then. according to kingdon (1984, p. 48) actors who do not hold formal position in the government include: interest groups, researcher, academic, consultant, media, party and other election related participants and the public in general. kingdon admitted that it is obviously difficult to draw a clear line between those ‚inside‛ and ‚outside‛ the government. particularly since the relations between both groupings are open and the flow of information is quite strong through networks built by these actors. nevertheless, differentiation is still needed because those inside have formal authorities whichthose outside do not. kingdon’sinitial arguments on how the identified actors influence the policy making in the united states are used as departing points of the discussion on the efforts made by the actors identified in this research. journal of asean studies 105 women policy influencer, the question of who where and what have they done the initial stage of the field research was an identification of potential respondents, based on their past and present positions and activities within the migration system in order to later group them under the policy influencer grouping. it was able to identify around 20 women who are and/or were academics, journalists, doctors, social activists, lawyers, government officers, politicians, artists, and public figures. we decided and were able to contact and interview a number of them to represent each grouping of policy influencer, as formulated by kingdon in his book. for an actor to be influential toward a policy making process, he or she should have access to the policy making process or be able to generate public opinion. therefore, the respondents we chose are those who can access the policy making process and/or public figures who are likely to shape public opinion. they were interviewed with a set of questions, aimed at cultivating information on their relative positions vis-à-vis the policy making process, the efforts they have made to improve the protection of indonesian women migrant workers, the opportunities they have made use of and the challenges they have faced. the result is as follows. interest groups: anngo activists the first actor identified by kingdon as an actor outside the government is interest group. according to kingdon (1984, p. 52), interest groups conduct varied activities. it can take the form of influencing policy agenda or alternatives considered by policy makers. they can push for a new policy direction or even preventchanges to occur. they direct government’s attention toward certain issue by mobilizing supports, writing letters, sending delegations, and encouraging their partners to act similarly. the principle used here is the louder they are, the more they will be heard. however, kingdon (1984, p. 53) also highlights that interest group is not the only determining factor for an issue to be considered by the government, there are others. moreover, when an issue has become a policy agenda, interest group cannot control the rest of the process. kingdon (1984, 54) also states that there are more cases where interest group reject policy agenda than where they suggest one. to represent this type of actor, we chose anis hidayah, the executive director of migrant care, an ngo working on the protection of indonesian migrant workers (hidayah, 27 june 2014). anis is not the only migrant workers advocates associated with an ngo but her activism and her public profile has made her one of the few that stands out. furthermore, she is chosen to represent interest groups because as commonly found in indonesia when an activist becomes the leader of an ngo, his/her works become more identical with organizations he/she is leading. this is apparent in the interview with anis with her frequent reference to what migrant care has done in answering the interview questions. this research first identified the respondent’s position vis-a-vis the process of making policies on the protection of indonesian workers abroad. this information is used as a starting point in analyzing what they have done and the challenges and opportunities each respondent is facing. the basic assumption is that the closer a stakeholder to the center of policy making, the more influencing they can be. mid-1990s, anis was already a student activist which enabled her to interact with and join local organizations. 106 women on the steering wheel at that time she was already in touch with migrant workers issues and continued to do so when she started her career as a member of solidaritas perempuan east java at the end of 1990s. anis then became a volunteer in kopbumi2 and established migrant care3 in 2004. for her dedication in giving leverage to issues faced by indonesian domestic workers in various countries and stopping a number of violence against them, she has been awarded alison des forges for extraordinary activism by human rights watch in 2012. anis is also active at the regional and international level. in 2013, for example, she was involved in 100 women conference conducted by bbc. she is a member of executive committee of migrant forum in asia since 2008 and frequently joined regional forums on migrant workers. in 2014, anis received another award in the field of human rights, yap thiam hien award. for anis hidayah, relationship with the government has taken take two forms, personal and institutional (hidayah, 27 june 2014). anis claimed to be personally close with a number of policy makers in the governmental institutions such as the ministry of labour, ministry of foreign affairs, and ministry of women empowerment and protection of children. on the other hand, institutionally anis described migrant care to be ‚face to face with‛ or in opposition to the government. while her organization is positioned rather away from the government, anis makes use of personal lobbying in building rapport with policy makers. in terms of involvement in the stages of migration 2 consortium of indonesian migrant workers advocacy is a consortium of migrant workers advocates. its main agenda was to pass a law on the protection of the rights of indonesian migrant workers. 3a national ngo which focuses on strengthening the protection of migrant workers’s rights. process, according to anis, migrant care exists at every stage, from providing information and trainings at the prerecruitment stage to monitoring the going home process. stakeholders identified which effort is more dominant for their positions, whether it is personal or institutional, and whether the effort is directed more toward influencing policies or handling cases. efforts made by anis through migrant care include providing information media for pre-departure in the form of guide book, leaflet about the migrant workers’ rights and conducting trainings on safe migrationandanti-trafficking for migrant workers communities. migrant carealso provides legal assistance for migrant workers with legal problems. migrant care has also initiated migrant worker care village which is a model for protection at the village level by providing services from pre-recruitment to returning stage. by doing this, the village has control and role in protecting their people. from all the efforts above, according to anis the most dominant is case handling to ensure that migrant workers’ rights are fulfilled. the information gathered from the case handling process is then used to put pressure on the policy makers. anis sees her efforts with her institution as efforts to organize the voice of migrant workers because the information gathered from case handling is also used to channel their voice through international organizations like ilo and national media and international media like the jakarta post, cnn and aljazeera. the impacts of an action made by a stakeholder are also determined by the partners they are working with. anis could easily mentioned migrant care’s partners at each level. at the international level, their partners include human rights watch, journal of asean studies 107 amnesty internasional, and walk free. at the regional level, migrant care is a part of migrant forum asia. at the national level, migrant care joins networks of civil society organizations and at the local level they work with ngos that are concern with the issue of women migrant workers. their partners also come from various backgrounds, including social media like change.org. the media supports in disseminating information on the issues of migrant workers to influence the policy makers. the media also form strong public solidarity toward the efforts made by migrant care. the ability of stakeholders to identify and make use of the opportunities they have and also the ability to identify and overcome the challenges they are facing, determine the impacts of the efforts they make and the sustainability of the efforts. anis hidayah sees the existence of migrant care’s networks as an opportunity because it can leverage the voice and pressures. as for challenges, anis sees the involvement of the ‚mafia‛ as a big challenge because it involves a significant number of actors. the business practice which tendsto become a human trafficking practice and the lack of political will from the government are also considered as challenges. anis hidayah’s works with her organizations fit into what kingdon (1984) describes as interest group. personally and through her organization, migrant care, she has made various efforts to influence the processes of making and implementing policies to guarantee the fulfillment of migrant workers’ rights, particularly those of women. the activities conducted by anis with her organization tend to lean toward the efforts of changing policies and direct the attention of policy makers toward a certain aspect of the labour migration, in this case protection, through various ways and medias. anis’ experience also confirms kingdon’s statement that influence is more likely to happen if the voice voicing it is louder. anis through migrant care, tries hard to widen her network and use various media to amplify their voice. however, also in line with kingdon’s argument, their campaign is not strong enough to become a determiner in policy making because other factors such as issue or agenda preferences of policy makers and the focus of media attention still play determining roles. academics, researchers, and consultants: a reputable scholar kingdon position the group of academics, researchers and consultants as another influential non-state actor after interest group (kingdon 1984, p. 57). his research found that politicians ask inputs from this group for matters of their concern and solutions for problems they are facing (kingdon 1984, p. 59). in terms of short and long term impacts, according to kingdon, academics tend to influence the framework of thinking in the long term. in the short time, policy makers will listen to academics when the analysis and proposal they made directly related to the problems which have already become their focus of attention (kingdon 1984, p. 59). therefore, if academics and researchers want to create short term impacts, they need to know what are in the mind of the policy makers or they need to be inside the government (kingdon 1984, p. 59-60). sulistyowati irianto was chosen to represent this group because she is one of the leading indonesian academics on the issue of labour migration with substantial research, publication and network (iriyanto, 18 may 2014). sulis is the head of the interdisciplinary graduate programme at 108 women on the steering wheel the university of indonesia and a professor of law anthropology at the same university. from 2002 to 2010 she became the head of center for women and gender studies in university of indonesia. she is one of the editors of jurnalperempuan and the writer of a number of books on women and law, including that on access to justice for indonesian domestic workers in uae which she wrote in 2008. in 2014 sulis received an award as a scholar with outstanding achievements from a national newspaper, kompas. as a researcher, sulis has conducted researches and disseminated the results of her researches to policy makers through the ministry of manpower and members of the parliament. her research which was funded by a research center in canada has been turned into a book and policy briefs for countries needing it, advocacy materials for ngos, and presentations in various seminars. during her time in the center for women and gender studies, she also conducted research and policy advocacy with ngos to amend uu 39/2004 on the placement and protection of indonesian workers abroad. in terms of her relative position to policy makers, sulis could not pin point her position. she even stated, ‚i do not really know if they listen enough, if they are curious enough, and if they actually read my writings‛. according to sulis, this condition might be related to the condition of the bureaucracies who are difficult in accommodating changes, the corruption practices, and the absence of courageus and visionare leaders. in terms of the stages of migration, sulis as an academic looks into the whole process. in conducting her activities, sulis has worked with ngos at the local level such as sbmi4 and komnas perempuan5. although the cooperation between themis not continuous, tend to happen only when needed to address cases, it can be seen that as an academic, sulis is not isolated in what is usually known as ‚the ivory tower‛. she tries to vary her efforts and interact with various actors. unfortunately, sulis tends to see that her opportunity as an academic is small. as she stated: ‚as an academic i do not feel that i have power. we have small power, only conducting research, making policy brief, giving recommendation, helping ngos, and conducting law reform.‛ this shows that academics are still positioned within the outer ring of the process of making policies on migrant workers. as for challenges, sulis mentioned financial one considering research grant is usually not big and the lack of support from the government in terms of permissions to conduct research. therefore, sulis choose to build her networks abroad including with academics in destination country such as saudi arabia. sulis’ statements have led to a confirmation of kingdon’sarguments. the policy brief, research and books produced by sulis can be used by related and interested stakeholders, particularly the government. they can be used to seek for both short term and long term solutions. nevertheless, whether her works are utilized or not really depends on the policy makers and to date, sulis still perceived that academics do not have big enough influence on the policy making process. using kindon’s terms, sulis is not inside the government and she does not know what are in the mind of the policy makers. 4 indonesian migrant workers union 5 national commission on violence against women journal of asean studies 109 media: a veteran journalist kingdon sees media as an actor that influentially determines policy agendas because the media can influence public opinion (kingdon 1984, p. 61). according to him, media coverage on a certain issue influence the attention of policy makers because as members of the society policy makers also follow coverages from the mass media and the media influence their constituents. however, his research revealed that the influence is not as big as expected. he thinks that one of the reasons is the tendency for media to cover an issue only for a short period of time and immediately move to the next one (kingdon 1984, p. 62). kingdon also thinks that the tendency for media to cover an issue which is newsworthy in a dramatic way also reduce the impacts on the determination of policy agendas becausenews usually tend to be dramatic towards the end of a policy making process. nevertheless, kingdon sees the importance of mass mediain other forms (kingdon 1984, pp. 63-64). first, media can become communicators in a policy community, connecting those who are inside the government with those outside. this kind of communication also occurs through non-daily media such as journals in certain field. second, media can widen a movement which has been initiated at certain places by speeding the development and amplifying the impacts. third, if the assumption is that public opinion influence participants in policy making, then the attention of the participants toward public opinion shows the importance of media. fourth, although those who are already inside or have direct access probably will not need the media, those who are outside the policy making process need the media to get the attention of government officers. to represent the media, the chosen respondent is dewi anggraeni, a woman now living in australia (anggraeni, 19 may 2014). dewi is well-known as one of the senior journalists among journalists in indonesia and australia. she writes for leading media in indonesia like majalah tempo and english newspaper the jakarta post and she is also a contributor to australian media such as the age, the australian financial review and the canberra times. in 2006 dewi recorded the stories of indonesian women migrant workers in singapore, malaysia, and hongkong, supported by the international labor organization, in a book titled dreamseekers: indonesian women as domestic workers in asia. the beginning of dewi’s interest towards the issue of migrant workers reflects how the media perceives an issue. as she stated: “after i observed it for years, because as a journalist i actually did not specialize on the issue of migrant workers. but after years of paying close attention, i then notice that what the media is covering is something interesting. if there is nothing interesting or there is no news value in it, it will not be published.” her statement highlights the fact that an issue can only become a news item if it has selling value. thus, dewi decided to write a book which is more continuously accessible, consisting of a summary of the situation faced by indonesian migrant workers. until now, the book is still used as a reference by a number of researches on indonesian migrant workers. in identifying the efforts that she has made, dewistated that as a writer and a journalist she continues to write topics related to the issues faced by women migrant workers, in general media like 110 women on the steering wheel tempo and the jakarta globe and women media like pesona. from the feedback she received, dewi feels that the readers are moved by the opinions and columns she wrote. in terms of migration stages, dewi believes that her work covers all stages. dewi also claims to have worked with various actors. unfortunately, on the same note with sulis, dewi also does not believe that she can influence policies. as she stated, ‚only when my book is read by people and it helps people to understand, then the people can put pressure on the government. so it is a long way. direct influence does not exist.‛ it shows how the influence of media occurs through the shaping of public opinion which is then expected to put pressure on the government. for opportunities, dewi sees her access to the media as an opportunity which she continues to use. as for challenges, dewi mentioned the values in the indonesian society, the negative behavior of the women dosmetic workers which create stigma and negative stereotype on women migrant workers, and distortion of values. she also sees that what exist in the society is reflected in the government. that is why dewi tries to change the existing stigma through the stories which she wrote and the people read. dewi’s opinion is in line with kingdon’s statement that the influence of mass media is yet to be as big as expected. the writings of dewi anggraeni are yet to significantly shape public opinion, let alone influence the attention of legislators. her writings are still at the stage of moving the people reading her book. moreover, the duration of an issue to stay as a headline really depends on its selling value, often too short to shape public opinion. in the case of women migrant workers another factor that needs to be considered is the magnitude of the media coverage at the time it was covered. the case of nirmala bonat6 and nunukan7 for example, the time span of the coverage was not that long but they were quite big and supported by migrant workers’ advocates that it led to a policy change (yazid 2013, p. 28). this has further confirmed that influence is also determined by the number of actors involved. elections-related participants: members of parliament according to kingdon, because election produces officers who eventually will make important decisions in the government, election influences policy agendas (kingdon 1984, p. 65). the promises made during campaigns can influence policy agendas but kingdon do not see it as an automatic process because it still requires commitment from those chosen (kingdon 1984, p. 67). in relation to election, kingdon also thinks that the political party’s platform influence policy agendas. it becomes interesting in indonesia’s context where political party is seen to be not having clear enough platforms, where political parties are still relying on figure popularity and where money politic is still an issue. to confirm the influence of election-related participants, we chose two women figure from a political party which is often associated with the issue of migrant workers. 6 nirmala bonat is one of the many indonesia women migrant workers abused in malaysia whose case caught the attention of many, especially the media. 7nunukan is a district at the border between indonesia and malaysia in the island of kalimantan (borneo). in 2002 thousands of undocumented indonesian migrant workers were deported by malaysia and stranded in nunukan journal of asean studies 111 ribka tjiptaning (19 august 2014) this figure is chosen because she led commission ix of dpr-ri (manpower and transmigration, demography and health) where the issue of migrant workers was included in it for the period of 2009-2014. ribka took the political track by becoming the member of pdip since 1983 and she has served as a member and the head of commission ix for two periods. with her background as a doctor, ribka was assigned to this commission and since the commission also covers the issue of labour, ribka also dealt with the issue of migrant workers. ribka emphasized that their efforts as the parliamentarians were made with the government. as a member of the parliament she claimed to have urged, pushed, and put pressures in meeting with related ministries. ribka sees this as a political contract with the people which if not implemented should be sanctioned. through the parliament, she also formed a special team and a monitoring team which involved members from other commissions. for the issue of migrant workers, according to ribka their governmental partners are bnp2tki,8 and the ministry of manpower. but from her explanation, it can be assumed that the relationship is not that good. ribkaalso stated that she often had to face challenges from the legal umbrella, such as laws. therefore, she argued for a bigger role of the state leader. ribka believes that one of the challenges is indonesia’s weak bargaining power because it does not have a law on domestic worker. while in the parliament, the challenges she faced was the existence of fears among the parliamentarians such as fears that indonesian domestic workers are 8 national agency for placement and protection of. indonesian overseas workers not yet readyto compete for more skilled works and fears that the domestic workers will form a union, combined witha thick existence of feodalism culture. according to her, these have hindered the process of formulating the law on domestic workers and the revision of law no. 39/2004. ribka also hoped for greater spontaneity from the members of the government. she would like to see the members of parliament to actually go to the field and give material assistance, not just trying to solve the problems through series of meetings. ribka also hopes for the increase of the number of women in the parliament because she believes that with the sharper and more motherly women instinct, there will be deeper empathy. she also believes that women have stronger determination which makes it more difficult to ‚lobby‛ them. ribka argues that women neeed to take strategic and key position in the political parties, not only as a complimentary element to fulfill the quota. she further argues that it is difficult for women to be independent in the parliament because political parties are their ‚vehicles‛ limiting their actions to those in accordance with the parties’ agendas. as for challenges outside the parliament, ribka also sees the understanding of the migrant workers as something difficult to change because they already believe that being a woman migrant worker is a solution. rieke dyah pitaloka (25 august 2014) rieke is an actress turned parliamentarian from pdip. as a parliament member, rieke believes that she has implemented her legislative function by fighting for the bill on migrant workers to be included in the national legislation programme in 2009 with her extraparliamenter network which included 112 women on the steering wheel ngos. she was also active in the parliament’s working group and special committee. with the view that the people’s representatives seem to be in a ‘glass house’, rieke thinks that they should open communication and be monitored by all their constituents. that is why she always tried to work with civil society organisations and their networks. rieke even recruited a researcher from ecosoc institute as her staff to assist in the discussion process of legislations and communicate with the network outside the parliament. rieke also tries to make the meeting of the working group in the parliament to be open for public. since this is yet to be possible in every parliamentary meeting, she assigns her staff to be present in the meetings and disseminate the information they gathered to their networks. her interactions with those concerned with the issue of indonesian