a.m. iqbal1 islamic state university of bandung, indonesia abstract as the prevailing studies tend to neglect how media depict the sociological question about the relationship between self and society and the dualism between pleasure and reality in modern society, this article examines this important issue by analyzing the award-winning film babel by using a psychoanalytic perspective. based on textual analysis of the film’s storylines, this article argues that babel not only substantially represents the relationship between self and society, but also depicts the continuing tension and dualism between them. this is seen in the storylines of its characters that illustrate the relationship between sexual drives and social regulations. for the sake of social interests and cultural production, pleasure is repressed by external reality and sexuality is repressed through socially sanctioned sexual regulations. the self must attempt to balance between libidinal desire and social control to enter the normality of the social world. keywords self, society, pleasure, reality, repression, film babel intisari terdapat kecenderungan pada kajian-kajian yang ada untuk mengabaikan kajian bagaimana media menggambarkan persoalan sosiologis tentang hubungan antara diri-individu dan masyarakat dan dualisme antara kesenangan dan realitas dalam masyarakat modern. rtikel ini mengkaji isu penting ini dengan menganalisis film peraih pernghargaan babel dengan menggunakan perspektif psikoanalitis. berdasarkan pada analisis tekstual atas storylines film tersebut, artikel ini berargumen bahwa film babel bukan saja secara substantif merepresentasikan hubungan antara diri-individu dan masyarakat, melainkan juga menggambarkan ketegangan dan dualisme yang terus berlangsung antara keduanya. hal ini terlihat pada storylines tokohself, society, and repression in babel: a psychoanalytic perspective journal of asian social science research 2019, vol. i, no. 1: 15-25 http://jassr.cassr.web.id © the author(s) 2019 article 1 corresponding author: a.m. iqbal department of sociology, faculty of social and political sciences, islamic state university of bandung jalan a.h. nasution 105, cibiru, bandung, indonesia 40614. email: am.iqbal@uinsgd.ac.id 16 journal of asian social science research vol. 1, no. 1, 2019 tokohnya yang mengilustrasikan hubungan antara dorong seksual dan peraturan sosial. demi kepentingan sosial dan produksi budaya, kesenangan ditekan sedemikian rupa oleh realitas eksternal dan seksualitas ditekan melalui peraturan seksualitas yang disepakati. diriindividu akhirnya harus berupaya menyeimbangkan antara dorongan libido dan kontrol sosial agar bisa memasuki normalitas dunia social. katakunci diri, individu, masyarakat, kesenangan, kenyataan, represi, film babel introduction scholars from various disciplines such as sociology, philosophy and political science have studied the relationship between self and society, one of the fundamental questions about human society. many of their studies explore how individuals need to adapt to society to be part of civilization through repression so that a civilized society can rise and sustain (freud 1977; marcuse 1987; tangney 2003; burkitt 2008). undoubtedly, this literature has provided important insight into the understanding of the nature and dynamics of the relationship between individuals and society. nevertheless, i believe, what appears to be missing from these prevailing accounts is an analysis of how media depict the dynamics of individual desires and social repression. to fill this gap, this article attempts to analyze how media represent the complex and subtle relationship between self and society. in doing so, it focuses its analysis on how the award-winning film babel represents the dynamic of the relationship between self and society and the dualism between pleasure and reality in modern society. the focused analysis will be on love or sexual desires and social repression from the psychoanalytic perspective as expressed in the storylines of yussef and zahra, and chieko. the article argues that babel substantially represents the relationship between self and society and successfully depicts the continuing tension and dualism between them for the sake of social interests and cultural production. data required for this study were collected through investigation that involved reading babel synopsis, watching the film, and reading its storylines. this was done primarily to collect information about how babel develops its narratives to represent the dynamic of dualism between self and society, particularly on the question about love and social repression. relevant collected data in the form of storylines, images, and synopsis were analyzed for categories, topics, and arguments in accordance with research questions. the method involved textual analysis of the collected data to uncover how babel depicts the relationship between self and society in terms of sexual desires and social repression. drawing mainly on the views of the founder of psychoanalysis, sigmund freud, as its theoretical framework, this article examined the collected data to uncover the extent to which babel constructs the dynamic as well as the subtlety of the relationship between self and society as seen in its narratives of individual 17iqbal, a.m. sexual desires and social repression. within the context of self and society, babel provides texts which can be analyzed to understand how these two are related and intertwined. the images and storylines of the movie selected for this study were analyzed to understand how a self’s sexual desires need to be repressed so that society works as expected. this will reveal the extent to which how media contribute to maintaining or transforming the relationship between self and society. in what follows, this article, first, describes some essential information about babel and its storylines. then, it presents its findings and explains how babel represents the dynamics and subtlety of the relationship between self and society as seen in the storylines of its main characters. finally, the article summarises its findings and its possible contribution to the related discourse. about babel babel, which earned its director, alejandro gonzales inarritu, the prize for best director at the 2006 cannes film festival, is a film of four disparate families with different cultures and languages, but eventually interwoven with a hidden connection. this multiple story film was named babel, literally means noise and miscommunication, to show the diversity and complexity of human languages that in turn make people difficult to understand each other. as inarritu said, he named his film after a biblical story of people of babylon who at that time talked and spoke one single language so that can could understand each other. they began to build a tall tower so that they expected to have direct access to heaven. one morning, god woke up and saw these people working and heard what they were trying to do: they were trying to be god. god said angrily: “i don’t like this. i will punish those acts. they will speak different languages” (paramount pictures 2006). regardless of this judeo-christian story, this film reflects the way modern society lives in which language diversity becomes a shattering barrier that separates humankind. it was intended to “invite us to get past the babble of modern civilization and start listening to each other” (travers 2006). babel, which was shot in three continents (asia, africa, and america) and four languages (moroccon, english, mexican and japanese), concludes the trilogy of interweaving multiple stories films that the gifted mexican director alejandro gonzales inarritu and the remarkable screenwriter guillermo arriaga began with their two previous films amores perros and 21 grams (travers 2006). in babel, there are four separate, but intersecting storylines (lumenick 2006). the first, at the mountain village in morocco, a goat herder (played by mustapha rachidi) bought a rifle and gave it to his young sons, ahmed (played by said tarchani) and yussef (played by boubker ait el caid) to shoot jackals. the boys test the rifle innocently by shooting a passing tourist bus. second, an american tourist couple, richard (brad pitt) and susan (cate blanchett), travel by bus in mountainous areas of morocco. third, in san diego, susan and richard’s two young children (elle fanning and nathan gamble) have been left with their mexican nanny, amelia (adriana barraza). as amelia does not find someone to replace her in taking care of the kids, she unwisely takes them to mexico to attend the wedding of her only son. the last, in tokyo, a deaf-mute teenager chieko 18 journal of asian social science research vol. 1, no. 1, 2019 (rinko kikuchi) is grieving over the suicide of her mother, rebels against her father (koji yakusho) who pays little attention to her and acts out sexually with boys and a police detective. the key event occurs when susan, on a tour bus with richard, is shot in the shoulder by yussef and ahmed who are testing a hunting rifle wildly from a hillside given by their father to shoot jackals. media report the shooting as a terrorist attack on the american people. the impact spreads to tokyo, where police detectives are looking for chieko’s father as he is connected to the gun that used to shoot susan. further explanation of the intersection of the ensemble storylines and the complexity of human communication in babel is not interest in this paper. rather, this paper is confined to analyze particularly the characters of yussef and zahra, and chieko in terms of their sexual desires and social and personal realities that constraint the expression of their sexuality. pleasure and reality in the freudian perspective where can we psychoanalytically locate gonzales inarritu’s babel? picking up the storylines of yussef and zahra, and chieko as a unit of analysis, i suggest the film can be read in the light of dualism between “pleasure principle” and “reality principle” or between sexual desires and repression. since my interpretation of the film hinges on the distinction between pleasure and reality in the context of sexual desires, i begin with a brief explanation of these freudian concepts. pleasure principle according to sigmund freud, the founder of psychoanalysis and the great theorist of the human mind, the relation between self and desire can be traced to the early bodily experiences between an infant and its primary caretaker, particularly the mother. the small child depends completely on others, typically the mother, for satisfying its biologically fixed needs. through their care, warmth, and nutrition, the infant needs others to survive. at this point, freud says, the small infant does not make a distinction between inside and outside, between itself and the maternal body because it experiences the mother within a closed imaginary space and lives in a world which is totally different from structures of time and space to satisfy its natural needs (elliott 2002:18). however, for freud, the infant’s self-preservation goes beyond biological needs. after satisfying its biological needs for nourishment, the small child seeks pleasure by attaining libidinal enjoyment or what freud called “pleasure principle”. this is exemplified famously by the child sucking milk from its mother’s breast. after getting the needed biological nourishment, the small infant experiences and develops a certain pleasure in the act of sucking itself (elliott 2004:26). this, in freud’s account, is the emergence of the core of human sexuality, which is created and developed, not predetermined biological force at birth (elliott 2002:18-19). for freud, obtaining pleasure after satisfying biological needs for nourishment can be called sexual. freud says: “the baby’s obstinate persistence in sucking gives evidence at an early stage of a need for satisfaction which, though it originates from and is instigated by the taking of nourishment, nevertheless strives to obtain 19iqbal, a.m. pleasure independently of nourishment and for that reason may and should be termed sexual“ (cited in elliott 2002:26). pleasure, in fact, is bound up with sexuality as needs are bound up with the pleasure of obtaining libidinal enjoyment. in his three essays on the theory of sexuality, freud develops the theory of human sexual development, which is derived from the infantile sexual stages. first, the earliest stage of sexual life is associated with ‘labial zones’ as seen in the infant’s act of sucking milk from the mother’s breast (wollheim 1991:113). this sexual development is called the oral stage. in this stage, oral pleasure becomes ‘erotogenic’ as the baby develops ‘fantasy-infused imaged deriving from the comfort of the breast’ (elliott 2002:19). the oral stage links the opening up of other bodily erotogenic zones, the second sexual phase, the anal stage, where the infant obtains pleasure by letting or holding on feces; it experiences erotic pleasure through expulsion. freud calls these two sexual stages ‘pregenital organizations’ (freud 1977:116-117). the third phase involves the association of sexual drive or libido with genitals as expressed in the act of masturbation along with fantasies and self-sufficiency; this is the phallic stage of human sexuality. the important point of these sexual stages is, for freud, that the infants create and develop an emotional relationship with their own body, other people and society (elliott 2002:19). reality principle: the repression of the pleasure-seeking self in the stage of pleasure-seeking principle, the child develops sexual knowledge and experiences bodily pleasure with the mother. besides, it also fantasizes about the sexual union with the mother in its closed and imaginary world (elliott 2002:20). however, the imaginary world of the child-mother dyad and the fantasy of sexual union are broken through the intrusion of reality into this pleasure principle. at this point, the father’s presence represents the outside world or reality principle that breaks the mother-child dyad. according to freud, the intrusion of the father means that external reality enforces harsh restrictions on the pleasure-seeking drives of the unconscious (elliott 2002:20). pleasure-seeking drives are repressed in the face of external reality. in this regard, civilization imposes severe repressions on the human pleasure-seeking (elliott and frosh 1995:193). the repression of the pleasure-seeking self, including sexual drives, plays a key role in the construction of social regulations and human civilization. but, here emerges the freudian moral imperatives. it is a task of the self, the ego, to balance its pleasure-seeking demands of the unconscious with social regulation and cultural constraints of external reality. the self must negotiate the shift from the pleasure principle to the reality principle, from the unconscious pleasure to the world of reality. otherwise, the self can experience schizophrenic tendencies and other related pathologies (elliott 2002:20-21). in addition, the uncontrolled expression of pleasure leads to interpersonal and social destruction (frosh 1987:38). yet, the surrender of pleasure to reality, freud says, does not mean that the pleasure is defeated; the unconscious only suspends its immediate satisfaction of pleasure to obtain the long-lasting type of pleasure in the form of the unfolding of fantasy (elliott 2002:21). thus, the intrusion of external reality as represented in early childhood by the father suggests that conflict and ambivalence between pleasure and reality constitute a fundamental structure of human life. 20 journal of asian social science research vol. 1, no. 1, 2019 pleasure, reality, and repression in babel babel represents the dualism between pleasure and reality, the conflict between the pleasure-seeking drives of human and external reality or between the self and society. it also portrays the repression of the self by the social regulations and controls. in particular, the film shows how sexual drives of humans are repressed and constrained by external reality, social restrictions and controls through mainly family institutions. in my view, a storyline of yussef and zahra, teenagers of a goat farmer in a mountainous and arid village in morocco, represents a pleasureseeking self in its pure and natural sense. this can be seen in the expression of their sexual drives, the basic form of human pleasure, which can be experienced by anyone regardless of the fact he or she lives with a poor family of a remote village. stealing time from his duty of keeping goats grassing, yussef sneaks to spy her sister, zahra. peeping through a hole in the wall of his brick-made house, he watches zahra putting off her cloth. the camera yields the bare naked back of zahra. surprisingly, or interestingly, zahra is not unaware of the act of her brother, even she enjoys, at least does not mind, her body is seen by her brother. being aware that yussef is peeping through the hole, zahra turns her head around, as her back is bare naked, and smiles at him. it seems that they obtain pleasure and enjoyment through the act of peeping. this act for them can be an expression of their sexual desire, a catharsis of their pleasure-seeking unconscious. however, yussef and zahra’s pleasure is broken substantially by the intrusion of their brother, ahmed. he gets angry with yussef when he catches him spying on zahra and grabs him to the ground. yussef cannot accept this as he feels he does not do anything wrong. ahmed: “what are you doing? i told you, don’t spy on her”. yussef: “what do you care?” ahmed: “move it!” ahmed can be said as the representation of external reality, the other, that intrudes the pleasure world of yussef and zahra. furthermore, ahmed can be regarded as the representation of wider social world when he calls them pigs and threatens to tell their father what they do. yussef: “zahra doesn’t mind”. ahmed: “she doesn’t, but i do”. yussef: “this is between me and her”. ahmed: “you’re both pigs. next time, i’m going to tell dad”. yussef: “stay out of this!” ahmed: “if you want me to stay off it, don’ do it!” yussef and zahra’s pleasure-seeking drives obtain further opposition from external reality as represented by their father who eventually notices what they do. father (to zahra): “you got naked so your brother could watch you?” ahmed: “zahra got naked many times, so yussef could watch her. she’s a street girl”. 21iqbal, a.m. father (to zahra): “is it true or not?” without waiting for her answer, he beats her on the head. yussef considers pleasure-seeking as expressed in his sexual desire as private and personal when he says to ahmed that it is the matter of “between me and her” and asks him not to get involved. yet, the pleasure-seeking self is facing opposition from the reality of the external world. yussef is facing opposition and control from his brother and father, his family. at this point, family plays a role in imposing the reality of the external world, social control and cultural regulations on the self. as erich fromm says, “the family is the medium through which the society or the social class stamps its specific structure on the child, and hence on the adult; the family is the psychological agency of society” (elliott 2002:48). in other words, the pleasure must surrender to the reality of the external world, meaning the self has to surrender to society. nevertheless, the reality of the external world does not totally defeat the pleasure-seeking self; the self does not completely surrender to social regulations. the self finds another way to satisfy its pleasure drives. sitting behind the rock, being away from ahmed, yussef does the phallic stage of sexual development as a substitute for his unsatisfied desire; he starts to masturbate. the storyline of chieko, a deaf-mute japanese girl, can also be read in the freudian concepts of pleasure-reality dualism and the relationship between emotional turbulence and sexual desires. the character of chieko represents the severe imposition of reality on pleasure-seeking drives, in particular sexual desires. at a dental clinic, the dentist asks chieko to open her mouth to check her teeth. when the dentist is checking her teeth and she is opening her mouth, she attempts to kiss him. he seems surprised about chieko’s behavior, “what are you doing?” he says, but he keeps doing his job. chieko then grabs his hand and press it on her genital –she is not wearing panties at that time. the dentist is very surprised and pulls his hand. “what’s wrong with you? get out!” he says. pleasure-seeking chieko as expressed in her flaming sexual desires is facing opposition from reality as represented by the dentist who refuses to satisfy her instinctual libido. pleasure can arouse anywhere to anyone as experienced by chieko, but reality and society impose restrictions and opposition on it as represented by the dentist who regards chieko’s sexual desire inappropriate as it is expressed in public space (the clinic), to the dentist (the public figure) and as she is just a girl. this is also consistent with the scene where chieko invites the police detective to her apartment to tell him about the death of her mother. the pleasureseeking self in terms of sexual desires can be seen when chieko asks him not to leave, after telling the detective how her mother committed suicide. then, she goes to her room. the detective sees a reflection of chieko on the glass of the apartment; approaching him, she gets fully naked. chieko attempts to seduce him by touching his face and taking his hand to her breast. yet, reality rejects to corroborate with pleasure. the detective refuses her seduction and says: “no, this is wrong. you’re just a girl. enough, stop it!”. though he may instinctively and unconsciously be attracted to her, he decides to refuse to satisfy her flaming sexual desires, her pleasure drive, but he lets chieko suck his finger. at this point, he represents the agency of social control that it is inappropriate to express and 22 journal of asian social science research vol. 1, no. 1, 2019 satisfy sexual desires with a young girl, at the time he is on duty, and in her father’s apartment. having her pleasure unsatisfied, chieko attempts to find a way to relieve her suffering: she sucks his finger and cries. moreover, chieko’s pleasure drives are facing opposition from the reality that she is a girl with disabilities. at the club, a boy is approaching chieko when she and her friend are playing video games. he attempts to say hello to chieko and ask her to drink with him or let him join her, but she gives no response. using a sign language, her friend asks him to speak a little slower. the boy is astonished and leaves them saying “excuse me”. he gets back to his friends and says, “asshole, how embarrassing!”. chieko sees them laughing. besides, chieko’s unsatisfied pleasure desires have an impact on her behavior. as freud suggests, the turbulence of emotional life has a relationship with sexual desires and experiences of early childhood (elliott 2002:19). chieko looks unhappy, often loses her temper, and acts out sexually. the death of her mother who committed suicide and lack of attention from his busy father can be other contributors to her ‘uncontrolled’ behavior. but, in my view, the greatest problem results from the fact that she cannot satisfy her pleasure-seeking drives, in particular her flaming sexual desires. when her volleyball team plays the game, she protests against the referee’s decision that ball is in; for her, it is out. she rejects by pointing her middle finger to the referee, an act that makes her sent off. her impulsive characters can also be seen in her conversation with her friends (using a sign language) in the change room after the game. first friend: “you shouldn’t have lost your temper. we lost the game” chieko: “it wasn’t my fault. it was the referee” second friend: “why are you in a bad mood?” first friend: “she always in a bad mood because nobody’s fucked her yet”. chieko: “i gonna fuck your dad to get rid of my bad mood!” her decision to take her underwear off and show the boys in the club “her hairy monster” is another example of the relation between her unsatisfied sexual desires and her emotional turbulence. sitting at the bench in the restroom, chieko looks upset. friend: “what’s the matter?” chieko: “they look at us like we’re monsters” friend: “oh, come off it!” chieko goes to the toilet, puts her panties off and throws it in a bin. friend: “what are you doing”? chieko: “now they’re going to meet the real hairy monster”. sexuality and repression, self and society the storylines of yussef-zahra and chieko are consistent with the freudian concepts of sexuality and social repression. their sexuality, following freud, is ‘polymorphous perversity’; it is formless, purely pleasure which is independent of the idea of procreation or propriety, and able to flow in all directions and all 23iqbal, a.m. objects and bodily parts. erotic love is private and not social as it is biologically “an element of the instincts, greedy, self-serving and hostile to the interests of the group”(frosh 1987:44-45). in the case of children, their sexual life is richer than that of adults (brown 1959 in frosh 1987:45). however, yussef, zahra and chieko cannot satisfy their instinctual erotic love easily. pleasure does not always win over reality. society cannot tolerate the pleasure-seeking self and its uncontrolled sexuality; otherwise, human civilization is threatened to break up. society, therefore, restricts sexuality and regulates what are socially accepted sexual expressions. society forces the self, the child, who is narcissistic and auto-erotic animal, to accept others and certain appropriate sexual expressions and organizations (hirst and wooley 1982 in frosh 1987:45). as a result, sexuality is repressed and regulated in the name of social control and for the sake of civilizations through certain sexual regulations. freud argues that repression of sexuality is justified for the interests of society; this is the way for children to be social adults and our way to normality (frosh 1987:46). in the view of marcuse, basic repression, a minimum level of desire renunciation for the interest of social life, is indispensable. he argues: “a certain level of repression is necessary to produce a ‘socialized subject’, a subject capable of sustaining the business of social and sexual reproduction” (elliott 2002:53). even so, as freud describes, social repression is a painful process for the social regulations of human sexuality constitute the recognition that society enters into the inner world of individuals and regulates what is regarded as private (frosh 1987:46). this is all that yussef, zahra and chieko are facing; they must recognize the reality of the external world to enter into society and the normality of human life. they are forced to enter into the harsh reality of the external world. they are obliged to recognize the existence and significance of others, society. their pleasure-seeking drives are repressed and regulated for the interests of civilization. but, their pleasures are not easily overcome by reality; their sexual desires are not easily beaten. they attempt to find a way as a catharsis to channel their sexual desires, though it does not fully satisfy their instinctual forces. in yussef’s situation, he must satisfy his instinctual desires by masturbating and in chieko’s, she must satisfy her flaming sexual desires by sucking the detective’s finger and hugging her father. or, as freud says, their sexual desires, their pleasure-seeking drives can take a new form of the unfolding fantasy. it seems that sexuality and repression, the self and society, develop a complex relationship, which cannot be put into a single category and description. conclusion babel depicts substantially the nature of pleasure and reality as well as their continuing tension, conflict, and dualism. it represents the relationship between human sexuality and social regulations. it also illustrates the relationship between the self and society. at the core of the relationship lies the idea of repression; for the sake of social interests and cultural production, pleasure is repressed by external reality and sexuality is repressed through socially sanctioned sexual regulations. an individual, the self, the ego, is not the master of its own home; 24 journal of asian social science research vol. 1, no. 1, 2019 the self’s pleasure-seeking drives are repressed in the face of harsh reality and its sexual impulses are restricted through certain sexual regulations. since desire is deeply intertwined with the law and social order, the self experiences an internal conflict between the id (libidinal desire), ego (self) and superego (moral). hence, freud encourages self-control, the renunciation of unconscious desires by which the self must attempt to balance between libidinal desire and social control to enter to the normality of the social world. this is a painful human fate as experienced by yussef, zahra and chieko. yet, this is how society, where the self is its only member, works. this article has contributed significantly to the relatively neglected studies of media and the relationship between self and society by providing insight into understanding the important question about sexual desires and society. nevertheless, it is not a sufficient explanation to understand more the complex and subtle relationship between self and society. therefore, further related studies are appropriately needed in our attempts to uncover how our society works and how media play their roles in maintaining or transforming the ways society works. 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london: penguin books. frosh, stephen. 1987. the politics of psychoanalysis: an introduction to freudian and post-freudian theory. basingstoke: macmillan education. lumenick, lou. 2006. “what 3 years if angelina will do to a man… and other joys of babel”. retrieved 27 april 2018 (https://nypost.com/2006/10/27/ what-3-years-if-angelina-will-do-to-a-man-and-other-joys-of-babelold-brad-shines-in-interlocking-dramatic-tales-babel-will-have-a-lot-ofpeople-talking/) marcuse, herbert. 1987. eros and civilization: a philosophical inquiry into freud. london: ark. 25iqbal, a.m. paramount pictures. 2006. “interview with alejandro gonzales inarritu”. paramount pictures. schickel, richard. “the power of babel”. retrieved 27 april 2018 (http://content. time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1549314,00.html) tangney, marl leary. 2003. handbook of self and identity. new york: guilford press. travers, peter. 2006. “reviews of babel”. retrieved 27 april 2018. (https://www. rollingstone.com/movies/reviews/babel-20061020) wollheim, richard. 1991. freud. second edition. glasgow: fontana press. food innovation and local social movement: the case of juang community of lebak, indonesia journal of asian social science research 2022, vol. 4, no.2: 149-164 https://cassr.net/jassr/ © the author(s) 2022 article riswanda universitas sultan ageng tirtayasa, indonesia m. dian hikmawan universitas sultan ageng tirtayasa, indonesia bayu nurrohman* universitas sultan ageng tirtayasa, indonesia ika arinia indriyany universitas sultan ageng tirtayasa, indonesia yeby ma’asan mayrudin universitas sultan ageng tirtayasa, indonesia abstract this article aims to describe how the movement carried out by the juang community of lebak, indonesia, encouraged and empowered the community to develop honey bee cultivation in lebak regency amidst the growing issue of local food innovation and diversification. this study contributes to the studies of the movement of honey bee cultivation, which are so far still understudied. research on honey bees commonly focuses on collaboration with government or community empowerment. this study, however, tries to look at the social movements aimed at developing honey production in local contexts using a qualitative research method with a descriptive approach. the results show that the juang community of lebak was a driving force for the community in kampung buana in cultivating honey bees. it attempted various activities such as building collaboration, * corresponding author: bayu nurrohman, universitas sultan ageng tirtayasa, indonesia email: bayu.nurrohman@untirta.ac.id 150 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 2, 2022 strengthening and developing resources, and seeking wider networks for a more open market. however, the movement had difficulties in establishing good collaboration from various parties to jointly develop the potential of honey bees in lebak regency. key words social movement, food innovation, honey bee, juang community of lebak introduction food is an important thing in the human life system. without food, the consumption process, which is a basic human need, will never be fulfilled. due to the human need for food, the food production process must continue because it will encourage the creation of sufficient food availability for the needs of all people in a country. therefore, the availability of food in various commodities is important for the survival of human life and will have an impact on the administration of the state (nurrohman and mayrudin 2021). the availability of sufficient food will stabilize food prices so that people can access food easily and affordably. in the current era where food needs are increasing, a discourse has emerged for optimizing the potential of local food in encouraging the emergence of other commodities in food (benu and kumaat 2017) as food diversity will make people have more food preferences for consumption. indonesian people generally identify food only with rice. however, with the current food diversification, it is hoped that it will be able to bring up other food commodities that can increase people’s accessibility to food (hikmawan 2020). achieving food security can be done by empowering humans and cultivating various food commodities (mayrudin 2022). small efforts can be started by managing and utilizing natural resources effectively and applying the principle of continuity (herjayanto et al. 2021). one of the food commodities that have the potential to be cultivated as local food is honey. honey has a large market both locally and internationally. the high demand for natural honey is not matched by sufficient honey production. the high demand for honey is because of the benefits of honey for health. honey cultivation has great potential because the need and demand for honey in the country are still not fulfilled. the changes in healthy lifestyles in the form of return to nature consumption are expected to increase the demand for honey as a multipurpose natural nutritional product (hapsari 2018). 151riswanda, et al. honey is one of the potential food commodities to be developed and cultivated. honey cultivation is one of the alternative livelihoods for communities around forest areas. this is supported by the very high demand for honey on a national scale, but honey production is limited (yunianto and jannetta 2020). banten province is one area in indonesia that has the potential to develop honey. natural conditions in banten province make the area still has a very large forest area, especially in pandeglang regency and lebak regency. such natural conditions make honey more cultivated because they are suitable for their natural conditions. this potential has finally made many people in pandeglang regency and lebak regency hunt honey in the forest, process it simply and sell it. however, it turns out that there are not many honey farms in banten province as most people still rely on hunting for beehives and taking their honey (utari et al. 2021). when the honey cultivation process is done, it can give more results to honey cultivators. however, behind the large demand for honey, there are various problems experienced in honey cultivation which are still commonly found in the field. this is also what makes communities get discouraged to cultivate honey and make it for a living. the main problem faced by the beekeeper groups in t village is the weak institutional management of the groups. at this time, it is necessary to have a group or community so that activities in honey cultivation are more institutionalized so that it can be clear direction, goals, and even profits that will be obtained in carrying out honey cultivation. they are not concerned with the maintenance of bee feed plants and tend to leave the plants alone without doing maintenance. this is also important because maintenance that is done properly will result in a better forage crop as well. in addition, the use of bee boxes is not in accordance with the existing standards and criteria although the use of bee boxes is crucial because it will save the results of the honey bees that have been produced. the last problem is disease control and harvesting techniques. these various problems still cause unsuccessful stories of honey cultivation that can inspire people (dewantari and suranjaya 2019). the problems above show how necessary a social movement is to further encourage honey cultivation. social movements are the result of joint behaviour, which is carried out collectively by people who are not routine and their behaviour is the result of a response to events that occur (kaharuddin and suardi 2016). social movements arise from events that occur in society caused by injustice and arbitrary attitudes towards society. social movements can 152 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 2, 2022 be seen as one of the results of social change, but they can also produce transformations in the social order. they are also seen as a tool in carrying out the changes, instead of just the main cause or just a surface manifestation (hapsari 2016). due to the various problems described above, this article aims to describe how the movement by the juang community of lebak in encouraging honey cultivation was carried out in lebak regency. this article is important because, amid the issue of local food innovation and food diversification, it examines how the social movement carried out by the juang community of lebak as a group empowered the community to cultivate honey properly so that they can increase their income and get a permanent job which will ultimately improve the local community’s economy. in addition, this article offers an approach to research because it tries to show the importance of social movements in honey cultivation, an issue which has been understudied. as most studies on honey are usually described in collaboration with the government or community empowerment, this article tries to look at the role of social movement in honey farming. the locus of this research is kampung buana, sukamanah village, malingping district, lebak regency. many people of kampung buana are honey farmers. in sukamanah village, the juang community of lebak community carried out social movements to make the community more competitive by cultivating honey bees. we investigated how the juang community of lebak carried out a movement that increased the interest and activities of the community in cultivating honey bees. this article contributes theoretically to the studies of social movement and food diversification. practically, it can be used as a reference on how social movements can encourage changes in the local food system which has the potential to be further developed into products that have an impact on the economy of farmers. this study used a qualitative research method with a descriptive approach. the qualitative research method is a research method whose result is descriptive data such as speech or writing with individual and group behaviour as its object of study (bogdan and biklen 1992). it is a form of research whose final result is in the form of findings that cannot be obtained through a series of quantification (creswell 2015). the qualitative research method with a descriptive approach is carried out with a research process that describes and explains the condition of the subject and object of research in detail both in oral and written forms which aims to gain an 153riswanda, et al. understanding of social phenomena that occur at the focus and locus of research (creswell 1998). in collecting data, we conducted interviews, observations, and documentation. the interviews were conducted openly with several informants including the head of the juang community of lebak, the banten provincial agriculture office, and honey bee cultivators. observations were made by observing directly in the field to find out how the movement of the juang community of lebak encouraged the improvement of honey bee cultivation. we also collected the documents to complete the data including the profile of the juang community of lebak and the farmers and their honey bee cultivation. the data analysis technique used was data reduction, data presentation, and conclusion drawing. social movements there are several points on how to understand social movements. first, social movements arise because of interest. this is the stage of aggregation of individuals who believe in the value of the same commitment. issues include marginalization, social class, and environment. after obtaining the aggregation of values, the social movement shifted to the second stage, namely protest. at this stage, there usually appears to be disappointment in the movement’s actors because the values/issues they bring do not bring change to society. therefore, they try to attract as many masses as possible so that the problems of these few become the anxiety of many people. third, the perspective is extended to the whole community by touching the positive sides of each community, although the impact was the difference in commitment among movement actors (smelser 2011). there are several key success factors in a social movement (tilly and tarrow 2007). first, a movement has a clear mission and goals to be achieved. there needs to be a clear mission and goals for the movement’s actors. this mission and purpose will be achieved by identifying the interests and values that are believed collectively. this value can arise from the internal actors of the movement or be influenced by what happens outside the actors themselves. second, a movement has good leadership. leaders must be able to engage people and encourage them to change. they must be able to create the same anxiety or set an example for the wider community. they also must be dedicated and brave to face the challenges when the movement is carried out. 154 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 2, 2022 third, a movement has structure. this includes not only the political structure but also the social and cultural structures that exist in the community in understanding change. the most important structure is a democratic structure where everyone is treated equally with strong bonds. fourth, a movement develops cooperation and collaboration. cooperation and collaboration are established by both intra-actor and extramovement actors. therefore, it is important to identify any actor who plays an important role in determining the success of a movement, whether it is civil society actors, government actors, or economic actors. collaboration is important because, with collaboration, individual egos can be set aside for a larger goal, namely group goals. this is related to the fifth factor, namely advocacy strategies such as the lobbying process, negotiation and mobilization of actors. lobbying and negotiations are important to ensure that the message conveyed is indeed capable of producing change, starting with influencing the political structure. sixth, a social movement should be realistic as it cannot set targets that are too far from the current real conditions. it cannot set a target that changes must be made massively and radically. movement actors need to understand that the target will be easier to achieve if the stages of how to reach the target are properly arranged. seventh, a social movement has economic support to ensure the movement can run. this can be generated independently of the community itself or get support from outside the movement. eighth, a movement needs to initiate events. this event aims to attract a wider and uninterested mass of people to become interested in getting involved in the movement. ninth, a movement needs to have a long-term strategy. this requires patience and strong commitment and unwillingness to give up. the last, a movement involves in the internationalization process. at this last stage, the movement needs to involve the wider community technology and social media to support its success. the juang community of lebak, honey bee cultivation and local food innovation in empowering honey cultivation in buana village, the juang community of lebak carried out various kinds of activities. this was considered one of the things that need to be done to change the lives of honey cultivators. 155riswanda, et al. doing these activities were considered an important step in encouraging an independent life so that in the future honey cultivators in lebak regency can continue to exist and be productive even without assistance from the government at the provincial, district, and village levels. the juang community of lebak conducted social movement activities as follows. first, it established a mission and goals to be achieved. the existence of a common goal is certainly a strong driving factor for how someone joins a social movement. the juang community of lebak consists of people who have the same goal, namely helping and fighting for the social life of the community. regarding honey bee cultivation in kampung buana, the juang community of lebak initiated the community to be competitive. this was in accordance with its goal as stated by the head of the juang lebak community, iyos rosadi, namely participating in community empowerment to improve community welfare. this was expected to increase their income because the potential for honey bees in kampung buana was very large and could be utilized and increased when the community moved to carry out proper cultivation. the juang community of lebak, which was interested in the potential for beekeeping and a market that was considered broad, felt the need to give more encouragement to honey bee cultivators to be able to continue to exist and produce so that they could be independent and live better from honey bee cultivation. second, the juang community of lebak had good leadership that enabled people to engage and encourage them to change. the results of interviews with honey bee cultivators show that yosa, the head of the juang community of lebak community, had a great influence on efforts to cultivate honey bees. his influence was important because it mobilized the youth in kampung buana to participate in this social movement. his charismatic leadership was seen from youth participation in achieving mutually agreed goals between the juang community of lebak and honey bee cultivators. in this case, it shows that the leader was able to encourage his members to move to achieve the goals that have been set. leaders’ influence can be seen in how much they accelerate the performance of their members to move in the direction of the goal (nurrohman and ramadhan 2020a). young people in kampung buana believed that what yosa instructed as the head of the juang community of lebak would have a good impact on the development of honey beekeeping. yosa gave confidence by not only actively providing encouragement and motivation but also by providing assistance and even funding that made the productivity of the honey bee continuously improve. leadership in organizations is necessary so that an 156 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 2, 2022 organization can be truly organized in moving and working together to achieve the goals that have been set together. a good leader will ensure that everything in the organization runs as expected (nurrohman and ramadan 2020b). third, the structure was another factor in the success of the juang community of lebak. the people of kampung buana joined the juang community of lebak so that honey bee cultivation activities were institutionalized and better coordinated as an organization. the shared goals of the juang community made the people of kampung buana who wanted to increase their empowerment in honey bee cultivation get organized with a systematic movement. the shared goals between the juang community of lebak and the honey bee cultivating groups made it easier for both of them to create a more empowered community in honey bee cultivation. this also made better cooperation, communication and action between them. communication among them became more focused because they shared one perception so that the actions taken were controlled following the goals that have been previously set. the problem was the limited resources owned by both of them to maximize the existing potential. fourth, cooperation and collaboration were established between both intra and extra-movement actors. this is related to the fifth factor, namely advocacy strategies such as the lobbying process, negotiation and mobilization of actors. therefore, it is important to identify any actor who plays an important role in determining the success of a movement. in building the collaboration, there were several actors involved but their roles did not empower the people of kampung buana in cultivating honey bees. the task of empowering local people in the cultivation of honey bees was handed over by the local government of lebak regency to the local village government. the juang community of lebak let the village government plan and set a budget for honey bee cultivation activities. however, this has not been realized. one of the villages that had potential, sukamanah village, was not yet interested in making kampung buana a centre for honey bee tourism. the role of the village government was not seen in empowering the community, although the existence of honey bee cultivation could improve the welfare of the community by increasing income from honey bee cultivation. at the sukamanah village, although the village had been aware of the potential of these honey bees, there had never been a desire from the village to make honey bees one of the focuses of village development and empowerment. this can be seen from the budget priorities in the apbdes that were not planned and realized for honey bee cultivation. sukamanah village prioritized bumdes for the 157riswanda, et al. improvement of people’s houses which were located close to the bagedur beach (riswanda, et al. 2021). meanwhile, the legislative institutions, especially the dpr ri, had advocated through hasbi jayabaya who was a representative from the banten i constituency, but there had been no attention and follow-up. it was also not a null commission because it was not in the authority of his commission. this added to the list of government negligence towards the honey bee community. from the private sector, various large companies in lebak regency such as the merah putih cement factory were also reluctant to provide their csr to increase honey bee production. their csr were directed to finance youth and organizational activities and sheep farming. there was a collaboration with ipb but through an integrated centre partnership institutions such as toga (family medicinal plants). meanwhile, the need to increase honey bee production in applied theory was not implemented with universities in banten and surrounding areas. honey bee cultivators hoped for continuous guidance and assistance to correctly understand the application of bee maintenance and cultivation and marketing efforts for the result, namely pure honey to be marketed widely (riswanda, et al. 2021). sixth, social movements cannot set targets that are too far from the current real conditions. they cannot set a target that requires changes that must be made massively and radically. movement actors need to understand that the movement will be easier to achieve if the stages are clearly set(hikmawan, 2019). the goal that was shared by the juang community and honey bee groups formed the same interests. this was the interest to make honey bee cultivation in kampung buana one of the activities carried out to increase people’s income. in addition, another common interest was the formation of kampung buana to become a honey bee village which could later be projected to be one of the centres for honey bee cultivation in lebak regency, banten province. furthermore, in the future, it was hoped that the realized bee village would make kampung buana a tourist destination that provides uniqueness where the majority of its residents were honey bee cultivators in kampong buana. the juang community of lebak hoped that kampung buana could be a centre for honey bee cultivation in lebak regency and banten province. this was based on weather, geographical location, and adequate environmental conditions in lebak. in addition, when the limitations of human resources and budgetary resources could be resolved, this cultivation would develop rapidly in kampung buana. meanwhile, to make kampung buana a tourist destination, it is more realistic to realize kampung buana first as a honey centre. currently, the community is not limited to tourism to certain tours 158 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 2, 2022 although in banten province, especially in pandeglang regency and lebak regency, the most frequented and crowded tours of tourists are religious and marine tourism. when a new model tourist destination with the concept of a honey village is provided, it will provide visitors with a natural entertainment of honey bee cultivation. seventh, economic support is important to ensure the movement can run. the economy can be generated independently of the community itself or get support from outside the movement. the juang community of lebak mobilized eight young people to do a honey bee business, which is located in kampung buana. it convinced the youth to continue doing business even though there were still many problems in the production of this honey. many things were done to motivate such as seeking assistance from fatayat nu in lebak regency which gave 10 million in cash to honey bee farmers so that they could motivate farmers to keep running the honey bee business. currently, honey bees are not promising because there are problems in developing honey bee cultivation in kampung buana (riswanda et al. 2021). the juang community of lebak with its limited network had difficulty providing more funding to youth in kampung buana in cultivating honey bees. however, when viewed from the enthusiasm when getting funding from fatayat nu, it encouraged youth to participate more actively in honey bee cultivation. currently, the juang community of lebak is still looking for other sources of private funding agents that shared the same goal of developing local potential in the region and improving the welfare of the people in lebak regency. therefore, the presence of the private sector in providing funding and equipment assistance could help honey bee cultivation. furthermore, it would provide hope and motivation because the facilities and infrastructure, as well as the required infrastructure, had been completed. the youth of kampung buana only needed to focus on how to do the best honey bee cultivation, and the marketing would be assisted by the juang community of lebak to reach a wider market. eighth, the juang community of lebak initiated the event to attract a wider, previously disinterested mass of people to become interested in getting involved in the movement. there were few resources currently engaged in honey bee cultivation in kampung buana. there were only eight young people who were actively involved. looking at the potential of kampung buana, the juang community of lebak encouraged more people to be active in honey bee cultivation. several activities were carried out including outreach activities that involved elements of the government, community leaders, academics, and practitioners of honey bee cultivation 159riswanda, et al. which aimed to attract other young people to participate in honey bee cultivation. the government’s involvement was clear to get more attention which was implemented with programs owned by the government. in addition, the government encouraged people in the form of equipment assistance and assistance so that honeybee cultivation could develop better than what was happening. the government was only able to join and contribute more when it knew that the kampung buana honey had the potential to be developed in the future. if the government knew the potential of kampung buana could expand widely, the government would participate and contribute by providing more motivation to the young honey bee cultivators in kampung buana. meanwhile, the involvement of academics who had expertise in the food sector, especially in honey bee cultivation, was expected to provide broader and up-to-date knowledge to honey bee cultivators, especially on cultivation techniques. food production is inseparable from the use of technology, especially at this time when the development of science and technology greatly affects the effectiveness of producing food for various commodities. in addition, practitioners were involved in encouraging and motivating the youth in kampung buana to achieve or even exceed the achievements that had been made by madu cinangguler. wandi, the head of madu cinanggoler, was invited to motivate the youth. the achievement of cinanggoler honey which can penetrate the international community with their involvement in festivals in italy could ignite the enthusiasm of the youth in kampung buana who were still pessimistic about the prospects and sustainability of kampung buana honey. the pessimism was seen in the low participation of young people who joined the juang community of lebak in honey bee cultivation. only eight people joined the juang community. if more youths joined, it would be easier and faster to produce better and larger honey bee cultivation. this shows that the more human resources joined, the wider the land was needed to develop honey farming. in the future, this will gradually become an identity of kampung buana as a centre for honey bee cultivation in lebak regency. the private sector is believed to be able to provide cultivation development by providing sufficient capital assistance. the government is very important to support empowerment activities and business traffic so that it is more developed and independent. the presence of academics can support the development of honey bee cultivation and improve the quality of empowerment through research, development, and community service activities (yuliani 2019). ninth, the juang community of lebak provided motivation and assistance to honey bee cultivators. honey bee cultivation did not increase 160 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 2, 2022 the income of the kampung buana people. there were many limitations such as land that needs to be expanded, resources that still need to be increased both in quantity and quantity, and supporting equipment that was still inadequate. despite these limitations, the juang community of lebak understood that in the future when honey bee cultivation develops, there will be more markets for their honey. this was accepted by honey bee cultivators in kampung buana because the things offered were very reasonable. it is hoped that in the future when all limitations could be resolved and even turned into advantages, honey farming would be one of the leading food commodities from lebak regency which had a wide market across indonesia. tenth, the juang community of lebak planned to collaborate with wider groups that could help internationalise its honey bee cultivation. reflecting on the success of madu cinanggoler that joined a festival in italy, the leader of the juang community played as a motivator and role model to take kampung buana to a higher level in the future. the movement was not in the direction of internationalization because there were many limitations facing the youth of kampung buana in cultivating honey bees. however, as explained earlier, the market for real honey is never empty and the demand is always high because the human need for the efficacy of honey is very large. people need truly genuine honey like the honey of cinanggoler and kampung buana. when this honey was produced and could enter a wider market, kampung buana honey would reach the international market like cinanggoler honey as one of the world’s original kinds of honey. the above social movement that was carried out by the juang community of lebak had several impacts. these include the increase in the interest of young people in kampung buana to be more aware of the potential and development of honey bee cultivation, the increasing motivation of honey bee cultivators in lebak regency, the increasing networks and partnerships in encouraging more productive and competitive honey bee cultivation, and the expanding of more competitive markets. however, the social movement was not able to increase the existence and productivity of bee honey in kampung buana because there were limitations that hindered the development and cultivation of honey bees. these obstacles include limited human resources as seen in the fact only a few young people participated in honey bee cultivation, limited land, equipment, and insufficient financial resources to increase honey production in kampung buana. 161riswanda, et al. conclusion the article has shown that the juang community of lebak tried to be a driving force for the people in kampung buana in cultivating honey bees. it built collaboration, strengthened and developed resources, and sought wider networks for more open markets. however, it faced difficulty in cultivating honey bees as it had no support from various parties to jointly develop the potential of honey bees in the lebak regency. acknowledgements the authors would like to thank the lembaga penelitian dan pengabdian masyarakat, the university of sultan ageng tirtayasa for the funding support provided through the “research and community service grant program 2021”. references bogdan, robert and sari biklen. 1992. qualitative research for education. boston: allyn and bacon. 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ghazi maulana* universitas syiah kuala, indonesia khalilullah khalilullah universitas syiah kuala, indonesia intan qanita universitas syiah kuala, indonesia amanda yufika universitas syiah kuala, indonesia abstract the ongoing coronavirus disease 2019 (covid-19) pandemic has affected the global population, especially the vulnerable groups such as children, the elderly, indigenous people, and people with disabilities. restriction and limited access to education, health, and public services due to measures taken to cope with the pandemic have made life even more difficult for people with disabilities, particularly those with intellectual ones. people with intellectual disabilities were not counted as a high-risk population, thus being excluded in most public health measurements that are done to encounter the pandemic. several investigations have been conducted to explore the impacts of the covid-19 pandemic on children, women, and the elderly, yet very few discussed how pandemics affected people with intellectual disabilities. this article is a review of existing literature using medical subject headings (mesh) keywords like “covid-19” and “intellectual disabilities” which was conducted in pubmed, web of science, mendeley, google scholar and researchgate to find related studies. here we reviewed studies on the impacts of the covid-19 * corresponding author: ghazi maulana school of medicine, universitas syiah kuala, indonesia email: ghazi.ana@mhs.unsyiah.ac.id 142 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 2, 2021 pandemic on people with intellectual disabilities, including access to education, healthcare, public services, and other related concerns. we also discussed the inclusivity of covid-19 prevention and control measures taken so far and how it should be designed to accommodate people with intellectual disabilities. this review is expected to provide an insight for the stakeholders and policymakers to employ better and more inclusive approach in the management of pandemic to ensure the wellbeing and rights of people with disabilities in general and people with intellectual ones in particular. key words covid-19, people with intellectual disabilities, inclusive society introduction the pandemic of coronavirus disease 2019 (covid-19), which started at large at the beginning of 2020, has caused major negative impacts on not only the health sector but also almost every single aspect of life. by mid of july 2021, the new emerging disease already infected 186.255.516 people and caused the death of 4.021.947 people around the world (johns hopkins university & medicine 2021). in indonesia, the pandemic has infected 2.491.006 people and caused 65.457 of them to die (satuan tugas penanganan covid-19 2021).1 physical distancing as a measure to stop the spread of covid-19 has shut down businesses, restricted travelling, closed offices and schools, and limited access to healthcare (kaufman et al. 2021). developed nations such as the uk and the us provide aid funds, online education, healthcare services, treatment and vaccination to support their people during the lockdown (gov.uk 2021; usagov 2021). however, developing nations like indonesia are struggling with economic inflation, the increasing rate of unemployment, neglected noninfection patients and students as the internet and technology are luxuries for most of its citizens (safitri et al. 2021; satria 2021). according to the world health organization (who), intellectual disability (id) or impaired intelligence is a significant inability of a person in getting complex or new information and acquire or apply new skills. it usually occurs before adulthood and affects development (world health organization 2021). a study shows that 10.37 out of 1000 people worldwide were identified to have id from 1980 to 2009, with a higher 1 this figure was at the time of writing this article in june 2021. in december 2021, around 4.2 million people are infected and 144.000 people died of covid-19 in indonesia (https://covid19.go.id). 143ghazi maulana et al. prevalence in male adults and children or adolescents than in females (maulik et al. 2011). in indonesia, 1.389.614 people were identified to have id in 2013 (warista, dewi and damanik 2018). people with id are in struggle in doing daily activities due to limited verbal ability, delayed language and motor skills, difficulties in learning and controlling impulses (parekh 2017). moreover, they have limited access to health care services, education, job, and public services, especially in low and middle-income countries like indonesia (cameron and suarez 2017). the pandemic of covid-19 has limited access to all, including people with id. due to government regulation to prevent vulnerable people from getting infected by covid-19, a lot of social services have been shut down including schools and health care facilities for people with id (courtenay and perera 2020). not only did it limit access to people with id, but also caused new challenges for the caregiver and family of people with id in taking care of them (menon et al. 2020). taking care of people with id is stressful and exhausting, and the stress due to its prolonged tenure has escalated the pressure (alexander et al. 2020). pandemic also has resulted in limited work availability, downsizing of businesses, and even the closing down of factories, leading to even more limited work options, hours, and salary, for people with id. some of them were even laid off or dismissed instead of being given chances to work from home like other people (schall et al. 2021). moreover, people with id are more vulnerable than the general population. they struggle with low self-esteem, poor critical thinking abilities, and emotional instability, which lead to the inability to protect themselves from coronavirus infection. general protection such as hand hygiene, mask-wearing, and social distancing are difficult to be enforced on them (buono et al. 2021). in regards to comorbidities, people with id usually have several underlying diseases such as metabolic, respiratory, and cardiovascular disease, which put them at higher risk of severe covid-19 infection (turk et al. 2020). to date, there have been several investigations on the impact of the covid-19 pandemic on vulnerable populations such as children, pregnant women, and the elderly. however, very few studies discuss how the pandemic affected people with id. thus, we would like to fill in the gap by reviewing existing literature on the impact of the covid-19 pandemic on people with id. we hope this review could serve as an insight for the stakeholders to use a better and more inclusive approach in the management of pandemics, to ensure the wellbeing and rights of people with disabilities in general and people with intellectual disabilities in particular. 144 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 2, 2021 search for relevant literature was done in pubmed, web of science, and researchgate, mendeley, and google scholar using the medical subject headings (mesh) terms like “covid-19”, “intellectual disability”, “pandemic”, “outbreak”, “coronavirus”, and “people with disability”. articles written in english and published before may 2021 were considered eligible, and were evaluated for their relevancy and reviewed for its eligibility. in addition to scientific reports and research (e.g., cohort, cross-sectional, qualitative studies), legal documents (e.g., government regulation, report, and law) were also searched and reviewed. limited access to work, education, and healthcare for people with intellectual disabilities the ongoing covid-19 pandemic is a serious health threat to millions of people around the world. in tackling this pandemic, governments around the world conducted public health measures to protect their citizens from covid-19 such as closing public places such as schools, offices, restaurants, and museums, and enforce people to stay at home (world health organization 2020). these policies have had a considerable impact on people with id (courtenay 2020). due to lack of activities in their lives, the loss of work or daily activities may have a very significant impact on people with id (lysaght, ouellette-kuntz and morrison 2009; embregts, tournier and frielink 2020). the stay-at-home measure during the covid-19 pandemic has given new challenges for families of children and adults with intellectual and developmental disabilities, in the form of the absence of education and health services (eshraghi et al. 2020). most people with id need special education services which integrate behavioural support and interventions such as speech therapy and occupational therapy that are difficult to do outside schools (liptak, stuart and auinger 2006; boulet, boyle and schieve 2009). moreover, people with id often have some underlying medical conditions such as epilepsy, psychiatric disorders, sleep disorders, and gastrointestinal problems that require intensive and rapid supervision from healthcare professionals (centers for disease control and prevention 2020). the impact of the limited access to education and medical support due to pandemics is enormous, adding a substantial burden to caregivers and also jeopardizing the overall health and wellbeing of people with id (jeste et al. 2020). a survey on families of children with id shows that children with id lost their access to medical and educational support during the pandemic leading to overburdening on caregivers and eventually disrupting the 145ghazi maulana et al. wellbeing of both caregivers and the children (aman and pearson 2020). most families of children with id at the very least were unable to get one of the behavioural or educational services, some of them even lost them all, with only a few families still having direct service. although some families were supported by face-to-face education services, other families were likely relying on tele-education services as they were afraid to send their children to school (jeste et al. 2020). however, the distant educational structure could not meet the need of children with id because direct instruction is best for them to understand the lesson. thus, the national academic of science, engineering, and medicine urged the reopening of schools for children with special needs (dibner, schweingruber, and christakis 2020). regarding healthcare, adults with id are more likely to have limited access to quality health care and health promotion programs because they are usually undetected (centers for disease control and prevention 2009). most healthcare services in developed countries like the us were delivered through telemedicine during the pandemic. a recent survey shows that both patients and caregivers had high satisfaction in the use of telemedicine offered by pediatric clinics in the us (rametta et al. 2020). telemedicine also benefited people with rare disorders including id during the pandemic as it could still provide necessary healthcare (jeste et al. 2020). extension for community healthcare outcomes (echo) in new mexico proposed telemonitoring consultation to diagnose and treat autism and certain syndrome that appeared due to id by providing video conference between consultations provider and the patients (arora et al. 2011; mazurek et al. 2016). however, telemedicine is not available in low and middle-income countries, leaving people with id in these countries with very limited access to healthcare during the covid-19 pandemic. limited access to information about covid-19 for people with intellectual disabilities providing information about covid-19 and its preventive measures for people with id is important because they rely solely on others in receiving information (courtenay and perera 2020). people with id have difficulties in accessing medical services resulting in an increased risk of infection. nevertheless, they also face challenges to get information about covid-19 prevention measures (gulati et al. 2020). access to information for persons with disabilities in remote or rural areas was very minimal, especially at the early phase of the pandemic, leading to misinformation such as using 146 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 2, 2021 hand sanitiser instead of soap to wash hands (“informasi covid-19 untuk penyandang disabilitas di wilayah terpencil minim”). the lack of an internet network, the absence of reliable radio and television transmission has made people who live in low and middle-income countries, including those with id, lose access to proper information about covid-19. persons with disabilities have different characteristics and abilities to access information. therefore, the government has to ensure that the information about pandemics is delivered through specific approaches. groups of people with hearing impairment, for example, communicate through sign languages. but, the government did not provide sign language interpreters to convey information regarding covid-19 since the beginning of the pandemic (firmanda 2021). the same thing was also experienced by people with visual impairments, where information about guidelines for covid-19 prevention and control was written in inaccessible format (nilawaty 2021). people with id need information that is simple, easy to understand, and repeatedly delivered. however, most of the information regarding covid-19 was not delivered in a particular approach targeting this vulnerable group, including people with id. listening to the voices and needs of people with disabilities during outbreak response planning and emergency response is very important to maintain physical and mental health and reduce the risk of being infected with covid-19 (susanto 2020). considering the right of access to information, there should be no discrimination experienced by people with disabilities. the government must cooperate with all elements of the society, including organizations or communities of people with disabilities in the regions, so that information about the covid-19 pandemic can be conveyed based on their respective conditions. in addition, working with organisations that provide volunteers can be a good alternative solution to overcome the problem of limited access to information, especially in remote areas. regarding the covid-19 information which is new, abundant, and a little bit complex, who has urged governments in each country to provide sign language for all recorded events and live broadcasts such as press conferences, news, and social media; converse public material into an “easy to read” format so that it is accessible to people with id or cognitive impairments; develop accessible written information with structured titles, large print, contrasting colours, and braille versions for people with hearing and vision impairments; use more inclusive images and do not stigmatize people with disabilities, and lastly collaborate with disability organizations to disseminate public health information (kimumwe 2020). 147ghazi maulana et al. the international disability alliance (ida) has issued recommendations for a disability-inclusive covid-19 response, which include general information about covid-19, tips for preventing/mitigating infection including public space restriction policies, the use of accessible technology in covid-19 related services, information regarding supported services such as rehabilitation services and sign language interpreters, information on the available call centre special for people with disabilities, counselling/ psychological assistance for people with disabilities, social assistance and education services for people with disabilities (international disability alliance 2021). the impact of the ongoing pandemic on mental health of people with intellectual disabilities individuals with intellectual disabilities (id) are at greater risk of experiencing a decline in health during covid-19 pandemic, due to various factors, including difficulties in accessing services, restrictions caused by physical distancing, lockdown, and staying at home policy as well as the fear and anxiety caused by mass media coverage on the pandemic (holmes et al. 2020; ho, chee and ho 2020). the pandemic of covid-19 had also brought a formidable challenge for people with id, especially people with autism who rely on strict daily activity routines to maintain a sense of control over their environment, emotional stability and minimize the occurrence of challenging behaviours (murphy et al. 2005). moreover, the pandemic impacted the level of social support for people with id such as day care and break arrangements, resulting in the increasing stress among caregivers of people with id (tsai and wang 2009). during the pandemic, some non-pharmacological strategies to support people with id like community support were not available or limited, leading to an increasing risk of reliance on medication to support mental health and manage challenging behaviour (tromans et al. 2020). studies show that adults with autism spectrum disorder (asd) experienced a higher level of depression and anxiety during the pandemic of covid-19 (e.g. lake et al. 2021). meanwhile, children with asd demonstrated poor mental well-being during the pandemic, leading to increased aggressive, anxious, and sedentary behaviour (theis et al. 2021). families and caregivers of children with id also had stressful experiences during the pandemic due to the change in daily activities, were over worried about the risk of infection to their children, and had a higher risk of breakdown. all these resulted in higher depression and anxiety during the pandemic (willner et al. 2020). a survey by theis et al. 148 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 2, 2021 (2021) shows that the majority (96.4%) of parents of children with id said that the physical activity and the mental health of children with id during lockdown were worse compared to that before the pandemic. furthermore, a study in zambia and sierra leon about the effect of covid-19 on children and young people with disability shows that participants who were female, had two or more disabilities, and aged between 12-14 had worse mental health well-being. some factors associated with this condition were the type of disability, knowledge about covid-19, types of isolation, and worry about the long-term impact of the pandemic (sharpe et al. 2021). a study by wos et al. (2021) shows that the caregiver of people with id, especially parents, whom 73% of the survey respondent identified as a support source, felt overwhelmed by managing time between their professional, domestic, and responsibility of taking care people with id and faced significant difficulty due to the lack of access to special equipment for the necessary rehabilitation exercises for people with id. the parents felt enormous pressure from the support quality they could give to their children, especially adult ones, compared to the professionals. the study also shows that the caregivers had poor ability in using technology, making it difficult for them to utilize online healthcare or school platforms. all these resulted in stress and anxiety on the caregivers. conclusion this article has shown that the existing literature found that the covid-19 pandemic has negatively impacted people with intellectual disabilities. not only were their rights restricted, but also the un-inclusive measures taken to cope with the pandemic have left people with intellectual disabilities in the dark. as the pandemic does not seem to end soon, we hope this review could serve as an insight for the stakeholders and policymakers to employ better and more inclusive approach in the management of pandemic to ensure the well-being and rights of people with disabilities in general and people with intellectual disabilities in particular. acknowledgments we would like to thank the 1st bandung international conference on social sciences (bicoss) for accepting our paper to be presented at the conference we would also like to give sincere gratitude to all of the people that have supported us: parents, teachers, and friends for always being there and helping us to be the better version of ourselves. last, we hope that this paper can be beneficial to society. 149ghazi maulana et al. references alexander, regi et al. 2020. “guidance for the treatment and management of covid ‐19 among people with 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influence in the democracy of maldives. some islamic fundamentalist groups also tried to put a stain on the democracy of maldives. a weak judiciary, corruption, and nepotism have taken a terrible toll on the country's democracy. in the presidential election of 2008 and 2013 maldives, india's cooperation was an unprecedented event in this electoral system. however, maldives has wandered between various ups and downs leading to the establishment of democracy. as a small country in south asia, the establishment and context of democracy are very important, and maldivian foreign policy towards india is always influenced by domestic politics. so, this paper focuses on the role of india to establish democracy in maldives. the content analysis method was used in this study. hence, this article contributes to studies of politics and international relations among countries in south asia. key words maldivian democracy, domestic policy, india’s role, opposition, radical forces india’s role in the restoration of democracy in maldives: challenges and options journal of asian social science research 2022, vol. 4, no. 2: 183-194 https://cassr.net/jassr/ © the author(s) 2022 article * corresponding author: hemanta kumar biswas department of political science, kazi nazrul university,asansol, west bengal, india. e-mail: hemanta.biswas07@gmail.com 184 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 2, 2022 introduction the republic of maldives is a small, weak, and vulnerable island state in the south asian region that is geographically situated about 675 km southwest of sri lanka and about 700 km south of lakshadweep. maldives consists of 1192 islands of which 192 are inhabited. indiamaldives relationship is influenced by their geographical closeness and historical bond of friendship since 1965. as one of the largest democratic institutions, india plays a vital role in establishing democracy and sustaining political stability in the maldives. so, india has been its most important development partner, and both countries maintain their diplomatic ties and neighbourly relations for regional stability. although india-maldives cordial relationships have faced many difficulties or challenges several times, it can be said that india and maldives have already taken sincere steps in terms of their regional foreign policy. the free and fair election of 2008 ended the autocrat gayoom’s regime of 30 years and the new constitution allowed maldivians to elect mohamed nasheed democratically. although the maldives became turbulent at the dawn of democracy and emerged in the discourse of world politics, india consciously did not want to involve in the internal politics of maldives. but, in this context, china, pakistan and the usa wanted to influence the island nation. in addition, fundamentalist groups of the middle east seek to infuse radicalism into the maldivian political culture. the citizens of maldives have adopted one religion and one language so national integrity is well established in maldives. likewise, if we want to discuss the democracy of any country, the issue of women’s participation in the political functions of that country is important. the contribution of women is equal to that of men in maldivian electoral politics. in comparison to other islamic states in south asia, maldivian women are faring well in terms of gender-based development. the first national university of maldives was established in 2011 under the presidency of mohamed nasheed (fernando 2011). due to the low rate of higher education in the maldives, civil society does not develop in the country whereas it is a necessary condition for the democratic development of a state. this article aims to discuss the basic structure of maldivian democracy, analyze the challenges in the way of establishing democracy in maldives and find out india’s role and assistance towards maldivian democracy. the required data were collected through literature data collection from main and secondary sources such as books, journals, newspapers, and 185hemanta kumar biswas websites. the content analysis method was used to analyse the collected data. by doing so, this article contributes to the studies of maldives’ politics and international relations in south asia. historical journey of democracy in maldives in the 16th century, the maldives was a portuguese colony. after the portuguese rule, from 1887 to 1965 the island nation was under british rule. however, they did not interfere in the internal affairs of maldives, and at that time the island nation was ruled by the sultan. sultan was the elected head of the state. after abolishing the sultanate in november 1968, maldives became the second republic and ibrahim nasir was elected the first president of maldives after independence (bussa 2018:44). he was the prime minister during the sultanate regime (the europe world year book 1996:2089). in 1968, a new constitution was formulated in the maldives by his initiatives. the most important aspect of this new constitution was that a presidential election will be held every five years and the president is the head of the state. the president will have all the administrative powers. president will also select the cabinet members by his own choice while the cabinet members are responsible to the majlis, the parliament of maldives. apart from that, the power of the president, cabinet, and legislature was specified in this constitution (chowdhury 2019). under the presidency of ibrahim nasir, maldives faced a few abortive strategies and the maldivian economy was moving downward due to the collapse of the export of dried fish. so, the popularity of nasir’s government declined and was replaced by mamoon abdul gayoom peacefully through the electoral process in 1978. during gayoom’s presidency, maldives was undergoing political stability and economic development. but, the failure in basic human rights protection, the process of reforming the constitution, and the influence of autocracy became the major constraints to better democracy and faster development of the island nation. a series of constitutional reforms was proclaimed on february 2005 including the limitation of the number of years in presidential terms, the removal of the gender restriction on a presidential candidate, the establishment of a supreme court, the separation of powers among the executive, legislature, and judiciary, and the emergence of political parties (bussa 2018:52). on 27th march 2006, the government of maldives adopted an extensive reform program entitled “roadmap for the reform agenda” with specific goals of strengthening governance that will lead the country’s democratic transition (bussa 2018:52)..6 despite the widespread demand for reform, 186 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 2, 2022 gayoom had no desire to weaken his position of authority while the people of maldives were still denied their basic civil rights. gayoom’s government failed to establish a more democratic form of government because most of the reform bills were not fully implemented. the reform roadmap provided the first multi-party election in maldives in october 2008 that recognized mohamed nasheed as the head of the state smoothly ending up the three decades of gayoom’s corrupt autocratic reign. however, the credit for introducing multi-party democracy went to gayoom only. adopting the new constitution paved the way for the multi-party electoral competition. but, nasheed found it difficult to survive in power for long ignoring the influence of the longest-serving president of the island nation. towards democratic transition in maldives and india’s responses the first democratic presidential election was held based on the new constitution. as a dictator for 30 years, gayooom did not try to block the multi-party platform so this development came with his exit and the election was very much a choice between democracy and autocracy. this democratic election of 2008 was a milestone in the history of an island nation that was held in the two sets of the electoral process. in the first round, 60% of a citizen of maldives voted, and even registered citizens of maldives who belonged to other country loyalty due to their jobs voted at the maldivian embassy of that country. there were 396 and 403 polling stations in the first round and second one respectively. the total number of voters was 209294. table 1 shows the result of the first round of the presidential election in 2008. table 1 the first round of presidential elections, 8 october 2008 name of candidates vote received percentage 1 gasim ibrahim 27,056 15.32 2 uz. maumoon abdul gayyoom 71,731 40.63 3 dr hassan saeed 29,633 16.78 4 mohamed nasheed 44,293 25.09 5 ibrahim ismail 1,382 0.78 6 umar naseer 2,472 1.40 source: elections commission, republic of maldives, at http:// www.elections.gov.mv/presidentialelectionsresults2008.html. 187hemanta kumar biswas table 2 the second round of presidential elections, 28 october 2008 name of candidates vote received percentage 1 uz. maumoon abdul gayyoom 82,121 45.79 2 mohamed nasheed 97,222 54.21 source: elections commission, republic of maldives, at http://www. elections.gov.mv/presidentialelectionsresults2008.html. as seen in tabel 2, in the second round, gayoom got 45.79% and nasheed gained 54.21% votes to change in leadership (bonofer 2010:439). on 11 november 2008, nasheed became the first democratically elected president of maldives who treated the former president and leader of the opposition with full dignity, respect, and privileges and they publicly promised to work together. after assuming the president’s office, he took some initiatives that were administrative reforms that brought a new addition to the structure of maldivian democracy. nasheed was appointed home minister and municipal chairman of male. he assigned vice president to collect the opinion of the citizens of maldives to maintain a good relationship with citizens. he also appointed two sub-ministers in the health and family department. he claimed that government will continue the process of decentralization. the president appointed the deputy commissioner of police, a sub-minister for human resources, youth, and sports, and six atoll counselors. he tried to stimulate the tourism industry by developing the sea beaches. as a president, nasheed established the police integrity commission and instructed the democratic institutions to cooperate with the anti-corruption commission as well as tried to secure human rights (maldives news bulletin 2008). nasheed also gave the pledge to introduce sustainable economic policies, establish good governance, and invite foreign investments. however, the new government faced many challenges in the political life of maldives as nasheed started to govern a nation that was economically bankrupt and took the enormous responsibility of repairing the damage caused by 30 years of dictatorship. under the ratified constitution, maldives was able to conduct the first multi-party parliamentary election on 9 march 2009, in a very transparent manner. in this election, mdp, the ruling party, failed to get a majority in the majlis and the drp along with the other parties won with 28 seats and mdp gained 26 seats (maldives news bulletin 2008). as a result, the maldivian power structure was divided between 188 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 2, 2022 the parliament and the president of maldives which changed the political scenario in the island nation and the aftermath nasheed faced enormous problems in governance and opposition made hurdles in his every move in running the country. failing to get a majority in majlis, nasheed was unable to pass any bills and did not get cooperation from parliament creating a political rivalry between the government led by mdp, the ruling party, and parliament led by drp, the opposition. the political environment of maldives was showing a lack of understanding of democratic values. since assuming power, nasheed’s government was met with a global economic crisis that showed the downfall of the country’s gdp by 4.5% (kumar 2016:24). the economy of the island nation, which was highly dependent on exporting fish and tourism industries, had a drastic decline. this financial crisis forced nasheed’s government to take some controversial steps which made him unpopular. to improve the economic condition, the world bank and the government of india agreed to provide loans as financial assistance to the maldives. another prominent challenge facing nasheed’s government was the emergence of islamic extremism in the republic of maldives for the president represented moderate islam and liberal views. losing control of parliament forced nasheed to resign and the opposition seemed more concerned with ousting the president than with preserving the gains of the democratic transition. as the legislature was controlled by the opposition, the parliament could be able to impeach the president with two-thirds of the majority as well as nasheed had no power to dismiss the assembly. apart from that, the immature decision of resigning enmasse on 28 june 2010 created political instability in the maldives. as a result, as nasheed’s team needed approval from the parliament to restore their position, they lost their position as ordered by the supreme court in december 2010 (kumar 2016:37). however, nasheed acknowledged the decision for consolidating the constitutional democracy and he tried to handle the situation constitutionally while according to the constitution, the maldives presidential system of governance imposed much power on the parliament to maintain checks and balances in power. the judiciary is one of the three pillars of democracy. in that case, the judiciary system of maldives was weak and backward. nasheed wanted a quick reform in the judiciary system of maldives. as a result, the conflict between the executive and the judiciary reached a boiling point and the political crisis became worse when nasheed ordered to arrest of the chief judge for his decision on 16 january 2012, creating 189hemanta kumar biswas confusion between the government and the judiciary of maldives that led to the exit of the first democratically elected president of the island nation on 7 february 2012 (kumar 2016:39). looking for a solution to the maldives’ political turmoil, nasheed demanded india’s military support as the cooperation between the mndf and the indian army that became stronger during his presidency. but, india’s first recognization of the waheed government disappointed nasheed and new delhi also made it clear that india would not intervene in the domestic affairs of maldives. after the resignation of nasheed, for the remaining part of his five– year term, waheed hasan manik took over the presidency for 20 months. during his short period of the regime, waheed focused to restore law and order, freedom, and authority of judiciary and legislature across the indian ocean archipelago to protect democracy and hoped for a “national unity government” in democratic transition. after assuming the power, waheed released judge abdulla and appointed home minister, foreign minister, attorney general, and six exministers got the post in waheed’s cabinet. the day after his resignation along with other mdp leaders protested against the coup and waheed’s government for its legitimacy, nasheed faced several charges against him like terrorism and waheed’s government wanted to convict nasheed’s unconstitutional decision of arrest judge abdulla on 15 july 2012, that would not allow him for contesting the presidential election. for this reason, fearing arrest, nasheed took shelter in the indian high commission on 13 february 2013 (mulberry 2012). after the disposal of his presidency, nasheed continuously kept demanding an early presidential election to regain his power in the maldives and also claimed support from the international community including india and other countries. under former president nasheed’s administration, maldives signed an agreement with the gmr group of companies in india for upgrading the male international airport in 2010. but, on 28 november 2012, waheed’s government cancelled the airport development agreement “ab initio” of $ 500 million which raised a concern regarding the damage to the relations with india (kumar 2016:49). in the aftermath, a serious economic crisis occurred in the maldives due to political turbulence and the rejection of the gmr contract fuelled to decrease in foreign aid and diminish the interests and confidence of investors. under the pressure of continuous protests and demonstrations by the opposition and the influence of the international community, waheed fixed up the second multi-party presidential election ahead of schedule held 190 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 2, 2022 on 7 september 2013 and continued till november (kumar 2016:50). in the presidential election of 2013, nasheed was allowed to take part and negotiate with the maldivian government. india gave assurance that nasheed would not be arrested after leaving the indian high commission. however, being a leading candidate in the first round, nasheed got 48.61% votes in the second round and abdulla yameen from ppm secured 51.39% to emerge as the new president of the republic of maldives. after the presidential poll, yameen was also able to capture the majority in the parliamentary election which led him to run the government smoothly. gasim ibrahim, the third-ranking candidate in the first round of the presidential poll 2013, went to the supreme court with allegations of deception in the first round and the supreme court imparted a greater role to the police than election commission and also ordered them to submit the voter list approved by the candidate. but, except nasheed, no one endorsed the list. while election commission rushed to hold the election, the police and judiciary tried to delay it. with this advantage of misusing the democratic institution, yameen managed to get achieve victory easily. in his presidential campaign, yameen used the religious sentiments of citizens and emerged as the saviour of islam. after taking over the president’s office, yameen suppressed his opposition to cling to power. he also managed to send the opposition leaders behind the bars. in his presidency, yasmeen ruled a dictatorial way to bring the internal and external circumstances in his favour that threatened maldivian democracy. the worst came when the supreme court ordered yameen’s government to release political leaders including nasheed. he disobeyed the court order and declared a state emergency on 5 february 2018 (mallempali 2018). he also diminished the press liberty to consolidate his grip over power. in this socio-political turmoil, the opposition continued to hope for the intervention of international communities including india in the maldives to force holding the free and fair multi-party election for the third time and the us threatened to possibly sanction the maldives if yameen’s government failed to conduct a free and fair election (mallawarachi 2018). yameen’s presidency, which was full of excessive corruption, violation of civil rights, violent repression of political opponents, used religious fundamentalism and pro-china policy that drowned the maldives in debt and left the commonwealth contribute to his defeat in the third multi-party presidential election held on 23 september 2018. mohamed ibrahim solih of mdp won the election with 58.4 per cent of the vote and emerged as the new and yameen from ppm go 41.6 per cent that ended up in his dictatorial (mallempali 2018). 191hemanta kumar biswas this significant result would strengthen democratic processes and institutions, establishing rule of law and protecting human rights in the maldives. this significant victory of mohamed solih brought an opportunity for the democratic power to dig deeper roots in the country which needs its value, truth, and reconciliation mechanism to resolve decades of political instability. yameen’s embarrassment of china raised india’s concern about its national security as the island nation is just 700 km away from lakshadweep. after the winning of solih, india was heartily congratulated on the triumph of democratic forces and was also relieved. at the same time, the legacy of yameen’s rule threw many challenges to the new government. with the support of four political parties -ex-presidents gayoom, nasheed, jhmhooree party and adhaalath partysolih’s first step was to re-establish rule of law in the country despite their different views. he also promised to investigate the corruption and deterioration of human rights under yameen’s presidency. after a week of taking over the administration, solih’s government pledged a quick economic reform through investments and welcoming of foreign aid in various sectors for the prospect of maldivian democracy. growing radicalism under yameen that truly threatened democratic values forced solih’s government to prioritize taking steps against extremism. being trapped in china’s “debt diplomacy” called upon complications in running the government for the new administration and serious security challenges not only for the maldives but also its neighbour countries like india and sri lanka. india and challenges towards the establishment of democracy in maldives maldives is important to india from various aspects including its geostrategic location. since its prompt recognization of maldives as a sovereign state, india has been interested in the political stability in the neighbour country and would like to prevent the island nation from influences from external forces and that is why india always stands by maldives. in the context of india’s participation in the process of establishing democracy in the maldives, there are three main challenges for india as follows: 1) india had an interface in the domestic politics of weak, small countries of south asia showing his big-brother phobia; 2) the islamic radicalized group which emerged in maldivian politics of the influence of pakistan and the middle east is anti-india and that is a serious security issue for india; and 3) maldive’s pro-china policy was decreasing india’s influence in the indian ocean region. 192 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 2, 2022 despite all this, india has maintained its cordial relationship with its neighbouring country and promised to support establishing a democratic government peacefully. in the post-gayoom regime, india-maldives relations faced many ups and downs. after nasheed’s resignation in february 2013, maldives experienced political instability and waheed’s rejection of the gmr project made distances between india and maldives. nevertheless, india supervised the presidential election of 2013 at the invitation of former president waheed. to conduct the democratic election, b.b. tandon, the ex-election commissioner of india, j. m. lindo, and n. gopalaswami went to the maldives as observers. yameen’s anti-india approach also restrained india from providing financial assistance to the maldives. in 2015, prime minister narendra modi cancelled his tour of the island nation due to its political turbulence. but, solih’s victory gave india relief from several prospects. conclusion this article has shown that in the last few years, maldivian democracy has faced critical challenges like extremism, dictatorship, infighting, violation of human rights, and nepotism which are very common in south asian democracy. despite all these odds, india as a south asian country has enjoyed democracy for over half a century. since 2008, the long way toward the democratic transition has not been easy for the maldives. but being one of the largest democracies, india always has supported the maldives through financial assistance in the survival of democracy and given assurance that the maldives does not fall into autocracy. apart from that, india has already assisted in maldives’ defence sector for its security purposes which is under threat of extremists. india has not shown its big brotherhood towards one of the smallest states in asia and has not favoured umbrella diplomacy in the indian ocean region but is rather interested in the growth of maldives. in the post-gayoom era, india-maldives relations deteriorated in international politics and external forces including china and pakistan. so, india should be careful in making foreign policy so that external powers do not influence the maldives in opposing india. only based on equality, cooperation, benefit, mutual trust, and respect will firm the bilateral relations between india and maldives, the newly democratized nation ignoring the big brother-small state syndrome. 193hemanta kumar biswas references abdullah, jameel. 2015. “china-maldives sign 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achdian universitas nasional, indonesia abstract the massive spread of the covid-19 pandemic which started in the mid-2020 has had a significant impact on the sustainability of the production and marketing activities of goods and services by small and medium enterprises (smes). in the context of indonesia, the so-called policy large scale social restriction encourages small and mediumsized business groups to find strategic ways so that they can continue to carry out production and marketing activities. one of the strategic ways is building a network of people who consume goods by using digital technology. this study analyses the strategies of small and medium-sized business groups in building a community network of the consumption of small and medium-sized business products through digital technology during the covid-19 pandemic with special reference to the case of depok, in indonesia. this is a descriptive qualitative study with interview, observation, and documentation techniques. the findings show that small and medium enterprises use several digital applications to be able to connect individuals to create a consumption group of “common taste” so that those small and mediumsized enterprises could maintain the continuity of selling their goods or products. as a result, this strategic method is proven to be quite beneficial for small and medium business groups. key words digitization, network, consumption, smes, covid-19 *corresponding author: ichmi yani arinda rohmah sociology department, universitas nasional, jalan sawo manila, no.61, pejaten, jakarta selatan, indonesia 12520 email: ichmi@civitas.unas.ac.id optimizing the use of digital technology in building a community network of consumption of small and medium enterprises’ products during the covid-19 pandemic: the case of depok, indonesia journal of asian social science research 2021, vol. 3, no. 2: 155-166 https://cassr.net/jassr/ © the author(s) 2021 article 156 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 2, 2021 introduction like most countries in the world, the covid-19 has been spreading in indonesia since the first quarter of 2020. due to the rapid spread of covid-19, the indonesian government has imposed regulations known as large scale social restrictions (pembatasan sosial berskala besar or psbb), especially in areas that fell into the red zone category or the zone with the highest number of covid-19 patients. the areas surrounding the capital city of jakarta, bogor, depok, tangerang, and bekasi (jabodetabek) experience the strictest measure of this regulation of large scale social restrictions. the large scale social restrictions consist of a set of regulations that must be obeyed by people as follows: 1. people who work in workplaces or offices are required to temporarily work from home. apart from office work, educational activities are also to be carried out from home; 2. activities that are exempt from temporary suspension are government agencies, state/regional owned enterprises, health, logistics, energy, communication and information technology, finance, hotels, construction, strategic industries, basic services, public utilities, industries that serve as objects of national vitality, daily needs, local and international organizations dealing with disasters and social; 3. all business activities that provide food and beverage service are not allowed to provide on-site services and must be accommodated from home, or using online services; 4. the hotel should provide services for people who would selfisolate and are not allowed to open service facilities that create crowds; 5. public religious activities are conducted in limited ways and are advised to be carried out at home; 6. it is not allowed to carry out activities in public spaces with more than five people; 7. the operational hours of traditional and modern markets are all limited, namely: at traditional markets at 03:00 am-3:00 pm, retail traders and minimarkets at 08:00 am – 8:00 pm, retail, wholesale, hypermarket, supermarket, minimarket, and convenience store at 10:00 am -09:00 pm; 157ichmi yani arinda rohmah and andi achdian 8. all social and cultural activities are temporarily suspended when large scale social restrictions are implemented; 9. tourist attractions, entertainment, internet cafes, spas, massage parlours are temporarily suspended. 