migrant workers, including academics, researchers, and heads of local governments are in the form of inviting them to give inputs. rieke sees her status as a parliament member as an opportunity which she make use by asking to be assigned in the commission which take care of the issues of migrant workers. she stated that her party allows its members to propose the position they want according to their qualification. interestingly, different from ribka, she refused to consider the fact that she is a woman as a differentiating or determining factor. rieke perceives the political fights in the legislation process as a challenge. her effort is to fight it through parliamentary and extra-parliamentary movements. she also tries to make the parliament to actually become the representatives of the people and to allow public control or active citizenship to be present in the parliaments’ meeting rooms by informing the meetings’ schedule. rieke also sees the lack of political will from the policy makers to protect indonesian migrant workers as a challenge. according to her, parliament members have to have the perspective of welfare for all indonesians. in a slightly different point of view, ribka and rieke who come from the same political party has committed to the making of policies on migrant workers. to a certain extent, both of them have confirmed kingdon’s opinion that what is done by members of the parliament is really determined by the stand of his/her political party. although whether indonesian political parties have platforms or not is still a big question, it can be said that these two women can continuously fight for the protection of women migrant workers because their party allows them to do so. another point worth highlighted is that although there is a special quota for women in the parliament, their influence is still limited by a number of factors such as the small number, the not so strategic position, and the compliance to political party’s stand. public figure: a vocal celebrity this category is not mentioned by kingdon but we believe that it should be included because in indonesian society, public figure, particularly the celebrities are often viewed as capable in forming public opinion. to represent the women from this category, we choose melanie subono, known as a celebrity9 who is quite vocal and concern about the issues of indonesian migrant workers and anti-slavery (subono, 27 june 2014). melanie started with her close 9 melanie subono is a singer and the daughter of a well-known concert promotor in indonesia. journal of asean studies 113 relationship with suci munir, the wife of the late munir. she then studied the case of marsinah and other labour cases. aware of her position as a public figure, this woman has been using social media as a tool to increase awareness among indonesians about the issues of migrant workers. melanie’s efforts and achievements motivated migrant care to ask her to be their ambassador. melanie sees herself as a campaigner, a socializer, ambassador of migrant care, ambassador of walk free who is also learning to go to the field. about proximity to the decision maker, melanie feels that decision makers are not open to the people. melanie is more focusing on the victim or in other words when the problems surface but she is trying to be involved in the preparation stage. melanie sees the young generation of indonesia as apathetic because they are rarely involved in the discussion on politics, rights and laws. she would like the talks on human rights to be part of a lifestyle. to do so, melanie use social media like twitter and facebookto run fun and friendly campaigns to be close to the people. according to melanie, her main effort is to inform and encourage society’s movement. therefore melanie sees the society as her main partner. the significant number of her follower in social media is also seen as an opportunity to spread information. as for the challenge, she mentioned the inability of people in strategic positions. personally, she has to sacrifice her artistic work because her albums are considered non-comercial. she also gets fewer invitations to perform on tv and on stages compared to before she actively campaign on human rights issues, including those of women migrant workers, because she is considered as a provocator. stereotype also becomes a hindrance for her, for she is less respected for wearing tattoos. melanie’s experience is yet to prove a strong influence on process of making policies on women migrant workers. her campaigns have not resulted in a mayor policy changes. nevertheless, her actions have brought the issue to a bigger audience, particularly the younger generation, which in many cases today is believed to be the potential target to be influenced if change is expected. as the above discussion shows, there is a difference in the way the questions are answered, depending on the status of the respondent in their institutions. those with more independent professions like journalists and academics tend to refer to efforts, opportunities and challenges related to herself as an individual. meanwhile, for those in a larger institution, the same questions tend to be answered with reference to their institutions. while working individually may give independency, affiliation with an institution may allow bigger impact, thus stronger influence. the interviews also show how the women actors perceive their identity as women differently. some respondents see their identity as a woman as a potential differentiating factor which may contribute to the betterment of their activisms. others, however, argue that the differentiation is not necessary. in the context of influencing the policy making process, these women who are mainly outside the main circle of policy making do not see their influence on policy making as something significant. although most respondents described their efforts to influence policies, none of them can have a strong claim on an actual policy change or formulation. when talking about opportunities and challenges, most of the respondents see their positions, professions and institutions as sources of opportunities and conditions outside such as political and 114 women on the steering wheel policy environment and policy makers’ political will as sources of challenges. in other words the perception of opportunity tends to be inward while challenges tend to be outward. finally, in a rather successful instances, the policy making process can only be influenced significantly when the pressures are simultaneous from various actors in a significant magnitude. while the women are important parts of the efforts, they are not exclusive sources of influence. conclusion this research has identified and classified anumber of women which are seen as influential in the effort to protect indonesian women migrant workers. in general the data obtained by asking the questions set by this research confirmed the arguments put forward by john w. kingdon on the influence of a number of actors outside the government on policy making. while interest groups, in this case migrant workers advocate, can conduct various activities to influence the policy making process, the actual influence created are very much determined by the strength of the interest groups’ voices and how accommodative the policy making system is. the academics, with their type of works which mainly involve research have better chances with long term impacts as for the media, although the influence is not as strong as generally expected, it still plays a significant role in shaping public opinion which should be one of the main inputs for policy making process. the election-related participants, in this case parliamentarians, still have to adhere to their parties’ agendas and platforms, giving them limited room to maneuver, especially if the party does not see the issue of women migrant workers as one of their main concerns. one type of actor identified in this research, not by kingdon, is a celebrity or a public figure. in a country like indonesia where public figures are highly adored, the public figures may not have direct formal access to the policy making process but they have strong influence on the creation and shaping of public opinions. the women interviewed for this research play active and significant roles within indonesia’s migration system. nevertheless their efforts are frequently limited by external factors. as for their identity as women, some see it as irrelevant while others believe that there are aspects attached to the identity that can be used to strengthen their efforts. about the author sylvia yazid, ph.d is the head of international relations department, faculty of social and political science in parahyangan catholic university, bandung. sylvia yazid can be reached at sylvia_yazid@yahoo.com. detail profile see; http://hi.unpar.ac.id/sylvia-yazid/. elisabeth s. dewi, ph.d is a lecturer at parahyangan catholic university, bandung. detail profile see; http://hi.unpar.ac.id/elisabeth-a-s-dewi/. reference anggraeni, d., interview 19 may 2014 ball, r. & piper, n. 2006 trading labourtrading rights: the regional dynamics of rights recognition for migrant workers in the asia-pacific. in hewison, k. & young, k. (eds.) transnational migration and work in asia. abingdon, oxon, new york, routledge. bnp2tki 2013. penempatan berdasarkan jenis kelamin (2006-2012) [online]. available: mailto:sylvia_yazid@yahoo.com http://hi.unpar.ac.id/sylvia-yazid/ http://hi.unpar.ac.id/elisabeth-a-s-dewi/ journal of asean studies 115 http://www.bnp2tki.go.id/statistikmainmenu-86/penempatan/6758penempatan-berdasarkan-jeniskelamin-2006-2012.html [accessed 20 february 2013]. bnp2tki 2015. statistik penempatan, available: http://www.bnp2tki.go.id/stat_pene mpatan/indeks, [accessed 30 march 2015]. chant, s. 1992 conclusion: towards a framework for the analysis of gender-selective migration. in chant, s. h. (ed.) gender and migration in developing countries. london, belhaven press. enloe, c. 2000 bananas, beaches and bases: making feminist sense of international politics, london, university of california press, ltd. hidayah, a., interview 27 june 2014 howlett, m., perl, a., ramesh, m. 2003, studying public policy: policy cycles and policy subsystems, ontario: oxford university press. iriyanto, s., interview 18 may 2014 kingdon, john w. 1984, agendas, alternatives, and public policies, little brown and company, boston. loveband, a. 2006 positioning the product: indonesian migrant women workers in taiwan. in hewison, k. & young, k. (eds.) transnational migration and work in asia. abingdon, oxon, new york, routledge. pitaloka, r.d., interview 25 august 2014 subono, m., interview 27 june 2014 simon, c. a. 2007, public policy, preferences and outcomes, new york: pearson longman. tjiptaning, r. interview 19 august 2014 yamanaka, k. & piper, n. 2005, feminized migration in east and southeast asia: policies, actions and empowerment, http://www.unrisd.org/unrisd/ website/document.nsf/462fc27bd1fce 00880256b4a0060d2af/06c975dec6217 d4ec12571390029829a/$file/op11% 20web.pdf, accessed 30 july 2006. yazid, s., 2013, indonesia’s civil society in the age of democratization: ngo responses on the issue of labour migration, baden-baden: nomos. yazid, s., 2015, indonesian labour migration: identifying the women in jurnal global & strategis, th.9, no. 1, januari-juni 2015, pp 49-62. young, k. 2006 globalization and the changing management of migrating service workers in the asia-pacific. in hewison, k. & young, k. (eds.) transnational migration and work in asia. abingdon, oxon, new york, routledge. http://www.bnp2tki.go.id/stat_penempatan/indeks http://www.bnp2tki.go.id/stat_penempatan/indeks journal of asean studies, vol. 9, no. 2 (2021), pp. 139-158 doi: https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v9i2.7757 issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic transboundary environmental governance in the eu and southeast asia: contesting hybridity in the biofuels and palm oil regimes helena varkkey department of international and strategic studies, faculty of arts and social sciences, university of malaya, malaysia helenav@um.edu.my received: 28th september 2021/ revised: 23rd november 2021/ accepted: 25th november 2021 how to cite: varkkey, h. (2021). transboundary environmental governance in the eu and southeast asia: contesting hybridity in the biofuels and palm oil regimes. journal of asean studies, 9(2), 139-158. https:/doi.org/10.21512/jas.v9i2.7757 abstract the research addresses the complexities of the european union’s renewable energy directives (eu red and red ii), contextualising them within the palm oil sector in southeast asia, in which indonesia and malaysia are known to be the two largest producers and exporters of palm oil. it aims to question the effect of this expanding role of markets on power dynamics and political processes. examining these developments at different organisational scales highlights the asymmetrical power relations that circulate through such transboundary networks to shape patterns of resource access and the distribution of environmental risks. employing a qualitative approach, the research uses case study method to reflect on how market forces and broad political dynamics establish the hybrid environmental governance regime of biofuels. the research concludes that this transboundary market approach to biofuels and palm oil should be regarded with caution, as it (1) lowers regulatory quality within the biofuels sustainability regime, (2) undermines the sustainable palm oil market, and (3) indirectly bolsters unsustainable practices outside the palm oil sector. keywords: transboundary, environmental governance, palm oil, european union, renewable energy directives introduction hybridity may undermine sustainable development and environmental justice objectives, and increase economic hardship by leaving too much room for decision-making and mailto:helenav@um.edu.my 140 transboundary environmental coercive tactics by powerful private actors (miller et al., 2020; stattman et al., 2018). such hybrid transboundary governance regimes may not be equally well-designed. environmental conditions may get worse if they produce contradictory directives resulting in operational confusion. therefore, such regimes should be considered carefully. miller et al. (2020) argue for the need to understand how such “hybrid governance regimes are being enacted across borders, including in legally flexible ways that span formal and informal spheres, to improve the efficacy and inclusiveness of existing transboundary governance arrangements to sustain transboundary resources and mitigate cross-border environmental threats and crises”. an example of a transboundary complex environmental issue extending beyond jurisdictions is the global market for biofuels. miller et al. (2020) have argued for the potentially productive role of markets in mitigating such ecological issues. accordingly, various states developed national (and in the case of the eu, regional) regulations, subsidy systems, and directives to uphold production, trade, and use of biofuels against standardised sustainability requirements. this came alongside the development of national and transnational private and multi-stakeholder sustainability certification schemes, both directly and indirectly focused on biofuel sustainability. such elements characterise the hybrid transnational governance of sustainable biofuels: 1) institutionally co-existing alongside intergovernmental regimes and complex overlaps and 2) interactions between national and transnational elements (ponte & daugbjerg, 2015). the application of state authority to such private certification schemes, like in the case of the european union regional energy directive (eu red), has been assumed to “harden” accountability towards more sustainable production. as the state can set legally binding requirements, this is expected to be able to coerce corporate entities into submission (moser & leipold, 2019). however, kemper and partzch (2018), larsen et al. (2014), moser and leipold (2019), and stattman et al. (2018) have argued that “instead of yielding an increasingly stringent sustainability framework, the hybrid eu governance arrangements resulted in a proliferation of relatively lax, industry-driven sustainability standards”. hence, there is still an ongoing debate in the literature about whether a hybrid approach can strengthen or weaken sustainability objectives (stattman et al., 2018). methods the research centres the academic debate around the eu red in southeast asia, where indonesia and malaysia are the largest producers and exporters of palm oil, a type of biofuel. considering the latest developments under eu red ii and responses from both countries, the research takes a qualitative approach and uses the case study method to reflect on how market forces and broad political dynamics can shape the hybrid environmental governance regime of biofuels. the research employs the researcher’s own knowledge and understanding of the selected case study combined with an extensive review of the academic literature on both the biofuels and palm oil sustainability regimes. furthermore, it also provides detailed content analysis of recent official documents and statements from major stakeholders to reflect on the sustainability outcomes of transboundary market approach to biofuels and palm oil. miller et journal of asean studies 141 al. (2020) point out that “understanding hybrid environmental governance through this fluid register of (market and political) power relations afford heightened visibility of the differentiated beneficiaries of environmental benefits” within such regimes. the research follows miller et al. (2020) who argue that the market’s considerable role in environmental governance can be seen as less about economic activities and more about power dynamics and political processes. miller et al. (2020) consider how "power relations circulate through transboundary geographies of hybrid governance to allow or block access to the benefits of particular resources, resulting in (redistributive) inclusions and exclusions, with implications for environmental (in)justice”. they argue that both state and private actors engage transboundary networks at the national and translational scales to increase their respective power positions and ecological agendas. through such processes, hybrid environmental governance regimes become sites of political contestation. powerful states may attempt to design and broker arrangements that reinforce unequal power relations to maintain their hegemonic values in lieu of actual ecological reforms, while weaker actors may try to mobilise to resist attempts at enclosure and resource capture by more powerful states. the research offers a conceptual discussion of transboundary environmental governance and locates hybrid forms of the same within the literature. it is followed by elaboration on the market-based sustainable governance regimes of both biofuels (in the eu) and palm oil (based in southeast asia). the research then describes the interplay of these hybrid instruments as sites of political contestation, focusing on how power dynamics have influenced outcomes within these regimes. finally, it discusses how these market, political, and power dynamics affect sustainability trajectories within both of these sectors and regions. results and discussions hybrid forms of transboundary environmental governance the united nations development programme (undp) (in haque, 2018) defines governance as “the exercise of one’s political, economic, and administrative powers or authorities at various levels”. this includes procedural and institutional mechanisms that actors can use to actualise their rights and interests, fulfil obligations, and negotiate differences. badenoch (2001) defines environmental governance as encompassing the range of “processes and structures that underlie the decision-making processes that affect the environment, however unintentionally”. an environmental view of governance thus includes examining the “rules of the game” and “who gets to play” in ecological issues and encompasses more than just the environmental sector. thus it refers to how the debate is held, decisions are made, and authority is exercised over the environment (woods, 2003). traditional types of state-led environmental governance have often been inadequate to solve transboundary environmental problems. such complex environmental problems often extend beyond individual property regimes and jurisdictions, and generate cascading and farreaching impacts such as market fluctuations, livelihood transformations and human displacement and resettlement. they cannot be resolved at a single scale of decision making 142 transboundary environmental within the boundaries of administrations or individual countries (miller et al., 2020). for example, in southeast asia, asean member states agree to adopt a collective approach to regional transboundary haze governance after national efforts proved inadequate to address this complex air pollution problem involving transnational capital, state-to-state relations, and global commodity markets (varkkey, 2016). in the scope of marine pollution management, the mediterranean action plan materialised due to the inability of mediterranean states to adequately govern the movement of marine pollution across borders in the mediterranean basin, which negatively affects environmental health and tourism in the region (thacher, 1977). formal state-level institutional structures, especially in the developing world, tend to have weak implementation which limits environmental governance effectiveness (larsen et al., 2014). badenoch (2001) offers transboundary environmental governance as an alternative approach, which involves “the interaction of many actors along two axes: vertically through the various levels of government administration and inter-governmental cooperation, and horizontally among the range of state-market-community actors”. transboundary environmental governance can mean many things, among them “private” and “non-state, market-driven” transnational governance (ponte & daugbjerg, 2015). however, while scholars have acknowledged the shift of such state to non-state types of authority, there is also an understanding that this has not weakened the state. such a condition is known as hybrid governance defined by ponte and daugbjerg (2015) as “a form of governance where public and private come together in complex configurations that include civil society, business, and a plethora of nontraditional actors”. hence, hybrid means more than a varied combination of public and private governance components. it denotes their “mutual dependence and deep interrelation, characterised by polyarchic and overlapping governance arenas, where interactions between a variety of mutually dependent private and public actors give rise to hybrid regulatory features, and where collective orders and individuals engage in cross-border rulemaking, implementation, and enforcement activities” (ponte & daugbjerg, 2015). miller et al. (2020) have further refined this definition as “deliberative, multisector (cogovernance, public-private, and private-societal) partnerships that collaboratively produce, synthesise, and mobilise knowledge from diverse sources and through flexible institutional arrangements”. such hybrid models serve as an appealing alternative to the often piecemeal and inflexible traditional forms of environmental governance. some scholars have argued that hybrid governance should increase the capacity of governments to fulfil sustainability objectives, including environmental protection, social advancement, and economic prosperity. this is mainly linked to the belief that state-led initiatives that include private governance efforts will technically promote stricter criteria and best practices towards a race to the top (stattman et al., 2018). however, when competition is created between private schemes due to multiple governance options, the resulting fragmentation can weaken sustainability through a race to the bottom (stattman et al., 2018). miller et al. (2020) point out that hybrid governance regimes furthermore tend to validate “democratic environmental collaborations, usually with the support of market incentives, without fully understanding the trajectories of different journal of asean studies 143 combinations of hybrid regimes or their interplay at specific scales of governance”. hence, such hybrid intervention can produce suboptimal environmental outcomes if major stakeholders cannot resolve coordination issues, adapt to change, overcome trust issues, or confront power asymmetries. furthermore, failing to systematically organise and exchange information needed for transboundary decision making can undermine such hybrid arrangements right from the planning stage. this process is rarely straightforward or smooth, involving coordination across often contrasting political dynamics and ideologies (miller et al., 2020). therefore, perceiving the political dynamics of hybrid environmental governance arrangements is vital in understanding the complex and contradictory development in environmental governance. creating a market for sustainable biofuels in the eu while biofuels have been put forward as a viable alternative to fossil fuels, doubts have been cast on the impact of biofuel production on greenhouse gas (ghg) emission reductions. biofuels have been blamed for causing serious food price increases as it removes water and land from food production. further climate justice issues include inequitable land investments, limited local benefits and participation in decision-making, and ecological degradation (ponte & daugbjerg, 2015; pye, 2010). transnational governance focusing on markets can be potentially productive in addressing sustainability issues (miller et al., 2020). larsen et al. (2014) argue that incorporating sustainability standards into government regulations in importer countries and regions can improve the accountability of market actors. in the context of biofuels, they argue that voluntary multi-stakeholder sustainability standards can complement weaker public regimes and, by extension, improve accountability in international markets of biofuel products. however, this must be couched against existing hybrid sustainability regimes and market incentives for palm oil, a major type of biofuel. hence, it is important to understand the trajectories of both the eu biofuel regime and the southeast asia-based palm oil regime and their interplay at specific scales of governance. the eu biofuels governance regime has succeeded in creating an important market for biofuels (oosterveer, 2020) and stimulating global demands for vegetable oil (larsen et al., 2014). indeed, without the policy, there would be no market for feedstock-based biofuels in the eu (oosterveer, 2020). the eu started to develop its own biofuels policy in 2001 (wahid, 2008). the first eu biofuels directive entered into force in 2003 to promote biofuels and other renewable fuels for transport. it set a voluntary blending target of 2% renewable energy in the transport sector in 2005 and a binding target of 5,75% in 2010. it resulted in a growth in imported sugarcane bioethanol from brazil and soybean biodiesel from the united states due to lower production costs (stattman et al., 2018). imports of palm oil from southeast asia also continued growing to serve the new biofuel market (oosterveer, 2020). while the eu officially reported a ghg emissions savings of 14.0 mt in 2007, lobbyists, environmental organisations, and scientists began positing that the eu-driven increase in international trade of biofuels led to increased emissions overseas due to indirect 144 transboundary environmental land-use change (iluc) there. the much-discussed link between palm oil and deforestation at the time quickly spotlighted land-use change in palm oil-producing countries as a primary concern. the 2007-2008 food price crisis also raised concerns that biofuels were taking land and water away from food crops, and thus driving food prices up. it was proposed that these indirect adverse effects should be considered risks to be mitigated in eu biofuels policies (stattman et al., 2018). in response to this, the eu came up with a follow-up directive, the eu red, in 2009. the eu red required that at least 20% of the eu’s total energy needs should come from renewables by 2020, of which at least 10% should come from renewable transportation fuels. to qualify, biofuels should meet these sustainability criteria: (1) it should achieve ghg savings of at least 35% compared to fossil fuels; (2) it cannot be cultivated on previously high carbon stock land like wetlands or forests; and (3) it cannot be produced from raw materials obtained from high biodiversity land like primary forests or high biodiversity grasslands (stattman et al., 2018). in this way, the eu set a “meta-standard” (basic, minimum sustainability requirements) for biofuels which could be counted towards national renewable energy targets (ponte & daugbjerg, 2015). however, the world trade organization (wto) regulations limited the ability of states to impose product requirements and regulations on other members (stattman et al., 2018). furthermore, imported biofuels' sustainability criteria are based on productionlevel attributes, with production centres often located outside the eu. therefore, ponte and djauberg (2015) argue that the eu “needed private certification schemes to extend its authority and capacity to implement the environmental sustainability criteria beyond its territorial borders”. many private certification schemes were created in response to this demand, leaning on the red incentives to establish themselves as a legitimate market-based instrument for sustainability governance. some schemes are limited to a specific national scope, while others could potentially be applicable worldwide. some cover specific crops or specific parts of the production chain, while others cover all crops and the whole production chain. seven private schemes were first accepted (on five-year terms) by the eu in 2011, which increased to 19 in 2016 (stattman et al., 2018). however, the eu red criteria continued to be challenged, especially on the absence in the policy of ghg impacts from iluc caused by biofuel feedstock production and social impacts, including consequences for food security. however, palm oil imports for biofuel continued to grow and replaced soybean oil as the most imported biofuel feedstock by 2015 (oosterveer, 2020). in response to citizen concerns over palm oil, the eu red ii was introduced as an updated policy framework for 2021-2030. under this iteration, the target for agricultural feedstock-based biofuels was reduced to 7% from 10%, so countries could introduce tax incentives and quota measures to achieve this. some existing sustainability measures were tightened, such as an increase in the requirements for ghg savings from 35% to 65%, with palm oil clocking in at only 45% of savings (oosterveer, 2020). thus, eu red and red ii have increasingly complex transnational and hybrid features (ponte & daugbjerg, 2015), with the hybridity of the system being based on deep public-private journal of asean studies 145 interdependence and interconnection (pacheco et al., 2020). this integration of private initiatives created a hybrid biofuel governance landscape consisting of public standards and private certification initiatives to govern access to the eu biofuels market (stattman et al., 2018). at the same time, and evolving quite independently from the eu biofuels regime, a complex governance regime for palm oil, which has in recent years replaced soybean oil as the main imported feedstock for biodiesel into the eu, has developed in response to its own unique sustainability issues (pacheco et al., 2020). parallels with the palm oil sustainability regime due to its production efficiency, low price point, and usage versatility, palm oil has become the world’s leading vegetable oil, representing more than 35% of the global vegetable oil market. it is also a highly tradeable commodity, with around 70% of its production traded internationally. india is currently the largest importer of palm oil, followed by the eu and china. in the eu, palm oil is becoming an increasingly important input in the processing and food industries in europe (oosterveer, 2020). however, the expansion of oil palm, especially when on peatlands, produces significant amounts of emissions and drives biodiversity loss when on primary forests (pacheco et al., 2020). consumer concerns over these sustainability issues, particularly in europe and north america, have resulted in bad publicity for the commodity and inspired boycotts against producers using palm oil (oosterveer, 2020). to address these sustainability issues, various state and non-state regulatory initiatives have been developed, resulting in regime complexity characterised by “parallel or overlapping and competing initiatives [that] are not combined into a single hierarchical system” (overdevest & zeitlin, 2012 in pacheco et al., 2020). the roundtable for sustainable palm oil (rspo) is the most widely adopted private standard within the palm oil sustainability regime. rspo was set up in 2004 which involves third-party compliance monitoring of adherence to the rspo standard, primarily addressing palm oil-specific land and environmental performance issues (pacheco et al., 2020). several loose coalitions, including the palm oil innovation group (poig – ngos and corporations) and the indonesian palm oil pledge (ipop – indonesia’s “big five producers), pushed for additional standards related to deforestation, planting on peat, and social exploitation (“no deforestation, no peat, no exploitation” or ndpe) beyond rspo’s existing standards. responding to this, an enhanced voluntary standard, termed “rspo next”, was introduced in 2015, incorporating ndpe norms (nesadurai, 2018). rspo has also developed the shortlived rspo-red, which attempts to comply with the eu red sustainability criteria (stattman et al., 2018), as the largest and second-largest palm oil producers worldwide, respectively, the indonesian and malaysian governments also have developed their own certification schemes. the indonesian sustainable palm oil (ispo) mandatory certification scheme was launched in 2011, and the malaysian sustainable palm oil (mspo) was launched as a voluntary scheme in 2014, which became mandatory in 2017. unlike rspo, which relies on voluntary participation, ispo and mspo rely on national government regulations (oosterveer, 2020). furthermore, 146 transboundary environmental while all these schemes claim to be sustainable, they all differ slightly in their principles in criteria, reflecting the malleability of this concept (lélé, 1991). the mspo and ispo have applied to be recognised under the eu red criteria but failed. while the creation of the eu biofuel regime has indeed created an expanded role for markets in biofuel sustainability governance. the research provides elaboration that this must be understood as less about economic activities and more about power dynamics and political processes. the eu as a normative environmental power? the eu is considered a powerful and influential actor due to its wealth, political competencies, legal personality, and power to bind members, which feed into its ability to exert leverage and develop complex policy (vogler & stephan, 2007). it is also recognised as a considerable ‘normative power’, first described by manners (2002, in afionis & stringer, 2012) as “a distinct actor that is guided by and seeks to advance in the wider world the values and ideas on which it is founded upon, including democracy, the role of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms”. sustainable development was explicitly identified as a fundamental objective of the eu’s relations with the outside world in its 1997 amsterdam treaty and successors. it has become a core norm within the eu’s normative outlook, which it promotes through enlargement, environmental, trade, foreign and development policies (afionis & stringer, 2012). the eu has been recognised as a normative international leader of sustainable development at least since the late 1980s. it played significant roles in promoting the 1989 basel convention on hazardous waste, strengthening the 1989 montreal protocol, providing leadership during the 1992 rio conference, creating the 1995 intergovernmental panel on forests, supporting the 2000 cartagena protocol on biosafety, influencing the 2001 stockholm convention on persistent organic pollution, developing the un framework convention on climate change (most significantly through the 2005 kyoto protocol), and ‘greening’ the wto (afionis & stringer, 2012; bretherton & vogler, 2000; delreux, 2009; vogler & stephan, 2007). it chose to use its platform at the 2002 johannesburg summit to communicate its ‘europe 2020 strategy’ for smart, sustainable, and inclusive growth. it pushes to keep sustainable development on the agenda of important international organisations and processes such as the g8, g20, world bank, un security council and general assembly, and the world health organization (afionis & stringer, 2012). promoting a global sustainability agenda in these manners has been seen as evidence of the eu genuinely attempting to fulfil its normative role successfully and credibly. on these grounds, it could be understood that the eu’s normative leadership departs from the realpolitik tradition by promoting the global common good, arguably over and above the national interest (falkner, 2007 in afionis & stringer, 2012). however, the concept of sustainable development is highly malleable (lélé, 1991), and scholars have noted how the eu upholds its normative environmental leadership position based on its own narrow interpretations of the concept even while it pursues unsustainable trade strategies (afionis & stringer, 2012; bretherton & vogler, 2000). cracks became visible in journal of asean studies 147 this façade when the eu played an active role in inserting text into the unced’s agenda 21, but without insisting on the inclusion of trade, an issue area where it would have had a substantial influence based on the size of its single market (vogler & stephan, 2007). following this, several notable cases have highlighted the divergences between the eu’s trade interests and its environmental policies, including the eu’s refusal to ban the import of furs from important trading countries obtained through inhumane methods and its refusal to take a stance on genetically modified organisms for fear of souring transatlantic trade relations (bretherton & vogler, 2000). by viewing eu’s normative environmental leadership through a political economy lens, it can be argued that economic and trade interests are the key motivators for eu’s leadership in international ecological policymaking, while normative aspirations maintain a subsidiary role (kelemen, 2020 in afionis & stringer, 2012). while vogler and stephan (2007) argue that “there is no necessary contradiction between the promotion of european values, the pursuit of economic interests, and the strong support for a more ambitious agenda of global regulation”, the research argues that the eu’s position as a normative environmental power augments its own power position and sustains its own hegemonic values vis-à-vis other countries. in this manner, the research argues that the eu biofuels governance regime has become a site of political contestation. political economy of eu biofuel governance the rapid development of the eu biofuels policy can be linked to both a normative concern for the environment and realpolitik considerations. before the biofuels policy, the eu’s transport system was almost completely reliant on oil from russia and the politically unstable middle east and central. furthermore, the eu was not on track to meet its kyoto protocol emissions reduction targets (afionis & stringer, 2012). under the kyoto protocol, the eu committed to an 8% ghg reduction by 2012 and 20% by 2020 (kemper & partzsch, 2018). failure to achieve these targets would deliver a major blow to the eu’s position as a global environmental leader (afionis & stringer, 2012). therefore, taking advantage of the malleability of the concept of sustainable development, the eu focused its biofuels sustainability criteria on ghg reductions to effectively contribute to its commitments under the un framework convention on climate change (unfccc). this pragmatic determination of sustainability criteria to fulfil international commitments has ignored other equally important aspects of sustainability. for example, kemper and partzsch (2018) and larsen et al. (2014) determine that the eu red standards does not promote water sustainability at production sites on the ground. a major criterion to the eu red was that biofuels may only be counted towards the 10% renewable transport fuels requirement if they achieved ghg savings of at least 35% over fossil fuels. there is, however, no specific scientific consensus pointing towards the necessity of this figure. rather, it conveniently ensures that the heavily subsidised domestic rapeseed oil will qualify by a small margin, but the default ghg savings of palm oil and soybean biodiesel would not (erixon & abbott, 2009; meredity, 2012). this attempt to limit future market 148 transboundary environmental expansion for the eu’s main biofuel competitors fulfils the demands of local vegetable oil producers arguing that their products should be preferred over imported vegetable oils (firrisa et al., 2014 in oosterveer, 2020) and connecting to the eu’s earlier geopolitical concerns of reducing the dependence of imported sources of energy. the eu works through the transboundary network to augment its own power position and interests (miller et al., 2020). positioned as a powerful global actor in more ways than one, it is implicitly understood that when the eu adopts a standard, other countries will adopt similar standards or comply with the eu standard in other ways to prevent being locked out of the eu market. hence, the eu can use its market power to incentivise other countries to behave in an acceptable manner according to the eu’s view (erixon & abbott, 2009). hence, several certification schemes were quickly established and modified in the attempt to be recognised under eu red to gain market access. one example is the german-based international sustainability and carbon certification (iscc), established in 2010 specifically to certify biofuel feedstock, including crude palm oil (cpo) for the eu biodiesel market (pacheco et al., 2020), and was among the first set of schemes recognised by the eu red in 2010. rspo, certifying a large chunk of the southeast asian market, introduces rspo-red, a voluntary add-on to the generic rspo standards and criteria. rspo-red used methane capture to meet the 35% ghg reduction requirement. in november 2012, rspo-red was accredited under eu red. the accreditation expired in 2016 (stattman et al., 2018) and was renewed in 2019 until 2021. however, the eu indicated that the scheme would not be renewed after 2021 as the scheme did not adhere to the eu’s narrow interpretations of biofuel sustainability. this was followed by another european parliament decision in 2018 to phase out palm oil as a feedstock for biofuels by 2021 (stattman et al., 2018). however, explicitly excluding palm oil would raise legality issues as it would not comply with wto requirements (oosterveer, 2020). therefore, a slightly softened version of the eu red ii went ahead at the end of 2018. in this iteration, a distinction was made between high-risk and low-risk iluc biofuels. high-risk biofuels were defined as those produced from a feedstock for which there has been observed a significant expansion of the production area into land with high carbon stock. these types of biofuels would need to peak at 2019 levels and be phased out by 2030 unless specific batches could be certified as low-risk. in the operationalisation of this criterion, the expansion into high carbon forest for palm oil was calculated as 45%, and 9% for soybean. under these calculations, even though palm oil was not specifically identified, it was almost automatically considered a high-risk iluc biofuel feedstock (oosterveer, 2020). this would render palm oil “virtually unmarketable” within the eu member states as palm oil would be more expensive than both fossil fuels and domestically produced biofuels without the red tax benefit (meredity, 2012). hence, by erecting barriers aimed at shielding its own inefficient domestic biofuels production, the eu is placing trade competitiveness and economic growth above normative environmental protection, thus permitting sustainability concerns to be addressed only in part. the eu’s selective interpretation of sustainable development has not compelled eu-based actors to radically change existing developmental practices while forcing external actors to adapt to their own narrow interpretation of sustainability. it is indeed ironic that a powerful journal of asean studies 149 normative actor, so keen on promoting environmental sustainability, is so openly impeding palm oil imports based on its own questionable and limited sustainability criteria. palm oil is not only more energy-efficient than its heavily subsidised domestic counterparts (afionis & stringer, 2012) but also has a robust sustainability regime of its own. despite this, the eu, leveraging upon its normative and market power, brokered a settlement designed to reinforce unequal power relations between itself and palm oil-producing states that sustain narrowly defined ‘european’ sustainability values and assign benefits to local agro-industry at the expense of genuine environmental reforms (oosterveer, 2020). market-based resistance and cooperation among producer states the outcomes of these arrangements effectively attempt to block access of less powerful states (palm oil producers) to the benefits of trade with the eu, with implications for environmental and trade (in)justice which has been described as “green protectionism” afionis and stringer (2012), arief et al. (2020), erixon & abbott (2009), meredity (2012), and ponte and daugbjerg (2015). in response to such developments, weaker states will often try to mobilise to resist resource capture and enclosure by these more powerful actors (miller et al., 2020). indeed, the two main palm oil-producing states, indonesia and malaysia, have tried to mobilise to resist the market-limiting efforts at the eu, primarily through collaborative, market-based mechanisms. palm oil and biofuels aside, the southeast asian, or asean, region remains an important trading partner for the eu (mazur, 2017). european exporters have tried to increase access to southeast asian markets through eu trade agreements (meredity, 2012). the eu kick-started negotiations with asean towards a region-to-region free trade agreement (fta) in 2006. while 2010 saw the redirection of negotiations to state-to-regional (eu) ftas, the eu reaffirmed that its ultimate objective was to reach an agreement with asean (mazur, 2017). soon after, singapore and vietnam concluded bilateral ftas with the eu (tham, 2012). however, bilateral negotiations with malaysia and indonesia are still ongoing. both countries have expressed that continued barriers to palm oil trade vis-à-vis the eu red ii would be a “deal-breaker” for these bilateral ftas (lim, 2018; tham, 2012). in context, palm oil only contributes 4,4% of the total eu-malaysia trade, where only 1,4% of it is used for biofuels that fall under red ii limits (varkkey, 2020). however, the national interest significance of the sector (choiruzzad, 2019), and the perceived power dynamics at stake, has put malaysia and indonesia in a position willing to sacrifice these ftas despite complementarities and benefits in other trade areas. furthermore, given the centrality of both these states in asean, this may also have further regional effects on the planned asean-eu agreement, as has been explicitly expressed by malaysia (varkkey, 2020). indonesia has also submitted an official request for a consultation with the wto dispute settlement body (dsb) over “certain measures concerning palm oil and oil palm cropbased biofuels” under the eu red ii (“european union”, 2019). after an initial block, indonesia’s second request was approved by the dsb for a panel to examine certain measures adopted by the european union and eu member states affecting palm oil and oil palm crop150 transboundary environmental based biofuels. malaysia has reserved its rights to participate in the proceedings as a third party as a ‘sign of solidarity and support’ alongside other palm oil producer countries thailand, guatemala, costa rica and colombia, and major agricultural exporters the united states, canada, brazil, and argentina (“panels established to review”, 2020). third parties receive the parties’ first written submissions to the panel and present their views orally to the panel during the first substantive meeting. malaysia has also submitted its official request for wto consultation in early 2021, which has also been accepted (“european union and certain member”, 2021). both countries have argued that the eu red ii violates the principle of nondiscrimination in the wto (arief et al., 2020) and has the potential to damage the reputation of palm oil in non-biofuel eu markets (siahaan, 2020). the wto’s basic free trade tenets are understood such that if a foreign product looks like a domestic product, it should not be taxed or sanctioned differently from that domestic product. as rapeseed oil and palm oil are virtually identical in terms of functions and physical characteristics, erixon & abbott (2009) and meredity (2012) have predicted that the wto will likely demand a repeal of the policy to allow southeast asian palm oil to compete freely in europe, using existing certification schemes like the rspo, ispo, and mspo. with the eu already being on the losing end of at least two biodiesel-related cases that it brought to the wto in 2013 (anti-dumping of soybean-based biodiesel from argentina and palm-oil based biodiesel from indonesia), further losses should deliver considerable blows to eu’s global normative standing (oosterveer, 2020). these responses were coordinated through the council of palm oil producing countries (cpopc). the cpopc was found by indonesia and malaysia in 2015 originally to harmonise the indonesian ispo and malaysian mspo sustainability standards (nesadurai, 2018), but has now developed to become a platform to coordinate palm oil diplomacy and trade access efforts of the commodity’s largest producers (siahaan, 2020) (colombia, the thirdlargest producer pf palm oil, has recently joined). for example, the cpopc made a strong statement against the eu red ii at the asean-european union summit in 2017, where ftas were discussed (wibowo & ratnawati, 2020). other coordinated efforts include indonesia’s ban of products labelled as ‘palm oil-free’ and the malaysian government’s implicit support of retailers doing the same (australian industry group, 2019). the cpopc’s ministerial meeting in 2019 called for unity among palm oil-producing countries in combating discriminatory trade measures against palm oil through aggressive joint campaigns (siahaan, 2020). its eighth meeting in 2021 continued in this vein, with discussions focusing on bolstering cooperation between indonesia and malaysia over palm oil. possibly in response to the contested science and calculations on ghg emissions related to palm oil under the eu red, the cpopc established a scientific committee to focus on research and development activities for the enrichment of public knowledge on palm oil commodity ("indonesia, malaysia to bolster", 2021). in addition to colombia, representatives from ghana, honduras, and new guinea attended the meeting as observers. the collaborative approach is interesting, considering that indonesia and malaysia avoid bilateral cooperation over palm oil for decades, with both marketing their own palm oil journal