10. religion-related gatherings such as weddings and funerals that are not due to covid-19 are allowed. circumcisions should be carried out at the health service provider’s place and marriages can only be carried out at the civil registry office or the office of religious affairs; and 10. the operational hours and capacity of public and private transportation are limited. public motorized vehicles and trains are only allowed to operate from 06 am to 6 pm (dharmastuti 2020). the regulations that apply to people during the implementation of the large scale social restrictions have a significant impact on the activities of small and medium enterprises. focusing on the case of depok municipality in west java province, this study chose three types of small and medium enterprises as its research subjects, namely small and medium enterprises that sell clothing, food, and masks. the small and medium enterprise groups of clothing and food have been operating since before the covid-19 pandemic while the small and medium enterprise group of masks has been operating after the covid-19 pandemic in 2020. during the covid-19 pandemic, the three groups of small and medium enterprises have carried out new strategies in marketing their products. they surely needed new strategies as a form of adaptation to the implementation of the large scale social restrictions. especially in marketing their products, they optimized the use of digital media which were considered quite effective tools by which the business groups can build a robust network with consumers within a relatively short time. they introduced their specific products in detail using digital media, either through e-commerce or instagram platforms. the small and medium business groups seemed to benefit from the background of most consumers, ranging from children to adults, who are accustomed to using digital media. referring to statistical data submitted by the indonesian internet service providers association (apjii) during the covid-19 pandemic, internet users in indonesia increased to 73.7% or 196.7 million from the total population of 266.9 million as recorded by the central statistics agency of indonesia (elvira 2021). during the covid-19 pandemic, ever since 2020, the indonesian e-commerce association reports that there has been an increase in the number of 158 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 2, 2021 small and medium enterprises that utilize various types of marketplaces (sukarno 2021). this paper focuses its analysis on the use of digital technology in building a community network of consumers by small and medium enterprises in depok during the covid-19 pandemic. the type of research method used is qualitative one that has the characteristics of proximity between researchers and research subjects. here, a researcher is also the main instrument in research. the qualitative research method encourages researchers to do interpretation to social phenomena in society (denzin and lincoln 2009). the role of researchers in qualitative research is therefore substantial in extracting data in the field. the subjects of this research were the small and medium enterprise groups that produce clothing, masks, and food commodities during the covid-19 pandemic. this selection was based on preliminary observation, which showed that the three business groups experienced operational changes in running their businesses, especially in the process of selling and distributing goods to the consumers. this qualitative study uses non-participant observation, open, structured and unstructured interviews, and documentation. we made observations on the operational activities of the small and medium enterprises groups that produce clothing, food, and masks. we examined how the small and medium enterprise groups utilized digital technology and marketplace applications. then we also interviewed and documented the use of digital technology by the groups in their way to build consumers networks. in checking the validity of the data in this qualitative research, we used triangulation of sources and methods. source triangulation was used to check the validity of the information data obtained by comparing information from several informants. the triangulation of methods or / techniques used to check the validity of the information data by comparing the data obtained using several methods, namely interviews, observation, and documentation (sugiyono 2013). in data analysis, we used the analytical model from miles and huberman (1984), namely (1) data collection, (2) data reduction, (3) data display, and (4) drawing conclusions and verification (sugiyono 2013). we+ carried out qualitative data analysis repeatedly while extracting data in the field. 159ichmi yani arinda rohmah and andi achdian the operational activities of small and medium business during the covid-19 pandemic during the covid-19 pandemic, the operational activities of small and medium enterprises underwent significant changes. before the pandemic, small and medium-sized businesses used marketing strategies for goods sold traditionally, namely through direct buying and selling, where business actors met directly with consumers to offer their goods. everything changed when the covid-19 pandemic hit the world. business actors were compelled to use e-commerce and social media applications such as instagram and whatsapp as the last resort. during the covid-19 pandemic, the small and medium businesses have more opportunities to market goods than before the pandemic. during the pandemic, the business expenditure used for marketing strategies, which was not cost-sensitive, is now relatively small. small and medium business actors, the subjects of this research, felt it on their side. therefore, they market their product using digital technology to offer varieties of services or goods to consumers. opportunities to get more consumers through digital technology were also wide open. these small and medium business actors could now see the characteristic of their consumers during the pandemic. they observed that these consumers did many things using the internet, so they could be the premier target of marketing. through this platform, they thought they were able to aim at consumers of various ages, ranging from teenagers to adults. consumers from all walks of life, from various professions and occupations such as homemakers, office workers, schoolchildren and students, are marketing targets. the price of goods offered through this platform become relatively accessible to many consumers. making purchases now was without fuss; not to be bothered with various transaction terms, even without requiring them to leave the house. the customers only picked products that suit their needs or desires. this made selling goods through digital technology grow rapidly. the buying and selling goods to consumers in such new and different ways encouraged consumers to innovate and create new things using the platforms of digital technology. in addition, manufacturers could establish relationships with other manufacturers to establish business cooperation. figure 1 shows the transformation of business activities carried out by small and medium-sized businesses before and after the covid-19 pandemic. 160 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 2, 2021 figure 1. the transformation of small and medium business activities before and after the covid-19 pandemic in figure 1, we see that before the covid-19 pandemic, small and medium business actors did business, especially in buying and selling goods, through conventional markets. business actors met their consumers at conventional market locations. in contrast, after the covid-19 pandemic, business actors sold goods to their consumers through digital markets or known as digital marketplaces. business actors and their consumers did not need to meet in person to make transactions. both simply used digital technology to do business transactions. the operational activities in utilizing the technology of buying and selling goods took into account the form of trust built for their consumers. trust is one of the elements of social capital to build relationships and networks between individuals and others, individuals with groups, and between groups (dwiningrum 2014). the phenomenon of social transformation in the digital era gave a sign that trust between individuals become easy to form. we see this from the behaviour of consumers who trusted their sellers to buy goods without having to meet them in person. optimizing the use of digital technology for business technological innovation in the economic field cannot be separated from the needs of market players: producers, distributors, and consumers (smelser and swedberg 2005). during the covid-19 pandemic, especially when the government of indonesia declared a state of emergency due to the 161ichmi yani arinda rohmah and andi achdian spread and transmission of covid-19 in almost all parts of indonesia, the central government and regional governments in the red zone areas including depok city imposed the rules of large scale social restrictions (psbb). this state of emergency had a significant impact on various fields including the economic sector. this prompts the need for efforts to help the economic market to survive in these difficult times. heeding to its people’s predicament, the indonesian government has made various efforts to keep businesses running. for example, the establishment of an online platform integrated into traditional markets. this was to sustain various types of innovations, which provided virtual market space or often referred to as a marketplace, following their initiations before the pandemic. therefore, the market players were able to get new solutions to keep optimizing the operational activities of their small and medium businesses. through various types of marketplaces on e-commerce and social media applications, small and medium business actors were able to connect easily with their consumers and fellow business actors. even during the pandemic, relationships were easy to build among resellers and distributors. so was between business actors who sold goods from other business actors. in e-commerce applications, business actors could cooperate and easily find the preferred-market prices of various goods so that a reference of prices could help to make decisions and to determine the right price of goods offered to consumers. another phenomenon that we found in the relationship between small business actors in the marketplace was that competition between business actors in the marketplace would easily occur, ranging from the types of commodities to the selling price of goods to consumers. this is what we perceive as a perfectly competitive market. the efforts that were made to optimize the use of digital technology to maximize their operational activities were as follows: 1) giving an attractive name for the online store; 2) using product brands that are easily recognized by consumers; 3) designing an online shop window to be attractive; 4) giving discounts to certain commodities, and 5) providing merchandise on several occasions so that consumers are interested in visiting online shops for business actors. apart from fulfilling their needs, most of the consumers were also attracted to visit the online shops due to the above-mentioned five efforts made by business actors. the consumers satisfied with the services of business actors and the goods they bought would make more purchases. 162 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 2, 2021 in addition, these satisfied consumers would provide a good response and assessment that supported these business actors to grow. the network of small-medium business consumers during the covid-19 pandemic barry wellman (1983) describes that a network always emphasizes to heed the regularity and maintain collectivity formed between individuals and groups. his analysis also identifies the patterns of ties that link these actors within a social structure. there are five characteristics of the formation of social networks described by barry wellman (1983 in ritzer [2014]) as seen in figure 2 as follows: 1. the symmetrical nature of the bond that connects the actors provides a reciprocal relationship and provides mutual support; 2. individual bonds in the context of macro-network structure; 3. non-random network formation; 4. the existence of groups in networks can produce relationships across groups and between individuals; and 5. asymmetric bonds in a system can result in a different distribution of resources. figure 2. formation of social networks (adapted from wellman [1983]) consumer networks in small and medium enterprises were easily identified by using indicators of network theory from barry wellman. the symmetrical nature of the bond that connects producers and consumers in the marketplace had a reciprocal relationship. business actors in building initial networks with consumers used several strategies, namely at the beginning of opening a business by building a network with consumers who 163ichmi yani arinda rohmah and andi achdian have personal and emotional closeness such as friends, family, and work environment. then business actors built networks with foreign consumers who had no personal relationship. many foreign consumers could easily track their orders through e-commerce applications. the reciprocal relationship that occurred between business actors and consumers may take different forms. this symmetrical reciprocal consumer relationship can be easily identified through the network formed through several e-commerce application tools. these tools include as follows: 1. assessment tool or evaluation; 2. evaluation of business services and goods purchased by consumers; 3. commentary tools that can be filled out by consumers; 4. tool for signs of liking the products and services of business actors, storefront link; 5. storage tool from online stores; 6. question and answer tool between consumers and business actors; 7. discussion and communication tool between consumers and business owners; between business owners, and between consumers; and 8. then there is also a follower tool. consumers who felt satisfied with the services provided by business actors and are satisfied with the goods purchased gave a good response to online shop owners. the response was required in several forms: commenting or reviewing of satisfaction on the purchase of goods, giving a rating, following the online shop, adding items and closing their purchase at the last minute with the exact amount or multiplied. in the context of the macro network, it can be identified in the relationships that were built between business actors and e-commerce companies, relationships between business actors, relationships between consumers, and relationships between business actors and consumers. the macro network could form cross-network with various groups of business actors and consumers. networks that are not random (non-random networks) can be seen in the homogeneous types of consumers. for example, there was a consumer network from a socialite housewife environment, which was seen in the type of commodity they needed and in the number of purchases at certain times. another was the consumer network of teenagers who were pursuing higher education had homogeneous characteristics in determining the type of commodity and the number of goods needed in a certain period. 164 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 2, 2021 the existence of groups of business actors in the market was needed to increase the attractiveness of consumer groups or individuals. the strategy taken by the business groups to exist was to design an online storefront that looked attractive, use product brands that sufficiently increased consumer interest, and provide discounts on goods offered to consumers. in addition to symmetrical network bonds, there were asymmetrical network bonds. asymmetric bonds in the context of this study were often found in the bonds formed between business actors and foreign consumers or consumers without any emotional and personal ties. the asymmetric bonds were characterized by the behaviour of consumers themselves. usually, consumers in asymmetric bonds only made purchases of goods once or rarely bought goods at the same online store, and these consumers were not active in providing or ratings and reviews of the services provided by the actors, businesses and goods purchased. this asymmetric bond also affected the special treatment given by business actors to their consumers. in asymmetrical ties, business actors rarely gave bonuses and discounts on the prices of goods offered to consumers. the use of new digital technology innovations that create virtual spaces for economic actors was a form of effort to maintain community economic resilience, especially at the microeconomic level, which comprises many small and medium businesses. nevertheless, there were still things less optimal and new problems arose in this digital technology-based economic activity. so, attention and solutions from many parties should be put here from digital economic technology developers, e-commerce companies, business people, both micro and macro, consumers, and the government as policymakers and supervisors of economic activities in digital spaces (marketplaces). several problems were still there such as the lack of protection of consumer rights, protection of personal data of market players from producers to consumers, frauds and crimes experienced by consumers. we may add that there are groups of business actors whose understanding of the use of digital economic technology is still low. this particular segment of the digital marketplace needs to receive digital technology education. conclusion this article has shown that during the covid-19 pandemic, the community’s dependence on digital technology to meet their needs is increasing as seen in the case of the small and medium enterprises groups in depok. the 165ichmi yani arinda rohmah and andi achdian small and medium enterprise groups saw a great opportunity to sell various products and services through digital technology. the types of digital technology widely used by small and medium enterprise groups were marketplace applications and social media such as instagram. the small and medium enterprise groups made a new strategy in building a consumer network using digital technology; it proved quite effective and profitable for the small and medium enterprise groups. although there was a large scale social restriction regulation enforced from early 2020 to mid-2021 and then continued with the enforcement of community activity restrictions, the covid-19 pandemic did not weaken the small and medium enterprises groups in running their business. acknowledgement thanks to the 1st bandung international conference on social science: contemporary issues and trends in social sciences in the era of the internet of things, bandung, 6-8 july 2021. references “apjii: pandemi covid-19 buat pengguna internet di indonesia meningkat hampir 200 juta.” voi, november 10, 2020. retrieved july 7, 2021 from (https://voi.id/teknologi/19331/ apjii-pandemi-covid-19-buat-pengguna-internet-di-indonesiameningkat-hampir-200-juta). denzin, norman k. and yvonna s. lincoln. 2009. handbook of qualitative research. yogyakarta: pustaka pelajar. dhamastuti, hestiana. 2020. “catat! ini daftar aturan psbb di bogor, depok dan bekasi yang berlaku hari ini.” detiknews, april 15. retrieved july 6, 2021 from (https://news.detik.com/ berita/d-4977383/catat-ini-daftar-aturan-psbb-di-bogor-depokdan-bekasi-yang-berlaku-hari-ini/3). dwiningrum, siti irene astuti. 2014. modal sosial dalam pengembangan pendidikan (perspektif teori dan praktik). yogyakarta: uny press. ritzer, george. 2014. teori sosiologi: dari sosiologi klasik sampai perkembangan terakhir postmodern. sleman: pustaka pelajar. 166 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 2, 2021 smelser, neil j. and richard swedberg (eds.). 2005. the handbook of economic sociology. princeton: princeton university press. sugiyono. 2013. metode penelitian kuantitatif, kualitatif, dan r&d. yogyakarta: alfabeta. sukarno, p. a. 2021. “ada pandemi, jumlah transaksi dan pelaku umkm di e-commerce melesat”. ekonomi bisnis 29 april 2021. rully khairul anwar1 university of padjajaran, indonesia m. taufiq rahman uin sunan gunung djati, indonesia abstract this paper discusses the archiving system of knowledge transmission in traditional islamic educational institution in indonesia. the process of knowledge transmission in islamic traditional educational institution cannot be separated from its position as the center of islamic education and information. this study focuses its analysis on the pesantren miftahul huda, tasikmalaya, indonesia, using qualitative method and data collection techniques through observation and interview. the results show that archiving knowledge transmission was limited and not well-managed in the pesantren miftahul huda. the pesantren was traditional in its archiving system in that it relied on the teachers’ memories in the process of transmission of islamic science. to maintain an archiving system in traditional islamic educational institution, pesantrens in indonesia must pay serious attention to the archiving of their documents and activities for practical and scientific purposes. the support of local and central government support and other parties will be valuable and useful for these purposes. keywords archiving, knowledge transmission, islamic educational institution, pesantren, indonesia intisari artikel ini membahas sistem pengarsipan transmisi ilmu di lembaga pendidikan islam tradisional di indonesia. proses transmisi ilmu di lembaga ini tidak bisa dipisahkan dari posisinya sebagai pusat pendidikan dan informasi islam. artikel ini memfokuskan analisisnya pada pesantren miftahul huda, tasikmalaya, indonesia, dengan menggunakan metode kualitatif dan teknik wawancara dan observasi archiving knowledge transmission in islamic educational institution: the case of pesantren miftahul huda tasikmalaya, indonesia journal of asian social science research 2019, vol. i, no. 1: 63-72 http://jassr.cassr.web.id © the author(s) 2019 article 1 corresponding author: rully khairul anwar address: university of padjadjaran, jalan raya bandung-sumedang km 21, hegarmanah, jatinangor, sumedang, indonesia 45363 email: rully.khairul@unpad.ac.id 64 journal of asian social science research vol. 1, no. 1, 2019 untuk pengumpulan datanya. hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa pengarsipan transmisi ilmu masih terbatas dan tidak dimenej dengan baik di miftahul huda. pesantren ini masih tradisional dalam sistem pengarsipannya dengan mengandalkan pada ingatan para guru dalam proses transmisi ilmu. untuk menjaga sistem pengarsipan yang baik di lembaga pendidikan islam tradisional, pesantren harus memberikan perhatian yang serius terhadap pengarsipan dokumen dan kegiatan mereka untuk kepentingan praktis dan ilmiah. dukungan pemerintah lokal dan pusat serta pihak lain akan sangat berharga dan berguna bagi terwujudnya tujuan ini. katakunci pengarsipan, transmisi ilmu, lembaga pendidikan islam, pesantren, indonesia introduction pesantren is the oldest educational institution that still exists until now in indonesia. generally traditional and located in rural areas, pesantren is an islamic educational institution that has successfully maintained its key role as the leading center of religious learning in indonesia. its contribution to the development of indonesia has been recognized by the indonesian government and society. while modern society has experienced and witnessed various kinds of scientific progress that lead to social, cultural, and technological changes (stehr 2017), pesantren still maintains its traditional methods of learning. nevertheless, indonesian muslims still entrust pesantren or pesantren-based boarding schools as an important learning institution to educate their children. this is closely related to low living cost in pesantren and the belief that pesantren is the best place of developing future generations with good characters and attitudes. pesantren has adapted and will continue to adapt to modernity. there was one type of pesantren known as salafi (traditional) in the past. today, pesantren can be categorized into three types: salafi (traditional), khalafi (modern) and mixed traditional and modern. social changes that occur in pesantren can be explained through a systemic approach (von bertalanffy 1973). modern organizational standards are needed to see how modernity has been adopted by pesantren, including a modern archiving system. early modern administrative theories (huse 1979) including the theory of school administration (poston, et.al. 1992) can be used to examine the archiving system in pesantren. many individuals, groups or government –local or foreignagencies come to pesantren for various purposes. some visited pesantren to research the issues of pesantren, while others came to deliver financial aid from local and foreign goverment or non-government agencies (rahman 2016). all this made the pesantren administrators aware of the importance of archiving system in pesantren this paper deals with the attempt of pesantren to build an archiving system. archiving refers to “all recording of activities or events in various forms and 65anwar and rahman media in accordance with information and communication technology created and accepted by state institutions, local government, educational institutions, organizations, societies and individuals in the implementation of community life, nation, and state”(undang-undang nomor 43 tahun 2009 tentang kearsipan). using this definition, this study seeks to describe archiving in pesantren both dynamic archiving -which is valuable for administration, law, finance, and scientific and technological useand static archiving –which is valuable for evidential, informational, and intrinsic (gilliland 2016). this study used a qualitative approach as it focused on subjective meanings, understandings, metaphors, symbols, and descriptions of a specific case of archiving in pesantren. this approach was chosen to obtain a detailed and in-depth picture of the phenomenological information. thus, this is a descriptive research that attempts to describe the specific details of the situation, setting or social relationships that take place within the scope of research subjects (hammersley 2007). furthermore, this is a case study that answers the research question of how the pattern of archiving of learning activities in pesantren is. in this context, this study focuses its analysis on archiving activities at pesantren miftahul huda tasikmalaya. it asks how the pesantren does archiving in terms of recording, documentation, and storage of its learning activities. the unit of analysis of this research is the students of pesantren miftahul huda tasikmalaya and their parents. this is in line with yin’s explanation that the case study approach is suitable for research which attempts to answer “how” and “why” as well as to looking at contemporary phenomena (yin 2009). through case study methods, the findings to be presented in the research results are facts that are found during the research. the presentation of the results will be delivered descriptively based on qualitative and quantitative data available. all informants were familiar with learning tradition in pesantren. being informed by relatives, friends, mass media and internet, they knew the types of learning in pesantren where the most popular is a study of kitab kuning (“yellow books”; books on islamic teachings written in arabic and printed mostly in yellow paper) and tahfizh (memorizing the quranic verses). techniques used in the process of data collection were observation and interview. data analysis used was descriptive, which generally in the forms of data reduction, data presentation, and conclusion or data verification. all steps were performed simultaneously since in the research site as follow: (1) data was manually collected and verified; (2) the answers were placed in each category according to their answers; (3) the findings were arranged and descriptively analyzed; (4) preparation and analysis of data through various archives, both formal and informal archives. validity and reliability in qualitative research have their specifications. testing the data validity was done by (1) triangulation of data and sources, i.e. through interviews with informants from various background such as government apparatus groups, communities, interest groups, and experts who understood the research problems, as well as observations and document analysis so they generated 66 journal of asian social science research vol. 1, no. 1, 2019 the pattern of relationships; (2) examination by members or informants (member check) who acted as examiner along the analytical process to illustrate the genuine of the data provided; (3) long-term and repeated observations in the study sites; and (4) examination by peer or colleagues (cresswell 2002). about pesantren miftahul huda miftahul huda is located in pasirpanjang, kalimanggis, manonjaya, tasikmalaya regency, jawa barat province. this pesantren was founded by kyai choer affandy, known as uwa ajengan. he named his pesantren miftahul huda, which means “key of guidance”, to hope that this pesantren produces the pious religious teachers who can provide religious guidance to their community. the groundbreaking of mitahul huda was conducted on 7 august 1967 in the presence of the regent of tasikmalaya. col. hussein wangsaatmaja and the commander of the kodam iii / siliwangi major general ibrahim ajie. the first building established was a 30 m x 40 m madrassa which consisted of four rooms, three classes, female student beds, and a room for the kyai (pesantren leader) and his family. later, a neighbor lent his house to kyai’s family. miftahul huda employs the traditional way (salafi) of learning. kyai choer affandi is renowned for his attitude that retains the traditional characteristics of traditional pesantren despite he had opportunities to change it with modern ways of learning and teaching as adopted by most contemporary pesantren. after the death of choer affandi, miftahul huda is managed by his children and sons-in-law. now, the pesantren is a house for around 4000 students. it employs 150 lecturers, most of whom are alumni of the pesantren. miftahul huda continues to progress. this is seen in the large number of its students reaching around 2500 students, who come from various regions in indonesia. now, this pesantren has many more buildings includinng mosques, study centers, a kyai house, and dormitories for male and female students. in addition, it has a mini-market that sells utensils and goods of students’ daily life, and a computer center. what is interesting about this pesantren is that although its students do not have classes in modern science such as management science, this pesantren has succeeded in implementing an organization system. even it runs baitul mal watamwil (bmt; a small scale islamic credit and loan system) that serves students as well as community members providing them with a loan of idr 500.000 (us$ 40-50) for each creditor. moreover, many alumni of pesantren miftahul huda have successfully established their pesantrens. it is said that there are around 1000 pesantrens established by alumni in many cities and regions in indonesia. west java province has the highest number of muftahul huda-affiliated pesantrens. the most prominent pesantren include miftahul huda ii (ciamis) and miftahul huda iii (tasikmalaya city). these pesantrens follow the orientation and characteristics of the first miftahul huda in terms of education and teaching systems as well as leadership, in which kyai plays central roles. 67anwar and rahman what distinguishes miftahul huda from the pesantrens founded by its alumni is that miftahul huda still does not include school and madrasah lessons in its curricula, while the pesantrens founded by alumni adopted school and madrasa system, which was combined with traditional learning system of pesantren. to consolidate and communicate with the alumni of miftahul huda, a general gathering for alumni of the pesantren is held every year. the participants discuss the issues related to the pesantren problems and strengten their commitment to maintain and promote the reputation of miftahul huda pesantren. here the alumni also receive a morale boost from pesantren officials and teachers to continue to work and develop a kind of traditional pesantren pioneered by miftahul huda. if religion is considered as tradition, then it is clear that since its beginning, pesantren is a traditionalist in its educational philosophy. pesantren leaders are generally proud of the tradition inherited from previous generations and are unwilling to accept new works. they believe that the educational system in pesantren has succeeded in guiding the students to be good and successful people, many of whom become muslim scholars. therefore, many traditional pesantrens never change their educational systems because they want to keep their traditional educational philosophy. this is different from the concept of western education which regards education as the process of continuous modernization (depaepe and smeyers 2008). however, this does not mean that pesantren resists progressive ideas. in fact, every pesantren has its formula to realize what they mean by preserving the ancestral heritage (tradition). some traditional pesantrens are open to non-religious education programs in the pesantren. they believe that pesantren must progress and change to survive (green 1995). like other traditional pesantrens, miftahul huda focuses on the regeneration of religious leaders (ulama). to do this, the pesantren has a mission as follows: 1) produce devout muslims (muttaqin); 2) produce pious leaders (imamal muttaqin); 3) produce scholars who put his knowledge into practice (ulamaul ‘amilin); 4) produce skilled and independent citizens, who support the development of the country; and 5) prevent evil humans arising from the obedience of faith, so they become stupid and arrogant to the detriment of the state (tohir sh 1999). education in pesantren focuses on the understanding of islam (wekke 2015). it is said that the more original pesantren, the more traditional its is (nakamura 2018). this is also true for miftahul huda. pesantren miftahul huda, for example, still teaches its students islamic teachings based on ‘old books’, which are believed to be more original in preserving the original islamic teachings as seen the table below. 68 journal of asian social science research vol. 1, no. 1, 2019 subjects books tawhid ‘aqidah al-’awam, tijan al-darari, khulashah ilmu tauhid, majmu‘atul ‘aqidah, sya‘bul iman, ‘aqidah islamiyyah tafsir tafsir jalalain, tafsir ibnu katsir, tafsir al-sabuni, tafsir almunir, tafsir ayat-ayat ahkam. hadith riyad al-shalihin, sahih bukhari, sahih muslim, tajrid al-sharih al-bukhari, kifayatul akhyar. fiqh safinah, riyadul badi‘ah, i’anatut talibin, fath al-wahab, fath al-mu’in, fath al-qarib, fath al-jawab, minhaj al-qawim, aliqna. ushul fiqh al-waraqat, jam’ al-jawami, lata’if al-isyarah. tasawuf akhlaq lil banin, sullam al-taufiq, ta’limul muta’allimin, ‘alajul amrodl, ihya ulum al-din, durrat al-nasihin, syarh al-hikam, tanbih al-ghafilin. arabic language mutammimah, ajurumiyah, imriti, nazm alfiyah, ibn aqil, qawaid lughah, kailani izzi, mugni al-labib, al-amsilat altasrifiyah, jawhar al-maknun, sulam al-nauroq. source: offical document of pesantren mifathul huda 2017 the learning system at miftahul huda is divided into three levels: ibtida’iy (basic, 1-3 grade of junior high); tsanawy (middle, grade 4-6 high school); and ‘aly (high, college rankings for three years). the following are subjects taught on each education level: 1. subjects at grade 1 ibtida (junior high school): introduction to tawhid, introduction to fiqih, syahadatain, introduction to tarikh, dzikir and istigosah, shalat fardu, iqra/al-qur’an, tajwid, arabic vol. 1; 2. subjects at grade 2 ibtida (junior high school): safinah, jurumiyyah, tashrifan salim, akhlaq li al-banin vol. 1, tijan al-darury and khulashoh nurul yaqin juz i, tajwid, arabic, tahfiz jurumiyyah, tahfiz juzu’ ‘amma; 3. subjects at grade 3 ibtida (junior high school): kailany, khulashoh nurul yaqin juz ii & iii, riyadlul badi’ah, majmu’atul aqidah juz i & ii, akhlaq lil-banin juz ii dan iii, hadis arba’in, qiyasan, arabic vol. 3, dan tahfiz juzu’ ‘amma; 4. subjects at grade 1 tsanawi (senior high school): al-bajuri vol. 1-2, kifayatul atqiya, alfiyah ibn malik, riyadlus sholihin, i’adah sharaf kailani, tafsir jalalain, kifayatul ‘awwam, dan tahfiz matan alfiyah; 5. subjects at grade 2 tsanawi (senior high school): isti’arah, mantiq, ‘alajul amrod, jauhar tauhid, fathul mu’in juz 1-2, rohbiyyah/faraidl, sahih bukhari juz 1-2 dan sahih muslim juz l, i’adah al-fiyah ibnu malik, dan tahfiz rohbiyyah, mantiq dan isti‘arah; 69anwar and rahman 6. subjects at grade 3 tsanawi (senior high school): jauhar maknun, fathul mu’in juz 3-4, khoridatul bahiyyah, kifayatul akhyar, tarikh islam, nazhom tauhid, waraqat, lathoiful isyarah, sahih bukhari juz 3-4 and sahih muslim juz 2, sirajut talibin, i’adah mantiq, and tahfiz jauhar maknun; 7. subjects at year 1 ma’had (college) aly: ghayatul wushul, ‘uqudul juman juz 1, fathul wahhab, tafsir ibnu katsir juz 1, bidayatul mujtahid, ihya’ ulumuddin, and al-asbah wan-nadzair; 8. subjects at year 2 ma’had (college) aly: jam’ul jawami’ juz 1, uqud aljuman juz 2, fathul wahhab, bidayatul mujtahid, ihya’ulumuddin and al-asbah wan-nadzair; and 9. subjects at year 3 ma’had (college) aly: jam’ul jawami’ juz 2, fathul wahhab, bidayatul mujtahid, ihya’ ulumuddin, and al-asbah wannadzair. like other traditional pesantrens, miftahul huda uses the teaching-learning methods of bandongan (a teacher reads, students listen) and sorogan (a student reads, a teacher listens). to recall what a teacher has delivered, the students rewrite the arabic sentence written in kitab kuning (the main reference) “pegon” script (arabic script in malay language). the process of teaching and learning in miftahul huda uses the local language, which in tasikmalaya is sundanese, just like most districts in west java province. regarding assessment, miftahul huda doe not conduct an official assessment. assessment is determined by the memory of the kyai alone: whether a student (santri) passes or fails depends on the kyai’s memory. nevertheless, pesantren miftahul huda uses a modern way in the implementation of the teaching and learning system. for example, the teaching uses a class system -in which in many cases the classrooms were equipped with chairs and desks except one for teachersdiscussion method, and public lectures, which were incorported into the pesantren traditional ways of learning (bandongan and sorogan). the pesantren emphasizes to meet the standards of competence that were determined based on the general pattern of learning. whether or not a student passes from one stage to another stage can be interpreted administratively in this pesantren. if students have graduated from the diploma stage, which is called ma’had ‘aly (for 3 years), the graduation was held for the students. for those who simply wanted to learn vocational skills, they had classes in farming, carpentry, and computer skills. all these vocational skills were taught on sundays by the teachers at miftahul huda, who graduated from various faculties such as law, agriculture, and computer science. there were 89 teachers in pesantren miftahul huda. this was considered fairly comparable with the number of students (almost 2500 people). almost all teachers were graduates of the pesantren. from our observation, it appears that teachers were still a little less prosperous. so, to get additional income, some teachers gave religious lectures as da’i (preacher) to muslim communities surrounding the 70 journal of asian social science research vol. 1, no. 1, 2019 pesantren or at mosques in the city of tasikmalaya. this was disadvantageous to students because at learning time the teachers felt exhausted after having preached outside the pesantren. the students in large traditional pesantrens like miftahul huda were diverse: beginners, middle-rank students, and the senior ones. around 100 students worked (some of them worked as teachers). around 30 students were laborers. 50 students were active in organizations. around 150 students worked as security guards. from our observation, many students were diligent and had the willingness to study, but could not afford to pay tuition fee. then, they worked for their kyai as a way of seeking “blessing” as they believed that serving the kyai would provide them with advantage, good knowledge, and sustenance. to help students with financial problems, scholarships or adoptive fathers were sought. another solution was providing these students with part-time jobs inside the pesantren. thus, they could earn money to support their living without leaving their study. archiving knowledge transmission in the pesantren miftahul huda in general, the pesantren miftahul huda did not conduct knowledge archiving through recording and documentation. in fact, teachers in pesantren no longer needed to record and document their lessons. they simply relied on mind recall or memory, or referred to old books. based on our field observations, the process of transferring knowledge through recording and documenting was not done. nevertheless, they did individual translation of the book which was being read. this was considered as documentation or archiving, although it was for individual use. in archiving knowledge, one must first determine the important things that must be maintained and finalize how to maintain it. the storage of science involves technical (records, database, etc.) and human processes (collective and individual memory, consensus) (ocasio et.al. 2016). in this case, the archived knowledge should be structured and stored so that the system can find and send them quickly and correctly. science will be taken by different groups in different manners. it should be divided into categories such as facts, policies, or procedures based on learning purposes. it als should be organized so that it can be delivered clearly. lastly, the stored knowledge should be accurate, timely, and available to those who need it (larsson 2016). the archiving of the teaching system in the pesantren miftahul huda was not well managed by the pesantren administrators. much of this was derived from writers’ papers and records from the government, especially the ministry of religious affairs. in reusing the science of teaching in the pesantren, the knowledge seekers usually practiced the knowledge in order not to forget. this was closely related to the fact that the pattern of knowledge archiving was traditional and individual. thus, there have been many things to be done about the archiving of knowledge and teaching in the pesantren miftahul huda. the government could provide the pesantren with assistance to archive its activities pesantren, including learning activities. 71anwar and rahman conclusion based on the above findings, this study concludes that as seen in its vision and mission, the pesantren miftahul huda tried to educate students to be religious people and ready for the world challenges. nevertheless, this vision and mission remain unimplemented into practical programs and operational activities. accordingly, this vision and mission were not well archived by the pesantren. the miftahul huda adopted the curriculum of traditional pesantren (salafi) preserving a long tradition of pesantren learning in indonesia. therefore, the indonesian government’s education programs were not used by the pesantren. the learning system used kitab kuning as the main reference. some subjects were memorized, but most of them depended on the books with written meaning in arabic. the evaluation system was not clear because it was not well documented. the extra-curricular programs offered by the pesantren were also not documented. it was common that the miftahul huda recruited teachers from its graduates or the kyai family members and relatives. but, the archiving of this activity was not available. perhaps what was well archived was the pesantren rules for students. teachers in the pesantren miftahul huda did not archive their activities. to maintain an archiving system in the traditional pesantrens like miftahul huda, the pesantrens must pay serious attention to the archiving of their documents and activities for practical and scientific purposes. in this context, the support of local and central government support and other parties will be valuable and useful. references von bertalanffy, ludwig. 1973. the general systems theory. new york: g. braziller. cresswell, john w. 2002. qualitative inquiry and research design: choosing among five approaches. california: sage publications. depaepe, marc and paul smeyers. 2008. “educationalization as an ongoing modernization process”. educational theory, vol. 58, no. 4: 167-176. gilliland, anne j. 2016. “designing expert systems for archival evaluation and processing of computer-mediated communications: frameworks and methods.” in anne gilliland, a. lau and s. mckemmish (eds.), research in the archival multiverse. melbourne: monash university press. greene, maxine. 1995. “what counts as philosophy of education?” in w. kohli (ed.), critical conversations in philosophy of education. pp. 3-21. new york: routledge. hammersley, martyn & paul atkinson. 2007. ethnography: principles in practice. london: routledge. huse, edgar f. 1979. the modern manager. new york: west publishing company. larsson, axel. 2018. “utilizing digitalization for improved knowledge transfer in project-based organizations: a single case study of a management consulting firm.” masters program thesis. retrieved 20 february 2020 (http://www.diva-portal.se/smash/get/diva2:1216673/fulltext01.pdf) 72 journal of asian social science research vol. 1, no. 1, 2019 nakamura, yuriko. 2018. “possibilities of modern school libraries in pesantren in indonesia: a case study with two young muslim women.” school libraries worldwide 24, no. 1: 57-70. ocasio, william, michael mauskapf, and christopher steele. 2016. “history, society, and institutions: the role of collective memory in the emergence and evolution of societal logics.” academy of management review 41, no. 4: 676-699. poston, william k., m. p. stone, c.t. muther. 1992. making schools work: practical management of support operation. newbury park, california: corwin press. rahman, m. taufiq. 2016. “pendidikan karakter islam modern di sekolah berbasis pesantren.” discussion paper. retrieved 20 february 2020 (http://digilib. uinsgd.ac.id/13474/) stehr, nico. 2017. “knowledge societies.” in volker meja (ed.), society and knowledge, pp. 299-322. london: routledge. tohir sh., asep moh (ed.) 1999. sisi lain pesantren miftahul huda. tasikmalaya: yayasan pesantren miftahul huda. “undang-undang nomor 43 tahun 2009 tentang kearsipan”. wekke, ismail suardi. 2015. “arabic teaching and learning: a model from indonesian muslim minority.” procedia-social and behavioral sciences 191: 286-290. yin, robert k. 2009. studi kasus: desain dan metode. jakarta: rajawali press. agung marsallindo* gadjah mada university, indonesia cici safitri andalas university, indonesia abstract west sumatra is one of the indonesian provinces that conducted the simultaneous regional elections in 2020. it was said that it had the highest rate of election vulnerability index in 2020 based on the indicators of assessment including political participation, socio-political context, free and fair elections, contest, and vulnerability due to the covid-19 pandemic. in west sumatra, the three regional head elections in 2005, 2010, and 2015 show that public political participation decreased from 64% to 58%. however, in the 2020 election, the voter turnout rate rose to 61.68%. therefore, this article analyzes how did the west sumatra government build public legitimacy to increase public political participation in the 2020 election, which was held in the covid-19 pandemic with all its limitations? in doing so, it uses a literature study method. the collected data were analyzed according to the principles of the qualitative method. the results of this study indicate that public legitimacy of the 2020 regional election in west sumatra was built by three actors in the consolidation of democracy in the gubernatorial election as follows: a) local government, b) election participants and c) election management institutions, each of which had strategic steps in restoring public trust in the election during the covid-19 pandemic. keywords west sumatra regional election, public legitimacy, pandemic covid-19 * corresponding author: agung marsallindo gadjah mada university, yogyakarta province, indonesia email: amarsallindo@mail.ugm.ac.id public legitimacy of government and people’s political participation: the case of the 2020 west sumatra regional election, indonesia journal of asian social science research 2021, vol. 3, no. 1: 93-102 https://cassr.net/jassr/ © the author(s) 2021 article 94 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 introduction society has a central role in a democratic country, as abraham lincoln argued about democracy, which refers to the governance of people, by people, and for people (in epstein 2011). in running a country, power and authority are obtained to run the wheels of governance. as the first requirement for the establishment of a state, people are given a basic right in the form of legitimacy given to the government, which plays an important role in running their country. this legitimacy in the procedural definition of democracy is manifested in the form of an electoral process that functions to determine who exercises power and control of the state (schumpeter 2003). in this democratic process, there is a process of institutionalization so that the whole process reaches the status of social order, namely when power, authority, and legitimacy run simultaneously. in indonesia, this power is achieved through a general election process aimed to elect the president, parliament members, and regional heads. pp no. 6 of 2005 explains the reform of regional head elections, in which governors, mayors, and regents are directly by the people, whereas previously elected by dprd members. in that year, the first simultaneous regional head elections (pilkada) were held. fifteen years later, precisely in 2020, indonesia held its fourth simultaneous regional head elections in nine provinces and 270 regencies/cities throughout indonesia. this time, the elections faced a special challenge in that they were carried out in the covid-19 pandemic situation that hit the world. the government had postponed the election time twice because of this situation, but they finally determined that the election would be held on december 9, 2020 (budilaksono 2020). but, civil society organizations such as nahdlatul ulama and muhammadiyah opposed this government decision (wicaksono 2020) arguing that people’s participation and legitimacy would decrease because they were afraid to come to vote. this article deals with the simultaneous regional head elections focusing on those held in the province of west sumatra in 2020 to vote the governor and mayors or regents in 13 regencies. west sumatra, according to research conducted by the election oversight agency (bawaslu) of the republic of indonesia, was regarded as an area with the highest level of vulnerability in elections in indonesia based on several criteria (bawaslu ri 2020). this was based on vulnerabilities in the aspects of social and political context, free and fair elections, contestation, participation, and the covid-19 pandemic (yamin 2020). implementing the elections in west sumatra election faced the challenges of these potential vulnerabilities. in addition, the organizing agency had a burden in the form of a target 95agung marsallindo and cici safitri set by the kpu to increase the rate of public participation from 58% in the 2015 gubernatorial election to 77% in 2020 (zikri 2020). after the election process on december 9, 2020, was successfully carried out, the west sumatra kpu recorded that the public participation rate in the governor election increased from the previous election to 61.68% (zikri 2020). although it did achieve the national target set by the kpu, at least this figure is better than the previous gubernatorial election. this indicates that the level of public trust and legitimacy in the governor’s government increased by around 3.5%, as evidenced by the enthusiasm of the community in the election despite the covid-19 pandemic and the threat of vulnerability in this election process. based on this, we assume that actors interested in consolidating democracy in west sumatra have built public legitimacy as a form of increasing people’s participation in the 2020 gubernatorial election process. as stated above, legally and formally, the implementation of elections is interpreted as a legitimate political mechanism to legitimize the elected political elite to occupy political positions in the form of the people’s vote. therefore, in this paper, we attempt to answer the question of how have the consolidating actors of democracy in the 2020 west sumatra gubernatorial election built public legitimacy in increasing public participation in the 2020 elections? this study uses descriptive qualitative methods to analyze how the consolidating actors of democracy in the 2020 west sumatra governor election were able to build public legitimacy in increasing public participation in the 2020 elections. a descriptive analysis method is used to collect data and information on phenomena or actual problems through the process of data collection, compilation, processing, and concluding, which seeks to describe an objective empirical situation on the phenomenon or problem being studied. the data collection technique used in this study is a literature study due to the limitations of the researcher to conduct direct interviews with the informants (creswell 2007). a literature review is a critical and in-depth evaluation of previous research. a good literature review is done by evaluating new findings from scientific journal articles. it does not stop at the reading process alone as the researcher also summarizes, analyses, and makes a critical and in-depth synthesis of the articles reviewed (wahono 2016). besides, the data were obtained from reports (journals articles, and documentation related to the research problem) and were analyzed by the principles of the exploratory postpositive method. a large amount of data were reduced by making abstractions as a core summary. 96 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 political participation many scholars have studied political participation. meyliana and erowati (2020) studied the people’s political participation in the 2020 tana toraja regency regional head election (pilkada). tana toraja regency had to study the people’s readiness for the 2020 regional head election during the covid-19 pandemic. elections during the pandemic were full of debate because they could threaten public health, which would have implications for the level of public participation in the regional head election. therefore, public participation in exercising their right to vote, which is an indicator of the success of the local elections, had to be considered. moreover, public participation in elections in tana toraja was in decline in previous years. their study reveals that the low level of public participation in the 2015 regional head election was due to the lack of political awareness and public trust in the government in anticipating conflicts between supporters of candidates. furthermore, in the 2020 regional head election during the pandemic was also predicted that there would be a decline in the people’s participation in exercising their right to vote due to the high rate of covid-19 cases. similarly, wahyuningsih (2021) analyzed people’s participation in the simultaneous regional head election during the covid-19 pandemic in semarang. her study was aimed at exploring the level of community participation and its supporting and inhibiting factors. in contrast to the prediction by many experts and studies, her study reveals that the rate of people’s participation in the regional head election in semarang increased more significantly than that in the previous year. her findings show that when viewed nationally, the participation rate reaches 74.34% in central java province and 68.62% in semarang city. factors that influenced this level of participation include the increasing public awareness, local election organizers who could ensure safety from the transmission of the coronavirus, and the high participation of novice voters. this made the city of semarang achieve a fairly high level of public participation in the election. public trust in the organizers in implementing the regional head election was an important factor so that people were not mentally disturbed when they came to polling stations. compared to previous studies above, the difference and novelty of this study lie in the argument that despite the covid-19, the consolidation of democracy actors and the good impression of the public on the performance of the west sumatra provincial government increased the rate of people’s participation in the 2020 regional head election more significantly than that in the previous elections. 97agung marsallindo and cici safitri public legitimacy and political participation in west sumatra we use the concept of legitimacy to analyze the success of actors in consolidating democracy in the west sumatra gubernatorial election, which succeeded in increasing the rate of people’s participation and obtaining high public legitimacy compared to the previous gubernatorial elections. according to surbakti 2009, legitimacy in the practice of political power is very important because it is related to the legitimacy or acceptance of society towards the authorities or parties who have authority. beetham (in mas’udi 2017) states that legitimacy and the creation of legitimacy are central issues in social and political theory. it is at the core of any political organization to survive. legitimacy is needed for both democratic and non-democratic political authority as a moral basis for enforcing rules and regulations and imposing public policies. although many scientists define legitimacy differently, political scientists emphasize defining legitimacy and what constitutes legitimate or illegitimate power. the essence of legitimacy is about recognizing the right to rule. based on this, looking at the increasing level of public legitimacy of west sumatra in the 2020 gubernatorial election, we explain that the legitimacy was achieved through the consolidation of democracy actors. if we try to relate it to peter g. stillman’s presentation (in rothstein 2008) that describes legitimacy as the conformity of government outputs with relevant value system patterns from society, these outputs are not always related to desired or expected responses but also include unwanted or unexpected outcomes of the government’s actions. in the sense that the government or the actors of the consolidation of democracy certainly take actions that result in the process of increasing public legitimacy, and in this paper, the author will describe how the actions of these actors gave birth to an increase in community legitimacy in voter participation in the 2020 west sumatra governor election. government the covid-19 pandemic hit the world and caused losses in many sectors of people’s lives. the government is the main actor in overcoming this outbreak, starting from the central government to the regional governments in regions. the west sumatra provincial government, in the process of handling covid-19, tracing positive people with coronavirus, and doing the covid-19 test, which was fast and on a large scale, received praise from various parties in indonesia (kemendagri 2020). the regulations for implementing free pcr swab tests for the people of west sumatra by the 98 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 government are very beneficial for communities. the public’s impression of policies of handling this pandemic had implications for public legitimacy to the government. the public felt the existence of the government as an actor who had the authority and power to make policy on controlling the covid-19 pandemic. as a result, the community satisfaction with the government increased. although we did not find any research that explained that the covid-19 policy in west sumatra was able to increase the community satisfaction of the government, the enthusiasm of the community, and the government’s ability to promote the process of preventing the spread of covid-19 in this area were able to increase the people’s legitimacy of government, in the sense that there was the sense of comfort and pride that the government brought to the community through the process of forming the legitimacy of the government (routhstein 2008). the suitability of government work with what was desired by people resulted in public legitimacy. this impacted a sense of security among people to vote in the covid-19 pandemic because the provincial government was prepared in preventing covid-19 in west sumatera. the people began to realize the important role of the provincial government, and, as a result, when there was a leadership change, they expressed their aspirations and voted for a leader who could at least show the same performance as the current leader. the process of establishing legitimacy by the government of west sumatra created a good impression that produced social order. furthermore, if we look from the government’s point of view and its executive actor, the governor of west sumatra, irwan prayitno, it was recorded that prayitno had campaigned for the governorship several times to the public. we see that when he was given legitimacy by the people due to his hard work during his leadership, he tended to get legitimacy from people in the gubernatorial election. election participants based on data from the election supervisory agency (badan pengawas pemilu [bawaslu]) of west sumatra province, in the west sumatra regional head election process on december 9, 2020, pre-election, election day, and post-election processes were carried out well and a few frauds were reported. regarding the election vulnerability indicators made by the bawaslu in the social and political aspects, in which security measures, state administrators’ authority, and power relations at the local level had to be watched, we found all these run well (yamin 2020). this resulted in a good public impression of the election so that people voted in the election. 99agung marsallindo and cici safitri in addition, all four pairs of candidates targeted people of all ages, young and old. audy jonialdy of the candidate pair no. 4 mahyeldi-audy jonaldy was the youngest candidate for deputy governor as he was 37 years old when he applied for the position. the other three pairs of candidates also targeted young people in their campaign attempting to get their votes in the election. therefore, all this eliminated the conservative gap that the politics is only for the old as seen in the presence of candidates from young people and the campaign that targeted youth. as a result, the process carried out by the regional head election participants created public legitimacy to carry out the gubernatorial election and the increase in the rate of public participation. the output of the presence of the younger generation in the election process was that the young people believed that when they were part of the government, their interests would be prospered by these actors. so, this is in line with the type of legitimacy category (surbakti 2009), one of them is instrumental legitimacy, that legitimacy comes from the process of the leader’s agreement with the community to provide welfare in material form to get support and legitimacy from the community. election organizing agency the regional head election during the covid-19 pandemic provided challenges to the organizing institutions, kpu and bawaslu. in response, they conducted large campaigns and promotion of elections. this was aimed at convincing people to vote and not be too afraid of the pandemic (farisa 2020). this is also true for the west sumatra kpu, which did a budget efficiency up to idr11 billion, that still focused on campaigning to attract public participation (saputra 2020) such as collaboration with local governments to promote this so that people felt safe to participate in the election (watra 2020). furthermore, the view that that west sumatra was a region with a high level of vulnerability in the elections as underlined by bawaslu made the organizing institutions well-prepared to deal with potential problems (shania 2020). as a result, the organizers appeared more assertive in carrying out their duties. for example, in the case of the rejection of an independent candidate who applied for running for governorship, the kpu, and other parties directly conduct an assessment or review of the decision of the west sumatra kpu chairman in rejecting the independent candidate. their finding showed that the kpu chairman was found to have violated the code of ethics and was immediately dismissed as the west sumatra 100 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 kpu chairman and transferred to be a regular commissioner (agusmardi 2020). we see that the quick response of the organizers to internal errors convinced the public to trust the organizing agency. based on research by marsallindo (2019), it was found that acts of fraud committed by people were caused by the lack of firmness and distrust of the organizing agency in taking action against a problem. through the large-scale promotion and responsiveness of the organizing institution in the west sumatra gubernatorial election, the legitimacy of this institution was built. this is in accordance with the concept of the validity of power by heywood (2004) that says power must be exercised through formalized or standardized rules. these rules must be justified in terms of common good beliefs, namely a society that has legitimacy. in terms of the suitability of the regulations designed by the organizing agency, we think that it can create trust, and the output is that they think the level of fraud will be minimized. they confidently participate in the process of the 2020 gubernatorial election in west sumatra. conclusion this article has described that legitimacy is a political process given by people based on their assessment of the government as seen in the case of the 2020 regional head election in west sumatra. in the process of forming this legitimacy, the government as an actor that has power and authority takes steps to realize the act of legitimacy. this legitimacy was possible due to the actors interested in consolidating democracy in the 2020 west sumatera gubernatorial election. in the case of west sumatera, a province with high vulnerability, the regional head election was carried out successfully due to democratic consolidation, particularly during the covid-19 pandemic. the evidence was seen in the increase of people’s participation in west sumatra in the gubernatorial election in 2020 from 58% to 61.68%. this public legitimacy was obtained by the government through, first, actors who had an interest in the consolidation of democracy in the gubernatorial election. they managed to get the attention and sympathy of the people who were satisfied with the government’s performance in the previous term, coupled with the national assessment of west sumatra as being excellent in handling the covid-19 pandemic, resulting in a proud community and a sense of security presented by the government. second, public legitimacy was achieved because people believed that the gubernatorial election was equal for all groups as evidenced by candidates 101agung marsallindo and cici safitri came from all ages including the younger generation, and all candidate pairs focused their campaign on young people. third, the organizers received a good reception of their performance from the public before the election as they conducted a large scale of promotion of the election to persuade people to vote. as a result, there was an increase in the rate of people participating in the election. public legitimacy was present in the 2020 west sumatera regional head election and this indicated how people hoped for better leaders who govern their country. references agusmardi. 2020. “soal pendaftaran cagub perseorangan, amnasmen dipecat dari jabatan ketua kpu sumbar.” jurnalsumbar.com, november 4. retrieved 1 october 2021 (https://jurnalsumbar. com/2020/11/soal-pendaftaran-cagub-perseorangan-amnasmendipecat-dari-jabatan-ketua-kpu-sumbar/). bawaslu ri. 2020. indeks kerawanan pemilu (ikp) pilkada serentak 2020. padang: bawaslu. budilaksono, imam. 2020. “komisi ii dpr setuju pilkada 2020 dilaksanakan 9 desember.” antaranews.com, may 27. retrieved (https://www.antaranews.com/berita/1518730/komisi-ii-dpr-setujupilkada-2020-dilaksanakan-9-desember). creswell, john w. 2007. research design, qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches. thousand oaks, california: sage. epstein, richard a. 2011. “direct democracy: government of the people, by the people, and for the people.” harvard journal of law & public policy 34: 819-826. farisa, fitria chusna. 2020. “kpu prediksi biaya pilkada 2020 meningkat jika digelar di masa pandemi”. kompas.com, may 26. retrieved 1 october 2021 (https://nasional.kompas.com/ read/2020/05/26/21513071/kpu-prediksi-biaya-pilkada-2020meningkat-jika-digelar-di-masa-pandemi?page=all). heywood, andrew. 2004. political theory an introduction. third edition. new york: palgrave macmillan. kemendagri. 2020. “mendagri puji penanganan covid-19 di sumatera barat.” kemdagri.go.id, august 25. retrieved 1 october 2021 (https://www.kemendagri.go.id/berita/baca/29160/mendagri-pujipenanganan-covid-19-di-sumatera-barat). 102 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 marsallindo, agung. 2019. “dampak hate speech dalam pemilihan kepala daerah kota padang tahun 2018.” padang: universitas andalas. mas’udi, wawan. 2017. “creating legitimacy in decentralized indonesia: joko ’ jokowi ’ widodo’s path to legitimacy in solo, 2005 2012.” melbourne: the university of melbourne. meyliana, inggried fena and dewi erowati. 2020. “menakar partisipasi politik masyarakat kabupaten tana toraja terhadap pemilihan kepala daerah (pilkada) tahun 2020.” jurnal academia praja 3(2):168–81. saputra, wahyu. 2020. “kpu sumbar efisiensi anggaran pilkada 2020 rp11 miliar.” gatra.com, july 14. retrieved 2 october 2021 (https://www.gatra.com/detail/news/484651/politik/kpu-sumbarefisiensi-anggaran-pilkada-2020-rp11-miliar-). schumpeter, joseph a. 2003. capitalism, socialism, and democracy. london: routledge. shania, tita. 2020. “ketua kpu sumbar: pilkada serentak 9 desember 2020.” sumbarprov.go.id, july 14. retrieved 3 october 2021 (https://sumbarprov.go.id/home/news/19051-ketua-kpu-sumbarpilkada-serentak-9-desember-2020). wahyuningsih, c. d. 2021. “partisipasi masyarakat pada pemilihan kepala daerah serentak masa pandemi covid-19 di kota semarang.” public service and governance journal 1-10. watra, boyke ledy. 2020. “kpu ajak pemda sosialisasi alasan pilkada dilanjutkan saat pandemi.” antaranews.com, june 19. retrieved 3 october 2021 (https://www.antaranews.com/berita/1564032/kpuajak-pemda-sosialisasi-alasan-pilkada-dilanjutkan-saat-pandemi). wicaksono, adhi. 2020. “pilkada 2020, potensi rendah partisipasi dan minim legitimasi.” cnnindonesia.com, september 22. retrieved 4 october 2021 (https://www.cnnindonesia.com/ nasional/20200922065014-32-549179/pilkada-2020-potensi-rendahpartisipasi-dan-minim-legitimasi). yamin, ilham. 2020. indeks kerawanan pemilu (ikp) pilkada serentak 2020. edited by tim editor bawaslu ri. jakarta: bawaslu ri. zikri, fuadi. 2020. “meski pandemi, partisipasi pemilih pilgub sumbar 2020 meningkat.” padangkita.com, december 21. retrieved 4 october 2021 (https://padangkita.com/meski-pandemi-partisipasipemilih-pilgub-sumbar-2020-meningkat/). battling against covid-19 infodemic in indonesia: a sociocybernetics perspective journal of asian social science research 2021, vol. 3, no. 2: 125-142 https://cassr.net/jassr/ © the author(s) 2021 article lovira l. putri*1 university of british columbia, canada reno f. rafly catalyst global consulting, indonesia abstract as indonesians collectively fight against the covid-19 pandemic, the nation is simultaneously combatting the rampant spread of misinformation related to covid-19. this phenomenon is often referred to as an ‘infodemic,’ defined by the world health organization (who) as the mass spread of information, factual or nonfactual, during a disease outbreak. in this article, we employ the methods of sociocybernetics analysis to examine the covid-19 infodemic in indonesia. we divide this paper into two sections. in the first section, we lay out the current state of the problem in indonesia -how misinformation has challenged the post-pandemic recovery and changed the dynamics of indonesian society at all levels, ranging from individuals to the society as-a-whole. in the second section, we propose a model, based on the approach of sociocybernetics, by which we propose to assess this challenge not just as a single entity but as a continuous, looping process, from the conception to the impact it has caused at all levels (micro, meso, and macro) of society. given the complexity of this issue, we propose to develop an awareness and the education of cybernetics or systems thinking across multiple sectors when dealing with the infodemic in indonesia. key words infodemic, social media, system thinking, critical thinking, cybernetics, sociocybernetics, covid-19 * corresponding author: lovira r.putri university of british columbia, canada email: lovira@student.ubc.ca 126 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 2, 2021 introduction the covid-19 pandemic has brought a significant change in society. a technology change is no exception since we live in an era where we are more connected than ever. in fact, according to the world health organization (who), this is the first pandemic in recorded history where information is being spread at this rate (world health organization 2020). with the increasing channel of information flow, the truth-value of the content of the information itself becomes questionable. it is easier for any kind of information, factual or not, to be spread around by individuals or groups of individuals. in times where global health is in crisis, nonfactual information regarding the pandemic might turn into a much bigger problem. who classified this phenomenon as infodemic, namely, “(having) too much information including false or misleading information in digital and physical environments during a disease outbreak” (world health organization 2020). indonesia is home to 171.2 million internet users, according to a 2019 survey by the indonesian internet service providers association (2019:3). it is not surprising that indonesia is facing a major covid-19 infodemic problem, on top of the pandemic itself. according to the indonesian ministry of communication and informatics, from january 2020 to september 2020 alone, 1984 covid-19 hoax posts were found on social media (2020: 2). the existential threat posed by the pandemic, coupled with the abundance of information related to the virus, creates a perfect storm that hinders the effort to recover from the covid-19 pandemic. as such, for indonesia to gear up towards post-pandemic recovery, it is essential for us as a society to combat the spread of the covid-19 infodemic, alongside the pandemic itself. covid-19 infodemic in indonesia the covid-19 pandemic has brought significant changes to all aspects of society, including the relationship between society, technology, and information. one of the recommended measures enforced to reduce the spread of covid-19 is to minimize physical contact with other people. to reduce physical contact between individuals, the indonesian government issued large scale social restrictions (pembatasan sosial berskala besar) in some regions where there is an increase in the rate of covid-19 cases. this restriction takes form in the closure of public spaces such as schools, offices, places of worship, and other places that facilitate public gatherings. this restriction induces changes in the way people interact with each other as these spaces typically facilitate such interactions and communications. 127lovira l. putri and reno f. rafly it is no surprise that the abrupt change in life due to covid-19 restrictions has brought negative impacts to the mental health of the people. sutarto et al (2020) conducted a study using the depression, anxiety and stress scale (dass-21) and found that of 472 indonesian workers, 81.6% experienced minimal to mild acute depression, 35.4% experienced and 86.9% experienced stress. a nationwide study conducted by andindyajati et al. (2020) found an increase in the anxiety level of indonesians during the covid-19 pandemic, which sits at 20%, compared to 9.8% in 2018. the majority of the respondents of the study were actively observing social restriction protocols. as such, it can be postulated that the social interaction restriction negatively impacted people’s wellbeing. we are witnessing and experiencing a global health crisis where technology and digital media are interwoven into our lives as it has never been before. with the role it has in our society, it is no doubt that technology and digital media could be one of the key contributors to the process towards covid-19 recovery. the implementation of telemedicine, for example, eliminates the need for physical interaction when seeking medical care or consultation, which could reduce the spread of the virus (bahl et al. 2020). technology also has enabled researchers and scientists to share their latest covid-19 research findings to the scientific and medical communities as well as the general public. social media is another example of technology that has been central during the covid-19 pandemic. one way to define social media is “internet-based channels that allow users to opportunistically interact and selectively self-present, either in real-time or asynchronously, with both broad and narrow audiences who derive value from user-generated content and the perception of interaction with others” (carr and hayes 2015: 50). social media is no longer foreign for the majority of people in the world; one in three people in the world use social media (ortiz-ospina 2019). while there are numerous social media platforms available, facebook, instagram and wechat are the three platforms with the greatest number of users (ortiz-ospina 2019). in places where state-mandated lockdowns are enforced, social media provides an alternative means for people to connect and socialize with each other. social media can also facilitate communication when the information evolves quickly (gottlieb and dyer 2020). on social media platforms, the exchange of information can go both ways by which a user can receive as well as give information that can be accessible to other individuals or a group of individuals. once a post has been made by an individual, others may propagate it through actions such as sharing, liking, or commenting 128 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 2, 2021 on the post, which could exponentially increase the spread and reach of such information (buchanan 2020). the possibility to expose any kind of thoughts to a huge number of people, paired with limited regulation social media platforms currently have, creates a perfect vessel for information to rapidly spread across communities, regardless of whether or not such information is factual. during the covid-19 pandemic, there has been a reported trend in increasing screen-time in several countries around the world (carroll et al. 2020; hu et al. 2020; ozturk and yalçin 2020). thus, we can expect that covid-19 related content is being exchanged by people on social media. it is not a strange phenomenon. even before the pandemic, people have been turning to social media for health-related information (cuellogarcia et al. 2020). however, the credibility of some information found on social media is questionable. for example, more than a quarter of the most viewed covid-19 related videos, which in total have 62 million views, contain non-factual information (li et. al. 2020:). angeline et al. (2020) analysed 534 indonesian articles that were classified as misinformation by the indonesian ministry of communication and information. the findings show that the majority of misinformation is commonly found in a form of social media text (41%), followed by social media pictures (31%) and social media video (17%). the research also found that the most common content of misinformation in indonesia is related to community spread, followed by public authority actions or policies. the prevalence of misinformation during the covid-19 pandemic in indonesian society is a problem that affects every layer of society for information has the potential to snowball into bigger problems that go beyond the level of individuals. next, we will review the potential challenges in three different levels of groups micro, meso, and macro (figure 1). 129lovira l. putri and reno f. rafly figure 1. three levels of groups micro, meso, and macro micro one of the direct impacts of infodemic is that constant exposure to covid-19 news might be overwhelming to an individual, which can trigger stress, anxiety, or other mental health problems. there has been an extensive body of research that discovers the positive relationship between the information overload covid-19 and stress and anxiety levels (lee et al. 2020; bendau et al. 2020; mongkhon et al. 2021). the rise of stress and anxiety levels poses a risk to individuals as stress has been reported to weaken the immune system (glasser and kiecolt-glaser 2005). misinformation might also lead one to follow medically inaccurate advice that has the potential to worsen the health of an individual. one of the types of misinformation found circulating is about medical advice related to covid-19 (angeline et al. 2020). medical advice misinformation can range from less severe advice of gargling with warm salt water to a more severe and possibly life-threatening advice such as using the anti-malaria drug, hydroxychloroquine to cure covid-19, which has been reported to cause serious heart rhythm problems and other safety issues (u.s. food and drug administration 2020). at the micro-level, misinformation can directly impact individuals, depending on the content of the information. individuals who are exposed to the misinformation may then spread this news to their peers or family, regardless of whether such individuals believe in the information, furthering the harm to a broader level. 130 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 2, 2021 meso at the meso level, the spread of misinformation creates a problem in communities or organizations within the indonesian society that may slow down the process towards recovery. to halt the spread of the virus, a community effort is needed to reach the common goal that is to end the spread and recover from the pandemic. information on social media platforms can spread from individuals to individuals, or from individuals to a group of individuals. organizations often rely on a platform that can facilitate group communications, one common example used in indonesia is group chat features on platforms such as whatsapp, which is commonly used with families, neighbourhood communities, work, or school groups. group chats could increase the reach and the speed of the spread of information, including non-factual information. when misinformation has reached the meso level, misinformation spread becomes harder to contain. the spread of misinformation at a community level has led to some grassroots efforts by the public, creating a public community that aims to battle misinformation on the internet such as mafindo (masyarakat anti fitnah indonesia). macro as previously discussed, there is a positive correlation between the use of social media, which is rampant with misinformation, and the anxiety levels of individuals. if left untreated, the high level of anxiety that infodemic has caused may result in another public health crisis that the nation will have to face, during or post-pandemic. some content of misinformation may contain health advice that could lead to hospitalization. as such, at a macro scale, infodemic could burden the already overwhelmed healthcare system. another effect of covid-19 infodemic on the macro level is that it could trigger panic buying in a society. some covid-19 related misinformation contains the recommendation to use a certain product which was thought to reduce the spread of covid. some of the items do help to reduce the spread of covid-19 such as masks or other protective equipment. as the supply of these items is limited, panic buying could lead to the shortage of such equipment in society. recovery from covid-19 requires all parts of society to work in tandem. to contain the virus, we also have to pay attention to the social and behavioural aspects that may influence the spread of the virus. in the previous section, we have described the covid-19 infodemic in indonesia 131lovira l. putri and reno f. rafly and how it influences indonesian society at all scales. in the next section, we will introduce our proposed model to combat the infodemic problem in indonesia, borrowing concepts from (socio)cybernetics. cybernetics the term cybernetics originated from the greek word kubernetes, meaning a steersman. kubernetes was used by plato to mean “the steering of people ‘’, which later evolved into the modern-day “governor”. cybernetics as a field of inquiry was pioneered by the mathematician norbert wiener (1948) who defined it as “the science of communications and automatic control systems in both machines and living things.” the act of governance requires some degree of control. thus, cybernetics can also be understood as a principle of control that can be applied to any organized system (herring and kaplan 1998). components of a cybernetic system one important thing that lies at the heart of cybernetics is a cybernetics analysis concerns a system, of any scales, natural or artificial, where a system can be defined as “a whole consisting of interdependent components.” (hornung 2005: 8). parts of a system make up a whole, functional unit. generally, a system consists of an input, a processing unit, an output, and the environment. the environment, in this case, is everything outside of the system. this structure can manifest differently depending on the application, but any system can be abstracted in this sense. it is important to note that not all systems are cybernetic systems. systems theory or science, although it may seem similar, is different from cybernetics. both are analyses of systems. general systems theory typically makes inquiries about the common laws that exist within any kind of system (bertalanffy 1968), where cybernetics emphasizes the goalorientedness and functional control of a system. heylighen and joslyn (2001:3) said: perhaps the most fundamental contribution of cybernetics is its explanation of purposiveness, or goal-directed behavior, an essential characteristic of mind and life, in terms of control and information. 132 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 2, 2021 a goal, or a purpose, is an important concept in cybernetics. a goal can take on many forms depending on the system itself. as a goal-oriented system, a cybernetic system will direct itself to achieve its goal, and when the system deviates away from the goal, it corrects itself by minimizing the difference between the current state and the goal. this act of minimizing the difference between the goal and its current state can be thought of the steering, governance, or control that characterizes a cybernetic system. to know the difference between a system’s current state and the goal, a cybernetic system utilizes what is known as a feedback loop. this is another defining feature of a cybernetic system, that it is a closed-loop system. the output of the system circulates back to the system itself. a feedback loop enables a system to regulate itself — to use the output as a guide to control the system to bring it closer to the desired state or the goal. in other words, information about the output and the changes that the output and the environment brings to the state of the system travels back into the system itself. the information will then use the information it receives to govern the system to bring it closer to the goal. first-order vs second-order cybernetics in general, cybernetics as a field is distinguished into two kinds, the first is the initial formation of cybernetics and the second is the updated view as a result of the maturation of the field. at the beginning of its conception, the cybernetics approach studies a system from an outside perspective. it is the “study a system as if it were a passive, objectively given “thing”, that can be freely observed, manipulated, and taken apart” (heylighen and joslyn 2001:3). the observer of the system is, in this case, separate from the system itself. second-order cybernetics, while the essence of the inquiry remains the same, it distinguishes itself from its predecessor by adding the observer into the equation. rather than looking at a system from an outsider’s point of view, the observation is made from within (figure 2). thus, the observer is also being observed there is a self-referential aspect of this observation. second-order cybernetic assesses a system as “an agent in its own right, interacting with another agent, the observer. as quantum mechanics has taught us, observer and observed cannot be separated, and the result of observations will depend on their interaction” (heylighen and joslyn 2001:4). as von foerster, one of the pioneers of second-order cybernetics, 133lovira l. putri and reno f. rafly puts it, first-order cybernetics is the study of “observed systems’’ while second-order cybernetics is the study of “observing systems” (hornung 2005). observers are not neutral but engaged with the system. the way the observers think about the way they think matters and will affect the system it observes. figure 2. first-order cybernetics (left) second-order cybernetics (right) sociocybernetics modern social problems require solutions to deal with their growing complexity. social problems live in a society, which can be thought of as a system of sub-systems that interrelate with one another. sociocybernetics can be defined as the application of systems science and first and second-order cybernetics to sociology and other social sciences (hornung 2005). sociocybernetics combines concepts from sociology as well as cybernetics, such as first/second-order observation distinction, systems approach, and feedback loops, applying it to social systems. sociocybernetics emphasizes the self-steering of social groups and not deterministic control of social groups (almaguer-kalixto and giglietto 2019). self-steering takes place as a combination of both feedback and feedforward loop. feedback, as described in the previous section, controls a system using the difference between the goal and the output. on the other hand, feedforward systems utilize forward-thinking, proactively anticipating errors that may disturb a system (figure 3). 134 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 2, 2021 figure 3. sociocybernetics system our proposed model: how sociocybernetics approach can help reduce infodemic using the concept of the sociocybernetics model, we propose to combat the infodemic by looking into how we can empower individuals or organizations to use a closed-loop system in information processing. there are two goals of using sociocybernetics as follows. to reduce the transmission of misinformation the use of critical thinking can lessen the transmission of misinformation. according to paul and elder (2006), there are two levels of thinking (figure 4): a. first-order thinking, which is the kind of thinking that is unfiltered, impulsive, and spontaneous. this kind of thinking is quick, easy, and requires very little thinking skill. it is what most people do when they first receive any information. however, it is prone to bias and error and can increase the level of quick transmission. b. second-order thinking, which adds a process into our thinking, checks in on our assumptions and analyses other information that might be pertinent before transmitting the information or making a decision. this is what we call critical thinking, where we become a critic of our thinking. 135lovira l. putri and reno f. rafly when an individual or organization is equipped with critical thinking, the amount of transmission of misinformation can be significantly reduced and prevent further misinformation that can be fatal. by thinking critically, it means we align ourselves to use the sociocybernetics approach. within the sociocybernetics model, if we can empower an individual, a group, or an organization with critical thinking, in the long run, they can gain the information, analyse it and make informed decisions on what to do and what to improve next time. the closed feedback loop system will create a self-governed organization where they can review themselves and gain the feedback to self-correct themselves. this system thinking will also increase the level of positive change management to empower themselves to make their improvements and to create better solutions next time. if done correctly, managing information using a sociocybernetics system can increase the ability of an organization to gain innovation. figure 4. first order and second order of thinking to reduce the impact caused by the misinformation sociocybernetics can also help reduce the impact that is caused by misinformation. when an individual or an organization adds critical thinking when processing information, they will automatically pause and filter the information using several methods, for example, by adding to 136 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 2, 2021 view other perspectives or opposite viewpoints, checking whether the information is legit, and conducting further research. an example of misinformation is the spread of “fake news” of vaccination. in january 2021, there was misinformation circulated across chat groups about vaccination containing religiously forbidden (haram) ingredients (ningtyas 2021). given indonesians are predominantly muslims, news like this will greatly impact the speed of people getting a much-needed vaccination to boost their immune system and to reduce the spread of covid-19. using a sociocybernetics approach, groups and organizations can inoculate themselves against this type of misinformation by conducting information processing, thinking and assessing, challenging assumptions, and using the right information to fight it back (hornung 2005). this approach can empower groups to have the ability to think critically and make informed decisions either to respond or to stop further spread. over time, using the same approach, they will be able to combat other future misinformation and become informed citizens. another example of misinformation was captured by a survey conducted by the university of indonesia that revealed 21% out of 772 respondents in greater jakarta believed that coronavirus is a conspiracy (the jakarta post 2020). this will impact vaccine hesitancy if not managed well and can further challenge the fight against covid-19. the indonesian government has conducted several programs and initiatives to combat hoaxes and the spread of misinformation. one of them is to establish a website page “laporan isu hoaks” via their website kominfo.go.id. another program is to establish a cybercrime division under indonesia police force (polri) to combat fraud, cyber fraud, and cybercrime. these moves are notably going in the right direction. furthermore, we propose using the sociocybernetics approach in proactively educating groups and citizens through multiple platforms to build a solid foundation in our citizens in combating misinformation, especially during the covid-19 pandemic. conclusion this article has shown that battling against the covid-19 infodemic in indonesia needs multiple approaches. one of them is to build a solid foundation of a closed feedback loop system using a sociocybernetics approach so that individuals, groups, and organizations can use the 137lovira l. putri and reno f. rafly feedback to conduct a self-governance and self-correction in fighting against misinformation. by doing so, the ecosystem will be able to use the right approach according to their needs and contexts in building the right filter to assess, analyse, and make informed decisions. we recommend that organizations and government proactively design helpful methods in combating misinformation that need to be included in future programs and policies. at the micro (individual) level, we propose to equip individuals by introducing critical thinking concepts beginning in early education. students as early as elementary school years can learn what to do when they receive new information, analyse the information, ask a trusted person about the information, and make an informed decision. early exposure to massive information through social media has the negative potential to alter their thinking and decision-making process permanently. by providing this skillset early on, we can help strengthen their thought process, understand that “not all you see in social media are true”, and educate them to analyse the information before sharing. at the meso level, communities and organizations can build their feedback loop system through a channel where people can report and assess incoming information to check whether it is legit and coming from a reputable source. in addition, everyone should be trained not to automatically “forward” or “share” any incoming information to chat groups and social media before making sure the accuracy and validity of the information. peer-checking information can also help when people in the group are encouraged to speak up and ask if there is any information, rumours, or news that may seem misleading or damaging to a certain extent. regular awareness should be provided from time to time so that, over time, it becomes a habit and norm that is built permanently into the community and the organization. lastly, at the macro level, in making public policy, the key is to proactively combat misinformation through ongoing public awareness via multiple platforms such as social media and chat groups as well as providing training through local communities and local pkk (pemberdayaan & kesejahteraan keluarga) about the danger of misinformation and how to increase self and group awareness in combating against it. in addition, the government should partner with social media platforms to help flag ambiguous data or any potentially harmful information while reducing the virality of hoaxes. news media can also help by sharing accurate information and positioning themselves as one of the valid sources the public can rely on. by doing this, we can build reliable sources and reduce the power of unreliable sources going into the public system. 138 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 2, 2021 in conclusion, by building a solid capability in critical thinking and using effective feedback in sociocybernetics, we can have a better strategy in battling against the infodemic in indonesia. while the above approaches may take some time to have a notable impact, however, in the long run, as a nation we will be better prepared in fighting against misinformation and will be better equipped with better tools. by empowering them through critical thinking skills and building the right capabilities to conduct the right feedback response and self-governance, over time our nation will be much stronger in battling against infodemic. funding the authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/ or publication of this article. references almaguer-kalixto, 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(https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-safety-andavailability/fda-cautions-against-use-hydroxychloroquine-orchloroquine-covid-19-outside-hospital-setting-or). von bertalanffy, ludwig.1968. general system theory: foundations, development, applications. new york, ny: george braziller. wiener, norbert. 1948. cybernetics or control and communication in the animal and the machine. cambridge, ma: mit press. world health organization. 2021. “infodemic.” retrieved june 21, 2021 (https://www.who.int/health-topics/infodemic#tab=tab_1). confucian historical narratives and misogynic culture in south korea journal of asian social science research 2023, vol. 5, no.1: 49-62 https://cassr.net/jassr/ © the author(s) 2023 article bernadine grace alvania manek* universitas pertamina, indonesia abstract president yoon suk-yeol's campaign for the presidency embraces the anti-feminism movement that has further fueled the misogynistic culture in south korea. south korea is quite thick with patriarchy and misogyny because there is a lot of criticism of women, especially feminists. this article analyses the phenomenon of misogynistic culture in south korea using document-based research and internet-based research techniques. it employs foucault's discourse of power and the concept of misogyny to analyse the impact of history on misogynist culture in contemporary south korea. the findings show that as confucian teachings are the basis of state ideology in south korea, korean society believes in the chastity of women. in the koran history, a negative connotation was given to women who are considered to have damaged the country’s ‘joseon-ness’ and the standard of femininity in south korean society. given south korea's high level of sexism and low level of female empowerment, the representation of males in dramas as caring and empathetic is unfortunately not representative of the real world. sexist behaviour in south korea is founded on confucian ideology. key words south korea, misogyny, confucian, history, discourse, power-knowledge, sex * corresponding author: bernadine grace alvania manek universitas pertamina, jalan teuku nyak arief, rt.7/rw.8, simprug, kec. kebayoran lama, kota jakarta selatan, daerah khusus ibukota jakarta 12220. email: alvaniagrace@gmail.com 50 journal of asian social science research vol. 5, no. 1, 2023 introduction this article analyses colonial history’s impact on south korea’s misogynistic culture. south korea is a country in the east asian region widely known for its popular product, k-pop. k-pop itself has become the main icon of south korea in promoting the country’s identity, with girl groups or boy bands that have managed to steal the world’s attention from k-drama, which is synonymous with the romantic genre. men in k-drama are characterised as very gentle so it is a dream for female viewers to get a man like in the show. nevertheless, in reality, men in south korea behave the opposite of that depicted in k-drama. this can be seen from the many misogynistic actions based on the notion that men are the owners of the nation and women are the cause of the nation’s crisis (sojeong 2017). the issue of gender equality has become a worldwide concern and has slowly given women the rights they deserve. however, in south korea, the anti-feminism movement is rapidly growing. men in south korea view the special rights granted to women as unfair in addition to being misogynistic, which has existed since antiquity. one such right is that men must serve in the military while women do not (bicker 2022). in early 2022, yoon sukyeol of the people’s power party (ppp) won the presidential election by using the anti-feminism movement as the main backer, attracting men who were inferior to women as the main political force. in his campaign, yoon argues that the ministry of gender equality should be abolished because men are considered ‘potential sex criminals,’ and he links the feminist movement to the low birth rate in south korea (gunia 2022). when yoon becomes president of south korea, it will be the hardest thing to do to ensure that men and women have the same rights. the majority of korean feminist organisations were founded in the 1980s. the anti-military regime democratisation movement had a crucial influence on creating an autonomous women’s rights movement (şener 2019). however, feminist groups existed before this decade, and until the late 1980s, they were scattered across many civil society organisations. in 1987, the korean women’s association united (kwau) was founded, giving feminism in south korea its first institutional shape. nonetheless, throughout this decade, feminist organisations prioritised democratic change above their agendas. following democracy, women’s rights groups began advocating for distinct legislative objectives. in the context of shifting political and social dynamics, they attacked various problems, including laws on sex crimes, the gender pay gap, the double shift of burden, and patriarchal parts of family law (lee and chin 2007). despite 51bernadine grace alvania manek improvements in legislative regulations, a cultural context that supports the maintenance of gender stereotypes inhibits significant institutional change. for instance, the equal employment act was enacted in 1987 to promote wage parity and employment opportunities for women (şener 2019). in conjunction with marriage and childbearing, women’s labour force participation levels decline substantially in their 30s (oecd 2012). a work environment characterised by long hours and a lack of adequate childcare options make it difficult for parents to maintain employment. cultural factors also encourage this gender-based division of labour in the nation, on the assumption that women are the primary carers in the family, mothers are expected to remain at home throughout their children’s early years (chang and england 2011). these tendencies are seen unfavourably by recruiting managers, who do not prefer to invest in employees who are likely to leave their jobs. moreover, according to 2021 figures, south korea has the largest gender salary disparity among the 45 oecd nations, at 31.1% (oecd, 2022). such institutional issues are the primary preoccupation of feminist organisations today. all this has raised questions as follows: what made this misogynistic culture in south korea? i assume that korean history contributes to the formation and insistence of misogynistic culture despite the country’s incredible advancement in modernity and technology within the last decades. a country’s culture is formed from its deep-rooted history. it becomes an identity, so the formation of a misogynistic culture in south korea results from the linkage between history and the current social context. therefore, this article attempts to answer the question of how does korean history impact the misogynistic culture in contemporary south korea? there have been many studies on misogyny in south korea in the last decade. these include studies by kim (2017; 2018; 2021a; 2021b), jeong and lee (2018), ashman et al (2020), park and kim (2021), lee and abidin (2021), and youngmi (2021). the most recent works on misogyny in south korea are studies by chen (2023), kwon (2023), and fahy (2023). undoubtedly, all these works provide us with an understanding of misogyny in the south korean context. to better understand how and why the phenomenon of misogyny in south korea, this article aims to contribute to this literature by uncovering the historical-religious background within confucianism that influence misogyny in south korea. 