of asean studies 151 as superior to the other (varkkey, 2016). however, when confronted with the eu using and augmenting its position of power and influence in the interest of its own agro-industry, these two weaker producing countries decided to mobilise (sometimes together with other smaller producer states) to resist such resource capture and enclosure jointly. while joint diplomatic efforts (like the cpopc joint mission to brussels in april 2019 to appeal against the eu red ii) (wibowo & ratnawati, 2020) may be less effective due to the large power differentials between the two parties. the market-based mechanisms may speak more directly to underlying economic and trade interests of the eu. the eu’s response, suggesting that eu red ii fulfilled wto regulations by establishing sustainability criteria for biofuels that are global, objective, and nondiscriminatory to meet the eu’s renewable energy targets and not limit access to the eu biofuels market (arief et al., 2020), would seem to be once again leveraging upon its position as a global normative leader to justify its policy choices. however, the recent establishment of the eu and asean joint working group on palm oil and its first meeting held in early 2021 significantly marks a possible ‘softening’ of the eu’s stance in the face of mobilisation and resistance (roozen, 2021). hybrid governance and sustainability trajectories by focusing on the same crop, the interplay between the eu red ii biofuel governance regime and the southeast asia-based palm oil sustainability regime has resulted in a complex hybrid environmental governance regime with effects across governance scales, trading markets, and political actors. it has been warned that such hybridity and fragmentation can result in operational confusion among regulators, economic providers (producers and manufacturers), civil society observers, and consumers (larsen et al., 2014; miller et al., 2020; pacheco et al., 2020; stattman et al., 2018; von geibler, 2013). what follows would be suboptimal outcomes for sustainable development and environmental justice (miller et al., 2020; stattman et al., 2018). such suboptimal hybridity within the biofuels and palm oil regime can be observed in at least three distinct ways: (1) the lowering of regulatory quality within the biofuels sustainability regime, (2) the undermining of the sustainable palm oil market, and (3) the indirect bolstering of unsustainable practices outside the palm oil sector. firstly, both european biofuels and the southeast-asian based palm oil sustainability regimes, and the schemes within them, vary widely in the scope of their standards, modes of implementation, and compliance costs (larsen et al., 2014), reflecting the malleability of the concept of sustainability. the resulting fragmentation can decrease sustainability through a race to the bottom when there is competition between schemes due to various governance options (stattman et al., 2018). in the case of biofuels, the eu considers schemes initiated and developed both before and after the red. rspo was developed before the eu red to address sustainability issues within the whole palm oil sector, not just for biofuels to europe. such roundtable-based programs tend to stipulate more stringent environmental and social sustainability criteria. indeed, the sustainability requirements under rspo already went beyond the requirements of the eu red (larsen et al., 2014). however, these additional 152 transboundary environmental features were of no interest to the eu (larsen et al., 2014), which was only interested in the strict (and arguably arbitrary) (sharman & holmes, 2010) criteria under red. on the other hand, programs created (or, in the case of iscc, fully fleshed out) after red were explicitly designed to serve as certifiers for the european biofuels market. they tend to be business-led, which include red-stipulated sustainability criteria only and discriminate more easily against the global south. due to the less rigid and more affordable production rules and auditing standards, these types of standards tend to dominate (kemper & partzsch, 2018; moser & leipold, 2019; pacheco et al., 2020; ponte & daugbjerg, 2015). indeed, the european-based iscc is considered relatively more accessible, as it is leaner, quicker, and more in tune with industry interests (ponte & daugbjerg, 2015). this has paid off with most biofuel feedstock including palm oil biofuel, which enters into the eu market is currently certified under the iscc scheme (oosterveer, 2020), with 85% of companies certified under red having iscc certification in 2017 (moser & leipold, 2019). in comparison, despite rspo’s rspo-red scheme, which was specially designed to align with red, “no [rspored certified] tonnes were shipped [since its recognition in 2012], and currently there are no rspo-red certified growers [due to lack of demand]”. rspo has since decided to discontinue the scheme upon its expiry in 2021 (“rspo-red scheme not to be”, 2020). such race-to-thebottom outcomes lower the overall regulatory quality of the regime and discourage the expansion of a more inclusive, sustainable, and transparent certification system for biofuels in europe (ponte & daugbjerg, 2015). secondly, the eu red ii regime has also indirectly undermined the efforts in the palm oil sustainability regime and the palm oil sustainability market more broadly. for example, in 2017, a european parliament resolution questioned the “ecological and social integrity” of certification schemes like the rspo, mspo, and ispo, and thus their value as benchmarks for sustainable palm oil (nesadurai, 2018), which reflects the perceived lesser credibility of these schemes among european constituencies (nesadurai, 2018). this is despite recognition elsewhere: 1) scholars and commentators have acknowledged that the rspo performs better on many sustainability criteria compared to iscc (nesadurai, 2018; stattman et al., 2018); and 2) mspo has received recognition from bodies such as the tokyo 2020 olympics and paralympics games sustainable sourcing code committee, china’s green food development centre, and the solvent extractors' association of india (sani, 2020). this is especially ironic since a major driver for developing these schemes was the sustainability demands of western consumer goods manufacturers, ngos, and governments (siahaan, 2020; nesadurai, 2018; pichler, 2013). the market for certified sustainable palm oil (cspo) remains limited as downstream corporate buyers, mainly in europe, did not match their pledges with the actual purchase of cspo. for example, uptake of rspo-certified cspo has been less than 50%, keeping premiums low (nesadurai, 2018). this has translated to only around 20% of palm oil produced globally being rspo-certified even though 40% of total palm oil is produced by rspo members (nesadurai, 2018). such lacklustre demands reduce the incentive for these schemes to strengthen their standards continually. for example, both mspo and ispo continue to suffer from unresolved issues like tenure rights and the conservation of high-carbon forests within concessions journal of asean studies 153 (pacheco et al., 2020) and rspo’s challenge remains in smallholder inclusion. it also reduces grower interest to comply with difficult sustainability certifications (nesadurai, 2018). in addition, it encourages the sector to make strategic market adjustments by refocusing export to equally lucrative but less demanding (by way of sustainability) markets like india, pakistan, and china and utilising similarly less demanding domestic markets (rifin et al., 2020). indeed, exports to these countries have been steadily growing (erixon & abbott, 2009; nesadurai, 2018; pacheco et al., 2020; von geibler, 2013), and both indonesia and malaysia have been actively strengthening their national biofuels policies as key strategies to increase domestic palm oil consumption (varkkey, 2020; varkkey, 2018). thirdly, the eu red ii guarantees that the market demand for biofuels remains regardless of palm oil supply to the region. the narrowing of the european market for palm oil would mean that this demand would have to be filled by less land-efficient and energy-efficient oils. palm oil uses the least amount of land area (also less fertiliser and pesticide) than other key crops like soybean, sunflower, and rapeseed. thus, it is the most land-efficient oilseed crop, producing around nine times the yield per hectare of competing oils (nesadurai, 2018). schubert et al. (2010 in meredity, 2012) have explained that “to the extent that demand remains for the food or feed previously produced on [the] land [in question], its production is likely to shift elsewhere”. hence, the shift away from palm oil may drive even larger deforestation rates elsewhere (for example, soybean in latin america), as even large areas of land will be needed to produce these less land-efficient oils. currently, soybean already contributes 19% to deforestation worldwide (lim, 2018). furthermore, biofuels' energy efficiency depends on the feedstock type, cultivation methods, and production conditions. rapeseed, europe’s main domestic source of biofuels, is a feedstock that is considerably lower in energy per hectare than palm oil. biofuels in europe are already heavily subsidised, so they produced way above the opportunity costs of the fossil fuels they replace (afionis & stringer, 2012). to maintain supply, european countries will have to continue to subsidise the production of these more expensive and less energy efficient oilseeds (erixon & abbott, 2009; meredity, 2012; wahid, 2008). afionis & stringer (2012) point out that “this confirms the image of a powerful trading state seeking to protect its native biofuels industry, even if doing so entails promoting or subsidising uneconomical, inefficient, and unsustainable production”. the complexity of the biofuel-palm oil hybrid transboundary environmental governance regime lies in different conceptions of sustainability, which stems from different political motivations on both sides. indeed, leveraging market connections can be a powerful tool for sustainability (miller et al., 2020), but under certain conditions, market-driven governance can weaken sustainability objectives. pye (2010) state that despite differences, translational campaign alliances show how civil society from both southeast asia and europe can work together towards positive market outcomes. however, in the three manners, the hybrid state-non-state european biofuels regimes threaten to undo sustainability progress in southeast asian producer states. taking pointers from transnational activism on palm oil and biofuels, the eu should look more towards southeast asia for sustainability certification signals. a more open interpretation of sustainability standards, and an understanding that they 154 transboundary environmental continue to evolve and improve, will support a more holistic and organic approach to sustainability on the ground. conclusions while transboundary environmental governance instruments are generally presented as neutral, problem-solving, and consensus-based initiatives (pichler, 2013), the discussion has illustrated how processes like certification and standards development are, in fact, deeply politicised. global production systems are integrated economic, political, and discursive systems in which market and political power are intertwined (von geibler, 2013). hence, powerful entities in the commodity network use these governance tools to continue to legitimise their power position (woods, 2003) by exerting ‘control at a distance’ in disciplining less powerful actors in the network (klooster, 2005). in this manners, these governance instruments are sites of political contestation where key players’ relative political and economic power, and geopolitical position allow powerful ones to broker settlements designed to reinforce unequal power relations (miller et al., 2020). hence, transboundary environmental governance cannot escape from the confines of geopolitical realities (woods, 2003). these geopolitical tensions complicate the process of transboundary environmental governance, with power asymmetries creating obstacles to coordination, information and knowledge sharing, adaptation to changing circumstances, and resolving trust issues. this is especially the case when different combinations of hybrid regimes clash at various scales of governance (miller et al., 2020). the deep interrelatedness of the european biofuels regime and the southeast asian-based palm oil biofuels regime has given rise to hybrid regulatory features, including overlapping arenas of governance and mutually dependent public-private interactions (ponte & daugbjerg, 2015). the resulting cross-border and cross-scale rulemaking, implementation, and enforcement processes. however, rather than enhancing the overall governance capability to strengthen sustainability objectives, they have weakened them. key players will leverage upon power dynamics to block or allow access to the benefits of particular resources (in this case, markets) in line with their own interests, with serious environmental implications (miller et al., 2020). in conclusion, using the case study of hybrid biofuels and palm oil sustainability governance, the research has attempted to add further weight to the argument that hybrid transboundary governance can weaken sustainability objectives (stattman et al., 2018), particularly when market incentives are validated without the full understanding of how incentives in particular regimes may have counterproductive spill over effects on other overlapping regimes (miller et al., 2020). for the eu in particular, its own credibility and power position as a global normative environmental leader is at stake if its trade-related environmental policies are increasingly seen to have detrimental effects outside the eu, in particular on the developmental opportunities of countries in the global south (afionis & stringer, 2012). in this case, hybridity within the biofuels and palm oil sustainability regimes may serve to undo the advances achieved within the highly politicised palm oil sector and discourage further advancements in sustainability. journal of asean studies 155 references afionis, s. & stringer, l. c. 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(2003). transboundary environmental governance in the mekong river basin: civil society spaces for transboundary participation. presented at politics of the commons: articulating development and strengthening local practices, chiang mai, 11–14 july. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4312310 https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/04/02/palm-oil-politics-still-threaten-eu-malaysia-ties/ https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/04/02/palm-oil-politics-still-threaten-eu-malaysia-ties/ https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-007-9051-5 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2012.08.027 https://doi.org/10.31098/pss.v1i1.200 journal of asean studies, vol. 11, no. 1 (2023), pp. 159−189 issn 2338-1361 print / issn 2338-1353 electronic received: 31th october 2022/ revised: 27th may 2023/ accepted: 16th july 2023 a “matter of life and death”? patterns of securitisation and desecuritisation of food resilience in indonesia i gusti bagus dharma agastia graduate school of international relations, ritsumeikan university, kyoto, japan international relations study programme, president university, indonesia gr0606pv@ed.ritsumei.ac.jp how to cite: agastia, i. g. b. d. a “matter of life and death”? patterns of securitisation and de-securitisation of food resilience in indonesia. journal of asean studies, 11(1), 159−189. https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v11i1.9143 abstract food self-sufficiency had been a perennial quest for indonesian administrations. the research explored two questions. first, how have political leaders securitised the self-sufficiency narrative? second, is the securitisation of food justified? this research examined the “self-sufficiency” narrative across indonesian governments and charts the patterns in its securitisation and de-securitisation through the lens of just securitisation theory. the research made two arguments. first, the securitisation of food in indonesia has not always been for the benefit of the nation, but instead, the political elite. the second argument is the securitisation of food in indonesia is not always justified, and therefore, necessitates further review of policies related to food security. the findings show that the securitisation of food in general to be unjustified. therefore, the de-securitising food security and returning it to the realm of normal politics should be the immediate goal for indonesian administrations, in addition to formulating alternative policies not grounded in the self-sufficiency narrative. keywords: desecuritisation, food security, food self-sufficiency, indonesia, securitisation introduction food self-sufficiency has been a perennial quest for indonesian administrations. the notion of food self-sufficiency is closely linked to the idea of independence, of not having to rely on global markets, to fulfil the fundamental need of the nation. this nationalistprotectionist ideal, however, contradicts the interdependent logic of market-driven globalisation, where self-sufficiency is not always a feasible goal, especially if it does not serve in p re ss mailto:gr0606pv@ed.ritsumei.ac.jp 160 a “matter of life and death”? the interests of providing equitable access to food (macrae & reuter, 2020). yet, despite this contradiction, food self-sufficiency continues to be a top priority for indonesian governments, with some pressing the issue stronger than others, sometimes to the point of representing the issue as a “matter of life or death” to the nation (neilson & wright, 2017). from the suharto to widodo administrations, indonesian political leaders have often promoted large-scale agricultural projects aimed at achieving self-sufficiency. most of these projects have failed, yet these policies continue to remain on the political agenda. from this condition, two questions arise. first, how do indonesian political leaders frame self-sufficiency in security rhetoric? second, who benefits from the use of security rhetoric in self-sufficiency? the research examines how indonesian governments have securitised the selfsufficiency narrative through the lens of just securitisation theory. the inclusion of normative analysis provided by just securitisation theory allows analysts not just to scrutinise security policies in retrospect, but also inform policymaking by identifying previous transgressions and mitigate future harm. this contribution is arguably important in complementing the corpus of research applying a generally critical lens to the nexus of food and environmental security (brisman & south, 2017; sommerville, essex, & le billon, 2014). moreover, to the best of the author’s knowledge, studies applying securitisation theory in indonesia specifically have mostly approached securitisation through the classical lens, focusing on securitising moves and speech acts (isnurhadi, 2018; kurniawan, 2017; scarpello, 2018; taufika, 2020). while these studies are highly informative of the securitisation process, they usually stop short of critical examination of whether securitisation should have been initiated. thus, this research’s contribution is twofold. first, it seeks to expand the scope of inquiry and present a more critical approach to analysing security issues in indonesia. to the best of the author’s knowledge, securitisation theory, and just securitisation in particular, has yet to be applied in investigating food security in indonesia. second, the research enriches the discussion of just securitisation theory by showing the application of normative analysis in the context of a developing state and in a longitudinal setting. the research makes two interrelated arguments. first, the self-sufficiency narrative in indonesia is inherently political. thus, the securitisation of food does not always serve the benefit of the nation; instead, it mostly serves to benefit political actors who present the issue of food in security language. following the first argument, the second argument is the securitisation of food in indonesia is not always morally justifiable, and therefore, necessitates further review of policies related to food security. to demonstrate the argument, the research proceeds in four sections. the first section elaborates and discusses just securitisation theory, which is used as an analytical framework in this paper. the second section then clears some conceptual ground in the indonesian food security discourse, specifically concerning the use of the terms “food self-sufficiency”, “food sovereignty”, “food security”, and “food resilience”. narratives and policies related to food self-sufficiency during the sukarno, suharto, yudhoyono, and widodo administrations are explored afterwards. these periods were chosen due to the adoption of emblematic narratives and policies which continue to characterise subsequent administrations’ approach to food security. the third section analyses the narratives and policies of these administrations using in p re ss journal of asean studies 161 just securitisation theory. the conclusion outlines prospects for further research on just securitisation theory in general and more responsible approaches for food security in indonesia. analytical framework: just securitisation theory the notion of threat, or the “security-ness” of an issue is not always considered in the objective sense. though objective threats do exist, other issues only become security threats based on intersubjective agreement. the process of designating an issue as a “threat” is done through a speech act, which the second feature of securitisation theory. in a speech act, ‘by uttering “security”, a state-representative moves to a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it’ (wæver, 1995). this is further specified as a ‘securitising move’, where a securitising actor attempts to convince an audience that something poses a threat to a referent object. securitisation is said to have occurred when the audience accepts the speech act, and thus achieving intersubjective agreement. this allows the securitising actor to enact emergency measures to address the threat, even if those measures contravene liberal democratic principles (buzan, wæver, & wilde, 1998). figure 1 flow of just securitisation theory (floyd, 2019) source: author’s own illustration. numerous proposals to refine securitisation theory have been proposed. these proposals have attempted to highlight and address important shortcomings of the original securitisation framework proposed by the copenhagen school (hereafter “classical securitisation”) (balzacq, 2005; côté, 2016; kaunert & ezeokafor, 2022; vuori, 2008; williams, 2003). among critics of classical securitisation, floyd’s revision is notable. floyd’s (2010) critique of classical securitisation centres on “the securitisation theorist’s inability to say something meaningful about the moral value of different securitisations” and “his inability to in p re ss 162 a “matter of life and death”? theorise why actors securitise.” in addressing the shortcomings of securitisation theory, two important contributions are made: the examination of intent behind securitisation, which has been largely ignored by the classical securitisation; and the normative test, which allows for analysis of whether securitisation is morally defensible (floyd, 2011). these contributions serve as the basis for just securitisation theory (floyd, 2019). just securitisation theory attempts to establish the justness of a securitisation and desecuritisation in its initiation, conduct, and termination as shown in figure 1 (floyd, 2019). initiating securitisation the initiation of securitisation refers to the act of moving a previously-politicised issue into the a “securitised state of affairs”. floyd’s formulation of a securitised state of affairs differs from the audience-dependent interpretation of classical securitisation. a sanctioning audience is not necessarily required for a speech act to constitute securitisation. securitisation occurs when a securitising agent identifies an existential threat to the referent object (securitising move) and then engage in response to the threat (security practice). a securitising move can be generally divided into two moves—a promise to protect or a warning to retaliate—which is directed to the referent object. the security practice can be understood as the policies which the securitising actor enacts in response to the threat they have identified which may take form of the creation of new agencies or the extension of responsibilities to existing agencies (floyd, 2016). the initiation of a securitisation requires both just cause and intent. just cause requires the presence of an objective existential threat to a morally justifiable referent object. an existential threat is understood as threatening the survival and essential properties of a referent object (floyd, 2019). a threat need not come from an external agent to be existential; agent-lacking and agent-caused threats, such as natural disasters and climate change, may also pose an existential threat to societies. the objectiveness of a threat is based on whether available evidence reliably shows the threat to be real, rather than being perceived (floyd, 2019,). the justness of the referent object is based on whether the referent object provides instrumental value to human life (floyd, 2011). in this formulation, state and non-state political orders would only be just referent objects if they “satisfy a minimum level of basic human needs of people part of or contained in that order” (floyd, 2019). just intent requires a securitisation to be sincere, which is analysed by comparing what securitising actors say and what they do. an insincere securitisation may be identified by a disconnect between rhetoric and policy practice (floyd, 2019). moreover, insincerity may be identified if the main beneficiary of the securitisation is the securitising actor, rather than the referent object (also known as “agent-benefitting” securitisation). a referent object-benefitting securitisation is identified by whether 1) the securitising actor “seriously intends to secure the referent object identified” and 2) the securitising actor “acts to alleviate the insecurity he himself identified”. a discrepancy between the identified threat and the actions taken, in p re ss journal of asean studies 163 especially when the action serves to benefit the securitising agent, would be an indicator of an agent-benefitting securitisation (floyd, 2010). conducting securitisation the conduct of securitisation centres on proportionality and effectiveness. a securitisation is considered proportionate if it seeks to address the causes of the objective existential threat without overstepping. it is considered effective if it limits the amount of harm done compared to if securitisation was not conducted. moreover, in conducting securitisation, the securitising actor must “respect a limited number of relevant human rights” (floyd, 2019). to illustrate an example of just conduct, the securitisation of terrorism should result in security measures aimed specifically at mitigating the potential harm of terrorism without resorting to the infringement of civil liberties, e.g., mass surveillance or the subsequent enactment of harsh immigration policies. terminating securitisation or desecuritisation de-securitisation is presented as the theoretical opposite of securitisation. where securitisation is the process of elevating a security issue above the realm of normal politics, de-securitisation is the process of returning the issue into the realm of normal politics (roe, 2004). the copenhagen school contends de-securitisation as being a positive process and desirable long-term goal, as “security should be seen as a negative, as a failure to deal with issues as normal politics” (buzan et al., 1998). just securitisation theory similarly views de-securitisation as a process. it defines desecuritisation as a process leading to a de-securitised condition. the de-securitised state of affairs is distinguished by either the return of the previously-securitised issue into ‘normal’ politics (re-politicisation) or its de-politicisation (floyd, 2010; floyd, 2019). re-politicisation is aligned with the copenhagen school’s definition and desired goal of de-securitisation. in the latter, the issue is discarded from normal politics, meaning the issue is not even discussed by political actors, though it may still be discussed outside of the realm of politics by civil society (floyd, 2010). this does not necessarily render de-securitisation as politicisation to be just. under just securitisation theory, the securitising agent, usually political leaders, generally holds both the power and responsibility to terminate an unjust securitisation. in an ideal situation, this would mean the onus to de-securitise, regardless of whether securitisation was initiated justly or unjustly, would be on the initial securitising agent. in the case where the initial securitising agent no longer occupies the same political position due to succession or other reasons, the onus shifts to the succeeding agent due to their power to undo their predecessor’s securitisation (floyd, 2019). should de-securitisation be attempted, the timeliness and presence of context-specific restorative measures serve as indicators of justness. a securitisation initiated and conducted justly should end the moment the objective existential threat has been neutralised. in p re ss 164 a “matter of life and death”? continuation of securitisation in the absence of a just cause renders the securitisation unjust. moreover, if securitisation was initiated unjustly, it ought to be terminated as soon as possible (floyd, 2019). the actions taken to terminate securitisation also matter. securitising agents ought to declare the end of specific securitising actions and terminate the use of security language. this should then be followed by context-specific restorative measures to prevent re-securitisation, and ideally, keep the issue within the realm of normal politics (floyd, 2019). methodology the research employs a combination of discourse analysis of verbal and written statements, government policy documents, and other publicly available publications related to food policy in indonesia. in particular, annual state of the nation speeches, government regulations and policy documents, and statements to the public are scrutinised. discourse analysis identifies the structure of narratives of food security in indonesia, which determines patterns and extent of securitisation. this method primarily reveals major securitising agents, securitising practices, and securitising and de-securitising moves, while in a secondary manner, it also allows to probe the intents of securitising agents. in conducting the normative analysis, the following limitations are observed. due to the nature of food security, it is difficult to precisely establish whether threats are agent-caused or agent-lacking. this is mainly due to the multifaceted character of threats to food security. however, it is possible to reasonably determine whether threats are objective or perceived based on existing evidence. in analysing initiation, the referent object remains consistent across all administrations, namely the indonesian nation-state. thus, the analysis of just initiation will focus on evaluating threats perceived by and intent of securitising agents. it should be noted that intent cannot be precisely established, only probed, especially from public statements. in analysing conduct, space limitations preclude an exhaustive analysis of the implications of every policy made to address food security and possible counterfactuals. as such, only major policies related to food security, and more specifically rice selfsufficiency, are examined due to its central importance in the indonesian food security discourse. rhetoric and practice of food security in indonesia indonesia’s concepts of food security might draw from these international influences, but it is moulded to suit nationalist purposes (neilson & wright, 2017). in the indonesian context, the revised law no. 18/2012 on food (undang-undang pangan; hereafter, food law) serves as the authoritative basis for understanding food security. the food law distinguishes between food sovereignty (kedaulatan pangan), food self-sufficiency (kemandirian pangan), food resilience (ketahanan pangan), and food security (keamanan pangan). indonesia’s notion of food sovereignty closely follows the ideals of la via campesina as “the peoples’, countries’ or state unions’ right to define their agricultural and food policy, without any dumping vis-àvis third countries” (“food sovereignty”, 2003). food self-sufficiency, according to law no. in p re ss journal of asean studies 165 18/2012 (hereafter “food law”) art. 1(3), is understood as the “capacity of the state and nation to produce food domestically to guarantee an adequate level of food to for the needs of the individual”. food resilience and security are particularly distinct, with the former being “the condition of having food needs fulfilled from the state to the individual level” and the latter being “the conditions and efforts required to prevent biological, chemical, and other forms of contamination of food.” to have resilience would not just require adequate production or supply of food, but also guaranteed equitable access to safe and nutritious food, whereas food security is narrowly concerned with practical efforts to prevent hindrances to achieving resilience. in practice, ketahanan pangan is often more concerned on food availability (ketersediaan) than access. in political rhetoric, ketahanan is often conflated with the other terms, and used with the intention of reinforcing the role and function of the state in food policy (neilson & wright, 2017).1 food security during the soekarno administration indonesia’s quest for food self-sufficiency is a constant amidst the variables of indonesian administrations. soekarno’s 1952 oration serves as an important starting point for understanding indonesia’s fixation on self-sufficiency (soekarno, 1952). the oration, titled soal hidup dan mati (“a matter of life and death”), was delivered at the laying of the first stone of the current-day bogor agricultural institute. the threat of food shortages was set on the backdrop of population growth, which, if not met with proportionate production growth, would be catastrophic: every year, without exception, without pause, without mercy, this issue of rice will come in a crescendo – greater, more intense, more terrifying – as long as our fast population growth is not balanced by increasing our food supply! (soekarno, 1952, translated by author) in line with his revolutionary nature, self-sufficiency was framed as an urgent necessity, especially where dependency was concerned. for soekarno, achieving food self-sufficiency was part and parcel of indonesia’s independence. indonesia should not have to rely on others, especially in the form of foreign aid, to fulfil such a basic need (weinstein, 2007). said soekarno: why should we talk about “liberal politics” (politik bebas) when we are not independent in rice, when we always have to ask for help from our neighbours? if world war iii breaks out, either tomorrow or the day after, and transport between indonesia, thailand, and burma becomes disrupted, where will we get our rice? (soekarno, 1952, author’s translation) soekarno’s rhetoric influenced the policies his administration took to increase production (table 1). self-sufficiency, soekarno believed, was a matter of ensuring a balance 1due to the conflation of these terms in indonesian food security discourse, these terms are also used interchangeably throughout this paper for consistency. in p re ss 166 a “matter of life and death”? between domestic supply and demand, but supply should ideally come almost exclusively from domestic production. however, these policies largely failed due to limited skills, resources, and political delays, compounded by rising inflation and economic downturn, resulting in several famines occurring throughout the 1950s to 1960s. to be sure, indonesia was by no means short of foreign aid; however, soekarno never applied for international food aid. instead, aid was provided in the form of program aid and scholarships for indonesian students to study in donor countries, with the hopes of those students returning to build the country (van der eng, 2014). table 1 summary of rice self-sufficiency policies developed and implemented under soekarno. (adapted from mears, 1984 and rieffel, 1969) name / period of implementation expectations practice kasimo welfare plan / 1952 – 1956 aimed for rice self-sufficiency by 1956. increased rice production by 6 per cent, but this was disproportionate to 20 per cent population growth which led to more than 800,000 tonnes of rice imports. five year development plan [garis-garis besar rencana pembangunan lima tahun] / 1956 – 1960 raise availability of rice through irrigation rehabilitation and use of metro corn variety. though rice availability did increase in 1959-1960, this was due to imports. corn production also increased marginally. balai pendidikan masyarakat desa (bpmd) establish focal point of development activities at the village level. there would be one per district. as of 1968, only 12 per cent goal reached due to difficulties in acquiring land and equipment. padi sentra / 1961 1964 establish 500 paddy centres which would provide fertiliser, seeds, and production credit to farmers. farmers did not repay credit. negative production incentive. centres were not equipped with adequate expertise. three year rice production plan / 1959 early 1960s achieve self-sufficiency by importing fertiliser and organising farmers. a national command and village-level executive teams would be established. “too diffused” and suffered from lack of expertise. food security in the suharto administration in contrast to soekarno’s fiery rhetoric positioning self-sufficiency as a “matter of life and death”, suharto’s food policy goals had two objectives. first, it was to mitigate food shortages caused by his predecessor’s mismanagement, while also accelerating economic development. in creating the first of seven five year development plans (rencana pembangunan lima tahun/repelita), the food shortages of his predecessor were still fresh in in p re ss journal of asean studies 167 the mind of suharto and the technocrats in his administration (thee, 2002). the focus, therefore, was increasing crop yields by introducing technological and administrative fixes. the agricultural sector, specifically rice production, was identified as a priority sector to be developed in the first repelita. the designation of agriculture as a priority was framed in terms of fulfilling dietary needs and lessening dependence on food imports (kansil, 1970). additionally, food production became viewed through a developmental lens. the suharto administration viewed a stable supply of food, ideally rice, as the basis for industrialisation (soeharto, 1985b). second, the administration sought to use rice production to seek legitimacy. suharto viewed rice production to serve the larger goal of achieving ‘national resilience’ (ketahanan nasional). the idea of national resilience was central to the administration, affecting the rhetoric of policy (anwar, 1996). the use of dire rhetoric was particularly evident in his annual state of the nation address in 1969: let us wager everything on the success of development! prosperity is our goal; development is our responsibility and honour. if there is any grave danger threatening us, that danger is the failure of our five-year development plan. the failure of development does not just result in a loss of confidence in government, but also the destruction of the results of economic progress that we have struggled to achieve to this day. a worsening economy surely results in the return of the pki [communist party of indonesia] and the destruction of pancasila.” (soeharto, 1985a; author's translation, emphasis added). food security policies hinged on a pilot program known as mass guidance (bimbingan massal/bimas) in 1963, which began as a small-scale project designed to provide hands-on training for students at the bogor agricultural institute. the central premise of the program was to have university students guide farmers in using new varieties of rice, fertilisers, and pesticides to improve crop yields. and became the precursor for suharto’s food policies, which centred on “green revolution” technologies, i.e., using new high-yield seed varieties, improved irrigation, and increases use of fertilisers and pesticides (mears, 1984). these technologies were promoted by foreign companies, and financed by the administration through loans and oil revenue (patel, 2013). the pilot project eventually became elevated to the level of national policy (elson, 2001). bimas had several variants, with the most controversial being the gotong royong variant, which relied on foreign companies to supply high-yield seeds, fertilisers, and pesticides. military elites would often act as intermediaries, which enabled rent-seeking behaviour (crouch, 1988). despite several episodes of political instability and rice shortfalls which happened during the first repelita, suharto continued to focus on managing rice production in the second and third repelita, with self-sufficiency being the goal (elson, 2001). the main instrument was the logistical affairs agency (badan urusan logistik, /bulog). the bulog became the sole state agency (primarily run by the military) that had the power to oversee supply and distribution of rice and had a monopoly on rice imports. this authority allowed the suharto administration to create national buffer stocks. the agency also had a monopoly in p re ss 168 a “matter of life and death”? on state imports. farmers were ‘unionised’ under a single state-approved national union. intensification and extensification of farmland continued under the new bimas programme (mears, 1984). rice self-sufficiency was achieved in 1984 as the sum of these policies. the following year, suharto was invited to speak at the food and agriculture organisation, where, in a theatrical gesture, he pledged 100,000 tonnes of unhusked rice as aid to ethiopia, which had been beset by famine (elson, 2001). self-sufficiency, however, was short-lived. suharto’s developmental fervour in java led to the loss of arable farmland due to land conversions and rapid industrialisation. in addition, rice production experienced a slowdown due to technological and infrastructural limits (thee, 2002). coupled with an increase in population, droughts, and rising food prices, by 1995, indonesia faced looming food shortages. with his political legitimacy on the line, the suharto administration hastily passed the pengembangan lahan gambut (peatland development project, plg) project under presidential decision (keppres) no. 82/1995. the project was expected to increase production of rice by 5.1 million tonnes annually by converting 5.8 million hectares of peatland to farmland in central kalimantan. suharto insisted the first harvest be ready by 1997, two years after the project began, just in time for the 1997 elections (mccarthy, 2013). plg, however, failed due to poor planning and corruption. surveys have shown that peatlands were not suitable for wet rice cultivation, yet the administration insisted on converting the land for rice paddies. the project was designed not by technocrats, but by corporate groups and bureaucrats with close connections to suharto. due to this poor design and corruption, the plan failed and was cancelled in july 1999 by habibie (mccarthy, 2013). food security in the yudhoyono administration the yudhoyono administration set out their priorities under the long-term national development plan for 2005-2025 (rencana pembangunan jangka panjang nasional tahun 20052025; hereafter “rpjpn”). the rpjpn had identified several challenges to food production, namely droughts and floods due to climate change and the low quality of indonesian agricultural products compared to the global market. to address these challenges, the rpjpn expects to increase domestic production, stabilise prices, and improve household to food. a system for food resilience would be “directed to preserve food resilience and sovereignty by developing domestic production”, which will be “supported by food resilience institutions capable of guaranteeing household food needs…” (government of indonesia, 2005). the middle-term national development plan of 2004-2009 (rencana pembangunan jangka menengah nasional/rpjmn) pledged to “revitalise agriculture” (revitalisasi pertanian) to achieve rice self-sufficiency. the following problems for food security were identified: water availability related to irrigation problems, decline in farmland, lack of access to credit and agricultural technology, lack of diversification due to dependence on rice as a staple food, and problems of food distribution. the administration also identified rice imports as a solution for maintaining supply and accessibility but emphasised its potentially disruptive effects on prices and farmer welfare. in p re ss journal of asean studies 169 in 2006, under presidential regulation no. 83/2006, the food resilience board (dewan ketahanan pangan; dkp) was established to advise the president on food security policy. the dkp issued a general policy on food security, which defines the administration’s priorities and perception of food resilience.2 the dkp understood food security to be fulfilled when 1) food is adequately and equally available for all citizens and 2) all citizens have adequate physical and economic access to nutritious foodstuffs. the dkp then proposed a 14-point comprehensive food security policy based on increasing food production, farmer welfare, developing national and regional food reserves, agrarian and land reform, food diversification, and developing efficient distribution networks (dewan ketahanan pangan, 2006). the policy was manifested in the food self-sufficient villages program in 2006, which aimed to establish food reserves at the village level, thus improving access and resilience during times of shortage (salim, 2010). yet despite these plans, in practice, the dkp was primarily concerned with maintaining national food reserves while progress in other policy areas stagnated (neilson & arifin, 2012). during yudhoyono’s first term, rice production steadily increased from 54.5 million tonnes to 64 million tonnes in 2009. this was followed by marginal increases in other foodstuffs as recorded in the middle-term national development plan 2010-2014, such as corn (from 12 million tonnes to 17 million tonnes), sugar (2.2 million tonnes to 2.9 million tonnes), and soybeans (0.8 million tonnes to 0.9 million tonnes). the increase in production coincided with a decrease in rice imports (figure 2), with the notable exception of 2007, when the administration imported 1.4 million tonnes. despite the global rise in food prices which was immediately followed by the 2008 financial crisis, indonesia managed to avoid the brunt of the crisis. thus, in his second term, yudhoyono set out to improve food production and resilience as one of his eleven priority agendas. these priorities were further elaborated in the middle-term national development plan of 2010-2014 to comprise of land reform, infrastructure, research and development, investment and subsidies, nutrition, and climate change adaptation measures. yudhoyono was worried about the effects of the 2008 financial crisis and sought to proactively seek an “opportunity amidst the crisis”. according to then-presidential spokesperson, dino patti djalal, yudhoyono corresponded with the un secretary-general, ban ki-moon, and other heads of state along with the president of the world bank, conveying his concerns of the effects of the food price hike on lower-income countries. the correspondence also served to highlight indonesia’s increased domestic production, not just in rice, but soybean, corn, and palm oil. this would provide the basis for yudhoyono’s belief that indonesia could achieve food self-sufficiency, which would in turn, contribute to alleviating the global food crisis (djalal, 2008). 