52 journal of asian social science research vol. 5, no. 1, 2023 discourse, power-knowledge and sex foucault’s key term is ‘discourse,’ which refers to relationships between power and knowledge. discourse is a collection of assertions with social power that significantly impact people’s behaviour and thought processes (mills 1997). as a result, any discourse must assume that language has shaped the subject’s identity. foucault maintains that the discursive structure determines what we consider significant, how we understand objects and events, and how we position them within a system of meaning (mills 1997). consequently, speech dictates how we see and respond to an object. the connection between power and knowledge is intrinsically linked to the practice of discourse. foucault argues that society’s search for truth and meaning is a constant fight between competing discourses. consequently, dominant discourse and peripheral discourse will always exist. foucault centres his ideas around the processes by which one particular discourse controls what is understood and what is true. according to foucault, power is a crucial aspect of understanding this. the foucauldian worldview denies a singular conception of power. instead of being oppressive, power is creative and ubiquitous. according to foucault, power permeates all social relationships, generating various forms of behaviour but restricting them (mills 1997). additionally, according to foucault (1980), power continuously influences knowledge while knowledge continuously generates power. simply put, power influences knowledge, and knowledge sustains power. this relationship between power and knowledge produces a dominant discourse that the public accepts as the truth. according to foucault, the regime of truth is naturally what those in positions of power want. this notion is recognised as a statement with a power bias, yet it is regarded as the truth. a substantial amount of credibility supports every assertion. there is no ‘true’ interpretation of the ruler other than the truth. in acquiring this knowledge, the bearer of power attempts to exert control or dominance over other subjects. foucault refers to this as subjection, which is the process of controlling the subject by making new knowledge. discourses about sex are powerful tools for social control and normalisation in the contemporary world, and sexuality serves as a vehicle for this discourse power (phelan 1990: 245). sex becomes the essence of society’s existence; sex is reality. according to foucault’s thesis, sex is a product of the sexual apparatus. contrary to popular belief, sex is not a pre-given datum that was just warped or characterised by the sexuality machinery; rather, it is a manufactured good, a signifier of a certain 53bernadine grace alvania manek arrangement of the body. this sexual machinery is the primary focus of what foucault refers to as biopower, a collection of tools that allowed the management of bodies and the planned control of existence (phelan 1990, 246). for effective management, the offender must be rendered helpful, obedient, and normal rather than eliminated. it necessitates that a population be passive but also productive and reproductive. these make sex the focal point of subject formation in both senses. sex and cultural understanding of those foundations work together to shape society into men and women now. just as every culture has its own language, each has its own set of scripts that members must adhere to while learning to perform the feminine, masculine, or both parts. misogyny in the 1970s, second-wave feminists used misogyny to refer to disrespectful behaviour towards women. most people understood that overt acts of violence, such as sexual assault or homicide, were indicative of misogyny. at the same time, more subtle forms of sexism against women were indicative of a more pervasive cultural problem. misogyny, however, became nearly synonymous with sexism during the so-called fourth wave of feminism that started in the early 21st century and may be used to reflect prejudices against women in addition to acts of violence or hate that specifically target women (kendall 2022). as a result, sexism has developed many definitions with varying severity. the feminist theory argues that sexism is a product of and a tool for maintaining rigid gender norms. in traditional patriarchal countries, women have been socialised to be homemakers and secretaries to serve their male counterparts. while most people would agree that women’s rights made great strides in the 20th century, most women in the 2000s nevertheless faced criticism for assuming positions that threatened rather than bolstered the status quo (kendall 2022). there was still a gender pay gap in the professional sports industry in the 2020s. still, misogyny persisted in other spheres of society. misogynistic culture in korean history the establishment of confucianism under the joseon dynasty (1392-1910) profoundly impacted korean cultural norms about sexuality and gender interactions (deuchler, 1992, 4). the three pillars of confucianism are fidelity to the ministerial calling, loyalty to one’s family, and chastity in the home (deuchler 1992:257). a revolutionary philosophy, confucianism 54 journal of asian social science research vol. 5, no. 1, 2023 sought to improve society. it did more than spark a new kind of political discourse about men and society; it led to the implementation of a social development programme that restructured and modernised south korean society. during the joseon dynasty, confucianism and a kinship system based on highly organised patrilineal lineage groups were south korean society’s driving forces and organising principles. chastity was regarded as the highest virtue for women in confucian thought, along with fidelity to one’s spouse and, by extension, one’s family lineage. the emphasis on the monogamous nature of marriage eliminated the need for a second spouse. widows of aristocratic (yangban) families who were too young to have children were forbidden to remarry for the remainder of their lives (deuchler 1992: 259). although it might be claimed that physical and spiritual chastity are closely connected, the notion of chastity throughout this period refers primarily to virginity or the physical sense of chastity. one may argue that the latter inspires the former, but the latter’s focus on physical chastity stands out more prominently. as a result, confucian philosophy established positions for women that demanded certain conduct from them (deuchler 1992: 280). either the women who played these roles to perfection or the women who rebelled against these roles are the ones who will be remembered. therefore, confucianism rejects the idea of a woman as a subject. to maintain the confucian hierarchy system between the sexes, it was necessary to suppress female sexuality and other forms of human desire. during the manchu qing dynasty’s invasion of the joseon kingdom in korea, a considerable number of joseons were subjected to enslavement by the qing army. following the war, the joseon populace relocated to their native land. the term ‘hwanyang-nyen’ is a pejorative expression that denotes women of immoral character who were subjected to enslavement by the manchu in 1637 (“화냥년,” n.d.). consequently, the term ‘hwanyangnyen’ acquired a derogatory connotation and continues to be employed as a gender-biased expression, owing to its association with the vilification of women who had returned from manchuria on the grounds of their alleged sexual impurity. the use of ‘comfort women’ was integral to imperial japan’s war effort throughout the second sino-japanese and pacific wars (yoon 2015, 461). as japan’s aggressiveness grew, the supply of these women was inadequate to fulfil the military’s growing needs, particularly after the china war. stopping japanese troops from committing sexual assaults on local chinese women, particularly after the ‘nanjing massacre’ of 1937, 55bernadine grace alvania manek seems to have been the primary motive for the comfort women system (yoon 2015: 462). young korean women, who were subjects of japan’s colonial rule at the time, were an appropriate replacement for local chinese and japanese women. after the nanjing massacre, many korean women were recruited into the comfort system to improve japan’s international standing. sending colonial women from korea ensured that regular japanese women were safeguarded. since japanese women were expected to have children who would be brought up as loyal subjects of the emperor, the armed forces of japan did not think japanese women should be in that position (tanaka 2018, 97). the joseon dynasty was in power in korea at the time of japan’s colonisation, and it had formally accepted confucianism as the driving theory of all elements of life. based on seniority, class, and other factors, confucianism taught people to respect the established order of things. also, women were trained to submit to men, and chastity and virginity were seen as important virtues. there was no institution of licenced prostitution in korea before the introduction of this by the japanese colonial authority, which had been in use in japan since the edo period. in 1990, comfort women first emerged as a political problem in south korea. during japanese colonial rule, comfort women were enslaved for sexual purposes. it took 40 years for the question of comfort women’s presence during the war to be publicly debated. many japanese and south koreans are embarrassed about the existence of comfort women. thus, they have sought to hide this shameful chapter of their history (sojeong 2017). some individuals were hesitant to inform foreign society about the predicament of comfort women when hak-sun kim, the first woman to speak out about it, held a news conference. they saw the loss of chastity by korean women at the hands of japanese men as a stain on the honour of their country, and they were shamed by their inability to protect their sisters, so they sought to suppress the comfort women (sojeong 2017). as south korea started the 20th century, several women obtained advanced degrees, obtained employment, sported sophisticated hairstyles, and participated in unrestricted relationships. they were known as the ‘new women’ (suh 2013). however, some considered these women unattractive because they violated customary patriarchal discipline. people believed that modern women had forsaken the ‘joseon-ness’ and perfect femininity of south korea and criticised them for being vanity-driven. similar attitudes occurred regarding yang-gongju, or western princess, a prostituted woman who entertained u.s. military personnel between the 1950s and 1980s (kunkel 1994). while south korea took advantage of 56 journal of asian social science research vol. 5, no. 1, 2023 them and called them patriotic for earning money from the united states, korean males felt embarrassed for them because the loss of virginity undoubtedly renders a woman less appealing, forcing her to settle for a less desirable partner. for example, she might be forced to marry a widower with a child or a guy with a disability. men in south korea place a great emphasis on the chastity of women before marriage, since it is a part of the culture and historical tradition upon which their society is founded. men dressed in current clothes hung around with americans, and chewing gum was not seen negatively. the terms ‘new man’ or “yang-wangja” did not exist. so, women were seen as troublemakers who degraded south korea’s values and dignity (sojeong 2017). the impact of history on misogynistic culture in contemporary south korea the term “kimchi-nyeo” or “kimchi girl” marks the conclusion of this chain of descent (ahn et al. 2016). it is slang for a young korean girl who is vain, enamoured with high-end fashion accessories, and expects her partner to foot the bill for their dates and eventual wedding (kim 2018). even if there are indeed vain ladies who inspired this term, it has become a pejorative for some to apply to all korean women. they believe that women from other countries are ethically superior to korean women. moreover, misogynists and sexists sometimes label korean feminists as “kimchi-nyeo” (kim 2018). as a result, the ‘koreanness’ of korean women is the foundation of korean sexism. misogynists believe that korean women humiliate the nation, but korean males are responsible for preserving the nation’s illustrious heritage. this perspective demonstrates that nationalism is the underlying ideology of south korea’s misogyny. ilbe is an online forum with illogical attitudes regarding politics, women, and minority groups. ilbe users argue that korean ladies are kimchi-nyeo for various reasons. the first of these concerns is the military; male citizens of south korea are obligated to serve in the armed forces. one reason misogynists in south korea label women kimchi-nyeo is that they believe women are taking advantage of the nation’s security system (ahn et al. 2016). they claim that women are not contributing to the cost of our national defence. the second problem is romantic relationships and marriage; men often feel that korean women do not contribute enough financially to relationships or marriages. some western female visitors on a tv programme on korean culture caused controversy when they stated that 57bernadine grace alvania manek they did not understand why men in south korea paid extra for dates and marriage (kim 2018: 160). some women may assume that men are better able to provide financially. it would be unfair to assume that all women share this viewpoint. it is important to remember that the patriarchal system has historically resulted in fewer opportunities for women to advance financially. nevertheless, misogynists do not care about the facts and instead blame women. thirdly, misogynists look down on korean women because they are not as attractive as japanese women. as a form of hate speech, ilbe users frequently compare and contrast the unique “jongteuk”, or racial traits, of korean women with those of japanese women to insist that korean women are selfish and lack sense. this idealised wife figure, known as “sushi-nyeo” or sushi girl, is a popular target of this comparison. the ethnic slur sushinyeo is often used to refer to japanese women, and it is not uncommon for them to be referenced in talks about the perfect husband (kim 2018:159). gender discourse makes it harder to establish gender equality in south korea. confucianism, which includes moral standards and laws governing the physical and spiritual realms of life, has historically had a significant influence on korean culture. the tenets of confucianism have affected the behaviour of koreans, making it a culture with strong roots in modern south korea. the social significance of its presence in south korea contributes to the social construction of misogynistic culture through perceptions and responses to interpreting confucianism’s principles and norms. foucault considers power to be the most important factor in the production of discourse. confucianism is a kind of knowledge that came from the governing party, notably in china in the past; it later became an ideology due to the king’s use of power to propagate confucianism in south korea. this discourse on knowledge and authority has brought truth to korean culture since confucian philosophy is essentially the king’s will. foucault believes that, with the establishment of the regime of truth, a person would be deemed virtuous if he complied with the established norms. the confucian philosophy is the product of the virtuous dictatorship in south korea and the society’s practice of confucian principles and standards. in korean culture, the confucian principle of chastity, particularly for women, has become a prejudiced reality. the perception of women’s virginity is crucial to men. in korean history, women have been victims of wartime and imperial crimes. women who were seized, enslaved, and raped by colonialists were thought to have tainted confucian ideals and standards because they had betrayed their husbands or lost their virginity, 58 journal of asian social science research vol. 5, no. 1, 2023 rendering them unclean. in the confucian rule of virtue, female impurity was seen as improper and disgraceful. based on confucian philosophy, the inferior status of women in korean history justifies misogynistic conduct in korean society, particularly among males. men believe that women have broken confucian doctrine in the past by losing their virginity at the hands of other males (non-korean men), leading them to believe that it is true that women are nation-destroying. this is evident from the reasoning men use to evaluate korean women nowadays. the majority of society still places a high value on female chastity, particularly among the elderly. whenever a woman loses her virginity, it is usually because of something she did, yet she still blames herself and gives up the life expected of a normal female. even suicide is a possibility. a woman who was immediately accosted by her rapist while travelling on a highway perished tragically while attempting to flee the situation by swimming in a nearby river. as a result, a man may utilise the chastity idea to own a woman he wants by raping her so she cannot marry anyone else except him (shim 2001:137). in contrast, men’s chastity has hardly ever become a problem. because of the double standard of sexuality in korean society, men who flirt and engage in adultery are admirable rather than repulsive. conclusion south korea is renowned for k-pop and k-drama, and its musicians and performers adhere to certain aesthetic standards. the international community increasingly favours k-drama because the lovely romance genre is the most popular. however, due to south korea’s high degree of sexist conduct and low level of female empowerment, the portrayal of males as loving and compassionate in dramas is regrettably not representative of the actual world. the culture of sexist conduct in south korea is rooted in confucian philosophy. the dialogue between power and knowledge in south korean society has influenced the regime of truth. this discourse emerged since power spawned knowledge, and knowledge will continue to sustain power. the king of joseon exercised a great deal of influence on the development of confucianism among the populace. this ideology formed the foundation of the values and standards of society as it evolved into a regime of righteousness. confucian philosophy has an impact on contemporary korean society’s views on the double standard of sexuality and a woman’s virginity, turning it into a skewed social justification. 59bernadine grace alvania manek the long history of conflict and colonialism in korea has resulted in many victims, particularly women who were enslaved and exploited as comfort women by colonialists. according to legend, the disappearance of a chaste korean woman’s spouse tainted confucian ideology, leading to the rejection and shunning of these women by their families and by themselves because they resisted the distorted reality of confucian philosophy. consequently, korean males see 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(https://www.wordsense. eu/%ed%99%94%eb%83%a5%eb%85%84/). 62 journal of asian social science research vol. 5, no. 1, 2023 2-cover-jassr-vol.5.no.1.blkng [rev-2023-08-15].pdf page 1 environmental challenges in indonesia: an emerging issue in the social study of religion journal of asian social science research 2021, vol. 3, no. 1: 1-14 https://cassr.net/jassr/ © the author(s) 2021 article frans wijsen* radboud university, the netherlands abstract one of the emerging issues in religious studies is the relationship between religion and the environment. this issue has conceptual, empirical, and practical dimensions. this article explores some of the completed and ongoing empirical research projects and asks what a social study of religion can contribute to the theory and practice of environmentalism in indonesia, and what this signifies for future research in this field. it argues that the social study of religion can help to conceptualize religion as a social construct and move beyond reified understandings of religion. scholars of religion can make them aware of the fact that on the one hand religion has an added value and makes a difference, and that on the other hand religion is complex, diverse, and ambiguous. for future research in this field, the article proposes to elaborate more on the ambivalence of religion and to use the dialogical self-theory to deal with the dilemma between norms and practices, the tension between theological and technological voices, the faithbased underpinnings of ‘small’ (‘back to nature’) and ‘smart’ (circular economy, green technology) solutions for ecological challenges, and the gap between the religion that is lived in every-day lives and the religion that is learned in schools and mosques, drawing on classical sources. key words environmental issues, water management, waste management, islam, social study of religion, indonesia introduction one of the emerging issues in religious studies is the relationship between religion and the environment (bagir 2021). this issue has conceptual, empirical, and practical dimensions. what do religious leaders teach * corresponding author: frans wijsen erasmusplein 1 6525 ht nijmehen, the netherlands. email: frans.wijsen@ru.nl 2 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 about the relationship between humans and nature? how do believers conceptualize and interpret the ecological challenges and what solutions do they suggest? which forms does faith-based environmentalism take? how do faith-based organizations position themselves in relation to governmental and other non-governmental actors in the environmental movement? indonesia is the third largest polluter in the world. there are quite some studies on environmentalism in indonesia from a religious studies point of view. in this paper i do not address conceptual (“know how it is”) and practical (“know how to do”) issues such as what do religious sources teach about nature, and how can faith-based organizations make a difference in this field? rather, i explore some of the completed and ongoing empirical research projects that i am involved in and ask what a social study of religion can contribute to the theory and practice of environmentalism in indonesia, and what this signifies for future research in this field. the project framework environmental degradation is a common challenge to the whole of humanity, and indonesia is a major player in this respect both in terms of causes and solutions. indonesia is the fourth largest country population-wise, and it has the second largest rainforest reserve in the world. it is named the third largest polluter, the second biggest contributor to waste, the second highest emitter of greenhouse gas, and the second biggest deforester of the world. it has a population growth of 1,5% and an economic growth of 6% (before the covid-19 pandemic). jakarta alone produces 6.000 tons of garbage every day. rivers such as ciliwung and citarum in west java are heavily polluted by microplastics, chemicals, metals, and anti-biotics, causing health problems (asian development bank 2016). indonesia lost 80% of its forests. forests affect climate with their carbon-absorbing superpowers. trees absorb carbon dioxide as they grow, converting it into oxygen. deforestation is one of the factors that cause climate change. indonesia is also a major player in international climate change negotiations. it was the first opec country to sign the kyoto protocol in 2004. it hosted the united nations climate conference in bali in 2007, which produced the bali roadmap that plays a role in the debates until today, promised to control greenhouse gas emission at a meeting of g20 leaders in 2009 (jotzo 2012: 98), and at the united nations ocean conference in new york in 2017 committed itself to reduce plastic waste by 70% in 2025 (editorial board 2019). 3frans wijsen also in its domestic policy, the indonesian government promotes green policies, despite various constraints. in 2014, the indonesia ministry of environment published a report on “environment education in indonesia” to implement environmental education in 250.000 schools and 3.000 universities, among them numerous islamic institutions (deputy for public participation 2014). and increasingly it urges religious leaders and faith-based organizations to play their part in promoting environmental awareness and nature-friendly behavior. among others, it stimulates ecopesantren and eco-mosques. indonesia has the largest muslim population in the world. according to bagir and martiam (2016), the issue of ecology does not occupy an important place yet in islamic thought. this is because there is a tension between norms and practices in islam. they argue “that one of the important keys to further islam and ecology discourse is to pay more attention to the empirical study of living traditions and practices. such studies have long existed but are not widely accepted because of narrow normative criteria about what makes an idea or a practice ‘islamic’. what needs to be explored is not (only) the consistency and coherence of an idea with canonical sources but how muslim communities develop, justify, and defend eco-friendly practices, and form their ideas about islam and ecology through their practices (bagir and martiam 2061:85). this article is an attempt at such an exploration. it will do so from the perspective of the cognitive dissonance theory and elaborate on it from the perspective of the dialogical self theory. cognitive dissonance theory assumes that people find dissonance between two or more cognitions, and between cognition and behavior unpleasant, and have a tendency to reduce the dissonance. an example is smoking. we know that smoking is unhealthy. when we are smokers, we will find arguments to justify our behavior or stop smoking (festinger 1957). dialogical self theory argues that inconsistency between cognitions and practices is not always experienced as unpleasant. the cognitive dissonance theory assumes that the self is homogeneous, however, according to the dialogical self theory it is not. the self is polyphonic and people can live with conflicting voices from a multiplicity of positions they take. as a rational consumer, i want to buy goods as cheap as possible; as an engaged christian and citizen, i feel the responsibility to buy goods that are produced in an eco-friendly way to protect the earth and i am willing to pay a bit more. thus, i shift between different i-positions and i dialogue with various voices in my ‘self’ (hermans 2018). 4 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 water, health and development as said above, the citarum river in west java is one of the most polluted rivers in the world. the national and provincial governments have had an integrated vision of river management since the early sixties of the previous century (citarum roadmap 2017). but, the practice of river management has been quite fragmented. to stimulate a sense of shared ownership, co-creation, and collaboration, in 2012 the alliance for water, health and development started a netherlands-indonesia multidisciplinary research network training eight doctoral students in the fields of water management, engineering, medicine, health science, international economics, development studies, cultural anthropology, and religious studies. the underlying idea was that water quality, health, and well-being are interrelated. the research team realized that it could not solve the massive problem of pollution of citarum river. it thought that it could make a modest contribution through the interdisciplinary training of future leaders in indonesia. so every doctoral student had an indonesian and a dutch supervisor from two different disciplines. the team acknowledged that indonesia has the largest muslim population in the world and that more specialized knowledge about indonesian islam and its position on environmental issues was needed. this is how i got involved in the research team as a scholar of religion. together with an indonesian professor in the field of water management, i supervised an indonesian doctoral candidate who herself had a technical education and an islamic background. our contribution to the multidisciplinary research program was a project entitled pollution of citarum river and purification in islamic thought (wijsen & saptaningtyas 2016; saptaningtyas 2020; wijsen & saptaningtyas 2021). our question was: how come the citarum river is heavily polluted, while the people who live close to the river consider themselves to be muslims and purity is a core value of islam (jotzo 2012)? every day, approximately 400 tons of livestock waste, 25 thousand cubic meters of household waste, and 280 tons of industrial waste are disposed to citarum river, partly because people do not care about the river, and partly because of the lack of good infrastructure in terms of waste disposal, mismanagement, and corruption. inspired by the tension between norms and practices (bagir and martiam 2016) and looking at it from the perspective of the cognitive dissonance theory (festinger 1957) and the dialogical self theory (hermans 2018), we conducted a comparative case study in a rural and 5frans wijsen an urban area. the rural area was represented by kampung mahmud, in bandung regency. the urban area was represented by cigondewah kaler, in bandung municipality. both locations are historically linked. the residents claim that they are descendants of a saint, eyang mahmud. this is symbolized by a grave for eyang mahmud in both locations. from an economic point of view, the population of kampung mahmud is mainly made up of farmers, shopkeepers, and artisans. cigondewah kaler is less agricultural. farmland has been sold to industries where people work as factory workers. there are also people who work for the government and there are local artists. religiously, people in kampung mahmud are traditional. the government has declared kampung mahmud a place of pilgrimage for pilgrims wishing to visit the saint’s tomb, making the tomb a tourist attraction and source of income as well. in cigondewah kaler, industrialization and urbanization have transformed traditional spirituality. people generally have more money to spend and more people are able to go to mecca for the compulsory pilgrimage, making the experience of muslims a little more pan-islamic. on a conceptual level, we found that the religious voice dominated the other voices. most interviewees in both case studies said there was “no relation” between purity in islamic thinking and pollution of the citarum river. religious communities provide for the spiritual needs of the people, and water management is a concern of the government. so, at the conceptual level, we noted a secularization, a tendency to separate the sacred and the profane realms, also called “the rule of god” and “the rule of man”. only some scholars, artists, and activists in the urban site made a conceptual connection between religion and environment in the sense that they felt there should be a connection. however, at the level of daily practice, most people did use religious beliefs and rituals. these are the “living traditions and practices” that bagir and martiam (2016) refer to, or everyday religion, not the religion that is learned in islamic schools and mosques (stringer 2008). in the rural area, the interviewees, on the one hand, drew upon a technical voice, emphasizing the availability of groundwater by drilling wells. on the other hand, they referred to the religious voice. according to islamic jurisprudence, pure water, which is water that can be used for ritual washing before prayer, is running water. the water in wells does not flow. however, people knew that they needed water from wells as an alternative to the water of the river. again, according to islamic jurisprudence, pure 6 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 water does not smell, has no taste and color, but the water of the citarum river does. it smells and sometimes it turns yellowish because it is used by textile factories to dyeing textile. so people performed a ritual at the tomb of eyang mahmud (tawasul) to ask the ancestors for permission to dig wells. the water from the well is pumped up to make it running water and thus pure according to islamic jurisprudence. in the urban area, the interviewees relied on common sense knowledge and what they called “religious science”. religious science is used to provide a local interpretation of islamic tradition (hadith), combined with a technical view. to reduce the dilemma of using the polluted river water for the ritual purification before prayer, the local people pumped up the spring water through pipes to make running water, and they created a basin of water of two by two meters in size and thirty centimeters deep. if the amount of water in a basin is approximately 384 liters and does not smell, has no taste and color, it is pure according to regulations of muslim scholars. so they used applied technology to adapt their water use to the prescriptions of islamic jurisprudence. being aware that these are not long-term solutions, local activists and artists campaigned to clean up the river, combining local wisdom, islamic thinking, and scientific views. religious rituals from various traditions were used and freely mixed by some activists and artists to raise awareness and stimulate action. before going to demonstrate against the government, demanding to clean up the river, a local artist of the cigondewah cultural centre washed the feet of his mother to ask her blessing and drank the water. he implicitly referred to the washing of feet of his disciples by jesus of nazareth (john 13:2-5). the wastewater of washing his mother’s feet was considered to be dirty water, but he used it as water that brings blessing, among others to show the power of rituals. artists and activists also perform an annual keruh ritual in which they transform keruh (dirt) into ke-ruh, “towards the spirit”. we concluded that there are several mechanisms to relate perceptions of pollution and purification to daily practices that need water, namely suppression, compromise, and harmonization (hermans 2018:317). suppression occurs when one voice, e.g. the religious voice, is dominant and marginalizes other voices such as the medical and technical voices. compromise occurs when people mediate between different voices and try to see overlaps between islamic teachings, medical science, and technology. people harmonize when they look from a helicopter view and combine contrasting ideas into a more abstract idea that allows them to act in a way that is beneficial to them. the notion of “religious science”, a combination 7frans wijsen of islamic belief and logical reasoning, is an example of this. thus, the inconsistency that the cognitive dissonance theory conceptualizes is not always experienced as unpleasant, and pollution is not always perceived as a disorder (douglas 1966). it is coped with in a multiplicity of ways. eco-theology in indonesian islam in the above project, we focused on “living religion”, that is, the religion outside the religious institutions. perhaps that could explain the division between the spiritual and the material world because ordinary people prefer not to make statements about religious matters. they feel that they are not experts on religion and prefer to leave the decisions on religious matters to the religious leaders who have studied them. intrigued by the distinction between “the rule of god” and the “rule of man”, we wanted to gain a deeper understanding of what happens within religious institutions (aoki 2016). we started a new doctoral project conducting a comparative case study in the two largest muslim organizations in indonesia, nadhlatul ulama, and muhammadiyah. the former claims to have 80 million members and the latter claims 60 million. since 2019, we have been studying the development of eco-theology in indonesian islam, and the rich vocabulary associated with it: eco-jihad, eco-fatwa, eco-dakwah, eco-halal, eco-pesantren, eco-mosque, and so on. this is a work in progress, but we found that there is a growing awareness of environmental issues in islam and that there are efforts to close the gap between the “rule of god” and the “rule of man” (mangunjaya 2015; fahrurrazi 2019; gade 2019). it requires quite some reinterpretation in islamic jurisprudence as most of the contemporary issues were unknown in the time of the prophet muhammad (pbuh). at that time, there were no microplastics, chemicals, metals, pesticides, and antibiotics in the water. now, this is the case. muslim scholars try to solve this by analogous reasoning and by using applied technology as we saw in the example of the wells. in literature, nadhlatul ulama and muhammadiyah are labeled as ‘traditionalist’ and ‘modernist’ (gade 2019). we expected to find a deep ecology approach in nadhlatul ulama (a “back to nature” and “small is beautiful” attitude, a plea for environmental conservation and protection of nature) and eco-modernism (with an emphasis on green and clean technology, and circular economy) in muhammadiyah. so far, we have found that these two attitudes do exist in indonesian islam, but that they are present in both organizations and thus do not coincide with any of them. it is a matter of emphasizing and balancing interests. 8 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 one informant in the nadhlatul ulama case study gave “toll roads” as an example. toll roads increase mobility and bring prosperity to people, but they also destroy nature because trees are cut. thus, we have to balance economy and ecology. “balancing” and “moderation” are keywords in the islamic dealings with ecological issues (central board of muhammadiyah 2016:32), balancing between ‘small’ and ‘smart’ solutions, between anthropocentric (ego-centric) and cosmocentric (eco-centric) visions, and the image of human beings as al-khalifa, the guardian and partner of nature, thus human beings as above nature, and humans and nature on equal footing. plastic waste in islamic boarding schools since 2018, the water, health and development program that i mentioned above has entered a second phase under the name living labs water indonesia. a living lab is a research concept based on the notion of co-creation and shared ownership. it is defined, among others, as an “experimentation environment in which technology is given shape in real-life contexts and in which (end) users are considered ‘co-producers’” (ballon and schuurman 2015). usually, green technologies are developed in the laboratories of universities, but they are not or hardly used by the people for whom they are intended, because they go beyond their imagination. for example, there are various techniques for purifying ablution water, but purified water is not used for ablution because people do not know or trust the technology behind the purifier. a living lab brings technicians, policymakers, and entrepreneurs to the users to see what their problems are and how they interpret them, what solutions are (technically) possible, (financially) feasible, and (culturally) acceptable. above i already referred to the pesantren ekologi. to gain a deeper understanding of the reinterpretation of islamic jurisprudence, we decided to conduct an in-depth study of plastic waste in pasuruan, east java. this issue was explicitly mentioned by one of our informants in the project on eco-theology in indonesian islam. east java is an interesting area as it is the cradle of traditionalist islam. there is a disproportionate number of islamic boarding schools. some of them have a history dating back to the eighteenth century and a student population of twenty thousand or more. the welang river flows through the area, which is just as polluted as the citarum. out of a list of 58 brands of mineral water produced by islamic organizations (“list merk air minum 2020”), some of which are affiliated 9frans wijsen to muhammadiyah or nadhlatul ulama, 7 come from pasuruan regency (kabupaten pasuruan). the water from pasuruan is known for its high quality. the springs are located on the slopes of mount arjuna. also, some islamic boarding schools in pasuruan, such as pondok pesantren al-yasini and pondok pesantren sidori, produce mineral water as an income-generating project and distribute the water in plastic bottles. this is remarkable because nadhlatul ulama, the organization that they are affiliated with, has committed itself to reduce the use of plastic (lamb 2018). so here again we look at the inconsistency between norms and practices. in its 2019 meeting in banjar, the national conference of religious leaders (musyawarah nasional alim ulama [munas]) within nadhlatul ulama discussed the disposal of plastic in the committee for discussion of contemporary religious issues, bahtsul masa’il ad-diniyyah waqi’iyyah (mubarok 2019). it also discussed the depletion of wells and springs by commercial water companies, such as the producer of aqua (a brand of the danone company). aqua is also located in pasuruan and gets its water from the same sources as the pesantren in pasuruan do. there is quite some competition between them. in line with islamic jurisprudence, the committee distinguished different attitudes towards waste. first, disposal of plastic waste is prohibited (haram) if it is manifestly (tahaqquq) or suspected (dzan) to be harmful to our health and environment. second, disposal of plastic waste is discouraged (makruh) if the impact on health and the environment is small (tawahhum). third, it is obligatory (fardhu) to obey the ban on disposal of plastic waste if the government has published a law on this (fazin 2019). according to some of our informants, the religious leaders recommended the second attitude. although plastic bottles are not harmful (mudharat) to our health and environment, the use of plastic must be reduced and littering of plastic waste must be discouraged (syakir 2019). one informant spoke about “fasting”, or refraining from needs created by the market, such as plastic. according to another informant, this advice should be better disseminated to the people so that it is followed up. and it has to be taken over by the state so that it becomes obligatory (fardhu). fatwas do not have a legal basis as they only have a moral basis. in the next stage of our research, we aim to conduct a comparative case study in a ‘traditional’ and a ‘modern’ pesantren, using the living lab approach. based on the principles of shared ownership and co-creation, we bring the kyai, the chief executive officers of the cooperatives that produce and distribute the water (e.g. koperasi pondok pesantren sidogiri and koperasi konsumen pondok pesantren al-yasini), and industrial 10 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 designers of technical universities together, to see if collaboratively they can do something to reduce the plastic waste in harmony with nadhlatul ulama’s decree. many questions come up. how do religious leaders come to the conclusion that plastic is not harmful (mudharat) to our health and environment? how do they evaluate scientific evidence showing that there are microplastics in the water that endanger our health (petrlik 2019) and that 70% of the plastic waste in indonesia is burned which releases toxic gases that cause climate change? are industrial designers able to develop eco-friendly bottles that are completely (using wood-fiber) or almost completely (using bio-plastic) degradable in a relatively short time? are they able to produce them in cost-effective ways? would religious leaders propagate the use of these alternatives? are the chief executive officers able and willing to compete with the commercial water companies, even if it makes the distribution of their water slightly more expensive? are green or clean bottles a unique selling property in this highly competitive market? would customers be willing to pay a bit more, because the water coming from an islamic boarding school brings more blessing than that from a commercial company, and green or clean alternatives to plastic bottles do justice to nadhlatul ulama’s commitment to reduce plastic waste? here, too, we can make use of the theory of the dialogic self: weighing medical, commercial, and religious considerations. conclusion in the introduction, i asked what a social study of religion can contribute to the theory and practice of environmentalism in indonesia, and what this signifies for future research in this field. my answer is that the social study of religion can help to conceptualize religion as a social construct and move beyond reified understandings of religion. i purposely speak about religion here, and not about faith or belief, to avoid a theological debate. an elaboration on the consistency or inconsistency between the empirical (social-scientific) and normative (theological) study of religion (bagir and martiam 2016) goes beyond the scope of this article. the indonesian government wants faith-based organizations to be included in waterand waste management and faith-based organizations such as nadhlatul ulama and muhammadiyah committed themselves to collaborate with the government in this respect. however, often the understanding of religion is naïve on both sides. scholars of religion can 11frans wijsen make them aware of the fact that on the one hand religion has an added value and makes a difference, and that on the other hand religion is complex, diverse, and ambiguous. for future research in this field, i propose to elaborate more on the ambivalence of religion and to use the dialogical self theory to deal with the dilemma between norms and practices that bagir and martiam (2016) wrote about earlier, the tension between theological and technological voices, the faith-based underpinnings of ‘small’ (‘back to nature’) and ‘smart’ (circular economy, green technology) solutions for ecological challenges, and the gap between the religion that is lived in every-day lives and the religion that is learned in schools and mosques, drawing on classical sources. references aoki, takenobu. 2016. “islamic ngos on environmental problems in indonesia”. pp. 69-86 in ngos in the muslim world: faiths and social services, edited by susumu nejima. london: routledge. asian development bank. 2016. indonesia: country water assessment. mandaluyong city: asian development bank. retrieved 19 july 2021 (https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutionaldocument/183339/ino-water-assessment.pdf). bagir, zainal abidin and najiyah martiam. 2016. “islam: norms and practices”. pp. 79-87 in routledge handbook of religion and ecology, edited by willis j. jenkins, mary e. tucker, and john grim. london: routledge. ballon, pieter and dimitri schuurman. 2015. “living labs: concepts, tools and cases”, info 17 (4), https://doi.org/10.1108/info-042015-0024. central board of muhammadiyah. 2016. the islamic view of water use and conservation. yogyakarta: central board of muhammadiyah. citarum roadmap and investment program. 2017. retrieved 19 july 2021 (http://citarum.org/en/citarum-knowledge-2/publication/ cita-citarum-photo-report/89-investment-program-summary-ipsummary-english/file.html). deputy for public participation and environmental communication. 2014. environmental education in indonesia. ministry of environment, the republic of indonesia. retrieved 19 july 2021 (https://www.epa.gov.tw/public/attachment/78717114334. pdf). 12 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 douglas, mary. 1966. purity and danger. an analysis of concepts of pollution and taboo. london: routledge and kegan paul. editorial board. 2019. “a dish of microplastics”. the jakarta post, january 28. retrieved 19 july 2021 (https://newgelora.thejakartapost.com/academia/2019/01/28/adish-of-microplastics.html). fahrurrazi. 2019. “to be ecological is to become pluralist: inclusive religious education at the eco-pesantren ath-thaariq, west java”. studies in interreligious dialogue 29(1): 23–42, https://doi. org/10.2143/sid.29.1.3286453 faizin, muhammad. 2019. “ini hukum tidak mengelola dan membuang sampah sembarangan”. nu online, february 28. retrieved 19 july 2021 (https://www.nu.or.id/post/read/103151/). festinger, leon. 1957. a theory of cognitive dissonance. stanford, ca: stanford university press. gade, anna m. 2019. muslim environmentalism: religious and social foundations. new york: columbia university press. hermans, hubert. 2018. society in the self: a theory of identity in democracy. oxforf: oxford university press. jotzo, frank. 2012. “can indonesia lead on climate change?” in anthony reid, ed., the repositioning of asia’s third giant. singapore: 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jindrich et al. 2019. “plastic waste poisons indonesia’s food chain“. retrieved 19 july 2021 (https://ipen.org/sites/default/files/documents/indonesia-eggreport-v2_0-web.pdf). saptaningtyas, haryani. 2020. this is our belief around here”: purification in islamic thought and pollution of citarum river in west java. münster: lit verlag. stringer, martin. 2008. contemporary western ethnography and the definition of religion. london: continuum international publishing group. wijsen, frans and haryani saptaningtyas. 2016. “religion and environment: pollution of citarum river and purification in islamic thought”. pp.125-154 in teologi yang membebaskan dan membebaskan teologi, edited by r. setio & w. wibowo. yogyakarta: universitas kristen duta wacana. wijsen, frans and haryani saptaningtyas. 2021. “cleanliness is part of faith: religious values in water management”. pp. 163-182 in varieties of religion and ecology: dispatches from indonesia, edited by a. bagir, m. s. northcott, and f. wijsen. münster: lit verlag. 14 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 the interaction effect of personality traits and gender differences on risky behaviours among first-year university students in south africa journal of asian social science research 2022, vol. 4, no. 2: 105-122 https://cassr.net/jassr/ © the author(s) 2022 article choja oduaran north-west university, south africa samson f. agberotimi* north-west university, south africa samuel moetji north-west university, south africa abstract this article investigates the effect of personality traits and gender differences on risky behaviours among first-year students of a south african university. a sample of three hundred and twelve (312) first-year students comprising 59.6 per cent females was selected as participants. data were collected with a questionnaire to measure risky behaviours, personality traits, and demographic information. collected data were subjected to statistical analysis using the statistical package for social sciences v23. descriptive and inferential statistics were conducted. results showed that the use of alcohol to the extent of being drunk, staying out late at night without parents’ knowledge, taking chances while doing hobbies, reckless driving, and unsafe sexual practices are prominent among the students. agreeableness (f (1, 308) = 9.863, p <.005), and conscientiousness (f (1, 307) = 20.445, p <.001) personality traits significantly influenced risky behaviours, while there was a significant gender difference (t (310) = 6.13, p <.01) in the rate of risky behaviours among the participants. it is concluded that personality traits significantly contribute to risky behaviours. in addition, males are generally more inclined to engage in risky behaviours than females. intervention-based research and activities to address the issue of risky behaviours among students are recommended. this study contributes * corresponding author: samson f. agberotimi lifestyle diseases research entity, north-west university, mafikeng campus, south africa. e-mail: femiagberotimi@gmail.com 106 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 2, 2022 to the study of risky behaviour among young persons with a reference to the context of university life in south africa by considering gender as an important factor that contributes to risky behaviours among firstyear university students. key words risky behaviours, personality traits, gender, first-year students, south african university introduction globally, including in south africa, the transition from high school to university is seen as one of the most important stages in the life of adolescents because, during this period, they may experience adjustment stress, peer pressure and other negative social influences, including participation in risky behaviours (kipping et al. 2012; salameh et al. 2014). life of undergraduate students entails certain levels of psychological, academic and social adjustment challenges for many individuals as the experience tends to overlap with the transition from adolescence to adulthood. as noted by papier et al. (2015) and salam et al. (2015), leaving significant others and old friends behind, forming new friendships and adjusting to a new but higher academic expectation may combine to make the transition to university particularly stressful for freshmen. although engaging in risks can, and is regarded as, be an essential part of living, irreparable damage may result when a person engages in risky activities that are not associated with any foreseeable long-term benefits to the risk-taker. however, in the context of the present study, risky behaviours are those associated with greater danger and are defined as acts that can lead to adverse outcomes on the overall development and well-being of young people (de guzman and bosch 2007). ilo et al. (2015) consider risky behaviours as acts that potentially threaten the integrity and morality of young people and interfere with their route to becoming responsible adults. similarly, risky behaviours relate to behaviours that a person intentionally performs, which may lead to or harm one‘s mind and/or body, which does not include the completion of suicide (sadeh and baskin-sommers 2017). cross-national studies that included samples selected among south africans have shown significant increases in the prevalence of risky behaviours among university students, which is suggested to be one of the current social problems among younger persons (ngidi et al. 2016; 107choja oduaran, et al. raghibi 2012; utpala‐kumar and deane 2010; wordofa and shiferaw 2015). because unhealthy risky behaviours can result in long-term negative consequences, researchers have attempted to identify factors that influence risky behaviours. one stream of research explored whether psychological factors are related to risky behaviour. this may have been influenced by psychological theories which postulate that sensation seeking, which reflects the desire for diverse, new, and complex experiences, may encourage an active willingness to undertake social and physical risks (zuckerman 1979). along this line, previous studies that focused on the relationship suggest that personality traits may strongly exert an influence on risky behaviour (reid et al. 2012). vermetten et al. (2001) had earlier argued that an individual‘s personality traits influence the development of certain intentional states such as desires, goals and beliefs. several models of personality have been used to predict and understand why behaviour varies among individuals. however, the big-five personality traits, comprising conscientiousness, agreeableness, extraversion, neuroticism and openness to experience (costa and mccrae, 1992) constitute one of the most influential models for assessing personality influence on behaviour, including risky behaviours. openness to experience is associated with the need for a novel experience and a tolerance for unknown and novel things. more open individuals are curious, non-traditional, and unconventional, and tend to seek out novel experiences and rethinking authorities, although they do not necessarily lack value systems (jovanović et al. 2012). conscientiousness, as a personality trait, is defined as the extent of organisation, persistence and motivation of goal-directed behaviour. individuals who score high on this trait scale are found to be precise, punctual, diligent, reliable, and thoughtful and possess strong feelings of order, duty and self-discipline (jovanović et al. 2012). conscientious individuals also can exercise self-discipline so that they are much more able to control their behaviour (costa and mccrae 1992). extraversion reflects social relations, the need for stimulation and the capacity for a positive emotional experience. extraverts have a high need to socialise and are successful in nurturing social relationships. they also tend to score high on related traits such as talkativeness, cheerfulness, optimism, enjoying excitement and stimulation and being full of energy (jovanović et al. 2012). agreeableness is the personality trait that reflects a person‘s relationship with and attitudes toward other people. those with high scores on agreeableness are described as altruistic, empathetic and willing to assist others, and believe that others will reciprocate the 108 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 2, 2022 same behaviour and treatment in return in an interpersonal relationship (fiddick et al. 2016). finally, neuroticism relates to an inclination to experience negative emotions and difficulty in dealing with problems. neurotic individuals are less efficient in their attempt to overcome stress and are prone to irrational thinking (jovanović et al. 2012). they also have problems with emotional regulation, which tends to diminish their ability to think clearly and logically, make decisions and cope effectively with stress. besides personality traits as likely predictors of risky behaviour among university students, gender is another individual factor that may influence risky behaviour. gender is a social construct used to describe normative behaviours appropriate for males and females. gendered behavioural pattern is linked to socialisation differences for both sexes with agentic traits, including competitiveness, aggressiveness and assertiveness modelled for boys, whereas girls are socialised to internalise communal traits, including altruism, cooperation and consideration. literature suggests that the differential socialisation of boys and girls results in gendered differences in risk-taking propensity. for instance, research suggests that boys have higher activity levels (edwardson et al. 2013) compared to girls, and are likely to behave more impulsively (reid et al. 2012). also, the socialisation process is such that boys are allowed to play alone (morrongiello and sedore 2005), which may increase the tendency to test out risky behaviours with less supervision. based on these socialisation differentials, one may posit that it may be logical to expect that males will be higher on risky behaviours compared to girls. according to the south african national youth risk behaviour survey 2002, the number of adolescents engaging in risky behaviours rose from 41 per cent to 58 per cent, an increase of 17% (akinboade and mokwena 2010). follow-up studies since then on risky behaviours among young persons have soared. most of these studies have focused on the prevalence of risky behaviours such as risk-taking sexual behaviours, alcohol and drug abuse, unhealthy use of tobacco, violence and self-harm among adolescents, including university students (abels and blignaut 2011; abousselam et al. 2016; jain et al. 2018; maughan-brown et al., 2018). while it is acknowledged that risky behaviours are becoming alarmingly common among young south africans as described above, little is known about how personality traits and gender may influence participation in risky behaviours among first-year university students. therefore, this study aimed to examine the interaction effect of personality 109choja oduaran, et al. traits and gender on risky behaviours among a sample of university firstyear students in south africa. this study also sought to understand if there were gender differences in risky behaviours among first-year students. by doing so, this article contributes to the study of risky behaviour among young persons with a reference to the context of university life in south africa by considering gender as an important factor that contributes to risky behaviours among first-year university students. three hundred and twelve (312) first-year students of a rural-based south african university participated in this study. a multistage sampling procedure involved stratified random sampling for the selection of faculty and department which formed the primary sampling unit, and simple random sampling for the selection of students from a list of students registered for undergraduate courses offered by each department selected. the participants comprise 59.6 per cent females and 40.4 per cent males aged between 17 and 19 years at the time of data collection. the big five personality inventory is a 44-item self-report measure designed to screen individuals on the five broad dimensions of personality (openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism). the items on the scale were written in short phrases. responses were rated on a 5-point likert-type format with options ranging from disagree strongly (1), disagree a little (2), neither agree nor disagree (3), agree a little (4) and agree strongly (5). the cronbach alpha coefficients for the subscales of the big five in this study were as follows: openness to experience .73; conscientiousness .71; extraversion .67; agreeableness .64; and neuroticism .76. higher scores on each dimension indicate possession of that personality trait. the risk-taking and self-harm inventory for adolescents (rtshia) developed by vrouva et al. (2010) was used for data collection. the rtshia is a self-report measure designed to measure risk-taking behaviour and self-harm among adolescents. it was divided into separate risk-taking (rt) and self-harm (sh). the risk-taking behaviour includes 12 items: reckless driving, not taking necessary precautions in a risky situation, involvement in violent activities, sexual risk behaviour, and alcohol and drug abuse. items are scored on a 4-point likert scale with options ranging from 1 = (never), 2 = (once), 3 = (more than once) and 4 = (many times). higher scores indicate a higher frequency of engagement in risk-taking behaviours. cronbach alpha coefficient .73 was established in this study. goodwill permission and appropriate ethical approval were duly obtained before the commencement of this study. a detailed statement of 110 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 2, 2022 informed consent that contained the purpose, procedures, potential risk(s) (if any) and benefits of participating in the study was given and explained to participants. participants were also assured of the confidentiality of their responses. individuals who consented voluntarily to participate in the study administered the research questionnaire. participants were approached at different locations including lecture theatres and lounges. data were collected over two weeks. respondents took about 30 minutes to complete the questionnaire. four hundred questionnaires were administered, out of which 312 were found usable for data analysis, yielding a response rate of 78 per cent. the 312 questionnaires used for data analysis were sufficient for the calculated minimum sample size required for this study. the data collected were subjected to the statistical package for social sciences version 23 for statistical analysis descriptive statistics, pearson product-moment correlation, a two-way analysis of variance, and independent sample t-test analysis were used to analyze the data, and results were accepted at p≤0.05. risky behaviours among first-year university students the results presented in table 1 reveal that on the list of risky behaviours assessed among first-year university students, the use of alcohol to the extent of being drunk ranked as the most occurring risky behaviour among the participants. it was also shown that about 60 per cent of the participants reported ever staying out late at night without the knowledge of their parents or guardians. other prominent risky behaviours reported by the participants include taking chances while doing hobbies, reckless driving, putting self in a risky situation such as classroom cheating, and not taking precautions against sexually transmitted diseases or pregnancy during sex. a further look at the results revealed that the students reported that they have been involved in taking chances while doing hobbies, (21.2%), staying out late at night without the knowledge of parents (15.1%), and using alcohol to the extent of being drunk (14.4%) on multiple occasions implying that these risky behaviours are quite popular among the target population. 111choja oduaran, et al. table 1 the prevalence of risky behaviours among the participants (n = 312) never (%) once (%) more than once (%) many times (%) have you ever taken chances while doing your hobbies (e.g. not wearing your helmet and other safety gear, riding risky stances on your skateboard, etc.)? 43.9 15.7 19.2 21.2 have you ever deliberately crossed the road dangerously or driven recklessly (e.g. raced, did not fasten your seatbelt, drove while intoxicated or drunk)? 48.7 15.7 26.3 9.3 have you ever put yourself in a risky situation (such as classroom cheating, traveling without a valid ticket, shoplifting etc.) knowing that you may get caught? 54.2 24.7 14.7 6.4 have you ever been suspended (i.e. punished with exclusion) or dropped out of school? 89.7 6.7 1.9 1.6 have you ever stayed out late at night, without your parents knowing where you are? 40.4 17.0 27.6 15.1 have you ever participated in gang violence, physical fights or held a weapon 85.9 8.7 3.5 1.9 have you ever been promiscuous (i.e. had many sexual partners within a short period of time)? 75.3 11.5 8.3 4.8 have you ever had sex avoiding precautions against sexually transmitted diseases or pregnancy? 59.9 17.3 14.1 8.7 112 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 2, 2022 have you ever put yourself at risk of sexual abuse? 88.1 6.7 3.2 1.9 have you ever had so much alcohol that you were really drunk? 39.4 25.3 20.8 14.4 have you ever used drugs (such as marijuana, cocaine, lsd etc)? 69.2 13.5 9.9 7.4 have you ever smoked tobacco? 65.7 20.2 6.7 7.4 table 2 shows the relationships between gender, personality traits (extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism and openness to experience), and risky behaviours among first-year university students. the result showed a significant positive correlation between gender and risky behaviour (r = .33, p <.01), which implies that more males than females scored higher on the risk-taking scale. further, the result reveals that agreeableness (r = -.30, p <.01), and conscientiousness (r = -.30, p <.01) are the only personality traits that have significant relationships with risky behaviours. table 2 descriptive statistics and correlations among variables mean sd 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 gender 2 extraversion 26.65 5.33 -.08 3 agreeableness 36.08 5.20 -.07 .14* 4 conscientiousness 34.03 5.70 -.03 .23** .41** 5 neuroticism 21.73 5.92 -.08 -.30** -.31** -.29** 6 openness 36.46 4.47 .02 .22** .19** -.28** -.08 7 risky behaviours 19.96 6.03 .33** .01 -.30** -.30** .03 -.01 ** p < 0.01 * p < 0.05 note: male = 1, female = 0. 113choja oduaran, et al. personality traits, gender and risky behaviours among first-year university students the main objective of this study was to examine the interaction effect of personality traits and gender on risky behaviours among the selected university first-year students. to investigate the statistically significant main and interaction effect of gender and agreeableness on risky behaviour among the participants, a two-way analysis of variance was conducted. the result obtained was presented in table 3. table 3 interaction effect of gender and agreeableness on risky behaviours among first-year university students source type iii sum of squares df mean square f sig. intercept 124035.476 1 124035.476 3926.145 .000 gender 1106.315 1 1106.315 35.019 .000 agreeableness 311.595 1 311.595 9.863 .002 gender * agreeableness 18.407 1 18.407 .583 .446 error 9730.392 308 31.592 total 135607.000 312 a. r squared = .141 (adjusted r squared = .133) b. computed using alpha = .05 table 3 reveals that there was no statistically significant interaction between gender and agreeableness on risky behaviours (f (1, 308) = .583, p >.05). the result, however, shows that there were statistically significant differences in mean risky behaviours between males and females (f (1, 308) = 35.019, p <.001), and students with high and low levels of agreeableness personality traits (f (1, 308) = 9.863, p <.005). to investigate the statistically significant main and interaction effect of gender and conscientiousness on risky behaviours among the participants, a two-way analysis of variance was conducted. the result obtained was presented in table 4. 114 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 2, 2022 table 4 interaction effect of gender and conscientiousness on risky behaviours among first-year university students source type iii sum of squares df mean square f sig. intercept 122292.549 1 122292.549 3983.876 .000 gender 1198.693 1 1198.693 39.049 .000 conscientiousness 627.583 1 627.583 20.445 .000 gender * conscientiousness 64.025 1 64.025 2.086 .150 error 9423.940 307 30.697 total 135351.000 311 a. r squared = .167 (adjusted r squared = .159) b. computed using alpha = .05 table 4 shows that there was no statistically significant interaction between gender and agreeableness on risky behaviours (f (1, 307) = 2.086, p >.05). the result, however, shows that there were statistically significant differences in mean risk-taking between males and females (f (1, 307) = 39.049, p <.001), and students with high and low levels of conscientiousness personality traits (f (1, 307) = 20.445, p <.001). gender differences and risky behaviours among first-year university students the second objective of this study was to understand if there were gender differences in risky behaviours among first-year students. table 5 shows that there was a significant difference in the risky behaviour reported by male and female students (t (310) = 6.13, p <.01). further observation of the means showed that the mean score on the scale of the risky behaviour reported by males (m = 22.36; sd = 6.67) is significantly higher than what was reported by the females (m = 18.33; sd = 4.95). this implies that male first-year engage more in risky behaviours than their female counterparts. 115choja oduaran, et al. table 5 gender difference and risky behaviours among first-year students n mean std. dev. t df sig. male 126 22.36 6.67 6.13 310 .00 female 186 18.33 4.95 explaining the effect of personality traits and gender differences on risky behaviours among first-year university students in this study, we investigated the interaction effect of personality traits and gender on risky behaviours among a sample of university first-year students in south africa. our preliminary findings raised concern over the rate of risky behaviours among the first-year university student population in south africa. in this regard, elbialy et al. (2017) observed that risky behaviours among students largely contribute to morbidity and mortality during the school period. we found that the students highly engaged in several risky activities including staying out late at night without the knowledge of their parents or guardians, taking chances while doing hobbies, reckless driving, putting themselves in risky situations such as classroom cheating, and not taking precautions against sexually transmitted diseases or pregnancy during sex with prevalence ranging between 10.3 per cent (ever being suspended or dropped out of school) to 59.6 per cent (staying out late at night without parents’ knowledge). it was further revealed from the results that about 21 per cent of the students reported multiple occasions of taking chances about safety while doing their hobbies, 15.1 per cent indicated staying out late at night without the knowledge of parents many times, while about 14 per cent of the participants had used alcohol to the extent of being drunk on many occasions. related studies have also reported a disturbing situation of risky behaviours among south african university students (ngidi, et al., 2016). alcohol use and unprotected sex among undergraduate students despite knowing the associated consequences have been repeatedly reported as major risky behaviours among the population. this assertion has been affirmed by other scholars arguing that the period of late adolescence and young adulthood which corresponds with university age is particularly characterized by several risky behaviours including alcohol and drug use, unsafe sexual practices, dropping out of school, and involvement in violence and crime which have serious harmful 116 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 2, 2022 consequences on young people (graham et al. 2018; radcliffe and thorley 2015). on the other hand, bhuvaneswari (2018) gave another perspective on the high prevalence of risky behaviour among university students, opining that risky behaviours are more prominent among the student population than the general population because university students face a lot of pressure from peers and the excitements from new experiences, as well as their incapacity for understanding complex concepts such as consequences for their actions. examining the relationships between personality traits, gender and risky behaviours, we found that only agreeableness and conscientiousness significantly correlated with risky behaviour. both agreeableness and conscientiousness personality traits were significantly negatively associated with risk-taking, implying that high scorers on both traits scored low on the risk-taking scale. in essence, freshmen who possess a warm attitude in interpersonal relationships, and are empathetic and considerate of others are less likely to engage in risky behaviours. similarly, attributes of being goal-directed, thoughtful and diligent in first-year students are inversely related to risky behaviours. also, the correlation analysis conducted shows that males more than females are more likely to be involved in risky behaviours. findings from our first objective show that there was no significant interaction between agreeableness and gender, as well as conscientiousness and gender on risky behaviour among the sampled population. however, there was a significant main effect of each of the personality traits of agreeableness, and conscientiousness on risky behaviours. the results also showed that gender has a significant effect on risk-taking. this implies that significant differences exist in mean risky behaviours between freshmen with low and high agreeableness, and conscientiousness, and also between males and females. but risk-taking did not significantly change by interactions between personality traits and gender. in this regard, irrespective of gender, the effect of agreeableness, and conscientiousness on risky behaviour are significantly stable. our findings have support from several previous studies establishing significant impacts of personality traits on risky behaviours (fiddick et al. 2016; chraif et al. 2015). conscientiousness is associated with several self-inhibiting traits such as conventionality and self-discipline (costa and mccrae 1992). it is plausible that the more conscientious a student is, the more risk-averse (more conventional, more self-disciplined) he or she tends to become, resulting in lowered tendencies to engage in risky behaviours. 117choja oduaran, et al. males reported significantly higher risky behaviour than their female counterparts. our finding is consistent with previous studies which revealed that females are more risk-averse compared to males (charness and gneezy 2012; reniers et al. 2016). also, it has been asserted that irrespective of the situation, males are more likely than females to engage in risky behaviours (de jager and naudé 2018). there are, at least, two plausible explanations for this result. first, male students could have perceived situations that confronted them as less risky compared to females. thus, the perceptual difference in the risk level associated with a potentially harmful activity could have fuelled male students’ involvement in harmful behaviours. second, it could be that males in the sample were influenced more by peer perception of approval to engage in harmful behaviours, while females were less likely. conclusion this article has shown the effect of personality traits and gender on the risky behaviours of first-year students in a south african university. our findings revealed a significant prevalence of risky behaviours including staying out late at night, intentional avoidance of taking precautions in a risky situation, alcohol use and unsafe sexual practice among the sampled population. it was established that of the five personality traits studied, only agreeableness and conscientiousness significantly affected the risky behaviours reported by the participants. furthermore, the male participants reported significantly higher involvement in risky behaviours than their female contemporaries. nevertheless, this study has some limitations. the design adopted in the study (i.e. cross-sectional design) does not allow tracking of risktaking propensity over time. a longitudinal design would have provided more information about changes in risk-taking tendencies among firstyear students. also, a self-administered questionnaire was used for data collection. this approach could have increased the likelihood of respondents faking their responses, thus affecting the reliability of the results. also, the sample was selected among first-year students only at one university. this may affect the generalisation of results to first-year students at other universities in south africa. based on this, we have some recommendations for future studies. first, identifying and helping students with mental health challenges in the university community is important. we recommend that the south african university authority should strengthen their healthcare services 118 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 2, 2022 to the students by building a system that targets students with needs for mental health assessment and interventions. this will translate into a reduction in the rate of risky behaviours and possible associated harmful consequences. in line with the aforementioned, students whose personality traits and profiles are put at risk of engaging in risky behaviours should be identified and assisted accordingly to develop the appropriate capacity and skills to embrace a more healthy and safe lifestyle. finally, there is a need for more intervention-inclined research to address the challenging issue of risky behaviours and associated harmful consequences among university students in south africa. future researchers are, therefore, encouraged to conduct studies in this direction. funding the author(s) received no financial support for 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no. 1: 33-48 https://cassr.net/jassr/ © the author(s) 2023 article mir hussain amiri* universitas islam international indonesia (uiii), indonesia abstract afghanistan, known for its ancient history and as a centre of knowledge in the past, has seen the rise of great civilizations such as arya, bakhtar, and khorasan. education in ancient afghanistan was influenced by the vedic religion and later the avestan civilization until the arrival of islam. education in afghanistan is recognized as a fundamental human right that plays a crucial role in alleviating poverty, addressing inequality, and fostering sustainable development. however, the hazara people, an ethnic and religious minority in afghanistan, have historically been deprived of this right due to cultural, linguistic, and religious differences with the dominant pashtun population. hazaras have faced discrimination, marginalization, and violent persecution throughout afghan history. they have been systematically denied access to education, employment, and political representation. despite some progress, the hazara people continue to face barriers to accessing quality education. hazara students also face discrimination and harassment from peers and teachers who hold negative stereotypes of them. moreover, hazaras have been subjected to targeted attacks by terrorist groups like the taliban and isis, resulting in loss of life and injuries. nevertheless, hazaras demonstrated their goodwill. they actively participated in national processes such as elections, civil society strengthening, sports, and education, showcasing their commitment to the new system. this article contributes to the study of the history of education in afghanistan which lacks adequate analysis of education among minorities in afghanistan like the hazara people. key words hazara people, discrimination, education in afghanistan, minority, history * corresponding author: mir hussain amiri address: jalan raya bogor km 33.5, cisalak, sukmajaya, depok, west java, 16416, indonesia. email: hussain.amiri@uiii.ac.id 34 journal of asian social science research vol. 5, no. 1, 2023 introduction the history of education in afghanistan is a complex and multifaceted issue for it is shaped by a range of social, political, and cultural factors. a key aspect of this history is the education of the hazara minority which has a long and rich history that goes back centuries. however, the hazaras are a historically marginalized group that has faced significant challenges in accessing quality education. their cultural and religious differences have often led to discrimination and marginalization by those in power. this has had a significant impact on their ability to access education, with hazara children historically having lower levels of education than other groups in afghanistan. in recent decades, the hazaras community has made strides in improving education for its children by creating hazaras-led educational initiatives and advocacy efforts to promote policies that support educational equity for marginalized groups. universities and educational centres in kabul and the hazara provinces were full of hazara male and female students who turned to the educational centres with the desire to change and participate in the development process of their homeland. although they have had a dark history and a tragic life and have suffered from massacres and discrimination for more than two centuries, the hazara people have always been proud of themselves in all social and cultural fields and have sworn against their enemies with the weapons of science and art. during the last twenty years, they have brought great and important achievements to afghanistan in the fields of art, music, cinema, sports, and other fields. this article studies the history of education in afghanistan focusing on the hazara minority and how political and social dynamics have affected their educational opportunities over time. drawing on a range of primary and secondary sources, including government records, scholarly articles, and interviews with educators, policymakers, and members of the hazaras community, this article examines the evolution of hazara’s education from the late 19th century to the present. through this analysis, the purpose of this article is to shed light on the complex dynamics that have shaped the history of education in afghanistan and the challenges that continue to face the hazara minority in accessing quality education. it also emphasizes the importance of targeted policies and initiatives to promote educational equity and inclusion for marginalized groups and the need for ongoing research and advocacy to support these efforts. finally, this study provides important insights into the history of education in afghanistan and the ongoing struggle for educational equity and inclusion for all. 35mir hussain amiri this study was purported to provide answers to the following questions: how has access to education transformed in the past 20 years in the hazara provinces? and what ups and downs have the hazaras of afghanistan faced in the historical course of education in their provinces? to do this, this article examines the historical course of education among the hazara minority through a qualitative research method of case study (gay et al. 2012; starman 2013). the use of this method was justified as follows: first, hazaras are an ethnic minority; second, they are a religious minority with the majority belonging to islamic shiism; and third, the hazara people have always been deprived of social services in every government and have even been the target of attacks by the taliban and isis terrorist groups only because of their status as a religious and ethnic minority (hussaini 2021:109-162). this study used the document analysis method for data collection, which calls for data to be studied and interpreted to extract meaning, gain insight, and create empirical knowledge, similar to other analytical techniques in qualitative research (bowen 2009:27-40; rapley 2007). all the books, e-books, article journals, newspapers, and magazines related to this study were collected before conducting the necessary data analysis using the document analysis method. according to rodrigues et al. (2019), skimming (a shallow examination), reading (a detailed examination), and interpretation were all parts of this document analysis. thematic analysis and content analysis are combined in this iterative procedure, which entailed a document evaluation in which significant and pertinent text or other data portions were found. there has been a lot of discussion regarding the lack of education in afghanistan and the state of education in hazara areas (baiza 2013, handayani 2016, sarmachar 2016, samady 2013, hussaini 2021:109162, and chiovenda 2014:449-462). this study aims to contribute to this literature by analysing the specific case of education among hazara people. its importance lies in the following ways. first, education is a basic human right, and access to education has important consequences for individuals, societies, and nations in general. therefore, this study provides an understanding of the history of education in afghanistan to identify the challenges and barriers that have prevented certain groups, such as the hazara minority, from accessing education. second, the hazara community has historically faced significant discrimination and marginalization in afghanistan, including limited access to education. thus, this study gives an understanding of the history 36 journal of asian social science research vol. 5, no. 1, 2023 of education for the hazaras minority to see insights into the broader social and political dynamics that have shaped their experiences of marginalization and exclusion. third, afghanistan is a conflict-affected country that has experienced significant political and social changes in the past few decades. the impact of the conflict on education has been particularly devastating, with schools and universities destroyed and disrupted, and students and teachers forced to flee. therefore, this study provides an understanding of the history of education in afghanistan and how it has been affected by conflict is critical to developing effective policies and practices to promote access to quality education for all. the history of education in afghanistan, especially considering the experiences of the hazara minority, is an important issue to understand the complex social, political, and economic dynamics that have shaped education in afghanistan. research on this issue is important to identify strategies to overcome challenges and barriers to education in afghanistan and promote access and equity for all afghan citizens. the history of education in afghanistan the activity of new schools during the era of amir habibullah remained within the limits of the capital city, and even after the implementation of the constitution, there were limitations. during the amani period, at the same time as the expansion of new schools in the capital city, newstyle schools were established in the provinces, including the provinces of jalalabad, kandahar, herat, mazar-e-sharif, and qatghan. all in all, until the end of amanullah’s rule (1928), more than 322 chapters of new government schools were established throughout afghanistan. according to some statistics, in 1926, the number of primary students across the country was 51.000 and the number of students in developmental and vocational schools was more than three thousand. they said that whenever afghanistan was moving at this speed, it would not lag behind the caravan of culture and literature, even compared to the neighbouring countries. but after the fall of the amani government, all schools were closed. at the beginning of nader khan’s period, twenty years later, that is, in 1946, the number of official schools increased from 223 to 334 chapters. assuming that no schools were built in 1926–1928, during nader khan’s rule and even the initial period of zahir shah’s rule, only 24 new schools were established within 18 years. 37mir hussain amiri before the russian coup d’état in 1957, there were 4,198 schools in afghanistan, 888,800 educated people, and 12,400 teachers and professors. nearly a thousand students were enrolled in the country’s public schools. in all hazara areas, no more than two or three schools were built, which shows the government’s attention to the expansion of education (khwajamir 2016). the taliban has caused irreparable damage to afghanistan’s education in both the first and second periods. the taliban leadership took over the educational system in the middle of 1999 and implemented a rigorous interpretation of islamic law. during these periods, the schools for girls were completely closed and some schools for boys were open, but there were no teachers to teach. this is because, with the arrival of the taliban, all secondary schools have been closed to girls, and on the other hand, women, in general, are prohibited from working, going to the market, going to parks, and travelling without a sharia mahram, and this has caused despair among the youth. the period during which this group existed can be described as the “dark age of education” because they were alien enemies with knowledge. in particular, new knowledge never had a place in that regime (poladi 1989). according to the statistics of the world bank in 2012, the population of afghan children who went to school reached about 7.8 million, and of these, about 2.9 million were girls. however, there were still not enough buildings and facilities for schools, and in many villages, classes were held either under tents or in residential houses, and sometimes under the shade of trees. according to the world bank, only 180,000 teachers or about half of the teachers in this country, had the necessary training and capabilities, and the rest of them were trained while working. still, the number of girls who dropped out of school was very high and the illiteracy rate in the country was very high. only 39% of people over the age of 15 could read and write, which was one of the lowest among countries in the world. in the first days when the taliban fled from the gates of kabul and the northern provinces of afghanistan to the mountains and valleys of the southern provinces in 1996, along with thousands of collapsed and shaky foundations, the educational institutions of afghanistan were also in a pitiable state. in 2001, there were 3,400 active schools throughout afghanistan, where 20,000 teachers taught one million students, and the presence of girls among these one million people was close to zero. in 2011, about 14.000 schools were activated all over afghanistan, and in these schools, there were 8.100.000 students, 38 % of whom were girls, who were taught by 175.000 teachers. many schools have gotten new buildings or had their old ones renovated in the last ten years. 38 journal of asian social science research vol. 5, no. 1, 2023 among the achievements of the education system in afghanistan, we can mention the establishment of universities and private schools. according to the ministry of higher education and education, more than 127 private universities and more than 800 registered private schools are operating in afghanistan with the official license of these two ministries. of this, tens of thousands of people are engaged in education and training and thousands have been provided with work fields (sarmachar 2016:2931). in the past fifteen years, the afghan government, with the support of the international community, has launched extensive efforts to improve the country’s education system. part of these efforts were made to reopen schools and revive the country’s collapsed education system. during these years, more than six million students came to school and work was done in the field of improving the curriculum and creating new schools. however, the educational situation in the country did not change as much as expected. even though the country’s education situation has improved in terms of quantity, afghanistan continues to adhere to traditional structures. the important point here is that this time the citizens of the country also supported education despite all the problems and security threats from the opposition groups. today, along with thousands of public schools, thousands of private schools are also operating in the country, which should be mentioned as a phenomenon of the years after talabani because there was no such thing as a private school in the country’s education system before that. during the past years, it was a good opportunity to create a modern education infrastructure that supports transformational education in the country. but the existing problems also created enough obstacles to modernize the country’s education. in the past thirteen years, the country’s education remained within the scope of attracting boys and girls to schools and creating a safe environment for education, and the main challenges of the country’s education were given less attention. education is considered one of the successful fields of reconstruction in the country after the fall of the taliban. in 2001, there were no schools for girls, and the number of boys who went to school was about one million (nijat 2015). the afghan government established an independent high commission of education in 2002 with the assistance of unesco to make policies, objectives, and strategies for the rehabilitation and development of afghanistan’s education system. strategic development plans for primary, middle and secondary, technical and vocational education and higher education were created by the ministry of education in collaboration with unesco and other international organizations (samady 2013). but 39mir hussain amiri what is remarkable is that the education situation in afghanistan has not changed significantly. it seems that the lack of security, corruption, lack of importance given to education by certain circles, the remaining traditional structures in afghanistan’s education, and political confrontations are factors why, despite all the help of the international community, afghanistan’s education has not progressed. the hazara people as minority in afghanistan undoubtedly, studying a society necessitates studying the structures that govern that society. essentially, understanding the reality of the existence of a clear picture of what exists in society is impossible without systematic studies and sufficient information about the structures. these structures are the fabric of social life. only when the problems can be handed over to analysis can the facts be extracted from them; only then can the chain structures related to life be broken down and studied. in this regard, understanding the issues related to the hazara people’s situation is also based on studies of these structures, including hazara’s geographical structures (mousavi 2018). the hazara people are one of the big ethnic groups in afghanistan, which have been named by hazara historians and researchers in some documents as such because they have a thousand streams, valleys and a thousand high mountains. it is said that a thousand fountains came out of the hazara area, and after islam, a thousand mosques and a thousand minarets were built. this is also likely related to the time of the old sultans of zabulistan when the hazara people paid a thousand horsemen as taxes to the royal army (mousavi 2018). hazaras have suffered from social, cultural, and economic inequalities in every government. fundamental educational work in hazara areas has not been done by any government for a variety of reasons, including political inequalities and tribal and religious conflicts. the basic problems in hazara areas are discrimination among students and teachers (ethnic, sexual, party, religious, regional, etc.) and the lack of teachers, buildings, facilities, books, classes, and learning materials (ismail 2022:16-32). hazara people have been subjected to racial and religious discrimination and genocide for many years and every period of the ruling government. genocide against hazara people has started since abdul rahman’s rule, with more than 60% of hazara people having died in afghanistan. hazara people have been subjected to targeted suicide and explosive attacks in schools, mosques, educational centres, and hospitals (mousavi 2018). 40 journal of asian social science research vol. 5, no. 1, 2023 they have frequently been the targets of genocide in afghanistan over the past 130 years, according to bbc radio. hazaras have experienced violence and targeted ethnic massacres under amir abdul rahman’s leadership (1901–1980), the mujahideen era (1992–1996), the first taliban administration (1996–2001), and the current taliban administration (august 15, 2021–present). undoubtedly, one of the most despised social and political phenomena is targeted executions. this discrimination and execution of hazara people will endure in afghan history (rajan 2015). there are three opinions about the history of the hazara people. first, the idea of indigenousness of the hazara people. in the 19th century, the french researcher p. freire proposed this theory after discovering that thousands of years before alexander the great, people lived in the southern regions of the hindu kush. second, according to vambery (1864), the hazaras are the survivors of the mongols. according to this idea, the hazaras did not migrate from another land; they used to live in their current location a long time ago. third, mixed hazaras. according to this idea, hazaras are not only turkic and mongolian survivors but also a mixture of races such as tajiks, afghans, etc. (mousavi 2018). education of the hazara people opinions about the beginning of the educational process in hazaras areas are not very different. what is certain is that the basic education in the lives of the hazaras started at the same time as they converted to islam. but this process has always been accompanied by ups and downs under the influence of circumstances. the conditions that caused ups and downs in the development of education can be summarized as a few examples of the challenges facing education for hazaras (baiza 2014:151-171). the history of education in afghanistan is a complex and multifaceted issue that has been shaped by a wide range of social, political, and cultural factors. although the current governments of the country have tried to make the country’s education go through its evolutionary process, the authorities’ approach to cultural development issues has not been consistent and equal. in the meantime, hazaras have been victims of unbalanced cultural policies and have seen severe losses in the way of promoting social knowledge. this is a cultural isolation that these people have suffered in the twodimensional process of formal and informal education. these people have been denied access to science and new teaching methods and they have to overcome this with what they have. the path of education in the hazaras is the subject of discussion in the framework of the epistemology of the hazara people, which illuminates their hidden angles. 