2this document was released prior to the revisions to the 1996 food law, hence the conflation of the terms “food security” and “resilience”. in p re ss 170 a “matter of life and death”? figure 2 rice imports and production, 2004-2021. source: the national statistics agency, impor beras menurut negara asal utama, 2000-2021 [rice imports based on origin country, 2000-2021] (https://www.bps.go.id/statictable/2014/09/08/1043/impor-beras-menurut-negara-asal-utama2000-2021.html); produksi tanaman pangan, 1993-2015 (https://www.bps.go.id/indicator/53/23/1/produksi.html) and luas panen, produksi, dan produktivitas padi menurut provinsi, 2018-2021 (https://www.bps.go.id/indicator/53/1498/1/luaspanen-produksi-dan-produktivitas-padi-menurut-provinsi.html). the conversion rate from unhusked dried rice to milled rice is 64 per cent based on the national statistics agency, survei konversi gabah ke beras 2018 [survey of conversion of unhusked rice to husked rice]. prior to the yudhoyono administration, the role of bulog was significantly weakened in part due to conditions of accepting the imf structural package. during the megawati administration (2001-2004), based on presidential regulation no. 7/2003, the bulog was restructured as a state-owned enterprise with the duty to secure, manage, and distribute national staple food reserves (cadangan pangan pemerintah) and in special cases, stabilise the prices of staple food commodities (saragih, 2016). the yudhoyono administration did not make significant alterations to the duties of the bulog, which was criticised as undermining the agency’s function in providing national reserves (“mewaspadai krisis pangan”, 2011). the administration focused instead on enacting protectionist regulations aimed at protecting farmers’ welfare through the imposition of import quotas. these included horticulture law (law no. 13/2010), the farmer protection and empowerment law (law no. 19/2013), the trade law (law no. 7/2014), and a revision of the 1996 food law (law no. 18/2012) (howes & davies, 2014). in p re ss https://www.bps.go.id/statictable/2014/09/08/1043/impor-beras-menurut-negara-asal-utama-2000-2021.html https://www.bps.go.id/statictable/2014/09/08/1043/impor-beras-menurut-negara-asal-utama-2000-2021.html https://www.bps.go.id/indicator/53/23/1/produksi.html https://www.bps.go.id/indicator/53/1498/1/luas-panen-produksi-dan-produktivitas-padi-menurut-provinsi.html https://www.bps.go.id/indicator/53/1498/1/luas-panen-produksi-dan-produktivitas-padi-menurut-provinsi.html journal of asean studies 171 the revised food law of 2012 would allow for the creation of a new agency, which would answer directly to the president, to create policies relevant to food security. the agency would also be empowered to coordinate relevant ministries in production, distribution, and stocking of staple food commodities (art. 126-129). the proposed agency, however, was not established in time and would only later be established in the second widodo administration in 2021. additional revisions specify conditions governing imports and exports. article 36(2) stipulates imports would only be permissible if domestic production and reserves cannot fulfil domestic demands, especially for staple foods; whereas article 34 stipulates exports of staple food commodities would only be permissible if national reserves and demand have been fulfilled. it was also during the second term that yudhoyono set higher ambitions for indonesia’s agricultural output. in april 2008, yudhoyono called for a joint meeting with representatives from various ministries, state-owned enterprises, kadin, and key figures in the energy and agricultural industries. a follow-up meeting was conducted two weeks after, and thus the komite aksi peningkatan produktivitas pangan, energi, dan mineral was established, to be headed by yudhoyono himself. it had the full support of the kadin. from this meeting, kadin would organise two “feed indonesia, feed the world” conferences held in 2010 and 2012 respectively. in the first conference, kadin identified 15 priority commodities, four of which are classified as “strategic”, i.e., rice, sugar, soybean, and corn, and presented a roadmap of the necessary procedures that would need to be taken to support yudhoyono’s aspirations (maulia, 2010). these ambitions would entail ramping up production significantly, which would be achieved through extensification of farmland. the administration opted to build upon a previously defunct project known as the merauke integrated rice estate (mire) to increase rice production in eastern indonesia. the administration rebranded mire as the mifee after a series of deliberations with numerous stakeholders. mifee would span 1.2 million hectares of land, but in practice, land concessions reached around 2.1 million hectares. though the project was designed to bolster food security, in reality, food crops only accounted for 2.8 per cent of the estate with the remainder being planned for cash crops such as sugar cane, lumber, and oil palm (ito, rachman, & savitri, 2014). as a result, it has been criticised as a land grab serving corporate interests instead of improving food security (ginting & pye, 2013; mcdonnell, 2020). ironically, this has led to increased food insecurity for the indigenous people in papua, who have long relied on sago as their staple food (hadiprayitno, 2017; neilson, 2013). food security in the widodo administration as part of his 2014 campaign, widodo pledged to improve ketahanan pangan during his first period in office. the pledge was contained in his 2014 campaign manifesto, nawacita, under the promise of establishing economic independence. this would later be used as his policy platform for both administrations. in the manifesto, widodo viewed economic selfsufficiency as essential for upholding sovereignty. as he claimed, “political sovereignty will in p re ss 172 a “matter of life and death”? lose meaning if not accompanied with economic self-sufficiency, which is a precondition for autonomy in national policymaking” (widodo & kalla, 2014). to achieve self-sufficiency, widodo pledged to “foster food sovereignty (kedaulatan pangan) based on people’s agribusiness (agribisnis kerakyatan)” which would entail eradication of rent-seeking “import mafia”, increasing exports, building agricultural capacity and supporting infrastructure, increasing investment in villages, and enacting agrarian and land reform (widodo & kalla, 2014). widodo also cited soekarno’s “soal hidup dan mati” oration in the preamble of the food security and vulnerability atlas of indonesia in 2015, further affirming the nationalist orientation of his food policies (dewan ketahanan pangan et al., 2015). a similar nationalist theme could also be seen in the agriculture ministry’s strategic plan (rencana strategis) for 2015-2019. the ministry had identified several challenges for food resilience, i.e., increasing population and climate change, global economic competition, food price hikes, and distribution issues related to lack of infrastructure, illegal stockpiling, and natural disasters. the strategic plan lays out several responses to those challenges, namely increasing domestic production of rice, soybean, corn, and beef, and improving access and distribution safety. agriculture minister regulation no. 14/2015 stipulates the goals of self-sufficiency in rice, corn, and soybeans must be reached within three years. however, the most striking indicator of the widodo administration’s move towards securitising food can be seen in the inclusion of food resilience into the discourse of national security. the 2015 defence white paper does not provide a definition of food resilience; however, it does specify “challenges”—climate change and decreasing food supply—to food resilience in its strategic outlook section. 3 the document notes the “indirect” effects of climate change on “non-fulfilment [of] human life basic needs”, which will “cause disruption [of] resilience… leading to insecurity”. interestingly, the document emphasises the effects of population increase, inflation, water crises, and dependency (presumably on imports) on food supply (defence ministry of the republic of indonesia, 2015). these outlooks, outlined in national strategic documents, have led to the policies implemented by the administration being mostly focused on increasing productivity through state intervention (hamilton-hart, 2019). joko widodo viewed the matter as an issue of infrastructure. the administration designated several dam construction projects as ‘nationally strategic’ infrastructure projects and increased funding for villages and rural areas to prepare 9 million hectares of agricultural land and improve local irrigation infrastructure (salim & negara, 2018). the widodo administration also distributed, per 2019, a total of 11 million land certificates to small and middle landowners to ensure the legal status of their land, which in the administration’s view, was as an implementation of land reform (“presiden jokowi serahkan”, 2020). the agriculture ministry increased fertiliser subsidies, which reached idr 34.4 trillion in 2019 (“berhitung uang subsidi pupuk”, 2021). in addition to infrastructure fixes, the widodo administration also expanded the remit of state agencies to handle food security. presidential regulation no. 48/2016 marginally expanded the authority of the bulog to manage the prices of rice, corn, soybean, sugar, beef, 3in the official english translation of the defence white paper, “food resilience” is used. in p re ss journal of asean studies 173 and poultry. the administration also passed presidential regulation no. 66/2021, which established the national food agency (badan pangan nasional/bpn). the new agency, which replaces the dkp, is a non-ministerial agency that answers directly to the president. the bpn implements food security policies developed by the agriculture ministry for specific foodstuffs, namely rice, corn, soybeans, sugar, shallots, poultry, eggs, beef, and chili. the bpn’s remit also allows it to regulate food prices, which was traditionally the domain of the bulog. however, the most notable was the close cooperation between the agriculture ministry and the indonesian military (tni). since 2015, the agriculture ministry and military have signed numerous memoranda of cooperation to achieve the widodo administration’s target of self-sufficiency. based on agriculture minister regulation no. 14/2015, the military and university students are expected provide guidance and assistance for farmers to reach selfsufficiency goals. tens of thousands of babinsa (bintara pembina desa; non-commissioned officers at the village level) are expected to act as “motivators, facilitators, innovators, and dynamisators [sic]” under the program tni manunggal masuk desa (solih, 2017). the agriculture ministry justified its reliance on military assistance due to their lack of manpower and the tight deadline imposed by the administration; while then-tni commander, gatot nurmantyo, justified the cooperation on the basis of military operations other than war (kresna, 2017; “tni lanjutkan garap”, 2017). the results of the cooperation on agricultural output, however, remains questionable. the national audit agency (badan pemeriksa keuangan, bpk) found the cooperation, dubbed program cetak sawah kementerian pertaniantentara nasional indonesia, was riddled with financial mismanagement, resulting in substantial losses (“program cetak sawah”, 2020). whether these policies had a positive impact on rice production remains debatable. the national statistics agency recorded a decline in production of dried unhusked rice in the same year, from 59.2 million tonnes to 54.6 million tonnes. since 2018, average production of dried unhusked rice has hovered at around 54 million tonnes. the decline in rice production in 2018 led to the government importing 2.25 million tonnes of rice; however, since 2019, indonesia only imported an average of 444,000 tonnes (figure 1). the decline in rice production may likely be attributed to a decline in arable land and unfavourable climate conditions. the agriculture ministry has also recorded a steady decline in per capita rice consumption (figure 3 and figure 4), which may be attributed to rising real prices resulting in less consumption or a change in dietary preferences attributed to higher household income (kementerian pertanian, 2021). in spite of production decline, joko widodo received an award from the international rice research institute for achieving rice self-sufficiency, marked by zero imports of rice for consumption—distinct from rice imports for industrial purposes—for three consecutive years from 2019 (“jokowi highlights zero rice”, 2022). in p re ss 174 a “matter of life and death”? figure 3 annual rice consumption by sector. (badan pusat statistik, 2021). note: data for 2013, 2016, and 2018 are not reported. horeca stands for “hotel, restaurants, and cafes”. industrial consumption refers to the use of rice for industrial purposes, e.g., manufacturing additives, livestock feed, etc. figure 4 annual per capita rice consumption for households, 2002-2020. (kementerian pertanian, 2021). having achieved rice self-sufficiency, it would seem there would be no reason to further intensify measures related to food production. the next step would be to focus on improving in p re ss journal of asean studies 175 access and bolstering farmers’ welfare. however, in the second term, the widodo administration became concerned of a looming food crisis due to the covid-19 pandemic, and later, the russian invasion of ukraine. on 28 april 2020, jokowi met with the agriculture ministry and ordered extensification of existing farmland to anticipate the upcoming food crisis. in coordination with the soe ministry, the agriculture ministry expects to open new farmland on peatland in central kalimantan (“kejar target ‘sejuta’ hektare”, 2020a). leading a limited meeting on the food estate in september 2020, widodo requested his ministers to prioritise national food reserves in anticipation for a potential food crisis due to the covid19 pandemic, global warming, and an overall desire to decrease food imports (“rapat terbatas mengenai lanjutan”, 2020). joko widodo again cautioned his cabinet and regional leaders of a looming food crisis in a national working meeting in 2021 (kementerian sekretariat negara republik indonesia, 2021). concerns of a food crisis were further accentuated as the russo-ukraine war broke out. the war resulted in a global food price hike due to russian blockades of ukrainian wheat exports, which was particularly felt in indonesia. widodo visited moscow in hopes of ensuring a resumption in the flow of wheat. the meeting resulted in an agreement from putin to lift the blockade and ensure a resumption in the flow of goods out of the black sea (maulia, 2022). in addition, indonesia also added food security to its g20 presidency agenda, further reflecting the widodo administration’s belief of an existential threat to indonesia’s food security. the administration’s response to the potential food crisis was to establish food estates in sumatera, east nusa tenggara, central kalimantan, and papua for an expected total of over 770,000 hectares of new farmland to be opened; with 148,000 hectares allotted for rice and the 622,000 hectares for non-irrigated crops such as cassava and corn. more than half of the food estate will be concentrated in central kalimantan (mcdonald & meylinah, 2021; “indonesia starts developing”, 2020). though the food estate project was expected to be part of the first term agenda, it experienced delays and could only proceed in 2017 due to difficulties in finding a suitable location. the widodo administration designated the food estate as a “strategic national project”, making it a priority for the administration. after a series of deliberations, it was decided the food estate would be built on former plg lands in central kalimantan. the location was recommended by the mayor of central kalimantan and endorsed by a feasibility study conducted by the environment and forestry ministry (anam, 2020). the food estate project was designed as a joint inter-ministerial project. though initially led by the agriculture ministry, joko widodo decided to appoint defence minister, prabowo subianto, as the project lead. joko widodo rationalised the appointment as a means to “quickly anticipate [a possible food crisis] by establishing strategic food reserves”, noting that “defence isn’t only about weapons systems, it’s also about resilience in the food sector”. the defence ministry is expected to coordinate at least six ministries: public works and housing, soe, spatial planning, environment and forestry, agriculture, and national development planning (fachriansyah, 2020). in p re ss 176 a “matter of life and death”? the new food estate project has generated considerable controversy, particularly from conservationist groups. critics have pointed out the potentially detrimental financial, social, and environmental impacts of the project due to widespread deforestation, displacement of indigenous communities, and questionable profitability (“stop food estate di kawasan”, 2020). there have also been allegations of widespread mismanagement within the defence ministry as the primary interlocutor of the program. environment and forestry ministerial regulation no. 24/2020, also colloquially known as the food estate law despite not being a product of legislature, allows for a streamlined conversion of production forest areas to food estate areas. the new regulation would permit an area to be converted to a food estate based on an expedited environmental assessment in lieu of a more exhaustive assessment. this new provision has allegedly been exploited by the defence ministry. the management of the food estate was entrusted to a private company, pt agro industri nasional (agrinas). the company is owned by a non-profit foundation, development of potential defence resources foundation, where defence minister prabowo subianto serves as the head of advisory board. key leadership positions within the foundation are held by members of prabowo’s political party, gerindra. the defence ministry, however, has denied its links to pt agrinas (“rainforests fall for indonesia's food”, 2021). analysis having elaborated the food security policies of indonesian governments, this section proceeds to examine whether the issue of food security has been securitised and whether the securitisation of food can be considered morally defensible based on the framework of just securitisation. summaries of the results of the analysis may be found in table 2 and table 3 respectively. has food been securitised? the sukarno administration sukarno had identified the objective threat of famine to the nation, caused by an inability to produce enough rice to meet the demands of an increasing population. left unaddressed, this inability would eventually “eliminate” the nation. note that in his 1952 speech, sukarno used the term “bahaya kemusnahan”, which the closest translation would be “the threat of extinction”, further accentuating the urgency of the matter. compounding on these threats was indonesia’s dependence on the global market, which, as a recently independent country beset by economic turmoil, would only exacerbate the threat to the nation. to save the nation, sukarno had placed his hopes on policies aiming at agricultural intensification, extensification, and providing professional education. from the use of security language, it is clear the issue of food had been securitised. the conduct of security measures in the form of production-oriented policies further indicate securitisation has occurred. in p re ss journal of asean studies 177 the suharto administration suharto saw food as a means to assert and sustain political legitimacy, which depended on his administration’s ability to maintain the prices of foodstuffs, rice especially, at an accessible level. food was no longer a “matter of life or death” requiring extraordinary measures to protect, yet due to its perceived central role in advancing economic development, the administration continued to present the issue in security language. further enabling this was the fact that the issue of food had not yet been fully de-securitised largely in part due to the abrupt transfer of power from the sukarno to suharto administrations. the absence of proper de-securitisation resulted in a condition perhaps best described as a state of “latent” securitisation, where the issue remains securitised, though extraordinary measures are not taken. a latently-securitised issue may be re-securitised, given favorable conditions (taufika, 2020). suharto left food policy to technocrats in his administration, which focused on introducing “green revolution” technologies, economic incentives, market controls, and transmigration (falcon, 2014). however, the administration’s focus on achieving national resilience as a bulwark against a communist resurgence essentially enabled the administration to frame any issue in security terms, food notwithstanding. additionally, the suharto era bureaucracy was not purely civilian; active military personnel were permitted to occupy civilian posts. these structural conditions eased the involvement of military personnel in implementing food policies, as evidenced in the involvement of the military elite in the bimas gotong royong program. however, when the administration perceived threats to domestic stability and the nation due to the loss of food self-sufficiency, it quickly responded with a measure to ensure food resilience was maintained. following the collapse of the administration in 1998, food security became latently securitised again due to the absence of a proper de-securitisation, even by the transitionary administrations. the yudhoyono administration the yudhoyono administration did not initially securitise food during the first term. food security remained on the political agenda, but there were no significant moves to securitise the issue. there are two possible explanations for this. first, there were positive developments in agricultural output, while imports were generally within acceptable levels. coupled with relatively stable economic growth, the administration may have not seen the need to securitise food. second, the administration was occupied with other pressing security issues, such as counterterrorism and reconciliation with the gerakan aceh merdeka separatist movement (jones, 2015). as a result, yudhoyono had maintained the politicisation of food resilience, while not engaging in neither de-securitisation nor securitisation. a trend towards securitisation became more apparent in the second term, after the administration had perceived threats to food resilience. the revision of the food law, in addition to the passing of laws related to horticulture and farmers’ protection was motivated by protectionist tendencies in agriculture, were a reaction to the increased budgetary strains in p re ss 178 a “matter of life and death”? on food imports, which in turn were perceived to be devastating to local farmers. the administration also passed presidential instruction no. 5/2011, which allows for narrow involvement of police and military personnel in securing food reserves during extreme climate conditions (droughts, floods, etc.). the administration started to ramp up perceived threats of a looming food crisis, which would be exacerbated by population increase. in defending the mifee, the coordinating ministry for economic affairs has noted mifee was a necessary policy to “anticipate a food crisis” (neilson & wright, 2017). the practice of allowing the involvement of military and law enforcement may suggest a form of extraordinary action, however, military personnel may be deployed for a wide range of military operations other than war based on the 2004 armed forces law (haripin, 2020). regardless, the involvement of the armed forces would constitute as a security practice hinting towards securitisation as it expands the remit of an agency which initially was not equipped to deal with food security. like previous administrations, the yudhoyono administration did not openly and completely de-securitise the issue, thus rendering it latent. the widodo administration securitisation of food in the widodo administration is more obvious compared to the previous administration. the incorporation of food resilience into national security discourse represents a break from the yudhoyono administration’s reluctance to engage in overt security language. in addition, the administration had also positioned food self-sufficiency as a goal of his administration through the referencing soekarno’s “soal hidup atau mati” speech. in his second term, the threats to the nation became more evident. a notable aspect was the unified adoption of the narrative across ministries, which was less evident during the yudhoyono regime. this has been attributed to joko widodo’s big-tent coalition, which weakened political opposition, thus centralising power within the executive circle (mietzner, 2016). positioning food resilience as not just a national development priority, but also a matter of national security, allowed the widodo administration to establish new agencies and expanding the remit of existing agencies dedicated to responding the identified threats. is securitisation morally defensible? having identified instances of securitisation, the second part of the analysis calls for a normative testing of securitisation, and in some cases, de-securitisation, to determine whether securitisation is morally defensible. the analysis proceeds by examining initiation, conduct, and termination of securitisation in each administration. in addition, as the widodo administration is currently ongoing, analysis on conduct of securitisation remains preliminary. in p re ss journal of asean studies 179 table 2 summary of the state of securitisation/de-securitisation of food security across administrations. sukarno suharto (early) suharto (late) yudhoyono (first term) yudhoyono (second term) widodo securitising moves identified objective threats of famine in existential terms identified objective threats of famine as an issue of regime survival loss of selfsufficiency posed a threat to legitimacy and stability nonapparent perceived threats of food shortage identified objective threats of climate change and its effects in existential terms security practice productionoriented policies productionoriented policies, price controls, and improving access. failed execution of largescale food estate creation of new agency with additional remit in food security import restrictions, increasing operational remit of military, and food estates productionoriented policies, import restrictions, and food estate state of securitisation securitised securitised securitised “latent” securitisation securitised securitised state of desecuritisation not desecuritised not desecuritised not desecuritised not desecuritised not desecuritised unknown source: author’s own illustration. the sukarno administration the initiation of securitisation by the sukarno administration may have been based on just cause and intent. the widespread food shortages in the 1950s and 1960s, caused by a combination of population growth, droughts, and logistical problems posed an existential and objective threat to the nation (van der eng, 2012). as far as intent is concerned, the available evidence points towards just intent, as the administration enacted policies aimed at intensifying rice production. in conducting securitisation, the principle of proportionality has been observed as the policies were mainly targeted to increase production. in the case of an agent-lacking threat, the available evidence does not suggest the presence of an ulterior or agent-benefitting motive underlying these policies. the effectiveness of conduct, however, may be questioned. first, the evidence suggests the administration lacked the necessary technological and logistical capacity to ensure the success of these policies. second, the explicit rejection of foreign food aid raises doubts on the administration’s sincerity in security practice. by rejecting international food aid, the administration did not act in a way to mitigate further harm to the referent object. this practice further raises questions of the sincerity of the securitising agent. until the end of the sukarno administration in 1966, there were no publicly available statements announcing the termination of food securitisation. as a result, the issue may be considered to still be in a securitised state. in p re ss 180 a “matter of life and death”? the suharto administration during the first decade of his rule, suharto re-initiated securitisation of food. the justness of initiation, however, may be questioned. the threat of food shortages, which persisted throughout the late 1960s, served as a just cause for securitisation. the following conduct, represented in the acceptance and use of foreign aid and ‘green revolution’ technologies to increase rice production, may also be considered proportionate and effective in addressing the identified threats. this was marked by an overall improvement in living standards and an increase in agricultural output (booth, 2000; thee, 2012). within this particular time bracket, the agent’s intent may be considered just as the agent’s actions are consistent with the threats identified by the agent. however, when one looks at the sociopolitical context, the sincerity of intent may be questioned. by portraying food policies as a bulwark against a potential communist resurgence, the primary beneficiary