41mir hussain amiri according to the official statistics of afghanistan in 1961, there were 10 faculties, 31 professional schools, 22 high schools, 52 secondary schools, 533 primary schools, and 788 rural schools, totalling 1436 schools. according to the statistics provided above, ten faculties in kabul were only in the service of individuals or government officials. they did not exceed the number of fingers. the hazara people were only provided with a religious national unit. professional schools did not exist in the hazara areas. according to the findings, there were no more than five high schools and two hundred rural primary and secondary schools in the hazara areas during the era of zahir khan and after him when public schools were active. the hazara areas had less than 30,000 students out of a total of 734,261 students across the country in 1974, which is approximately 4%. there were only a few public schools in the hazara areas in the last half-century. it was surprising how the regimes of that time tried to establish several schools in some areas of the hazara areas while they were clinging to the lives of these people like leeches sucked their blood. overall, in the hazara areas, despite the large population, elementary schools are not enough, and the percentage of people who are literate and have formal education is low. however, the number of people who have received private education is large. lately, the government has taken certain measures, including in the rural development program, to address the issue of improving the social, economic, and civic lives of rural people, the growth and development of handicrafts, the prevention and preservation of people’s health, and the development of education. in the third five-year plan from 1968 to 1972, in uruzgan province, the establishment of 16 primary and secondary schools in the punjab region, the opening of girls’ and boys’ schools, hospitals, and literacy courses for the elderly was considered (baiza 2013). the need to advance gender equality and women’s empowerment has been identified by the international community as one of the millennium development goals, and education is expected to play a vital role in achieving these goals. the accomplishment of gender parity and equality in education is viewed as being of the utmost importance in the aims of education for all (efa) by 2015 (see, for example, unesco, 2003– 2004). these factors appear significant for the hazara people since the empowerment will be extended beyond individuals. the idea of “power” and its absence among the hazaras are equally crucial to understanding what empowerment means. the disempowerment of hazaras is seen in both afghanistan and (changezi and biseth 2011:79-89). hazaras in afghanistan did not have access to educational institutions in most parts of afghanistan until the 1950s and 1960s. there were only a few elementary 42 journal of asian social science research vol. 5, no. 1, 2023 schools and hazaras could not enrol in official or non-hazara schools unless they officially changed their identity to tajik. the afghan government sometimes forced the hazaras to change their ethnic identity. hazaras, who were able to enter school and later obtain government jobs, adopted tajik as their ethnic identity. they were not allowed to attend higher education institutions, especially military academies (baiza 2013). hazaras in afghanistan are marginalized in terms of education. in afghanistan, hazaras are an ethnic group with a long history of marginalization and even outright persecution, mainly because of their shia muslim religion. only after international intervention in 2001 did socio-economic opportunities open up for the hazara people. however, hazaras have a strong perception that they are still second-class citizens and claim that they are neglected by the afghan government and receive less funding from the international development community. in addition, afghanistan’s hazara migrants who travel to neighbouring countries including pakistan, do not receive primary education there. the hazaras themselves are responsible for the education of their children. educational institutions for girls founded by hazara themselves show that education is indeed considered important. all these are reasons for the commitment and perseverance of hazara people to education (changezi and biseth 2011:79-89). during the reign of muhammad daoud, education was highly politicized. tribal politics which is defined by pashtun nationalism and a selective approach to education form the overall framework of education. for much of this period, the government barred the admission of shiites and hazaras as well as other ethnic minorities, to higher education institutions, military, military schools, diplomatic and political positions. and this ban was eased after afghanistan’s admission to the united nations (un) in 1946, as the government had to obey international conventions. afghanistan’s admission to the united nations also obliged the government to resume girls’ education, which began to develop slowly and selectively, especially in the capital city. education has been common among the hazara people since ancient times, but the beginning of new education started when they accepted islam. many people became capable of islamic knowledge and this growth and development of religious knowledge opened the way for opening new schools and reading contemporary sciences. but in the later periods, especially during the period of abd al-rahman, the generation of rightseekers and knowledge-seekers of the hazara was brought to an abyss of destruction. this was the first, biggest, and most fatal death of freedom and knowledge, which could not rise for tens of years due to the severity 43mir hussain amiri of those hazara. but this action could not destroy the logic of seeking justice. after a long time, the caravan started again on the path of time. years later, another mishap occurred. there were still effects from the first encounter, and this time nader blocked the freedom fighters and supporters of marafet. this time, he avoided hazaras’ awareness and knowledge. although education in afghanistan has faced challenges and problems throughout history, what is noticeable is that the people of afghanistan have sent their children to school without ignoring all these challenges and problems to continue their education and have a better future. many factors influence education quality in afghanistan, including a lack of experienced teachers and effective teaching methods, the absence of a safe and conducive learning environment, and the scarcity of high-quality teaching materials (including textbooks). the classroom atmosphere, the lack of quality education, particularly the quality of teaching, and the students’ political and religious conflicts have all had an impact. in addition, teachers rarely address the specific learning needs of each student in the classroom. the education system in afghanistan has suffered a lot in the past several years due to wars, a lack of sufficient resources and capacities, and the absence of a strategic plan. the only way out of these challenges is with the cooperation of all citizens, by educating the youth, and by creating a capable education system. the hazara people have been discriminated against for decades. they have been subjected to political, economic, social, and cultural harassment and even targeted attacks; they are deprived of social services in some areas, and hazaras have been racially discriminated against many times. they are easily recognizable due to their distinctive facial features and are targeted by sunni extremist groups such as the taliban and the islamic state, which consider them infidels. although the hazaras have always been subjected to racial and religious discrimination, systematic massacres, and terrorist attacks, they are on their way to schools and universities with a strong will and determination. they have achieved progress in the field of education. today, hazara students are getting high grades in schools, universities, and entrance exams, and some of them have been awarded scholarships to different countries baiza 2013). the second article of the law of the ministry of education of afghanistan emphasizes providing equal rights to education for the citizens of afghanistan through the growth and development of the public education system in a balanced and fair manner. in addition, regardless of social sex (gender), ethnicity, social and political status, or religious affiliation, all 44 journal of asian social science research vol. 5, no. 1, 2023 children and adolescents who are of school age will have equal access to quality education to develop knowledge, skills, and values and reveal the necessary methods that are considered necessary for themselves and their country. however, education has existed as a semi-closed world in the lives of hazaras. although the current governments of the country have tried, with the help of the international community and institutions that support education, to make the country’s education go through its evolutionary process, in some cases, the authority’s approach to cultural development issues has not been consistent and equal for everyone. hazaras have been victims of unbalanced cultural policies more than other ethnic groups and have seen severe losses in the way of improving knowledge and social services. although hazaras have been denied basic citizenship rights by all governments, they pay serious attention to science and education and understand that the only way out of this impasse is to acquire science and knowledge and develop human resources. this has given hope to the next generation of hazaras. they realise that racial discrimination and the lack of access to the right to education are not confined to afghanistan, but also facing religious and ethnic minorities in other countries. conclusion the article has shown that education in afghanistan has gone through different stages over time and the methods of education have been different in each stage. afghan education has had its ups and downs in different periods and every regime and government has proposed its political ideologies and theories of the educational system. what can be inferred from the whole of this study is that education has been common among afghan people since ancient times. discrimination and inequality started from the time of abdurrahman, and at first, abdurrahman’s ambush led those who sought justice and knowledge to an abyss of destruction. for tens of years, the hazara people were unable to advance in terms of freedom and knowledge. as a new generation of hazara students attends school in relative safety but is unmotivated to study given the perceived disparities, their success could change afghanistan’s ethnic balance of power. despite the restoration of the infrastructure and the assistance of the international community, the provinces of the hazaras remain poor, although they are considered relatively safe, compared to other provinces. the revival of the 45mir hussain amiri hazara people depends more on education, and this is the capital that they can carry with them during the years of exile. while it is mentioned in the second article of the law of the ministry of education of afghanistan that “citizens of the islamic republic of afghanistan have equal rights to education without any discrimination”, the hazara people in many afghan regimes have been deprived of all their basic rights, including the right to education, which is one of the basic rights of every citizen. funding the author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. acknowledgements i am extremely grateful to the two instructors of life, my dear parents, the model of humanity, love and 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2-cover-jassr-vol.5.no.1.blkng [rev-2023-08-15].pdf page 1 ahmad abrori* uin syarif hidayatullah jakarta eva mushoffa uin syarif hidayatullah jakarta dzuriyatun toyibah uin syarif hidayatullah jakarta abstract this paper aims to show a new characteristic of diaspora. while previous literature discusses the issue of diaspora mostly in terms of victim subject and is associated with the marginalized individual and forced refugees, this article finds a new category which we call a voluntary diaspora. this term refers to a group of diaspora society who actively organize their members to maintain a social bond and identity. this finding was sufficiently generated by conducting literature research, especially on recent works of the diaspora of indonesian muslims in western countries. the finding then contributes to the theoretical explanation of diaspora which is dominated by the notion that views diaspora as a victim phenomenon, as discussed in previous literature. key words victim diaspora, voluntary diaspora, indonesian muslims, social identity, globalization, migration, missionary voluntary diaspora and missionary purposes: mapping indonesian muslim diaspora in western countries journal of asian social science research 2023, vol. 5, no. 1: 63-78 https://cassr.net/jassr/ © the author(s) 2023 article * corresponding author: ahmad abrori fakultas ilmu sosial dan ilmu politik (fisip), universitas islam negeri (uin) jakarta, indonesia. email: ahmad.abrori@uinjkt.ac.id 64 journal of asian social science research vol. 5, no. 1, 2023 introduction diaspora is a global phenomenon that increasingly plays an important role in the advancement of globalization. in the context of the muslim diaspora, its role is pivotal since it determines not only the current interaction between muslim communities and citizens in the west but also influences the relationship between the governments of the muslim countries and the western countries. this article clarifies the notions of diaspora, muslim diaspora and indonesian muslims overseas. the analysis is unfolded in three sections. the first section explores diaspora as a conceptual framework. it clarifies the genealogy of the diaspora and its characteristics. the second section focuses on diaspora in the wake of globalisation and migration. it discusses how migrations give an influence on diaspora and vice versa. the discussion is closed with the contextualization of the muslim diaspora in western society. the scholarship of diaspora has developed to a great extent in the past few decades. there has been a significant shift from a highly particular sort of diaspora to one that is characterized by multi-disciplinary studies. in his early work, cohen (1996), for example, initially discusses the issue of diaspora as a fact of victims resulting from unexpected situations such as war, poverty, and overpopulation. he analyses that such experience of victim diasporas has caused various complex issues for social identity in the modern state and the notion of nation-state and this also has been astonishing in the economy, education, arts, sport and other aspect of life. in other words, some diaspora have changed their status from victim to challenger. responding to this change, later cohen (2008) classifies diaspora into four categories: first, notions of diaspora which roots in the classical jewish tradition; second, victim diasporas that relate to africans and armenians diaspora; third, labour and imperial diasporas that refer to diaspora where indians and the british were indentured; and fourth, trade and business diasporas that refer to diaspora from chinese and lebanese. similarly, dufoix (2015) proposes two types of diasporas. the first type of diaspora is a centred, essentially political version of diaspora. this mostly relies on the jewish case, characterized by either migration or exile, nostalgia, the perpetuation of original traditions, customs and languages, and a dream of returning to the homeland. the second version relies on the black/african case. this can be traced from the mid-1970s (the evolution of british cultural studies) towards greater attention to identity issues. this type of diaspora is characterized by several identity issues related to a 65ahmad abrori et al. situation where the member of any kind of group spread across many areas. some identity issues are being a minority group, becoming a migrant or a transnational community and a statistical group of expatriates. based on the literature review on diaspora in general above, we mapped the patterns of the muslim diaspora as well as the indonesian muslim diaspora. this study of the indonesian muslim diaspora contributes to adding one characteristic of diaspora, that is a voluntary diaspora, to previous literature which dominates the articulation of diaspora with the forced and marginalized population (cohen 2002, 2008, 2017), which cohen characterizes this as victim diaspora (cohen 1996). this article emphasizes that one of the most important features of the voluntary diaspora is the missionary endeavours of the indonesian muslim diaspora in the west. the structure of this article is as follows: first, the genealogy of diaspora and its characteristics; second, diaspora in the wake of globalization and migration; third, global diaspora and muslim communities in the western context; and finally, indonesian muslim diaspora in western countries. the genealogy of diaspora and its characteristics the genealogy of diaspora has a strong relationship with the phenomenon of jewish society. at least, in the last two thousand years, a large volume of historical records demonstrated that the term “diaspora” was strongly linked with the prototypical jewish experience of ‘exile’ (baumann 2000, 2016; safran 2005; cheyette 1996; ray 1016). the term “diaspora” was found for the first time in the evolved greek translation of ‘the septuagint’ (third/second century bce) undertaken by the jews to describe jewish communities that then spread all over the eastern mediterranean. genealogically, it refers to “their capacity to preserve the ‘law’ outside ‘the holly land’, to live a life according to the command of torah despite assimilative pressures from the host society” (baumann 2016). it was associated with the experiences of marginalized individuals and a group of forced refugees who were separated from and longed for returning to their place of origin (cheyette 1996). applying postmodern theory, the phenomena of jewish diaspora within western metaphysics was considered as the signifier of ineffable alterity. they show all kinds of heterodoxy, otherness and nonconformity as lyotard described that christians expect jews to convert, and monarchs, republics, and nazis demand them for these acts: expel, assimilate, exterminate respectively (cheyette 1996). outside the jews’ case, the christian generation in the first century ce adopted the term diaspora and adjusted it into their eschatological meanings 66 journal of asian social science research vol. 5, no. 1, 2023 to refer to ‘the dispersed christians’ who travel to circulate the message of god. yet, christian writers abandon ‘diaspora’ in the second century ce, limiting its use to the jewish dispersion as an exemplary curse for their sins. in the first centuries of the christian era, the ‘diaspora’ is confined to the eastern roman empire and later the byzantine empire (dufoix 2015). with the replacement of greek with latin within the western roman a millennium later, after the sixteenth-century reformation and the emerging christian schools, the diaspora was associated with the protestants living in catholic territory and vice versa (dufoix 2015). in the wake of the inner state migrations of the nineteenth century, the term diaspora then was used for the confessional minorities. during the second half of the twentieth century, it was not only jewish experiences that appeared in academic as well as media debate on ‘exile’ but also included a large number of tibetans, cubans and armenians (baumann 2016). the latter portrayed the armenians’ longdistance commerce and trade that emerged following the early expulsions of armenians by a byzantine emperor in the sixth century ad. however, cohen (2008) contended that it was approximately 1.75 million armenians were expelled in the late nineteenth century and their forced displacement during 1915–1916 allegedly carried out by turks which eventually forced many armenians to escape for france and the usa. cohen also paid attention to the two third of the arab population of palestine which was initially scattered around neighbouring arab countries and then the middle east at the creation of the israeli state in 1948 which also demonstrated the notion of exile, dispersal, alienation and denial experienced by diaspora. since the 1960s, following the scholarship debate on the comparison between the enslavement of sub-sahara africans and the exile of the classical jews, the term ‘diaspora’ has been associated with a group of a national, cultural and religious people who live in a foreign land (cohen 2008). literature on the african diaspora during these periods was specifically concerned with the misfortune of ten million africans who were forcibly transshipped across the atlantic for mass slavery and coerced plantation labour in the americas. yet still, the account of the indian ocean african slave trade to asia and the middle east involving as many as four million was under-researched. it was during these periods that the study of african diaspora also highlights post-colonial african emigration caused by civil war, famine, economic failure and political instability (cohen 2008). up to this point in time, diaspora literature was drawn upon major cases that described the process of victimization which over time invoked ‘social cohesion’ among particular groups and drove them away from the 67ahmad abrori et al. surrounding context in their countries of settlement and created their own separated life. there were two major characteristics for defining diaspora, i.e. “the traumatic dispersal from an original homeland and the salience of the homeland in the collective memory of a forcibly dispersed group” (cohen 2008). hence, cohen labelled this type of diaspora as the victim diaspora (cohen 1996). in the post-1990s although the jewish experiences continue to influence the study of diaspora, the term was expanded widely to include groups that might experience ‘analogous circumstances’ caused by difficulties they encountered at home or limited acceptance from the society of the hosting countries. in this context, safran’s article in the opening issue of the new journal, diaspora, had a significant influence on developing subcategories of diaspora in the literature (safran 2005). cohen himself, for example, argued that the nineteenth-century system of indentured labour abroad involving many indians, japanese and chinese was to be included under the increasingly broader categories of diaspora for they maintained the compelling element of their history of the original homeland. at this point, it is important to note that ‘the homeland’ was still central in defining major characteristics of diaspora as safran observed: members of a diaspora retained a collective memory of ‘their original homeland’; they idealized their ‘ancestral home’, were committed to the restoration of ‘the original homeland and continued in various ways to ‘relate to that homeland’ (as cited in cohen 2017: 4). for this reason, safran’s list of diaspora included cubans and mexicans in the usa, pakistanis in britain, maghrebis in france, turks in germany, poles, blacks in north america and corsicans in marseilles and any groups of ‘expatriate minority community’. they share several of the following features: • they, or their ancestors, have been dispersed from an original ‘centre’ to two or more foreign regions; • they retain a collective memory, vision or myth about their original homeland including its location, history and achievements; • they believe they are not – and perhaps can never be – fully accepted in their host societies and so remain partly separate; • their ancestral home is idealized and it is thought that, when conditions are favourable, either they or their descendants should return; 68 journal of asian social science research vol. 5, no. 1, 2023 • they believe all members of the diaspora should be committed to the maintenance or restoration of the original homeland and its safety and prosperity; and • they continue in various ways to relate to that homeland and their ethno-communal consciousness and solidarity are in an important way defined by the existence of such a relationship (as cited in cohen 2002: 5). cohen then revised the aforementioned features of diaspora developed by safran as he added the process of dispersal from the homeland which is accompanied by a single traumatic event due to bad memory of injustices that eventually provide social cohesion for the group. in addition, cohen also proposed an important point of the ex post facto construction of an ‘imagined homeland’ to allow groups such as kurds or sikhs to be included as a diaspora (cohen 2002:5). based on these features, further sub-categorizations of the diaspora were introduced to include labour, trade and imperial diaspora. the first category refers to those people who were recruited for their labour in the foreign land. this category fits the indian indentured migrants who work for tropical plantations. the second category could be applied to the chinese merchants who are scattered outside the chinese mainland, hence a ‘trade diaspora’. the last category is for the groups that were brought to foreign land as imperial or colonial settlers (cohen 2002:7). another important characteristic of diaspora is also related to what cohen called “the positive virtues of retaining a diasporic identity” in which competition and the demands for advances are strongly embedded for survival. this is evident in the number of nobel prizes won by the western jewish diaspora (cohen 2002:7). however, this point should be cautiously analyzed, particularly to identify factors that lead to advances instead of focusing on extraordinary achievement gained by particular groups of diaspora. global diaspora and muslim communities in the western context the study of diaspora hardly avoids the twin process of globalization and migration and its interconnection with the complex notion of diaspora (knott and mcloughlin 2010). in this context, the study of migration and diaspora are interwoven (toyibah et al. 2022). the association of islam with the terrorist activities following the 9/11 attacks has increased islamophobia among western citizens. this has affected the lives of many muslim immigrants who have settled in europe and north america. 69ahmad abrori et al. against this background, the muslim diaspora has recently become a focus of concern and discussion among government and other public bodies, including academic circles. toyibah et al. (2022) show that the most recent global estimate for the number of international migrants is 244 million in 2015 or about 3.3 per cent of the world population (global migration trends fact sheet 2015). according to ioms world migration report 2015, the majority of those migrants live in the top 20 largest cities globally (international organization for migration 2015). the report also found that in many of these cities, migrants make up at least one-third of the total population. in toronto, canada for instance, 50 per cent of its population is canada’s foreign-born. table 1. foreign-born population in major cities source: international organization for migration 2015 data from global migration trends fact sheet 2015 also revealed statistics on different reasons that made those 224 million people international migrants. in most cases, those individuals fell under the category of forced migration. the end of 2015 recorded the greatest level of forced displacement as 65.3 million people were forcibly displaced due to persecution, conflict, generalized violence, or human rights violations. this number includes 21.3 million refugees, 40.8 million internally displaced people (idps) and 3.2 million asylum-seekers (global migration trends fact sheet 2015). instead of the movement of people in terms of forced migration or becoming victim diaspora, the diaspora of indonesian muslims shows a different trend that can contribute to the recent study of this issue. in the following section, we provide an analysis that the trend of the indonesian muslim diaspora seems to be voluntary diaspora. 70 journal of asian social science research vol. 5, no. 1, 2023 indonesian muslim diaspora and the missions of preserving islamic identity and spreading islam the diaspora of indonesian muslims has been discussed by several scholars. they see indonesian muslims as active communities in organising their members and maintaining their social identity. for example, mujab (2017; 2019) and sujadi (2006; 2010; 2013; 2017) look at the development of islamic organizations in the netherlands by studying the case of ppme (persatuan pemuda muslim di eropa/the young muslim association in europe). those authors focus on describing the contribution of organisations in shaping indonesian muslim identity in europe. other authors explore the role of the typically indonesian islamic organization of nahdlatul ulama in the netherlands (pribadi 2022) and the role of the persatuan pelajar indonesia (ppi; indonesian student association) in germany (hasyim 2014). these works portray the way the indonesian muslim diaspora in europe voluntarily maintains the social bond and identity of their community (fachri and gusnelly 2019; mudzakir 2020; wardana 2015). hence, the type of indonesian muslim diaspora in western countries is not similar to cohen’s criteria and classification (cohen 2006; 1996) except muslim diaspora in the netherlands, where some relate to the history of dutch colonialization in indonesia. fachri and gusnelly (2019) mention that historically, since the end of world war ii muslims have been in north-western europe. those who migrated between 1945 and 1965 were the ex-colonials who arrived in their colonizing country, the netherlands. they were from indonesia (16,000) and javanese-surinam (34,000). others are students or workers who seek a better opportunity to live. however, they experience similar problems in the muslim diaspora. for example, it has been argued that indonesian muslims in australia are very vulnerable to experiencing being a minority in religion and identity (fakhruroji 2019) and being discriminated against islamophobia (safei et al. 2022; briskman 2015; akbarzadeh 2016). problems facing the indonesian muslim diaspora have motivated indonesian islamic organizations to introduce indonesian islam in western countries even though intolerance cases have been raised and some scholars consider indonesian islam is not as promising as it was. the pessimistic views are triggered by the decreasing indonesian democracy (aspinall et al, 2020; fossati et al. 2020; mietzner and muhtadi 2019), indicated by the flourishing inequality (muhtadi and warburton 2020; mietzner and muhtadi 2020), the increasing of conservatism/populism (bruinessen 2021; jubba et al. 2021; pribadi 2021; zuhdi 2018), and islamism (azca et 71ahmad abrori et al. al. 2019; arifianto 2020). however, some are still confident in the power of moderate islam as the origin of indonesian islam (subchi et al. 2022) and the fact of raising islamism is not the mainstream of indonesian islam (dzuhayatin 2020; sakai and fauzia 2014). “intolerant islam” currently may be more popular than it was, but the core of indonesian islam is moderate and tolerant indicated by moderate practices and interpretation and its compatibility with democracy, and human rights principles (azra 2004, 2006; daniels 2009; feener 2007; ricklefs 2012; woodward 1989). the power of indonesian islam promoted by nahdlatul ulama with the islam nusantara (arifianto 2016; aminuddin 2020; schmidt 2021) and muhammadiyah with progressive islam or islam berkemajuan (ali 2015; qodir et al. 2020; nashir et al. 2019) can go globally and influence muslim in the west and other regions. in this regard, pribadi (2022), for example, investigates how the perwakilan cabang istimewa (pci; special branch) of the nahdlatul ulama (nu) in germany extends its networks, seeks influence, competes and also compromises with other indonesian islamic organizations, campaigns indonesian islam, and exercises its religious agency. nu promotes moderate islam overseas to make its voices heard within the islamic communities and broader public in the host country and maintain socio-religious connections with the home country. this strengthens previous research on the role of religious study (pengajian), the role of other indonesian islamic organizations, and some media to keep indonesian muslims maintaining their religion and identity (muttaqin et al. 2016; setianto 2015). interestingly, future studies on indonesian muslims in the diaspora and the efforts to promote tolerant and pluralistic indonesian islam will be developed simultaneously. in addition to the role of organization, the voluntary diaspora can be identified as the activity of a missionary. here, diaspora is seen as a form of islamic missionary (dakwah) by which muslim preachers go overseas for their agenda in spreading islamic teachings. yet, their orientation is still strengthening internal groups within islamic communities who originate from indonesia. the reason why there is missionary activity amid the diaspora movement can be traced from the perspective of both preachers and the community. in the view of a preacher, the number of islamic scholars who are taking the role of recognised ulama or ustadz overseas has a small figure compared to the mushrooming of those who live in indonesia. this drives some preachers to have a call to go abroad to enhance islamic knowledge and guide islamic practices for their counterparts who live as diaspora muslims. ashabul kahfi, one of the indonesian muslim diaspora 72 journal of asian social science research vol. 5, no. 1, 2023 communities in sydney, for example, was founded under this missionary agenda and its leading islamic teachers have become permanent residents there (nasir 2019). this phenomenon of the missionary is also one of the key findings of the recent works of toyibah et al. (2020) and toyibah et al. (2017) who underline that there is a strong relationship between diaspora and the islamic missionary. the diaspora of recognised islamic ulama from indonesia can also be explained from the perspective of the community. this can use the data collected from indonesian muslims in australia, especially in sydney, which shows the range of indonesian muslim diaspora communities who identify themselves as kelompok pengajian (islamic study groups) (muttaqin et al. 2016). a recent work that listed 34 kelompok pengajian says that individual muslims from indonesia prefer to identify themselves as indonesian muslims who live in australia rather than australian muslims (muttaqin et al. 2016:178). the study provides the possible reason for this, namely the unwillingness of the community to integrate themselves into a larger number of australian muslims who came from other countries, such as lebanon, pakistan, and turkey (muttaqin et al. 2016). instead of integration, the indonesian muslim diaspora in sydney has enjoyed their kelompok pengajian-based communities which are formed due to their salient backgrounds, such as ethnicity or even ideological preferences. based on this sense of belonging, those communities are very welcome to those who visit australia intending to do the islamic missionary agenda and liven their kelompok pengajian. these some muslim scholars sometime turn eventually to be australian residents and are becoming part of the diaspora. conclusion the article has shown that the majority of muslim diaspora from islamic countries is a migratory population heading to western countries due to war and expulsion from their countries (55%), but the indonesian muslim diaspora is a more voluntary one. nevertheless, the indonesian muslim diaspora faces the same problems of being marginalized in western countries as most diaspora from other islamic countries. handling the social gap with the larger population, the indonesian muslim diaspora manages themselves by becoming 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things have changed the way of teaching and learning activities. the question was how schools provide services to their stakeholders. this disruption was accelerated with the onset of the covid-19 pandemic. this article aims to identify the social dimensions of education and their characteristics caused by the disruption of iot technology and covid-19. it examines social dimensions from the point of view of social intelligence, which comprises of three dimensions, namely social sensitivity, social insight, and social communication. in doing so, this study used a qualitative method based on a survey that involved respondents and their experience of learning through the iot platforms. the results of this study indicate that social sensitivity and social communication were the most problematic social dimensions in learning and teaching activities through the iot platforms. on the other hand, social insight was a very good dimension experienced by students in learning and teaching activities through iot and during the covid-19 pandemic. key words social sensitivity, social insight, social communication, internet of things, covid-19 *corresponding author: sabam parjuangan jl. z.a. pagar alam no.93, bandar lampung, lampung, indonesia email: sabamparjuangan@darmajaya.ac.id social dimensions of education in the era of the internet of things (iot) and during covid-19 pandemic journal of asian social science research 2021, vol. 3, no. 1: 57-72 https://cassr.net/jassr/ © the author(s) 2021 article 58 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 introduction internet of things (iot) is a term that refers to the ability of devices to connect and exchange data (parjuangan, setyawan and sofiyan 2019). the simplest term for iot is internet-enabled devices (wortmann 2015). internet connection is not just an exchange of data between two connected devices but also a function of completing a job or a process so that it can be done consistently and in real-time, and the production increases. being consistent means that the service that implements iot will not serve a particular service request selectively, but refers to the fulfilment of access and request queues. being in real-time means that the services delivered through the iot network output from the process have the same time where the service is processed and where the service is received. the increase in the number of production occurs, due to consistent processing capabilities and no wasting time for each production, because the connected devices run consistently. in addition, another thing that contributes to the popularity of iot technology is its ability to provide services and be served by the network. lastly, the combination of iot with various other fields of science further adds to the increasing use of iot in various sectors such as merging iot with artificial intelligence (yarlagadda 2018), iot and blockchain (fernández-caramés dan member 2018)where many of our daily objects will be interconnected and will interact with their environment in order to collect information and automate certain tasks. such a vision requires, among other things, seamless authentication, data privacy, security, robustness against attacks, easy deployment, and selfmaintenance. such features can be brought by blockchain, a technology born with a cryptocurrency called bitcoin. in this paper, a thorough review on how to adapt blockchain to the specific needs of iot in order to develop blockchain-based iot (biot, iot and big data (ochoa, fortino and di 2017) and iot with gis (geographic information system) (nourjou and hashemipour 2017). various fields have experienced iot disruption such as finance, sales, transportation services, supply chain, health, agriculture, and education. disruption certainly changes various aspects including changing the existing business processes in that field. as seen in the payment system, a transaction occurs by scanning the barcode using a smartphone device in which an application that has been integrated with an electronic wallet account has been installed. every change in business processes will change the role of everyone involved. this also happens to education. one of the business processes in the field of education is reporting student learning outcomes to students, 59sabam parjuangan and meliyanti parents, and related parties. the reporting system used today has information technology-based software that has a function in terms of reporting student learning outcomes (parjuangan and aditiya 2020). another thing that is currently being disrupted is the learning process in education. teaching and learning activities have been disrupted since 1990, starting from the computer-based training (cbt) era where the e-learning system was included in cd-room that could be accessed by students. however, in 1997 a new technology was born, namely the learning management system (lms). lms is a web-based learning platform through websites in which teaching and learning activities are carried out such as registration of participants, explanation of the concept of teaching materials, marking of student attendance, distribution of teaching materials to students, and implementation of exams and assessments (agustina, riska, santosa, and paulus 2016). currently, it is integrated into mobile applications, not only web-based. furthermore, software that provides virtual classes has been created so users can meet face-to-face online. so, currently, all teaching and learning activities can be carried out through software, although on separate platforms. now, this disruption is getting more massive with the outbreak of the covid-19 pandemic that started at the end of 2019, creating unexpected changes in the way how services are delivered including education services. all education services are forced to find solutions to deliver services to their stakeholders. new technologies are massively used to carry out teaching and learning activities such as zoom, google meet, and webex. this technology is used to carry out the implementation of learning like learning in class. currently, it has been more than a year that learning is carried out through virtual classes. many stories of joy and sorrow are reported in this field of learning activities through these platforms. some teachers are happy when their classes run smoothly, and all of their students have no problems in joining virtual classes. however, other teachers or educators have difficulty in explaining their learning materials to their students (syafutra and rachmat 2007). the arising problems are not only related to how to make students understand but also to various obstacles in providing independent learning to students and forming high order thinking skills (hots) of learning patterns. one of the demands of the current curriculum is that students are expected to have 21st-century skills in communication, collaboration (cooperation), critical thinking, problem-solving, creativity and innovation. all these aspects of 21st-century skills, in the development process, experience various challenges with learning platforms that implement iot 60 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 technology. for example, at the moment students’ critical thinking skills are only developed with assignments, whereas assignments are certainly influenced by various influences such as the opportunity to get assignments from various sources as well as help from related stakeholders. this is similar to problem-solving skills, in which problems are often used as assignments to students, even though these assignments provide students with opportunities to be not honest in solving these problems. so, teachers and lecturers cannot develop the ability of students in the field of problemsolving to the maximum. most of them give students online exam methods in the form of online quizzes. working together and communicating are the most difficult skills to develop as they cannot be done in virtual classes in the form of assignments (septiana and nila 2019). thus, 21st-century skills cannot be done completely with virtual classrooms. the limitations of the iot learning platform are thought to be unable to accommodate the development of 21st-century skills, especially in the communication and collaboration aspects. this article describes the forms of social intelligence of students who participate in teaching and learning activities through iot-based learning platforms. it especially describes the inequality of aspects of social intelligence in students. it also aims to give a recommendation for policymakers in the field of education in finding solutions for the development of the social intelligence of students. the method used for this research is qualitative. the stages in conducting this research were data collection, data analysis, and conclusion. the population and sample for this study were teachers and students who meet the criteria as follows: (a) teachers selected were those who conducted teaching and learning activities using an iot-based learning platform. the iot platforms in question are the learning management system (lms), edmodo, google meet, google classroom, google form, zoom, social media, and chat communication media platforms; (b) students selected were those who participated in teaching and learning activities through an iot-based learning platform. the iot platforms in question are the learning management system (lms), edmodo, google meet, google classroom, google form, zoom, social media, and chat communication media platforms; and (c) students selected were those from sma or equivalent schools, and higher education institutions. the sampling technique used was purposive sampling. data collection techniques used in this study were interviews, observation, and documentation. the interview is a communication and interaction process carried out by at least two people in a natural setting, in which the direction of the conversation refers to the goals that have been set 61sabam parjuangan and meliyanti and carried out based on mutual trust as the main foundation in the process of interpreting the contents of the conversation. the type of interview used in this study was a structured interview. each respondent was asked the same questions. another method of data collection was the observation by utilizing the human senses to see, hear, and feel. this observation was carried out on online kbm activities in virtual classes. the last data collection method used was documentation. documentation is carried out in finding data on various forms of notes, transcripts, books, newspapers, meeting minutes, agendas, and others (sidiq, choiri and mujahidin 2019). documentation was done in books or notes of a teacher/educator. the data analysis technique carried out in this qualitative research involves stages as follows. first, data reduction. this was done by summarizing the results of interviews, selecting the main things, focusing on matters relating to the variables and indicators. data that did not meet the criteria and indicators were ignored. second, data presentation. this was the stage of displaying data so that they could be understood easily in the form of tables, graphs, or summaries. the purpose of presenting this data was to organize the data so that they were well structured and had a pattern or grouped based on their similarities and differences. lastly, drawing conclusions and verification. this step was carried out after presenting, presenting, and analysing the data. so the data were studied comprehensively to conclude the data presented. social intelligence in his book, goleman (2006) tells a story to describe the social intelligence of two students. a student could not cooperate with others because he knew that he was intelligent and creative so that this made him arrogant and nobody could cooperate with him. he only reached the interview stage in employee recruitment so he failed to get jobs. but, another student, who was average in terms of academics, got job offers in various companies. this story shows that there is in need for 21st-century skills, namely the ability to work together and communicate, and this is related to social intelligence. social intelligence is a person’s ability to position themselves in an environment according to their scalability and competence. one must have these reliable skills to communicate and work with others. social intelligence is interpersonal intelligence in creating relationships, building relationships and maintaining relationships with other people so that both parties benefit from the relationship (bakti and putra 2012). kihlstrom and cantor (2019) who quoted thorndike and 62 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 edward (1920) say that “by social intelligence is meant the ability to understand and manage men and woman, boys and girl – to act wisely in human relations”. likewise, moss and hunt 1927 defines that social intelligence as the “ability to get along with others”. referring to these definitions, social intelligence is a person’s ability to interact with others and make these interactions valuable and useful for those who interact with each other. social intelligence has several indicators to pin on a person, namely: (a) ability to identify social situations; (b) ability to remember names and faces; (c) ability to observe human behavior; (d) ability to identify mental states when other people speak; (e) ability to identify mental states from facial expressions; (f) ability to know social information; and (g) ability to understand humor and convey humor. of all the indicators, it is narrowed down into several parts, namely: (1) someone sensitive to the social environment; (2) someone has social insight; and (3) someone who is able to communicate socially. so that these three indicators can be measured in humans to understand and identify a person’s level of social intelligence. referring to the current education curriculum at the primary, secondary, and higher education levels, students have a target specification of intelligence called 21st-century skills. the skills in question are the ability to work together, problem-solving skills, being creative and innovative, and the ability to communicate. however, disruption to teaching and learning activities is thought to interfere with the development of this ability for students. therefore, this assumption needs to be proven, and how much social intelligence is disrupted because of learning activities that use iotbased learning platforms and the occurrence of the covid-19 pandemic. characteristic of learning activities through iot-based learning platforms the ability of the device to exchange data with other devices provides opportunities for humans to exchange data (documents, voice, and video). the capabilities referred to are not only for devices similar to the spreader device, but also for different devices in terms of type, size, and specifications. data exchange certainly cannot be done without instruction. these instructions are embedded in the hardware and interface. hardware functions to store and generate instructions conveyed by instructions from the interface on it. structurally, the iot-based learning platform has several components as shown in figure 1. 63sabam parjuangan and meliyanti figure 1 iot-based learning platform architecture the iot learning platform architecture has several components, including teachers/lecturers who carry out several activities, namely managing classes, students, courses, distributing courses, creating virtual classes, evaluating, and reporting on teaching and learning activities. the next component of the iot-based learning platform is the participant/ student, the functions that can be performed as students on the iot learning platform are accessing classes, courses, and reports, doing assignments, and taking exams. the next component is the e-learning component, which functions to accommodate the activities of two groups of users, namely teachers/educators and students/participants. this component is in the form of hardware and software, a server computing device that can run a learning platform. the virtual class component is used by teachers/educators in conducting learning through virtual classes. the main component of all of them is the internet by which every device is connected to the internet network, which passes all data in teaching and learning activities. referring to figure 1, the characteristics of teaching and learning activities on an iot-based learning platform are a complex environment. so the possibility of various disturbances when learning using the iot learning platform is very high. currently, the most disturbing factor is 64 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 the network factor. when teachers/educators have made classes, managed courses, and distributed courses, students/participants cannot access them or vice versa. another nuisance was the power supply. since all devices must have a power source, it is best if this power source is always available throughout the teaching and learning process. to overcome these technical obstacles, teachers/educators and students/participants used different communication channels such as whatsapp, telegram, and telephone. another obstacle was the psychological condition of the participants who will experience disturbances to carry out learning. this happened to both teachers/educators and students/participants. another characteristic in teaching and learning activities is the communication line that is not always reliable in conveying a condition. for example, when the course material has been distributed through the e-learning platform, participants need some explanations to explore the course material that is distributed. but when communicating with teachers/ educators, they do not get a response or get a different response. this was an understandable thing in learning using the iot platform. likewise, when a virtual class is opened, when students/participants join, some of the characteristics of the incident are that the voice of the teachers/educators is not heard well and the opposite is true. likewise, course slides sometimes cannot be the main reference for students in understanding the course material that is being delivered. this characteristic demands that students must be in the best condition every time they participate in teaching and learning activities. so the difference in the material of learning conditions triggers the ability of students/participants to absorb the course material delivered. another thing, for some people this condition causes stress, because of the complexity of the course material that is assigned or tested. on the other hand, certain students/students even consider it a normal problem and seem to allow the consequences of the various obstacles they experience. these characteristics cause a variety of social intelligence among students/ participants.1 therefore, it is necessary to conduct an in-depth study of the impact of social intelligence on the characteristics of teaching and learning activities using the iot platform. covid-19 pandemic the covid-19 pandemic has started at the end of 2019. until today, efforts are made to deal with it so that it can be suppressed. as of today, the covid-19 pandemic has not ended. the handling methods recommended 1 another alternative that is done by teachers/educators is to switch to communication apps such as whatsapp and telegram. but some students/participants have the potential not to experience teaching and learning activities like in class (ajibaho 2021). 65sabam parjuangan and meliyanti in many countries are to maintain physical distancing, wear masks, wash hands, stay away from crowds and eat healthy food. all this has created changes in all fields. the pandemic has changed the way people communicate, shop, study, worship, and even visit families. the impact of the covid-19 virus on all corners of the earth has been so terrible. as a result of covid-19, teaching and learning activities have also undergone forced changes, in which teachers, institutions, students are not ready to face the covid-19-style learning pattern. it is not certain when this change will end because the regulations are still rolling to find the best method of tackling the spread of covid-19. teaching and learning activities that have changed are the activities of delivering teaching materials and learning activities in the classroom. during the pre-covid-19 pandemic, teaching and learning activities were held face-to-face directly in the classroom, with classroom equipment and procedures that supported learning conditions. meanwhile, during the pandemic, classes move to virtual ones, where teachers and students use various video streaming platforms. all course materials are distributed to students through various online platforms. some educational institutions have learning tools developed on a web-based basis, which are called lms. other institutions use communication platforms such as whatsapp or telegram. however, it can be ascertained that until today, there is no single teaching and learning activity that only uses one platform. all of them do a combination of platforms such as a communication platform with a video streaming platform and lms with a video streaming platform. some also use three platforms by using the lms platform to distribute course materials, take attendance, collect assignments and administer exams. the communication platform is used to hold discussions and disseminate information related to classes. video streaming is used to conduct online meetings to present course materials. for the prevention of covid, this method may be good, but for teaching and learning activities this method has many problems such as infrastructure, device availability, access, and users mindset. so the education sector is the most impacted by covid-19. the impact on the education sector is different from other sectors. the impact on other sectors can be directly felt and seen, but if the one on the education sector will be only seen in the next few years. one of the characteristics of teaching and learning activities during the covid-19 pandemic is the increasing communication lines to students/participants. this communication pattern has an impact on students, namely on their communication skills. another characteristic of teaching and learning activities during the covid-19 pandemic is the changing pattern of developing communication and collaboration skills. 66 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 all indicators of communication and cooperation skill development are assignments. in addition, due to teaching and learning activities from home, the development of critical and creative thinking skills in solving problems cannot be controlled directly by teachers/educators. another issue is the teaching and learning environment that is not always conditioned for the learning activities. students who want to complete assignments have to find the right time in quiet times or at night. this condition has impacted the students’ health. there are other issues in teaching and learning activities during the covid-19 pandemic, including the incompleteness of teacher/educator explanations in virtual classes due to interference from various sources. as a result, the course material is not holistically and comprehensively conveyed. social dimensions of teaching and learning activities through the iot platform demographically, the respondents in this study are aged from 16 to 59 years with 21.5% male and 78.5% female. the learning platform used by respondents in the pre-pandemic, pandemic, and post-pandemic periods are shown in figure 2. figure 2 the use of iot-based learning platforms and their supporting communications dimension of sensitivity the form of the social dimension that will be described in this article is social intelligence. social intelligence has three indicators, namely sensitivity to the environment, social insight, and communication and cooperation (mamangkey et al. 2018). an indicator of sensitivity is a 67sabam parjuangan and meliyanti person’s ability to understand a person’s mental state when interacting (suplig 2017). the iot-based learning platform is only able to present one’s atmosphere to others in three forms of visualization, namely visual texts, sound, and video. so, the things that can be identified from teaching and learning activities through iot-based learning platforms are voices and faces. meanwhile, for the delivery of material through text/sensitivity messages, it can be seen from the various forms of emoticons embedded and the use of fonts (uppercase or lowercase). the mental state of a person observed in this study was anger, sadness, enthusiasm, confusion, and pleasure. the cues that can be used by respondents who understood a person’s mental state when interacting are facial (41,5 %), sound (24,4%), gestures (4,9%), eye contact (2,4%), and others (26.95%). other criteria, referring to respondents’ answers, including being enthusiastic about a topic of conversation or on an issue (4,9%), emoticons and text messages (12.25%), and the answer to the assignment (9.8%). the number of respondents who understood a person’s mental state through the aforementioned cues that occur in iot-based learning platforms was 60,29%. this gesture was understood by several respondents after it happened more than twice that someone gave a response through facial cues, voice, gesture, eye contact, and replies to messages in the form of texts and emoticons. the number of respondents who understood a person’s mental state in teaching and learning activities through the iot platform after giving a signal was more than twice (76.47%). about 51 % of respondents admitted that knowing enthusiastic persons is easier than angry or confused ones. so that after suppressing the response to the signal, it can only be known that someone is angry or confused. however, there is 11.76% of respondents experienced that a person’s mental state cues are shown by turning off the camera on the iot learning platform for this type of video streaming. this is known after respondents took several types of approaches, including inviting them to talk through communication platforms and telephones. likewise for communication platforms, where during a discussion other cues were signs that describe a person’s mental state, namely by giving emoticons without texts, and not responding to the topic being discussed. this was identified when someone did not respond to the topic being discussed related to several mental states of a person such as “dislike” the topic and “confused” about the topic and experiencing “disruption of the learning environment” when there are other activities. regarding the messages that are only emoticons without texts, respondents understood that someone was gesturing to “care” about the topic being discussed. 68 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 video streaming platforms and communication platforms are iotbased learning platforms that are considered the easiest to accommodate respondents by giving and detecting signals of the mental state of the interlocutor or other participants in online meetings or learning activities. there was 77,94% of respondents shared their experiences that they knew someone was angry, sad, happy, or enthusiastic when conducting online meetings in virtual classes through the zoom platform and google meet. meanwhile, through communication platforms, only 47% of respondents understood easily the mental state of others. dimension of social insight this dimension of social insight was identified from one’s knowledge of social information. it was person’s ability to find out social information that develops in the educational environment such as information on changes in the implementation of online classes, offline classes, and exams, friends who were in grievance, friends who got an accident, and other social information of the class members. this dimension was not only measured from their social knowledge, but also from one’s response when they know social information. in this dimension, there was 91.17% of respondents said their experience. few of the class members in their learning group were slow in receiving social information and responding to it. there were one or two people of their class members who had less responsive social insight. usually, this was caused by several factors, including the use of communication tools simultaneously by family members as well as someone who had a high activity so that the hours of use of communication devices were high. the second indicator in determining one’s social insight was from their ability to accept humor. according to respondents, when information circulates in one’s social environment, it often became a source of humor for some people in a group who like to do humor. but if someone did not understand the information included in humor, then the humor was not funny to him or her and made them confused. someone who had good social insight knew minimal social information in his or her smallest environment. the respondent’s experience in teaching and learning activities shows that sometimes a participant in a virtual class or discussion said humorous words or texts made up of information that was being discussed. there is 69.11% respondents admitted that social insight in their environment was easy to detect, seen from the response when the social information was discussed in a discussion group or sometimes became an example in 69sabam parjuangan and meliyanti teaching and learning activities. however, this indicator was only seen from the information known or not, not from the depth of understanding of the information. given the massive communication platform used today, all respondents said that information, even the real-time one, was very easy to obtain. dimension of social communication this social communication was measured from several indicators, namely a person’s ability to express opinions to others and respond to opinions from others. teaching and learning activities carried out through the iot communication-based learning platform were measured by the ability of a person to work together in solving problems through the platform used, such as the ability to do group assignments. almost all respondents experienced miscommunication when they had assignments given through an iot-based learning platform. respondents usually overcame this by confirming each conversation with other communication platforms. regarding the indicator of “a person’s ability to express opinions”, 82.35% of respondents experienced difficulty in expressing opinions on the iot learning platform. this is because of the form of response to express opinions. for example, the form “if someone wants to ask/express opinions, please click the raise hand icon”: when someone clicked the icon of raise hand, he or she was not seen by teacher or educator. however, 95.58% of respondents often experienced inconsistencies in this communication. for example, if a guide said: “all questions can be submitted in the chat room”, he or she allowed others to express opinions or ask directly through their microphone. another problem was when several people wanted to ask questions or express opinions, technical problems like microphone troubles occurred. almost all of the respondents experienced these obstacles. as for the indicator of “cooperation ability” in teaching and learning activities through iot-based learning platforms, it is recognized that 95.58% of respondents said that cooperation could not be done through virtual classes. discussions had to be carried out in the form of assignments. collaboration was made possible via zoom pro in which groups could be divided into separate rooms. as for other platforms, this was usually done separately from online meetings or virtual classes. likewise, on the lms and edmodo platforms, collaboration indicators could not be carried out except in the form of assignments which were collected at a different time from the class implementation. 70 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 conclusion this article has shown that teaching and learning activities through the iot learning platform were limited in forming social intelligence, especially efforts to develop social intelligence in the dimensions of sensitivity and communication. the causes of problems in teaching and learning activities include the problem of “understanding course material”, which was not comprehensively measurable by teachers/educators. through virtual classes or communication platforms, the actual situation could not be identified by the participants of teaching and learning activities at iot based learning platforms. the results of this study also show that learning through an iot-based learning platform could not be developed to the maximum of the communication and collaboration skills of students/ students due to the unavailability of facilities for collaborative problemsolving in the learning platform in use. the controlled communication was one of the obstacles in the development of the communication dimension so that students/participants did not ask questions or did not answer questions because of the factors of the devices they used. as a result, the students were unable to develop critical thinking and problem-solving skills because every effort was carried out without control (in the form of independent assignments). as for social insight, it was only a social dimension that was well developed in teaching and learning activities through iot-based learning platforms. this was supported by the massive development of information dissemination platforms. but, this was not entirely as such due to the use of iot-based learning platforms. iot-based learning platform technology should be a supporting learning tool, not the main one, as it created problems particularly in terms of developing social intelligence, which is one of the important achievements in learning in the era of the industrial revolution 4.0. the ability to communicate, collaborate, be creative and innovative, as well as critical thinking and problem-solving are skills that need to be developed in the 21st century. however, the use of iot-based teaching and learning activities did not support all this. therefore, face-to-face mode of learning and teaching should be taken within a strict health protocol. the longer students learn from home, the more young generations experience setbacks in terms of social intelligence. 71sabam parjuangan and 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29 september 2021 (https://journals.sagepub. com/doi/abs/10.1177/000271622008700133). wortmann, f. and k. fluch. 2015. “internet of things,” bus inf syst eng. 57. doi: 10.1007/s12599-015-0383-3. yarlagadda, ravi t. 2018. “internet of things & artificial intelligence in modern society.” international journal of creative research thoughts (ijcrt) 6(2): 374-381. the impact of overseas training on the performance of bangladesh civil service: the case of ait extension training, thailand journal of asian social science research 2021, vol. 3, no. 2: 103-124 https://cassr.net/jassr/ © the author(s) 2021 article mohammad ali haider* university of chittagong, bangladesh shamim noor university of chittagong, bangladesh abstract public administration has to compete with private sectors in terms of quality service delivery to citizens. in this context, civil service training, especially overseas training, has been considered the most significant requirement to increase the performance of the bangladesh civil service. this article tries to explore the impact of overseas training on the performance of the bangladesh civil service. to achieve this objective, this study interviewed bangladesh civil servants who participated asian institute training (ait) extension training programme from 2016 to 2018. a mixed-method was applied to analyse the collected data. it found that bangladesh civil servants, who have received ait extension training, were satisfied with the training management of ait. participants believed that such overseas training positively contributes to enhancing the performance of the bangladesh civil service. however, this study also disclosed that fewer overseas training opportunities for young civil servants, lack of needbased training, and poor management of overseas training policy are the main obstacles in bangladesh civil service management. this article strongly recommends that there must be a detailed overseas training policy management and more collaboration with international training institutes to get better performance from the government officers in bangladesh. key words overseas training, ait-extension, bangladesh civil service, quality service, mopa * corresponding author: mohammad ali haider department of geography and environmental studies, university of chittagong, bangladesh. e-mail: haiderges75@cu.ac.bd 104 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 2, 2021 introduction in recent years, quality public service has become a significant issue in many developed and developing countries. however, the poor performance of government institutions, lack of resources, and traditional mindset of bureaucrats have been considered as major barriers in ensuring the quality improvement of bangladesh civil service (khan 2016; jamil 2002, 2019). now, quality improvement in public administration and civil service is vital. as it enables public administrators to ensure smooth, easily accessible, convenient, and impartial service delivery for citizens (khan 2016). a study by khan (2016) shows that due to proper implementation of administrative reform and strong political commitment and goodwill, the civil servants of southeast asian countries like hong kong, malaysia, and singapore can provide quality service to their citizens. in contrast, the experience of bangladesh is the opposite due to poor implementation of different administrative reform recommendations, lack of political commitment, politicization in administration, and lack of effective training of civil servants in building a sense of true professionalism with the mission of quality service delivery (khan 2013; 2015; jamil 2002). world bank report, governance matters-2012, made a ranking of government effectiveness of 209 states, in which singapore, hong kong, and malaysian civil service were categorized as ‘highly effective bureaucracy’ and ranked as 4th, 13th, and 41st respectively (khan 2015) whereas bangladesh civil service was apparent as an ‘inefficient bureaucracy’, and ranked 168th of 209 states. however, such empirical studies portrayed that civil service management of bangladesh is performing with various loopholes that need to consider for ensuring quality service from the civil servants in comparison with the global milieu. challenges to public administration are huge, not only because of regional diversity, but also states want to renovate the structure and functions of traditional public administration in the light of globalization, digitization, and new managerial principles (jamil et al. 2019). in this perspective, the bangladesh government has been trying to modernize the civil service to meet all these challenges. undoubtedly, to fulfil this mission, there is no alternative to the systematic application of organizational development through administrative reforms and staff development programmes like training and overseas exposure programmes for the civil servants. besides, an effective training programme has been considered as a robust process, through which both organizations and the routine functions of civil servants could be transformed into more professional, service-oriented as well as people-oriented. to fulfil such an endeavour, 105mohammad ali haider and shamim noor there must be a modern and inclusive human resource management policy focusing on the importance of training with career development. a study by european union (2015:179) states that “human resource management policy contributes to achieving the organization’s goals and objectives, as well as to realize a more integrated hrm approach, in which training is well connected with the appraisal and promotion system, career development and progression.” after the liberation, the government of bangladesh designed a detailed civil service management system. in bangladesh, both the ministry of public administration (mopa) and bangladesh public administration training centre (bpatc) are considered as legal functional bodies that are assigned to plan, design, and implement training for the civil servants. bpatc is considered as the apex training institution in the field of training civil servants of all cadres, which conducts several types of training like foundation training, on-the-job training, advanced training (ali 2007; kabir & baniamin 2012). besides this, to fulfil the special demands of different development plans and projects, government officials at different levels have to take part in different overseas training and exposure programmes from time to time. such types of international training and exposure programmes assist government officials to manage and implement various development and welfare projects at the national level. in this regard, the bangladesh government signed mou with different international training institutions, staff training colleges, and universities that offer professional training for government officials. in some cases, controversies have been raised regarding the effectiveness and proper application of such overseas training and exposure programmes. nevertheless, the importance of overseas training cannot be overlooked. the ultimate target of any human resources development intervention like training is to bring qualitative change in professionalism and ensure better service delivery. different staff training in bangladesh civil service is also a part of this process. beside financial support, various international donors like world bank, adb, imf, usaid, and undp provide technical assistance to the bangladesh civil service (khan 2013). as a part of this technical assistance, these international organizations always showed their priority on staff development through proper training and exposure visits both at home and abroad. similarly, the bangladesh government arranged and sponsored various staff development training abroad. however, there remains a controversy about the implementation of the learning that has been gathered from overseas training. studies reveal that lack of appropriate overseas training 106 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 2, 2021 policy regarding human capital for foreign-trained public managers is a major cause for their non-utilisation (alam and haque 2009). it is a pity, since their contributions are needed for customer-oriented public service and for the private sector to grow (muslim 2011). due to practice of maladministrative culture like inherited attitudes of the colonial legacies, elitism, administrative corruption, lack of transparency, uncertainty and ambiguity, and status-quo attitude of the civil servants (jamil 2002; khan 2013; 2016), sometimes, it has become impossible to bring changes and apply updated knowledge, skills and leanings of overseas training at the works place (ali 2004; aminuzzaman 2013; 2009; siddiquee 2003). it causes a great loss of public funds and citizens do not get their best services from bureaucrats. considering these facts and realities, this study tries to assess the outcome of overseas training of bangladesh civil service and to what extent these pieces of training are contributing to enhancing the performance of bangladesh civil service that leads to citizen-centric service delivery in bangladesh. it analyses the effectiveness of such overseas training and exposure programmes for bangladesh civil servants focusing the case of the asian institute of technology (ait) extension, thailand. it attempts to find out the impact, priority issues, and possible ways to improve overseas training for ensuring quality service of bangladesh civil service. it reviews and analyses five different mid-level to higher-level overseas training and exposure programmes offered by the ait extension, thailand. through the analysis, this article explores the ultimate impact and correlates the outcomes with service delivery of bangladesh civil service. it also analyses the expectations of the civil servants and practical constraints that most civil servants are experiencing at their workplace. institutional framework of human resource management of bangladesh civil service in this era of rapid globalization and the application of icts, from both public and private organizations’ perspectives, human resource management constitutes the most important component. the success of organizational missions and objectives largely depends on ensuring the right persons in the right positions, a detailed strategic plan for staff development, as well as the commitment and contributions of personnel in ensuring client/ citizen’s satisfaction (siddique 2003). in this regard, from both theoretical and practical aspects, sound human resource management, for both public 107mohammad ali haider and shamim noor and private sectors, have acquired a growing significance and is seen as the most crucial variable that regulates the performance of an organization (patterson et al. 1997). however, the entire framework of human resource management of bangladesh civil service operates within the framework of the constitutional provision, statutory and non-statutory rules, and regulations (siddiquee 2003). the constitution of bangladesh was adopted in 1972 and has been amended several times. since then, different political governments have amended and adopted new rules and regulations through which the bangladesh government has designed a detailed framework for the management of the civil service and its procedural. central personnel agencies (cpa) of the government, the ministry of public administration (mopa), and public service commission (psc) have been functioning in bangladesh (ali 2004; siddiquee 2003). the mopa is charged with the general responsibility for overseeing important aspects of personnel administration whereas the routine control of personnel belonging to various ministries/departments remains the responsibility of concerned ministries. the mopa not only lays down the broad policies, principles, and regulations for managing the public service and part of these, but is also assigned to take major decisions in respect of creation of a cadre, its composition, and strength, rules of recruitment, and promotion policy (ahmed 1986; siddiquee 2003). the mopa is responsible for the initial recruitment of all cadre service officials and disciplinary actions and the welfare of senior officials in the secretariat and outside (ali 2007; siddiquee 2003). for staff development, the mopa is also assigned to formulate training policies for the improvement of the professional skills of the government officers and arrange training both at home and abroad. the psc, which is known as a constitutional body, is responsible for conducting all tests and examinations for the selection of suitable persons for appointment to the civil service. the structure and function of pscs are delineated in the article no. 137 and 140 of the constitution of bangladesh (gob 2016). the psc is supposed to advise the government on personnel matters and act as a ‘watchdog’ and acts more as a ‘recruiting agency’ of the government, whereas the mopa is considered as the most significant agency that has jurisdiction over almost all aspects of human resource management of bangladesh civil service (ali 2007; siddiquee 2003). 108 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 2, 2021 training institutions and training policy for bangladesh civil service training institutions training is seen as the most appropriate mechanism that can improve performance by enhancing the knowledge, skills, and capabilities of public servants to accomplish their tasks with efficiency. as such, training has received a high priority in subsequent plans of the government and an elaborate institutional arrangement has already been made to this effect. the most significant move towards this direction was the establishment of the bangladesh public administration training centre (bpatc) in 1984, by amalgamating the four existing training institutes like basc, nipa, cota, and sti (ali 2004; kabir & baniamin 2012). in addition to bpatc, currently, there are a good number of training institutes offering specialized training to civil servants of different categories and levels. based on departmental training needs, most of the cadres of bcs have training institutes that offer a wide variety of courses (siddiquee 2003). however, the establishment of bpatc with modern facilities, logistics, and staff support is seen as a major event in the field of public service training. as an apex training institute of the country, bpatc runs both post entry and in-service training for civil servants of all categories and levels (ali 2004; siddiquee 2003). besides its core programmes, bpatc offers various courses of shorter duration for a variety of trainees and its four regional centres offer skill training for lower-level employees under various ministries and departments. at present, there are different types of training imparted to bangladesh civil servants. the major categories are a) foundation training covering four months; b) on-the-job training during the period of probation covering about a year; c) on-the-job training for bcs (administration) cadre known as settlement training covering three and a half months or less; d) advanced training for officers of and above the rank of joint secretaries; and e) foreign training (ali 2004:235). moreover, to conduct different professional or specialized training, it is estimated that there are all most 150 training institutions in the country belonging to different ministries and public statutory bodies (ali 2004). public administration training policy (patp) the government of bangladesh approved the public administration training policy (patp) on may 6, 2003, which aims at strengthening and reorienting training activities for enhancing the administrative and managerial capacity of the government officials (aminuzzaman 2013). 109mohammad ali haider and shamim noor for the human resource development of public servants, the patp recognizes training as one of the major instruments. aimed at building the professionalism of public servants at different levels, the patp gives a clear policy direction that bpatc and other public sector training institutions would invent need-based, result-oriented, and market-based training programmes. however, giving these issues priority, there are some significant objectives of this policy to fulfil the ultimate objective of civil service training as follows: • to meet the challenge of the 21st century, civil service training must be operated based on diverse need-based, result-oriented, and market-responsive, which aims at building the professionalism of the government employees at a different level; • to equip the public servants at all levels with the requisite knowledge, skills, and techniques to enable and make productive use of their potentials, and to ensure balanced and sustainable economic development; • to make training at various levels attractive, enjoyable, and rewarding, there must be a congenial environment through which both trainees and trainers will be attracted; and • to ensure institutional capacity through efficiency and training performance, there must be an appropriate environment in the public offices (gob 2003). apart from these objectives, public administration training policy 2003 sets different overseas training criteria and required eligibility and provisions for civil servants. in this regard, the policy states to enhance the efficiency, eligibility, and to supplement the skill deficiency of government officers, overseas training should be regularly organized (gob 2003). to fulfil this aim of overseas training, the policy suggests a standing committee in each ministry or division for the selection of candidates for overseas training. to achieve both home and abroad training objectives, the policy also defines some important strategies that cover strengthening of the existing training institutions by developing infrastructural facilities, capacities of the faculties, collaboration with private sector training institutions, decentralisation of training activities, and so on (gob 2003). however, in reality, there remains a gap between de facto and de jure of civil service training in bangladesh. though the institutional framework and the policy are properly designed, due to the colonial mindset of the bureaucrats and the practice of various mal-administrative cultures, the 110 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 2, 2021 ultimate impact and the application of training is negligible at the workplace (khan & siddiquee 1998; khan 2016). moreover, proper utilisation of training sometimes becomes more confined due to having a lack of support from the superior level and the absence of proper career planning (ali2004). the selection for overseas training sometimes depends based on interrelationships with the superior at the office. a study by ali (2004:139) shows that “foreign training opportunities are available to those who could manage it and domestic training opportunities are for those who could not avoid the training.” ensuring the best outcome of overseas training, alam and khair (2014) argue that it should be based on the administrative needs and the trained officials should be placed in relevant departments so that their acquired knowledge could be productive. they also showed that 39 per cent of respondents who acquired knowledge from overseas training had either underutilized or not utilized at all and 22 per cent of respondents said that they had dissatisfied with the present overseas training (alam and khair 2014). therefore, long-term strategic vision and well-articulated training policy need to be adopted in support of the maximum utilisation of overseas training learnings. furthermore, in each ministry, there is a committee that allocates scholarships for overseas training and visits to the civil servants. although the impact of these exposure visits and foreign training is hardly assessed in actual terms, overseas training programmes seem to help officials gain insight, learn lessons, network and formulate particular policies more effectively (jamil et al. 2019). importance of overseas civil service training in bangladesh due to the pressure of globalization and the application of ict in the public sector, a rapid transformation has been noticed both in the nature and practice of service delivery in bangladesh public administration (khan 2013; bhuyian 2011). certainly, such transformation at the organizational level brings changes both in the structure and employees’ culture, beliefs, and practices. as a result, there is a growing consensus among governments to portray public administration to be more customer-oriented, costeffective, and user-friendly when delivering public services to the citizens (bhuyian 2011) by discarding the contextless nature of traditional public administration (haque 1996). to perform such changes, considering the local or indigenous norms, civil servants have to be more dynamic and people-oriented. but, in reality, due to conflict between inherited colonial administrative culture and the formal or expected behaviour based on western bureaucratic norms, government officials sometimes failed 111mohammad ali haider and shamim noor to realize the expectations of the citizens in developing countries like bangladesh (haque 1996). in another study by european union (2015), the traditional relationships between government officials and citizens were more bureaucratic and hierarchical, while the new relationships have become more pluralistic and user-centric to achieve an understanding of their perceptions, expectations, and commitment through active participation between bureaucrats and citizens. as a discipline, the study and practices of public administration have been transforming through a paradigm shift over the years. therefore, to keep pace with such changes, the administration of the developing nations takes several attempts to reject the traditional model of administration and advocate more dynamic, professional-oriented, and business-like management principles through which sustainable social and economic development would be ensured (sarker 2004; bhuyian 2011). despite its poor implementation and incapacitated management, several studies found that overseas training has helped considerably on the performance of civil servants of public administration in bangladesh. it has resulted in substantial impacts such as the improvement in knowledge, skills, and learning performance, acceleration in administrative reform initiatives, reformation in the local training curriculum, people-oriented mindset, cost-effective services and good turnover (alam and haque 2009). however, the implications of such new values will focus more on changes in structure, processes, and functions of traditional public administration values (common 1998). in the bangladesh context, the nature and practices of public administration are also experiencing such a transformation. the government of bangladesh is committed to digitizing all public services in every ministry or department by maximizing the service quality and minimizing the time and cost of the citizens (planning commission 2015; siddiquee 2016; undp 2017). there has also been significant progress including the introduction of the citizen’s charter since 2008 in every government office for ensuring quality services (kundo 2018). so, improving the quality of overall governmental functions has been considered a big challenge and there remains a tension between tradition and modernity in developing countries like bangladesh. public administration faces several challenges to ensure quality services in both the least developed and developing countries like bangladesh. therefore, they need to develop and enhance the network of bilateral and multilateral cooperation for the development of their public servants. certainly, such cooperation and knowledge sharing opportunities like overseas training, higher studies, and exposure visit 112 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 2, 2021 programmes enable the bureaucrats of least developed and developing countries to achieve updated technical knowledge, know-how and facilitate institutional capacity building (alam and khair 2014). however, bangladesh has received the highest number of foreign-funded training programmes in south asia (adb 2006). governments in bangladesh and development partners have placed a high priority on the human resource development of government officials in the form of providing various overseas training, higher studies, and exposure visit programmes both at home and abroad. besides the domestic training programmes, foreign training has also become almost an institutionalized feature in bangladesh. for the training of bangladesh public servants, donor organizations and development partners such as australia, japan, netherlands, norway, and the united kingdom have provided constant technical support (alam and khair 2014). as a result, in the last few decades, the number of foreigntrained and educated public officials has increased in bangladesh. keeping the importance of overseas training in priority, after the creation of bpatc, the bangladesh government has arranged several international training and exposure programmes for the government officials through bilateral cooperation. as a part of this process, the asian institute of technology (ait) extension, an international training partner organization of mopa and bpatc, offers different training or exposure programmes based on three categories like instant need-based training, training as a part of bpatc’s foreign training, and participation in the international training bid to organize training session. ait extension believes that public sector reform efforts in developing countries need to embrace the changes of public administration and draw on a range of public management models by putting the needs and interests of citizens at the centre. in this context, to transfer technical knowledge and capacity buildup of government officials, ait extension promotes exposure visits to a network of government agencies in the regions and capacity development expertise and learning professionals’ programmes since its inception (ait extension n.d.). through the public sector capacity building programme of ait extension, it has been selected as an implementing partner to run the regional training session for the bangladesh civil service at different levels. the ait extension offers various series of training courses focusing on public administration reform, good governance and citizen-centric service delivery, and advanced public sector management for effective policy implementation for bangladesh civil service (ait extension n.d.). 113mohammad ali haider and shamim noor such programmes have been designed as on-site studies in which learning courses are mapped with the requirements that mopa gives. such a training or exposure programme will allow the participants to think and identify critical areas that can be applied to reform programmes of bangladesh civil service (ait extension 2016). the ait extension overseas training programmes it has been recognized that human capital development is not confined to internal interventions, but rather the importance of external affairs like overseas training, exposure visit, and higher studies has got equal acceptance. one of the main objectives of such human capital development is to acquire new knowledge, skill and bring a positive change in attitude. but such staff development endeavours are not confined to acquiring competencies. rather, a congenial environment of concerned institutions is also considered a prerequisite. however, this study attempts to focus on overseas training effectiveness, especially the ait extensions’ training programme, and its impact on the knowledge, skill, and attitude of the government officials. figure 1. conceptual framework the objective of this study is to critically analyses the ait extension’s training and its impact on the performance of bangladesh civil service. specifically, this study tried to investigate the effectiveness of overseas training conducted by ait extension, the impact of the training on the trainees, major barriers in training management, priority issues in overseas training, and how to make training courses more effective for enhancing the competency level of bangladesh civil servants. 114 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 2, 2021 this study used both primary and secondary sources of data. primary data were collected through key informant interviews, training observation, and extensive exposure visits with the respondents. for key informants’ interviews, a structured checklist was used and the number of key informants was 83. there was 25 assistant commissioner who has been working for around five years in different ministries of the bangladesh government and 58 additional secretaries who have been working for more than 20 years in different ministries. among the 83 respondents, 12 (14.46 per cent) were female and 71 (85.54 per cent) were male. five full training courses were observed to understand the training in-depth. major sources of secondary data were collected from related sources like journal articles, books, and reports. the performance of ait extension training programmes human resources of any organization (public or private sector) need proper training to achieve organizational goals and objectives. undoubtedly, professional training enables the personnel to be more competent to perform their duties and responsibilities. however, the ultimate objectives of any successful training endeavour depend on the proper application of training methods and materials through which an effective and inclusive learning process could be ensured. figure 2 indicates the overall performance of the ait extension training programmes within the stipulated time. it was found that maximum participants were highly satisfied with ait’s training. participants shared their opinion based on the likert five points scale indicating excellent to poor. the participants considered ait’s training a very good programme (54.22 per cent), excellent (18.07 per cent) and good (19.28 per cent). figure 2. performance of ait extension training 115mohammad ali haider and shamim noor ait extension has achieved a world-class position in offering international training for government officers at different levels. the civil servants of bangladesh received training with the collaboration of ait extension, mopa, and bpatc. ait extension is capable to develop their training infrastructure like world-class international trainers, modern training equipment, exposure visit to relevant national and international organizations (both public and private) and hospitality at reasonable training cost. it should be mentioned here that participants who received training from ait extension more than one time considered the programme ‘very good’ and ‘excellent’, and they shared that it is very convenient to receive overseas training that is not far away from home. the impact of the ait extension training programme this study analyses the impact of ait extension training at the participants’ workplace. after receiving training, they were interviewed based on the likert five-point scale indicating from ‘significantly high positive impact’ to ‘poor impact’. figure 3 shows that the training of ait extension was considered to have a ‘significantly high positive impact’ (38.55 per cent), ‘high positive impact’ (30.12 per cent), and ‘very high positive impact’ (8.43 per cent). figure 3. the impact of the ait extension training however, the training impact depends on some factors like the trainee’s level of competency, working environment, organizational culture, and institutional support. the gravity of training impact also depends on 116 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 2, 2021 participants’ performance in the session, and the trainer’s capability to reach the trainees. participants state that though the overseas training motivates them highly, in reality, in most cases they cannot apply their learnings effectively. for this reason, they pointed to the traditional mindset of the superior, resistance to change attitude, and lack of a congenial working environment. subsequently, though the overseas training seems highly effective, the positive outcomes are not worth mentioning due to having different barriers at the implementation stage. the barriers of effective overseas training management since the inception of bangladesh, public administration faces some major challenges in ensuring good governance. consequently, there remains a controversy in the quality of service delivery of government officials. the main hindrances of good governance in bangladesh civil service are colonial legacy, lack of transparency, strong leadership, and poor institutional capacity. this study found some constraints of good governance and their impact on quality training. figure 4 depicts the key interferences such as lack of commitment and inefficiency (34.94 per cent), the colonial mindset of government officials (31.33 per cent), political interventions (25.30 per cent) directly or indirectly contributing to lack of effective training planning and management (44.58 per cent), and less training opportunity, and inappropriate training (30.12 per cent) for the right officers of the bangladesh civil service. figure 4. barriers of effective overseas training management 117mohammad ali haider and shamim noor factually, in bangladesh civil service, remain some dominant factors of the british colonial legacy. the training participants at ait extension also feel that the government offices and civil servants are not free from such mariculture. figure 4 shows that a lack of accountability, transparency, integrity, commitment, professionalism and administrative corruption still prevails in the bangladesh civil service. after completing ait training, participants had to perform within such an environment. unfortunately, such administrative culture and practices at the workplace create barriers in the way of proper implementation of overseas training values and experiences. in many cases, qualified officers miss the opportunity for overseas training and the participants are selected for overseas training that is not relevant for hi or her needs. consequently, such types of management and planning hamper ensuring good governance and quality service. ensuring the right person for the right training and its proper implementation certainly assists in the gradual elimination of existing barriers of good governance. the priority issues of overseas training for bangladesh civil service strategic training management is indispensable for effective training. the controversy is always persisting in bangladesh civil service whether the right persons are selected for the right training. sometimes, the debate has arisen when need-based training is not offered to the participants. this study found some priority issues that need to be considered for the overseas training of the bangladesh civil service. figure 5 shows that emphasis should be given to department-wise need-based training (69.88 per cent). it also indicates that behavioural and motivational training (54.22 per cent) and recent development issues (45.78 per cent) must be considered in the overseas training. 118 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 2, 2021 figure 5. priority issues of overseas training sometimes government officers are sent to overseas training for which she or he does not fit. overseas training modules should be redesigned based on concerned departmental needs. so, it might be expected, the objectives and outcome of the training will be attainable meaningfully. however, the overseas training programme should not be implemented merely from a generic perception, that will cause excessive spoil of public exchequer. making effective overseas training for bangladesh civil service in response to how to make overseas training more effective and meaningful, the key informants gave several suggestions and ideas. though the participants were very much pleased with the hospitality of ait extension training, some issues need to be considered in the case of overseas training. figure 6 shows that the highest number of the participants (66.27 per cent) thought that overseas training should focus more on the case study and real-life examples avoiding excessive theoretical discussion. they also suggested sufficient scope of exposure visits (62.65 per cent) to the different offices of international organizations with day-long experience of sharing sessions and seminars. moreover, sufficient training duration and schedule (59.04 per cent) need to be considered for ensuring effective learning outcomes of the overseas training. 119mohammad ali haider and shamim noor figure 6. making effective overseas training this study indicates that for ensuring effective learning, there must be a sufficient duration of overseas training. participants suggested at least two weeks of training duration will be helpful to concentrate on the training contents, which will be quite difficult for the one-week training session. moreover, based on the conventional trainees’ assessment (pre and post), performance results should be disclosed and need to be considered in career development. it is also found that resource persons who have indepth local knowledge and administrative culture will ensure a congenial environment for the trainees to share and discuss local problems in the training session. conclusion this study has shown that considering the reality of political and administrative culture in bangladesh, ensuring an effective and resultoriented public personnel training of civil servants is not a smooth task. though the government has a training policy at the national level, there must be some specific articles or clauses through which the government can ensure robust and need-based training for suitable personnel, especially in overseas training or exposure programmes. however, such an effective and detailed policy framework for overseas training has been considered indispensable. having a lack of such a policy framework, sometimes it has been noticed that different ministries and departments arrange overseas training or exposure programmes, and it has become the talk of the country due to the programmes’ questionable purposes and allocation of irrational 120 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 2, 2021 expenditure. generally, every year the government has to expend a huge amount of public money for such international training or exposure programmes for government employees. regrettably, it has been found that due to poor training management like lack of need-based training, proper selection of trainees, suitable training schedule with sufficient duration, overseas training or exposure programmes failed to bring a positive and satisfactory outcome of overseas training. the fundamental purpose of training is to acquire know-how, new skills, and competence for the greater interest of quality service. but due to traditional administrative culture and practices, trained staff cannot apply the acquired knowledge at their workplace in most cases. consequently, the trained personnel feel isolated from the rest of the members and get psychologically demotivated at the workplace. this study also highlighted such findings from the participants’ point of view. to maximize the best outcome and better service-driven administrative mechanism, this study recommends some suggestions to make overseas training or exposure programmes more mission-driven and result-oriented for the recipients. the recommendations would be (i) offering overseas training on contemporary issues and need-based such as information and communication technology (ict)-related training, strategic management, and leadership quality build-up and there must be a provision of serving to a certain period after receiving an international training; (ii) selecting promising personnel for ensuring more participation of junior and mid-level officials who are likely to render a greater length of service and the selection process should be free from all kinds of departmental biases and favouritism; (iii) sufficient training duration in ensuring the best outcome; (iv) disclosing training evaluation report and linking training with career progression, and (v) ensuring the congenial working environment and the concerned authority needs to assist respective officers in every aspect of eliminating all possible 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2017. south-south in action: citizen-friendly public service innovation in bangladesh. united nations office for southsouth cooperation and access to information (a2i) programme. prime minister’s office, government of the people’s republic of bangladesh. retrieved from (https://a2i.gov.bd/wp-content/ uploads/2017/11/3-south-south-in-action-citizen-friendlypublic-service-innovation-in-bangladesh.pdf). 124 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 2, 2021 muhamad ali1 university of california riverside, usa abstract indonesia and malaysia offer comparative perspectives concerning the relationship between loyalties to the muslim umma, local ethnicity, and the modern nation-state, and how interpretations of the sharia and modern constitution, laws, politics, and policies intersect in multiple and changing ways. this article seeks to compare and contrast some of the contemporary discourses on sharia and citizenship as demonstrated by indonesian and malaysian scholars, politicians, and activists. both indonesian and malaysian constitutions were born out of the modern notion of citizenship that recognizes religious diversity. on the one hand, the constitution of indonesia does not specify islam as the state religion, but the government promotes official religions. on the other hand, the constitution of malaysia makes it explicit that islam is the state religion while recognizing religious diversity. the indonesian government does not conflate particular ethnicity with islam, whereas malaysia integrates islam and malay ethnicity amidst malaysian religious and ethnic plurality. both cases prevent us from categorizing each case as either an islamic legal conservatism or a modern legal liberalism. these two cases resist the binary opposition between sharia conservatism deemed against citizenship and modern legal liberalism deemed against religious laws. there are ambiguities, contradictions, as well as compromises and integration between conflicting ideas and systems concerning islam and citizenship. keywords sharia, citizenship, the constitution of indonesia, the constitution of malaysia, ethnicity, legal conservatism, legal liberalism intisari indonesia dan malaysia menawarkan perspektif perbandingan mengenai hubungan antara kesetiaan kepada umat islam, kesukuan lokal dan negara-bangsa modern, dan bagaimana tafsiran syariah dan konstitusi modern, hukum, politik dan kebijakan saling interaksi the conceptions of sharia and citizenship in indonesia and malaysia journal of asian social science research 2019, vol. i, no. 1: 1-14 http://jassr.cassr.web.id © the author(s) 2019 article 1 corresponding author: muhamad ali religious studies department, university of california riverside, 900 university ave, riverside, ca 92521, usa. email: muhamad.ali@ucr.edu 2 journal of asian social science research vol. 1, no. 1, 2019 dalam cara yang beragam dan senantiasa berubah. artikel ini berupaya membandingkan wacana kontemporer tentang syariah dan kewarganegaraan yang diusung oleh cendekiawan, politisi dan aktivis di indonesia dan malaysia. konstitusi indonesia dan malaysia keduanya lahir dari gagasan modern tentang kewarganegaraan yang mengakui keragaman agama. pada satu sisi, konstitusi indonesia tidak menjadikan islam sebagai agama negara, tetapi pemerintah mempromosikan agama-agama resmi yang diakui oleh negara. pada sisi lain, konstitusi malaysia secara jelas menyatakan islam sebagai agama negara sambil mengakui keragaman agama. pemerintah indonesia tidak menggabungkan kesukuan tertentu dengan islam, tetapi malaysia mengintegrasikan islam dan melayu di tengah keragaman agama dan suku. kedua kasus ini tidak bisa dikategorikan satu pihak sebagai konservatisme hukum islam dan pihak lain sebagai liberalisme hukum modern. keduanya tidak bisa disimpan dalam oposisi biner antara konservatisme syariah yang menolak kewarganegaraan dan liberalisme hukum modern yang menentang hukum agama. dalam kasus indonesia dan malaysia ini, terdapat ambiguitas, kontradiksi, kompromi dan integrasi antara ide-ide dan sistem yang bertentangan mengenai islam dan kewarganegaraan. katakunci syariah, kewarganegaraan, konstitusi indonesia, konstitusi malaysia, suku-bangsa, konservatisme hukum, liberalism hukum introduction indonesia and malaysia offer comparative perspectives concerning the relationship between loyalties to the muslim umma, local ethnicity, and the modern nationstate and regarding how interpretations of the sharia and modern constitution, laws, politics, and policies intersect in multiple and changing ways. this paper seeks to compare and contrast some of the contemporary discourses on shari’a and citizenship as demonstrated by indonesian and malaysian scholars, politicians, and activists. both indonesian and malaysian constitutions were born out of modern notions of citizenship that recognizes religious diversity. the constitution of indonesia does not specify islam as the state religion but the government promotes six official religions, whereas the constitution of malaysia makes it explicit islam as the state religion while recognizing religious diversity. indonesia does not conflate particular ethnicity with islam, whereas malaysia integrates islam and malay ethnicity amidst malaysian religious and ethnic plurality. in this paper, i compare and contrast the relationship between the conceptions of sharia and citizenship in indonesia and malaysia. both cases prevent us from categorizing each case as either an islamic legal conservatism or a modern legal liberalism. it resists the binary opposition between sharia conservatism deemed against citizenship and modern legal liberalism deemed against religious laws. 3ali, muhamad there are ambiguities, contradictions, as well as compromises and integration between conflicting ideas and systems concerning islam and citizenship. different people and institutions have demonstrated diverse interpretations of sharia and citizenship and have produced eclectic, often contradictory legal discourses and policies. colonial legacy, demography, forms of government, religious networks, and cultural politics and political culture contribute to such similarities and differences as well as persistence and change. the position of islam and worldly laws in the constitutions of indonesia and malaysia the early debates concerning the position of islam leading toward the birth of the nation-states of the republic of indonesia (proclaimed in 1945) and federation of malaya (proclaimed in 1957) suggest that each state was not meant to be an “islamic state” in which muslim leaders would be the only possible leader and islamic law would be the primary source of the constitution. both states were post-colonial states adopting and adapting the european and internationalizing system of nation-states with their notions of citizenship and religious freedom, instead of the classical and medieval notions of the dhimmi (the protected “people of the book” minorities) or other forms. yet, the malaysian case presents some islamist discourses where dhimmitude is an important point of reference, whereas the indonesian case hardly shows such reference. indonesia was declared as being founded on the state’s philosophy called pancasila with the first pillar being one godhead (ketuhanan yang maha esa) with the seven words (stipulating that the state shall oblige muslims to practice their shari’a) being proposed, then removed, and sometimes debated (hosen 2005). malaysia has one of its constitution’s articles stating that islam was to be the religion of state while recognizing the belief and practice of other religions. in indonesia, the intentions of the founding fathers, including sukarno, were quite clear: indonesia shall not be a secular state in the sense of the complete separation of the religion and the state as perceived to have prevailed in the west, neither shall it be an islamic state. in malaysia, the intention of the founding fathers, including tunku abdur rahman, was a “secular” state amidst the recognition of the special position of islam in the rituals and ceremonies and the recognition of religious freedom (fernando 2006). in both constitutions, there is neither a “secular state” nor an “islamic state”. in the malaysian federal constitution 1957, the word ‘secular’ does not occur, although references to islam occur in twentyfour places and to sharia on three occasions. other islamic words such as mufti, kadi, and kadi besar also occur in the text (kamali 2008). still, there is no explicit and official statement indicating unambiguously the position of the sharia and its relationship with citizenship. the law of malaysia is mainly based on the common law legal system, as a result of the british colonization of malaya, sarawak, and north borneo between the early nineteenth century to 1960s. the constitution of malaysia stipulates the responsibilities and rights of malaysian citizens. federal laws, which apply throughout the country, set out such matters of citizenship, defense, civil and 4 journal of asian social science research vol. 1, no. 1, 2019 criminal law, trade, and education) whereas state laws address local government, sharia law and courts, state holidays and public works. in terms of citizenship, the constitution states that to acquire it, three basic methods are recognized: by operation of law, by registration, and by naturalization, and by transfer (applicable to singapore citizens). the requirements are the intention to reside permanently, having a good character, and having an elementary knowledge of the malay language (or the english language, or any native language in the case of sarawak) (groves 1963). there is no specific religion stated as one of the requirements for malaysian citizenship. on fundamental liberties, the federation of malaya’s constitution has several subject matters such as the prohibition of slavery and forced labor, protection against retrospective criminal laws and repeated trials, equality, prohibition of banishment, freedom of movement, freedom of speech, assembly and association, freedom of religion, rights in respect of education, and rights of property. certain liberties are subject to constitutional qualifications such as that of equality, specific privileges being granted to malays, freedom of religion, the states being permitted to control or restrict the propagation of any religious doctrine or belief among persons professing the muslim religion, rights in respect of education, laws providing special financial aid for muslim institutions being authorized (groves 1963:270-271). regarding equality, malays will continue to enjoy, as before, special privileges, notably as to positions in public service, scholarships, and bursaries, and business licenses. in terms of religion, article 3 (1) states islam as the religion of the federation and preserves the right to practice other religions in peace and harmony. islamic religious acts, observances, or ceremonies cannot be extended to sabah or sarawak as they can be extended to other states. the constitutional provision allowing state law to restrict the propagation of any religious doctrine or belief among muslims extended to the whole federation; but the borneo states may include provisions requiring a special majority, not being a majority greater than two-thirds of the total number of members of the assembly, for the enactment of such legislation. according to a study, with the joining of the borneo states, the significance of the constitutional proclamation of islam as the religion of the federation is reduced; for it is the official religion of only a part of the federation, and the concept of religious pluralism has been strengthened (groves 1963:271-272). in the aftermath of the ethnic riots in 1969, malaysian leaders formulated rukunegara, the pillars of the state, although they did not put it in any part of the constitution. the principles of citizenship were an attempt to forge solidarity among the peoples: 1) belief in god, 2) loyalty to the king and nation, 3) upholding the constitution, 4) sovereignty of law, 5) good behavior, and 6) courtesy and morality. it is not a legal document but an important policy document (ponniah 2000:31-34). all state constitutions in the malay states (nine out of the thirteen states) prescribe that the ruler of the state must be a muslim. there is no formal announcement of the islamization policy, but affirmative actions have taken place in the sphere of matrimonial law, divorce, guardianship, maintenance, child custody, inheritance, etc, for its muslim citizens, and the law 5ali, muhamad also provides a structure of sharia courts, state councils of muslim religion, fatwa committees, the islamic center, and the islamic religious affairs department. the government also established the international islamic university malaysia (iium), the international institute of islamic thought and civilization (istac) and the institute of islamic understanding malaysia (ikim). the administration of islamic law enactments in the various states penalizes offenses against islam and deviationist teachings. article 121a of the federal constitution protects the sharia court against interference by the civil courts (kamali 2008:237). the preamble of the 1945 constitution of the republic of indonesia recognizes such terms as the almighty god (allah yang maha kuasa), and the pillar of one godhead (ketuhanan yang maha esa). one of the articles stipulates it is the unitary state of the republic and it is based on law (negara hukum), without specifying what systems of law (while malaysia mention the sharia laws and courts being one of the state’s law jurisdiction, although still under the federal laws in the event of conflict). the dutch civil law, customary laws and aspects of islamic law have become parts of the indonesian legal pluralism. on citizenship, the 1945 constitution states that citizens shall be the people of indonesia who are indigenous (orang indonesia asli) and the peoples from other nations (orang-orang bangsa lain) legalized with laws. all citizens shall be equal before the law and governance and shall have the same responsibility for upholding the law and governance without exception. the constitution states that every citizen has equal human rights, including the civil and legal rights, the right to life and job, to have family, and protection from violence and discrimination. in chapter xa “human rights”, article 28e stipulates that every individual has the right to profess a religion and worship according to the religion, to choose education and teaching, to choose job and citizenship, to choose where to live and leave it and return. the article also includes a clause stating that each individual has the right to freedom of belief, to express ideas and attitudes, according to their own conscience. on chapter xi “religion”, article 29 states that the state shall be based on one godhead and the state shall provide freedom for each citizen to profess a religion and to observe according to their religion and belief. the indonesian constitution does not have any statement that islam is the official religion nor does it state that islamic law shall be the source for the laws. yet, islamic law has become one of the sources for the laws and regulations, and bylaws in different parts of indonesia from 1945 to the present day. of course, dutch-influenced, local customary, and other laws and customs have interacted with islamic laws and practices. conceptions of sharia and citizenship in political discourses in the above official documents, the notion of citizenship, in particular, is not framed in terms of dhimmitude although discourses on dar al-islam, dar al-harb, and dar al-‘ahd have been put forward in non-official publications and speeches. in some of the muslim organizations’ writings and speeches, indonesia has been conceptualized as being dar al-‘ahd, the house of agreement (between different factions, muslims and other religious communities). but, dar al-‘ahd is framed as 6 journal of asian social science research vol. 1, no. 1, 2019 neither a secular nor an islamic state. the mainstream formulation has been that indonesia is negara pancasila, a state based on the “official national ideology”, capable of satisfying all citizens of the new state and expressing several principles that would bind them together. however, those in power would tend to interpret and use it in conformity with their particular interests (meuleman 2006:52). in terms of ethnicity, indonesia has no mention of a religion with a particular ethnicity in its formulation and enactment of citizenship. the constitution does not state javanese, which numbers around 40 percent of the 250 million population as being necessarily islamic. malaysia has malayness as being associated with a special position against other races, particularly chinese and indians, and with islam. as part of the colonial legacy, and preserved however endlessly debated, islam and malayness continue to be conflated and article 153 of the constitution states that a malay is described as someone who habitually speaks malay and is a muslim. of the 30 million population, about 57.8 percent are malay (and indian) muslims. malay citizens who convert out of islam are no longer malay under the law and hence forfeit the bumiputera (sons of the soil) privileges afforded to malays under the constitution. the politics and culture in malaysia has been largely and frequently framed in terms of the bumiputera and the non-bumiputera, even until the present day. ethnic and religious pluralism in both sociological and normative terms has been the source of tension and conflict as well as cooperation, being shaped by pre-colonial and colonial experiences, and post-colonial interests and agendas (embong 2001). although the constitution has no statement on the concept of dhimmi, scholars and activists have discussed malaysian citizenship in terms of the old concept. in a booklet entitled malaysia adalah sebuah negara islam, ahl aldhimma is translated as non-muslims, orang kafir or unbelievers, and some references are made to the payment of jizya by non-muslim, in light of the book al-ahkam al-sultaniyya by al-mawardi (martinez 2001). the malaysian culture and politics of the bumiputera versus the nonbumiputera has its indonesian parallel, the pribumi versus the non-pribumi, although the history and development vary. quite similarly, in the post-colonial and contemporary discourses, the terms have their racial connotations: the pribumi has been associated with muslims (malays in the case of malaysia, and multiethnic muslims in the case of indonesia) and the non-pribumi particularly with the chinese deemed immigrants and a threat. social-economic disparities and racial prejudices have persisted, partly as a colonial legacy and post-colonial attitudes and policies. the dutch colonial administration divided their colonial population into the europeans, foreign orientals (including chinese, indian, arabs, and other non-europeans), and the inlander. the latter had been translated as “pribumi”. the new order’s assimilationist politics for the sake of national unity and political order, despite the integration of chinese elites in the national politics and marginalization of chinese public and culture in the public arena, proves destructive to a national sense of freedom and justice. in the aftermath of the 1998’s racial riots, president b.j. habibie issued a presidential instruction banning the use of pribumi/non-pribumi by public officials and allowed schools 7ali, muhamad to teach mandarin (husen 2017). president abdurrahman wahid further allowed chinese languages and cultures in the public and confucianism to revive itself and develop. indonesian political parties such as golkar, pdip, pan, and pks have expressed their official and non-official statements on the relationship between islam and citizenship. generally speaking, they all recognize indonesian as their citizenship and loyalty to their homeland (tanah air) as a crucial part of their vision and programs. being muslim, for them, thus showing loyalty to the umma, meant not in contravening with being a citizen of the republic of indonesia. however, they differ and change over time in terms of specific ideas, discourses, and policies concerning issues and subject matters about islam, muslims, sharia, democracy, citizenship, and other social, economic, and political issues. for example, as a political party long associated with secular nationalism and sukarno, partai demokrasi indonesia perjuangan (pdip) has sought to make alliances with islamist parties and islamic civil society, particularly the nahdlatul ulama. the creation of baitul muslimin indonesia (bamusi) has been seen as a way of debunking the perception that the party is at odds with islam. for the pdip, however, islamic law should not be formalized in the form of laws and regulations but can be interpreted as being primarily moral and substantive and to be enacted in the framework of indonesian nationalism and the state’s philosophy of pancasila, such as demonstrated through the bamusi’s concern with the people’s welfare in the villages (sa’di 1999). for this party, in theory, loyalty to the nation is greater than loyalty to islam or any other religion, but these multiple loyalties should not be in contradiction if islamic law was approached as moral law and spiritual guidance rather than formal laws and regulations. the notion of modern, democratic citizenship is above and foremost in both form and substance. the party of justice and prosperity (partai keadilan sejahtera [pks]) has its vision: a missionary (da’wa) party promoting islam as the solution to the life of the nation and the state. for the party, islamic teachings and values serve as the transformative force in the process of development of the muslim umma and the nation in all the domains of life. islam as both a norm and a system can and should be the source for creating a civil society (masyarakat madani) in indonesia. the party has one of its mission: to pursue communication and cooperation with all other elements of the muslim umma in the creation of islamic solidarity (ukhuwah islamiyyah) and the unity of the muslim umma (wihdah al-ummah) and with all other elements of the nation in sustaining togetherness in realizing reform agenda. partly in a response to many muslim groups who sought to revive the piagam jakarta “with the obligation that muslims should implement their sharia”, and those who sought to keep the chapter without the phrase, during the debate in the house of representatives in 2000, the party’s leaders, such as hidayat nur wahid, made references to the constitution of madina, piagam madinah, attributed to the prophet muhammad during his religio-political rule. along with other politicians, hidayat nur wahid proposed the revision of the article: “the state shall be based on oneness of god with the obligation that each religious community implements their religion,” in accordance with the piagam madinah when the existing religious 8 journal of asian social science research vol. 1, no. 1, 2019 communities coexisted under the leadership of the prophet. he proposed “piagam jakarta in the light of the piagam madinah”. he said that the obligation for each religious community to observe and implement their own religion is in accordance with the quran 42:13; 4:59; and 5:41-47). nur wahid proposed a “constitution that is just and democratic” (cited in rahmat 2008:52). among the muhammadiyah leaders, scholars, and activists, there is variation in the discourses concerning sharia and citizenship despite the broad agreement that emphasizes their organizational identity (as warga muhammadiyah), the sense of belonging to the islamic umma and their indonesian patriotism (exemplified in their views of watan and qawm) and national citizenship, without contradiction. indonesia is referred to as the state of pancasila, the state’s ideology for all indonesians in their national life. indonesian citizenship is conceived of as one of the multiple loyalties that could be hierarchical, equal, different, or inter-connected, depending on one’s perspectives. organizationally and individually, discourses on citizenship have emerged in response to the diverse, often conflicting ideologies in contemporary indonesia. there is the concept of umma fadhila, the outstanding, virtuous society, or “khairu umma”, “the best society”, where there is justice and prosperity. according to haedar nasir, the “true islamic society” or the khairu umma is a society based on the teachings of islam (the quran 3:110), a civilized society that respects human rights (the quran17:70), keeps relations with god and other human beings (the quran 3:112) and upholds equality and prosperity for all humankind (cited in fahrudin 2006:149). citizenship refers to commitment on the contractual basis for performing one’s responsibility. the muhammadiyah’s leaders and members do not promote the creation of an islamic state, but they believe that citizens have to be critical of the government, global capitalism and other forms of practices deemed injustices as the effects of globalization. they have the responsibility for supporting and criticizing the government in terms of the implementation of islamic values in society. according to the leaders, responsible citizens should demonstrate readiness to face problems in the state and the nation. they have to be critical and use their voting rights to elect their leaders. citizens should have a control capacity and criticize the violations of human rights, and to respect and to be tolerant toward diversity, and to struggle against discrimination, parochialism, and chauvinism (fahrudin 2006:150). citizens have equal rights to education, economic empowerment, security, and defense. citizenship also should mean equality before the law. it also means loyalty to the state and the nation, not the regime as such, without being critical (fahrudin 2006:151-153). the nahdlatul ulama (nu)’s conceptions of the shari’a and citizenship are not radically different from the muhammadiyah in terms of their continued support for the unitary state of the republic of indonesia and the pancasila state. specific discourses center around the localization of islam labeled as “pribumisasi islam”, which was promoted by abdurrahman wahid, and more recently the archipelagic islam, “islam nusantara”. the ahmad siddiq’s formulation of ukhuwwa islamiyya, ukhuwwa wataniyya, and ukhuwwah insaniyya (islamic, nationalistpatriotic, and human brotherhoods), that has been reiterated by the contemporary 9ali, muhamad leaders, shows their commitment to promote and defend indonesian islam deemed unique and special in relation to other, particularly arab, “fundamentalist”, and “liberal”, expressions of islam. said agil siradj, for instance, said that building a strong democratic nation requires good quality citizenship. participation in development in all fields of life through deliberation (musyawara). citizenship also means that the state apparatus should set as examples in upholding the law, distribute the economy, and provide the people’s welfare and security. citizenship (muwatana) and nationalism are closely related. hence, “civic nationalism” should be implemented in the essence and substance, not in the label. an islamic conception of muwatana, he said, emphasizes the values of human progress such as capability, professionalism, ethos, ethics, and character, all the more important than just the labeling. the teachings of islam do not detail the affairs of politics. islamic identity is not important because the nu promotes civic values such as diversity, justice, equality, prosperity and human dignity, and blessing for all humanity (sakri 2015). for the salafis, who seek to emulate the original three generations of muslims and a return to the true islam, islam is more global than local, more universal than particular. the wahdah islamiyyah, founded in 1988 by some students at hasanuddin university in makassar, south sulawesi, after disconnection with the muhammadiyah that accepted the pancasila’s sole ideology during the soeharto’s era, and influenced by the transnational muslim brotherhood, sees itself as a “nationally oriented islamic movement”, not radically different from the muhammadiyah and the nadhlatul ulama. this movement also embraced the concept of “wasathiya”, moderation, which, according to its leader muhammad zaitun rasmin, was neither “extreme left”, by which he meant liberalism, and communism or “extreme right”, which denotes the islamic state (isis) and jamaah islamiyah. by “wasathiyya”, the group also meant defending the unity of the indonesian republic and, according to most of the leaders and members, upholding pancasila. it also supported “middle-road democracy”, between “authoritarianism” and “chaos”. it still rejects the shia and the ahmadiya as heretic groups and foreign to islam, but may accept them as citizens, and the rest of the organizations as islamic and indonesian (chaplin 2016). in malaysia, mahathir mohammad declared “bangsa melayu” in 1991 that would cultivate an inclusive national citizenship, with equal rights for all citizens, regardless of ethnicity. but, the tension remains: malays remain concerned about their special position and special rights enshrined in the constitution. malaysian citizenship remains between both the civic and the ethnic (guan 2013). datuk seri najib tun rajak, then deputy prime minister, the leader of the united malays national organization (umno), understood the concept of malaysia’s citizenship as being based on a social contract and consensus among the races when malays proclaimed their independence. that concept has been translated into the federal government which states specific details concerning the rights and position of the malays and those of the non-malays, he contended, in response to the revived ideas of malayan union and malaysian malaysia (hasan 2006). the debate reemerged when the public questioned the contract social which 10 journal of asian social science research vol. 1, no. 1, 2019 gave malays the special status as being only the leaders of umno, the malaysian chinese association (mca), and the malaysian indian congress (mic), not the people through a referendum. malay privileges, for them, should remain intact, making references to the early days of independence. pas continues to promote its islamization agenda but with pragmatic politics. different leaders and activities propose the idea of islamic state, but they seek to emphasize its compatibility with democracy, clean governance, human rights, and justice. for abdul hadi awang, a madina and al-azhar graduate who assumed the position of pas deputy president and unofficial ideologue, the islamic state would accommodate non-muslims. awang said that malays should not be entitled to special rights and privileges and he condemned ethnic chauvinism of the umno-lead barisan nasional. but, awang and pas found it difficult to reconcile its demands for the implementation of the shari’a law, including the hudud criminal law, with their accommodative politics toward non-malays and non-muslims (liow 2004). for nasharuddin mat isa, another deputy president, pas sought to re-imagine or even re-brand the party. they wanted to make the party more relevant to multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, and multi-religious malaysia. they believe in democracy. they needed to be realistic because “malaysia is not an overwhelmingly muslim-majority country”(case and chin-tong 2006). although malaysia was meant to be a “secular” in the beginning, regarding it as an islamic state has become popular among many, albeit for different meanings and purposes. for example, ustaz engku omar amiruddin engku ali from majlis ulama isma (muis) said that islam is the state’s ideology and an islamic state is a state based on the ideology of islam. in malaysia, islam is the religion of the federation and this should become the basis for all the laws and regulations. the prophet muhammad practiced this when he got rid of the jews who challenged islam as the basis of the islamic state of medina. the caliph umar practiced this through the dhimma: the people of the book (ahl al-kitab) should not make their shirk public. they should show their symbol of a cross and other things from their scripture in the paths of the muslims. they should not use the bell except softly. they cannot raise their voice in their churches when muslims were present. if they violated these requirements, their dhimma status would be annulled. therefore, engku ali maintained that people should understand their responsibilities as citizens to protect islam as the basis of the state without confusing it with the issue of religious freedom (engku ali 2017). but for sisters in islam, malaysia is not an islamic state and the interpretation and implementation of the sharia should be in accordance with the ideas and practices of human rights and equal citizenship. as stated on their website, they “promote an understanding of islam that recognizes the principles of justice, equality, freedom, and dignity within a democratic nation-state.” they are critical of racial segregation and discrimination and provide legal advice on matters related to various problems such as child marriage, polygamy, domestic violence, hijab, criminal laws or hudud, and fundamental liberties. for them, islam, human rights, secularism do not have to be contradictory. in all their concerns, sisters in islam prioritizing malaysian citizens over only malay or muslim concerns many groups as it could violate universal human rights and islamic principles. 11ali, muhamad the delicate balance between modern constitutionalism and islamic teachings has been threatened by the increasing islamist legalism (hamid 2009). now, some voices and movements are pushing toward islamization of the laws in malaysia, but other voices are resisting the islamist tendency. abdullah badawi’s concept of civilizational islam (islam hadhari) eclectically articulates religious desires and secular agenda with its modern notion of piety, good governance, and protection of the rights of minority groups and women (ali 2011). the prime minister najib abdul razak promoted “1malaysia”, aimed to emphasize unity in diversity without necessarily neglecting the special place of islam and malayness in the state and the nation. one of the official websites states that 1malaysia is built based on the federal institution, the constitution, rukunegara, wawasan 2020 (vision 2020), the national mission, and their vision on unity and togetherness. the concept combines the ideas of integration in all fields of life and emphasizes the interests of national integration regardless of racial backgrounds and religions for the sake of prosperity for all, a concept that is enduring and important for malaysians to understand and embrace. according to a public survey conducted by the merdeka center, non-malays are increasingly appreciative of the multi-ethnic initiatives by najib, in particular, the “one malaysia” concept (hamayotsu 2012). yet, one malaysia is a goal, not necessarily the practice. there are competing ideas of citizenship, including those between the “common” national citizenship and “regional” citizenship. malaysians seek a “deep horizontal comradeship” between the subjects, but civil society often raises regional citizenship such as those in sabah in opposition to any nationwide and shared citizenship. there is also a power struggle between the bumiputeras, the malay muslims and the non-malay non-muslims, such as between malays and christians and animists in sabah and sarawak (sadiq 1999). conclusion in theory, a state with an official religion or a state with godly nationalism can recognize the political equality of all its citizens as long as the religion itself embraces some relevant sort of equality for everyone (feldman 2002). but, liberal theories oppose the idea that specific ethnic or national groups should be given a permanent political identity or constitutional status (kymlicka 1995). in practice, malaysian laws recognize the equality of citizens, but they give privileges and affirmative action to the malays in the context of their underdevelopment in contrast to the chinese race considered non-indigenous yet better-off. 1indonesian laws state equal citizenship, but some laws and policies are potentially and in many cases discriminatory against particular religious and gender minorities. theory and practice do not always go hand in hand. the old concept of the dhimmi has been referred to in some circles in malaysia and the concept of the prophetic constitution of medina is also used in the discourses in indonesia. but, these old concepts are references that different people use and interpret in different ways and for different purposes. islamist and secular orientations continue to prevail and struggle for more influence in society. but, the “middle paths” between sharia conservatism and modern law liberalism are the norm rather than the exception. for most malaysians and indonesians, sharia and equal citizenship are at least in theory no contradiction. 12 journal of asian social science research vol. 1, no. 1, 2019 notes 1 see www.sistersinislam.org.my 2 see http://www.1malaysia.com.my/ 3 in other contexts, such as those among the progressive egyptian scholars, the modern concepts of muwatinun or citizens are conceptualized as being different from the old concept of dhimmiyun, the protected peoples. liberal practices of religious freedom and secularism may actually make a greater difference and polarization. see fahmi huwaydi, muwatinun la dhimmiyun (cairo: dar alshuruq, 1985); saba mahmood, religious difference in a secular age: a minority report (princeton and oxford: princeton university press, 2016). references abdusalam, husen. 2017. “asal-usul dan politik kata “pribumi”. retrieved 26 october 2017 from (https://tirto.id/asal-usul-dan-politik-kata-pribumicyxt ). ali, muhamad. 2011. “eclecticism of modern islam: islam hadhari in malaysia”, studia islamika, vol. 18, no. 1: 1-32. case, william f. and liew chin-tong. 2006. “how committed is pas to democracy and how do we know it?”, contemporary southeast asia, vol. 28, no. 3: 385-406. chaplin, chris j. 2016. “global salafi activism and indonesian islam”. new mandala, 29 july 2016. retrieved 27 october 2017 from (http://www. newmandala.org/global-salafi-activism-indonesian-islam/). embong, abdul rahman. “the culture and practice of pluralism in postcolonial malaysia”, pp. 59-85. in robert w. hefner (ed.), the politics of multiculturalism: pluralism and citizenship in malaysia, singapore, and indonesia. honolulu: university of hawai`i press. engku ali, ustaz engku omar amiruddin. 2017. “menghormati malaysia negara islam adalah tanggung jawab semua warganegara”. retrieved 27 october 2017 from (http://muis.org.my/2017/05/menghormati-malaysia-negaraislam-adalah-tanggungjawab-semua-warganegara/ fachruddin, fuad. 2006. agama dan pendidikan demokrasi: pengalaman muhammadiyah dan nahdlatul ulama. pustaka alvabet.: 2006. feldman, noah. 2002. “political equality and the islamic state”, philosophical topics, vol. 30, no. 2: 253-272. fernando, joseph m. 2006. “the position of islam in the constitution of malaysia”, journal of southeast asian studies, vol. 37, no. 2: 249-266. groves, harry e. 1963. “the malaysian constitution: malaysia act”, malaya law review, vol. 5, no. 2: 245-275. guan, lee hock. 2013. “shades of citizenship: betwixt the civic and the ethnic”. southeast asian affairs , 168-188. retrieved march 24, 2020 from (www. jstor.org/stable/23471143) 13ali, muhamad hamayotsu, kikue. 2012. “once a muslim, always a muslim: the politics of state enforcement of syariah in contemporary malaysia”, south east asia research, vol. 20, no. 3: 399-421. hamid, ahmad fauzi abdul. 2009. “implementing islamic law within a modern constitutional framework: challenges and problems in contemporary malaysia”, islamic studies, vol. 48, no. 2: 157-187. hasan, rosni. 2006. “konsep kewarganegaraan berasaskan kontrak sosial”. retrieved 27 october 2017 from (http://ww1.utusan.com.my/utusan/ info.asp?y=2006&dt=1204&pub=utusan_malaysia&sec=muka_ hadapan&pg=mh_06.htm) hosen, nadirsyah. 2005. “religion and the indonesian constitution: a recent debate”, journal of southeast asian studies, vol. 36, no. 3: 419-440. humaydi, fahmi. 1985. muwatinun la zimmiyun. cairo: dar al-shuruq. kamali, mohammad hashim. 2008. shari’ah law: an introduction. oxford: oneworld. kymlicka, will. 1995. multicultural citizenship: a liberal theory of minority rights. oxford: oxford university press. liow, joseph chin yong. 2004. “exigency or expediency? contextualising political islam and the pas challenge in malaysian politics”. third quarterly, vol. 24, no. 2: 359-372. mahmood, saba. 2016. religious difference in a secular age: a minority report. princeton and oxford: princeton university press. martinez, patricia a. 2001. “the islamic state or the state of islam in malaysia”, contemporary southeast asia, vol. 23, no. 3: 474-503. meuleman, johan. 2006. “between unity and diversity: the constitution of the indonesian nation”, european journal of east asian studies, vol. 5, no.1. ponniah, moses. 2000. “the situation in malaysia”, transformation 17, 1:31-34. rahmat, m. imdadun. 2008. ideologi politik pks: dari masjid kampus ke gedung parlemen. yogyakarta: lkis. sa’di, ahmad. 1999. “islam dan pdip: studi terhadap aktifitas politik dan pandangan keagamaan baitul muslimin indonesia”, bachelor degree thesis. department of islamic political thought, the faculty of ushuluddin and philosophy, syarif hidayatullah state islamic university, jakarta. sadiq, kamal. 1999. “when being “native” is not enough: citizens as foreigners in malaysia”, asian perspective, vol. 33, no. 1: 5-32. sakri, satar. 2015. “kewarganegaraan dalam pandangan kang said”. retrieved 27 october 2017 from (http://liputanislam.com/kajian-islam/ kewarganegaraan-dalam-pandangan-kang-said/.) 14 journal of asian social science research vol. 1, no. 1, 2019 panji mulkillah ahmad* universitas gadjah mada, indonesia indi hikami universitas gadjah mada, indonesia biko nabih fikri zufar universitas gadjah mada, indonesia appridzani syahfrullah universitas gadjah mada, indonesia abstract youtube is a digital platform that allows content creators to stream their videos in exchange for money earned through the youtube partner program mechanism, motivates many people to join youtube. however, what they do not realize is the hidden effect youtube brings in the form of alienation experienced by youtube content creators as digital labour. this article discusses this phenomenon of alienation experienced by digital labours. using a qualitative approach with a descriptive research design, it offers a narrative research strategy to examine the narrative and discourse of alienation of content creators on youtube. the unit of analysis of the study is the content of youtube creators as digital labour. the findings show that youtube is mainly a vehicle used by digital capitalism for the sake of profit accumulated by exploiting content creators from the videos they make. content creators receive disproportionate or even no financial compensation from youtube for the videos they produce for youtube. as a result, youtube content creators as digital labour experienced alienation from their work, their work activities, from themselves as a human species and from other humans. * corresponding author: panji mulkillah ahmad department of law science, universitas gadjah mada, indonesia email: panjimulkillah@mail.ugm.ac.id digital labour: digital capitalism and the alienation of youtube content creators journal of asian social science research 2021, vol. 3, no. 2: 167-184 https://cassr.net/jassr/ © the author(s) 2021 article 168 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 2 2021 key words alienation, youtube, digital labour, digital capitalism introduction it is not exaggerating to say that the advanced development of science and technology has brought a tremendous impact on all aspects of human life. such development that stands out is the convergence of two entities: technology and communication. long before the age of the internet, it is already known that telecommunication equipment in the form of a telephone, for example, is the result of this convergence at its first foray. as time progressed, the convergence produce other products which are more advanced than before. the variety of platforms we encounter today is the result of this long process of creating new and better technologies now and then. in these platforms, the interaction among humans is a duplication of the embodiment of interaction in cyberspace. in this sense, castels (2004) refers to a network society as a society whose social structure is made up of networks supported by microelectronics-based information and communication technology. in more detail, castles (2004) explains that the network society is formed from three processes: the technological revolution, the restructuring of capitalism, and the socio-cultural movement. the process of exchanging information becomes one of the keywords of the network society. this model society is a society characterized by information that flows through global networks at an unprecedented speed (redshaw 2020). the flow of information on the internet goes so fast as a result of the duplication of human interaction being transferred to the virtual realm. this can be seen from the high number of mobile phone users around the world, which is statistically around 48% of the total world population. almost half of the world’s population has a cellphone and interacts there and the virtual world becomes a noisy space due to interactions that occur non-stop for 24 hours. on the other hand, van dijk (2006) distinguishes different characteristics between network society and mass society. the significant differences include, according to van dijk, network communities are more heterogeneous and more individualistic considering their connectedness due to existing networks, whether it is the internet or more specifically social media. digitization also has impacted the economy so that the term digital economy appears. according to turban (2002), the digital economy, also known as the internet economy, the new economy, or the web economy, refers to an economy based largely on digital technologies including digital 169panji mulkillah ahmad et al. communication networks (internet, intranet, etc.), computers, software, and other related information technology. the digital economy also has characteristics that are different from that of the conventional economy. according to potts (2016), the digital economy can be digitized and tracked, connected to the internet which then connects assets, suppliers, workers, and policymakers. another characteristic is that the digital economy operates by sharing, personalizing customers, and creating direct relationships between buyers and sellers. these characteristics provide convenience for the community. in addition to the convenience obtained by the owners of capital, the convenience for the public in accessing the internet and a wide selection of products are the main attractions for conducting transactions. however, there are several obstacles when it is used for conducting conventional shopping transactions. the internet has now also turned into product windows and spoils the eyes of the people who are constantly thirsty for their consumptive desire. as a result, the digital economy has a strong capitalistic style and capitalist domination that will never stop even though times have changed to the digital era (fuchs 2014). the velocity of money in the virtual realm occurs in an astonishing number and grows higher every year. data from statista state that the revenue received by e-commerce in 2020 reached 4.2 trillion dollars, a three-fold increase from 2014 which was recorded at only 1.3 trillion dollars. the largest turnover of money occurs in e-commerce. for example, ebay revenue alone in the first quarter of 2021 amounted to 3.2 billion dollars. in 2020, amazon’s revenue reached 386.1 billion dollars. digitalization has also created in the world’s top companies that profit at a fantastic rate. three of the top five companies in the world today are companies that are closely connected to the internet. however, the money circulation on the internet is not only generated by e-commerce alone but also by various social media platforms. facebook as a social media platform, for example, is included in the world’s top companies that generated 870.5 billion dollars in 2020. social media platforms can turn into giant companies with huge profits. although these social media platforms are downloaded and used for free, profit-taking is a common motive behind the creation of such platforms (elder-vass 2016). this article analyses youtube, one of the most popular digital platforms in the world. it provides youtubers (the video content creators on youtube) with opportunities to produce videos on youtube in exchange for dollars earned through the youtube partner program mechanism. this 170 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 2 2021 motivates many people, including media corporations, to make youtube their main platform for showing their videos. youtube’s economic potential is in line with the indonesian government’s agenda to encourage young people to engage in the digital economy. according to president joko widodo (2017), the potential money from the digital economy sector in indonesia could reach us$ 130 billion in the 2017-2022 period. what is not conveyed behind this big lure is that there is a hidden alienation experienced by content creators as digital labour. this article aims to uncover this alienation and to prove that youtube as a digital platform is not just a space of expression, but also a capitalistic profitoriented corporation. in doing so, this article uses a qualitative approach with a descriptive research design and uses a strategy narrative research (ollerenshaw and creswell 2002) to analyse the narrative and discourse alienation of creator content on youtube. the rich narrative and discourse on digital labour who experience alienation as a social phenomenon is much interest of this research. the unit of analysis of this research is youtubers as content creators who have unconsciously experienced alienation as long as they continued to create content. youtube and digital capitalism youtube is the largest video on demand platform today, which was founded in 2005. it has the slogan “broadcast yourself” with an ambition to be a place of expression through video. at first, users or content creators only made youtube-like social media in general, as a space for self-expression. then in 2007, youtube introduced the youtube partner program (ypp) which allows youtubers to receive funds in return for the videos they upload with a certain mechanism. in addition to ypp, youtube then provides support to creators in the form of youtube academy and youtube ambassador. the ypp is given to content creators to motivate them to monetize their videos on youtube. while the role of youtube academy is to improve the quality of videos and channels, the youtube ambassador is to inspire other people/creators to be more successful in monetizing their activities on youtube (labas and yasmine 2017). the main way to earn money from youtube is with ypp. to be able to join ypp, the content creator’s videos must be watched by the public for 4000 hours for 12 months, and have a minimum of 1000 subscribers. later, the youtube team will review the channel of the content creator that has met the requirements. the content creator must then register for google 171panji mulkillah ahmad et al. adsense at a later stage. from here, content creators can earn money from ads and subscribers from youtube premium (2019). regarding the ypp money payment scheme, from videos uploaded by content creators and serving ads, google pays 68 per cent of its adsense revenue to content creators. a youtube channel can earn an average of us$0.18 per view or the equivalent of us$18 per 1000 views (geyser 2021). according to social blade (2021), world-class content creators such as pewdiepie that has 110 million subscribers are estimated to be able to earn up to us$6.3 million per year. meanwhile, in indonesia, atta halilintar, who is estimated to be able to earn up to us$1.2 million per year, is considered the content creator with the largest number of subscribers estimated at around 23.6 million. the great content creators who have earned a lot of money from youtube have motivated many people to become youtubers. the ministry of education and culture of the republic of indonesia even regards content creators as professionals and discusses the opening of a vocational study program in content creation at schools or universities (kemendikbud ri 2019). youtube has turned into a serious thing to work on. initially, content creators used youtube as social media in general, as a space for content creators to express themselves. however, along with the increased turnover of money on youtube, the motivation of creators becomes material and fame (labas and yasmine 2017). youtube is an audiovisual social media platform, which was created as a for-profit corporation. youtube can only exist with the creative activities of its content creators, whatever the motivation of content creators and viewers (idealism, fame, money, information, alternative entertainment, etc.). youtube’s role and position are on the logic of capitalism and follow the rotational speed of capital (swara 2014). to understand better the political-economic logic of youtube as a platform for digital capitalism, it is necessary to first explain what is meant by digital capitalism. according to schiller (1999), digital capitalism is an epoch in which digital media becomes the means of production and central control of an increasingly supranational market system. capitalism can operate effectively on a global scale through digital network technologies. various internal contemporary companies also operate based on this digital capitalism management. it is also characterized by private ownership of digital networks to generate commercial profits. pace (2018) concludes that digital capitalism is the accumulation of processes, sites, and 172 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 2 2021 moments in which digital technology mediates the structural tendencies of capitalism. one of the industries that developed in the era of digital capitalism is social networking sites (sns) such as google, facebook, and youtube. the way sns makes a profit is not like the conventional way of selling goods or services to consumers. sns reaches a large number of viewers or users, and at the same time sells their personal information data to advertisers for the benefit of the company. sns performs tracking and information gathering, turning collective subjectivity into profit (bolano and vieiral 2015). the manifestation of youtube as a platform for digital capitalism is seen from the benefits they get. youtube has 2 billion active users, with 38 million channels worldwide. from that audience and content creator market, in 2019 youtube revenue from its ads reached 15.1 billion us dollars from advertising, which is an increase of 408 per cent in 7 years. this is not counting from youtube premium and the youtube music service (dean 2021). this article argues that the relationship between content creators and youtube is a capitalistic production relationship. karl marx stated that there is an alienation experienced by workers in a capitalist production relationship. the next section will reveal the capitalist relationship found in the relationship between youtube and its content creators. alienation of youtube content creators as digital labour alienation in the marxist perspective the concept of alienation is closely related to marx and engels’s analysis of work. in german ideology, marx and engels stated that work is a conscious productive activity, which transforms and organizes nature so that man “produces the means of his survival” to fulfil human needs, as “the production of material life itself”(marx and engels 1932). work has different characters depending on the relations of production in society such as slave labour, feudal labour, and wage labour. the form of wage labour that exists today can only apply to a capitalist society, and cannot apply to a society of slavery or feudalism. as marx argued: “work is a natural condition of human existence, a condition of material exchange between man and nature, completely independent of the form of society. on the other hand, exchange-value labor is a specific and social form of labour” (marx 1859). 173panji mulkillah ahmad et al. in a capitalist society, work is divided into two forms. the first is ’work’ that is an activity to produce products that have a use or usevalue and are determined qualitatively. here, work aims to meet human needs. the second is ‘labour’, an activity that creates value that is only measured in quantity. labour exists as a historical form of organizing work in capitalism. in this form of labour, the activity becomes alienated (marx 1859). work that takes the form of labour is alienated because the product produced is not solely for the fulfilment of human needs but also produces surplus value for the capitalist (marx 1859). workers produce commodities that are then sold by capitalists to make a profit. however, the capitalist does not redistribute the profit to the workers who made it because the production of the commodity is considered the property of the capitalist. workers only get wages as compensation for the labour they provide. yet it is only through labour that a commodity can have value because only workers can produce value in that commodity. capitalists, machines, and raw materials cannot work on their own so they cannot produce value in a commodity. the capitalist exploitation of workers is based on this theft of surplus-value. thus, exploitation and alienation have a close relationship. alienation is both a condition and a result of exploitation. both are the foundation of capitalism, in addition to private property rights and the commodification of labour (fisher 2015). work in a capitalist society is not devoted to meeting human needs, but to capital. labour opposite capital “is alienated labour” and capital opposite labour “is alienated capital” (marx 1857). marx further elaborates alienation in the economic-philosophical manuscripts of 1844. he mentions four situations in which workers are alienated: 1) alienated for his work; 2) alienated from work activities; 3) alienated from himself as a human species, and 4) alienated with other humans (christ 2015). digital labour in digital capitalism what about alienation in the context of digital capitalism, especially on youtube creator content? to answer this, it is necessary to examine the concept of labour in digital capitalism. this is to show whether the activities of youtube creators are included in marx’s concept of work. there are two types of labour. first, material labour that produces products for human material needs (clothing, food, shelter, etc.), and 174 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 2 2021 second, immaterial labour that produces immaterial products such as information, knowledge, and social relations (hardt and negri 2004). in the age of the internet, labour that produces information through digital media is called digital labour. humans with their brains organize experiences in such a way to create symbolic representations, social relations, artefacts, and social systems (fuchs and sevignani 2018). as fuchs (2015) describes, digital labour on social media platforms such as youtube has several characteristics as follows: 1. digital labour on social media produces meaning, content, communication with other users, and social relationships; 2. social media corporations monitor, store and review all online activities of users. corporations have profiles about their users’ activities, interests, interactions, and social relationships. personal data is sold as a commodity; 3. advertising on social media targets users based on their interests and personalization; and 4. algorithms play a role in regulating the placement of targets, prices, and the number of advertisements on social media. as conventional labour in capitalist production in general, digital labour in digital capitalism cannot be separated from the process of exploitation and alienation. in the context of digital labour in social media, fuchs (2012) explains: corporate social media sell the users’ data commodity to advertising clients at a price that is larger than the invested constant and variable capital,” making it partly the users and partly the corporations’ employees that “create the surplus-value contained in this commodity. the difference is that the users are unpaid and therefore – in monetary terms – infinitely exploited. in their study of facebook, fuchs and sevignani (2018) view that activity on social media has alienated humans. they think that activity on social media is a productive work (to make commodities) that alienates humans from four aspects: labour, work activities, oneself as a human, and other humans. 175panji mulkillah ahmad et al. first, the alienation of workers from their labour. marx explained that workers produce commodities that are not under their control or decisions. the capitalist determines the decision. the capitalist, not the worker, then owns the commodity, which is ironically the result of the workers’ production. here, there is a separation between workers and their products. marx (1884) said: the alienation of the worker in his product means not only that his labour becomes an object, assumes an external existence, but that it exists independently, outside himself, and alien to him, and that it stands opposed to him as an autonomous power. the life which he has given to the object sets itself against him as an alien and hostile force. second, the alienation from work activities. because the workers’ products have been separated from them, the workers in carrying out work activities are not based on their own decisions. workers carry out products based on market and capitalist decisions. workers lose their creativity and freedom, and work activities are only a condition to be able to obtain food and other necessities. marx (1884) said: “his work is not voluntary but imposed, forced labour. it is not the satisfaction of a need, but only a means for satisfying other needs”. third, the alienation of the worker from him or herself as a human species. humans are species that live as part of nature with animals, rocks, air, light, and so on. alienated labour makes workers no longer live as species, and live only as individuals. his life activities are merely used as a means for his physical existence. marx (1884) stated: in tearing away from man the object of his production, therefore, estranged labor tears from his species-life, his real objectivity as a member of the species and transforms his advantage over animals into the disadvantage that his inorganic body, nature, is taken from him. fourth, the alienation of workers from other humans. in the capitalist system, human relations change from social relations to money exchange relations. this is a consequence of the previous three aspects of alienation (marx 1884). 176 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 2 2021 alienation of youtube content creators what about youtube content creators? we view that youtube content creators are alienated from these four aspects. youtube content creators are alienated from their work, due to the exploitation youtube makes on content creators. this is because content creators produce more value than youtube takes. content creators in producing videos use work tools such as cameras, voice recorders, computers for video editing, which are owned by themselves and not provided by youtube. content creators also devote their labour which is not provided by youtube, to work on scripts, corroborate with directors, producers, actors, camera people, doing editing, and so on. youtube does not make its own videos. youtube only acts as a platform provider that accommodates all the creativity created by content creators (ulya 2019). indeed, when a content creator’s video is uploaded on youtube, it contains the name of the content creator’s channel as a person who made the video. however, as explained by wasko and erickson (2009), youtube is trying to invite people to become content creators with monetization bids. people then do not realize that what they have uploaded on the platform belongs to youtube according to its slogan “broadcast yourself (as long as the content it’s ours)”. as seen from the statistics, it turns out that not all content creators are involved in ypp. a total of 84.2% of channels have fewer than 1000 subscribers (geyser 2021), which means the majority of content creators do not qualify for monetization. youtube does not pay them for their videos. in addition, content creators who are not or have not joined ypp do not receive copyright protection on their content (ulya 2019). the outpouring of their labour is not compensated, while youtube reaps such large funds. in this context,it is clear that the content creators on youtube or youtubers are alienated from their products. they are alienated from their work activities. unlike factory or office workers who work under orders from superiors, youtube content creators invisibly produce videos without being ordered by anyone. they also do not have employer-defined work hours. therefore, that content creators appear to have the freedom to make videos voluntarily, without coercion. nevertheless, today’s youtube phenomenon suggests otherwise. the youtube content creators are not ordered by anyone to make videos. it is their decision whether they want to produce videos of comedy, music, dramas, or podcasts. however, not all types of videos can invite 177panji mulkillah ahmad et al. viewers in large numbers. many youtube channels are only watched by a few viewers so their creators cannot invite advertisers through adsense and do not earn any money from the videos they have made. youtube has an algorithmic system that recommends to viewers based on what is trending on youtube and based on viewers’ interests from their viewing history. the ability of youtube’s algorithm to direct what viewers should watch indirectly directs content creators about what videos they should make to earn money. this algorithm plays a significant role because, in 2018, youtube’s chief product officer said that 70% of watch time on youtube was spent watching videos recommended by the algorithm (cooper 2021). several indonesian content creators have exposed the problems of youtube’s algorithm in their videos. some of them have ended their careers on youtube because they viewed youtube as an unhealthy ecosystem. skinnyindonesian24, a content creator who has worked for 10 years and finally ended his channel in 2020, said: if we look at the current youtube system… rewards in terms of views, subscribers, likes, comments… these rewards are given to content whose content for me is not the best. there is a lot of good content out there that ends up being invisible. youtube, if we look at the old days, gave voice to the voiceless. our voices can be heard because we upload them to youtube. now the voices of people like us are dead because the entire spotlight is on the voices of great people. youtube used to be cool, now it is just a business… moreover, does this system benefit you? no, it benefits people who have money. it seems that youtube provides work time flexibility for content creators. however, this is wrong. the content creators who make youtube their source of livelihood cannot simply disappear from youtube. a content creator who has been inactive for 6 months will be de-monetized if his or her viewers and subscribers’ time decreases. the content creators are forced to continue making videos for youtube if they do not want to lose their source of livelihood. that way, content creators must work continuously in producing video content without a clear working time (ulya 2019). the youtube content creators are distorted in terms of free time and work time. this is inseparable from the nature of work in digital capitalism which steals more value; not only did they steal formal work but also 178 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 2 2021 value. working time remains work time, while leisure time is converted into work time. digital technology allows capitalism to prioritize capital accumulation by breaking through space and time (novianti and wulandari 2017). it makes youtube content creators alienated as a human species. the content creators can only be recognized as long as they are productive in making content for youtube. they make the digital platform youtube the world they live in. ultimately, the content creators are alienated from other humans. this sounds contradictory to the reality that youtube makes collaboration between fellow content creators easier. given the technical and social features of the unique social media platform, it has helped the formation of the involvement of its community members, thereby attracting the interest of its users to collaborate and produce media products that are creative, expressive, as well as original homemade (jenkins 2009). however, a thorough and clear investigation reveals a different reality. because the spirit of capitalism as an economic system is based on the recognition of individual rights, including private property rights as rand (1967) asserts, the collaboration between content creators, in this case, is not interpreted as an intention to build class solidarity but for the sake of profit needs that lead to capital accumulation. social relations have now been hegemonized into production-based economic relations. this is reflected in various collaborative efforts among youtube content creators that prioritize cooperation which is encouraged by two motives. first, to increase social and financial capital. for example, aldi taher in ananta rispo’s video entitled “aldi taher bikin rigen marahmarah.” in the video, aldi taher clearly states that he earned three million rupiahs for his participation in deddy corbuzier’s podcast. this can be interpreted as a profit-based collaboration if viewed from the point of view of aldi taher as the speaker. he wanted to collaborate with deddy corbuzier for financial capital. regarding deddy corbuzier as the host, he spent three million rupiahs as capital to increase his social capital, considering that aldi taher was a rising figure at the time. moreover, deddy corbuzier received financial benefits from his collaboration with aldi taher for his podcast content. therefore, the collaboration between deddy corbuzier and aldy taher was not based on social relations among digital labour, but financial dan social capital. social capital is not merely non-material profit. when a person gets wider exposure as a result of his broadening and growing social capital, the impact is that his or her valuation increases. this valuation can then 179panji mulkillah ahmad et al. be materialized in the form of his or her contract rate as a public figure or an increasing number of viewers on his youtube channel, which leads to profits from advertising. in indonesia, the term “social climbing” (panjat sosial or pansos) then emerged as an effort to increase social capital. to be well-known, a novice content creator increases the number of viewers of his or her video by collaborating with top content creators with more social capital than him or her. this has resulted in criticism such as from vngnc that criticizes youtube rewind content carried out by content creators in indonesia. in its video entitled “wtf indonesia: the finale episode,” vngnc said: “and all of you who follow youtube rewind, indonesia is funny, every year wanting gold, glory, and fame.” this criticism is not without reason as the collaboration between content creators is at large motivated by profit-taking (vngnc 2018). currently, media corporations are shifting the position of individual content creators. around 30 of 50 youtube channels that have the most subscribers in the world are media corporations such as t-series and wwe (2021). in indonesia, 9 out of 10 youtube channels with the highest number of views are owned by media corporations, most of which are television station companies such as rcti, trans7, and indosiar (2021). youtube appears to be increasingly leaning towards corporate media over individual content creators. this is because media corporations can produce videos in large numbers regularly, and are watched by millions of people. due to this, individual content creators are transforming by adopting the company’s way of working. they recruit staff into their team to work as scriptwriters, editors, camera people, and so on. they include atta halilintar, ria ricis, baim paula, gen halilintar, deddy corbuzier, and raditya dika whose channel rankings on youtube indonesia are at the top. this kind of youtubers who recruit working staff can no longer be called digital labour. in marx’s perspective as described above, the youtubers who own the big channels like the above-mentioned ones do ‘work’ but not ‘labour’. on youtube channels owned by media corporations or individual youtubers, the context of digital labour refers to workers who are subordinated to the owners of these giant channels. these workers are subordinated to the channel owner, do not have full control of the channel, and are not fully entitled to the profits generated by the channel. they are digital labour who are exploited and, therefore, alienated. alienation is experienced by youtube content creators as digital labour. nevertheless, this alienation does not mean it will last forever. fuchs and sevignani propose a remedy to this alienation: the content creators substitute the 180 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 2 2021 logic of capitalism with the logic of the commons and transform digital labour into playful digital work (fuchs and sevignani 2013). conclusion this article has shown that youtube is one of the platforms of digital capitalism. the production relationship that operates between youtube and content creators is capitalistic. youtube accumulates profits by exploiting content creators from the videos they make and upload to the platform. the majority of content creators are digital labourers who receive disproportionate financial compensation from youtube or do not even receive financial compensation at all for the videos they produce for youtube. as digital labour, the youtube content creators have been alienated in four aspects: alienation from their work, their working activities, from themselves as a human species, and from other humans. this article certainly leaves some interesting questions to be discussed further as consequences of 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sweden. youtube creator academy. 2019. “what is ypp?” retrieved june 29, 2021 (https://creatoracademy.youtube.com/page/lesson/ypp_whatis-ypp_video#strategies-zippy-link-1). 184 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 2 2021 restorying the experiences of muslim women academics in indonesian state islamic higher education: a narrative inquiry journal of asian social science research 2020, vol. 2, no.2: 159-174 http://jassr.cassr.web.id © the author(s) 2020 article siti muflichah* universitas islam negeri banjarmasin, indonesia abstract in the last three decades, women have been the majority of undergraduate students in indonesian higher education. however, the story is different when it comes to women as academics in islamic higher education institutions. compared to their male colleagues, female academics have unequal academic and lower leadership positions. there is a low percentage of female academics who have achieved the academic positions of associate professors or professors. they also have low productivity in research and publications. this article deals with the inequality facing muslim women academics in indonesian state islamic higher education (perguruan tinggi keagamaan islam negeri [ptkin]). it asks the question: do these problems happen due to no opportunities given to muslim women academics to develop their academic career? in doing so, this article uses narrative inquiry as an approach to revealing the story of indonesian muslim academics and the voice of muslim feminists, which is not internationally acknowledged and recognized. it focuses its analysis on the voice and career experiences of a muslim woman (muslimah) academic in an indonesian state islamic university using the feminist methodology. it aims to portray how and why female academics face unequal academic achievement. understanding their voice of higher academic promotion is important to solve the problem of the ‘leaking pipeline’ about genderbased representation in university. the article argues that indonesian muslimah academics had low representation at academic advancement as they experienced more barriers than their male colleagues. * siti muflichah, department of arabic and english education, universitas islam negeri banjarmasin, indonesia.email: sitimuflichah@uin-antasari.ac.id 160 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 2, 2020 key words indonesian muslim women academics, islamic higher education, fingerprint, narrative inquiry introduction the development of indonesian academics’ career runs through tri dharma perguruan tinggi, three main tasks for indonesian higher education institutions, which include teaching, research, and community services (gaus and hall 2016). besides, there is a kind of activity that adds to the career development, which is not compulsory, known as kegiatan penunjang. academics who have done these activities will be evaluated and may get a promotion either in academic level enhancement or leadership position. in the context of state islamic indonesian higher education (siihe), female academics achieve a lower development level both in academic career and leadership position (kholis 2012). compared to their male colleagues, these academic women achieve less publication, have less thesis supervision, and receive fewer research grants, but have heavier teaching tasks. similarly, they are rarely appointed as committee members and organizers of university-related activities. women have not been appointed as rectors in siihe (mora 2008; kholis 2012). their academic positions range from lecturers to associate professor. only 3% were female professors in 133 islamic higher education institutions (mora 2003). moreover, at state islamic universities, a few academic women have reached vice-rector positions (around 6% from 2006 to 2010). similarly, murniati (2012) found that no females were appointed as rectors and male academics occupied the positions of vice-rectors, deans, and vice deans with 75%, 88,9%, and 78,3% respectively. so, in general, a high percentage of academic women hold the lower leadership positions (moec 2008).2 a significant change happened in islamic higher education institutions in indonesia in the 2000s, which caused women to experience the condition as illustrated above. it is seen clearly in the area of management behavior, which has influenced the position of academics. the adoption of the “new managerialism” doctrine, which puts the private sectors’ norms and practices to organizations in governmental sectors like state islamic universities, made this trend stronger. deem (1998) asserts that universities 2 fortunately, in 2019-2020, recent data show a new development in which female academics were appointed as rectors in some state islamic universities such amani lubis in uin jakarta, nyayu khadijah in uin palembang, and inayatillah in stain/iain tengku dirundeng meulaboh aceh. furthermore, the percentage of academic women in the middle leadership positions has increased twice in the last decade. 161siti muflichah that focus on research are experiencing a dramatic change, especially when it comes to the relationship between gender and managerialism. teelkem and deem (2013) state that the new managerialism is gender-biased even though it seems to give women more chances based on the meritocratic system (harris, ravenswood and myers 2013). “new managerialism” is a masculine arena that benefits male managers and it is unequal management with certain practices and values. female academics’ positions and experiences are directly influenced by such change. this change has happened to state islamic higher education in indonesia resulting in the transformation of its particular aspects such as a transition from the form of institute or college to that of a university (lukens-bull 2013). in this context, this study investigates how female academics at state islamic universities experience career advancement within neoliberal managerial conditions. it explores how my understanding of the career development of indonesian female academics is informed by the theories of management and gender. in doing so, i use narrative inquiry (reissman 1993) to understand a female academic’s lived experiences of career development in indonesia and recognize the story of her life as a knowledge source. this study employs feminist research methodology and aggregated stories of women academics’ experiences. these stories are integrated with management theories and feminist ethics about the experience of indonesian academic women. the very specific condition of academic women who live and work under recent managerial conditions is revealed by gaus and hall (2016). in the indonesian context, new managerial doctrines are connected with the implementation of performance evaluation, work-based targets, emphasis on practices (ball 2015), and supervision of attendance through fingerprint scanning machine use. more classes are taught by academic women. more administrative works related to certain courses are tackled by female academics including planning, reporting, and engaging in strict evaluation, a process that is mostly done online. the academic women also experience supervising more theses making them have restricted time to read and write research proposals. the women who rarely participate in the process of national research grant submission are included in other problematic practices. it is also reported that female academics feel alienated to participate in international publications and they are required to focus on students’ pastoral care. these women also have low-level academic and leadership positions (bagilhole 2002). 162 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 2, 2020 postcolonial feminism as this article discusses the experiences of female academics at state islamic higher education in indonesia, i think using theories that deal with women’s experiences in postcolonial regions is the best choice. the theoretical framework of this study is provided by the postcolonial feminist theory. so, this part explores the work of mohanty (2003) and the development of postcolonial feminism as a theoretical framework used in this study to understand and theorize the variety of women’s experiences at state islamic higher education in indonesia. according to mohanty (2003), one of the impacts of colonialism is a forced lopsidedness between the west and the rest of the world. utilizing inclusive presumptions, the west is reprimanded for characterizing the individuals of the non-western world as “the other”. likewise, women’s liberation can be characterized as a scholarly and dissident development that intends to improve the situation of women. postcolonial feminism provides us with language to explore how female academics are enabled to ‘speak’. this is significant because female scholars have been misused by history and seen as ‘the other’. as contended by postcolonial woman’s rights defenders, postcolonial women’s liberation centers around ‘the others’ and rejects ladies’ universalism. subsequently, postcolonial woman’s rights advocate the affirmation of all gendered voices of islamic female scholars. it focuses on works for freedom in terms of the social, cultural, economic, and religious identity of women located ontologically, epistemologically, and geopolitically outside the global north (mohanty 2003). using postcolonial feminism, this study focuses on a female academic to reveal her voice of how she navigates her low presentation in a leadership position and academic career. this contributes to studies of muslim women (muslimah) academics and the female academics’ experiences under colonialism and patriarchy in indonesia. their experiences are rarely heard in literature. feminist research methodology i apply the feminist research methodology in this study. the feminist research methodology applies principles to the struggle of feminists for equal justice and inextricably links with feminist theories (hessebiber and leavy 2007) and, therefore, presents a proper methodological framework to this study. brooks and hesse-biber (2007) claim that the feminist research methodology originated in the second wave of feminist movement context and aimed to implement explicit feminist perspectives in conducting research. it also has the goal to enhance women’s welfare 163siti muflichah and promote change. feminist research methodology questions structure and ideologies that are oppressive to women. feminist research records the life and experiences of women by erasing stereotypes and biases based on gender, which create a subjugated knowledge of women (litchman 2013). besides, hesse-biber and leavy (2007) maintain that feminists do not apply the same approaches in their research. they share dissimilar perspectives, as same as they ask different questions, which draw from several methods and methodologies. they are aware of colonialist ideologies of practices, which are sexist, racist, and homophobic. therefore, feminist research adopts several research methods. harding (1987) argues that although they share the same basic methods with other researchers, feminist researchers are guided by a methodology that comes from special epistemology which looks for knowledge from women’s experiences. in feminist research, therefore, hesse-biber and leavy (2007) and litchman (2013) argue that there is no fixed set of rules in method, methodology, and epistemology. according to charmaz (2006), and hesse-biber and leavy (2007), this feminist research methodology is a ‘complete’ approach that includes all stages of the research process. it starts from theory to practice. it is from creating research questions to writing research results. feminist researchers focus on an inextricable link among epistemology, methodology, and method about how to collect and analyze data. all feminist researchers are consistent in expanding new epistemologies, methodologies, and methods of knowing, revealing hidden aspects of women’s life and claiming back subjugated knowledge. accepting the theories of feminist theorists stanley and wise (2002:2), this article removes positivist features. it looks ‘unusual’ such as avoiding to inform merely how to do research ‘correctly’. this feminist activist sociology research needs experimentally grounded examinations of how information is created. my exploration reflects styles of human science that centers around ‘experience’, with women’s regular day to day existence. additionally, i comprehend that ‘women’s mistreatments’ are differing and convoluted. consequently, ladies persecutions need complex apparatuses of dissecting and getting them. narrative inquiry as this study aims to understand, interpret and seek the meaning of female academic life experiences, i use narrative inquiry to collect required data. narrative inquiry is a methodology inside the subjective convention that 164 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 2, 2020 holds that the story is one of the basic units of human experience (clandinin 2007). as a part of a qualitative research design, the story is used to explain human life. the word “narrative”, according to polkinghorne (1995: 5), means “events and happenings are configured into a temporal unity utilizing a plot”. narrative inquiry enables us to understand fully female academics’ lived experiences at universities, especially their experiences of being subjugated and marginalized when they apply for promotion of academic career. narrative inquiry allows both participants and authors to sort out their current circumstances and anticipate what is to come (connelly and clandinin 1990). the narrative inquiry also allows me to give voice to women who are marginalized in the traditional research models and recognize women’s life stories as knowledge (hesse-biber 2012). as a feminist method, it is used to portray women’s presentation into universities to have their roles as women to shape subjects and make meaning. women may not even be heard of their own lived experiences. feminist data collection provides a space and context for women to tell and hear their own and other’s stories (ropers-huilman and winters 2011). lipton and mackinlay (2015) claim that stories of women faculty permit women to comprehend the status of women in the scholarly world. the stories also keep up a concentration upon women’s liberation in conversations of sex fairness in higher education. in telling muslim academic feminists’ story, i concur with olyaei (2013) that through sharing a story, it is conceivable to pass on the message of muslim women scholar-activists that qualities like human poise, sexual orientation balance, and women’s privileges are not the restrictive assets of western mainstream progress and, indeed, these are the common worldwide qualities that we have to take a stab at. by glancing through this story, muslim women activists will be encouraged to contend that because of the dynamic and moral establishment of islamic talk, they can emphatically uphold these common liberties. in her research, oikkonen (2013) tries to connect between narrative and feminism. she states that feminist narrative is a multi-area theory that consists of psychoanalytical, poststructuralist as well as culturally-oriented approaches to gender and narrative. she proposes the types of narrative analysis that connect the counteraction of some studies such as gender, science, cultural, and poststructuralist literary studies. moreover, oikkonen (2013) claims, the narrative is like a machine of text that ensures the story keeps moving. this machine changes representation into certain place 165siti muflichah and time organized patterns establishing the sense of movement which is recognized with the narrative. as a medium of knowledge creation, narratives generate interaction between gender and sexuality. roof (1996) assumes that gender and sexuality have organized narratives and both derive from the textual dynamic of narration. i met a woman academic who works at a state islamic university and interviewed her. we agreed to collaborate in this feminist project and share our experiences on how to deal with hard times in academia, namely dealing with the new managerialism system. her name is mutia. i picked up mutia for she had the potential to generate the data that i looked for. she holds a ph.d. degree from an overseas university. she is currently the head of a department at graduate school. she experienced a lag in her academic promotion. from the data i collected, i created a story. the data was re-storied by applying an approach offered by riessman and quinney (2005:2). in analyzing data, i applied an interpretation of texts based on stories told by mutia and blended them with my story as the author. below are the steps starting from collecting data until analyzing them. table 1 the stages of narrative research stage 1 share stories stories shared during the interview stage 2 construct stories researchers construct stories from the interview -transcribing story -generate theme stage 3 re-storying -time researchers build sequences or events -space -people stage 4 share our re-storying narrative stories created by researchers adapted from ollerenshaw, j. a., and creswell, j. w. 2002. “narrative research: a comparison of two restorying data analysis approaches.” qualitative inquiry 8(3): 329-347. 166 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 2, 2020 our sad experiences within neoliberal university this restorying is about challenging experiences on how to solve problems related to many tasks at the department, students’ services, lack of opportunity to write a research proposal, and most importantly, fingerprintbased attendance. i met a female lecturer, mutia, who told stories to me about the application of new managerialism at her university. she told me how her personal life was heavily influenced by new managerialism. once mutia and i sat together, she adjusted the way she sat, leaned her shoulder, and started telling me her story. she said that she had to provide stuff for her kids to go to school the night before. “in my university, fingerprint-based attendance regulation is implemented. then, my morning schedule must change. all my routine schedules change. for instance, i make everything for my kids to go to school is ready the night before. i always scream to my kids: “hey, where are your socks? where are your tie and hat? have you done your homework?”.” i asked her whether she woke up earlier. i heard nina, my other female colleague, who had to wake up two hours earlier to comply with the fingerprint regulation. “now i wake up so early”, she said. the room was filled with her voice. i started to be aware that only us in the room. without further due, mutia continued her story like waves were about to crash. “the time to go to university is changing, from 9 am to 7.30 am. this changes the time to do laundry. it cannot be done in the early morning anymore. it has to be done in the night.” she continued the sequences. but, a noise outside the room diminished the rhyme of her story. it seemed they were graduate students who just finished their class. i put my shoulder forward and i focused more on the next words from mutia’s mouth, “when the time to go to campus was 9 am, i had a chance to dry the clothes. now, i cannot. yeah, it is changing. the regulation of fingerprint-based attendance that is to be done at 7.30 am influences my time to take my kids to school. i need to make everything ready before going to take them to school. after delivering my kids, i stop by my university to do a fingerprint. i have to get out of home at 6.30 am. i think you know how the city traffic condition in morning rush hours is. it is hard to leave our house at 6.30 am. it is hard for me.” when she was telling this part, i could see her dropping her shoulders. the sad feeling roamed in the room. i decided to ask her another topic, the services she did to her students. i described a definition of pastoral care to her and she was happy to share her stories. 167siti muflichah “it is a must for me to do pastoral care to students. it is my obligation”, mutis said. mutia’s story that free pastoral care to her students was something must do reminded me clearly that my male office mate warned that i have to clearly say “no” to provide pastoral care to my students. according to him, our promotion is not counted on how much we do pastoral care to students, but rather on credit points taken from teaching, research, and community service activities, which are known as tri dharma perguruan tinggi. i understand that supervising students is a kind of community service. it is not a must for academics to mentor students. however, according to the male colleague, other activities are more “worth” than mentoring students such as teaching and being a speaker in a community seminar or a religious meeting. when we are promoted, community service points are only counted 10 percent, while research has a value of around 40 percent (dghe 2013). “why have to?” “i should help and focus on students’ life. i worry about them, if we do not help, just in case later in the next 20 years, they are still jobless.” she gasped for breath. i heard how heavy her breath was. mutia claimed: “i am worried, if we do not help them, then who is responsible for them? i think helping them is exactly our task. it contributes to their success in the future.” “so, i guess you provide more time on mentoring students?” i replied. there was a long pause between my question and her answer. “yes, it is true”. the way mutia replied was very calm. i witnessed with my own eyes that female academics tended to not say clearly “saying no” when they were asked to give service to their students. griffin, bennett, and harris (2013) confirm that female academics have difficulty in expressing their feeling to say “no” or do less service (and teaching). i have a female colleague who is still hard to say “no” to students’ requests even though she has a high academic position. she experiences well in her career progress, but she has low power in front of her students. as mutia admitted the ways she got involved with students in personal and professional ways, she said confidently that she provided more time to the students and engaged personally with them than her male colleagues. acker (1997) warns that task-loads at universities create gender inequality in some types of academic tasks. female academics conducted 168 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 2, 2020 unpaid service to students, more administration and teaching. in the area of research, men do more than women. this is illustrated by mutia as she described: “i have difficulties to apply for a competitive research grant because to prepare an application for the grant, i must read and read. i have limited time. i have less time to prepare a research proposal. very little time. really.” then, mutia made a connection between her dream for the next year’s hope and her last year’s failure. “but, i have to apply for the grant. i plan it for next year. last year, i was in rush in preparing required documents for my department accreditation. i did not enough time to write a research proposal because i did not have time to read”. she looked at the big window behind me. her eyes showed a dreamy look. she sighed and tried to remember all her memories when she had limited time to read so she was not able to submit a research proposal. “when i was a lecturer without any additional tasks, i mean, without responsibility as the head of a department, i surely had the time... now, i am a department chair, i have no time. meetings make me busy and students’ thesis proposals become my priority”. in indonesian public islamic universities, academic work is not segregated by gender. female and male academics have the same workloads of teaching, research, and administrative tasks. however, academics work in a variety of environments; some work in natural science areas and laboratories, others work in humanities areas (becher and trowler 2001) and this circumstance influences the way women academics work. a study by acker (1997) about women’s lack of time in writing proposals reveals that over workloads at university led to gender inequality in specific jobs of academia. explaining this, deem (2003) claims that new managerialism is gender-biased for, by monitoring employees, it is related with certain forms of macho-masculinity over female academics. at this point, new managerialism also tends to control the education sector. furthermore, deem and hillyard (2002) assert that women bear the culture of ‘long hours’ because men do less teaching and administration. this means that the female academics are required to work more and spend more time at the campus for the interest of their universities. since mutia experienced long hour culture, i asked her about her academic position as i believed these two were related. “bu mutia, what is your academic position now?” no words came out of her mouth. she gave me a sharp sight. her eyebrows which followed the curve of her dark eyes looked like an arch. 169siti muflichah then, she answered shortly: “i have not applied for promotion for many years. i am still a senior lecturer now.” my direct response was “i thought you were associate professor, looking at the time of your service. what is your obstacle?” she frowned and then replied. “i do not publish in internationally accredited journals”. i am aware that nowadays, to apply for the position of associate professor, academics had to have a good publication in international academic journals. “does this mean that the reason why you do not apply for the associate professor position is that you are not ready to apply for research grants and you do not have international publication?” “yes for me. my difficulty is the process of editing. to edit my articles needs the right moment. two days is enough for writing, but editing is hard for me since to do that i need to be absent from campus. for me, the problem is that i do not have enough time. i need more time,” mutia said. i listened intently, mutia frowned. i did not expect that she would tell me her promotion problem. however, i could understand her because i experienced the same. my understanding was real, it just happened to me when i was a manager. i did not have time to myself, on top of that, time to prepare my publication (muflichah, andriani and mackinlay 2018). after telling her academic promotion problem, mutia shared her long story on how to manage thesis supervision. she did it by email to save her time and did not want to spend much time with the students at the campus. her students sent her their thesis drafts by email. when she finished giving feedback, she and her students had a meeting. to do household chores, mutia employed a student to do laundry. she picked up her teenage daughter from school because it was the only chance to talk with her. her daughter had a relationship with her male classmate and this made her worried. as our meeting ended, i asked her about the inspiration for being a professor. she wanted to be, but, she was not sure to reach it. “i am keen to achieve a professor position, but my kids should…” she halted her sentence. her uncertainty was overwhelmed and my understanding of the unspoken word was there is no such value in being a professor if her children are neglected. i whispered: “oh. oh yes”. my throat was dry and i had a strange feeling as i had no idea how to properly respond to her story. 170 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 2, 2020 i understood that my interpretation of mutia’s story was a sensemaking activity. my interpretation has a performative dimension: it is an active process of constructing, shaping, and transforming intersubjective reality as pointed by riessman (1993), and it is not just about representing the world. my understanding of mutia’s story was influenced by my reading of feminist theories. as a feminist, i needed to focus on the amenability of our own stories. i also had to focus on narrative constructs and grammatical forms of discursive uses of gender and feminism. before i talked with mutia, i did not pay attention to the management shift at the state islamic university in indonesia. but, after i listened to her sad story, i realized that how theories of management influence the career of female academics like mutia. deem (2003) and susanti (2011) helped me retell the sad story of how academic life has deteriorated in many aspects since the last decade. i agree with smith and webster (1997:5) that “the university has turned out to be ‘survivalist’, dominated by a sense of the duty to endure rather than enjoy”. similarly, whitehead (2011) claims that the shift of educational culture in university to managerial culture will lessen equal opportunity discourse and create gendered culture. those cultures prefer men to apply aggressive management. moreover, whitehead (2011) says that the implementation of cultures will be a hazard for women who want to succeed in university or who want to encourage themselves to be managers. conclusion this article is a work of female academics who embrace the feminist perspective so that it shows an intellectual collaboration that regards highly women’s experience and knowledge. this kind of work is still rare and has not been fully addressed by the indonesian government. this article’s resources were derived from our personal and intellectual experience as female academics. this work is weaving ideas to employ sisterhood. in this article, i have expressed that how to exchange our experience is very important and mutual trust among us has been developed through showing care for each other and through sharing our stories which grows our mutual relationship. from the feminist epistemology, i express our focus on lived experiences in this study. i have witnessed that under the doctrines of new managerialism universities as workplaces like the state islamic university where mutia works change into places that provide female academics more difficulties than their male colleagues. i can conclude from our stories that one indonesian female academic in a state 171siti muflichah islamic university experienced lag to be promoted. she was left behind in terms of publication, research grants, and promotion to be a professor. i hope that these stories of indonesian muslim women (muslimah) academic provide deeper and wider insights into global female academics’ stories. women’s ideas, experiences, and perspectives are valuable and need to be acknowledged as well. their stories are relevant to female academics’ work. so, stories are central to the theory of research methodology which 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doi: 10.1080/03050068.2013.807642. whitehead, stephen. 2001. “woman as manager: a seductive ontology”. gender, work & organization 8(1): 84-107. military and water governance practices: a theoretical analysis of the involvement of indonesian national armed forces in the citarum harum project in west java, indonesia journal of asian social science research 2021, vol. 3, no.1: 39-56 https://cassr.net/jassr/ © the author(s) 2021 article mustabsyirotul ummah mustofa* universitas padjadjaran, indonesia shafa ghaisani salsabila brahmantika universitas padjadjaran, indonesia bima riandy tarigan universitas padjadjaran, indonesia abstract the citarum harum project as stated in presidential regulation no. 15/2018 was created as a response to a report that citarum is “the dirtiest river in the world”. it is said that the complexity of the management of the citarum river involves the indonesian national armed forces (tni) as the program implementer. this military involvement is claimed as a non-war military operation to increase the citarum harum program's effectiveness. however, in the discourse of water governance, the military is hardly mentioned as an engaged stakeholder, especially in the framework of "governance" which emphasizes the democratic process controlled by civilians. this article seeks to explain what kind of regime can justify the claim of military involvement in water management as a vital public affair. a qualitative approach was used to achieve a comprehensive theoretical analysis in explaining this research problem. the findings indicate that military involvement in water governance is related to security issues, especially water security, and mainly in conflict areas. meanwhile, in non-conflict areas, water governance places great importance on public and government participation in a * corresponding author: mustabsyirotul ummah mustofa department of political science, universitas padjadjaran, indonesia email: mustabsyirotul.ummah@unpad.ac.id 40 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 very democratic process. accordingly, the involvement of the tni in the citarum harum program can be said as a practice that has deviated from the shared concept of water governance. key words military involvement, water governance, citarum river, citarum harum project introduction flowing 297 kilometres, citarum is a strategic river that supports life in the provinces of west java and jakarta (brotosusilo et al. 2019; setiani et al. 2019). this river supplies water that supports the activities of economic sectors such as agriculture, animal husbandry, industry, and power generation. however, these sectors contribute to environmental problems and make this longest river in west java “the most polluted and dirtiest river in the world” as reported by several researchers and international media. the control of the citarum river problems is exercised by a task force led by the governor of west java through a project known as citarum harum. the indonesian national armed forces (tentara nasional indonesia [tni]) is involved in the implementation of this project, which is marked by the placement of the commander of the iii/ siliwangi regional military command as the first deputy commander for ecosystem arrangement of the task force. thousands of tni personnel were deployed to maintain and supervise programs in the citarum river area which were further divided into 22 sectors (pratama et al. 2020: 225). the military involvement in this project is considered as an effort to increase the project effectiveness and a military operation other than war (setiani et al. 2019:5; ginting and mulyana 2020:882; “tanpa tni, perubahan masif di citarum tidak akan terjadi”). based on presidential regulation number 15 of 2018, the task force is part of the citarum watershed team that carries out tasks based on policies and directives from a steering committee. the indonesian government gave mandate over the area and authority for the settlement of the citarum watershed to the task force under the command of the coordinating minister for maritime affairs, which is now known as the coordinating minister for maritime affairs and investment as the chief steering officer. this implies that the entire work system of the citarum watershed team is further regulated based on the coordinating minister 41mustabsyirotul ummah mustofa et al. for maritime affairs and investment regulation number 8 of 2018. before the central government took over, the management of the citarum river was carried out by local governments. in 2002, the west java governor dani setiawan launched the citarum bergetar program followed by the citarum bestari program during the reign of governor ahmad heryawan (setiadi et al. 2019). however, the programs to solve the problems in the citarum river by the regional civil government were not implemented properly because of weak community involvement and law enforcement (brotosusilo et al. 2019:2). however, according to pratama et al (2020), the citarum harum program now has a significant social impact such as the transition of local plant commodities. this indicates the acceptance of tni involvement which plays a direct role in persuading local communities about the importance of reforestation, especially for growing coffee plants (safitri et al. 2019:15). the local communities are said to have accepted the idea of relocation and have begun to accept the change in food commodities (pratama et al 2020:230). however, there are interesting findings that there are businesses that run in the citarum harum project such as the involvement of the budiasi foundation, which is owned by general doni monardo who has access to manage nurseries, and the institutions that have close relations with tni such as artha graha peduli which has access and control over the land. in addition, tni made massive changes related to the planting of plant commodities like coffee, which contributes to environmental damage. it prepared an area for a coffee processing factory which will most likely be given to kapal api company. it forced local communities to grow coffee, although they did not know who it was for. furthermore, tni threatened residents and blocked them to access the land used by residents to earn a living if they did not follow its instructions (safitri et al. 2020). in the literature on water governance, so far no study deals with the presence of military actors in water management. normally, water governance is a collaboration, cooperation and participation of government, community and private sectors in creating good water resource management (kusumah and mustofa 2020). governance is the effectiveness of implementing socially acceptable and politically inclusive resource allocations, involving behavioural mediation through values, norms and laws relating to regulations and institutions, as well as government policies, policy networks, global markets, private sector and civil society that changes and influences the political system (roger and hall in kusumah and mustofa 2020). 42 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 water governance is a set of systems that control decision-making concerning water resource development and management. hence, water governance is much more about how decisions are made (i.e. how, by whom, and under what conditions decisions are made) than the decisions themselves (batchelor 2009). according to undp-siwi water governance facility (2016), water governance is “the range of political, social, economic and administrative systems that are in place to develop and manage water resources, and the delivery of water services, at different levels of society”. in essence, water governance is a way of cross-stakeholder collaboration in water governance that involves many interests effectively through a joint policymaking mechanism from government, private and civil society elements that are participatory and democratic. more sharply, mollinga who uses a political sociology approach says that water governance is nothing but the domain of political struggle (araral and wang 2013). it means that the practice of water governance, the practice of power, and the contestation of power are important in the distribution of water which is manifested in policies and the division of roles in the context of managing water resources and their ecosystems. thus, there are political, environmental, and economic elements in the citarum harum project which is managed by tni under the commander of the iii/siliwangi regional military command and the deputy commander of the task force for ecosystem arrangement i. this has certainly raised the important questions as follows: what kind of regime that provides opportunities for the military to be involved in watershed governance?; is there a theoretical point of view that justifies the involvement of the military apart from state actors in water governance?; and how do communities participate when the military is involved in water governance? this article aims to answer these by using a qualitative approach with library studies and in-depth interviews with relevant stakeholders. it explores the existing literature related to the conceptual justification of military involvement in water governance and the empirical reality of military involvement in watershed governance. political authority vs knowledge in water governance practices the citarum harum project involved experts and academics in controlling environmental damage to the citarum watershed. in doing their roles, they were responsible to the task force commander. the ministry of research, technology, and higher education facilitated their research and provided 43mustabsyirotul ummah mustofa et al. innovation including the program of students community service (kuliah kerja nyata [kkn]) conducted by university students. since 2018, kkn, which is specifically aimed to support pollution control in the citarum river, has involved around 700 universities in west java and dki jakarta through the 2019 citarum harum thematic kkn program. the citarum harum thematic kkn program was also planned to be realized throughout the year and alternately along the citarum watershed. students, as part of academics, are given the task of assisting the community in terms of domestic waste management and community behaviour so that they pay more attention to environmental sustainability. apart from the thematic kkn program, research was carried out by experts. padjadjaran university (unpad) conducted 318 pieces of research on the issues of citarum. unpad also specifically established the citarum center of research, which until 2020 has produced 10 scientific publications. the bandung institute of technology (itb) research and community service institute published seven innovations and citarum harum thematic community service programs in 2019-2020. these include water treatment systems, technology transfer of coffee development technology, digital-based development, waste treatment assistance programs, and water quality monitoring programs. likewise, several other universities conducted research and programs that focus on the citarum problems. in the google scholar search engine, 16 multidimensional research results related to the management of the citarum river in 2018-2021 were found. meanwhile, using the keyword “citarum river management” (pengelolaan sungai citarum), six research results were found. all the results of research, innovation, and programs from these experts indicate the involvement of experts and academics in handling environmental issues in the citarum river. this collaborative strategy is known as the penta-helix strategy, which means that the citarum harum program ideally involves many parties: government, academics (experts, students), media, communities, and business groups (setianti et al. 2019:6). this certainly needs to be done considering the complex problems of environmental damage and pollution in the citarum river. the presence of the expert team, which is still under the task force commander and the daily chair appointed by the task force commander, is also important to pay attention to in optimizing its role. based on governor’s decree number 614.05/kep.144-dlh/2019, the citarum watershed expert team is assigned to assist the implementation of the task 44 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 force’s duties in terms of providing considerations for decision making. the role of experts through scientific studies and knowledge sharing is also important and closely related to the responsibility of monitoring and evaluation as well as determining references in river revitalization efforts. as has been done by lipi that developed composting toilet technology, wastewater treatment, methods for monitoring levels of chemical substances, pesticide residues, or heavy metal pollutants contained in water, and the development of bioplastics as an alternative for handling plastic waste. the participation of these various roles has a positive impact, but it does not rule out the emergence of problems regarding the harmonious and integrative efforts and relationships among the above parties (setianti et al. 2019). in addition, the significance of the role of the academics faced challenges. innovations are still sporadic or fragmentary because of the limited scope of research while citarum problems spread from upstream to downstream so that implementing innovation comprehensively requires greater efforts. community service-based programs carried out by college students are also temporary, generally limited to a certain period. meanwhile, to be able to influence people’s behaviour to pay attention and be willing to play an active role in environmental issues requires not only understanding but also habituation. thus, a systematic, consistent and sustainable pattern is needed to be able to understand and control the complexity of problems in the citarum watershed. a sustainable process that can accommodate the interests of all parties is necessary due to the wide coverage area and the involvement of many parties (brotosusilo et al. 2019: 5). this involvement of many parties in the citarum harum program paved the way to the dominant role of tni. the study by brotosusilo et al. (2019) states that the involvement of many elements of society is a challenge for inter-sectoral coordination in controlling environmental problems. one solution is to involve the military, provided it does not exceed its duties or authority (legally). the rationalization is in the form of communication patterns and organizational management of tni in carrying out tasks that are considered to be more systematic. in addition, the involvement of the military is justified to discipline the community to be more responsible in terms of environmental management. based on this research, the civilmilitary approach was found to be the main alternative that was considered an appropriate option in the implementation of the citarum watershed management policy compared to the alternative collaborative strategy and status quo (brotosusilo et al. 2019:5). 