of these policies would be the political elites as opposed to the nation. the justness of securitisation seems to further falter after the achievement of rice selfsufficiency in 1984. following the principle of timeliness in de-securitisation, security rhetoric and practice related to food should have been ceased. suharto’s 1985 state of the nation address, however, suggests continuation of previous policies to sustain self-sufficiency, although the administration had ceased the use of security discourse in the issue of food. this suggests an incomplete de-securitisation, rendering the issue latent. the loss of self-sufficiency, coupled with warnings of food shortages in 1995, served as enablers for the re-securitisation of food, as indicated in the initiation of the plg program. however, the initiation of securitisation in this instance would be considered unjust in intent, as it was conducted to benefit the securitising agent. in its conduct, the plg was also disproportionate and ineffective, as it resulted in long-term ecological and socio-economic harm, particularly to the indigenous population of kalimantan (mccarthy, 2013). it may be argued the suharto administration held the responsibility to de-securitise food, at least up to the point where self-sufficiency was achieved. by then, the threats of famines had generally been abated. however, until the abrupt end of the suharto administration in 1998, there were no evident attempts to reverse the securitisation of food, rendering the issue latent. the latent state of food security remained throughout the transitionary administrations of habibie, abdurrahman wahid, and megawati. the yudhoyono administration as the first administration that marked the beginning indonesia’s period of democratic consolidation, it had the opportunity to de-securitise food security. the creation of a new agency with remit in food security, in addition to the absence of reforms on previous policies which could be potentially used to securitise food in the future, however, suggests the issue remained in a latent state. in p re ss journal of asean studies 181 the initiation of securitisation in the second yudhoyono administration shows mixed results. in terms of just cause, although there were threats to food security as a result of the 2007-2008 financial crises, existing food security measures were considered relatively adequate to bear the brunt of the crisis. it was more likely yudhoyono was more concerned of his domestic image, as his relaxation of rice imports and general incompetence in managing agricultural policy was met with widespread dissatisfaction and political opposition (hill, 2015). this led to a need to strengthen his international image through the mifee project. in this sense, the parameters for justness of intent and cause are unfulfilled, which results in an unjust initiation of securitisation. as security practice, the administration’s proposed mifee project fails to meet the criteria of just conduct in both effectiveness and proportionality. the mifee project had questionable benefits in terms of increasing food security; instead, it may have worsened food security, especially in already food-insecure regions. in terms of production, the proportion of allocated land for growing food crops paled in comparison to the land allotted for cash crops. furthermore, the introduction of monoculture plots of land undermined local food production in papua, which contradicts the goal of improving access and diversification (ito et al., 2014). the widodo administration as far as threats are concerned, the widodo administration has identified several objective threats, with climate change and its effects being prominent, to food security as laid out in the defence white paper. other threats included global food price hikes due to pandemic-induced global supply chain issues. at a glance, these threats may be considered both objective and existential, thus fulfilling the requirements for just cause. however, it also raises the question of whether it is just to securitise against future objective threats as opposed to imminent threats. just securitisation theory seemingly rejects securitising future threats, as ‘it is unlikely to be the only and last thing that could deliver the desired result in a relevant situation’ (floyd, 2019). viewed in this light, the justness of cause becomes questionable, especially in justifying the administration’s chosen security practice of establishing a largescale food estate. the case for just intent and conduct requires further scrutiny. the emphasis on selfsufficiency as a goal in itself is problematic, as it would entail costly measures with questionable long-term benefits. moreover, the main beneficiary of self-sufficiency remains unclear: is it for the benefit of the state or citizens? (lassa & shrestha, 2014) however, as the previous sections have shown, the self-sufficiency narrative has been entrenched since the sukarno administration (neilson, 2018). thus, although alternatives may have been considered, the persistence of the self-sufficiency narrative, in addition to its public appeal, nudges the administration to pursue food estates as a security practice in response to the identified threat of food shortages. the evidence so far reveals the food estate policy might not have been carried out with sincere intent, as the main beneficiaries of the projects have in p re ss 182 a “matter of life and death”? mostly been political elites instead of the referent object. in sum, food securitisation may not have been initiated and conducted justly. table 3. summary of the normative analysis of securitisation/de-securitisation of food security across administrations. sukarno suharto (early) suharto (late) yudhoyono (first term) yudhoyono (second term) widodo initiation based on just cause and intent based on just cause, but questionable intent not based on just cause nor intent no initiation not based on just cause or intent just cause and intent questionable conduct generally proportionate, though narrowly effective, although implementatio n was marred by technical and logistical limitations. proportionat e and effective in addressing the identified threats disproportio nate and ineffective questionable disproporti onate and ineffective preliminary evidence shows disproportio nate and ineffective termination no explicit termination not terminated no explicit termination no termination, despite having moral responsibility no explicit termination no explicit termination source: author’s own illustration. conclusions the research had set out to identify and analyse the securitisation of food across four administrations in indonesia. it has made three central findings. first, the discourse surrounding food in indonesia is generally based on the dream of achieving food selfsufficiency as a pre-requisite for food sovereignty as laid out by sukarno. the narrative of selfsufficiency has since then been co-opted by subsequent administrations to legitimise practices which have mostly focused on increasing production and protecting domestic farmers, as opposed to ensuring equitable access. these practices have commonly taken the form of farmland expansion, particularly in areas beyond the main island of java. second, practices enacted by the administration are not always morally defensible, as they have not always been initiated with sincere intent and conducted in a manner to benefit the referent object while limiting harm to thereof. instead, this paper has shown that the securitisation of food presents a lucrative opportunity for the political elite to benefit themselves under the pretence of in p re ss journal of asean studies 183 addressing a “matter of life or death” for the nation. this has been particularly evident when large-scale projects are presented and implemented as an antidote for food insecurity. what often follows is mismanagement, which results in potentially more harm than expected. third, the research has also shown discourses of food security have generally remained in a latently securitised state due to incomplete de-securitisation, despite the change in administrations. this condition has enabled subsequent administrations to re-securitise food security in discourses of self-sufficiency, even in the absence of just cause or intent. the findings reveal that food security in indonesia has long been the product of security discourses due to the persistent self-sufficiency narrative. the continued securitisation of food, coupled with its lack of de-securitisation, enables political leaders to justify policies that have questionable benefit to the nation. continued securitisation of food security, therefore, would be considered unjustified. as just securitisation theory prescribes, de-securitisation becomes a moral imperative. however, doing so would require a fundamental ideational shift from self-sufficiency to an alternative paradigm of food security which promotes equitable access rather than a narrow focus on self-sufficiency. the research has attempted to empirically test the normative framework of just securitisation theory; however, it is not without limitations. admittedly, this preliminary attempt has only sought to apply just securitisation theory instead of developing a potential competing formulation. limited access to primary source material, which would have greatly enriched the analysis of intent, also posed a challenge in conducting a comprehensive analysis. additionally, this analysis has mostly focused on food production policies. future research may opt for a more comprehensive analysis on the justness of distribution and access policies, especially in the face of future existential threats. limitations notwithstanding, the research has shown just securitisation theory to be useful in longitudinal analysis of security policies spanning across administrations within a single country. further research may consider comparative applications of just securitisation theory to enrich its empirical applicability. acknowledgment the author would like to thank the anonymous peer reviewers for their comments. the author also thanks jun honna for their constructive feedback and support on an earlier draft of this article. the research is financially supported by the mext embassy-recommended scholarship 2021 and ritsumeikan university. about the authors i gusti bagus dharma agastia is a phd student at the graduate school of international relations, ritsumeikan university, kyoto, japan. he is also an adjunct lecturer at the international relations study programme, president university, west java, indonesia. in p re ss 184 a “matter of life and death”? references anam, k. 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in asean alexander chandra the habibie center abstract despite its ambitious asean economic community (aec) project, protectionism, and economic nationalism are on the rise in asean. protectionism, however, is not new to southeast asia, with governments across the region employing an inwardlooking economic policy when they enjoy economic stability, and pursuing economic reform when confronted with major economic challenges. unfortunately, embryonic industries will always exist in the region, and governments will find excuses to safeguard their existence. drawing on the murdoch school of critical political economy approach, this article argues that the inclination towards protectionism in asean be primarily rooted in the domestic political economy of member states. apart from bringing about domestic regulatory changes, major economic liberalisation initiatives of asean, such as afta and the aec, significantly redistribute power and resources, and ignite struggles between competing for domestic economic influences, many of which are in favour of government’s protection. whilst existing technical initiatives to address protectionism are useful, major crises that encourage structural adjustments in all asean member states might be needed to overcome protectionist inclinations in the region. keywords: protectionism, economic nationalism, economic regionalism, asean introduction the long-awaited asean economic community (aec) was finally launched on 1st january 2016. despite the success of the association of southeast asian nations (asean) in officially launching its most ambitious project to date, scepticisms linger over the viability of the association’s economic integration project. the rise of protectionism, as an expression of economic nationalism, in particular, has been seen by many experts and practitioners alike as a key hindrance to asean’s effort to deepen its economic integration project. while senior officials of asean member states (ams) have consistently reiterated their countries’ 2 regional economic community in asean commitments towards the aec; a significant contrast is depicted on the ground. despite significant achievement in reducing tariff barriers over the past decade, for instance, non-tariff measures (ntms)/non-tariff barriers (ntbs) remain rampant across the region. though the incidence of ntms in asean is relatively moderate in comparison with other regions of the world (cadot et al., 2013: 12), these protective measures will prove to be major stumbling blocks for asean to attain its 2025 economic vision.1 domestically in each ams, protectionist push against the aec is mounting. shortly prior and during the immediate aftermath of the aec launching, public debate on the subject was, unsurprisingly, becoming more common. while many express their excitement about this ambitious regional economic integration project, others remain sceptical, highlighting their countries’ unpreparedness to face, inter alia, increasing competition as a result of the aec. in indonesia, for example, professionals, such as engineers, and workers express their concerns over the potential flood of their more qualified peers from other ams.2 elsewhere, such as in the philippines and vietnam, experts and business practitioners alike also warn the difficulty that micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises (msmes) would face amidst the aec.3 with such 1 the aec vision 2025 is part of an overarching asean community vision 2025 that was adopted at the 27th asean summit, which took place in kuala lumpur, in november 2015. the document serves as a guide for asean to deepen its economic integration post-2015. further details concerning the aec vision 2025 see asean secretariat (2015b). 2 see, for example, tempo (2015) and ambarita (2015). 3 see, for example, mercurio (2015) for the philippines and anh (2015) for vietnam strong domestic pressures, ams become more reserved in their commitments towards the deepening of aec project. protectionism, however, is not new to southeast asia, with governments across the region employing such an inward-looking economic policy when they enjoy economic stability. on the other hand, major economic reforms, usually pursued in the form of deregulation and liberalisation, are commonly adopted when crises emerge. ams’ positive attitude towards the deepening of asean’s economic integration in the immediate aftermath of the late 1990s asian financial crisis through the launching of the aec is a case in point. consistent with jones’s (2015) murdoch school of critical politicaleconomy approach, this article argues that the inclination towards protectionism in asean be primarily rooted in the domestic political-economy of ams. more specifically, as jones further elaborates, agreements, such as the asean free trade area (afta) and the aec, call for major rescaling of economic governance at the regional level, which affects domestic regulatory changes that would significantly redistribute power and resources, and ignite struggles to promote and constraints their effects (pp. 3-4). whilst existing regional initiatives to address protectionism are useful, major crises that encourage major structural adjustments in all ams might be needed to overcome fundamental protectionist inclination in the region.4 4 the asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, for example, prompted asean to accelerate and deepen its economic integration process. the aec, which entails, amongst other things, indirect efforts to address protectionism, is a major regional economic reform resulted from such a process. journal of asean studies 3 in the meantime, however, the development of domestic consensus remains a key element in the deepening of asean’s economic integration project (yean and das, 2015). in this regard, as yean and das further argue, greater policy coherence in domestic economies, increased stakeholder consultation, mitigation of the negative impact of aec on domestic stakeholders, and the overcoming of resource constraint are primary areas that asean needs to pay its attention to post-2015 (pp. 7-8). aside from this, an effective strategy to find common denominators to lessen protectionism is also needed. though past initiatives, particularly the priority integration sectors (pis),5 were capable of attaining such a goal, ams’ half-hearted commitments render these initiatives ineffective. the new aec vision 2025, which identifies a new set of sectoral priorities for asean, could potentially serve as an arena in which efforts to lessen protectionist measures are tested.6 this article is divided into four sections. whilst the subsequent section two offers overview on the existing literature of domestic sources of protectionism, the analysis in section three is dedicated to showing trends and pattern of protectionism in asean. the 5 launched in 2004, pis is an initiative aimed at accelerating integration in sectors that are deemed priority by ams. originally covering 11 sectors, including electronics, e-asean, healthcare, woodbased products, automotive, rubber-based products, textile and apparel, agro-based products, fisheries, air travel, and tourism, in 2006 logistics was added as the 12th pis. 6 the new aec vision 2025 identifies several key sectors that are deemed important to enhance connectivity and sectoral cooperation in the region, and these include: (1) transport; (2) information, communication, and technology (ict); (3) ecommerce; (4) energy; (5) food, agriculture, and forestry; (6) tourism; (7) healthcare; (8) minerals; and (9) and science and technology. section also briefly highlights asean’s efforts to address protectionism, particularly in the area of elimination of ntms/ntbs. discussion in section four, meanwhile, is focused on exploring the domestic sources of protectionist inclination in asean. more specifically, it attempts to illustrate sector/actor-specific struggles that affect ams’ commitments towards the deepening of asean economic integration. furthermore, section five makes an argument for the deepening of asean’s economic integration in advancing domestic reforms that could assist the dismantling of protectionist inclination amongst ams. finally, the article is concluded in section six where the author attempts to identify specific policy-oriented recommendations for consideration towards dismantling protectionist inclination in the region. domestic sources of protectionism: a theoretical overview protectionism is understood as a form of government’s policies and actions that restrict trade and economic openness in favour of the protection of local business and industries, which can be implemented through the imposition of tariffs, quotas, subsidies, as well as other forms of direct state intervention in the economy. two notable arguments have been commonly used to promote trade protectionism, and these include national security and infant industry arguments. whilst national security argument is often advanced with consideration of protecting an industry that is deemed critical to national security; infant industry argument generally calls for temporary protection of fledging domestic industries from foreign competition (warrier, 2011, p. 225). amongst all arguments commonly used to advance trade protectionism, infant industry argument 4 regional economic community in asean probably enjoys the highest attraction for policy-makers and economists alike, and this is likely to be continuously invoked since embryonic industries will always exist (kicsi and buta, 2010, p. 179). although strong arguments have been made for free trade, protectionism continuously resurfaces in new guises (gilpin, 2000). throughout history, in fact, free trade has been the exception, whilst protectionism has been the rule (bairoch, 1993: 6). indeed, if free trade is more efficient in comparison to trade protectionism, it remains puzzling as to why the former is not more universally and consistently adopted by countries around the world (kaempfer et al., 2002, p. 2). an understanding of domestic political-economy of foreign economic policy-making can offer some explanations to this query. few hypotheses have been developed to analyse the reactions of politico-economic actors vis-à-vis regionalism. one hypothesis, for example, focuses on the type of domestic pressure groups capable of pushing for protectionist measures in a regional trade liberalisation process (hoekman and leidy, 1993). domestic industrial sectors, as hoekman and leidy further postulate, can be divided into two types, including holes and loopholes. whilst some domestic actors support the protectionist measures attached to all domestic industries (also refers to ‘holes’), others can be satisfied with the provisions that allow for only temporary protection, such as import restrictions, import subsidies (also called ‘loopholes’). other scholars, such as de melo and panagariya (1993), argue that the ‘preference dilution effect’ and the ‘preference-asymmetry effect’ may limit the power and the rent-seeking behaviour of domestic pressure groups. the preference dilution effect implies that the larger the political community, the less influence can be exerted by domestic pressure groups on the policy-making process. the preference asymmetry effect, on the other hand, allows for compromises on a specific issue to take place amongst different state actors and domestic pressure groups. another set of arguments focuses on the formation of a regional integration arrangement as a response of policy-makers to domestic pressures. in milner’s (1997, pp. 76-77) view, such an arrangement can be seen as a government’s attempt to balance consumer interest with the pressures that emerge from private economic agents, such as firms. a more recent political-economy analysis on the domestic consideration of foreign economic policy (fep)-making is offered by dent (2002). drawing from seminal work of putnam’s two-level game theory and assessment on the formulation of american fep carried out by ikenberry et al. (1988), dent’s contesting actor-based influence theory maintains that the process of fep formulation is usually contingent upon four factors, and these include: (1) state bureaucratic power, culture, and dynamics; (2) level of democratisation; (3) internationalisation of civil society; and (4) economic nationalism. whilst the first condition, or bureaucratic state power, culture, and dynamics, generally occurs in a statecentric society where constituents hold limited influence over fep formulation, the level of democratisation in a society determines the extent to which domestic constituents can exert their influence over a country’s fep. meanwhile, the level of civil society’s influence over fep is also dependent upon their knowledge regarding international political and economic conditions. in this regard, more journal of asean studies 5 outward-looking societies are more likely to assert a greater stake in the fep formulation process, and vice-versa. last but not least is economic nationalism, which acts as the source of protectionism in a country. in the asean context, whilst economic nationalism and protectionism today have been displayed in ams’s half-hearted participation in asean economic community building, in the past, cases of confiscation of foreign assets were also common in some ams. more recently, jones (2015) offers a more compelling political-economic argument to explain the domestic root of protectionism in asean. using the murdoch school approach,7 he argues that the rhetoric and reality of aec be primarily rooted in the domestic political economy and social conflict of ams. he went on to suggest that the proposed rescaling of economic governance at the regional level promotes domestic regulatory changes that would significantly redistribute power and resources, and this stimulates struggles between competing for domestic economic influences. accordingly, whilst the domestic socio-political coalitions that underpin state power in southeast asia generate political imperatives for some level of economic openness, the same forces also constraint ams to pursue full liberalisation at the regional level. it is not surprising, therefore, that the rich, substantive, agenda of the aec is often compromised by protectionist inclination arising from domestic alliances between 7 the murdoch school tradition emerged from the asia research centre at murdoch university, australia, which has generated numerous influential studies on the political-economy of southeast asia since the 1980s (see, for example, robison et al. (1987), hewison et al. (1993), and rodan et al. (2006)). for further detail on this approach see also hameiri and jones (2014). elites in political and business spheres, and the broader imperatives of avoiding socio-political unrest that could accompany structural adjustments emerging from the aec (pp. 3-4). elsewhere, this author has also argued that the relationship between nationalism and asean regionalism be symbiotic – the two variables can sometimes be mutually reinforcing, and sometimes mutually exclusive and conflicting.8 whilst it has always been assumed that nationalists are opponents to free trade agreements (ftas) and/or regional economic integration initiatives, they have not always been hostile to free trade and closer economic ties with other states (shulman, 2000, p. 365). as with other domestic actors, nationalists, today have to adjust to the ongoing and intense pressures of globalism and regionalism. incentives such as sustained economic development, the promotion of national unity, identity, and culture, the promotion of the state’s autonomy in international fora, the formation of regional collective action to attain regional governance, and the elevation of their country’s bargaining power at the international level are some of the incentives that nationalists can accrue from supporting initiatives such as the aec. pattern of protectionism in asean despite a commitment to open regionalism, the trend towards protectionism is increasingly common in asean. data made available by the global trade alert (gta) (n.d.)9 suggests 8 see, for example, chandra (2008). 