45mustabsyirotul ummah mustofa et al. the tni involvement in citarum water governance raised questions regarding the relevance of the military as an instrument of state defence in the management of natural resources and the environment. it is well known that military intervention in the citarum harum program includes nonwar military operations. in indonesia, military operations apart from war include controlling separatist movements and armed insurgencies, acts of terrorism, guarding border areas, securing strategic national vital objects, carrying out security and public order tasks, assisting local government tasks, coping with natural disasters, and assisting in the search and rescue process. this allows tni to operate and mobilize its troops even in nondefence activities. degree of participation and democracy in water governance there are four basic dimensions in water governance, namely social, economic, political and environmental dimensions. the social dimension is about equitable distribution of water resources and services; the economic dimension deals with the efficiency of water allocation and use and its role in economic growth; the political dimension is related to equal rights and responsibilities for stakeholders in the decision-making process regarding water governance; and the environmental dimension is about sustainable use of water (undp-siwi water governance facility 2016). these four dimensions are important in carrying out water governance and the basis for overcoming water problems. in the case of the citarum river, these four dimensions are included in the citarum harum mission which is targeted to be completed within seven years starting from 2018 (teguh 2019). overcoming the water pollution in the citarum river through the citarum harum project is expected to make the citarum river a water resource that can be utilized by various parties and help the indonesian economy, especially for the local community. the project also involves various stakeholders from the government, the private sector and the community. it also provides education to people living in the areas around the river to protect the citarum river and not to throw garbage into the river and aggravate river pollution. this is part of realizing sustainable water use by involving local communities to preserve the citarum river. however, appointing the commander of the regional command for military arrangement iii/siliwangi as deputy commander in the citarum harum project as stated in presidential regulation number 15 the year 2018 raised concerns about the exclusion of the community and 46 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 other stakeholders and their participation in handling the citarum river problems. legally, as regulated by the presidential regulation and the coordinating minister for maritime affairs number 8 the year 2018, the military is given the following roles: 1. commander of the iii/siliwangi regional military command as deputy commander for ecosystem arrangement i and commander of the jayakarta military regional command as deputy commander of ecosystem arrangement ii (article 8 paragraph (1) of the presidential regulation); 2. the task force (including the tni personnel) is authorized to determine an action plan based on the policy of the steering committee, localize and stop sources of contamination or damage, request information, data or documents, inspect factory areas, businesses, warehouses, storage places or factory waste disposal channel at any time required, prevent and prohibit people from establishing settlements in protected areas, establish a sector command led by a tni officer as the sector commander, divide work area based on the sector command, and involve other stakeholders including the community in the implementation of the tasks of the sector command (article 9 paragraph (1) and (2) of the presidential regulation). meanwhile, the activities claimed to have been carried out in the field are handling critical land, livestock waste, domestic wastewater, solid waste, and industrial waste, removal of sedimentation, prevention, and legal action (satgas ppk das citarum 2019:30); and 3. sector commands, which are led by military officers, are ordered to carry out pollution and damage control operations at locations determined by the task force (article 9 of the presidential regulation). sector commands are led by tni officers with the rank of colonel and placed in 22 sectors of the citarum watershed working area (article 16 paragraphs (1) and (2) of the coordinating ministerial decree). in the description of the working areas in the action plan (renaksi) document for control of pollution and damage to the citarum watershed, there are 23 tni officers are appointed as sector commanders, there are two sector commanders in sector 1 in which one focuses on revitalizing upstream areas (satgas ppk das citarum 2019:30). 47mustabsyirotul ummah mustofa et al. based on the presidential regulation, the task force must promote and educate people on the impact and damage to the citarum watershed and community empowerment (article 13). in addition, the coordinating ministerial decree states that the task force commander encourages the active participation of the community and business actors (article 21). based on the citarum task force action plan document, the military is involved in the improvement of effectiveness and the conditioning of the community, village officials, and business actors (satgas ppk das citarum 2019:26). following the stipulated regulations, the action plan further mentions the duties and authorities of the sectoral commander in the forms of promotion of public awareness and community development; billing and river damage, inspections, documents-checking of factories, disposal places and others ((satgas ppk das citarum 2019:30). activities done in the field include handling waste, domestic wastewater, solid waste, sedimentation, and industrial waste. however, not all tasks and functions are carried out optimally by the military. interestingly, every activity in the citarum watershed must be reported to the local sector commander (dansektor) based on article 9 paragraph 2c of the presidential regulation. the regulation makes the military have more power than other stakeholders. based on our in-depth interviews with stakeholders that work in citarum, they confirmed that the military is a key player in the citarum harum program so that it rules out and minimizes the role of other stakeholders such as the civil societies that have participated in previous programs1. this public participation has a significant position in the concept of governance on a par with that of the public (government) and private sectors. the community’s role is reduced and slowly shifted by the dominance of the military role in the governance of the citarum river. there is also a lack of knowledge and capacity of civil society around the citarum watershed. in fact, within the framework of effective water governance, active citizens are urgently needed to balance the power held by the government and the private sector. power relation between water governance stakeholders the actors involved in water governance have their respective roles and interests, but not all of them have the privilege to play an active role in water governance. the power relations of each actor are also different. water governance involves the complexity of actors who intersect in interest and involvement, either directly or indirectly. this can be a strength as well as an obstacle in the practice of water governance. in the case of 1 interview with a member of the water resources management coordination team (tkpsda) of bbws citarum. 48 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 the citarum harum project, the military is the most dominant actor and has extensive power compared to other actors. theoretically, water governance is democratic with an appropriate level of non-government participation, yet in practice, other actors apart from the military do not have freedom in their involvement. all actions related to the citarum river, especially in the upstream areas, must be approved by the military (safitri et al. 2020). graph 1 the rank of actors/stakeholders in citarum water governance the military plays a central role as stated in the presidential regulation as seen in graph 1. it has run its duties for half of the targeted time. the problem that is currently arising is business activities. besides coffee, there is a chlorine and chemical business for wastewater purification to comply with the quality standards. there are indications regarding economic relations between industries around the citarum watershed and the military in waste management, both in the supply of raw materials for wastewater purification and protection. there are also other economic activities carried out by the military in the citarum watershed. a case study in rancamanyar district, bandung regency, shows a community culinary centre on the banks of a river whose business premises are built and managed directly by the military. before the citarum harum program, people in the rancamanyar area planted vetiver plants and other plants to build erosionretaining embankments. this military involvement not only eliminated other stakeholders of citarum river, but also the local community and even local thugs.2 the military plays a strategic role in controlling the citarum program. this began by changing the history of citarum in a way that seemed as if 2 interview with water patrol officers, west java provincial environment service. 49mustabsyirotul ummah mustofa et al. it had just been noticed and attempted to improve when it was highlighted by a foreign movement that built kayak boats from plastic bottle waste and a meeting with president jokowi. a video uploaded by the make a change world” youtube channel published on august 30, 2017, shows the coverage of sam bencheghib and gary bencheghib when they sailed the citarum river in boats made of plastic bottles and draws the attention of around 41 thousand youtube viewers. as a response, a presidential regulation was issued in which the military actors were involved in making citarum policies. thus, after the issuance of the regulation, citarum seemed to be constructed as a war zone.3 there is a power relation in which the military is a dominant role. every activity and task must be coordinated first with the army in the relevant sector. indeed, the action plan states that all activities carried out by central and regional government stakeholders must be known by the sector commander as a guardian of the implementation of activities in each sector (satgas ppk das citarum 2019:30). this phenomenon shows an unequal power relationship in the management of the citarum watershed based on the citarum harum program. the tni plays a controlling power whereas the concept of water governance states that all stakeholders have equal power because partnership efforts require a decrease of sectoral ego so that the collaborative work can run optimally. the presence of the military in the governance of the citarum watershed increasingly shows that civil-military relations are unequal and hegemonic in every field of life, including if the military is involved in water governance schemes. where is the military in the water governance concept? military involvement in water governance is an extraordinary phenomenon, especially if it does not meet the required conditions. this is identified when there are indications of conflict. in addition, the border issue also follows the military’s involvement in water governance. for cases in authoritarian or semi-authoritarian countries, the military is involved as a supervisor to discipline. it is like what happened in the mekong river, where there were border issues as it flows through authoritarian and semiauthoritarian countries. the military involvement in the citarum harum project does not meet the criteria for the military to be directly involved in the water governance of the citarum river. it definitely can tarnish indonesia’s image as a democratic country. moreover, there are indications of land 3 interview with tkpsda bbws citarum member. 50 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 tenure and coercive control over local communities. although this military involvement is considered influential in the past three years, it is not enough to tolerate their complicity, especially with such negative shadows. the pattern of military complicity in water governance in citarum is unusual and does not accompany conflict factors behind the need for defence mechanisms to stabilize empirical events in other countries. a case study can be obtained from the dutch military intervention in uruzgan province, afghanistan, which is considered effective. in a stabilization mechanism, integrated resource management becomes an important military operation (huizinga and enserink 2020). the military framework for resource management interventions, especially water), uses the preconditions of potential conflict rooted in water resources. water management can be a potential crisis as well as a conflict management tool. in his previous study, huizinga (2015) described the possibility of using water as a conflict resolution effort. he cites several other studies that explain water management mechanisms as instruments that can address security issues. these are (1) water as an enabler (water as a basic need, increasing attention to problems and resulting in meeting water needs through development projects); (2) water for conflict resolution (there is diplomacy and discussion to reduce the impact of instability); and (3) water for cooperation (by facilitating discussion and collaboration with water users related to water issues and finding solutions) (huizinga 2015:vii). it is important to pay attention to these issues, especially in places where water conflicts are most likely to happen due to access to water. such water crisis or scarcity occurred in the middle east and north africa (fao 2018). meanwhile, the water governance in the citarum case is considered to have different characteristics. a study sees citarum as a water security issue, which refers to the un-water regarding different perspectives based on the community’s ability to maintain access to water of decent quality (widianingsih et al. 2020:204). it raises the importance of good water resource management, including in the context of riverbanks. however, the study directs decision-making to address water security issues by the government through collaboration between ministries and agencies to carry out cross-stakeholder forums with local governments and communities. it is needed to advocate water security issues through cross-disciplinary approaches such as socio-economic and socio-cultural perspectives. in addition, the conflict in the citarum river case was also discussed from a human security perspective. as mazon and zeitoun (2013) mention, environmental degradation is a security issue regarding the emergence of 51mustabsyirotul ummah mustofa et al. potential threats and dangers to the community due to environmental factors (bainus et al. 2021:6). in research on the perceptions of local communities on sukamaju village and several other villages in bandung regency near the citarum watershed like majalaya, perceptions related to environmental degradation in the citarum watershed have at least resulted in the lack of clean water and health problems in the form of skin diseases, air pollution, flood, and community economy problems (bainus et al. 2021:9-10). thus, in the case of environmental degradation in citarum, the security issue that arises is related to the affected community and their feeling of fear and threat. in addition, this human security perspective also looks at how local people’s perception of being threatened or insecure because the state is not fully present in providing a sense of security. instead, environmental issues handled by the state apparatus become an economic and political commodity.4 based on two recent studies related to water security and human security in citarum, the government needs to be present, not only in policymaking and implementation but also in considering the perceptions of the community. however, as the authority from the central government involves the task force of tni, the discussion on water governance at citarum also involves an overview of civil-military relations in indonesia. the post-new order regimes have been trying to “cure” the symptoms of authoritarianism, including restoring civil-military relations, especially the abolition of the dual function of former indonesian armed forces (abri). hernandez (1996 in djuyandi et al. 2018:132)) explains that in the context of civil-military relations as a phenomenon of political linkage, political authorities determine the duties and functions of military institutions by providing explanations about the mission for the military, allocating an adequate defence budget, and maintaining integration of military institution. this theoretical framework is also used to explain civil-military relations case at the local level between the military district commander in sukabumi and the sukabumi regency local government. the mandate from the central government to the army includes an adequate command structure down to local level. in doing so, the army assists local governments in state defence programs (djuyandi et al. 2018:140). in a way, such collaboration between the tni and the local government could perform a more integrative institution. it happens to the citarum harum program, with comparable characteristics, it is carried out on a mandate from the central government, given to military and local government institutions, which then incorporated to the task force. but again, the citarum case remains dissimilar since there is no indication of a state defence program. 4 the opinion of an activist of the non-governmental organization (in bainus et al. 2021:12-13). 52 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 the involvement or domination of tni in the citarum harum program implementation is not identical with other programs that involve relations between civilians and the military because there are no preconditions for conflict or disturbances to the sovereignty of the country’s territory in the citarum watershed areas. therefore, the need for military mobilization and operations as the rationalization of the project is barely possible to happen. however, the problems in citarum management is related to its impact on the security of water resources access that is strategic and reliable for the people. from the discussion based on several studies, the citarum issues are indeed indebted to security issues that later occurred, including those related to water security and human security. thus, water as a security issue may be a small part of the driving factors of citarum harum project. one factor is the mandate from the civilian authorities to the military. it encompasses the arrangement of authority in such a systematic way that manifested in the military under the pretext of non-war operations and program optimization with a more integrated command system. there are also economic or political interests as the factor of the military’s involvement in the citarum river program. conclusion this article has shown that military involvement in the water system has no conceptual basis that explains its existence and operation in the citarum harum project. a pivotal point in water governance is public participation so that multi-stakeholder or multi-actor elements are a necessity that needs to be attached with clear roles and functions in collaborative management. the military’s domination in the citarum harum program has so far reduced or deconstructed the order of community participation that has been built through the implementation of previous programs. law enforcement by the army as one of the stakeholders is considered out of place and becomes a specific problem. if the citarum harum program is completed within seven years as planned in the presidential regulation and the military no longer has much of a role to play, environmental governance around citarum will not experience an improvement because capacity building to the community is not exercised. the ecosystem of the citarum watershed is in a critical condition that it needs innovative and unusual handling to reduce the adverse effects of its damage. however, this does not mean that military involvement can be justified by granting them such free space in the water governance. normatively, and as contained in article 17 of the presidential regulation, the sustainability of citarum river control can involve the ministries/ agencies, regional governments, and stakeholders in carrying out their respective duties and functions. its sustainability is also carried out through 53mustabsyirotul ummah mustofa et al. program determination and allocating budgets to ministries/agencies and local governments following regulations. the hope for public participation, openness, and democratization of water will get lessened if the military’s role after seven years of the citarum harum program would run permanently. even if it would be discontinued in 2025, the community participation system that has never been built and managed today will complicate the citarum watershed saving from increasingly massive ecosystem damage. it requires a sharper and in-depth empirical study using the concept of watershed governance that specifically discusses river basin management for future research. it is needed to find a more comprehensive explanation of what scientific contributions the academic world can provide for the citarum watershed improvement. funding the author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, or 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sungai citarum & semrawutnya program pemerintah”. tirto.id, february 20. retrieved july 1, 2018 from (https://tirto.id/sejarah-pengelolaan-sungai-citarumsemrawutnya-program-pemerintah-dhnt) 56 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 undp-siwi water governance facility. 2016. issue sheet: water governance. stockholm: stockholm international water institute (siwi). retrieved july 1, 2019, from (https://www. watergovernance.org/governance/four-dimensions-governance/) widianingsih, ida, riswanda, and caroline paskarina. 2020. “governing water, engaging community: indonesian water security roadmap”. journal of governance 5(2):202-215. doi:10.31506/ jog.v5i2.9301 yon machmudi* universitas indonesia putih kusumah ardhani universitas indonesia abstract this article studies the role of women of the tablighi jamaat, a transnational islamic propagation movement, in the process of islamic propagation (da’wah) in indonesia. it aims to analyze the role played by female followers of tablighi jamaat in developing da’wah by focusing on the role of nyai (female family members of a religious leader of traditional islamic learning institution [pesantren]) in developing masturah da’wah in pesantren al-fatah and temboro village. this study uses a qualitative approach to understand how nyai of pesantren al-fatah were involved in da’wah activities in temboro. the required data were collected through observation and interviews. the findings show that like their spouses who were obliged to go for da’wah in the form of khuruj, female followers of tablighi jamaat of pesantren temboro were assigned to conduct da’wah through masturah, a form of islamic propagation which was only targeted on, organized and attended by the women of tablighi jamaah in temboro with strict rules such the obligation of wearing face veils for all participants. nyai of pesantren al-fatah initiated, led, and developed masturah so that tablighi jamaat has attracted more followers and religious students and temboro has experienced significant changes in social, religious, and economic aspects. *corresponding author: yon machmudi, arab studies, faculty of humanities, universitas indonesia. email: machmudi@ui.ac.id the role of women in islamic propagation: a case study of tablighi jamaat’s nyai of pesantren al-fatah, east java, indonesia journal of asian social science research 2020, vol. 2, no. 2: 175-190 http://jassr.cassr.web.id © the author(s) 2020 article 176 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 2, 2020 key words tablighi jamaat, role of women, da’wah, masturah, pesantren al-fatah, temboro introduction pesantren al-fatah is a traditional islamic learning institution that was founded by kiai shidiq in 1930 and is located in temboro, east java, indonesia. it experienced a significant change when it was led by kiai mahmud kholid umar (1956-1996). in 1983, a group of the tablighi jamaat followers from pakistan visited the pesantren and since then this visit has transformed it into the biggest center of tablighi jamaat in east java (az-zahro 2018). the change from a local pesantren (traditional islamic learning institution) with a strong local and traditional network into a part of the transnational islamic movement of tablighi jamaat is an interesting aspect of pesantren al-fatah. the change within pesantren al-fatah is closely related to the role played by its leader who is traditionally called kiai in java. as ziemek (1986) claims, the important role of kiai (male traditional religious leaders) contributes to the vast development of pesantren in indonesia. assisted by male and female teachers called ustadz and ustadzah respectively, a kiai in a pesantren carries out religious and educational activities. normally, these teachers were kiai’s first students who spent their time helping him running and developing his pesantren. however, the success of pesantren in expanding its role in islamic education and propagation is not only the result of kiai’s efforts alone. the kiai’s wife, commonly called nyai in java, helps with various jobs related to the survival and development of pesantren. the pesantren hosts not only male santri (religious students) but also female ones. a nyai not only runs managerial aspects of female santri boarding schools but also teaches female santri islamic doctrines through the reading of classical islamic books called kitab kuning (faiqoh 1998). studies on women of tablighi jamaat have been conducted by many researchers. for example, jaffrelot (2014) in an article entitled “transnational learning networks amongst asian muslims: an introduction” provides insight into understanding da’wah (islamic propagation) network conducted by tablighi jamaat in southeast asia. nisa (2014) in her article “insights into the lives of indonesian female tablighi jama’a” examines the role of pesantren in transmitting 177machmudi and ardhani religious knowledge carried by tablighi jamaah to its indonesian followers, in particular to female followers. she analyses the life experiences of female tablighis inside and outside pesantren as part of a global imagined tablighi community. the existence of female guests and foreign students who are enrolled in pesantren plays a significant role in strengthening their belonging to the transnational network of the global tablighi jama’at. another study by momotaj (2015) in his dissertation “negotiation for extended gender roles in islam: women in tablighi jamaat in bangladesh”, analyses the role of women in the jamaah tabligh organization, who are represented by masturah jamaah. janson (2016) in an article entitled “male wives and female husbands: reconfiguring gender in the tablighi jama’at in the gambia,” describes the contribution of the tablighi jamaat in providing space for the wives of tablighi men to carry out various activities outside their houses including doing da’wah activity. to support their wives’ activities in public space, the tablighi jamaat men in gambia are willing to do household chores. in the context of the current covid-19 pandemic, a recent report entitled “religious “super-spreaders” in indonesia: managing the risk of stigmatization” by the institute for policy analysis of conflict (2020) found that tablighi jamaat in indonesia contributes to the spread of covid-19 due to its members’ high mobility to do da’wah activity. those studies undoubtedly have contributed significantly to the understanding of tablighi jamaat women. however, what is missing from those studies is an analysis of the role of women in the tablighi jamaat movement within pesantren milieu. many people assume that only male followers of tablighi jamaat, who are called karkun, engage in islamic propagation through khuruj, leaving their homes to do da’wah for several days or months. but, our field observations, revealed that like their male counterpart, women of tablighi jamaat have played an important role in conducting da’wah. they are involved in da’wah activity through masturah, conducting islamic propagation at certain places organized by the movement for tablighi jamaati women. therefore, this article analyses the role of women in islamic da’wah with a special reference to the case of nyai and their role in developing pesantren al-fatah and temboro village, and in carrying out da’wah among the women of tablighi jamaat. for this purpose, this study uses a qualitative approach to understand the social phenomenon of tablighi jamaah movement at pesantren al-fatah employing social change change because da’wah activity is a process of changing social, cultural, and religious values. in this case, kyai is an important and influential agent 178 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 2, 2020 of change in the pesantren. according to karl d. jackson (1990), kyai as a religious leader has traditional authority through his charisma so that he can easily influence his followers. but, as this study will show, the female family members of kyai also play a significant role in directing women’s activities in the pesantren as well as masturah program of tablighi jamaat movement. we conducted interviews and observations to obtain the required primary data for this study. using in-depth interviews, we interviewed boarding school supervisors, managers and teachers at pesantren alfatah, and devotees of masturah as well as temboro village chief. we also conducted field observations to clarify the collected interview data. in what follows, this article, firstly, describes temboro as a center of tablighi jamaat in indonesia. this is then followed by the elaboration of the influence of the tablighi jamaat on the development of pesantren alfatah. lastly, it discusses the role of women in pesantren al-fatah as a center of tablighi jamaat movement. temboro village, east java temboro is a village located 12 kilometers from magetan district, 14 kilometers from madiun city, and two kilometers from the capital of the closest sub-district. it is a sloped area with 517,320 hectares (temboro village government 2016). the population of temboro villagers in 2018 is 7,873 people with 4,080 male and 3,793 female, and 2,322 households. most temboro people are entrepreneurs and farmers, and the rest are civil servants, laborers, and so on. according to the population data of temboro village in 2018, 100% of temboro villagers are muslims. there are 29 mosques and four mushala (prayer rooms), which are used for daily prayers, congregation, quranic recitation, religious lectures, community deliberation, and other activities (temboro village government 2018). in temboro village, there are four pesantrens, namely alal-fatah, al-qadir, roudhotul athfal, and almuttaqin. these pesantrens attract local and foreign students as well as groups of travelers to study, visit and stay in temboro. temboro has been known as a religious village as seen in the tradition that the male population wears sarongs and peci (islamic head covering) wherever they go. before the arrival of the tablighi jamaat to temboro village, the residents of temboro village had already strongly embraced islamic teachings. the temboro community acts as a social controller of 179machmudi and ardhani pesantren al-fatah. for example, if a male and a female santris are caught by the residents because they meet in secret without being accompanied by a third person, their names will be written on a wall in the village aimed as a social punishment for violating the pesantren rules of good conduct (syafi 2018). therefore, the village of temboro is widely known as kampung madinah (madinah village) as it resembles the life of people during the prophet muhammad in madinah in the period of early islam. pesantren al-fatah is located at a 60-hectare area on k. h. shiddiq street, temboro village, karas sub-district, magetan district, east java province. it is geographically located in the center of temboro village and surrounded by a residential neighborhood, rice fields, and sugar cane farms. because it is located in temboro which has a tropical climate, the temperature at pesantren al-fatah is hot and dry from morning to afternoon and cold at night. it is rich in water resources because it is adjacent to a river in temboro, which is used as the main source of water supply for the pesantren. different from most pesantrens whose buildings are usually located in one restricted location, pesantren al-fatah has some dormitories scattered in some areas in temboro village. the dormitory area is divided into two parts, one for male santri and another one for female ones. due to the increasing number of santri every year, the pesantren need more dorms to accommodate around 22,000 students. the location of al-fatah is divided into four areas, namely the central pondok located on jalan sunan ampel, pondok saridin, pondok utara, and pondok trangkil. pondok trangkil is divided into two building areas: pondok putih (white dormitory), known as such because it has a white mosque, which is specifically provided for male students who study formal-national school curriculum and diniyyah (islamic) school, and pondok merah (red dormitory), known as such because it has a red mosque, which is allocated for female students who study tahfidz al-quran (quranic memorization) and diniyyah school. the dormitories in pesantren al-fatah serve not only as a residence for the students but also as a place of teaching and learning and as a mosque. in each area of al-fatah, there is a housing complex provided for kiai, nyai, ustadz or ustadzah. tablighi jamaat movement of pesantren al-fatah a group of tablighi jamaat members came to pesantren al-fatah in 1983 led by its amir (leader), prof. abdul shobur from pakistan. the group that consisted of 10 religious scholars was traveling from banyuwangi to 180 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 2, 2020 jakarta. they stopped by at al-fatah for journey supplies. kiai mahmud accepted their arrival happily. this was when the exchange of ideas and opinions on religious issues began to occur between tablighi jamaat and al-fatah (yatini 2018). in 1986, the second group of tablighi jamaat members came to pesantren al-fatah. this group came from malaysia. two years later, the third group of tablighi jamaat members from pakistan came to the pesantren led by its amir, amin ghul. then, kiai mahmud ordered his first son, kiai uzairon, to follow the khuruj for three days and went to nizamudin to learn the principle of da’wah activity of tablighi jama’at (az-zahro 2018). after kiai uzairon returned from khuruj in 1988, santri, administrators, and teachers of al-fatah were obliged to do khuruj. kiai mahmud and kiai uzairon applied that dawah strategy because they felt in line with the thoughts of the tablighi jamaat movement. in 1991, a group of tablighi jamaat members from thailand led by abu dhar al-ghifari came to al-fatah bringing the teaching of masturah da’wah into the pesantren (nafisah 2018). at that time, they also began to oblige female santri and religious teachers to wear veils in al-fatah pesantren. female students were taught how to do masturah da’wah starting from the procedure of masturah to what subjects should be taught. these da’wah methods, khuruj and masturah offered by tablighi jamaat, were well received by the pesantren as well as the people of temboro village (yatini 2018). in pesantren, there are two categories of women. first, women who are knowledgeable in religious teachings and carry out religious da’wah activities. second, wives of kiai, either those who are involved in islamic propagation or those who do not (faiqoh 1998). in this article, the first category is discussed, namely women who have knowledge in the field of religion and carry out religious da’wah activities. because of her expertise in religious knowledge, a nyai can be an agent of change in her pesantren and the surrounding community. a kiai has a limited role when it comes to deal with problems of female santri. moral ethics and religious principles discourage him to interact freely with female santri so that he needs mediators to overcome their problems. in this context, a kyai needs an actor, namely his wife called nyai, as a female cleric (ahmadi 2002). the function of pesantren has changed since its early emergence. in the early days, pesantren is as a center for islamic education as well as islamic propagation. the pesantren’s islamic education is used as a 181machmudi and ardhani provision for its da’wah and da’wah is used as a means for building its islamic educational system. so, it can be said that the educational function of pesantrens is to support the islamic da’wah (qomar 2002). this is in line with the function of pesantrens at the time of wali songo (nine muslim saints) as a place to produce islamic religious scholars (ulama) and preachers (da’i) (saridjo 1982). pesantren al-fatah as an islamic educational institution not only carries out its educational function in providing islamic education but also its function of preaching islam to the wider community. al-fatah as a center of tablighi jamaat movement believes that faith needs not only belief and saying in words, but also needs to be proven through deeds, one of which is da’wah, propagation of islamic teachings. as the qur’an and the sunnah say, da’wah is mandatory for both muslim men and women (zahid 2017). therefore, for the tablighi jamaat movement, both muslim men and muslim women are obliged to do da’wah. the da’wah obligation for men is called khuruj fi sabilillah (going out of home in the way of allah), and the one for women is called masturah. nyai of pesantren al-fatah and the da’wah of tablighi jamaat in temboro kiai is a central figure in the development of tablighi jamaat movement in pesantren al-fatah. however, nyai should not be ruled out in the spread of this da’wah movement. in 1986, when the second group of tablighi jamaat members came to al-fatah, the daughters of kiai mahmud, namely umi fathimmah az-zahroh and nyai masrohah, had started wearing niqab or face veils. the face veil worn by nyai was different from the one that is normally worn today. umi fathimmah provided face veils for religious teachers and santri in pesantren al-fatah. but, teachers and santri had no obligation to wear a veil. nyai only gave lectures on the virtues and benefits of wearing a veil. she played a role as uswatun hasanah (exemplary role) whose behavior is an exemplary model for her santri. in 1991, all women in pesantren al-fatah began to be obliged to wear a veil. but, there were santri who could not accept the obligation to wear a veil and finally decided to leave the pesantren. umi fathimah said: “wearing a face veil means i respect my freedom. i am free to dress the way i do. i have the freedom to make myself not free for men’s consumption”. the development of masturah da’wah movement in pesantren al-fatah is inseparable from the role played by two nyai, namely nyai mashrohah and umi fathimah azzahro, the daughters of kiai mahmud 182 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 2, 2020 (1956-1996). they and other kiai mahmud’s daughters initiated the masturah da’wah in al-fatah and spread it to temboro village and other villages and cities. umi fathim, a nickname of fathima azzahro, started to do the masturah khuruj for 40 days in 1991. this was to find out how the principles of masturah da’wah were applied. after finished her masturah khuruj, she developed masturah da’wah in al-fatah and began to spread it to the community temboro village. now, the house of umi fathim is used as a markaz and a transit place before the devotees do masturah da’wah. nyai masrohah, the first daughter of kiai mahmud, is also an influential figure in temboro village. her husband, h. syadzali shiddiq, b.a., served as the village head of temboro (1986-1998). her position as the wife of the village head made it easy to spread the teachings of tablighi jamaat. the activities of women villagers changed gradually, especially in the way they wore clothes. she explained female villagers the obligation of wearing a veil and niqab. she attempted to provide a better understanding of face veil to those who looked at veiled women as ‘foreign persons’. temboro village market also had a special characteristic after the spread of masturah da’wah movement. many female traders at the market, who were temboro villagers as well came from outer temboro, initially did not wear a veil. in response, nyai and pesantren al-fatah attempted to provide them with a better understanding of the importance of using veils and face veils. some villagers joined the tablighi jamaat movement to distribute veils free of charge to market traders. as a result, now all temboro market traders wear veils or face veils and apply the islamic law of buying and selling things (masrohah 2018). the tablighi jamaat movement is an islamic conservativefundamentalist movement inspired by the reformers of the salafi movement from saudi arabia (noor 2012). in contrast to other islamic movements, tablighi jamaat focuses its mission on transforming the muslim community and bringing muslims back to the true path of islam by following tablighi standard of right practices of islam. in spreading the teachings of islam, the tablighi jamaat movement refuses to use the method of da’wah by force and chose not to engage in politics. nyai masrohah and umi fathimah took a persuasive approach in their da’wah to temboro villagers. there were no violence and coercion in their da’wah so a harmonious relationship was established between the village community and pesantren al-fatah. nyai have played important roles for pesantren al-fatah. as a wife, a nyai played a role in educating her children, taking care of her household, 183machmudi and ardhani and participating in her household’s decision-making meetings. as a dormitory caretaker, a nyai played as parents, educators, and caregivers for her students. as a community leader, a nyai gave advice or opinions on problems facing temboro villagers. as a muballighah (female preacher), a nyai gave religious lectures to her students and temboro villagers, and guided devotees on how to carry out masturah islamic propagation. masturah: da’wah movement among women of tablighi jamaat etymologically, the word masturah is derived from the arabic verb satara yasturu which means “to cover”. masturah is a noun of satara, which means “be covered”. in urdu, the word masturah means “woman” (azzahro 2018). there were different opinions of the meaning of masturah among tablighi jammat women of pesantren al-fatah. umi fathim said that when she went to india and pakistan, she found that masturah means “woman”. but, tablighi jamaat members like elis nafisah and yatini said that masturah is a closed islamic mission because it is carried out in a closed house approved by members, which is not seen from outside and the members inside cannot see outside. so, we conclude that masturah is an attempt of da’wah among women of tablighi jamaat, in which women must be accompanied by their husband or mahram (guardians), and is conducted at a certain time and place agreed by the members. masturah da’wah was initiated by shaykh maulana muhammad ilyas (1887-1948) when he was concerned with the condition of muslims in india at his time. it emerged at the same time as the obligation of khuruj for male members of tablighi jamaat (az-zahro 2018). shaykh ilyas expected that muslims should use 10% of their time to do this religious mission. as described by manshur (2010), requirements for a group that wished to perform masturah da’wah are as follow: a. in the three-day masturah, female participants should have attended ijtima’ or masturah ta’lim. the amir (leader) of three-day masturah should be a person who has carried out khuruj for 40 days and has been an amir before; b. in 15-day masturah, participants should be married persons and have carried out three-day khuruj masturah for at least three times. the amir (leader) of this 15-day masturah should be a person who has carried out a 40-day khuruj and experienced the 15-day masturah khuruj; c. in 40-day masturah, with neighboring countries as a destination, participants should be male members of tablighi jamaat who have been 184 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 2, 2020 in the group for four months, have done a 15-day khuruj masturah or five 3-day khuruj masturahs and are acknowledged by the shura (meeting board) in indonesia; and d. in two-month masturah, with india, bangladesh, and pakistan as countries of destination, participants should have done a 15-day masturah or 40day masturah, acknowledged by shura in indonesia, and get approval from shura nizamuddin, india. masturah is characterized by its closed nature as it is done by visiting a house of a da’wah participant, which was previously chosen, and a satir, a long cloth that must be installed surrounding the house so that those who are inside cannot see outside and vice versa. additionally, the attires worn by the participants must cover their awrah entirely. if a female tablighi wears a black veil and abaya for her daily clothing, she must wear attire with niqab that covers her body including face, arms and feet, except eyes, when she is attending a session of masturah (yatini 2018). masturah is mainly aimed at re-establishing islamic values in the participants’ household so that it can function as a mosque. religious values that can be implemented at the household are as follows: 1) reestablishing the fadhail amal taklim assembly (a main religious textbook of tablighi jamaat); 2) every woman has to be able to maintain their fard salah by doing it on time, preserve their dzikir all day, and read the quran in routine; 3) frequently discuss righteous deeds and the afterlife at home; 4) living a simple life, and 5) encouraging and helping husbands to do the da’wah khuruj fi sabilillah (az-zahro 2018). another requirement of masturah is a female participant must be accompanied by her husband or mahram (religious guardians) such as her dad, brother, or another family member. masturah is usually attended by married women, yet unmarried women and teenagers are permitted to get involved in this da’wah activity. the men who are accompanying their wives in a session of masturah will stay in a mosque near the household where the masturah is being conducted to keep an eye on their wives and their activities. khuruj fii sabilillah, which is conducted by male followers of tablighi jamaah, is focused on activities aimed at reviving religious practices outside the home such as reviving the function of the mosque as a place of congregational prayer and da’wah activities by visiting muslims one by one at their houses. meanwhile, masturah is aimed at reviving religious practices in the house, so the house functions like a mosque. masturah da’wah is different from the common model of da’wah which is open to 185machmudi and ardhani the public because it is carried out in public places by presenting a da’i (preacher). masturah activities in temboro can be described as follow. daily ta’lim daily ta’lim is religious learning which is held at home among family members for 30 minutes after the maghrib prayer. this includes learning the main reference books of tablighi jama’at such as fadhilah amal, fadhilah sadaqah, and muntakhab hadith, reciting al-quran, conducting deliberation of family issues such as determining what to be purchased the next day, religious issues, and others (nafisah 2018). weekly ta’lim weekly ta’lim is religious learning held once a week in mahallah, the residential place of a masturah participant. it is held at the day and time agreed by the participants of mahallah deliberation. the weekly ta’lim is attended by around 20 members. masturah organizers control the programs of this weekly ta’lim. participants do not use loudspeakers, stand, and sit on a chair. all sit on the floor. they are not allowed to bring children. new participants are permitted not to follow tightly the rule of body covering (yatini 2018). bayan masturah bayan masturah is religious learning usually held on friday after the ‘ashr prayer. it provides islamic lectures that describe the importance of da’wah, faith, and other islamic teachings. bayan masturah is attended by women and girls from temboro and other places (nafisah 2018). masturah ahad kliwon (selapanan) masturah ahad kliwon is one of the routine activities, which is held on kliwon sundays at the house of kiai ubaidillah located in trangkil. male and female attendants are separated from each other in that male participants attend religious lectures in the trangkil central mosque and female participants attend the house of kiai ubaidillah. bayan masturah is delivered by using loudspeakers so that it can be well heard by all women participants. 186 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 2, 2020 khuruj masturah khuruj masturah is a da’wah activity carried out by a group of tablighi jamaat members in a certain area. the data of the groups of devotees who carry out the khuruj masturah are recorded in the main office of tablighi jamaat (markaz). khuruj masturah is funded through the group’s own financial support. before leaving for khuruj masturah, each group must get approval from markaz. the obligation that doing da’wah is not only for men but also for women as stated in the quran (alu imran: 104 and110; al-fushshilat:33) is the basis of masturah da’wah movement. the impact of masturah on the development of pesantren al-fatah and temboro village our studies revealed that masturah da’wah impacted pesantren al-fatah and the community of temboro. first, women of pesantren al-fatah were obliged to wear a face veil. the first kind of veil or niqab was different from that of today. umi fathimah sewed a face-veil herself from a thick piece of cloth and later provided face veils for sale. umi fathimah, nyai masyrohah, and other daughters of kiai mahmud showed themselves as exemplary models of face veil to teachers and students at pesantren alfatah. but, in the beginning, women didn’t need to wear a face veil. these nyai gave lectures about the virtues of wearing a veil to women female teachers and studentsat pesantren al-fatah. second, masturah da’wah movement has attracted more santri to study at pesantren al-fatah. the santri did not only come from magetan, but also from various regions in indonesia and even from abroad. also, masturah da’wah has provided temboro villagers with positive impacts in terms of their social, religious, economic, cultural lives. in terms of social-religious life, masturah da’wah has made temboro villagers, around 7000 people, more devoted and obedient to islam. when adzan (a call to prayer) was announced, they closed their shops and stopped their worldly activities. men immediately went to the mosque to pray and women performed prayers in their homes. besides, ta’lim (religious learning) was conducted in every house, mosque, and neighborhood. majlis ta’lim (religious learning assembly) for women was found in each neighborhood. there was even a special ta’lim assembly for traders of temboro market. the assembly was held on thursday from 10.00 to11.00 eastern indonesian time at mr. bilal’s house behind temboro market. when the ta’lim assembly started, female traders left their shops and were guarded by their fathers or market security officers to attend to the ta’lim. 187machmudi and ardhani female traders at temboro market had to wear ‘islamic clothes’ including face veils. this development of the tablighi jama’at movement made temboro called kampung madinah (village of medina). in some places, there were green signposts say thayyibah. streets in the village use arabic names and islamic phrases such as medina i alley, k. h. ahmad shodiq street, and sunan ampel road. shops and other business places like lodging or pharmacy also use arabic names and islamic decoration such as jeddah shop that sold robe and abayas, and al-mabruk shop. the economy of temboro grew rapidly due to the development of the da’wah business in this village. many shops sold fittings for masturah, veils, niqab, abayas, and so on. the increasing number of santri every year also improved the economy of the local community. many masturah routine activities attracted participants from various areas outside temboro. those who were natives to temboro looked for a place to stay. there were also food sellers and vendors along the village street. motorbike services were in high demand in this village mainly for female participants and attendees because they no longer felt embarrassed to travel to an area with men who were not their mahram. other economic businesses also developed such as lodging, clinics, pharmacies, and car rental. women in temboro village were instructed to wear a face veil from an early age. they normally wore black abaya and a face veil. visitors to temboro were also advised to wear muslim clothes or at least wear decent clothes. furthermore, temboro has transformed into a village of religious tourism. male visitors could attend the regular congregation which was held every friday night at the trangkil mosque. female visitors could participate in the activities of parenting on fridays. islamic learning sessions were held in almost every corner of temboro. islamic congregations held by pesantren al-fatah were not only attended by laypersons, but also by local government officials and police officers of magetan regency. besides, visitors to temboro could experience natural tourism by taking a camel ride for idr 10,000. four camels brought from malang zoo were available for rent. visitors also could get on horseback for idr 5,000. water tourism in the form of canoe rental was also provided. visitors could go canoeing for idr 10,000. every year, archery and horse riding competitions were held at pesantren al-fatah which attracted enthusiastic visitors from the surrounding community. 188 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 2, 2020 conclusion this article has shown that jamaat tablighi women, who had not been previously involved in any public activities, played an important role in the development of islamic da’wah activities, particularly in pesantren al-fatah and temboro village. this is seen in the role played by nyai -wife and daugthers of pesantren al-fatah’s leader (kiai)in initiating and developing da’wah among women of tablighi jamaat movement called masturah. it is a form of da’wah activity conducted by and for female followers of jamaat tabligh with strict rules such as women participants must be accompanied by their husbands or religious guardians (mahram). masturah is held in private houses of female followers of tablighi jamaat, only offered to and attended by tablighi jamaat women so that it is not well known by the wider society. for tablighi jamaat movement, islamic faith should be put into practice by muslim men and women. this is manifested in masturah in which female followers of tablighi jamaat were actively involved in islamic propagation by and for themselves. it is comparable to the obligation of da’wah for male followers of tablighi jamaat. as male followers go for da’wah by leaving their families for a certain time known as khuruj, their wives conduct da’wah activities by and for themselves known as masturah. while khuruj is aimed at reviving islamic faith and practice in public space, masturah is designed to revive islamic faith and practices at home, making houses as mosques for female members of tablighi jamaat. nyai played an important role as agents of da’wah in developing masturah at pesantren al-fatah and the surrounding community of temboro. this has helped the development of pesantren al-fatah as well as the acceptance of tablighi jamaat movement among temboro people. as a result, all this has transformed temboro into a village with a stricter religious life and economic benefits due to the rapid development of islamic da’wah model developed by pesantren al-fatah and its tablighi jamaat movement. references ahmadi, fahmi muhammad. 2002. ibu nyai dan perubahan sosial pesantren. master thesis, university of indonesia. bungin, burhan. 2001. metodologi penelitian kualitatif. jakarta: rajagrafindo persada. 189machmudi and ardhani faiqoh. 1998. “nyai sebagai agen perubahan: tantangan bagi nyai-nyai generasi mendatang.” master thesis, university of indonesia,. institute for policy analysis of conflict. 2020. “religious “superspreaders” in indonesia: managing the risk of stigmatisation.” ipac covid-19 briefing no.4, 9 may 2002. retrieved february 20, 2021 (http://www.understandingconflict.org/en/conflict/read/92/ 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7 april 2018. interview with nyai masrohah, 15 april 2018. how reformist islamic theology influences muslim women’s movement: the case of liberal-progressive muslims in indonesia journal of asian social science research 2020, vol. 2, no. 1: 53-72 http://jassr.cassr.web.id © the author(s) 2019 nur hidayah* syarif hidayatullah state islamic university jakarta, indonesia abstract reformist muslim ideology has been perceived to liberate muslim women from the shackles of patriarchal religious and cultural norms. this article analyzes the extent to which contemporary reformist islamic theology influences muslim women’s movement in the light of muslim debates on women and gender issues. in doing so, it focuses on the case of islamic reform by indonesian liberal-progressive muslims since the late new order and its influence on the muslim women’s movement in the country. this article argues that islamic reform promoted by contemporary liberal-progressive muslims has given a significant contribution to the development of muslim women’s movement. it has laid the ground for an islamic paradigm shift on the discourse on islam and gender. the opening of the gate of ijtihad and respect for modernity espoused by reformist muslims have provided tools for radical change in islamic discourse on gender while still ground such change on an islamic basis. it has empowered muslim women to claim for the rights in religious knowledge production and build a critical mass of muslim women who take an active part in the struggle for gender and social justice. however, the development of muslim women’s movement has been far more vibrant through its engagement with the dynamic of its surrounding socio-political circumstances and though critical dialogue with broader currents of feminist thoughts. such complex genealogies have enabled muslim women’s movement to claim its own identity as indigenous islamic feminism that poses multiple critiques to any unjust systems that deprive muslim women of their rights. key words islamic theology, reformism, liberal-progressive muslims, muslim women’s movement *corresponding author: senior lecturer nur hidayah faculty of islamic economics and business, syarif hidayatullah state islamic university jakarta, indonesia. email: nurhidayah@uinjkt.ac.id article 54 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 introduction the relationship between islam and the notion of gender equality has become a recurrent theme of debate throughout history in muslim societies. from the beginning of this debate, the sources of islam—the qur’an, hadith, and fiqh (islamic jurisprudence)—have been utilized by many competing forces to justify their positions, ranging from reformist islamic theology promoted by liberal-progressive muslims arguing for islamic ideals of justice, equality, and human dignity to revivalist islamist theology contending that islam has its own distinctive notions of women’s rights and gender relations (mojab 2001:127). while reformist muslim ideology has been perceived to liberate muslim women from the shackles of patriarchal religious and cultural norms, revivalist islamist ideology has been perceived to emphasize on the particular islamic notion of gender issues and traditional women’s roles. this article analyzes the extent of influence of contemporary reformist islamic theology on muslim women’s movement in the light of muslim debates over women and gender issues. to do so, it uses the case study of islamic reform by indonesian liberal-progressive muslims since the late new order and its influence on the muslim women’s movement in the country. i argue that islamic reform promoted by contemporary liberalprogressive muslims has given a significant contribution to the development of muslim women’s movement. it has laid the ground for an islamic paradigm shift on the discourse on islam and gender. the opening of the gate of ijtihad and respect for modernity espoused by reformist muslims have provided tools for radical change in islamic discourse on gender while still ground such change on an islamic basis. it has empowered muslim women to claim for the rights in religious knowledge production and build a critical mass of muslim women who take an active part in the struggle for gender and social justice. however, the development of muslim women’s movement has been far more vibrant through its engagement with the dynamic of its surrounding socio-political circumstances and though critical dialogue with broader currents of feminist thoughts. such complex genealogies have enabled muslim women’s movement to claim its own identity as indigenous islamic feminism that poses multiple critiques to any unjust systems that deprive muslim women of their rights. in what follows, i analyze reformist muslim gender ideology and its influence on contemporary muslim women’s movement. then, i use a case study of muslims in indonesia to look at the dynamic interplay between reformist islamic theology on muslim women’s movement in the largest 55hidayah, nur muslim country in the world. lastly, i provide some reflections on the case study followed by some concluding remarks. islamic reform and its influence on muslim women’s movement historical overview of early islamic reform and its influence on muslim women’s movement the modernization programs embarked by many muslim countries following their encounter with the west since the colonial and postcolonial era have resulted in a significant transformation of many muslim societies. this transformation has not only resulted in the fragmentation of religious authorities but also the emergence of muslim intellectuals who eager to reform their societies and communities in the light of modern ideas while still trace the genealogies of their reformist ideas in islamic tradition and authoritative corpus. the synthesis between tradition and modernity as the hallmark of islamic reform since the late nineteenth century could serve as the balancing mechanism between two extremes of religious fundamentalism on the one hand and westernization on the other hand (haj 2009). one salient issue that concerns reformist muslims is the relationship between islam and gender equality and women’s rights. women who make up half of the population have potential human resources for the nationstate building. therefore, for reformist muslims, women’s liberation from the shackles of religious and cultural norms could contribute to not only women’s self-development but also the advancement of their societies. as early as islamic reform, the issues about women and gender equality in the muslim world have been one of the central issues for reformist muslims. rifa`ah tahtawi’s work in 1872 argued that the reform on women’s social status, roles, and rights in society has been a fundamental need for the betterment of society (tahtawi 1972). another influential reformist muslim is qasim amin with his works on women issues including hālat al-mar`ah fi al-hai`ati al-ijtimā’iyaah taabiah li hālat al-adab, tahrirul mar`ah, and mar`ah jadidah. three central ideas in his thought are his critique upon jilbab (veiling), the need to limit husbands’ rights to arbitrarily divorce their wives and his critique upon polygamy marriages (ja`far n.d). since then, there emerged reformist muslim women who also struggled for women’s rights and gender equality such as malik hifni nasif, huda sha`rawi, and munniroh tasabit musa (ahmed 1992). these scholars-activists have a significant influence on the rise of indigenous muslim women’s movement in egypt and inspired similar movements in other muslim countries. 56 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 in such early development, reformist islamic theology has been focused on the national struggle for independence from colonialism plagued the muslim world. this has also influenced the orientation of muslim women’s movements in these countries. muslim women’s movements have been mobilized to support the countries’ national independence. following the independence, islamic reform has been, to some extent, oriented, if not to say co-opted by the incumbent regimes, to support the modernization project embarked by these newly independent states. at this stage, muslim women’s movement also had more orientation for social reform and modernization. deniz kandiyoti argues that during this period, there have been persistent tensions between the modernist trends in nationalism, which favoured an expansion of women’s citizenship rights and social equality, and the anti-modernist strands which were concerned about the dilution and contamination of cultural values and identity in a post-colonial context (kandiyoti 1996). the rise of islamic revivalism and muslim women’s responses however, the emergence of post-modernist criticism of modernization theory in the 1950s and 1960s had given birth to islamist groups calling for returning to the “pristine islam” as a critique of the failure of essentialist western development theory transplanted to muslim countries. as kandiyoti (1995) argues, “[t]he failed promise of post-independence developmentalism could be interpreted not as mere technical failures but as moral failures requiring a complete overhaul of the world views underpinning them.” the ascendancy of political islam as exemplified by movements as varied as jama`at-i islami in pakistan, ikhwan al-muslimin in egypt, the islamic republic in iran, and the islamic salvation front (fis) in algeria, poses a significant challenge for muslim women’s movement as the former insists on singling out women’s status and roles in the society as the supreme test of the authenticity of the islamic order (afkhami 1995:1). the case of iranian women after the islamic revolution in 1969 indicates a clear case where women have been forced to return to their traditional roles under the name of sharia by the islamic state (mayer 1991). such a challenge has forced muslim women’s movement to critically engage with the reinterpretation of their religious texts to pose a counterdiscourse. in iran, for example, there have been women writing in the teheran women’s journal zanan to challenge the traditionalist discourse on women promoted by the islamic regime (mir-hosseini 1996). as ziba mir-hosseini (1996:6) notes, “one neglected and paradoxical outcome of the rise of political islam in the 1970s was that it helped to create an arena 57hidayah, nur within which muslim women could reconcile their faith with their new gender awareness”. however, muslim women’s critical engagement with their religious texts is not solely attributed to the internal dynamic of muslim societies. as kandiyoti (1995:24) argues, “since the 1970s, the framework for policy interventions affecting women and local women’s movements has been shaped not only by domestic considerations but by an increasingly complex set of international influences”. the un international women’s year in 1975 and the subsequent united nations decade for women have played significant roles in the promotion of women’s rights. women conferences in nairobi in 1985, in beijing in 1995, and international conference on population and development (icpd) in cairo in 1996 have been stepping stones for the urgency to formulate indigenous women’s movements in nonwestern muslim countries. icpd has particularly evoked the urgent need to have critical engagement between the notion of universal women’s rights with religious and cultural norms. this dynamic has been in parallel with the development in international women’s movements that commenced to acknowledge diversity in women’s movements by paying attention to women’s differences in terms of race, class, ethnicity, and religion. the emergence of islamic feminism all these influences have enabled muslim women’s scholars-activists to raise their multiple consciousnesses and pose multiple critiques to individuals, institutions, and systems that limit and oppress them (cooke 2001:109). this has marked the emergence of a new trend of islamic feminism. using their knowledge and authority in islamic knowledge, there have been growing islamic feminists who challenge the male-construction of islamic traditional scholarships by offering female inclusive islamic text reinterpretations. they reclaim their rights to participate in religious knowledge production such as riffat hasan, amina wadud, and asma barlas on qur’anic interpretation; fatima mernissi on hadith; and ziba mir-hosseini on fiqh. compared to the previous period, the rise of these islamic feminists has offered a shift of paradigm in islamic discourse arguing for gender equality. this new discourse argues that women’s sexuality is not constructed by nature nor the divine will, but rather by familial and social circumstances. the discourse challenges the notion that gender inequality or gender complimentary is a manifestation of divine justice, but rather a construction of classical male ulama (scholars) that reflect their surrounding contexts and time as well as the prevailing gender ideologies when such 58 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 traditional islamic scholarships were formulated and developing in the medieval islam. therefore, it poses a challenge to a long-held assumption that some rules concerning gender claimed to be islamic and part of the divine order. instead, they are, in fact, the views and perceptions of some muslims, and social practices and norms that are neither sacred nor immutable but human and changing (mir-hosseini 2003:20). in contrast to the earlier women’s rights movements that focused on rights, margot badran argues that islamic feminism builds a wider vision by focusing on the struggle for gender equality and social justice as basic principles enshrined in the qur’an and challenging men’s exclusive authority to define islam (badran 2002: 199-203;288-292). furthermore, islamic feminism has significantly contributed to transcend and destroy the constructions of old binaries such as polarities between religious and secular and between east and west. by doing this, badran (2002) further argues that islamic feminism closes gaps and demonstrates common concerns and goals as well as builds broader solidarities among women. islamic reform’s influence on muslim women’s mode of discourse giving the radical nature of the discourse that islamic feminists formulate, do they offer a new alternative? nasr hamid abu zayd (2006) argues that the great contribution of islamic feminists by offering a female inclusive reading of islamic texts has much indebted to reformist islamic thoughts. he points out that “as for verses that clearly enunciate equality, feminist hermeneutics cites all of the verses also cited by the reformists since the early 20th century, without providing any additional insight” (zayd 2006:91). it seems that abu zayd has emphasized the methodological drawing from islamic reformists by islamic feminists. indeed, islamic feminism has been part of a wider project of islamic reform in the muslim world. therefore, the methodological drawing would be inevitable, otherwise islamic feminists will be resisted as alien and transgressing the orthodoxy and boundaries of islam. this has been reflected in some cases of islamic feminists. amina wadud draws her ideas from the double movement theory of fazlur rahman, fatima mernissi takes hers from methodologies of hadith critique, and ziba mir-hosseini was inspired by abdul karim soroush’s reform ideas on the differences between religion and religious knowledge. however, they only draw in terms of methodology. in terms of substance, they offer new insights for islamic text reinterpretations that subvert male-exclusive perspectives. 59hidayah, nur islamic reform’s influence on muslim women’s mode of activism the close link between intellectual discourse and social activism in islamic feminism has also been partly influenced by reformist islamic theology that emphasizes the urgency of socio-cultural transformation to build a more humane and just society. from reformist islamic theology’s point of view, the vision of human beings as a creation on the earth is philosophically based on human’s mission not only as god’s servant but also as god’s vicegerent to bring justice and prosperity for all creatures on the earth. however, the praxis dimension of islamic feminism is also influenced by feminist thoughts. in nature, the feminist theoretical formulation is mostly derived from women’s lived experiences. although some scholars like haedah moghissi argue that ‘the marriage’ between islam and feminism is perceived to be “an oxymoron”,28 both have some convergent issues with the concern of women’s rights and the praxis dimension. therefore, besides muslim female scholars, there have also emerged muslim women’s movements in muslim countries and diasporas arguing for more strategic gender interests using the islamic framework. although islamic feminism has not constituted a big social movement, they have offered alternative modes for religious-based women’s collective actions in global, national, and local movement. at the international level, there have been organizational networks such as wlum and musawah that play a significant role in the process of cross-fertilization of muslim women’s movements across different countries. at the national level, muslim women’s movements participate actively at legal, structural, and cultural advocacies of women’s rights. at the local level, they empower their surrounding communities through gender consciousness and women empowerment programs using several strategies that have been also used by reformist muslims in launching their islamic reform projects such as public education, media, and ngos. these aim to build a constituency for strong civil society force that can bring about revolutionary and longerterm, bottom-up changes. to assess the influence of islamic reformist theology on muslim women’s movement in a specific context, the next section will discuss the case of indonesia as a country with the largest muslim population in the world. 60 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 islamic reform and its influence on muslim women’s movement in indonesia islamic reform in the late new order indonesia and its influence on muslim women’s movement the 32-year regime of the new order indonesia (1965-1998) witnessed a dynamic relationship between islam and the state in this largest muslim country in the world. in the first part of its period, the secular military-back up regime with economic development orientation embarked on repressive policies toward any formal expressions of political islam. islamist activists were the main target for government repression. as late as 1989, almost a hundred muslims in south sumatra were killed by army troops (mujani and liddle 2009:585). islamic political parties were merged into a single state-patronaged political party and all social-religious organizations had to pledge allegiance to the state doctrine, pancasila, limiting the freedom of muslims to use islam as a basis for their organizational ideology. however, along with declining military support, in the last decade of the regime, suharto shifted his previous repressive policies towards islam and muslims in indonesia into more accommodative ones. the modernization of islamic educational systems, the promulgation of islamic courts, the establishment of icmi (ikatan cendekiawan muslim indonesia), the founding of islamic financial institutions, and state-support of islamic media partly reflected such shift of policy orientation. the shift was primarily attributed to creative muslim responses to the secular regime’s policies. orthodox muslim intellectuals and activists played the creative role to respond to the context resulted from suharto’s actions in the first decades of the regime. the most celebrated actors were the modernist nurcholish madjid, making a conceptual or ideological contribution, and the traditionalist abdurrahman wahid, making an organizational and political contribution (mujani and liddle 2009:585). nurcholish offered a break-thought alternative to the deadlocked debate between the incumbent government’s secularism and islamist activists’ insistence for islam as the platform for the indonesian state where the majority is muslims. he creatively redefined islam-state relations in a way that met both the religious and secular needs of a potentially huge constituency by distinguishing between secularism and secularization (mujani and liddle 2009:585). his well-known slogan of “islam: yes, islamic party: no” has made a profound influence on the internal secularization of indonesian muslims. meanwhile, abdurahman wahid, a grandson of the founder of nu (nahdlatul ulama), the country’s largest mass-muslim organization, introduced two sensibilities to indonesian 61hidayah, nur political life: the traditional tolerance, pragmatism, even opportunism and a distinctly modern commitment to social democracy and secular nationalism. joining these two sensibilities both inside nu and in the larger indonesia society has made his contribution unique (mujani and liddle 2009:587). his famous jingle of “pribumisasi islam” (“domestication of islam”) transformed into a strategic tool to challenge local islamists’ aspirations for an indonesian islamic state and trans-national islamists’ agenda for khilafah islamiyah (pan-islamism), which has also increasingly been growing since the late 1970s. since then, muslims have shifted their orientation from formal political struggle into socio-cultural development. such a strategy has given birth to the so-called rising “civil muslims”. these civil muslims have been important actors that played a significant contribution to indonesia’s transition of the authoritarian regime into the current democratic one (hefner 2000). this internal dynamic has been also strengthened by western’s global campaign for democracy and human rights. western-funded programs for islam and civil society programs have been proliferated since the 1980s. there have been burgeoning ngos that oriented for grass-root empowerment and building constituencies for social movements. there have been growing numbers of islamic-based ngos campaigning for democracy, human rights, social justice, and pluralism. although the above two leading thinkers did not focus their reform on women and gender issues, their islamic reformist ideas have laid a profound ground for the radical change in islamic discourse, including the one on women and gender issues. through their reformist methodology of ijtihad (independent reasoning in islam) and contextualization of islam, they justified the orthodoxy of their reform and revitalized the islamic substantive ideas of equality, freedom, human dignity, social and gender justice. the notion of “secularization of islam” introduced by nurcholish madjdid has enabled muslim women’s activists to argue against patriarchal bias in traditional gender discourse promoted by islamist groups growing during the late new order period. in a similar vein, the notion of “domestication of islam” in indonesia launched by abdurrahman wahid has enabled muslim women to reveal patriarchal bias reflected in the classical islamic text interpretations. such reform ideas have also empowered muslim women to formulate counter-discourses. similar other thinkers also developed their reform ideas during the late new order. munawir sjadzali, the former minister of religious affairs, launched his reformist ideas on the so-called “re-actualization of islamic law” by some measures of the islamization of state laws 62 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 with a more progressive approach. under his leadership, the ministry successfully proposed the enactment of religious/islamic courts law and the compilation of islamic law on marriage, inheritance, and islamic endowment. these regulations are deemed to be necessary steps to protect women’s rights by the state against the arbitrary classical fiqh rules. his project of modernization of islamic higher educational institutions including sending some outstanding students to pursue their master and doctoral degrees to well-known western universities resulted in positive results. then, these returning students modernized the curriculum of their islamic universities. some of them founded women studies centers that also become focal points for women’s empowerment programs including the reinterpretation of islamic texts using a female inclusive perspective. at the society level, there emerges a new trend among the traditionalist muslims of nu who launched reform while still maintaining their identity of traditionalist muslims. they introduced a novel approach of islamic reform through the revitalization of fiqh that has been surpassed by previous modernist muslims in their reform project. they strive to transform the rich legacy of islamic jurisprudence from previously alleged to be accountable for the traditionalist muslims’ marginalization into the one that can serve as tools for societal change and social ethics. such transformation has been attributed to the decision of nu in its national congress in 1986 in lirboyo, kediri, east java, to return to its original platform as a socialcultural organization, to avoid nu to be trapped into pragmatic politics and be further politicized. in terms of methodology, nu has also shifted its orientation from following fiqh schools (madhhab) literally into applying these schools’ methodologies to solve contemporary human issues. one of these reformers, sahal mahfud, agues for the renewal of fiqh by developing the social fiqh paradigm. this paradigm attempt to re-orient fiqh as a tool to solve complex social problems through the formulation of islamic discourse that can empower muslim society to be agents for social change. such transformation at the state and society level has also provided an impetus for the emergence of muslim scholar-activists who are concerned with humanitarian issues, particularly on social and gender justice. since the late new order, there have been emerging independent muslim (women’s) organizations to provide advocacy for the rights of the marginalized groups of the society such as muslim women in pesantren (islamic traditional religious institutions), women factory workers, slum dwellers, and children. at this stage, the discourse on human rights in the western contexts and feminist ideas were reconciled with islamic substantive ideas of justice and equality to serve as methodology and tool 63hidayah, nur to reflect on indonesian women’s realities of multi-layered oppression from the state, cultural, and religious norms. the emerging organizations during this period included yasanti, fiqh nisa program of p3m, ykf nu, lsppa, kkpi, and women’s studies centres at state-funded islamic universities such as institut agama islam negeri (iain) and universitas islam negeri (uin). these organizations have also played a significant role in introducing both islamic and western feminist ideas to the indonesian muslim audience without generating many controversies and resistance. they translated the works of muslim scholars-activists such as riffat hassan, fatima mernissi, amina wadud-muhsin, ali ashgar engineer, and abdullahi ahmed anna`im. furthermore, indonesia women’s activists also started to translate into islamic-based projects the recommendations from international meetings such as the ones from icpd (international conference on populations and development) in cairo in 1996, the beijing platform for action from the fourth world conference on women in 1995, the vienna platform for action on human rights (1993) and other international conventions on women such as cedaw and ilo conventions. the salient issues raised by these organizations focused mainly on women’s suppression under the new order’s gender ideology of “state ibuism” and the way to subvert such ideology, a critique of patriarchal religious discourse on women, women’s reproductive rights, and women factory workers. they formulated counter-discourse to challenge the unjust systems responsible for women’s oppression and further formulate women’s empowerment programs. using such strategies, indonesian muslim women’s movement has successfully incorporated western-inspired, secular ideas into the discourses and structures of the indonesian contexts of islam, culture, locality, and history (van doorn-harder 2008:1027). indonesian muslim women’s movement in democratization era such a dynamic development of indonesian muslim women’s movement has been further progressed in the current democratization era of indonesia. van-doorn harder (2008:1028) argues that the period after the new order signifies the emergence of a new phase of muslim women activism marked by conflicting developments and incidents: freedom of expression, democratic experiments, economic hardship, and communal violence. this has been further complicated by burgeoning identity politics during the democratization era that gave rise to religious and extreme right-wing fanaticism that bring its own patriarchal gender discourses (budianta 2002:35-50). this can be reflected in various emerging social64 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 political forces with islamist platforms ranging from radical groups such as fpi (islamic defence front) and mmi (indonesian mujahidin council) to conservative ones such as ddii (the indonesian council for islamic predication), hti (indonesian hizbut tahrir) and political parties such as pks (justice welfare party) and pbb (star-crescent party). to respond to such challenges, muslim women scholars-activists turned to be more assertive in articulating their voices and agencies to formulate counter-discourses by reclaiming their rights in religious knowledge production and building a more humane and just society in indonesia. this can be reflected in emerging indigenous indonesian islamic feminism. these women scholars-activists continually make critical engagement with both texts and realities. having authority in islamic knowledge, the reclaim their right to exercise ijtihad where the access to such ijtihad had been denied for women for a long time along the course of islamic history. they draw from a western feminist strategy for the right to participate in the religious knowledge production and the reformulation of islamic law: “all who subject to a law have the right to adjudicate it” (wadud 2009). as islamic feminists in other counties, they are engaging with several paradigms at the same time: progressive fiqh, progressive tafsir (quranic interpretation), human rights arguments, international instruments, laws and treaties, and the lived realities of muslim women (sikand 2010). some muslim women scholars-activists formulated islamic feminist discourses to address gender issues in indonesian muslim society. they have been ranged from those who focus on tafsir such as zaitunah subhan (1999), nurjannah ismail (2003), lily zakiyah munir (2005), those who work on hadith such as sintha nuriyah et al (2001; 2005), and those who work on fiqh discourse such as siti mudah mulia (2004; 2004) and maria ulfah anshor (2006). they often gain support from male ulama who are also concerned with women and gender issues such as nasarudin umar (2001; 2002), husein muhammad (2001), syafiq hasyim (2006), and faqihudin abdulkodir (2007). they then further disseminate their islamic feminist ideas by engaging themselves in both legal and cultural reforms. at the level of legal reform, they build a network for public advocacy against discriminatory state policies and propose legal drafts using female inclusive perspectives. this has been partly attributed to more democratic channels of expression provided in this period as well as the proliferated global media facilitating more exchange ideas transcending local boundaries. their struggle can be reflected in their advocacy for women under the sharia regional legislation, their success to promulgate the law on the elimination of domestic violence and the revised law 65hidayah, nur on health that legalizes abortion under specific circumstances as well as the law on anti-human trafficking, the attempted counter legal draft that promotes progressive muslim family law as well as their debates and arguments against the promulgation of pornography bills that tend to victimize women. one salient strategy in this legal reform is the utilization of facts and evidence of women’s marginalization and oppression to effect policy reforms like the case of muslim women’s intensive lobbying for the promulgation of laws on the elimination of domestic violence and revision of law on health. this has reflected what khalid masud has argued that it is important for women’s groups in advocating reform to support their demands for change with data and statistics of the nature and extent of the problems. with such data, he contends that even the most patriarchal and fundamentalist people would have to agree with the analysis of the situation, and justice could then be used as a principle and guide to formulating the appropriate solution (masud 2009). at the level of cultural changes, there have been several muslim women’s organizations that promote women’s rights and gender equality using the islamic framework. it ranges from muslim women’s mass organizations like women’s wing organizations of muslim mass organizations (fatayat and muslimat of nu, and aisyiah and nasyiatul aisyiyah of muhammadiyah) to some muslim women’s ngos that focus on one selected particular issue such as rahima that promotes progressive muslim women’s discourse, puan amal hayati that provides women’s shelter for the victims of (domestic) violence. the activists of these organizations emphasize the praxis dimension of islam in which islamic feminist discourse is translated into liberation and empowerment tools for women. they have used several means of public education such as media, publications, seminars, workshops, and training to raise gender consciousness and effect long-term socio-cultural transformation toward social and gender justice. their efforts have built a critical mass of muslim women who take an active part in the struggle to build social and gender justice as well as critically engage in the indonesian public sphere. contribution of islamic reformist theology to islamic feminism in indonesia the reform launched by indonesian muslim women’s movement has demonstrated a radical shift of paradigm on gender issues in indonesian muslim society. it has introduced a thought-breaking middle path to the unresolved debate between islamist and conservative muslims who insist on the distinctive gender roles and rights in islam on the one hand and 66 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 secular feminists who perceive religion, particularly islam, as inherently patriarchal on the other hand. such a shift of paradigm paves the way for gender activists to challenge the asymmetric gender structures in indonesian muslim society without being fear to be condemned as unislamic. issues that had for long perceived as taboo have been currently open for discussion and debates. they currently question gender construction of traditional religious authorities, discussing issues on women’s leadership in politics and worship, sexuality and women’s reproductive rights, marital rape, and domestic violence. since they always attempt to find ideological and theological roots for the arguments, this has opened the exploration of a rich legacy of islamic traditional scholarship, particularly fiqh. madhavi sunder (2007), a professor of law at the university of california, in her article entitled “piercing the veil”, argues that the beginning of the twentieth century has witnessed the emergence of what she calls “the new sovereignty” marked by the rise of religious and cultural movements. she points out that such movements are the result of binary dichotomy between the public and the private spheres made by the old enlightenment. it has assigned science, politics, and law the roles in the public sphere, thus subject to reason, while relegated culture and religion to the private sphere by giving them the jurisdiction to regulate family and morality. as culture and religion are not subject to reason, there have been clashes between them and those aspects in the public sphere, namely science, politics, and law. this has explained some cases of human rights violations including women’s rights abuses, which are tolerated under the guise of religious distinctiveness and cultural relativity. however, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, sunder (2007) further argues, there has been a challenge to such dichotomy between public and private spheres as the legacy of the old enlightenment. using the case of muslim women activism, she argues that muslim women’s activists have introduced radical reform by giving birth to the new enlightenment where they demand religion and culture to be subjected to reason. the previous exclusivist jurisdiction of religion and culture as the domain of male traditionalist religious scholars and cultural authorities has been challenged by muslim women’s activists through their demand for the democratization of the production of religious and cultural meanings. the demand by muslim women’s activists for religion and culture to be subjected to reason will contribute significantly to the acceleration of the democratization of muslim society. m. steven fish (2002), in his article “islam and authoritarianism”, argues that one salient factor explaining the democratic deficit among muslim societies is the subordination of women. 67hidayah, nur he believes that such subordination and oppression of women may affect life not only in the family and immediate community but also at higher levels as well. he attributes such relation to the fact that individuals who are more accustomed to rigidly hierarchical relations in their personal lives may be less prone to resist such a pattern of authority in politics. the above sunder’s theory is useful here to explain the reform contributed by islamic reformist theology and islamic feminists in indonesia. they argue that as long as religion and culture are not subjected to reason and become the exclusive domains of male patriarchal religious and cultural authorities, there will always be the politicization of religion. thus, in contrast to previous indonesian islamic reform that demanded the relegation of religion to the private sphere to avoid the politicization of religion, the current islamic feminists go beyond this demand. they argue that the emergence of religious and cultural movements in the public sphere or the so-called “new sovereignty” requires the necessity of religion and culture to subject to reason. furthermore, they claim their rights for the production and reproduction of religious and cultural meanings. they argue for the right of each member of religious or cultural communities to participate in the formulation of rulings that will affect the life of the whole community. with such pluralization of religious and cultural meanings, the human rights abuses, particularly women’s rights violations, under the name of religious and cultural particularities can be refuted and eliminated. in offering the alternative religious meanings, as seen in the case of rahima with its islamic texts reinterpretations, they frame such reinterpretation within the boundaries of islamic traditional religious scholarship in the light of contemporary humanities and social sciences. they use the data of women’s lived experiences to argue for the reinterpretation of islamic texts that will resonate with the islamic universal principles of justice, equality, and human dignity. the mechanism of ijtihad in islamic intellectual tradition has served as a powerful tool for islamic feminists for the reinterpretation of the texts in light of the current realities. in islamic legal theories, they demand islamic feminist jurisprudence, an islamic law that includes women’s perspectives. they dig from the field current realities and issues facing women from women’s lived experiences and traced the roots from multi-dimensional aspects, including cultural-religious norms. in dealing with religious norms, they attempt to deconstruct the patriarchal world-view underlying such norms. several tools formulated by reformist muslim theology for islamic reform have been deployed for such deconstruction including critical and discourse theories as well as historical analysis to find the gap between islamic injunctions 68 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 for equality and justice and islamic patriarchal interpretations. following such deconstruction, they offer alternative interpretation guided by the principles of justice and equality. to gain the legitimacy, they also employ several tools of islamic traditional scholarships such as the contextual interpretation of islamic texts, the theory of maqāsid sharia (the main purposes of sharia) and the theories of ikhtilaf (interpretive disagreements among ulama including theories of abrogation, theories of sources, theories of taqlid and madhhab, and theory of mura`at al-khilaf) (masud 2009) as the basis of their reinterpretation of the texts. all in all, islamic feminists have significantly indebted to the methodologies of islamic reformist theology in constructing their female inclusive discourses. conclusion this article has shown that islamic reformist theology has played a significant influence on muslim women’s movement in indonesia. the former has affected the latter’s mode of discourse as well as the mode of activism. such influence has empowered muslim women to claim for their rights in religious knowledge production and build a critical mass of muslim women who actively participate in the struggle for gender and social justice. islamic reform promoted by contemporary liberal-progressive muslims in indonesia has given a significant contribution to the development of muslim women’s movement in the country. it has laid the ground for an islamic paradigm shift on the discourse on islam and gender. the opening gate of ijtihad and respect for modernity espoused by reformist muslims have provided tools for radical change in islamic discourse on gender while still ground such change on an islamic basis. nevertheless, the development of muslim women’s movement in indonesia has been far more vibrant through its engagement with the dynamic of its surrounding socio-political circumstances and critical dialogue with broader currents of feminist thoughts. such complex genealogies have enabled muslim women’s movement to claim its own identity as indigenous islamic feminism that poses multiple critiques to any unjust systems that deprive muslim women of their rights. notes 1 such transformation has been mainly attributed to three salient factors: the modernization of educational systems, the emergence of print culture, and the proliferation of socio-political organizations. 69hidayah, nur 2 see, for example, haedah moghissi, feminism and islamic fundamentalism: the limits of postmodern analysis (london dan new york: zed books, 1999). however, this argument has been refuted as it tends to essentialize islam into one single homogenous/ monolithic category as islamic fundamentalism. see miriam cooke, women claim islam: creating islamic feminism through literature (new york and london: routledge, 2001). references abdulkodir, faqihuddin. 2007. hadith and gender justice: 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perspektif alqur’an. jakarta: jaringan islam liberal and teater utan kayu. wadud, amina. 2009. lecture in special course in islamic studies, the university of melbourne, 12 february. wahid, sintha nuriyah abdurrahman, et al. 2001. wajah baru relasi suami-istri: telaah kitab `uqud al-lujjayn.yogyakarta: lkis. zayd, nashr hamid abu. 2006. reformation of islamic thought: a critical historical analysis. amsterdam: amsterdam university press. 72 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 adat court in indonesia’s judiciary system: a socio-legal inquiry journal of asian social science research 2022, vol. 4, no.1: 43-62 https://cassr.net/jassr/ © the author(s) 2022 article herlambang p. wiratraman* universitas gadjah mada, indonesia abstract this article addresses the question of how the constitution drafters considered the existence of a plural legal system in indonesia, especially the adat judicial system. there are several sociological arguments for constitutional pluralism, empirical and normative claims, and the necessity of formalizing adat court. constitutional pluralism identifies the phenomenon of a plurality of constitutional sources and claims of final authority which create a context for potential constitutional conflicts that are not hierarchically regulated. hence, this article argues that ‘constitutionalizing’ does not mean ‘formalization’, or even ‘structuring the adat court under the state formal judicial system’. this should be critically assessed not merely on recognition, but also on protection, especially to exercise fundamental values of social significance. it considers the concepts of ‘self-recognition based adat court’ and ‘regional recognition based adat court’ as important in defending universal values to respect and protect the rights of the people, including their traditional systems. by doing so, this article aims to contribute to the studies on the importance of the plural legal system in plural societies like indonesia. key words adat court, constitutional pluralism, formalization, self-recognition, indonesia * contact: dr. herlambang p. wiratraman faculty of law, universitas gadjah mada, yogyakarta, indonesia. jalan sosio yustisia bulaksumur no.1, karang malang, caturtunggal, kecamatan depok, kabupaten sleman, yogyakarta 55281 indonesia. e-mail: herlambang.perdana@ugm.ac.id introduction: constitutionalizing judiciary in plural societies one of the challenges for a modern state is formulating a constitution for plural societies, even plural legal systems. when the drafters have successfully enacted a single constitution, the questions are whether such 44 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1, 2022 a document has been consistently interpreted and implemented in the field. is that due to constitutional sources? this article departs from the thesis that the constitution itself embodied plural perspectives and therefore unsurprisingly its interpretation and implementation would provide empirical evidence on constitutional pluralism (wiratraman and shah 2019). the idea of constitutional pluralism is not new, especially by looking at the debate on constitutionalism in european countries, especially by understanding the existence of the national legal system and european constitutional system. therefore, discussing the constitutional law system in european countries would be inseparable from the regional constitutional system. miguel poiares maduro, professor of law at the european university institute, coined such a concept. he said that perhaps using constitutional pluralism has been the most successful attempt at theorizing the nature of european constitutionalism. maduro (2012) introduced three different claims of constitutional pluralism: first, the empirical claims, which say that constitutional pluralism identifies the phenomenon of a plurality of constitutional sources and claims of final authority that create a context for potential constitutional conflicts that are not hierarchically regulated; second, the normative claim, which recognizes that there is a constitutional claim of final authority and therefore such claim is legitimate; and the third, the thick normative claim, which reflects current state affairs and provides a closer approximation to the ideals of constitutionalism. this article prefers the empirical approach to overview the constitutionality of adat court. borrowing such an approach would be a way to see the constitutionality of the plural legal system. perhaps, it articulates various corners of laws which exist in society, namely adat law, religious law, and state law. international law would be part of the state law since it needs a political ratification process in enacting it into the national legal system. compared to southeast asian countries, especially indonesia, such claims could refer to the early debates on how colonial rules resided legacies in its legal system. therefore, understanding the development of the constitutional law system in indonesia would importantly refer to the works and of course insights from a leiden legal scholar, cornelis van vollenhoven. one of his important influential publications was de ontdekking van het adatrecht (the discovery of adat law) (1928). after he was appointed as professor of constitutional and administrative law of the dutch overseas territories and the adat law of the dutch east indies, van vollenhoven gave his inaugural lecture on 45herlambang p. wiratraman 2 october 1901 which discussed ‘exact jurisprudence’ that had to meet a crucial test of the legal problems created by a changing policy.1 he criticised the successful exploitation of the east indies through agrarian production for the european market, through state enterprises, compulsory cultivation by indonesians, and large private plantations. for him, the policy did not consider the role of adat law in the dutch east indies. hence, he promoted a principle of administrative policy that was proclaimed as ‘moral responsibility. since this was formulated as a christian obligation, it would later expand to what is called the ‘ethical policy’ (sonius 1981: xxix-xxx). interestingly, albeit he visited indonesia only twice, in 1907 when he was convinced of the importance of the indigenous system and in 1932 shortly before his death, van vollenhoven always tried to promote and dedicate himself to defending indonesian adat law as a prerequisite of justice. during the colonial administration, the division of racial groups was re-introduced in 1920, namely orang eropah (european); bumiputera (native indonesians); and orang timur asing (foreign easterners). such a division was indeed no longer relevant after indonesia’s independence, especially in the context of indonesian constitutional law. however, especially looking at the practice of indigenous communities in the field in resolving the cases, they still applied their legal system, including the role of the adat court. as hooker (1978:134) writes, although indonesia inherited the civil law system from the dutch, the legal realities in indonesia tend to complicate this inheritance. the courts face the questions of legal pluralism, the creation national legal system, and the demands of economic and legal modernization as well as the fact that a large proportion of indonesia’s population is still governed by the adat systems. it is against this background that this article discusses the adat court by focusing its analysis on how the constitution drafters considered the existence of a plural legal system in indonesia, especially the adat judicial system. by doing so, it aims to contribute to a better understanding of the plural legal system in plural societies like indonesia. adat court and its survival in colonial period historically, the term ‘customary justice’ was acknowledged before the independence of indonesia, at least through the laws and regulations of the dutch east indies. at that time, there were five types of judiciary, namely governor/government court (gubernemen-rechtspraak), indigenous or adat court (inheemsche rechtspraak), swapraja or self-governing court (zelfbestuurrechtspraak), religious court (godsdienstige rechtspraak) and village courts (dorpjustitie) (hooker 1978; hadikusuma 1989). 46 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1, 2022 the adat court has been existing since the dutch colonial era, especially regulated in article 130 of the indische staatsregeling (is), a fundamental rule in the dutch government which determined the existing courts in the dutch colonial era. the law recognized and allowed the entry of the local courts either in the form of customary courts in certain areas directly under the dutch east indies government and the swapraja or selfgoverning court (tresna 1978:73). the judiciary for indigenous people, namely customary or adat court and village court was recognized because the dutch colonial government realized that they could not solve the whole problems facing the citizens of dutch east indie by themselves, especially by using the european judiciary. therefore, there was the division of population formulated by the dutch government as part of a solution to solve legal cases. as mentioned above, in article 163 of the indische staatsregeling (is), the dutch east indies citizens were divided into three classes: orang eropah; bumiputera; and orang timur asing. each class of citizens applied their own rule of law when they had a legal case. at that time, the so-called indigenous or customary justice was a judiciary that was carried out by european judges and indonesian judges, neither in the name of the king or queen of the netherlands nor under european law. this was based on customary law established by the resident with the approval of the director of justice in batavia. the authority to exercise this judgment was against indigenous people who were domiciled in the jurisdiction, who were the defendants or suspects. plaintiffs or disputants could be non-local residents, including europeans or non-indigenous people who felt disadvantaged. this judiciary used its own formal or formal law, including the rules of the judiciary of the resident, such as the regulation of musapat aceh besar and singkel (1934), regulation on kerapatan kalimantan selatan and timur (1934), gantarang, matinggi and laikan regulation (south sulawesi 1933) (laudjeng 2003). the position of customary or adat court, similar to the village court at the time, was a judicial trial carried out by the village judges within the jurisdiction of the governor. this court was authorized to adjudicate minor cases which were customary affairs or village affairs, such as land disputes, irrigation conflicts, marriage, dowry, divorce, adat status and other cases arising among the indigenous peoples. village judges could not impose penalties that were provided in the criminal code. if the disputing parties were dissatisfied with the decision of the village judges, they could file their cases with the judges of the governor (laudjeng 2003). in such 47herlambang p. wiratraman context, no matter how hard the dutch east indies government attempted to undermine adat (indigenous laws), the law remained a space for indigenous communities to find justice amidst the dominance of european law. during the dutch east indies administration, the recognition of adat court (inheemse rechtspaark) was written in article 130 ind. staatsblaad and article 3 ind. staatsblaad 1932 number 80. such regulation covered adat court outside java and madura. in regions mentioned in 1932 staatsblad, local or indigenous communities were allowed to exercise their local court system, either ‘self-governing court’ (peradilan swapraja) or ‘indigenous court’ (peradilan adat). a ‘self-governing court’ had the authority to exercise legal cases either criminal law or private law in accordance with ‘self-governing law’. such court had been practiced in many regions, such as in bengkulu, kerinci, palembang, west kalimantan, nias, padang, gorontalo, and lombok. the ‘self-governing court’ was different to the local district court (peradilan desa), especially in java and madura. although there was a formal recognition over the indigenous court, as haveman (2002: 16) said, further recognition was stipulated after an addendum of article 3a ro. such an article says that legal cases can be exercised by adat court and become an authority of local judges based on adat law. although there was a unification of criminal law, the adat court could only exercise the authority of private, not criminal law. nevertheless, the local court was supposed to be a supporting system for landraad (equal to district court system). such legal ‘recognition’ over adat court did change during the japanese military occupation since the rule said that “all governmental institutions and their competences and all laws and regulations of the former government were recognized as still valid for the time being as long as they did not conflict with the regulations of the japanese military government.” the wetboek van strafrecht vor nederlandsch-indie as criminal code was still valid in continuation with previous laws, except for the population in certain regions in the directly governed territory, which was left its administration of justice, and the subjects of the self-governing lands, who were in principle subjected to adat law (siong 1961:5; soepomo 1957). constitutionalizing adat court the transfer of authority in 1945 similarly recognized the existence and the acceptance of previous laws and institutions. this could be traced to transitional rules in the 1945 indonesian constitution. it meant that in the field in the regions, the role of adat courts was still allowed as an informal justice system at the local level. 48 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1, 2022 having such historical background, then the first issue is whether the adat court was debated during the making of constitutional law. there was a ‘limited discourse’ in debating adat court during constitution making process in 1945, although they had discussed the judicial system and governance relation. adat, however, was a subject when they were discussing governance system, especially dealing with the relation between central and local governance, including ‘autonomous village’. such discourse, indeed, was very closely related.2 it was only muhammad yamin who addressed the adat court during the constitutional drafting process. early conceptions of indigenous and tribal peoples were discussed in the past and crystallized during the discussion at the bpupki session, 10-17 july 1945. in a session, yamin proposed that the constitution had to change the nature of subordinate governments to fulfil the wishes of the new era. nevertheless, yamin asserted, “... but what needs to be emphasized here is that the villages, lands, clans and others remain part of the government of the republic of indonesia.” in another session, during the second hearing of the preparatory meeting on citizenship and the draft of the constitution, yamin emphasized the necessity of a supreme court. in the supreme court, according to him, there are the adat court (mahkamah adat) and the islamic court (mahkamah islam), and/or the civil court and the criminal court. he highlighted that the supreme court would decide whether in line with adat law, sharia and the constitution. however, the strong debate on the adat court itself did not go further, except the soepomo’s disagreement with yamin in which he refused the idea of adat law and islamic law as review standards. soepomo tried to compare other legal systems in other countries, especially in dealing with how to build a strong constitutional system which had a broader perspective on accommodating diverse societies. he compared the legal systems in austria, germany and czechoslovakia. since yamin and soepomo had different arguments, radjiman kaityoo, the chair of the meeting, asked the meeting members to vote. finally, yamin’s idea was rejected by the majority of bpupki members (minutes of bpupki, plenary meeting 15 july 1945; kusuma 2004: 380-391; quoted also during constitutional amendment drafting in 1999-2002. vide: naskah komprehensif vi 2010:16). indeed, the constitution did not formulate all specific issues. it contains usually fundamental values, reflecting the basic necessities for societies and the state’s ideology. however, the importance of adat (including the existence of adat court) in the context of the indonesian plural legal system had to be maintained by strong law. yamin opened 49herlambang p. wiratraman possible avenues to highlight the debate on adat court, although finally, his idea was unacceptable. after such constitutional debates, all issues related to the adat court ended. nevertheless, the adat court itself was still considered valid since a new transitional constitution rule brought the existing colonial constitutional law system into a new indonesian state. constitutionalizing the selfgoverning court and the indigenous court was absent in constitutional making debates in 1945, although the adat law and governance (nonjudiciary) were firmly formulated in the following: the division of the territory of indonesia into large and small regions shall be prescribed by law in consideration of and with due regard to the principles of deliberation in the government system and the right of origin of special territories (article 18). hence, the constitutionality of the adat court was based on merely transitional rules as it was not substantively discussed as a specific subject to address how to highlight its role and relation to the national judicial system. therefore, a plural judicial system actually occurred in various regions in the early years of indonesia’s independence. of course, this could be said as transplanting sources of colonial constitutional law system under new state constitutionalism, including the judiciary system. on november 23, 1945, there was an effort to recognize the existence of a special region that was accommodated by arrangements in article 18, especially in regulating local governance. described in the state of indonesia, there were approximately 250 zelfbesturende landschappen (self-governing regions) and volkgemeenschappen. the term used by the 1945 constitution of the republic of indonesia (uud 1945) refers to volkgemenschappen, not to rechtgemeenschappen, although it was apparent that facts on the ground were found in customary law, village, nagari and clan, as well as other legal alliances (wiratraman 2013). because of such a form of recognition (volkgemenschappen), it had consequences for the recognition of the existence of an indigenous mechanism system to solve cases, especially referring to a local system that can be customary justice. this, which must be understood in the structure of the state administration of indonesia, does not necessarily mean that the 1945 constitution has deadened the existence of a local or customary court system (wiratraman 2013). however, such a dual constitutional law system in regulating self-governing courts in java and sumatra ended, especially after the enactment of act no. 23 of 1947 (august 29, 1947, undang-undang 50 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1, 2022 tentang penghapusan pengadilan radja, or zelf-bestuursrechtspraak). the jurisdiction of the self-governing court was transferred to the courts of the government. albeit there was no specific formulation, the substitution of the courts of the government for the self-governing courts means the substitution of all laws of the government for the laws previously applied by the self-governing courts. in the field of criminal law, for instance, criminal adat law was no longer binding the persons formerly subjected to the jurisdiction of the self-governing courts in sumatra. other examples from jogjakarta, s. 1941 no. 47, paku alaman, s. 1941 no. 577, surakarta, 5. 1939 no. 614 and mangkunegaran, s. 1940 no. 543 show that criminal adat law was no longer binding. the detailed and comprehensive analysis of such dynamics of the self-governing court and its relation to the government court was written by siong in his book (siong 1961:26-27). the history of the constitution also leads to a shift in the direction of thought of its constitutional articles, especially based on the 1949 constitution of the republic of indonesia (ris) and the 1950 constitution of the republic of indonesia. the regulation of indigenous peoples can also be observed in the provisions which govern the constitutional basis of adat law enforcement as mentioned in article 146 paragraph 1 of the 1949 constitution of ris and article 104 paragraph 1 of the provisional constitution of 1950. the articles state: “all court decisions must contain reasons and refer to the rules of customary laws and rules to make decisions.” there was a shift, from ‘special region’ (daerah yang bersifat istimewa) to ‘special area’ (daerah istimewa). this means it referred to zelfbesturende landschappen, and did not include volkgemeenschappen. nevertheless, this concept was not long maintained because since the presidential decree of july 5, 1959, in addition to the beginning of the soekarno’s guided democracy, the constitution was returned to the 1945 constitution. this means returning to the original initial concept of the indonesian state. although the unitary constitution confirmed the importance of customary laws, this subverted two basic statutes which were enacted and remained in force until the mid-1960s. the first is supreme court act (no. 1 of 1950), and the second is the organization and procedure of civil courts, no. 1 of 1951.3 the second one is more important to note in adat court history since it abolished fully customary judiciaries, either for self-governing court or adat court. this law unified the organization, the competence and the procedure of the civil courts.4 according to article 1(2), the courts of the (former) self-governing lands (pengadilan swapradja), especially in east sumatra, west kalimantan and east indonesia, and the indigenous courts 51herlambang p. wiratraman (pengadilan adat) in the directly governed territory, had to be abolished gradually on dates to be fixed by the minister of justice, except the peradilan agama (religious court) if it was a separate part of the peradilan swapradja and the peradilan adat. then, the transfer of authority was stated from such courts to local government courts (pengadilan negeri) (siong 1961:54). however, behind such judicial policy, the drafters of the law were uncomfortable with the need to go slowly in abolishing all adat courts, but there was little choice. for two reasons, local resistance had set in, while administrative caution in jakarta warned that there was a limited number of government judges (lev 1973: 23-24). such gradual change was stricter to abolish adat court during soeharto’s administration, especially after the enactment of act no. 14 of 1970 on judicial power.5 since then, the court would be merely a state-based formal court. the court, following the regime character, was centralized and formalized under the supreme court, while it was structurally coopted by executive power. the strong role of the executive power in controlling the judiciary can be seen as well from the law which provides legitimacy to end any adat court and self-governing court. article 39 of the act on judicial power stipulated the abolishment of adat court and self-governing court by the government. the article further elucidated that the abolishment was based on number 1 of the 1951 emergency law, which was aimed at provisional measures to organize the unity, structure, power and civil court proceedings of article 1, paragraph (2) by the minister of justice gradually to eliminate the adat and swapraja court in bali, sulawesi province, lombok, sumbawa, timor, kalimantan, jambi and maluku. this is also supported by presidential regulation no. 6 of 1966 on the elimination of adat/swapraja court so that the establishment of the district court in west irian, the adat/swapraja court in west irian was also abolished. moreover, when the court leaders were thoroughly co-opted, the limited control the court over lower court judges was directed towards the same purpose (pompe 2005:124-125). as a result, by the end of the new order, “[p]olitical interference in the course of justice became a routine matter” at the lower levels of the indonesian judiciary, even in minor cases with no obvious importance to the regime (pompe 2005:140). in this context, the plural judicial system due to the constitutionality of adat court which was established by transitional rules under the 1945 constitution was formally ended by judicial power law in 1970. nevertheless, the influence of the abolishment was not automatically and entirely at the local level since the adat court has its pride and effectualness in the heart of society. therefore, there are two models of local courts 52 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1, 2022 in responding to such restrictive state law, namely ‘self-recognition-based adat court’ and ‘regional recognition-based adat court’. first, ‘self-recognition-based adat court’. adat law and its court are still applicable for particular societies. the customary courts and other informal justice systems as part of adat court are not easily erased because the facts on the ground show that the judiciary still exists and continues. second, ‘regional recognition-based adat court’. as part of the local governance system, local governments provide ‘recognition’ to local law in the form of regional legislation. for example, as abdurrahman (2002) writes, in tanah batak, especially in tapanuli, the local government issued the local regulation no. 10 of 1990 on customary institution of dalihan natolu, an adat institution established by the district government (regency), as a deliberative institution that involves traditional elders who truly understand, control and live on the customs of the neighbourhood (articles 5 and 8). the existence of the customary institution of the na tolu dalihan is expected to provide solutions to the cases related to the conflicts that arise among the indigenous community in tapanuli. in kalimantan, several laws and regulations provide recognition of the existence of adat law such as the establishment of the kedamangan institution through the provincial regulation of kalimantan tengah no. 14 of 1998, followed by various district-level regulations, such as the district regulation of barito selatan no. 17 of 2000, the district regulation of kapuas no. 5 of 2001, and the district regulation of kotawaringin timur no. 15 of 2001. interestingly, after the demise of soeharto’s administration, the situation of ‘regional recognition’ continued and expanded. in papua, for instance, in which adat law was once abolished, the local government enacted the special regulation papua no. 20 of 2008 on the customary court. similarly, the affirmation of dayak customs is regulated by the local government through several regional regulations such as kalimantan tengah regulation no. 16 of 2008 on dayak indigenous institution in kalimantan tengah. moreover, the regulation which provides ‘guidance’ for the customary court rules was enacted such as the regulation of the governor of sulawesi selatan no.42 of 2013 on the guidelines of the adat courts in sulawesi selatan. having such a historical outline of the dynamics of the adat court, regardless of no specific constitutional debates on the adat court about the judicial system, i agree with bedner and huis (2008) who say that the constitution stipulated a formulation of protecting indigenous communities more than the latest amendment of the constitution (1999-2002), especially 53herlambang p. wiratraman on governance article, although during constitutional making process there was a lot of support for better recognition of adat law and its institutions.6 the amended 1945 constitution contains two related formulations in response to indigenous people, namely article 18b (2) and 28i (3), as follows: the state shall recognize and respect entities of the adat law societies (adat rechtsgemeenshap)7 along with their traditional rights to the extent they still exist and are in accordance with the development of the society and the principle of the unitary state of the republic of indonesia, which shall be prescribed by laws (article 18b (2)). the cultural identity and the right of traditional societies shall be respected in harmony with the development of the age and civilization (article 28i (3)).8 the conditionality under article 18b (2) seems like ‘four-level barrier arms’, which could be easily misused or disadvantageous to indigenous communities due to its state formal interpretation in its every ‘barrier arm’. such four barrier arms are (1) ‘still exist’, (2) ‘in accordance with the development of the society, (3) ‘in accordance with the principle of the unitary state of the republic of indonesia’, and (4) ‘shall be prescribed by laws’. unsurprisingly, the implementation of the constitutionality of recognition would go much further to restrict and affect the position and existence of indigenous communities, including their adat governance and judiciary systems. this is different to the previous constitutional basis of indigenous communities in that article 18 formulated the adat law more clearly than article 18b (2), even if over time the indonesian republic has reduced the rights attached to the special status (bedner and huis 2008). top of form article 18b paragraph (2) of the 1945 constitution is a form of conditional recognition for the existence of indigenous and tribal peoples. this model of conditional recognition is inherited from the colonial government (simarmata 2006). article 18b paragraph (2) of the 1945 constitution mandates that recognition and respect for the existence and rights of indigenous peoples ‘shall be prescribed by laws’. in legal terminology, the phrase ‘shall be prescribed by laws’ should be interpreted as ‘arranged in law’ (diatur dalam undang-undang), meaning that the elaboration of provisions on the recognition and respect for indigenous people’s existence should not be made in a single law alone. this is 54 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1, 2022 different from the constitutional provision states ‘regulated by law’ (diatur dengan undang-undang), which means that it requires the elaboration of a provision by a separate and specific law. hence, the protection and recognition of indigenous people under article 18b paragraph (2) of the 1945 constitution is not a special law on indigenous peoples. nevertheless, the indigenous peoples alliance of the archipelago (aliansi masyarakat adat nusantara), a national coalition for defending the rights of indigenous peoples, struggled to acquire recognition for years. there is also a special draft prepared to propose a law, namely ‘the recognition and protection of indigenous peoples rights (rancangan undang-undang tentang pengakuan dan perlindungan hak masyarakat hukum adat). the house of representatives even had drafted the law but had not enacted it yet.9 a landmark decision made by constitutional court concerning this issue was decision no. 35/puu-x/2012 (16 may 2013), which admitted the absence as well as the importance of law, by stating “… [l]aws mandated by article 18b paragraph (2) of the 1945 constitution until now has not been formed. because of the urgency requirement, a lot of legislation was enacted before the mentioned act. it can be understood in order to fill the legal vacuum to ensure legal certainty.” (p. 184). it seems that constitutionalizing the adat court had limited space in the last constitutional amendment process. however, the demand to have stronger legalization of adat law and better recognition is still a serious concern among many groups of indonesian society. the necessity of formalizing adat court constitutionalizing does not mean formalization or structuring the adat court under a state formal judicial system. constitutionalizing is a recognition and protection as an attempt to exercise fundamental values of social significance. however, legal formalization of adat law, including governance and judiciary system, is unavoidable, especially when looking at indonesian legal development toward modern law. in this context, van vollenhoven established an important foundation to develop a legal system in a plural society. the practice of law in the current legal development cannot be expected to seek meaningful justice for indigenous communities in the indonesian archipelago. from time to time, the constitutionality of article 18b paragraph (2) of the 1945 constitution has been interpreted in multiple ways. in some ways, this strengthens the position and existence of indigenous peoples in indonesia, but in others weakens the situation at the same time. to give an example, the legal criteria of indigenous people, who can be recognized and heard by the court, should refer to the constitutional court decision no. 55herlambang p. wiratraman 31/puu-v/2007, review of act no 31 of 2007 on the establishment tual city in maluku province. according to the court, there are five criteria for the unity of indigenous and tribal peoples: people, customary institutions, common properties, customary law norms, and an area where all this exists. a unity of indigenous and tribal peoples that fulfils all five criteria is domiciled as a legal subject and therefore has rights and obligations that are legally accountable. this might be accommodating, but it might be in reverse excluding (wiratraman 2007, 2014). constitutionalizing also means a shift or at least a process revisiting from the old paradigm of ‘integralistic state’10 to ‘constitutionalism state’. constitutionalism in this regard prefers to approach ‘human rights-based constitutionalism’, not merely considered as ‘structural-functional based constitutionalism’. it means that supporting the establishment of the adat court is not based on mere successfulness to reconcile its position and relation to the constitutional system or state judicial system, but also on considering the effectualness of the court itself in a plural legal system. positioning the adat court in the eyes of a state-based constitutional system would lead to ineffectiveness and even inappropriateness for indigenous people’s sovereignty. indeed, the adat court is neither entirely satisfying for all parties, nor at all without any mistake. since it is similar to other types of courts, the nonformal justice system is supposed to be critically assessed (arizona 2013; wiratraman 2013; wiratraman and steny 2013). in general, following bedner and arizona (2019), this article argues that those ideas that promote a new understanding of adat communities are needed, especially the ones that attempt to push recognition for the rights of adat communities. this will be connected to the current global rise of resistance against inequality. adat court as part of indigenous people’s rights has obvious constitutional importance in the context of indonesia’s plural legal system. it is not merely institutionalizing the court into the state’s judicial system which should be carefully considered, due to subjugation of adat’s legal system. it is also necessary to bring the message of representing universal values for human and people’s rights. the state should be able to provide possible avenues for seeking an informal justice system rather than pushing the formal mechanism or bureaucratization of adat court. this might be different to one another within the country, depending on social consensus and mainstreaming of social significance for the practice of adat court. as harper (2011) and simarmata (2013) point out, the ideal characteristics of the indigenous justice system philosophically reflect three values: harmony, restorative and consensus. 56 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1, 2022 conclusion this article has pointed out two issues. first, as otto stated in his inauguration speech which is relevant to understanding the present context of law in indonesia, “[t]his requires the enactment of adequate legal rules, but it calls above all, as van vollenhoven and asia’s great philosophers have said, for respect from each and every one of us for the public sphere of law and state, so that decent public officials can thrive; it calls for selfcontrol and compassion for our fellow men and women, from whatever ethnic or religious background they may be” (otto 2017). second, perhaps, if van vollenhoven was still alive in the present days, i would imagine that he would criticize constitutional and administrative law scholars who articulate their ideas on state laws rather than consider the plural legal system in indonesia’s societies. they seem to enjoy orchestrating and puzzling ‘structural-functional based constitutionalism’, instead of highlighting the importance of defending universal values to respect and protect the rights of the people, including their traditional systems. therefore, considering the adat court as human rights advancement is not a delusion, but rather a bridge to constitutional pluralism that respects and recognizes the indigenous laws and fundamental rights. acknowledgement the author thanks dian ah shah and gary f bell for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article, especially when i was completing this manuscript at the center of asian legal studies, faculty of law, national university of singapore (cals nus). notes the initial draft of this article was presented at the international conference on “adat law 100 years on: towards a new interpretation?”, national museum of ethnology, leiden, 22-24 may 2017, organized by van vollenhoven institute for law, governance and society (vvi) leiden law school and kitlv/royal netherlands institute of southeast asian and caribbean studies. 1 cornelis van vollenhoven, a professor from 1901 until his death in 1933, was a brilliant legal scholar who excelled in three different domains: the living customary law, especially the adat law of the netherlands-indies; the country’s constitutional law; and international law. he uncovered a wide diversity of local adat law norms, which he was able to incorporate into an organic corpus of local, national and international law (otto 2017). 2 constitutionalizing indigenous communities was related more to governance model than the protection of people’s rights. the adat court, unfortunately, 57herlambang p. wiratraman was excluded from such discourse on governance system. however, many regulations adopted the constitutional basis of indigenous communities’ governance in relation to local governance, except the 1960 basic agrarian law (simarmata 2006: 55). 3 undang-undang darurat no 1 tahun 1951 tentang tindakan-tindakan sementara untuk menyelenggarakan kesatuan susunan, kekuasaan dan acara pengadilan-pengadilan sipil, l.n. 1951 no. 9, binding from january 14, 1951. 4 in order to implement this law, especially related to abolishment of indigenous court, the government followed up numerous regulations under ministry of justice, which are: (1) ministry of justice regulation no. j.b.4/3/17 (tln 276), 21 august 1952, on abolishing self-governing court and adat court in sulawesi; (2) ministry of justice decision no. j.b.4/4/7 (tln 462), 30 september 1953, on abolishing adat court in lombok; (3) ministry of justice regulation no. j.b.4/3/2 (tln.641) 21 june 1954 jo. ministry of justice decision letter no. j.b.4/4/20 (tln.642), 18 august 1954, on abolishing self-governing court and adat court in kalimantan; (4) president regulation no. 6 of 1966, on abolishing self-governing court and adat court and the establishment of district court in west papua. 5 this law replaced act no. 19 of 1964 on judicial power (ln 1964 no. 107). 6 during the constitutional making, the support for adat law and its institutions came from various actors not only from human rights groups and academia, but also from parliament members itself. for instance, ifdhal kasim was concerned with indigenous land rights dispossession and threatened customary rights (naskah komprehensif i 2010:426-425). sandra moniaga was also concerned with a comprehensive perspective to protect and recognize indigenous peoples, including the principle of self-determination and in accordance to ilo convention no. 169 (naskah komprehensif iv (2) 2010:1141). from academics, mariana r.w. sumardjono was concerned with indigenous land rights dispossession in forestry areas (naskah komprehensif i 2010:571-572). interestingly, the issue of constitutional recognition to indigenous peoples and adat law/institution attracted members of parliament, such as indonesia democratic party’s hobbes sinaga on the issue of indigenous peoples position in decentralization (naskah komprehensif iv (2) 2010:1161, 1238, 1244, 1246); crescent star party’s hamdan zoelva (naskah komprehensif iv (2) 2010:1169, 1174, 1317, 1354); party of the fuctional groups’ hatta mustafa (naskah komprehensif iv (2) 2010:1183-1184), happy bone zulkarnaen (naskah komprehensif iv (2) 2010: 1324-1326, 1350, 1366, 1373-4, ) and t. m. nurlif on the issue that realization of autonomous governance should refer to adat law and native rights, and consider plural and special status (naskah 58 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1, 2022 komprehensif iv (2) 2010:1183-1315); united development party’s lukman hakim saifuddin (naskah komprehensif iv (2) 2010:1321-1322; and the group representative’s nursyahbani katjasungkana (naskah komprehensif iv (2) 2010:1335-1336). 7 the meeting was helped by bagir manan who explained the position of ‘adat rechtsgemeenshap’ during the constitutional making (naskah komprehensif iv (2) 2010:1356, 1362). 8 this article seems similar to article 6(2) of act no. 39 of 1999 on human rights: “the cultural identity of indigenous and tribal peoples, including the right of ulayat land, is protected in harmony with the altered times.” 9 “dpr siapkan uu pengakuan hak masyarakat adat”, kontan.co.id, 19 april 2012, http://nasional.kontan.co.id/news/dpr-siapkan-uu-pengakuan-hakmasyarakat-adat (accessed 12 march 2017). 10 the idea of integralistic theory of state was adopted from prof. mr. dr. r. soepomo’a speech at the meeting of dokuritsu junbi cosakai on 31 may 1945 in jakarta. soepomo described three forms of state theory: individualistic theory, class theory, and integralistic theory. he mentioned that integralistic theory is adopted from spinoza, adam müller, hegel, etc. he said that the state is formed not for the benefit of individuals or groups, but to guarantee the interests of the whole society as unity. the state consists of an integral social structure, encompassing all classes, all parts, and all members that are interconnected with one another and united in an organic society (kusuma [ed]. 2004:124-125). for further readings, see simanjuntak (1994) and assiddiqie et al. (2015). references abdurrahman. 2022. “peradilan adat dan lembaga adat dalam sistem peradilan indonesia”, paper presented at workshop on adat court, 2nd congress of aman, mataram, 20 september 2002. arizona, yance. 2013 “kedudukan peradilan adat dalam sistem hukum nasional”, paper presented at strengthening of adat court in central kalimantan for access to justice empowerment, 11 june 2013. asshiddiqie, jimly et al. 2015. pergulatan tafsir negara integralistik: biografi intelektual, pemikiran hukum adat dan konstitusionalisme. jakarta: pustokum-yakins-thafa foundation. bedner, adriaan and stijn van huis. 2008. “the return of the native in indonesian law: indigenous communities in indonesian legislation.” bijdragen tot de taal-, landen volkenkunde 164 (2/3):165-193. 59herlambang p. wiratraman bedner, adriaan, and yance arizona. 2019. “adat in indonesian land law: a promise for the future or a dead end?” the asia pacific journal of anthropology 20(5): 416-434, https://doi.org/ 10.1080/14442213.2019.1670246. “filosofi dan prinsip peradilan adat”. 2013. paper, workshop on strengthening adat court capacity through the making adat court guidance in central kalimantan. jakarta: saji project undp and bappenas/ministry of ppn. hadikusuma, hilman. 1989. peradilan adat di indonesia. jakarta: miswar. harper, erica. 2011. customary justice: from program design to impact evaluation. rome: idlo. haveman, roelof h. 2002. the legality of adat criminal law in modern indonesia. jakarta: p.t. tatanusa. holleman, johan f. 1981. van vollenhoven on indonesian adat law (selections from het adatrecht van nederlandsch-indie) (volume i, 1918, volume ii, 1931). leiden: kitlv. hooker, m. barry. 1978. adat law in modern indonesia. kuala lumpur: oup. kusuma, r.m. a.b. (ed). 2004. lahirnya undang-undang dasar 1945: memuat salinan dokumen otentik badan oentoek menyelidiki oesaha-oesaha persiapan kemerdekaan. jakarta: badan penerbit fakultas hukum universitas indonesia. laudjeng, hedar. 2003. mempertimbangkan peradilan adat. jakarta: huma. lev, daniel s. 1973. “judicial unification in post-colonial indonesia,” indonesia 16 (oct. 1973): 1-37 (southeast asia program publications at cornell university). maduro, miguel poiares. 2012. three claims of constitutional pluralism. retrieved 11 february 2017 (https://www.wzb.eu/sites/default/ files/u32/miguel_maduro_three_claims_of_constitutional_ pluralism_hu-coll_may_15_2012.pdf). naskah komprehensif perubahan undang-undang dasar negara republik indonesia tahun 1945, buku i: latar belakang, proses dan hasil pembahasan 1999-2002. 2010. jakarta: sekretariat jenderal dan kepaniteraan mahkamah konstitusi. otto, jan michiel. 2017. “unity in diversity. the topicality of professor c. van vollenhoven”, dies lecture, the 442nd dies natalis, wednesday 8 february 2017, de pieterskerk, leiden, the netherlands. 60 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1, 2022 peradilan adat dan utopia kekuasaan?.2013. jakarta: humanews. “perlindungan hukum masyarakat hukum adat”. 2014. laporan tim pengkajian hukum, pusat penelitian dan pengembangan sistem hukum nasional. jakarta: bphn. pompe, sebastiaan. 2005. the indonesian supreme court: a study of institutional collapse. ithaca, ny: cornell southeast asia program. risalah sidang badan persiapan usaha-usaha kemerdekaan indonesia (bpupki)-panitia persiapan kemerdekaan indonesia (ppki).1995. jakarta: sekretariat negara republik indonesia. simanjuntak, marsillam. 1994. pandangan negara integralistik: sumber, unsur dan riwayatnya dalam persiapan uud 1945 sumber, unsur dan riwayatnya dalam persiapan uud 1945. jakarta: pustaka utama grafiti. simarmata, rikardo. 2006. pengakuan hukum terhadap masyarakat adat di indonesia. bangkok: undp regional initiative on indigenous peoples’ rights and development (ripp). siong, han bing. 1961. an outline of the recent history of indonesian criminal law. leiden: kitlv/m. nijhoff. soepomo, r. 1957. sistim hukum di indonesia. 3rd. jakarta: noordhoffkolff n.v. sonius, h.w. j. 1981. “introduction”. pp. xxix-lxvii in van vollenhoven on indonesian adat law (selections from het adatrecht van nederlandsch-indie) (volume i, 1918, volume ii, 1931), edited by johan f. holleman. leiden: kitlv. tresna. 1978. peradilan di indonesia dari abad ke abad. jakarta: pradnya paramita. vollenhoven, cornelis van. 1928. de ontdekking van het adatrecht. leiden: brill. wiratraman, herlambang p. 2007. “the human rights situation concerning indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities in indonesia”. a research report. bangkok: forum asia. wiratraman, herlambang p. and dian ah shah. 2019. “indonesia’s constitutional responses to plurality.” pp. 115-142 in pluralist constitutions in southeast asia, edited by jaclyn neo and bui ngoc son. oxford: hart publishing. doi: 10.5040/9781509920488. ch-005. 61herlambang p. wiratraman wiratraman, herlambang p. and bernadinus steny. 2013.“pluralisme hukum dalam konteks gerakan sosial.” pp. 215-234 in pluralisme hukum: sebuah pendekatan interdisiplin (2nd edition), edited by rikardo simarmata. jakarta: huma. wiratraman, herlambang p. et al. 2013. “peluang peradilan adat dalam menyelesaikan sengketa antara masyarakat hukum adat dengan pihak luar.” laporan tim pengkajian hukum, pusat penelitian dan pengembangan sistem hukum nasional. jakarta: bphn. author biography dr. herlambang p. wiratraman is senior lecturer at constitutional law department, faculty of law, universitas gadjah mada, indonesia. he is head of lp3es law and human rights program, advisor for indonesian caucus for academic freedom (kika), and member of scientific committee for altersea, observatory of political alternatives in southeast asia (centre asie du sud-est) di ehess-ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales (since 2020). he has published many works on law, human rights and constitution studies such as “constitutional struggles and the court in indonesia’s turn to authoritarian politics”, federal law review june 2022; “protecting freedom of expression in multicultural societies: comparing constitutionalism in indonesia and canada” (with sebastien lafrance), yuridika 36(1), january 2021; “does indonesian covid-19 emergency law secure rule of law and human rights? journal of southeast asian human rights 4 (1), 1 june 2020; “the challenges for teaching comparative law and socio-legal studies at indonesia’s law schools”, asian journal of comparative law 14, supplement s1, october 2019; “freedom of expression, law and politics in indonesia”, in azmi sharom and magdalen spooner (eds), human rights and democracy in indonesia and malaysia, kuala lumpur: university of malaya-shapesea, 2019; and “indonesia’s constitutional responses to plurality”, in jaclyn neo and bui ngoc son (eds), pluralist constitutions in southeast asia, oxford: hart publishing, 2019. 62 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1, 2022 school leadership practices and identity politics in a multicultural society: the case of indonesia journal of asian social science research 2022, vol. 4, no. 1: 23-42 https://cassr.net/jassr/ © the author(s) 2022 article raihani* universitas islam negeri sultan syarif kasim riau, indonesia abstract this article aims to explore school leadership practices in the context of the multicultural society of indonesia. effective school leaders in a diverse context demonstrate a type of moral leadership characterized by high awareness and sensitivity to cultural diversity and act accordingly to enable everyone in school to pursue his or her goals. this study used a qualitative case study approach by selecting three different schools and interviewing the principals, teachers, and students. the findings suggest that while in rhetoric school leaders convey a commitment to recognize and respect diversity, they exercise covertly some discriminative policies towards powerless groups. in these schools, both cultural and religious identities were used to maintain domination in school. consequently, the schools have hardly become a venue for social justice and multicultural citizenship. by doing so, this article contributes to a better understanding of the nuance of school leadership in multicultural societies like indonesia. key words school leadership, diversity, multicultural education, islam, indonesia, identity politics * contact: professor raihani, universitas islam negeri sultan syarif kasim riau jalan soebrantas km 15, panam, pekanbaru 28293, riau, indonesia. e-mail: raihani@uin-suska.ac.id introduction this article aims to explore the practices of school leadership in the context of the multicultural society in indonesia. leadership is a pivotal element of school which provides vision and directions, manages and develops human resources, and (re)designs school organization through the creation of culture and structure supportive of school improvement (leithwood 2005; mulford and johns 2004). leadership is highly contingent on the context where it is exercised, and one style of leadership cannot fit all contexts 24 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1, 2022 (fiedler 1993). therefore, school leadership in a diverse society deals with more complex requirements and tasks to accomplish. the evolving body of literature suggests convincing evidence that school leadership in multicultural societies demonstrates an awareness of, and pays appropriate respect to, the home culture of students (banks 2011; bezzina 2018; hansuvadha and slater 2012). school leaders orchestrate other elements of school to establish communication with parents and the community to understand each home’s cultural expectations of schooling. multicultural school leaders set directions and take corresponding actions to meet such expectations. the literature also indicates that they strive to balance between meeting such cultural expectations and creating social justice among students of different backgrounds in terms of school services and, hence, student outcomes. student outcomes are the goals of every school education. in essence, multicultural leaders aspire to create a school to become a place where every student regardless of cultural background develops to achieve his or her maximum potential (banks 2011). indonesia is home to around 1300 ethnic groups and 650 local languages. the population of this archipelagic country is currently composed of around 275 million people of which muslims constitute the majority followed by catholics, protestants, hindus, buddhists and confucians. there is also a handful amount of people of traditional beliefs and faiths portraying a complete picture of diverse indonesia. in general, people live in harmony, indicating a positive reputation of this democratic muslim-majority country. however, cultural and religious frictions have occurred throughout the modern history of indonesia including relatively recent bloody incidents such as ethnic conflicts in kalimantan in 1998 and 2001 and religious conflict in ambon in 1999 (jonge and nooteboom 2006; klinken 2007; smith 2005). the evolving political contexts where the use of religious identity to gain power and voters have also been alarming. religious symbols and jargon have been largely and brutally employed to attack and weaken political rivalries in the contexts of presidential elections in 2014 and 2019 (brooks 2019). this suggests that the country has undergone a more complex and dynamic relationship among religious groups and could become worse when the politics of identity continues to go beyond control. this also suggests that in the indonesian context cultural diversity does not only refer to the state of being diverse in terms of ethnicity-based cultures but also encompasses religious plurality. the above dynamic and complex portrayal of a cultural and religious relationship in indonesia has implications for education policies and practices. much has been done by the government to advocate multicultural 25raihani policies including the issuance of the current national education law in 2003 outlining the new national education objectives, which emphasizes developing students’ personalities as religiously devout, democratic, and responsible citizens. previous research found that this education law was translated into subsequent policies like curriculum, but no convincing evidence was found to have suggested consistent practices across different schools in how to translate such policies into school and classroom daily routines (hoon 2013; raihani 2014, 2018b). many schools were not concerned with the teaching of cultural diversity, but a few demonstrated an awareness of the importance of multicultural education. this contrasting implementation depended heavily on the principals’ and teachers’ understanding of diversity, initiatives, and even personal and political interests (raihani 2014). this article is based on research conducted from 2009 to 2012 in yogyakarta, palangka raya and in 2016 in batam. although the research may sound outdated, the findings remain relevant to the indonesian educational context which has increasingly been more diverse and exists in a political context where cultural identity is used as a way to gain political benefits. the research was focused partly on school leadership in areas where cultural and religious diversity is strongly existent. in this article, i argue that school leaders in indonesia’s multicultural society cannot be divorced from personal beliefs and broader contextual factors including the nationally mainstreaming politics of identity while realizing the importance of maintaining social harmony in school. i will review relevant literature on school leadership in multicultural contexts and describe briefly indonesian education to provide a contextual basis for this article. i will explain the methodology used in both research, present findings, and draw on conclusive remarks on how school principals exercise leadership in such a context. school leadership in a diverse society people’s migration has contributed to the construction of a society where different races and ethnicities live together. there is almost no part of the world now which has not been impacted by people’s mobility. in the context of indonesia, the type of migration might be significantly different from that in other contexts. in this country, internal migration – very few transnational migrations – has been the main characteristic of people’s movement, whether it is a deliberate government policy of transmigration or natural/voluntary migration (drake 1989; taylor 2003). in either one, indonesia is an inherently diverse society. 26 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1, 2022 in education, as indicated previously, a diverse society contributes to the composition of diverse student and teacher populations in school. for this diversely populated school, to say the least, culturally responsive pedagogical, leadership and managerial practices are required to ensure that every student of different cultural backgrounds develops to the maximum of their potential. in pedagogy, banks (1986, 1997) proposed equity pedagogy as teaching strategies and classroom environment to help students from diverse cultural backgrounds to live and contribute to a democratic society. equity pedagogy does not only aim at equipping students with necessary literacy and numeracy skills but also assists them to become effective agents for social change. adopting critical theory and radical philosophies, other scholars (freire 1970; shokouhi and pashaie 2015) go beyond the notion of regular pedagogical practices by promoting critical pedagogy which attempts to provoke students to question and challenge existing domination due to, perhaps, the majority status and possessed power. students are invited to ponder upon deprived groups of the community by scrutinizing the majority domination. in leadership, no single style works effectively in the context of a multicultural school, and, therefore, i would like to discuss some elements of various styles of leadership, which correspond squarely to the circumstances of a school with cultural diversity. first, echoing fiedler’s (1993) theory of contingency, dimmock and walker (2005) argues that leadership is a socially bounded and constructed process. it does not exist in empty space and time, meaning that different contexts may require different leadership styles. in other words, to be an effective leader, a principal of a school with diverse populations should be culturally responsive. contingent leadership focuses on how leaders respond to the unique community and organizational circumstances, including the increasing diversity of cultures, in society (leithwood 1999, 2005; leithwood and duke 1999). second, if school leaders understand the cultural diversity of school populations, they develop a vision of multicultural education and set appropriate strategies to realize such a vision. this specific characteristic is the main element of strategic leadership. dimmock and walker (2005) argue that visionary cultural leadership demonstrates a capacity to develop student learning as the main objective of school education. by so doing, every student’s cultural interest is well accommodated in school programs, and different cultural backgrounds do not handicap children from equally performing. third, another element of leadership which i consider important for multicultural schools is a particular emphasis on social justice practices since schools with multicultural students are vulnerable to the practices of social injustice (banks 2010, 2011). this is moral leadership (sergiovanni 27raihani 1992), which is in line with the concept of social justice leadership that makes themes of social inclusion and multiculturalism central to leadership vision and practice (theoharis 2007). lastly, a strong participative style of leadership is a key to success in leading a school with diverse cultural characteristics (mulford and johns 2004). diverse ideas and interests, often underpinned by beliefs and cultures, are an everyday feature of multicultural schools. participative school leaders acknowledge, respect, and engage with these interests in a way that ensures equal benefits for all and set up a democratic mechanism of making decisions, involving school stakeholders of different cultural backgrounds. based on the above review, i argue that school leaders for multicultural education are required to exercise various styles for the complex roles they have to play in transforming schools into supportive places for diverse students. yet, social justice leadership which is based on moral imperatives plays a more significant role in the success of a multicultural school. school leaders exercising this style seem to be able to create a culture of respect, tolerance, equality, and cohesiveness among school members. they are critical of any practices and traditions of injustice, prejudice, and discrimination, and make efforts to combat such negative attitudes. they are able to question, for example, the status quo in which the majority enjoys privileges to dominate the minority and restore the confidence to perform in every teacher and student. in essence, they create schools as comfort zones for everyone to learn and maximize their potential. indonesian education and identity politics like in most other countries, schooling in indonesia consists of three levels, i.e., primary, secondary, and tertiary. primary education has early childhood and 6-year elementary schooling, whereas secondary education encompasses junior and secondary schooling, each of which is a 3-year program. those graduating from senior secondary education may continue to tertiary education for the duration of normally four to five years. graduate degree education is also available for those who continue further. unlike in most other countries, however, indonesian education has been characterized by an administrative dichotomy, namely general schools affiliated with the ministry of education and culture (moec) and religious (mostly islamic) schools or madrasah under the ministry of religion (mor). previously, this dichotomy went deeply into the curricula of education, i.e. one was predominantly general or secular subjects with a small proportion of religious subjects, and the other was dominated by religious subjects with a significant proportion of secular ones (mujiburrahman 2006; raihani 2018a). after a long political and 28 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1, 2022 ideological debate throughout the history of post-independence (1945) education, the tension between the two sectors has faded and left the dichotomy remaining primarily in the affairs of administration. this administrative dichotomy, however, does not go without problems. one of the problems has been that islamic education remains under the central authority as mandated by the autonomy laws, whilst general education is decentralized into local governments. consequently, there is a great variation in local government support to general schools depending on the budgets, while islamic schools across the archipelago generally receive similar support from the central government (kingham 2008). apart from the above picture of dichotomy, indonesian education has undergone major reforms in both management and curriculum. decentralization of education from the central authority to local governments in 1999 marked the efforts to improve the provision of education services by engaging communities to participate in education affairs. although the outcomes of this decentralization are not entirely satisfactory due to the structural and cultural reluctance and corruption, it has promoted more equality of access to education as the local governments are enabled to manage and oversight education (bjork 2006). in terms of the curriculum, since the reform era in 1998, the government has issued two subsequent curricula for schools across primary to secondary levels, namely the 2006 and 2013 curricula. generally, both curricula adopt the constructivist approach in designing the learning process, whilst the difference lies in the stronger emphasis of the 2013 curriculum on character education in responding to the current challenges of the moral decadence of students (bjork and raihani 2018). with regards to diversity, in indonesia, in general, cultural differences do not really matter to students (parker and hoon 2013), even though there are some trivial issues that one student makes a joke about the language or tradition of another. yet, chinese ethnicity remains problematic in the minds and social interactions of most indonesians largely due to prejudices (hoon 2008; suryadinata 2004). in another scene, religious differences are considered importantly fundamental to many students and even teachers. this means that religious interactions are practised in a quite cautious manner. a survey about youth interaction from different religious backgrounds indicates that most respondents are reluctant to develop an intimate relationship with someone of different religions or faiths merely because of their faith (parker, hoon, raihani 2014). religious presence through its symbols in schools in indonesia has been increasingly stronger partly due to various factors including the penetration of transnational religious ideologies like salafism and hizbut 29raihani tahrir, and the side effects of democratization starting from 1998 that open up spaces for people to display more visible religiosity (crouch 2009; fealy 2008; fealy and white 2008). this has made the student social demography more dynamic and brought about changes in relationships among students of different religious backgrounds and intensified religious programs and activities. in many schools, the competition between student religious groups and organizations is strongly but manageably visible. often, teachers invisibly play a role in helping this competition more tense and hence lead to latent segregation among students (raihani 2014). latent segregation here means that on the surface students look to have fluid interactions but there is a hidden tension in such a relationship. in summary, religious symbols and discourse have been taking an increasingly central place in contemporary indonesian schools in general, which requires leaders to become more aware of and competent in managing such a complex relationship. in a broader context, the above factors of the penetrating transnational ideologies and the side effect of democratization have led to the conservative turn of the islamic face in indonesia. bruinessen (2013) and hasyim (2019) argue that indonesian islam has moved to a more conservative outlook due to, among others, the influence of returning scholars from middleeastern universities particularly those of saudi arabia and kuwait over the religious thought of many indonesian muslims. further to this argument, the islamic transnational movements have gradually weakened the centrality of two main moderate islamic organizations – nahdlatul ulama (nu) and muhammadiyah – in guiding the moderate path of indonesian islam. in addition, fealy (2007) points to the counter-productive strategy by so-called “liberal islam” which has sparked controversies among the muslim people, and hence, backlash from the wider muslim community. in turn, the politics of identity – broadly defined as political intervention by targeting a group of people based on identities (younge 2018) – has been demonstrated in both political and social practices in which people and, in this context, their interactions are categorized based on ethnic and religious affiliations. this is a kind of phenomenon in which people exaggerate differences with others and emphasize similarities with those who share (appiah 2018). methods of investigation this study uses a qualitative approach to explore leadership practices in multicultural schools in indonesia. the use of the qualitative approach in this study is justified. the objective of this research is to understand deeply school leadership in multicultural settings (creswell 2002; maxwell 30 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1, 2022 1996; miles & huberman 1994). a quantitative approach reveals findings presented in numerical analysis and cannot be used to explore data deeply and comprehensively. it only suggests trends and patterns but does not investigate detailed exercises and practices of school leadership and the underpinning forces such as feelings, emotions, beliefs, values, traditions, cultures, and norms of school leaders. also, numerous studies have used qualitative approaches to understand school leadership in different contexts and produced in-depth and comprehensive accounts of what school leadership looks like. i investigated such principalship in various school settings across indonesia. the criteria for selecting schools include that they are general (not religious) schools and located in an urban and multicultural society. general schools in urban areas of indonesia usually have a more diverse student population in terms of both culture and religion than rural ones. this study also deliberately selected research areas which have multicultural populations, i.e., yogyakarta, palangka raya, and batam. yogyakarta is an urban area where many students from different areas come to pursue education at various levels, particularly tertiary ones, while palangka raya is one of the youngest cities in indonesia whose populations are diversely shaped by the traditional dayak and banjarese inhabitants and by voluntary and government-funded migrations. batam is home to indigenous malay and several ethnic groups coming from various parts of the archipelago for jobs. i selected one school in yogyakarta, one in palangka raya and one in batam. in each school, i interviewed the principal, vice principals, five to seven teachers, and a group of students to explore their opinions about school leadership and its practices in the context where student populations are diverse. the questions of the in-depth and group interviews were outlined in such themes as opinions about cultural and religious diversity, principals’ vision and strategies in dealing with such diverse realities, school programs to support such diversity, and supporting and impeding factors to leadership. in analyzing the data, i follow what miles and hubermen (1994) suggest to condense the data through checking and rechecking after each data collection process, transcription, coding and categorization. this inductive analytical practice provided grounded information and themes of school leadership practices and influential factors to leadership. the themes i developed from this analysis process will be presented in the following sections. 31raihani school profiles creativity has been one of the best vocational secondary schools in yogyakarta. in 2009, around 850 students were enrolled, the majority of whom are females with only eight male students. gender relations were unique at this school because of this disproportion. like other vocational schools in indonesia, this school served students from middle to lowerincome families who are from javanese muslim backgrounds. three study streams were offered, i.e., marketing, office administration, and accountancy. this school was reputably one of the best vocational schools in yogyakarta. the principal of this school was described as a man of energy and inspiration. he was aged at that time about 45 years old. rose garden is located in the heart of palangka raya, the capital city of central kalimantan. being famous as the best school in this province, in 2020 it enrolled around 900 students from various religious and ethnic backgrounds. different from the above school, students in this school came from middle to upper-income households. at that time, it was in the process of becoming an international school. this is why entry to this school was tough as higher exam results from junior secondary schools were required to be admitted to this school. three streams could be chosen by students in this school, namely natural sciences, social sciences and language studies. this school had a female principal aged at early fifty. the last school is located in batam, the riau islands province. one is named the hope school. this public school was established in 1987, and in 2016 it enrolled more than 1,100 students. this can be categorized as a large school in the context of indonesia. as one of the favourite schools in batam, this school is home to students from different ethnic and religious backgrounds including chinese students who were strongly present. the school community proudly explained that it is like a miniature of indonesia where various ethnic and religious backgrounds co-exist. the majority of students are muslims. it offers students natural sciences, social sciences and language studies. the principal was a male senior teacher aged about 50 years old and looked to lead the school in full confidence. school leadership in multicultural indonesia several themes were identified from the data to report how the principals exercised leadership in the areas where cultural and religious diversity is highly present in their contexts. the themes include displaying vision, developing programs supportive of multiculturalism, recruiting and evaluating students, and evaluating teachers for promotion. these themes were deliberately selected and presented here for their contents of issues relevant to school leadership in responding to diversity. 32 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1, 2022 displaying vision each of the three schools had an ideal vision to achieve, but none of them was concerned explicitly with diversity. commonly, the school’s vision idealized three aspects of school objectives, namely academic achievement, piety and personality, and global insight. in batam, however, the hope school emphasized the catchphrase “mencintai budayanya” or “loving his or her (student’s) culture” which can be interpreted as supporting the culture of individual students. when they were asked about their vision, the principals of the three schools always referred to the schools’ vision. there was no distinction between the school’s vision and their individual visions. however, the principals had their perceptions of cultural and religious diversity. they rhetorically praised the reality of diversity that indonesia has and stressed the importance of tolerant attitudes to respond to such diversity. the creativity school principal said that indonesia has a foundational capital of very rich diversity and could be used to underpin its development. diversity, the hope school principal conveyed, has made indonesia a good place to live because it exposed its inhabitants to the dynamics of different cultures and made them relatively easily mature. meanwhile, the rose garden principal believed that palangka raya has the natural wisdom to respond to the diversity, even though she realized that ethnic conflict had happened between dayak and madurese. she argued that it was because the migrants could not appropriate themselves to host cultures. vision is the central point of any organization and leadership as it comes from beliefs, values, and norms the principals and community have (leithwood and riehl 2003). vision inspires programs and strategies of an organization. vision should be explicit about what it wants to achieve including when the school wants to promote tolerance and respect for diversity. it cannot be implicitly or vaguely stated. in the above presentation of findings, in terms of diversity, the school’s vision was different from the principal’s individual vision. an individual vision of the principals depicted earlier may or may not work effectively as it is not a shared vision to which every stakeholder adheres. it was not “born” through discussions of ideas and collaborative thinking. therefore, the principals’ vision for respecting diversity may be opposed by other stakeholders or otherwise. on the one hand, this indicates that diversity and its consequential attitudes that follow did not come as primary concerns in the collective minds of the schools’ stakeholders. on the other hand, it shows that each of the principals demonstrated a distinctive belief and attitude toward diversity, but failed to influence others in formulating the explicit vision. 33raihani as argued above, what has been stated in the vision either in school or personal contexts should inspire actions. in this leadership praxis, it can be understood whether the above-mentioned personal vision was enacted in effective ways. in the following sub-section onwards, this aspect of school leadership is explored and discussed. developing programs supportive for multiculturalism all the schools were found to have developed several programs to directly or indirectly support the existing diversity of culture and religion. most of the programs were categorized into extra-curricular programs. one that was commonly found in the three schools was sporting clubs and activities, where no segregation whatsoever occurred. students from any background could join and be engaged in the activities. more importantly, as one student in the hope school said during a focus group discussion “by joining sports, we learn to live in harmony with those who are different from us. we have friends who are christians in the clubs”. other students agreed that they could work together despite the differences, even though no information was found to have indicated that they were heavily exposed to, or learned a great deal about, the religious teachings of others. strong exposures occurred when interreligious interactions became more personalized in a closer friendship, in which religious lessons of each side were exchanged. this was acknowledged by students in all three schools. in the hope school, every friday morning, students were asked to recite parts of their religious holy books. muslims had to recite surah yasin (a chapter of the quran) in classes, while non-muslims went out of the classes and found their community reciting parts of their holy books. so, each of the religious groups learned about religious differences and, in terms of worship, about the rules when they could be together and segregated. as acknowledged by tamrin, a teacher, this program has been implemented for some years, and everyone got used to it quickly. however, he admitted that the central focus of the program was how to educate children about their religious teaching and practices, although the impacts might be beyond, i.e., exposure to religious diversity. what was uniquely practised was that in rose garden, which was in the preparation of any religious ceremonies, an interreligious committee was formed under the guidance and direction of a teacher responsible for student affairs. students from any religious background learned directly about religious ceremonies of various religions, paid respects to them, and were engaged in preparation. they had a clear cut of what they may and may not do in helping other religious communities, i.e., never be involved in religious worships. although some teachers were concerned about this 34 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1, 2022 unique feature using the islamic perspective, they realized that this was a school program for building a truer interreligious understanding. as argued earlier, vision leads to actions. a leader’s vision leads to activities, programs and strategies that correspond to such a vision. the above findings confirm that the individual vision of the principals has influenced several programs in the schools. their personal belief in diversity, which was positive as presented before, has turned out into the development of supportive programs for religious diversity. although these programs might not manifest their detailed personal preferences and aspirations as they never told the stories, what had been practised was under their knowledge and jurisdiction. by providing policies or even only positive gestures, their leadership revealed a strong message for supporting and strengthening religious diversity, tolerance and harmony in school. however, this message needs to be explored further for its consistency across different leadership policies and practices as in the following subsections. recruiting and evaluating students hundreds of students were enrolled every year in each of the three schools. they were selected through different schemes such as the scouting method by which students were selected from the best-performing ones in previous schools and the normal entry examination. as one of the best schools in the area, each of the studied schools always received much more applications than the accepting capacity. therefore, as acknowledged by the principals, this made it easier for them to select new better students. the hope school principal, however, explained that what has been difficult for a favourite (best) school was dealing with a request from big officials in the province or municipality for them to accept their children or other family members whether the future students be qualified or not. every year the school had to accommodate a significant number of this type of student and compromise their selection criteria. this is similar to the other cases in this study. in addition, the hope school had the policy to accommodate neighbouring children in their school with a set of lenient selection criteria. the principal said: “this is, you know, to accommodate the interests of the surrounding community to place their children here. otherwise, we build the school in this community but failed to respect them”. another issue about student recruitment happened in the researched schools in palangka raya and batam. in rose garden, as the majority of teachers are catholics, the student recruitment was often religiously biased in the sense that future students from islamic backgrounds were crossed 35raihani out from the list even though they passed the entrance examination. as fatih, a teacher who was involved in the selection committee recalled: last year, i saw through my own eyes that many (prospective) muslim students were crossed out and replaced by catholic ones. this year, i tried to remind them, but did not know exactly what happened. muslim students added, but whether the practice is still going on, i have no idea. in the hope school, the principal proudly conveyed that he had covertly issued a specific policy of keeping the number of new non-muslim students limited to maintain the domination of the muslim majority in this favourite school. he continued to explain that in batam chinese community constituted a large proportion of the whole population and the majority of them were non-muslims. if he did not “play this game”, the number of muslim students who are the malay majority would be decreased in the school since chinese students were famously described as generally diligent and smart. as one of the chinese students, jessica, told me, the above discriminating policy was not limited to the new student selection, but also the streaming selection. like in other secondary schools, the natural sciences stream was considered the best stream and, therefore, many students during the first year worked very hard to become qualified for that stream whose classes had limited spaces. the hidden policy, as jessica explained, was that teachers never gave good marks in several relevant subjects to many chinese students, even though some of them deserved it. this made them unable to compete with other students to be qualified for that stream in year two. this was confirmed by several teachers i interviewed, and they argued that this was an affirmative action to assist muslim students to perform better than non-muslim ones. the above practices of student selection and evaluation did not fully comply with the principles of fairness, equal opportunity, and meritocracy. both new and old students should be treated equally and given equal opportunity to compete with each other in fairness. there should not be any discrimination or differentiation in any way. affirmative actions can be applied with the conditions to support a minority to be more represented in a school, to create a more diverse community in a school so that students are exposed to and learn from it, and to promote more equity in admission. other than these reasons, the policy would turn into discriminative actions to maintain the domination of the majority, a situation of education that critical pedagogues criticized (freire 1970). 36 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1, 2022 evaluating teachers for promotion as part of professional career practices, teachers in all the studied schools got promoted. they were promoted to a higher rank of teaching position after a certain period and meeting the requirements, and some others were promoted to have additional responsibilities such as being placed as vice principals. the process of getting promoted could be different from one school to another, and in some instances, identity was played to allow someone to be promoted or not. in creativity school, catholic teachers felt that they were being discriminated against in their career promotion because of their religious affiliation. arnita, a senior catholic teacher, explained that teachers from non-islamic backgrounds never got promoted to vice-principalship, not because of their competencies, but religion. she continued to say: “there used to be an assessment for becoming vice-principals, and one of our catholic colleagues actually passed the assessment. but, because she is catholic, she never get promoted”. another teacher confirmed this story and explained that there was a power behind the principal that decided on strategic issues in the school. the principal was weak in some aspects, as she said. while the above issue was not uncovered in the hope school, in rose garden, it was a different story. the principal exercised a very strong approach in selecting teachers for promotion to new positions. she never consulted teachers nor did a proper assessment, but decided by herself on who was placed in vice-principalship positions. as the principal argued, she chose those who represent religious groups in the school so that there would not be any chaos. however, as many teachers put forward, although the representativeness could be understood, it did not really demonstrate a participative decision-making process and, therefore, led to the placement of the wrong people in the wrong places. in other words, they were not capable of the positions. what has been described above indicates a very delicate situation of interreligious interactions among stakeholders particularly between school leaders and teachers when it comes to issues of selection and promotion (banks 2010, 2011). religious identity was capitalized to raise up and down people neglecting merits, competencies, fairness and equal opportunity. from the findings, leadership was crucial in playing the politics of religious identity in the schools. on the one hand, the creativity school principal was described as a laissez-faire leader who submissively let powerful others intervene with such strategic decisions. on the other hand, the rose garden principal used religious identity to ensure the 37raihani representativeness of every religious group in the leadership team despite the criticisms of such an undemocratic practice. in this case, she preferred stability to participative decision-making. conclusion: politics of identity in school from the above findings, it can be learned that school leadership in the three schools – the creativity, rose garden and the hope – has demonstrated an awareness and understanding of cultural and religious differences in both the schools and the surrounding community. at the personal level, this awareness has become one of the principals’ visions to create a school for nurturing tolerance and harmony amongst the existing groups but was not reflected in the official school visions. however, several school programs were deliberately designed to cater for the needs of students from different backgrounds and expose them to cultural and religious differences that provide ample opportunities for learning to live together in harmony. in fact, on the grass root, students interacted fluidly across boundaries and were not concerned with differences when deciding on friendship. another lesson from the findings is generally ethnicity and culture do not matter to many school community members, but religion does. this partly confirms previous findings in multiculturalism research in indonesia that what comes out as the main concern in group relations is religion (parker 2010; parker and hoon 2013). this study, however, reveals another interesting insight that while ethnicity, in general, is not a problem, the increasing presence of chinese students in school has concerned the principal of the hope school in batam. there remains prejudice growing in the minds of many indonesians towards their fellow chinese countrymen. this has not changed a lot since the new order regime (hoon 2008; suryadinata 2004) and influenced a discriminative policy towards this ethnic group like what happened in the hope school. school leadership in this study has failed to show moral imperatives of social justice and equality. the politics of identity have been played in the researched schools in the matters related to power and influence as a result of group prejudice and feeling threatened by others’ existence. the cases of student recruitment, evaluation and staff promotion as presented above were indicative of hidden discrimination driven by a political agenda of the dominating group in the schools. the dominating group strive to subordinate others by abusing power and discriminating against the powerless religious others. from the findings, this did not necessarily mean that muslims dominate nonmuslims, but those who possess power tend to dominate and discriminate 38 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1, 2022 against others. so, religious group competitiveness has gotten increasingly stronger in almost every context of indonesian society, as previously discussed, and led to more prejudice and injustice. the increasing presence of transnational ideologies and political islam have coloured significantly the dynamic of interreligious relations (abuza 2007). in this study, unfortunately, the principals of the three schools could not convincingly demonstrate moral and social-justice-oriented leadership. in such increasingly played politics of cultural and religious identity in both immediate school and broader contexts, it becomes more delicate to expect that the bottom-level student relationship in school remains fluid. the prejudice might be viral penetrating and influencing the minds and actions of students. consequently, the schools failed to become a place for inclusive practices of indonesian citizenship, which provides an equal opportunity for all students to develop their potential at maximum without having discriminative experiences. lastly, although this article is based on studies conducted quite some years ago, the findings remain valid and factual until now since indonesia has increasingly been prone to 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(2005). “understanding successful school leadership: progress on a broken front.” journal of educational administration 43(6):619-629. leithwood, kenneth and d. l. duke. 1999. “a century’s quest to understand school leadership.” pp. 45-72 in handbook of research on educational administration, edited by joseph murphy and karen l. seashore. san francisco: jossey-bass publishers. leithwood, kenneth and carolyn riehl. 2003. “what do we already know about successful school leadership?” retrieved 10 november 2019 (http://www.cepa.gse.rutgers.edu/division%20 a%20papers%202003/leithwood%20riehl4-28.pdf). maxwell, joseph a. 1996. qualitative research design. thousand oaks: sage publications. miles, matthew b and michael a. huberman. 1994. qualitative data analysis. thousand oaks: sage publications. mujiburrahman. 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citizens in indonesia: policies and practices,” compare: a journal of comparative and international education 48(6), doi: 10.1080/03057925.2017.1399250. raihani. 2018b. “banjarese islamic scholars (ulema) and social transformation in tembilahan (preliminary research).” jurnal ushuludin 26(2):215-224. sergiovanni, thomas j. 1992. moral leadership: getting the heart of school improvement. san francisco: jossey-bass publishers. shokouhi, mehdi and farnaz pashaie. 2015. “critical pedagogy and its realization in classroom context.” journal of applied linguistics and language research 2(3): 204-210. smith, claire q. 2005. the roots of violence and prospects for reconciliation: a case study of ethnic conflict in central kalimantan, indonesia. paper no. 23. washington, dc: the world bank. suryadinata, leo. 2004. peranakan’s search for national identity: biographical studies of seven indonesian chinese. singapore: marshall cavendish academic. taylor, jean g. 2003. indonesia: peoples and histories. new haven: yale university press. theoharis, george. 2007. “social justice educational leaders and resistance: toward a theory of social justice leadership.” educational administration quarterly 43(2): 221-258. younge, gary. 2018. “the politics of identity: from potential to pitfalls, and symbols to substance.” identities: global studies in culture and power 26(1):1-11. 42 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1, 2022 author biography dr. raihani is professor of islamic education studies at universitas islam negeri (uin) sultan syarif kasim riau, pekanbaru. through his fulbright visiting scholar grant, dr raihani researches education focusing on “islam and inclusive citizenship: curriculum and teachers’ perspective” at boston university. he completed his phd in educational leadership and his master degree in curriculum studies from the university of melbourne. he received his bachelor’s degree in islamic education from iain antasari banjarmasin. among his notable publications are “young people’s attitudes towards interethnic and interreligious socializing, courtship and marriage in indonesia”, (with l. paker and c.y. hoon), south east asia research 22 (4), 2014, doi: 10.5367/ sear.2014.0230; “creating a culture of tolerance in an indonesian school,” south east asia research 22 (4), 2014, doi: 10.5367/sear.2014.0234; and “education for multicultural citizens in indonesia: policies and practices,” compare: a journal of comparative and international education 48(6), 2018, doi: 10.1080/03057925.2017.1399250. sasak people’s resistance against mataram-karangasem and dutch colonial rulers: the role of tuan guru umar kelayu journal of asian social science research 2020, vol. 2, no. 1: 73-90 http://jassr.cassr.web.id © the author(s) 2019 ahmad tohri* hamzanwadi university, lombok timur, indonesia habibuddin hamzanwadi university, lombok timur, indonesia abdul rasyad hamzanwadi university, lombok timur, indonesia abstract this article discusses the sasak people’s resistance against mataramkarangasem and dutch colonial rulers in the 19th century in lombok, indonesia. it particularly focuses on tuan guru umar kelayu and his central role in the emergence of sasak people’s resistance which transformed into sasak physical revolution local and global imperialismcolonialism. using the historical method, this article collected data through observation, in-depth interviews, and documentation. the data analysis involved the historical methods of heuristics, verification or criticism, interpretation, and historiography. the findings show that sasak people’s resistance was not only caused by economic factors but also related to other factors such as social, cultural, and religious ones. tuan guru umar kelayu played a key role in the sasak people’s resistance in that it was under his leadership and influence that the resistance transformed into a physical struggle against mataramkarangasem and dutch colonialism as seen in sakra war and praya war which were led by his students and friends. key words tuan guru umar kelayu, social-religious movement, sasak people, mataram-karangasem colonialism, dutch colonialism *corresponding author: ahmad tohri faculty of social science and economics, hamzanwadi university jalan tgkh muhammad zainuddin abdul madjid no. 132, selong, lombok timur, indonesia 83612 email: tohri92@gmail.com article 74 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 introduction it is known that community resistance movements are strongly influenced by local religious leaders. the emergence and development, either success or failure, of a community resistance are dependent on the community’s religious leaders. the community members believe that their religious leaders preserve the community’s tradition and provide a way to salvation in the afterlife. they are obliged to listen to the advice of their religious leaders for daily life so that it is not uncommon that they become fanatical and militant followers of their religious leader. as a result, these religious leaders have full control over religious, social, cultural, economic aspects of the community. this holds also true for sasak people in lombok, indonesia. the majority of sasak people live in desê-dasan areas (villages) and strongly hold their tradition. rituals are an important part of the community’s lives to express and respond to the world around them to maintain order and stability in social relations. sasak people’s life is dense with ritual traditions which not influence their religious lives but also social, economic, and political activities (kumbara 2008:321). agricultural products have played a vital role in sasak communities for centuries ago. rice, for example, is exported to the philippines, china, bourbon, mauritius as well as some regions in the indonesian archipelago such as java, madura, maluku, and makassar (trisulistyono et al. 2003). even since the 18th century, lombok has been an important part of open trade traffic between australia, singapore, and china (agung 1992:187). the meeting of merchants from the indonesia-malay archipelago and traders from europe made lombok an important trade hub resulting in the business connection among islands in the archipelago and economic cooperation with some european countries. however, this strategic geographical location attracted rulers in the archipelago to invade lombok and exploit its natural resources. these include the rulers of mataram-karangasem kingdom and those of european countries like the netherlands. this led sasak people to fight these invaders in the forms of a large-scale resistance and wars, namely sakra war, praya war i and ii, and kalijaga war (wacana 1988; zakaria 1998). this sasak people’s resistance was characterized by the fact that it was highly influenced by sasak religious leaders known as tuan guru who traditionally exercised -even until nowa respected status and power over sasak people. one of tuan guru who played a major role in the sasak movement during the mataram-karangasem and the dutch colonialism was tuan guru umar kelayu. 75tohri, ahmad, et al based on the above background, this article examines the sasak people’s resistance against the mataram-karangasem kingdom and dutch colonialism in the 19th century. it poses two main questions: what caused sasak people to fight mataram-karangasem and dutch occupation? and how did tuan guru umar kelayu play his central role in this sasak people resistance? to answer these questions, this article uses historical analysis. the required data were collected through observation, in-depth interviews, and documentation. data analysis involved four stages: heuristics (source collection), verification (source criticism), interpretation (source interpretation), and historiography or history writing (kartodirdjo 1982; kuntowijoyo 1995; priyadi 2011). the heuristic phase involved collecting historical sources in the form of written documents on sasak resistance. the verification stage criticized the obtained historical sources as these sources have external and internal aspects. in the interpretation phase, collected data were interpreted to arrange related historical periods. lastly, the historiography stage reconstructed history. this article argues that various factors drove the sasak people’s resistance against the occupation of the mataram-karangasem kingdom and dutch colonialism, which was finally manifested in wars through the central role played by tuan guru umar kelayu. in what follows, this article, first, describes the sasak people’s resistance against the mataramkarangasem kingdom and dutch colonialism. then, it explains the factors that caused the sasak people resistance. finally, the article describes how tuan guru umar kelayu played a central role in the sasak people’s resistance. sasak resistance against mataram-karangasem and dutch colonialism sasak people’s resistance occurred in the 19th century against mataramkarangasem invaders and the dutch colonialism who wanted to control lombok’s natural resources and change the social order of sasak communities. it was conducted in the forms of wars and upheaval on various scales by the followers of tuan guru, local charismatic religious leaders. they were driven by the theological goal of upholding amr ma’ruf nahy munkar (islamic teaching of commanding right and forbidding wrong) and observing the holy war of jihad fi sabilillah (struggle in the path of god). the sasak resistance against the foreign rulers was a collective action to maintain the sasak tradition as a collective identity. sasak people viewed change introduced by the foreign rulers as a danger that could damage the 76 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 traditional consensus and local cultural values resulting in changes in one’s social or collective mentality. this view affected the level of development of social movements resulting in a high sense of solidarity and idealism that focus on action in making changes to conditions that are understood as things that must be resisted for change (broom & selznick 1981). this means that social movements or popular resistance movements are collective activities in a dynamic social life of the communities in response to changes or dissatisfaction with unfair and oppressive conditions. this was the most decisive factor in the resistance of sasak communities who wanted to free themselves from the invaders. the rule of the mataramkarangasem kingdom and dutch colonial government brought in various pressures on sasak people including the intervention on religious and cultural issues. this made sasak communities not free to observe their islamic beliefs. sasak people’s resistance was not separated from the key role that tuan guru played as will be explained below. the term tuan guru refers to a religious leader among lombok communities. it is attributed to those who are knowledgeable in islamic traditional science such as the qur’an recitation and memorization, fiqh, tauhid, tafsir, hadits, tasawuf, tarikh, nahwu-sarf, ilmu falak, mantiq, and hikmah. this title is similar to those of kyai among javanese people and anregurutta among bugis people in sulawesi. now, the term kyai is generally accepted to refer to islamic religious leaders among many communities in indonesia (yafie 1997: 104). tuan gurus have played a key role in the life of sasak communities in lombok. they have been culturally accepted and regarded to have determined the direction of sasak people’s life. they have played the role of advisors who have influenced political affairs, and as the elite group who have received public recognition in society (dirdjosanjoto 2013:35). tuan gurus have held a strategic position due to their expertise in religious knowledge (hasyim 1988). the function of tuan guru in the resistance of sasak communities against mataram-karangasem and dutch colonialism has placed them in a central position in the life of sasak communities as advisers, directors, mobilizers, and unifiers of fragmented groups (noblemen and non-aristocrats). all this made amar ma’ruf and nahi mungkar as theological basis of sasak people got even stronger. why sasak people fought mataram-karangasem and dutch colonialism the strategic position of lombok in the international trade route in the 19th century caused sasak people to collaborate with various kingdoms in bali, java, sumatra, and other regions in the indonesian-malay archipelago. 77tohri, ahmad, et al the relationship between sasak communities and those in other regions was not only in the form of trade relations, but also family relationships such as sasak community’ relationship with the gowa-tallo makassar communities, sumbawa communities, the javanese communities, and palembang communities. since the time of the selaparang and pejanggik kingdoms, sasak people have lived on agriculture. this was also true during the reign of karangasem king of bali in lombok, especially in west lombok. prominent commodities from lombok at that time were rice, cattle, horses, green beans, eggs, bird’s nests, tobacco, and tarum. imported goods to lombok included silk, porcelain, salt, liquor, opium, and firearms (agung 1992:189). according to records from the dutch colonial, during the reign of bali between 1870-1940, both export and import trade provided the king of mataram-karangasem with income, which was recorded in 1890 before the resistance from east sasak, amounted to 50,650 rijksdaalder (ringgit) a year. however, sasak people’s control of all resources -material, human, cultural, and moral oneswas eroded by the flow of foreign cultural waves that in turns infiltrated and dominated sasak people’s life. the imposition of foreign social rules caused the social structure of sasak communities increasingly depressed. king of karangasem bali invaded lombok to control the lombok economy and spread hinduism, which at that time began to be pushed by islam out from java. this economic domination and oppression continued during the dutch colonial rule. this exploitation was manifested in, first, the system of land ownership, and second, the colonial communities’ tax system. this led to the sasak people’s resistance against economic exploitation. the political oppression and the economic policies of the rulers of bali and the netherlands in the form of very high tax burdened sasak communities. during the rulers of bali, the land tax was raised to 60% and for the sake of the contract to procure slaves with the dutch, the authorities of bali arrested many sasak people and sent them to batavia as forced labor. also, the feeling that sasak’s dignity and pride were downgraded by the bali and dutch rulers triggered the sasak resistance. the resistance of sasak communities was not only caused by economic factors but also related to social factors. dutch colonial exploitation that was manifested in compulsory labour, taxes, and monopolies was not the only burden to sasak economic life, but also a threat to sasak’s sacred cosmos. under the leadership of religious leaders, as well as other figures, farmers in lombok villages were involved in various forms of resistance. 78 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 islam, which had long been a belief system of sasak people, was regarded to had been uprooted from its localization process in sasak indigenous communities, in which the indigenization of islam (pribumisasi islam) gave a room for an islamic “particularization” or local islam, namely islam sasak. it was an unavoidable process when islam met a local culture. islam had been believed to be originated by god, while culture was a product of human thinkings that continued to change. indigenization of islam is a transformation process of islamic elements into local cultures, which involves a continuous process of acculturation (nurdin dan kharlie 2019: 34–35). like other resistance movements against the dutch colonialism such aceh war and banten war, the theological belief in jihad fi sabilillah drove the sasak people to fight against the colonial rule of bali kingdoms and dutch government. it was common that religio-magical beliefs become a basis for social movements, rebellion and resistance. the spirit of religious struggle combined with elements of the local culture was a driving factor of sasak resistance against foreign rule of bali kingdoms and dutch colonialism in the 19th century. in addition, the dutch east indies government’s policy on islam incited the sasak people resistance. this was seen in identifying all teachers of tarekat (sufi brotherhood) and monitoring them. when they were considered a threat to the dutch east indies government, the tarekat teachers were arrested, killed and their schools were closed (suminto 1985:64). this created unrest among the communities of lombok because they were devout muslims and observers of tarekat tradition. the sociopolitical conditions of the colonized sasak communities and socioreligious pressure under mataram-karangasem rule led to a broader and better coordinated resistance movement led by religious leaders united by the spirit of islamic ideology. during the resistance, sasak leaders used religious symbols to recognize sasak people against bali and dutch colonialism. this was seen, for example, in the popular belief that a muslim was a sasak person; if one was not a muslim, one was an infidel and a royal hindu-karangasem army (babad praya durma pupuh 155, n.d.: 27). therefore, sasak people had difficulty in observing their religion as they were forced to work and lived under pressure and threat from foreign balinese landowners and slave masters. they had difficulty in practicing islamic laws in daily life such as performing shalat (prayers) and getting halal food, drinks and cloth. then, motivated by islamic teachings of the obligation of maintaining one’s life and property, sasak farmers and 79tohri, ahmad, et al other community elements fought against injustice, exploitation and high tax imposed by the balinese rulers and dutch colonial government. so, ideology played a key motivating factor in the sasak resistance. the sasak protest movement in the 19th century was characterized with ideological bases as it had features of millennialism, messianism, nativism, and belief in holy war (jihad fi sabilillah). ideology was the basis for resistance leaders to interpret the values and objectives of the protest movement. moreover, there were two factors that triggered sasak people took the fight against the balinese and dutch rulers. these were structural conduciveness and structural tension. structural conduciveness structural conduciveness, in the context of social movements, is certain structural characteristics that have the opportunity to support collective behavior. it is necessary to explain whether or not the socio-cultural structure of sasak communities was conducive to the emergence and development of their resistance against balinese and dutch colonialism. the socio-cultural structure of sasak communities was seen in the kinship system based on patrilineal relationships with patrilocal sedentary patterns. the extended family was common and even the main characteristic of sasak people, especially in rural areas. now, this differed from sasak communities who lived the government centers where the pattern of kuren or sekurenan (nuclear family) began to appear. this phenomenon was inseparable from the influence of industrialization and modernization of the innate party of the invaders who tended to prioritize nuclear family in the kinship system. a very strong kinship bond in the rural sasak communities is the main foundation of the social structure of sasak communities throughout the history of civilization and the culture they experienced. the history of the village in sasak communities in lombok consists mostly of a collection of branches. dasan consists of huts, each gubuk (hut) is a genealogical union (relatives), between one hut and the other separated by pengorong (aisles). in each hut, there are several family units that have family ties due to one blood genealogy. from a cultural point of view, the social structure of rural sasak communities as described above is reflected in the values of the local wisdom of sasak communities who describe the relationship among human being on earth as a microcosm and the universe as a macrocosm. sasak communities’s beliefs about the unity and relation of human life to nature gave birth to spatial cultural concepts, starting from the smallest, the 80 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 family (bale langgak), huts (paer gubug), village (desa-dasan; paer desa), to the greatest paer rinjani, which is gumi lombok as a symbol in the socio-cultural and historical meaning. sociologically, the solidarity of sasak communities is generally mechanical because it is created from the social structure of traditional societies that are communal and functional in a hierarchical manner. the solidarity of sasak communities is reflected in the local wisdom and culture of mutual assistance (beriuk-tinjal, besiru, and betulung), helping a group outside one’s group (memait), and cooperation in helping village leaders, especially in farming (najen). before the arrival of the hindu-karangasem communities in lombok both in the early period of sasak civilization and during the majapahit expansion in uniting the archipelago, sasak people already had a decentralized leadership system or distribution of power in each village. a leading member of the oldest family in each autonomous village, due to his services in clearing up an area and establishing a village in it, were trusted to be a village leader. someone who was appointed a village leader because of his services or blood relationship with the king or datu was called perwangsê who had the highest social status among villagers. before the coming of mataram-karangasem and dutch colonial rulers in gumi lombok, perwangsê were traditional political elites and local rulers who were highly respected, exalted, and obeyed by people. sasak was not exception: perwangsê had previlege and prestige, and controlled natural resources, especially land. they exercised political, social, economic and cultural authority among sasak people. perwangsê exercised their traditional political leadership authority in their villages where they ruled, governed communities, managds the village’s natural resources, maintained security, guaranted welfare, and established kinship and cooperative relationships with perwangse in other villages. therefore, the relationship among sasak aristocratic groups was well established in that they practiced local wisdoms of saling ajinang (mutual respect), saling engat (mutual understanding), saling ilingang (reminding each other), saling tulung (helping each other), saling tembung (mutual reconciliation), saling ayoin (visiting each other), saling wales (being kind to each other), and saling jot (food sharing). the above-described social structure of sasak people started to erode when mataram-karangasem kingdom and the dutch colonial ruler competed and divided gumi lombok. the uprooting of this social structure caused the emergence of resistance among sasak people. however, these social unrests were easily extinguished because they were sporadic and individualistic, and disputes occurred among sasak groups. 