9 the gta is an initiative that provides real-time information on measures that are likely to discriminate against international that is coordinated by a london-based think-tank, the centre for economic policy research. 6 regional economic community in asean that, to date, ams still make use of considerable amount of measures that are harmful to trade. the gta classifies trade measures as ‘green’, ‘amber’, and ‘red’ to indicate their degree of ‘harmfulness’, with the red classification being the most harmful. amongst 630 protective measures that ams adopt, 339 of them are classified ‘red’, whilst 182 and 109 of these measures are classified ‘green’ and ‘amber’ respectively (refer to table 1). with 346 measures, the majority of which, or 191 of them, are in ‘red’ category, indonesia is the heaviest user of protectionist policies in the region. moreover, despite the country’s recent aggressive moves in international trade negotiations, vietnam comes second as the ams commonly issuing a protectionist policy that is harmful to trade. out of 107 measures, 60 of them are under ‘red’ category, whilst 29 and 18 of these measures are classified ‘green’ and ‘amber’ respectively. furthermore, since tariffs are already low (refer to diagram 1), most protectionist policies in asean are in the form of ntms/ntbs, despite the 2007 aec blueprint setting the deadlines for the elimination of ntbs.10 to date, as the asean secretariat (2015, pp. 16-17) notes in its asean integration report 2015, though the feasibility to calculate the number of ntms identified as ntbs, or the number of ntbs eliminated, is small, it is possible, however, using the integrated trade intelligence portal of the world trade organisation (wto), to find the list of ams’ notified 10 the aec 2007 blueprint deadline for the elimination of ntbs include: 2010 for brunei darussalam, indonesia, malaysia, singapore, and thailand; 2012 for the philippines; 2015, with the flexibilities up to 2018, for cambodia, laos, myanmar, and vietnam. ntms to this global trade body (refer to table 2). the same report also suggests that out of the total 2,178 notified ntms, the largest concentration of these harmful trade measures is in the form of technical barriers to trade, which account for 1,188 measures, followed by sanitary and phytosanitary measures (sps), amounting to 735 measures. ironically, however, many of the sps measures are linked to resource-based products that are part of asean’s pis. countries green amber red t otal brune i da rus s a la m 1 0 0 1 ca mbodia 2 0 1 3 i ndone s ia 94 61 191 346 la o pdr 1 0 0 1 ma la ys ia 16 12 24 52 mya nma r 4 1 3 8 philippine s 11 3 7 21 singa pore 9 4 21 34 tha ila nd 15 10 32 57 vie tna m 29 18 60 107 t otal 182 109 339 630 table 1. har mful tr ade measur es in asean source: gta (n.d.). journal of asean studies 7 source: asean secretariat (2015: 9). table 2. asean’s notified ntms to the wto adp cv qr sg sps ssg tbt total i f i f f i f i f f i f brn 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 2 0 5 cam 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 3 ind 20 15 0 0 0 10 16 53 42 0 78 14 248 lao 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 mys 8 19 0 0 0 2 0 27 6 0 205 6 273 mmr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 phl 1 0 0 0 0 4 7 119 142 7 242 1 523 sgp 0 0 0 0 43 0 0 36 17 0 28 11 135 tha 4 34 0 0 59 2 2 205 18 0 523 22 869 vnm 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 43 23 0 44 7 119 total 33 68 0 0 102 19 26 486 249 7 1,126 62 2,178 note: adp: antidumping; cv: countervailing; qr: quantitative restriction; sg: safeguards; sps: sanitary and phytosanitary; ssg: special safeguard; tbt: a technical barrier to trade; i: initiated; f: in force. source: asean secretariat (2015: 16). 8 regional economic community in asean source: evenett and fritz (2015: 72-73). given the sheer size of its economy, much attention on the protectionism debates in the region has been given to indonesia. although the country is not the worst offender in the region in imposing new trade-restrictive regulations, it is one of the worst when it comes to ntms (patunru and rahardja, 2015, p. 7). while the number of liberalising measures adopted has increased from 3 in 2009 to 78 in 2015, the number of discriminatory policies has risen from 30 to 213 in the same period (evenett and fritz, 2015, pp. 72-73) (refer to diagram 2). the 16th gta report even considered indonesia as the worst ‘offender’ for increasing protectionism since the global financial crisis.11 these ntms, most of which imposed by the country’s minister of trade and include 11 in addition to ntms imposed for trade in goods, the 16th gta report in 2014 also highlights that indonesia, along with the philippines and thailand, are the top three most restrictive countries with regard to services trade (evenett, 2014). measures such as license and permit requirements, pre-shipment inspections, and new labelling requirements, were often imposed to reinforce the previous ones, often with added strictness, whilst others involved complex crossbureaucracy between ministries. in order to promote domestic industries, indonesia was also active in imposing policies, such as local content requirements and export restrictions, many of which propelled complicated and cumbersome business environment in the country (patunru and rahardja, 2015, p. 7). several initiatives have been introduced to address the issue of ntms in asean. as asean secretariat (2015, p. 16) reports, in addition to aligning and upgrading their ntms database in line with the new ntm classification system of the united nations conference on trade and development (unctad), each ams has also established interagency bodies to strengthen coordination journal of asean studies 9 in addressing these protectionist measures. other initiatives, such as the asean solutions for investments, service, and trade (assist), which is a consultative, internet-based facility that offers a structured mechanism for the private sector to lodge their complaints in a transparent and open manner (miti, 2015) and the asean trade repository, an electronic interface through which the public can freely access the information available on national trade repositories of each ams,12 are also expected to contribute to the elimination of various protectionist measures in asean. domestic sources of protectionism in asean by and large, the economies of southeast asia display mixed economic regimes that accommodate economic openness, market mechanism, and multilateralism in trade policy, on the one hand, and state-driven models and interventionist practices, on the other (nesadurai, 2012, p. 18). despite their ambitious content, present regional economic integration initiatives of asean, such as the aec, remain shallow in reality. as dosch (2015, p. 3) rightly points out, the aec reflects the same hesitant pattern that was evident in previous asean’s economic integration ventures, such as the asean preferential trade arrangement (apta) and afta. indeed, as highlighted in the previous section three, although, on the positive side, the association has managed to reduce member states’ tariff level to a considerable degree, protectionism is creeping in by way of ntms/ntbs. 12 further detail about the asean trade repository is available in its official website at (accessed 24th january 2016): http://atr.asean.org/. there is little doubt, however, that protectionism in asean is mainly rooted in the domestic political-economy of its ams. whilst regional economic integration projects are often argued as rational responses to globalisation and growing international competition, in southeast asian context, they are most and foremost political projects that are generated and promoted by specific social and political forces and contested by those threatened by the so-called ‘neoliberal’ restructuring and adjustments (jayasuriya, 2003). notwithstanding diversity in the state-society relations across different ams, two common features can be found in the region, including the central role played by the economy in politics and the intricate linkages between the state, political actors, and politically influential domestic social forces, particularly corporate sectors, that is embedded within the so-called patronage networks (nesadurai, 2014, p. 228). business-state relations deserve particular attention in this regard. as jones (2015, p. 7) argues, the development trajectories that have been developed in southeast asia have created forms of state power that are amenable to the interests of these non-state actors. the long process, developed throughout the cold war period, of the state-led development process that was backed by western governments, donor agencies, and international financial institutions has cultivated the symbiotic relationship between political bureaucracy and business groups, whilst marginalising opposition groups (rodan et al., 2006). in indonesia, for instance, the then suharto’s regime exchanged protection to ethnic-chinese business elite for economic support to advance the interests of the regime (robison, 1986), 10 regional economic community in asean whilst, subsequently, the surviving oligarchs in the post-suharto era, along with other provincial politico-business elites, reorganised themselves to dominate the country’s new democratic and decentralised political institution through money politics and clientelist networks (robison and hadiz, 2004). the same also applies to other asean countries, including malaysia (where the ruling umno has actively cultivated support for malay business elite in return for financial support),13 the philippines (where landed oligarchs and crony capitalists cultivated under the marcos regime remain in control of the country’s democratic elites),14 and thailand (where politico-business elites that have been cultivated under successive military regimes were able to dominate thai politics in the late 1980s and were always in competition for office thereafter).15 whilst these domestic circumstances present significant challenges to ams’ intention to pursue active engagement in international fora, this does not mean reforms and liberalisations have not taken place. tariff liberalisation, as mentioned elsewhere in this article, has been relatively successful, whilst the level of asean’s economic integration has arguably been deepened, albeit slowly. as in the case with its past economic integration projects, the degree of liberalisation achieved in asean is reflective of the outcome of struggles between liberalising reformers, who emphasised the general welfare gains offered by greater international economic openness, and their opponents, who sought to maintain specific, national-scale protections benefiting themselves and 13 see, for example, gomez and jomo (1997). 14 see, for example, hutchison (2006). 15 see, for example, pasuk and baker (2004). their allies (nesadurai, 2003). whilst this struggle generate substantial deregulation, with the average import tariffs, fell from 12.3 percent in the early 1990s to 1.5 percent by mid-2006 (hill and menon, 2010, pp. 7-8), many of the highly politically sensitive sectors remained protected (jones, 2015, p. 12). at the onset of afta implementation, for example, over two-thirds of agricultural products were excluded from the common effective preferential scheme (cept). more importantly, however, when their business interests are challenged by regional economic integration initiatives, such as afta, business actors were able to overturn specific policy decisions through their connection with the ruling elite (nesadurai, 2003, p. 122). such circumstances often spark frictions amongst ams. for example, the reduction of import tariff under afta has enabled japanese firms to consolidate their production in thailand. whilst this vastly improved the automotive industry of thailand, the automotive sectors in malaysia were severely hit, and this generated severe anti-afta resistance amongst the country’s politically connected producers (wad, 2009, pp. 175178). elsewhere in the greater mekong subregion (gms), glassman (2010) also argues that, instead of facilitating the deepening of the gms, this sub-regional initiative has, by and large, been used as a platform for thai and chinese capitals to serve the southeast asian region and beyond. protectionism, however, has been more profound since the emergence of 2008/09 global financial crisis (gfc). although many of the southeast asian economies were not heavily invested in journal of asean studies 11 the type of toxic assets that exposed owners to deep losses in the west, the gfc, nevertheless, affected the economies of the region through trade and financial channels, reflecting the region’s deep economic integration with the rest of the world (plummer, 2009, pp. 1-2). although asean leaders were quick to issue a statement that emphasised the region’s stance on antiprotectionism (mcdermid, 2009),16 the prolonged impacts of the gfc encourage ams to resort eventually to protectionist measures. the protectionist inclination is particularly alarming in the largest economy of asean, or indonesia. whilst much attention has been given to the present administration of president joko widodo, the trend towards protectionism was already visible in the second term of susilo bambang yudhoyono administration (2009-2014). at the time, not only that the country saw a significant increase of ntms to limit imports and exports, but it was also amongst the large and emerging economies that used this protectionist tool extensively to protect its domestic industry (oliver, 2012). whilst past economic crises were able to generate ‘good policies’, during the present economic hardship, however, indonesia is more inclined towards making ‘bad’ economic policies, including protectionist measures and various inward-looking policies (patunru and rahardja, 2015). aside from deteriorating domestic economic condition that has been fuelled by prolonged global economic slowdown, slow exports, and weak household confidence and consumption, rising nationalism, driven by various 16 see, for example, asean leaders’ statement at the 14 th asean summit that took place in hua hin, thailand, in 2009. political parties and business groups, also gives room for protectionist policy to exist (negara, 2015, pp. 4-6). the push for protectionism is also evident in other asean countries. in malaysia, for example, aside from its long-standing new economic policy, which is dubbed by some as discriminatory and protectionist,17 the country’s automotive sector remains one of the most protected ones in the region. the sector was only liberalised as late as 2004 under afta since the industry was considered as a key import substitution project designed to generate a malay capitalist class (jones, 2015, p. 12). until more recently, however, malaysia’s automotive sector remains protected from foreign competition through the elaborate construction of tariff barriers, investment-approval permits, differential excise taxes, subsidised credit, procurement arrangement, and tax allowances (nehru, 2012).18 in the philippines, meanwhile, the country’s investment climate has been hampered by its 1987 constitution that supports laws restricting foreign ownership of property to 40 percent (article xii) (tacujan, 2013), whilst presidential decree no. 1466, which prohibits government cargoes to be transported by non-philippines flagged ships, also restricts the country’s regional economic integration commitments.19 similarly, in vietnam, the country’s steel sector lobby 17 see, for example, the comment made by the former envoy of the european commission to malaysia, thierry rommel, as quoted in netto (2007). 18 despite this, as nehru (2012) further explains, the share of the main automotive producer of malaysia, or proton, has been declining, with the company now utilises only 45 percent of its capacity and is steadily losing ground to other domestic and international competitors. 19 as quoted in port calls asia (2014). 12 regional economic community in asean group has recently called for greater protection amidst challenges of weak domestic demand and, at the same time, dirt-cheap steel imports from china.20 around the same time, state-owned petrovietnam also asked the government to limit fuel imports and take measures to do local businesses to use products from its two oil refineries.21 from a sectoral perspective, protectionism is merely a result of sectorspecific struggles for powers and resources within asean societies. in an extensive analysis on the professional migration in asean, sumano (2013: 151204) argues that, in thailand, the country’s medical council was dominated by scarce, and, consequently, well-paid local doctors who feared competition from their peer abroad. in view of potential salary reduction, employers of these local doctors, both private and public hospitals, were expected to favour liberalisation in the sector. it turned out. however, public hospitals were divided, between those in the rural areas where medical professionals were scarce, and those in the urban areas where such professionals were plenty. in the meantime, private hospitals continued to lure medical professionals from public institutions with higher salaries. accordingly, employers in the sector were hardly ever unified behind a strongly pro-liberalisation stance, with the thai medical council insisted the country maintain qualifying examinations in thai, a de facto ntb (jones, 2015, p. 18). similar circumstances also occur in indonesia. recently, for instance, the indonesian medical association 20 as reported by the vietnamnet (2015). 21 as reported by the thanh nien news (2015). expressed their disagreement towards liberalisation trade practices of the aec. it argued that public health matters should not be left to the market mechanism (bisnis indonesia, 2016). in the public, the opinions are divided. a commentary in the jakarta post argued, for example, that indonesian medical services in the country need to be improved, whilst attitude of local medical professionals need to be changed so as to allow better treatments for the patients. at the end of the day, as the author of this commentary opines, ‘local physicians would only have themselves to blame if customers shift to foreign physicians’.22 can the deepening of the regional economic integration address chronic problem of protectionism in asean? can the deepening of asean integration serve as a tool to promote economic reforms and, thereby, dismantle protectionist inclination amongst countries in southeast asia? this is certainly the expectation amongst policy-makers and intellectual elite in the region. in the past, the association’s regional economic integration initiatives, particularly afta, were seen by many as a ‘training ground’ where ams could learn to compete with one another before they compete elsewhere in the global market place.23 many of these initiatives looked at ways in which asean could become more competitive, and this entailed, inter alia, the removal of tariffs as much as ntms/ntbs. recent literature, however, show a rather pessimistic view about the role that regionalism can play in dismantling protectionism. štĕrbovă (2008), for 22 see dharmawan (2014). 23 see, for example, ariff (1993). journal of asean studies 13 instance, argues that, over the years, regional integration has lost its historical role in supporting global trade liberalisation, and has, in fact, become a crucial obstacle to it. aside from bringing the protectionist element into the legal aspect of the multilateral trading system, the increasing intervention of global trade negotiations into domestic policies, such as in the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights, government procurement, administrative procedures, and so on, is making countries more inclined to pursue protectionist policies. along similar line of argument, abida (2013) also maintains that, by creating preferential rules that are inconsistent with the principles of the wto, regional integration strategy can create trade diversion, and increase the risk of trade disputes with third party countries that can generate a commercial environment that is full of threats and reprisals. fortunately, this is not the case with asean. given their vast economic dependence with non-asean economies, ams see the value in involving themselves actively in multilateral trade negotiations, and have, therefore, consistently extended their continuous support for the conclusion of the wto’s long-standing doha round of negotiations. it is also part of the reasons why asean’s trade agenda has been expanded over the years to include bilateral free trade agreements and/or comprehensive economic partnership with its key dialogue partners, and, more recently, the negotiations to create a regional comprehensive economic partnership (rcep).24 24 launched at the 21st asean and related summits in phnom penh, cambodia, in 2012, rcep is a free trade agreement currently being negotiated between asean and its six dialogue more importantly, if properly adhered to, asean’s economic integration initiatives possess the potential to advance domestic reforms that could assist the dismantling of uncompetitive, rent-seeking, behaviour that paves the way for protectionist inclination in ams. as widely argued by regionalism advocates, regional economic integration could propel domestic reforms that would enable governments to pursue policies that are welfareimproving, but incapable to do so in the absence of such a regional set-up.25 unlike engagement made at the multilateral and/or bilateral level, which, as mentioned earlier, governments can find extremely intrusive towards their development agenda, the pace and development of asean economic integration agenda have been built and designed to suit the development capacity of its member countries. though this in itself is an apparent half-hearted commitment towards economic integration amongst state apparatuses in asean, regional economic integration provides a more logical option for countries that wish to maintain status quo, on the one hand and pursue gradual economic reforms, on the other. given the emerging support for economic nationalism and protectionism in the region, however, asean is in dire need to truly self-reflect on its partners with which the association already has individual ftas with. when and if completed, rcep will make up 45 percent of the world population, and contribute a third of the world’s gdp. whist initially planned to be completed by the end of 2016, it is understood that the new schedule for additional negotiating rounds in 2017 has been set to further discuss sticking points in the negotiations. for further information on rcep, see, for example, ministry of trade and industry of singapore (n.d.). 25 see, for example, niekerk (2005). 14 regional economic community in asean achievement to date. aside from communicating better its economic integration policies to the public, the association also is in need of a better approach in amplifying the message that protectionism benefits the few, and harms the masses. at the same time, the public also needs convincing of the fact that the unwillingness of state apparatuses to distant themselves away from influential rent-seekers, which are often dominated by powerful business interests, keeps them away from potential benefits that asean economic integration promises. concluding remarks despite its ambitious aec project, protectionism is on the rise throughout asean. protectionism, however, is not new to southeast asia, with governments across the region employing such an inward-looking economic policy when they enjoy economic stability, and pursue reforms when confronted with major economic challenges. unfortunately, embryonic industries will always exist in the region, and governments will find excuses to safeguard their existence. with the major decline in tariff lines, ams can be expected to make use continuously of ntms/ntbs to serve such a protectionist purpose. whilst it is difficult to predict the occurrence of the next crises, and whether ‘good’ policies could, indeed, emerge from such a catastrophic event, it is possible, however, to take gradual steps to eventually lessen the use of protectionist measures. about ntms/ntbs, for example, there is a merit of considering incorporating efforts to eliminate these barriers in regulatoryreform agendas of each ams, and improve information-sharing and technical cooperation on the issue amongst ams (cadot et al., 2013, p. 2). another potential approach is to identify common denominator to lessen protectionism. whilst initiative, such as asean trade repository and the asean solutions for investments, services, and trade (assist) may pave the way for eventual elimination of ntms/ntbs, priorities on the elimination of these measures can be focused, for example, on the existing and new priority integration sectors asean. in the meantime, however, the attainment of domestic consensus, developed through greater policy coherence and extensive stakeholder consultations, will prove to be a critical ingredient in overcoming protectionism, on the one hand, and instilling popular support for asean economic integration, on the other. about author alexander c. chandra 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