81tohri, ahmad, et al structural tension the 19th century was marked as a period of colonial political transformation in indonesia. it was the century when people experienced a change from a traditional political structure to a modern one. as a consequence, traditional political structure declined due to pressure from the colonial political system. this also happened to sasak communities during the rule of mataram-karangasem and dutch colonialism for two centuries -from 1740 to 1942. the year 1740 was marked by the establishment of political power of bali in sasak districts taking advantage of hostilities between local sasak elites, while 1942 was the end of dutch colonial political power, which was then replaced by japanese occupation. the political development in lombok in the 18th and 19th centuries was strongly influenced by the colonial political systems both in bali and netherlands. internal tension within sasak people after sakra war 2 and praya war 2 which predated lombok war as a resistance of sasak communities against the hindu-karangasem rulers on a large scale, several villages in east sasak were occupied by warriors and fertile lands were seized. this caused a resistance, but it was well coordinated. sasak leaders took part in this struggle including mamiq bangkol and mamiq sapian in praya, mamiq mustiaji in kopang, mamiq nursasi in sakra, mamiq ginawang in batukliang, raden wira anom in pringgabaya, raden melaya kusuma in masbagik and raden sri banom in rarang. perwangsê as district heads in the seven main districts could not overcome this chaotic situation and were unable to meet the people’s aspiration of getting their fertile lands back from mataram-karangasem rulers. this condition was further worsened by the tensions between sasak leaders that had already taken place. eventually, sasak leaders agreed to ask for help from the dutch colonial government to fight against bali by sending a letter to the governor-general of the dutch east indies in batavia with a consequence that gumi lombok might be free from the rulers of mataram-karangasem, but could fall into the hands of dutch colonial ruler. tensions between sasak leaders and mataram-karangasem invaders tensions and conflicts between sasak leaders as traditional political elites and the kings of balinese descent have been around for a long time. these were manifested in three wars: kalijaga war, sakra war i, and praya war i, which occurred in eastern sasak. these were the seeds of the large 82 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 resistance from sasak communities, which were driven by perwangsê against the ruler of bali who wanted to strengthen his political power over gumi lombok. after mataram-karangasem controlled the entire lombok region, the autonomous villages led by sasak noble were abolished so that throughout lombok there were no more villages with prominent local leaders in gumi sasak. the centralized power approach adopted by mataramkarangasem and the abusive behavior of the royal dignitaries caused a chaotic government followed by the emergence of various sasak resistance on small scales. being united by islamic teachings, sasak people fought the unfair treatment of the mataram-karangasem kingdom and chaotic situation deliberately sprinkled to maintain political divisions and control. tensions between sasak leaders and dutch colonial ruler the dutch colonial rule over sasak people was more oppressive than that of mataram-karangasem. sasak leaders, especially from among religious leaders who served to preach islam to sasak people, made islam the ideological basis of their struggle to fight the infidel dutch invaders. during the dutch rule, tuan guru shifted their da’wah movements to local resistance with an ideological nuance of islam. this resistance movement, led by tuan guru, gained followers from day to day and gradually reducing the influence of sasak nobles who largely based their authority on localtraditional heritages. the dutch colonial ruler believed that the sasak resistance against mataram-karangasem which was driven by tarekat naqsyabandiyah (naqsyabandiyah sufi brotherhood; the dutch called it sekte naksybandrija) could endanger the interests of the dutch colonial government in indonesia. therefore, the actions that had be taken after the dutch directly colonized lombok were cleansing and hunting operations of the tarekat. the cleansing operation was carried out by arresting the followers of tarekat naqshbandiyah who was considered the most dangerous islamic group in gumi lombok. many of them were caught and tortured. in addition, tarekat activities such as zawiyah and khalaqah were forbidden and dissolved. the tarekat leaders (mursyid) in east lombok, central lombok, and mataram were enlisted for monitoring of their activities. like the dutch colonial ruler’s oppression of tarekat in other regions in indonesia, tarekat in lombok experienced an excessive unjust treatment. in the early 19th century, most of lombok religious leaders (tuan guru) adhered to and taught tarekat in addition to their main task of preaching islam to sasak people. among them were tuan guru ali batu sakra and 83tohri, ahmad, et al tuan guru siddiq karang kelok, the central figures within the tarekat of naqshabandiyah and qadiriyah wa naqshbandiyah in lombok. witnessing and experiencing the dutch invaders’ cruelty that exceeded the oppression of mataram-karangasem, sasak leaders including hajjis (muslim who went on pilgrimage to mecca) and sasak noblemen who were fanatical to islam and adhered to the teachings of tarekat rose up to resist the dutch colonialists in all parts of gumi lombok. in east lombok, wars broke up such as pringgabaya war 1, pringgabaya war 2 and the gandor war; mamelak-praya war and tuban war in central lombok; sesela war in west lombok; and batu geranting bayan war occurred i north lombok. the central role of tuan guru umar kelayu in sasak resistance tuan guru umar kelayu was born in kelayu village, selong district, east lombok regency, west nusa tenggara to the couple kyai rātane (also known as haji abdullah and amaq umar) and hajjah siti aminah (known as inaq umar). his father and mother were called pu’ rais mame and pu’ rais nine respectively. tuan guru umar kelayu himself was popularly called dato ‘umar (tpmd-ntb 1977:85-86). tuan guru umar kelayu was born in circa 1827 ad (1242 h) and died in 1930 ad (1349 h) in the age of 103 years old or 106 years old according to islamic hijriyah calendar. he spent his lifetime in lombok and saudi arabia. he studied how to recite the qur’an and islamic knowledge with his parents and religious scholars in lombok during his childhood; studies further religious knowledge with great scholars in mecca and media; taught, preached in lombok, and facilitated the construction of worship facilities (mosques) to strengthen his people’s faith; learned, taught at kholaqah and muzakaroh, and run a business (running a bookstore) in mecca; and taught, preached, and led the sasak people’s resistance against bali and dutch colonial rulers in lombok (badri 2007:31-36). tuan guru umar kelayu’s genealogy can be traced to kyai rātāne, the son of kyai nurul huda who was well-known as dato ’udā among kelayu community, and to penghulu agung of selaparang kingdom. he had a noble blood lineage of selaparang islamic kingdom who ruled lombok island before it was conquered by mataram-karangasem kingdom led by the kings of balinese descent. according to the charismatic leadership theory which is centred on the individual self-recognized by his community as to have power that can influence the views, patterns of thinking, and behavior of his community, a tuan guru has a full authority in his community. charisma is ability that 84 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 a person has because he has been appointed by god (mastuhu 1990:82). the leadership developed by a tuan guru is a form of leadership that is applied to a society that is developing towards certain fields or programs in accordance with changing conditions and the community’s environment (sukamto 1999:81). tuan guru umar kelayu’s leadership can be explained as follows: first, tuan guru umar kelayu was the role model and his leadership role was seen in his daily behavior before families, students, and worshippers; second, tuan guru umar kelayu’s leadership character was related to ways of thinking, behaving, and acting based on the principles of truth, honesty, amanah (trustworthy), and intelligence; third, the pattern of tuan guru umar kelayu’s leadership in carrying out islamic preaching showed his authority (charisma), an attitude of togetherness (collectivity), as well as his confidence before his students. the situational and conditional factors that influenced the pattern and character of tuan guru umar kelayu’s leadership include the lombok backwardness, the oppressed sasak people, the lombok traditions and culture that were still influenced by old traditions, and the religious behavior of sasak people. tuan guru umar kelayu had a thorough knowledge in islamic traditional sciences that affected his leadership pattern, which was firm, assertive, and even hard, but full of love as a form of his responsibility towards his community and nation in all parts of the island of lombok. therefore, tuan guru umar kelayu became the central figure in lombok. he coordinated the meetings of tuan gurus in lombok in the great mosque of pancor and mosque of al-umari kelayu during the lombok occupation by mataram-karangasem to discuss the problems of humanity, unite perceptions, build strategies and methods of da’wah as well as struggle against mataram-karangasem invasion and western influences brough by the dutch colonial rule. the emergence of socio-religious movements in lombok had to do with the that of islamic movements in other parts of indonesia and the muslim world. lombok’s strategic position in the archipelago and international trade routes impacted on the socio-political and religious dynamics of sasak people, especially the relationship between the descendants of local rulers in lombok who went on pilgrimage to mecca and studied in saudi arabia with ulama from various regions in the indonesian-malay archipelago and the muslim world. many pilgrims and ulama who returned to indonesia realized that their nation was in struggle against local and global imperialism. many of them became teachers (murshid) and members of tarekat (van bruinessen 1994:31) such as tuan 85tohri, ahmad, et al guru umar kelayu, tuan guru ali batu sakra, the leader of sakra war ii, and guru bangkol, the leader of praya ii war, who mobilized sasak people to fight the invaders. tuan guru ali batu sakra (known as haji ali) was a charismatic religious scholar, a famous murshid of the tarekat naqshbandiyah in lombok, and a student and friend of tuan guru umar kelayu. he was appointed by the king of mataram as the ruler of islam throughout lombok. one day he was summoned to the palace by the king to mediate the kingdom and praya under the leadership of guru bangkol and mamiq sapian who opposed the application of taxes to praya community. tuan guru ali found himself in a difficult position as he was the closest teacher to guru bangkol (parimartha 2014:119). seeing the appalling condition of sasak communities as they were oppressed and exploited by the invaders, tuan guru who had just returned from mecca and were inspired by the upheaval that occurred in various parts of the muslim world realized that they had a moral and social responsibility to release sasak people from the oppressive mataramkarangasem and dutch powers. as a result, resistance broke out in many desa-dasan in gumi lombok. the resistance to mataram-karangasem authority occurred since the issuance of various regulations by the kingdom aimed at establishing and enforcing its authority over lombok. these regulations included abolishing the title “raden” for sasak people, erasing inscriptions and pedigree for sasak communities, expanding cockfight gambling, assigning the title “jero” for sasak leaders, and extortion of labor for serving the king. this was acknowledged by snouck hourgronje in his letter to the goverment of dutch east indies documented by gobee and andriaanse (gobee and adriaanse 1993: 693): regarding rank and title, ... there has been severe chaos due to various influences. as for this influence, it has been abused for a long time by many communities with the aim of gaining a higher place for themselves in indigenous communities compared to what is actually their right, thus the value of many titles is degenerating and undetermined. in contrast to the earlier sasak resistance social movements, the leadership of the sasak resistance in 1890s was no longer in the hands of the traditional political elites of the aristocratic figures, but in religious figures such as tuan guru ali batu sakra, tuan guru shaleh lopan, tuan guru siddiq karangkelok and tuan guru bangkol. this happened in sakra war 86 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 ii and praya war ii. all of these resistance leaders were tuan guru umar kelayu’s friends and students. the sakra war ii and praya war ii with islam as the basis of resistance were able to unite differences and disputes in the dasanas into a force capable of inciting all sasak communities. the death of tuan guru ali batu sakra as the supreme leader of the eastern sasak’s resistance against the mataram-karangasem rulers did not lessen the spirit of struggle bound by sasak religious wisdom and principle of segeleng-segulung-segiling (we are at the same boat). after the leadership of tuan guru ali batu sakra, a new leader known as tuan guru bangkol emerged replacing the central position of tuan guru ali batu sakra. he continued the sasak resistance with praya as his basecamp. under his leadership, sasak resistance developed stronger and this eventually invited dutch intervention to end the domination of the oppressive invaders of mataram-karangasem in gumi lombok in 1894. unfortunately, under dutch rule, sasak communities experienced a more oppressive rule than mataram-karangasem as they were watched and oppressed more severely. sasak leaders, especially the teachers who used to focus on preaching islam in the midst of sasak society, finally made islam as the basis of ideological resistance to fight the pagan dutch invaders. islam as an ideology and fighting spirit provided powerful means to express identity and enhance the sense of self-esteem of sasak people before the dutch colonial invaders (bartholomew 2001:88). during the dutch colonial rule, tuan guru shifted their da’wah movement to local resistance on the basis of islamic ideology. the resistance movement led and driven by tuan guru with a source of authority on religious values gained more and more followers, along with the declining influence of sasak noblemen who largely based their authority on local-traditional heritages (budiwanti 2000:10). change in the leadership patterns of the sasak people resistance from sasak noblemen whose source of legitimacy was tradition to the religious leaders (tuan guru) whose source of legitimacy was religion showed a change in the strategy and orientation of sasak people resistance. the main driving factor for the change was the ineffectiveness of previous resistance, which was easily beaten by the authorities. one of tuan guru who played a key role in sasak struggle against imperialism-colonialism of bali and the dutch government was tuan guru umar kelayu. tuan guru umar kelayu had a central position in the fight against imperialism-colonialism in lombok. his central role can be explained from the perspective of elite theory (budiardjo 1984:120). having elite status in the structure of society made tuan guru kelayu ‘elites’ who 87tohri, ahmad, et al played an important role in his community’ activities. this position was achieved through effort or achievement (achieved status) or through an attached social position (ascribed status) such as heredity. so, tuan guru umar kelayu belonged to elite in his society who exercised privilege and respected positions that were used to influence community. from the value perspective (budiardjo 1984:234), tuan guru umar kelayu belonged to the elite group who had ability to create values that were recognized and received with appreciation by community members. these values could be in the forms of power, wealth, knowledge, charisma or an opportunity to be able to combine them all. laswell (in budiardjo 1984:234) states that the elite is a group consisting of those who manage to achieve a dominant position in society due to the values they form or receive high appreciation from the communities. furthermore, michels (in budiardjo 1984:238) argues that the elite does not only exist, but also its existence cannot be avoided due to its ability to make quick decisions and shape values in the wider communities. communities who do not have a direction will accept the direction of value created by the elite. moreover, the central position of tuan guru umar kelayu as a religious elite in the struggle of sasak people against colonial rulers can be seen from his genealogy. he was a descendant of the king of selaparang islam so that he had a respectable lineage in lombok society. in terms of economic capability, he was born to a wealthy family. his father, kiyai ratana, was rich but generous person who often gave alms to the poor and travellers in the form of money or rice, and donated land for the use of worship places. tuan guru umar kelayu was a religious and community leader who was able to create a value system based on islamic teachings to foster and guide lombok people to islamic values and civil society. here, religious doctrines and tradition were combined and the religious texts run functionally in a dynamic context. the key role tuan guru umar kelayu played in the sasak resistance movement which transformed into sasak wars against colonialism is clearly seen in sakra war against karangasem kingdom which was led by tuan guru ali batu sakra, a brave and charismatic leader, the student of tuan guru umar kelayu. under his leadership, almost all sasak communities including sasak noblemen were united by the bond of islamic values and tarekat networks based on the spirit of jihad fisabilillah -struggle for the cause of godand amr ma’ruf nahy munkar -commanding right and forbidding wrong. 88 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 conclusion this article has shown that the resistance of sasak people against mataramkarangasem and dutch colonial invaders in the 19th century was caused by economic factors in the form of high taxation on land and agricultural yields, compulsory labor, and trade monopolies that burdened and destroyed the joints of the sasak economy. it was also caused by socio-cultural factors in that local culture and traditional values of sasak which were regarded in high esteem as an ancestral heritage started to erode by the imposition of the culture of the colonialists mataram-karangasem and dutch east indies on the life and social structure of sasak people. in addition, the sasak resistance was closely related to religious factors in that mataram-karangasem kingdom and dutch colonial rulers strictly controlled sasak muslims’s activities such as monitoring the hajjis, tuan guru, and teachers of tarekat. led by sasak religious leaders known as tuan guru, the sasak resistance broke out in wider lombok communities and became better coordinated and united by the spirit of islam. this ideological factor made sasak protest movement in the 19th century characterized with milleniarism, messianism, nativism, and belief in holy war (jihad fi sabilillah). it was clear that islam was the ideological basis of sasak resistance against mataram-karangasem and dutch colonialism. tuan guru umar kelayu played a key role in this sasak resistance movements. this is seen in his ability to transform small scale and sporadic sasak resistance into a united physical revolution of sasak people against mataram-karangasem and dutch occupation of sasak land. this resulted in sakra war against mataram-karangasem, which was commanded by tuan guru ali batu sakra, the friend and student of tuan guru umar kelayu. under his leadership, sasak people were united to fight colonial rulers. another war led by tuan guru was praya war ii under the leadership of guru bangkol, a charismatic tarekat leader. during the relatively short period of dutch colonial rule, resistance movements broke out in almost all parts of the island of lombok,which were led by tuan guru umar kelayu’s friends or students and driven by islamic teachings of jihad fisabilillah and amr ma’ruf nahy munkar. references abdullah, taufik. 1979. sejarah lokal di indonesia. yogyakarta: universitas gadjah mada press. agung, anak agung ktut. 1992. kupu-kupu kuning yang terbang di selat lombok: lintasan sejarah karangasem (1661-1950). denpasar: upada sastra. 89tohri, ahmad, et al azhar, lalu muhammad. 1996. pengaruh budaya asing terhadap kehidupan sosial budaya masyarakat sasak di daerah nusa tenggara barat. mataram: departemen pendidikan dan kebudayaan kanwil propinsi ntb. babad praya durma pupuh 155. n.d. badri, n. 2007. “tgh umar kelayu”. majalah religi, 31–36. bartholomew, john ryan. 2001. alif lam mim: kearipan masyarakat sasak. translated by imran rosyidi. yogyakarta:tiara wacana. van bruinessen, martin. 1994. “the origins and development of sufi orders (tarekat) in southeast asia”. studia islamika 1 (1): 1-23). https://doi.org/10.15408/sdi.v1i1.864 broom, leonard and philip selznick. 1981. sociology: a text with adapted readings. new york: harper and row. budiardjo, miriam. 1984. aneka pemikiran tentang kuasa dan wibawa. jakarta: sinar harapan. budiwanti, erni. 2000. islam sasak: wetu telu vs waktu lima. yogyakarta: lkis. campbell, tom. 1994. tujuh teori sosial: sketsa, penilaian, perbandingan. translated by f. budi hardiman. yogyakarta: kanisius. dirdjosanjoto, pradjarta. 2013. memelihara umat: kiai pesantren-kiai langgar di jawa. yogyakarta: lkis. gobee, e. and c. adriaanse. 1993. nasihat-nasihat c. snouck hurgronje semasa kepegawaiannya kepada pemerintah hindia belanda 1889-1936 seri x. translated by sukarsi. jakarta: inis. hakim, abdul. 1961. dari pulau bunga ke pulau dewa: memperkenalkan pulau-pulau nusa tenggara. jakarta: pembangunan. hasyim, m. yusuf. 1988. “peranan dan potensi pesantren dalam pembangunan”. in oepen, manfred dan karcher, wolfgang (ed). dinamika pesantren dalam pendidikan dan pengembangan masyarakat, edited by manfred oepen dan wolfgang karcher, translated by sonhaji saleh. jakarta: p3m. karsidi, ravik. 2005. sosiologi pendidikan. semarang: lpp uns dan uns press. kartodirdjo, sartono. 1982. pemikiran dan historiografi indonesia: suatu alternatif. jakarta: gramedia pustaka utama. kartodirdjo, sartono. 1993. pendekatan ilmu sosial dalam metodologi sejarah. jakarta: gramedia pustaka utama. kumbara, a. a. ngr anom. 2008. “konstruksi identitas orang sasak di lombok timur, nusa tenggara barat”. humaniora 20(3): 315-326. https://doi.org/10.22146/jh.v20i3.947 90 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 kuntowijoyo. 1994. metodologi sejarah. yogyakarta: tiara wacana. kuntowijoyo. 1995. pengantar ilmu sejarah. yogyakarta: bentang budaya. mahardika, timur. 2000. gerakan massa: mengupayakan demokrasi dan keadilan sosial secara damai. yogyakarta: lapera pustaka utama. notosusanto, nugroho, sartono kartodirdjo, m. d. poesponegoro. 1992. sejarah nasional indonesia iv. jakarta: departemen pendidikan dan kebudayaan. nurdin, ahmad ali and ahmad tholabi kharlie. 2019. “sunni and shiite political thought of islam-state relationship: a comparison between abdurrahman wahid of indonesia and ayatollah khomeini of iran”. journal of asian social science research 1(1): 27-45. parimartha, i gde. 2014. lombok abad xix: politik, perdagangan, dan konflik di lombok 1831-1891. denpasar: pustaka larasan. priyadi, sugeng. 2011. metode penelitian pendidikan sejarah. yogyakarta: ombak. sukamto. 1999. kepemimpinan kyai dalam pesantren. jakarta: lp3es. tpmd-ntb. 1977. monografi daerah nusa tenggara barat. mataram: projek pengembangan media kebudayaan direktorat jenderal kebudayaan depdikbud ri. trisulistyono, singgih, didik pradjoko, bondan kanumoyoso, restu gunawan. 2003. simpul-simpul sejarah maritim: dari pelabuhan ke pelabuhan merajut indonesia. jakarta: kementrian kebudayaan dan pariwisata. wacana, lalu. 1988. sejarah daerah nusa tenggara barat. mataram: departemen pendidikan dan kebudayaan. yafie, ali. 1997. teologi sosial: telaah kritis persoalan agama dan kemanusiaan. yogyakarta: lkpsm. zakaria, fath. 1998. mozaik budaya orang mataram. mataram: sumurmas al-hamidy. the usage of online classrooms during the covid-19 in bangladesh: some issues and influences journal of asian social science research 2022, vol. 4, no. 2: 123-148 https://cassr.net/jassr/ © the author(s) 2022 article md. abu sadath* rajshahi university of engineering & technology, bangladesh jyothy mondal khulna university of engineering & technology, bangladesh abdullah-al-faisal médecins sans frontières (msf), bangladesh sanjana afrin disha bangabandhu sheikh mujibur rahman science & technology university, bangladesh sarmin fatema govt. edward college, bangladesh abstract the purpose of this study is to find out how teachers and students felt about online classes in bangladesh. during the covid-19 pandemic, the education system in bangladesh has made a change by delivering classes via online means. therefore, this study examines teachers' and students' perspectives and concerns about taking online classes, which have become mandatory because of the covid-19 pandemic. the data were collected by using an online survey method. the sample included 907 teachers and 1451 students from schools, colleges, and universities across bangladesh's eight divisions. the data show that in the pandemic situation, a total of 80% of students were able to be connected with online education. among them, 56% of students got no facilities regarding online classes from their educational institutions. to continue their study, 56% of the students wanted offline education. likewise, * corresponding author: md. abu sadath address: holding no. 2418, shalgaria 3/4, pabna 6600, bangladesh. email: abusadath98@gmail.com 124 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 2, 2022 it was tracked down that quality and convenient cooperation among students and instructors, specialized help accessibility, organized online class modules, and changes permitting the lead of reasonable exercises are largely fundamental elements in educators' and students’ fulfilment with online classes. the absence of typical classroom socializing, lack of face-to-face engagement with the teacher, and response time were among the major difficulties raised by the students. this study contributes significantly to the studies of the impact of covid-19 on education particularly within developing countries. it also will have a significant impact on the government of bangladesh's decision on how to continue online classes in the face of the epidemic and reopen bangladesh's educational facilities. key words online classes, covid-19 pandemic, technical support, classroom socializing introduction an epic covid-19, known as coronavirus, was found in a fish market in wuhan in 2029 (huang et al. 2020). consequences of the infection clinical investigation showed individual-to-individual transmission (li et al. 2020; paules et al. 2020; wang, cheng, et al. 2020). covid-19 was made by the world health organization (who) as an all-encompassing community health crisis of worldwide concern ahead of 30 january 2020 and a pandemic ahead of 11 march 2020 (cucinotta & vanelli 2020). the pandemic was referred to by merriam-webster online dictionary (2020) as “an epidemic of a disease that occurs over a large geographic area and affects an unusually high proportion of the population”. this pandemic has constrained the overall actual conclusion of partnerships, games, and schools by driving all organizations to move to online channels (adedoyin & soykan 2020). numerous organizations have been engaged in how best to bring to the table online course materials including assessments. thus, despite being a danger to mankind, the coronavirus has set up organizations to put resources into internet learning (muktar et al. 2020). internet learning and classes are progressively turning into a piece of the worldwide schooling framework (nambiar 2020). web-based learning frameworks depend on web programming that is utilized to convey, screen, and oversee courses over the web (keis et al. 2017). hrastinski (2008) expressed that while the two methods of web-based 125md. abu sadath, et al. learning, in particular nonconcurrent and simultaneous internet learning, are broadly differentiated, instructors, associations, and establishments should have an intensive comprehension of the advantages and limits altogether of web-based figuring out how to be effective and useful. it incorporates the acquaintance of specialized developments with a direct, plan and conveys the substance of learning and advances two-way contact between understudies and the workforce (thanji and vasantha 2016). in bangladesh, establishments typically use microsoft groups, zoom and google meet as learning board frameworks, alongside their video conferencing applications. others usually utilized video conferencing arrangements incorporating edmodo, moodle, skype for business, webex, adobe associates, etc (barbera and clarà 2012). a few scientists have performed studies on the comprehension of web-based learning by understudies. popovici and mironov (2014) tracked down that, through their impact on the learning cycle, it turns out to be obvious that understudies were significantly mindful of the progressions achieved by advanced innovations. male understudies, understudies with earlier pc experience, and understudies with idealistic perspectives toward arising innovation were all less ideal for e-learning nearby than different understudies (keller and cernerud 2002). likewise, eldeeb (2014) investigated that understudies picked blended mode and webenhanced courses instead of web-subordinate courses or fully online courses. concerning the advantages of e-learning, understudies saw the online e-learning module as useful in working on their arrangement, autonomy, self-restraint, learning inspiration, and communication with one another and the instructor (mislinawati and nurmasyitah 2018). likewise, mamattah (2016) showed that most understudies concurred that e-learning is a progressive idea and should be upheld, yet a couple of issues were perceived, for example, the dread of segregation by businesses against the individuals who concentrate on e-learning. since the viability of the e-learning framework depends on the capacity and knowledge of understudies to utilize this framework (almaiah and jalil 2014; almaiah and alismaiel 2019; shawai and almaiah 2018), the absence of utilization of the e-learning framework hampers the acknowledgement of advantages (almaiah et al. 2019a; almaiah et al. 2019b; almaiah and al-khasawneh 2020). accordingly, this prompts a fruitless technique and is a misuse of cash for certain colleges (naveed et al. 2017). study regarding this matter is as yet in its earliest stages, where students’ points of view are not altogether contemplated (tarhini et al. 2017; almaiah and alamri 2018). the execution of e-learning will lead colleges to all the more 126 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 2, 2022 likely comprehend the requirements of their understudies and at last lead to a viable e-learning framework (el-masri and tarhini 2017; alksasbeh et al. 2019). apparently, during the coronavirus pandemic, there was no nitty gritty survey of the issues and factors influencing the utilization of the e-learning framework; in any case, around 3 years prior, e-learning frameworks were executed in numerous colleges. due to this, this article aims to contribute to the above literature by investigating the key issues and factors affecting the utilization of the e-learning framework during the coronavirus pandemic. to do this, this study conducted an online survey to collect primary data using a questionnaire prepared based on online classes during the pandemic. the secondary data were collected from various journals, websites, and bulletins. the questionnaire was divided into two sectors: a) students and b) teachers. in the survey, a total of 2248 participants (1372 students and 876 teachers) from 64 districts of school, college and university were surveyed using a systemic questionnaire prepared based on socioeconomic, demographic, livelihood characteristics, online dependence, and student activity during the online assessment. informative questions were asked to ensure all possible implementation of better online assessments for students and teachers. then, the collected data were analyzed by using software such as spss, r, ms excel and arcgis v10.6 for mapping. finally, considering all the data and suggestions from students and teachers, the research concluded with some effective recommendations about the upgradation of the online educational assessment for students and teachers all over bangladesh. demographic and economic backgrounds of the students location and age of the students this survey was conducted online due to the covid-19 situation. therefore, the participants were from different divisions in bangladesh. the participants were mostly students and so their age level varied from 0 to 30+. their demographic information can be seen in table 1. 127md. abu sadath, et al. table 1 demographic information of the students age level of the students (in years) divisions population (in %) town (in %) village (in %) 0-10 (in %) 1120 (in %) 21–30 (in %) 30+ (in %) barishal 20 64 36 1 18 75 6 chittagong 14 65 35 1 16 70 13 dhaka 30 56 44 1 16 73 10 khulna 9 65 35 1 16 77 6 mymensingh 5 67 33 0 14 78 8 rajshahi 8 69 31 2 13 81 4 rangpur 7 29 71 0 14 79 7 sylhet 7 32 68 1 27 62 10 table 1 demonstrates the demographic information of the students who participated in the survey. from the total participants, it can be seen that from the dhaka division, 30% of the population had participated, among them 56% were from the town and 44% were from the village. moreover, 73% of the students aged 21-30 and only 1% of the students aged 0-10 from the dhaka division participated in this survey. on the other hand, from the mymensingh division, only 5% of the population participated in the survey of which 67% of them were from the town and 33% were from the village. moreover, 14% of the students aged 11-20 and only 8% of the students aged 30+ participated in this survey. from table 1, it can be seen that most of the students were from town because due to internet network issues. most of the participants’ age levels were from 21 to 30 because in this survey the participants were mostly university students. education and monthly family income in bangladesh, there are different levels of education. students must finish their education levels to go to the next steps. many students stop their education due to their family income problems. in this survey, the participants were from different levels of education and their family income varies from 0 to 50000+ bdt. their educational status and monthly family income data were tabulated in table 2. 128 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 2, 2022 table 2 educational status of the students and their monthly family income monthly family income (in bdt) education level % of population 0-5000 (in %) 500110000 (in %) 1000115000 (in %) 1500125000 (in %) 2500150000 (in %) 50000+ (in %) primary 3 5 15 51 27 0 2 secondary 10 28 29 26 13 1 3 college 11 17 32 24 16 6 5 o level 2 0 6 19 21 19 35 a level 6 0 0 0 83 5 12 university 64 13 11 47 21 7 1 madrasa 4 3 3 9 55 30 0 table 2 demonstrates the educational status of the students and their monthly family income. it can be seen that from primary level education, only 3% of students participated in this survey and 15% of the population had 5001-10000 bdt as their monthly family income. it also indicates that 51% of the population had 10001-15000 bdt and only 2% of the population had over 50000+ bdt as their monthly family income. participation from the primary level was less than 5%. it is because in bangladesh primary level students are not allowed to use online platforms. from table 2, it can also be seen that only 2% of students participated in this survey from o-level. among them, 6% had 5001-10000 bdt and 21% had 1500125000 bdt as their monthly family income respectively. moreover, 35% had over 50000+ bdt as their monthly family income. it is because most rich people send their children to take o-level education in bangladesh. table 2 shows 64% of the population was from the university level, from which 13% had 0-5000 bdt and the other 47% had 10001-15000 bdt as their monthly family income respectively. only 7% had 25001-50000 bdt as their monthly family income. the participation from the university level was greater than 50% because most university-level students were going through online classes to eradicate the session jam. 129md. abu sadath, et al. internet service-oriented information of the students device usage and internet connectivity students used different types of devices to attend online classes and their internet connectivity was not the same as they attended online classes from different locations in bangladesh. all the data related to the devices and internet connectivity that were used by students during online classes were tabulated in table 3. table 3 students’ use of devices during online classes and internet network connectivity internet connectivity device % of population wi-fi (in %) mobile data (in %) strong (in %) medium (in %) weak (in %) no internet (in %) mobile 47 42 58 28 52 10 10 pc/ laptop 25 54 46 47 38 11 4 tab 6 100 0 62 38 0 0 television 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 no device 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 table 3 demonstrates the devices that were used during online class and the internet network connectivity of the students who participated in the survey. it can be seen that 47% of the population used mobile to attend online classes. among them, 42% used wi-fi and the other 58% used mobile data. around 28% had strong internet connectivity and the other 52% had medium internet connectivity, and 10% had no internet connectivity. as for pc/laptops, 25% of the population used them for attending online classes. among them, 54% used wi-fi and the other 46% used mobile data. around 47% had strong internet connectivity and the other 11% had weak internet connectivity. other devices such as television were also used to attend online classes but the use rate was less than 5%. using mobile devices for attending online classes was greater in bangladesh because most people have at least one mobile device due to the cheap price given by the mobile company. though the cheap price of mobile devices in bangladesh, there were 20% of the population could not afford to buy them. that is why they could not able to join online classes to continue their education. 130 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 2, 2022 monthly internet bill and cost-bearable status figure 1 shows the monthly internet bill and cost-bearable status of the students who participated in the survey. the monthly internet bill and percentage of the population are on the x-axis and the cost-bearable condition is on the y-axis. it can be seen that 37% of the population paid 501-800 bdt for monthly internet bills and among them, 33% of the population believed that it was bearable and other 67% of the population believed it was unbearable for them. the reason for the cost unbearable of 67% was that most of the students were from middle-class families. as their family income was limited, they could not bear the cost of the monthly internet bill. only 4% of the population paid over 1500 bdt for a monthly internet bill and among them, 81% of the population thought that it was bearable and another 19% of the population thought it was unbearable for them. here the reason for the cost bearable of 81% was that these students were from rich families which is why their families could bear the cost of the monthly internet bill. figure 1 monthly bills and cost-bearable status 131md. abu sadath, et al. opportunities from institutions figure 2 shows opportunities which were provided to the students from their institutions. here, the percentage of the population is stated on the x-axis and opportunities are on the y-axis. from the figure, it can be seen that 6% of the population got free internet, a special package sim card, and a free zoom account from their institutions. around 54% of the population could not get any opportunities from their institutions. it was regrettable that institutions were unable to assist their students in continuing their online studies. that is why many of our students could not get any opportunities to move forward. figure 2 opportunities provided by students’ educational institutions online class-oriented information of the students duration of online classes and class location due to the covid-19 situation, most of the institutions have arranged online classes for their students. the class duration (in hours) varied for each institution and therefore students were facing problems in attending online classes. due to some issues, students attended online classes inside as well as outside of their houses. 132 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 2, 2022 table 4 demonstrates the online class duration and class location of the students who participated in the survey. it can be seen that only 7% of the population attended classes for 0-1 hour of the day. around 26% of students attended classes inside of their houses and 74% of students attended classes outside of their houses. the reason for attending classes outside of the house could be a weak internet connection. on the other hand, 28% of the population attended classes for 2-3 hours of the day. among them, 87% attended classes inside of their house and the other 13% of students attended classes outside of their houses. it can be said that students who had a strong internet connection inside their houses did not need to go outside to attend online classes. table 4 online class duration and class location class location duration (in hours) population (in %) inside (in %) outside (in %) 0--1 7 26 74 1--2 12 24 76 2--3 28 87 13 3--5 25 89 11 5+ 8 76 24 understandability (practical and theory classes) figure 3 shows the understandability of the students for online theory and practical classes. understanding ability is on the x-axis and the percentage of the population is on the y-axis. here it can be seen that 9% of the population fully understood practical classes and the other 19% of the population understood theory classes. in addition, 41% of the population did not understand practical classes and the same goes for the other 28% of the population. the percentage of understanding nothing in theory and practical classes were very high. network issues, load shedding or less concentration in online classes were the reasons for this. from figure 3, it also can be seen that practical and theory classes were not applicable for 27% and 6% of the population respectively. 133md. abu sadath, et al. figure 3 understandability of the students for online theory and practical classes students’ perspective of the low value of online classes figure 4 shows the reasons for the low value of online classes (students’ perspective). the percentage of the population is on the x-axis and the reasons are on the y-axis. here it can be seen that 20% of the population thought that the reason for the low value of online classes was weak or unstable internet connection in bangladesh. it also indicates that 18% and 10% of the population thought that the reasons could be less focused due to staying in the family and incapability of teachers because they were not used to taking these online classes previously respectively. moreover, 3% of the population thought that longer class time was the reason for the low value of online classes because it became monotonous for the students to keep studying for hours and hours. 28% of the population thought there were some other issues which could make them more comfortable in classrooms. 134 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 2, 2022 figure 4 reasons for low value of online classes (students’ perspective) positive and negative sides of online classes online classes had both positive and negative wings. the positive and negative sides of online class data from the students’ perspective were collected and tabulated in table 5. table 5 positive and negative sides of online classes (students’ perspective) positivity negativity positive side population (in %) negative side population (in %) zoom, classroom, google meet knowing 21 eye sight problem 15 efficient in software 4 mental health problem 7 technological advancement 7 incapability of understanding 8 no session jam 9 high temper 5 exam schedule maintain 2 spending more time in social media 7 no positivity 20 hearing problem 3 others 37 headache and insomnia 5 no negativity 5 others 45 135md. abu sadath, et al. table 5 demonstrates the positive and negative sides of online classes from the student’s perspective. it can be seen that, in the positivity section, 21% of the population said that during online classes, they got the opportunity to know about different online platforms such as zoom, classroom, and google meet. only 4% of the population believed that they were being efficient in software during online classes. moreover, 9% of the population believed that there would not be a session jam because classes and exams were taken on online by the institutions. 20% of the respondents thought that there was no positivity in online classes. from table 5, it can be seen that in the negativity section, 15% of the population believed they had eyesight problems due to constantly looking at the device screen and 7% said that due to online classes, they spent more time in online platforms which created mental health problem, hearing problem because of using headphone on the ear all the time during online classes, headache and insomnia problem with the rate was 7%, 3% and 5%, respectively. on the other hand, 5% of respondents believed that there was no negativity in online classes. the students’ demands figure 5 shows the demand of the students. the students’ demand is on the x-axis and the percentage of the population is on the y-axis. it can be seen that, due to covid-19, 44% of the population still wanted an online class so that they could be safe at home. nevertheless, 56% of the population wanted to go for an offline class because of the low value of an online class where they were facing difficulties to continue the online class. 136 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 2, 2022 figure 5 the students’ demands demographic and economic information of the teachers location and age of the teachers table 6 shows the demographic information of the teachers where some specific criteria such as divisions, percentage of the population, town, village and age differences were presented. all these data were collected through an online survey and tabulated in table 6. from table 6, it can be seen that among the 8 divisions, the highest percentage of the population (28%) belonged to the dhaka division. as dhaka was the capital of bangladesh, the percentage was genuinely high in the dhaka division. among them, 55% of teachers were from towns and 45% were from villages. table 6 also shows that 18% of the population was from 21-30 years and the other 53% were from 31-40 years. young teachers tried to do something good in a short time and they tried to stay in dhaka and that is why the percentage of middle-aged teachers rate was so high (53%). the second highest percentage was 16% which belonged to the chittagong division. among them, 51% were from towns and 49% from villages. moreover, 21% were from 21-30 years and 13% were from 40+ years. the reason could be that, after the dhaka division, chittagong was considered the third highest rank in the educational sector. on the other hand, 6% of the population was from the rangpur division. among them, 64% were from towns and 36% were from villages. of them, 19% were from 21-30 years and 56% were from 31-40 years. 137md. abu sadath, et al. table 6 demographic information of the teachers age level of the teachers (in years) divisions % of population town (in %) village (in %) 21 – 30 (in %) 31 – 40 (in %) 40+ (in %) barishal 8 59 31 28 49 23 chittagong 16 51 49 21 66% 13 dhaka 28 55 45 18 53 29 khulna 11 61 39 36 46 18 mymensingh 8 68 32 34 47 19 rajshahi 12 64 36 18 59 23 rangpur 6 64 36 19 56 25 sylhet 11 68 32 15 48 37 professional institutions and monthly income table 7 indicates the second most important point of demographic and economic information, which was the professional institutions of the teachers and monthly income. the table deals with the level of education and their monthly income in various scales such as 1-5,000 bdt, 5,00110,000 bdt, 10,001-15,000 bdt, 15,001-25,000 bdt, 25000+ bdt and no income. table 7 professional institutions of the teachers and monthly income monthly income (in bdt) education level % of population 1-5000 (in %) 500110000 (in %) 1000115000 (in %) 1500125000 (in %) 25000+ (in %) no income (in %) school 40 5 11 10 7 47 20 college 21 0 4 8 29 45 14 university 27 0 0 0 12 69 19 madrasa 12 10 21 29 3 0 37 from table 7, it can be seen that around 40% of the teachers came from schools. among them, 11% had monthly income in the range of 500110000 bdt and 47% of teachers’ monthly income was over 25000 bdt. moreover, 20% of the population had no income due to the covid-19 138 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 2, 2022 situation. table 7 also shows that 27% of the population came from universities. among them, 69% had monthly income over 25000 bdt and only 12% had monthly income in the range of 15001-25000 bdt. the reason for having a monthly income of over 25000 bdt could be, at the university level, monthly income starts from 25,000+ bdt in bangladesh. moreover, the reason for no income could be, due to covid-19, that some private universities faced a financial crisis so they could not provide the salary of the teachers. internet service-oriented information of the teachers device usage, medium and internet connectivity table 8 discusses the device usage during online classes and the internet connectivity of the teachers. internet medium is divided into two categories: wi-fi and mobile data. the internet connectivity is recorded in percentage for strong, medium, weak and no internet connection. all the data were tabulated in table 8. table 8 teachers’ usage of devices during online classes and internet connectivity internet connectivity device % of population wifi (in %) mobile data (in %) strong (in %) medium (in %) weak (in %) no internet (in %) mobile 34 65 35 30 28 25 17 pc/ laptop 50 63 37 25 53 15 7 tab 6 100 0 76 24 0 0 television 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 no device 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 from table 8, it can be seen that mobile, pc/laptops, tab and television were used to take online classes during the covid-19 pandemic. among them, most of the teachers used pc/laptops and the percentage was 50 %. among them, 63% used wi-fi and the other 37% used mobile data. moreover, 53% of the respondents had internet connectivity and only 7% had no internet connection. in addition, 3% of the population used television 139md. abu sadath, et al. to take online classes and 7% had no device to take online classes. the reason could be their monthly income which was below average to buy a smartphone. monthly internet bills and cost-bearable status figure 6 shows the monthly internet bill and cost-bearable status of the teachers who participated in this survey. the x-axis represents the monthly internet bill and percentage of the population and y-axis shows the costbearable condition. it was found that 30% paid 0-500 bdt and among them, 68% of the teachers believed that it was bearable and the rest 32% thought it was not bearable for them. moreover, 12% paid 801-1000 bdt and among them, 80% of teachers considered the internet bill bearable, but 20% of teachers could not bear the cost of the internet. in addition, the amount of 1,500+ bdt was paid as a monthly internet bill by only 2% of the population, where 77% of teachers thought it was bearable and 23% of teachers thought they could not bear it. among all these, most of the teachers used 501-800 bdt as monthly internet bills. the reason could be said that it was easy for small families to bear small amounts of monthly internet bills as there were other expenses. figure 6 monthly bills and cost-bearable status 140 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 2, 2022 opportunities from institutions figure 7 shows the opportunities that were given to the teachers from their professional institutions. different educational institutions provided different kinds of opportunities. some provided devices with a free zoom account with a webcam and headphones and others provided special packages with free internet. in this figure, the x-axis shows the percentage of the population and the y-axis shows the opportunities given to the teachers. it was found that the maximum institution provided free internet and the percentage was 43%. 23% of the population got special internet packages from their institutions. on the other hand, only 1% got a webcam and headphones because providing a webcam and headphones to every teacher could be very costly for the institutions. despite this, there were 4% of teachers got no opportunity from their educational institutions and the reason could be that their institutions were not capable to give opportunities to their teachers. figure 7 teachers’ opportunities from their professional institutions online class-oriented information of the teachers duration and location of online classes table 9 demonstrates online class-oriented information in which online class duration and class location of the teachers are presented. 141md. abu sadath, et al. table 9 online class duration and location class location duration (in hour) population (in %) inside (in %) outside (in %) 0--1 16 70 30 1--2 25 74 26 2--3 35 79 21 3--5 10 73 27 5+ 4 78 22 from table 9, it can be seen that 16% of the teachers gave online classes with a duration of 0-1 hour. among them, 70% of the teachers gave classes inside their houses and the other 30% gave classes outside of their houses as they faced network problems while giving classes. moreover, 35% of the teachers gave online classes, which lasted 2-3 hours. among them, 79% of the teachers gave classes inside their houses and the other 21% gave classes outside of their houses. understandability (practical & theory classes) figure 8 shows the understanding ability of the students for online theory and practical classes according to teachers. the x-axis represents the understanding ability of the students and the y-axis represents the percentage of the population. here, 23% of teachers believed they were able to fully understand the practical classes to the students and 31% thought they were able to fully understand the theory class. on the other hand, 26% of teachers thought they were able to understand the practical classes and 46% thought they were able to understand the theory classes partially. moreover, for 17% and 13% of the population, practical and theory classes were not applicable respectively. the reason for not being able to understand the practical class was that teachers took it online. they were not able to go to the lab in their institutions as they stayed home during the covid-19 pandemic. that is why students were not able to see the equipment in the lab and they were not able to understand the practical class. 142 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 2, 2022 figure 8 students’ understandability of online theory and practical classes teachers’ perspective of low value of online classes figure 9 shows the teacher’s perspective of the low value of the online classes. the x-axis represents the percentage of the population and y-axis represents the reasons. it can be seen these reasons could be device problems, load shedding, cost burden, lack of training, absence of students, students’ low focus on online classes, and weak internet connection. from figure 9, it can be seen that 38% of the population thought that a weak internet connection was an issue behind the low value of online classes. because of the weak internet connection, it was not possible to take online classes for teachers and students could concentrate on online classes. 27% of the teachers thought that students did not focus during online classes, which caused the low value of online classes. another reason for the low value of online classes was the absence rate of students, which was 10%. moreover, online classes were not easy to take without any training as most of the teachers had less knowledge of technology. that is why 7% of teachers thought that their lack of training was a reason for the low values of online classes. moreover, 8%, 2% and 4% thought that device problems, cost burden and load shedding were also the reasons for the low value of online classes respectively. 143md. abu sadath, et al. figure 9 reasons for the low value of online class (teachers’ perspective) positive and negative sides online classes had both positive and negative sides. because of covid-19, online classes were asked to be taken for the safety of the teachers, students and most of the people who were involved in the educational sector. these positive and negative sides are presented in table 10. table 10 positive and negative sides of online classes (teachers’ perspective) positivity negativity positive side population (in %) negative side population (in %) zoom, classroom, google meet knowing 19 eye sight problem 22 efficient in software 15 mental health problem 27 technological advancement 11 hearing problem with high temper 8 144 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 2, 2022 education environment in home 18 headache & insomnia 7 no session jam 20 mentally upset (didn’t receive full salary) 9 exam schedule maintain 8 mental problem with rough behave 9 no positivity 6 no negativity 10 others 3 others 8 from table 10, it can be seen that, from the teachers’ perspective, 19% of students got used to knowing about zoom, classroom, and google meet and 15% of students were able to be efficient with different types of software due to online classes. however, only 8% of the teachers thought that, due to online classes, the exam schedule was maintained and 20% of students would not face any session jam as they were given online exams. looking at the negative side, it was found that 27%, 22%, 8%, and 7% of the teachers faced mental health, eyesight problem, hearing problem, headache and insomnia due to constantly looking at the screen of the devices as electrical devices radiation was harmful to their health. moreover, 9% of the teachers were mentally upset as they did not receive their full salary during this pandemic situation. but, 10% of the teachers thought there were no negative sides to online classes. the teachers’ demand figure 10 shows the demand of the teachers who participated in the survey. the x-axis indicates the teachers’ demand and y-axis shows the percentage of the population. from the figure, it can be seen that almost 57% of teachers wanted offline classes. the main reason for demanding offline classes was that they faced difficulties while taking online classes. the difficulties could be a lack of technical knowledge to conduct online classes or getting no opportunities from their institutions. however, 43% of teachers wanted online classes because of the covid-19 pandemic. 145md. abu sadath, et al. figure 10 the teachers’ demand conclusion this article has shown the data that quality and timely interaction between students and teachers, technical support availability, structured online class modules, and adjustments to allow the conduct of practical lessons are essential factors in teachers’ and students’ satisfaction with online classes. education is one of the basic needs of people, but students and teachers are deprived of necessary facilities that are needed for continuing study during the covid-19 pandemic situation. almost half of the teachers and students wanted to go for offline classes as they did not get enough technical support from the government and educational institutions. government should give enough facilities to the educational institutions so that they can provide them to their teachers and students. moreover, a question arises on the effectiveness of the online classes. to make online classes more valuable, a structured online class module should be given to the students. educational institutions should give emphasis on making necessary adjustments to conduct theoretical and practical lessons. the students were vulnerable as they faced session jams, which affected their studies and career. hence, most of the students faced frustration and disappointment in their lives. furthermore, some students committed suicide as they lost hope. it was the government’s responsibility to provide vaccines for the teachers and students so that the educational system could be normal. 146 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 2, 2022 conflict of interest the authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to 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in the netherlands, practicing religious rites was a challenge because of social-cultural differences between the netherlands and their country of origin and lack of religious facilities such as mosques. one of these rites is performing a marriage ceremony. this article investigates wedding ceremonies among indonesian muslims in the netherlands. the required data were collected through interviews with participants who were involved in wedding ceremonies, attendance of wedding ceremonies, and watching the videos of participants’ wedding ceremonies. this study shows that marriages among indonesian muslims in the netherlands were divided into two categories. first, marriages that conformed to the regulations stipulated by the embassy of indonesia in the netherlands. second, those that conformed to the marriage regulations in islamic law. several weddings involved the conversion of brides or grooms into islam. the pronouncement of the marriage contract used three languages: indonesian, dutch, and english. the wedding ceremonies among indonesian muslims appeared to conform to the dutch social-cultural context. keywords islamic ritual, indonesian muslims, the netherlands, wedding ceremony, marriage, immigrants, minority intisari pada pertengahan abad ke dua puluh, banyak muslim dari beberapa negara muslim datang ke belanda termasuk dari indonesia. tujuan mereka beragam seperti karena ekonomi, politik dan pendidikan. banyak tantangan hidup dialami oleh muslim di negara non-muslim 1corresponding author: irma riyani faculty of islamic theology, universitas islam negeri sunan gunung djati bandung jalan a.h. nasution 105, cibiru, bandung, indonesia 40614. email: irmariyani@uinsgd.ac.id performing islamic rituals in non-muslim countries: wedding ceremony among indonesian muslims in the netherlands journal of asian social science research 2019, vol. i, no. 1: 47-61 http://jassr.cassr.web.id © the author(s) 2019 article 48 journal of asian social science research vol. 1, no. 1, 2019 ini seperti jarangnya fasilitas ibadah dan perbedaan budaya dan gaya hidup. hal ini menyebabkan pelaksanaan ritual keagamaan tidak dapat dilaksanakan sebagaimana di negara asalnya. artikel ini mengkaji isu pelaksanaan ritual islam di negara non-muslim dengan memfokuskan bahasannya pada pelaksanaan upacara perkawinan di kalangan muslim indonesia di belanda. data untuk artikel ini diperoleh dengan melakukan wawancara dengan para pasangan yang melakukan pernikahan di belanda dan juga dengan pihakpihak terkait. penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa terdapat dua model pelaksanaan upacara pernikahan bagi muslim indonesia di belanda. pertama, pernikahan yang mengikuti aturan yang ditetapkan oleh kedutaan besar indonesia di belanda. kedua, pernikahan yang dilaksanakan secara agama islam. untuk pasangan campuran (salah satu pihak berasal dari belanda) terkadang pernikahan diikuti dengan perpindahan agama terlebih dahulu. ijab kabul dilakukan dengan menggunakan tiga bahasa: indonesia, belanda dan inggris. kebanyakan muslim indonesia menyelenggarakan upacara pernikahan beradaptasi dengan lingkungan setempat dan diadakan secara sederhana. katakunci ritual islam, muslim indonesia, acara pernikahan, belanda, imigran, minoritas, perkawinan introduction from the 1950s to the 1970s, a large number of muslims from various muslim countries emigrated to europe for various reasons. most of them came to europe from morocco and turkey for economic reasons as in that tiinme european countries needed extra cheap labor forces. but, many surinamese and indonesians came to europe for political reasons (shadid and van koningsveld 1991:2; dasseto and nonneman 1996:187; shadid and van koningsveld 1995:1). in the case of indonesian muslims, they immigrated to the netherlands after the proclamation of indonesian independence. within this community, three major groups can be identified: moluccans, surinamese javanese, and indonesian muslims of other ethnicities of origin. the moluccans, who originated from moluccas island, came to the netherlands in 1951 as ex-knil (koninklijk netherlands indisch leger, i.e. the former dutch colonial army) members for political asylum (der hoek 1992:181-182). for the first time, the moluccans muslims lived in the camp in wyldemerk, the province of friesland. nowadays they mostly live in ridderkerk and waalwijk. they built two mosques in those towns. the muslims from surinam are divided into two groups: hindustani and javanese. the javanese surinamese muslims live throughout the netherlands. their centers of worship are not ‘official’ mosques, but mostly prayer-halls. therefore, any religious organizations within this community are scarcely found 49riyani, irma (shadid dan van koningsveld 1991:101). the last group of indonesian muslim community came from various regions in indonesia. in the netherlands, they live mostly in the province of zuid holland with one mosque coordinated by persatuan pemuda muslim se-eropa (ppme; indonesian young muslims association in europe) (shadid and van koningsveld 1991:100). for many indonesian muslims in the netherlands, practicing religious rites was not as easy as in the country of origin. the most serious problem facing this minority group, as suggested by m. ali kettani (1986:9), is social absorption by the majority. as a minority group, the indonesian muslim community in the netherlands is challenged by dutch lifestyles and a lack of religious facilities such as mosques. there is a small number of mosques, whose which some are difficult to be reached. this more or less influenced their religious senses and religious identities and resulted in what dessing (2001:7) calls as loosening “their firm basis in a social and religious context”. for example, to perform a marriage in the netherlands is different from the practice in the country of origin. there is less support from families, relatives, friends, and neighbors in organizing the marriage. hence, many couples, in general, perform their marriages in modest and simple ways. some studies have analyzed the issues of marriage among muslims in the netherlands, including nathal dessing (2001) in her rituals of birth, circumcision, marriage, and death among muslims in the netherlands. however, marriage within the indonesian muslims is excluded from her discussion, as she conducted the study among moroccan, turkish and surinamese hindustani and surinamese javanese muslims. hence, it is necessary to understand more the islamic rituals among muslims in non-muslim countries by focusing on the wedding ceremony among indonesian muslims in the netherlands. to do this, i interviewed participants who were involved in wedding ceremonies, such as couples, imams, and indonesian embassy staff in the netherlands. i also attended wedding ceremonies and watched videos of wedding ceremonies. i interviewed five couples who live in leiden and the hague. these interviewees were divided into three categories: first, couples both of whom are indonesians; second, couples one of whom, the bride, is indonesian, and the groom dutch; third, couples one of whom, the groom, is indonesian and the bride dutch. this study aims to describe how marriage ceremony among indonesian muslims was performed in the dutch context and to show how it was influenced by the new environment and how some rites had changed following the new situation. marriage in islamic law in islamic law, a marriage is a contract that legalizes intercourse between a man and a woman, which is usually represented by the woman’s guardian (al-aqili 1990:15; abu zahra 1950:16). because marriage is a contractual relationship, both parties (the bride and the groom) can stipulate it. marriage is encouraged in islam to safeguard chastity. then it is highly recommended to every adult muslim, who are capable mentally and financially, to do so because the prophet said: “there 50 journal of asian social science research vol. 1, no. 1, 2019 shall be no monasticism in islam”(al-naisaburi n.d.:1018.) besides, marriage is considered not only as a social relation (mu’amalah) but also as worship (ibadat). through marriage, a family is established, i.e. by way of procreation of the children and co-operation between the members of the family (esposito 1982:16). there are several requirements and obligations stipulated to perform a marriage in islamic law. the first step is commonly called an engagement (khitba). khitba is the precedent of marriage by a man to ask a woman to marry him (alaqili 1990:39; abu zahra 1950:26). in general, it is shown by the exchange of rings indicating that both of them are engaged with each other. but, this practice is not found in islamic teachings; it is adopted by muslims from various customs and traditions. the problem with this practice is muslim men are prohibited to wear golden accessories including golden rings as stated in a prophetic tradition (al-sadlan 1999). during the period of engagement, both parties could manage to know each other. according to some maliki jurists, if the proposal is accepted the man can see the face and hands of his prospective wife. other jurists even allow the man to talk to her frequently to manage some affairs such as negotiating the amount of mahr (bridal gift). however, a group of jurists do not allow the man to see her (ibn rusyd 1994:2). a man can propose a woman only in three situations: the woman does not belong to the category into which it is forbidden to marry, the woman is not observing the ‘idda, a period after a divorce, and the woman is not engaged to someone else (al-aqili 1990:42). to consider a marriage valid, essential requirements must be fulfilled: ijab (offer) and qabul (acceptance). the ijab and qabul should use words that exactly refer to marriage using the two arabic forms of tenses either past tense (fi’l madi) or present tense (fi’l mudari’) (al-kasani n.d.: 1993; abu zahra 1950:39). besides, the words of ‘offer’ and ‘acceptance’ should be declared clearly and directly, which means that there should no separation between these exchanges. thus, the declaration should be taken at the same moment and place (al-aqili 1990:54-6; al-ghazali 1984:42). other requirements of a valid marriage include the presence of two witnesses, who are intelligent, mature, muslim, competent, and just (al-kasani n.d.:1377), the bride is not the woman who falls within a relationship category within which it is forbidden to marry, none of the parties are forced by another, the consent of the bride should be taken into account as many women are married by force of their guardians (al-ghazali 1984:41), the marriage is not performed in the time of pilgrimage or umra, and none of the couples is ill condition (al-aqili 1990:66-73). mahr (bridal gift) one of the woman’s rights from her husband is a bridal gift. in islamic law, it is called mahr, saddaq or nihlah, but mahr is widely accepted term. it is a gift given to the woman by the virtue of the marriage contract. it is an essential aspect of marriage in the form of money or goods to please the woman and to honor her as a sign of love which is based on the quranic verse iv: 4: “…and give the women (on marriage) their mahr as a gift…” mahr belongs exclusively to the woman. 51riyani, irma therefore, none of her guardians or relatives can take it from her; she decides the amount of the mahr and she could spend it or use it for whatever she wants (engineer 1992:111). muslim jurists determined the minimum amount of the mahr. in egypt, the minimum amount is 10 dirham or 7 dinars according to hanafite school and 4 dinars according to maliki school (al-kasani n.d.:1426). meanwhile, the shafi’ite jurists do not set the minimum amount of the mahr; they stated that anything which can be called wealth or property that provides profit can be used as a mahr (abu zahra 1950:167-168). they argued by the hadith: “seek something (to give her as mahr) even if it is an iron ring” (al-nisaburi n.d.:1041). even so, the jurists do not decide the maximum amount of the mahr. nowadays, the amount and the form of mahr depend on the tradition and the culture appropriate to the homeland of every muslim. the woman has a right to get the entire mahr after marriage. it implies the sexual intercourse or sexual contact has already taken place. this becomes the sole property of the woman and she cannot be obliged to return it should her husband die. the woman still deserves half of the mahr if the husband divorced her after consummation and after the fixation of the mahr. however, if her husband divorced her after consummation, but before the fixation of the mahr, she deserves to get a proper gift from the husband. walima (wedding party) walima, a short for walimat al-‘urs, is an islamic term for a wedding party, which means banquet: serving a meal for the guests at a wedding party (al-sabiq 1997:158). generally, a wedding party is held after the wedding contract directly or a day after the wedding contract. according to the consensus of most muslim jurists, a walima is recommended to announce the marriage and to avoid secret marriage based on the hadith: “give the wedding banquet; even with a sheep” (alnisaburi n.d.: 1042). following the hadith above, announcing marriage is necessary to share happiness among relatives, friends, and neighborhoods. this happiness is shown by serving or offering food and drinks, dancing and singing songs. islam allows this practice as long as there is no undue excess, such as offering forbidden foods or drinks or mixing between men and women (al-sabiq 1997:155). marriage in indonesian law the law of marriage differs from one country to another depending on cultures, traditions, and religions. indonesia as a multi-ethnic nation has various customs of marriage according to regions and religions. nevertheless, there is an official regulation (national law) on marriage, the law of republic of indonesia no 1 of the year 1974, which applies to all ethnic groups and religions of indonesia. however, in its practice, marriage is performed according to religious and customary laws. since indonesia is a multi-religion and ethnic country, various ethnic and religious-based marriage laws are valid as stated in the marriage 52 journal of asian social science research vol. 1, no. 1, 2019 statute article 2 (law 1974:9). for muslims, the religious law applied differs from the customary law (koentjaraningrat 1976). sometimes, the religious law and customary law coincide in considering marriage. marriage regulation for indonesian muslims in indonesia is law number 7 of the year 1989 on religious jurisdiction (the compilation 1996/1997). in many cases, marriage in indonesia is parentally arranged, particularly in the lower and middle-class communities, and it often occurs at an early age. accordingly, after marriage, the couple still lives either with the groom’s parents or the bride’s parents, and are economically supported by their parents (koentjraningrat 1976:25-28). new marriage law requires that the minimum age for marriage in indonesia is 19 years both for the bride and groom. compared to other cultures, the age for marriage in indonesian ranks low for both men and women (taj 1990:4-5). nevertheless, within the upper-class community, delayed marriage is more common as they continue higher education or establish their working career (taj 1990:25). wedding party in indonesia since indonesia is a multi-ethnic nation, every ethnic group has its tradition and customary law of marriage. there are three systems of customary law in indonesia. first, pernikahan jujur, which means the groom offers the proposal of marriage to the bride. after marriage, the wife should follow and stay in her husband’s residence. this system is practiced in north sumatra, bali and other ethnic groups. second, pernikahan semanda; the bride proposes to the groom and after marriage, the husband follows and stays in his wife’s place. it is practiced among minangkabau people in west sumatra and semendo in south sumatra. third, pernikahan bebas; the proposal of marriage made by the groom to the bride, and after marriage, both of them can decide where they live according to their agreement. this practice can be found in java and has been adopted by modern couples in recent times (hadikusuma 1995:9). these customary laws are regulated following the traditions of every place as long as they agree with the philosophy of pancasila and 1945 constitution. a wedding party in indonesia is not only an announcement of the contract but also a social identity and stratification (taj 1990:24). the guests, the invitations cards, the food, the wedding venue, and the dress indicate how rich or not the bride’s family or the groom’s family is. these show not only the cost of the party but also the amount of the bridal gift. in rural areas, the amount of the bridal gift is less than rp 5.000.000 compared to that of the middle class between rp 5.000.000 and rp 10.000.000. in the upper-class communities, it could be more than rp 10.000.000 (taj 1990:102). the amount of the bridal gift may increase following the increase of daily needs. every ethnic group has its tradition in the wedding celebration and party. in most cases, the wedding ceremony is held in the bride’s house. the ceremony begins when the groom is picked up by the bride’s family. before entering the house, there is a ceremony of reciting pantun (traditional poetry), which is exchanged by 53riyani, irma the two parties. then, the groom enters the house to sign the marriage contract (koentjaraningrat 1976:71; surjadi 1974: 124). the ijab and qabul should be stated clearly and directly. after finishing the marriage contract, there are some other ceremonies until the bride and the groom sit on the dais, which is specially made for the bridal couple, and are flanked by their respective parents. then, the guests start to congratulate and give them presents, which are usually in the form of money put in a special place provided by their family. the wedding clothes used by couples are usually in bright colors. in java, representing three main ethnic groups -sundanese, javanese, and bataviansthe wedding clothes are simpler than those in sumatra, kalimantan, or sulawesi. in java, the wedding dress called kebaya, nowadays popular as a national dress, usually white for the signing of the marriage contract and various colors for the wedding party with simple accessories. in sumatra, the wedding dress is mostly in red or yellow with gold accessories on the dress and another worn on the head. the wedding background is colorful and full of shiny accessories. in sumatra, to perform the wedding ceremony a traditional party is recommended to preserve the tradition (radjilis 1995:6). a few days before the marriage, the bride is asked to stay at home and not to see her prospective husband until the time of the wedding contract to prepare physically and mentally, which is called berpingit. during this time, the bride takes care of her beauty, face, and body. she is also prohibited from eating certain types of food, and sometimes, she should fast for a few days. besides, she is taught the ethics of how to live with her husband, parents-in-law, and her husband’s relatives (radjilis 1995:18). dessing (1992:113) described in her research that there is usually a henna party on the night before the marriage for turkish, moroccan, and surinamese brides. this practice is also found in sumatra called bainai, which is conducted when the bride is given the nail color from henna on her hands. but, this is not common in java (radjilis 1995:20-21). however, modern muslim couples in the city usually ignore such traditional scenes at their wedding and just abide by islamic regulations; they even perform their wedding in a simple ceremony. indonesian muslims’ wedding ceremony in the netherlands the indonesian law of marriage for indonesians in overseas countries is issued in the regulation of marriage of republic of indonesia no. 1974, chapter twelve, second section, article 56: (1) a marriage performed outside indonesia between two indonesians or between an indonesian and a foreigner shall be legitimated if it is carried out based on the laws in force within a state wherein the marriage has been performed and if insofar as the indonesian is concerned, the marriage is not in contravention with the provisions of this law. (2) within one year after the return of husband and wife to indonesian territory, their certificate of marriage shall be registered with the office of the marriage registrar at their place of residence. 54 journal of asian social science research vol. 1, no. 1, 2019 the regulation applies to indonesians who decide to perform marriage outside indonesia. the indonesian embassy in the netherlands is the only institution that arranges an official imam for marriage (penghulu) since 1975 for indonesians living overseas. there are two kinds of procedures for indonesian muslims who want to do marriage in the netherlands: first, the formal procedure which is determined by the embassy of the republic of indonesia in the netherland, and second, the marriage procedure, which is set according to islamic law without following the stipulations made by the embassy. for this paper, i tried to deal with both procedures of the wedding practice. firstly, i contacted the embassy of indonesia, especially the minister consular, who handled marriage cases, and the imam penghulu, who was appointed by the indonesian government to lead the marriage ceremony for indonesian muslims in the netherlands. as he spoke both indonesian and dutch, he was often invited to lead the marriage ceremony not only among indonesians but also among couples from other countries that live in the netherlands such as moroccans, malaysians, and turks. for the first procedure, there were some regulations required for indonesian muslim couples who wish to get married in the netherlands. the following regulations are the formal regulation stated by the embassy of the republic of indonesia in the netherlands: the embassy of the republic of indonesia in the hague will only carry out muslim marriage if the couple brings a letter requesting for marriage to the head of consular in the embassy together with the following documents: 1. a letter from the bride’s father or her father’s representative requesting the embassy penghulu via the head of the consular section to conduct his daughter’s marriage; 2. a letter from the couple stating their intention to get married; 3. a letter from lurah (head of the village) informing the identity of the woman and the man who will get married; 4. a copy of the birth certificate of both woman and man. 5. a copy of the passports and residence permit of the woman and the man in the netherlands from the gemeente (town hall); and 6. if the man and the woman are already resident in the netherlands, a letter from the gemeente in the netherlands is required to inform the status of the man and the woman as single (each of them has not been married before) or the gemeente’s letter will inform the status of the woman and man as a widow or divorced. according to the indonesian embassy’s regulations, there was no need to hold a civil marriage in the gemeente for an indonesian couple. their marriage was valid according to islamic regulations and the indonesian embassy as well as dutch law. in the case of mixed couples, one of whom dutch nationality, they had to register their marriage to the gemeente. 55riyani, irma the second procedure of marriage performed by indonesian muslims was the marriage according to islamic regulations. generally, when a couple agreed to marry, they came to the imam of a mosque and the marriage contract was signed in a simple ceremony in the presence of the imam, witnesses and a few of their best friends. an imam only carried out a marriage contract if the couple showed a letter from the administrative office in their place residence, which informed that both of them had never been married before or informed the status of the woman and the man as widow or divorced, and the consent of the bride or the bride’s father or guardian. this second procedure od marriage was only recognized by the indonesian embassy if the couple registered their marriage to the embassy afterward. in many cases, the couple who followed the second procedure did not feel like registering their marriage to the embassy. they argued that their islamic way of was valid enough to make legal cohabitation. since there were mixed marriages, the marriage contract had to be declared in three languages: indonesian, dutch, and english. a couple could choose which language they wished. however, the imam used arabic for ijab and qabul even when the groom and the bride knew nothing about arabic. after that, he translated it into dutch or indonesian. many indonesian muslims got married to dutch couples. i interviewed three categories of couples: first, a couple whos bride and groom were indonesians; second, a couple whose bride was from indonesia; and third, a couple whose groom was from indonesia. most of them chose the mosque to perform their marriage, besides their apartment or house. some of them also did it in the indonesian embassy in the hague, but seldom did this happen. they usually performed it in a simple ceremony with limited guests and simple food. five couples that i interviewed said that the important thing for them was their marriage was valid and recognized by laws. they prepared their wedding in a short time like one month or even less. when they desired and agreed to get married they did it to guard their chastity. the average ages of the couples who got married in the netherlands were 27 years old or more. none of them got married at an early age. it seemed that education and working careers made them delay their marriage. based on my experience in attending wedding ceremonies, a wedding ceremony usually began with reciting the quran verses, usually sura al-rum, verse 21, which states that god created humans in pairs that they may dwell in tranquillity and love each other. then, someone gave a marriage sermon, which was mostly short, advising about marriage. then, an imam announced the marriage by calling the names of the bride and groom. after the declaration of ijab and qabul, the couple and the witnesses should sign the marriage document. in indonesia, after that, the groom had to read taklik talak, which was written in the marriage document. it was a kind of promise read by the groom after an ‘aqad, in which he promised to observe his duties and responsibilities should he died, abandoned his wife or was missing. but, this taklik talak was not declared by the groom in the case of marriage in the netherlands. the ceremony ended with a prayer 56 journal of asian social science research vol. 1, no. 1, 2019 led by the imam. then, the couple shook their parents’ hands for the blessing of their marriage. the bride usually felt very emotional asking for the blessing of the parents as she was sad to leave them and was happy to start a new life. then, the couple stood at the front where the guests congratulated them. the ceremony was simple and did not last long, no more than half an hour. in contrast, in indonesia, the marriage ceremony would take at least two hours or more and the imam gave a long marriage sermon. to give money as a bridal gift appeared uncommon as i saw only flowers were given to the couple. two indonesian muslim couples got married according to an official regulation of the indonesian embassy in the hague. the first couple (female, 30 years old; male, 33 years old), both were students, followed the formal procedure as stated in the regulation of the embassy above. as they had a good relationship with the embassy official, they held their wedding in the house of the embassy staff, followed by a little party. the bride was from west java and the groom was from kalimantan. she wore kebaya, a sundanese traditional wedding dress, lent by a friend who also helped with her make-up and the groom used a formal dress. the wedding ceremony began with reciting the quranic verses. then the marriage contract (ijab and qabul) was read and signed. it ended with a marriage sermon. after finishing the wedding ceremony, they provided guests, almost 100 guests, with indonesian food and entertained them islamic and sundanese music. their parents were absent, but at the time of the wedding ceremony, they were able to listen on the phone. when they went back to indonesia, they registered their marriage in the local registration office of their residence. they also performed their wedding feast according to their community tradition when they went back to indonesia. another indonesian couple, the bride (25 years old) was a student and the groom (30 years old) was a teacher at the indonesian school in the netherlands, performed their marriage in al-hikmah mosque with 100 guests and the presence of the bride’s parents. she also wore kebaya as her wedding dress, which is bought by the groom, but she did not make-up her face, and the groom wore the formal dress. she told me that she met her husband at the indonesian mosque in september and one month later in the same year they decided to get married. since they had to arrange their marriage by themselves, which meant it was without the presence of their families, the preparations for the marriage were simple and did not take much time. there was no time called berpingit since they had to communicate intensively discussing their marriage preparations. there was no time for body treatment in a beauty salon as they were busy searching for the wedding rings. as the price was high, there was no colorful invitation card, but simply invitations printed in white paper. in general, the process of marriage runs as follows: a man and a woman agreed to marry; this was followed by a formal proposal from the man to the woman’s parents by telephone or letter. the woman informed her parents about her plans to marry away from home and asked for their advice. although the 57riyani, irma parents felt sad about their child’s choice, they respected her decisions and bless her. then the couple’s families in indonesia made contact to discuss everything about their children. some of them held a party in their neighborhood to inform relatives and peoples about their daughter’s or son’s marriage at the same time as the couple was getting married in the netherlands. alternatively, they held a party when the couple returned to indonesia. another couple i interviewed was a mixed couple, the bride was indonesian and the groom was a dutch. many couples fell into this category. it was difficult to find the couples in the opposite category, the bride was a dutch and the groom was an indonesia. luckily, with the help of my colleagues, i met them in al-hikmah mosque. an indonesian woman (32 years old) came to the netherlands to get married to a dutchman (40 years old) after they had met in indonesia. her marriage was conducted in the al-hikmah mosque in a simple ceremony with the presence of her brother. since the religion of the groom was not islam, the marriage began with the groom’s conversion to islam pronouncing the shahadah (the declaration of faith) and continued with the marriage ceremony. the imam normally guided the groom to recite sura al-fatiha with its translation in dutch and pronounce shahadat with its translation in dutch. then, the imam guided the marriage step by step and concluded with the marriage contract. the marriage sermon was short and it was about the meaning of the marriage. the celebration of the marriage was held a day after the marriage contract. in the cases of other mixed marriages, the indonesian bride (29 years old) and dutch groom (35 years old) decided to get married to avoid a religiously forbidden cohabitation. they performed their marriage in the bride’s house and invited only their friends, most of whom were dutch people, but not their parent’s colleagues. they were eager to show their friends how an islamic marriage was performed. the groom’s parents came and wore an indonesian dress, which had been borrowed from the bride’s family. the ceremony was celebrated with respect as the bride cried holding her father because of the absence of her mother who died two years ago. the ceremony was held in dutch. after the marriage contract was finished, the guests were served with indonesian food ordered from a restaurant. another mixed couple, of whom the bride (38 years old) was dutch and the groom (31 years old) was from indonesia, married in al-hikmah mosque. she met her husband for the first time was when she came to indonesia in 1996 for vacation. this short meeting continued and became a serious relationship when she invited him to come to the netherlands in 1999. this intensive meeting made them talk to the more serious problem concerning marriage and her religion since she was a catholic. she decided to convert to islam in december 1999. she had a deep feeling about islam as she said: that was in ramadan when i herd him pray aloud, and i imagine that i also pray with him to god. but then, i realized my self at that moment that something happened inside my heart that i wanted to be a muslim. i 58 journal of asian social science research vol. 1, no. 1, 2019 felt islam is more direct; closer to god and it was a special experience… then, i decided to marry him and at the same moment, i did shahadat to be a muslim. i preferred to do it at the same moment because for me it is the same thing belonging together at a very important moment in my life: getting married and being a muslim.” the couple got married at al-hikmah mosque without the presence of the bride’s parents because they could not accept their daughter’s conversion to islam. the wedding ceremony was performed in the mosque with some guests who were served with indonesian food. she wore a modern-western dress for her marriage and the groom wore sarong and batik, typical indonesian dress. since the bride was a dutch person, she had to get married in a town hall (stadhuis). she and her husband had to inform the town hall of their plans to get married. then, two weeks later they had to come to the town hall to talk with the civil servant or the official who handle marriage. they needed to fill some forms to receive a marriage book. they invited their friends and their parents, who at this time did not mind coming to the town hall. they also had guests at their home to celebrate their wedding and provided them with some food and drink. the wedding ceremony that was performed by indonesian muslims in the netherlands was simpler and easier than that in indonesia. there was no bridal gift given to the bride since they preferred to share the financial burden of the marriage and there was no colorful wedding dress. the married couples got well documented in photographs or videos. most indonesian muslims who performed marriage in the netherlands put aside their country’s traditions and customary law of marriage. the only sign of a typical indonesian wedding tradition was seen in the dress worn by the bride: kebaya. some married couples preferred to perform their marriage in the netherlands to avoid indonesian traditions of the wedding ceremony, which were very high in cost should they applied them in the netherlands. conclusion many muslims immigrated to or visited european countries for various reasons and they needed to adjust to a new environment of non-muslim societies. since the 1970s, the dutch government was aware of the presence of the muslim minorities in the netherlands so that it protected the rights of minorities. it not only provided these minorities with financial support for prayer halls but also recognized their right to organize themselves. it seems that the netherlands accepted the presence of multicultural society as seen in its governmental policy that guaranteed that minority groups had opportunities to have a proper living and preserve their culture and identity. muslim immigrants in europe faced challenges when they came to perform islamic rituals. this was particularly seen in the case of muslim immigrants from indonesia in the netherlands. they needed to adjust islamic rituals to the dutch context. many indonesian muslims came to the netherlands for a short 59riyani, irma or long stay. as they lived in a non-muslim country, they faced challenges in performing their islamic rituals such as performing a marriage ceremony. the ways indonesian muslims in this country performed marriages can be identified into two categories. first, the couples conformed to the regulations that were stipulated by the indonesian embassy in the hague. secondly, they conformed to the islamic law of marriage. the indonesian embassy accepted both practices although the first category was more complicated than the second one. most of indonesian muslims took the second form of a marriage ceremony. in the cases of mixed marriage in which one of the partners was a nonmuslim, the wedding ceremony began with the conversion of the bride or the groom into islam and continued with the marriage contract. this made the imams pronounced the marriage contract in three languages: indonesian, dutch, and english. thus, the ‘new home’ of non-muslim countries made immigrant muslims adapt to the local context in performing islamic rituals as seen in the case of how indonesian muslims performed their wedding ceremony in the netherlands. endnotes notes 1 the netherlands government gave the fund to build a mosque for this community in ridderkerk and waalwijk apart from other indonesian mosques. since 1976, the netherlands’ government provides minorities with financial support for building prayer halls (shadid and van koningsveld 1991; dasseto and noneman 1996). 2 the hadith stated that the prophet used to wear a golden ring in his right hand. then, his followers did the same. the prophet discarded it and said: ”i will never wear it” (al-nisaburi, n.d., vol. iii:1655). 3 the qur’an, sura al-baqara: 236-237. 4 in performing wedding ceremony, the islamic law and the customary law were applied at the same time so that people sometimes could not differentiate between these two practices. 5 interview with an official imam of marriage affairs (penghulu) november 1, 2002, the hague. 6 the official imam appointed by the indonesian embassy in the hague was h. sofyan olong. he is a moluccan muslim who immigrated to holland during the colonial times as knil member. after the independence of indonesia he decided to stay in holland and continued his study in holland. he has was active as a preacher among indonesian muslims in the province of zeeland since he came in 1951. then, he worked at the embassy from 1956-1964 as a spokesman of moluccans and also as an imam. in 1975, the indonesian minister of religious affairs, alamsyah ratu perwira negara, appointed him as an official imam responsible for the marriage ceremony (penghulu) in 60 journal of asian social science research vol. 1, no. 1, 2019 the embassy of republic of indonesia in the hague. interview with olong, november 1, 2002. 7 interview with dienne h. moehario, the representative of the minister of counsellor of the indonesian embassy in the hague, november 14, 2001. 8 interviewed with the indonesian embassy’s penghulu on april 27, 2003. 9 there were four leading imams in mosque al-hikma: h. hambali, h. danun and h. naf’an and h. khairan. h. hambali and h. naf’an were the imams who were appointed to lead the wedding ceremony. both graduated from a middle eastern university, decided to stay in the netherlands and founded the ppme (interview on november 20, 2001 and november 2, 2002). 10 every city had its own prayer hall purchased by indonesian muslims. the function of those prayer halls include as a place of prayers, community iftar in the fasting month, learning and reciting the qur’an, discussion of religious topics and so on. the official mosque in the netherlands for indonesian muslims is al-hikma in the hague founded in 1996 and opened officially by indonesian government 1972. 11 observation of the wedding ceremony at al-hikma mosque on november 2, 2002. 12 interview on august 14, 2002, leiden. 13 interview on november 22, 2001, the hague. 14 interview on november 22, 2001, the hague. 15 interview in novemer 2001, the hague. 16 interview on september 10, 2002, the hague. 17 interview on november 2, 2002 at al-hikma mosque, the hague. 18 interview on november 2, 2002 at al-hikma mosque, the hague. references abu zahra, muhammad. 1950. al-ahwāl al-shakhsiyya: qism al-zawāj. egypt: huquq al-tab ‘mahfuzah li al-muallaf. al-aqili, khalifah ahmad. 1990. al-zawāj wa al-talāq fi shari`a al-islāmiyya. n. p.: dar al-jamahiriyya li sharri wa al-tauzi wa al-i’lan. dassetto, fellice and gerd nonneman. 1996. “islam in belgium and the netherlands: toward a typology of ‘transplanted’ islam”. in muslim communities in the new europe, edited by gerd nonneman. england: ithaca press. dessing, nathal. 2001. rituals of birth, circumcision, marriage, and death among muslims in the netherlands. leuven: peeters. engineer, ashgar ali. 1992. the rights of women in islam, london: c. hurts and company. esposito, john l. 1982. women in muslim family law. new york: syracuse university press. al-ghazali, abu hamid. 1984. kitāb al-nikāh: al-zawāj al-islāmi al-sa’id wa adab al-liqā’ bayna zawjayn, cairo: maktabah al-quran li tab` wa al-nasr wa al-tawzi. 61riyani, irma hadikusuma, hilman. 1990. hukum perkawinan indonesia menurut: perundangan, hukum adat dan hukum agama, bandung: mandar maju. al-kasani, alauddin abi bakr bin masud. n.d. bada’i al-sana’i fi tartib al-shara’i, vol. iii, egypt: matba’ah al-imam. kettani, m. ali. 1986. muslim minorities in the world today, london: mansell publishing limited. koentjaraningrat. 1976. “javanese, sundanese and madurese”. in insular southeast asia: ethnographic studies, compiled by frank m. lebar. connecticut: human relations are files. law of the republic of indonesia number 1 of the year 1974 on marriage and the government regulation of the republic of indonesia number 9 of the year 1975 concerning the implementation of law number 1, 1974 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obstacles in the acquisition of equal rights (with an extensive bibliography). kampen: kok pharos. shadid, w.a.r. and p.s. van koningsveld (eds.). 1996. muslims in the margin: political responses to the presence of islam in western europe. kampen: kok pharos publishing house. surjadi, a.1974. masyarakat sunda budaya dan problema. bandung: alumni. taj, anju malhotra. 1990. gender, intergenerational relations and marriage patterns in indonesia. michigan: university of michigan (umi dissertation services). the compilation of islamic laws in indonesia. 1996/1997. project for religious law counseling, the developmental directorate for religious courts, the directorate general for the development of islamic institutions, the department of religious affairs, the republic of indonesia. the holy qur’an. 2000. translated by abdullah yusuf ali. hertfordshire: woodsworth. tatang sudrajat* universitas sangga buana, bandung, indonesia supiana universitas islam negeri sunan gunung djati, bandung, indonesia qiqi yuliati zakiah universitas islam negeri sunan gunung djati, bandung, indonesia abstract the diversity of the indonesian nation in terms of religion, ethnicity, race, local culture, and others is an inevitable reality. it constitutes the nation’s socio-cultural capital, wealth, and potential to advance in which indonesia can be proud of. but, it can also lead to attitudes and behaviour that damage national integration. attitudes and behaviour that are tolerant of differences, inclusive, and moderate, especially in religious life, are the main pillars of a strong nation. currently, the attitudes and behaviour of certain groups of citizens and individuals show the opposite and these dominate the indonesian public sphere. using normative juridical methods and literature, this article examines the religious moderation program launched by the indonesian government under the coordination of the ministry of religious affairs as an effort to deal with the rising religious intolerance and violence in indonesia. from a public policy perspective, this article aims to analyse actors that are involved in the religious moderation program initiated by the ministry of religious affairs. higher education institutions with their resources have the opportunity to support this program. the religious moderation program is an implication of the policy environment that is currently embedded in people's daily lives. * corresponding author: tatang sudrajat komp. griya bandung asri 2, blok h 4, no 10, bojongsoang, bandung, indonesia. email: id.tatangsudrajat@gmail.com higher education, nation character, and religious moderation program: a public policy perspective journal of asian social science research 2021, vol. 3, no. 1: 73-92 https://cassr.net/jassr/ © the author(s) 2021 article 74 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 key words public policy, nation character, religious moderation, higher education introduction the plurality of indonesia, especially in religious life, has become a sociological reality for hundreds of years, which has been integrated into the ripples of daily life, long before the formation of indonesia as a nationstate. the diversity of religions embraced by the citizens of the nation with their various dynamics has been transformed into an incomparable sociocultural wealth. social differentiation in religious life has indeed become a gift from god because it forms one of the supporting factors for the rise of a sense of nationality to seize the independence that the colonizers took for more than three centuries. diversity in religious beliefs was not a barrier for the founding fathers to knit the spirit of unity in forming a sovereign state. after experiencing life as an independent nation for more than 75 years, it does not mean that the life of the nation is free from the potential threat of national disintegration. intolerant attitudes and behaviour towards people with different religious beliefs and behaviour that absolutes the truth of personal religious views to others, even considering them as infidels, have emerged as phenomena that should be taken seriously. the superficial perspective and understanding of religion for some members of the community has turned into acts of terror wrapped in the argument of jihad in the name of religion. therefore, the religious moderation program initiated by the ministry of religious affairs in 2017 is one concrete step in dealing with this problem. this is based on the ministry of religious affairs’ understanding and analysis of public problems in the form of threats to national unity due to selfish attitudes and behaviour and wanting to win for themselves in daily religious life. for the effectiveness of this program, it is beyond question that the ministry of religious affairs cannot work alone. it is necessary to collaborate with various elements of society so that this religious moderation program can achieve its goals. one of them is higher education, whose implementation principles, according to article 6, letter c, law number 12 of 2012 concerning higher education, are democracy, fairness, and non-discriminatory with reverence for human rights, religious values, cultural values, pluralism, unity, and national unity. this study aims to discuss the character of the nation, the role of universities, and religious moderation programs from a public policy 75tatang sudrajat et al. perspective. the theoretical framework or concept used relates to the components of public policy, categories of public policy, and public policy systems. this study uses qualitative methods and literature study. data were collected by interviewing several university leaders and lecturers who supported religious education, pancasila education, and citizenship education at several universities, public and private, in bandung city and outside bandung city. in addition, a literature review was also conducted by reviewing books and journal articles related to the research question. an analysis of documents in the form of laws and regulations and other texts related to religious moderation and higher education was also carried out. nation character academic discussion about the national character is not something that has just emerged in the last twenty years, because president sukarno has previously called it nation character building. the discussion of the character of the nation will not be separated from the discussion of values and morals in human life in individuals and groups. the content of good character according to lickona (2016:15-16) is kindness. virtues such as honesty, courage, justice, and compassion are a disposition to behave morally correct. character is good objectivity of human qualities, whether known to humans or not. these virtues are affirmed by societies and religions around the world. according to lickona (1992:51), character consists of operative values or values in action. a character has three interrelated parts: moral knowing, moral feeling, and moral behaviour. good character consists of knowing the good, desiring the good, and doing the good habits of the mind, habits of the heart, and habits of action. goodness according to lickona (2016:16) is objective good—not a subjective preference like taste in music or clothing—because goodness meets certain criteria: goodness determines what it means to be human, virtues increase the happiness and well-being of an individual, and they serve the common good and enable us to live and work in society. it is further stated that there are 10 essences of the most important virtues to build a strong character, namely wisdom, justice, fortitude, self-control, love, positive attitude, hard work, integrity, gratitude, and humility (lickona 2016:16-20). according to ma’arif (2018:38), a character is human conduct, moral, temperament, or personality that is more inclined towards positivity although, in essence, human temperament or morals can also be bad or disagreeable. character involves not only the physically visible body, but 76 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 also the psychology, feelings, and the heart so it can become a character that tends and leans toward goodness. the character can only be formed through continuous education. national character is one of the nine elements of the intangible power of a nation. as one of the national strengths, the national character must be maintained and constantly revitalized so that it can always be an inspiration and an encouragement and be able to function as the human capital of the nation because it determines the resilience of the nation (anwar and salim 2019:236). it is important to pay greater attention to the character of the nation, especially when we relate it to the current sociological facts that are full of hate speech, hoaxes, and narratives of hostility. the phenomenon of hoaxes, according to hidayat (2019:258), seem to be growing more acute and have plagued our society, as with the spread of pornography or drugs. people become addicted to consuming and doing things that are considered fun but actually, harmful to themselves and society. the character of the indonesian nation is an accumulation of the character of each individual, which is an ideal context as set out in pancasila as a source of value, will relate to five essential values, the first of which is the spiritual or religious value (i.e., belief in god). according to kaelan (2010:80-81), value is essentially the nature or quality attached to an object as opposed to the object itself. something containing value means that there are characteristics or qualities attached to that thing. a value contains ideals, hopes, and desires. talking about values means talking about das sollen, not das sein; we enter the spiritual field of normative meaning, not cognitive, and the ideal world, not the real world. notonegoro (in kaelan 2010:82) classifies values into material values, vital values, and spiritual values. the last type of the three, spiritual values, consists of the value of truth, the value of beauty, the value of goodness or morals, and religious values. pancasila values are classified as spiritual values. however, spiritual values recognize the existence of material and vital values. the discussion about character and character education is also related to the conception of morals. moral, according to suseno (1987:19), refers to the good and bad of humans as humans. the moral field is the field of human life in terms of goodness as a human being. moral norms are benchmarks for determining the right and wrong of human attitudes and actions in terms of good and bad as humans and not as actors in certain and limited roles. morality, according to sulismadi and sofwani (2011:69), is a source of unwritten rules that people hold fast because they have good values according to the size of the values that develop in society. 77tatang sudrajat et al. concerning other identities that pose a threat to national “identity”, according to bartolomeus samho, one of the strategic efforts to overcome them is the existence of a systematic movement toward internalizing pancasila values in the education sector without using pancasila as an instrument of political interest. the implementation of pancasila education should always be oriented, among others, to building the character of the nation’s generation toward values such as obedience to the rules, devotion to god, honesty, justice, peace, happiness, freedom, simplicity, respect, discipline, tolerance, a sense of unity, cooperation, responsibility, love for the homeland, love, and love for the environment (bolo et al. 2012:269). religious moderation program the religious moderation program is closely related to the policymakers’ in-depth analysis of social facts in recent years as well as various acts of violence with religious nuances before the collapse of the new order regime. in azra’s view, various forms of violence in the past were “political and economic radicalism” that used or manipulated religious symbols; the misuse and abuse of religious symbols are still rampant in political and economic violence scenes (azra 2000:11). indonesian society is very diverse. one aspect of social differentiation is religion, in which case, if selfishness emerges from the majority group, especially if it coincides with political power, it can potentially lead to social disharmony. therefore, tolerance, which is essentially an attitude and behaviour that respects differences, has a very essential role. tolerance, according to suseno (2000:108), is not only a pragmatic demand for the sake of peaceful coexistence but also a moral and religious requirement. the full belief of religious adherents, including adherents of islam, regarding the truth of their religion as well as the errors of other models, does not have to be highlighted, let alone echoed, in a pluralistic society (shihab 2018:49). within the last two decades, facts show that the public sphere is filled with the behaviour of some groups of individuals who always feel they are the most correct parties in understanding religion. quantitatively, they are not groups in the majority position, but because of the influence of social media and the dominance of the silent majority so far, their actions are getting on stage. according to akhmadi (2019:49), in the multicultural indonesian society, an exclusive religious attitude that only recognizes truth and salvation unilaterally can certainly cause friction between religious groups. in the context of religious fundamentalism, to avoid disharmony, it 78 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 is necessary to cultivate a moderate religious way, or an inclusive way of islam or an open religious attitude, which is called an attitude of religious moderation. thus, religious moderation is a middle way amid religious diversity in indonesia. moderation is an archipelago culture that goes hand in hand and does not cause religions and local wisdom to negate each other. it is not causing a contradiction between each other but seeking a tolerant solution. moderation or wasathiyyah is not an attitude that is not clear or unequivocal toward something like a passive neutral attitude, nor is it a mathematical middle ground as understood by some proponents of the thoughts of greek philosophers (shihab 2020:xi). wasathiyyah which characterizes islamic teachings is the balance between spirit and body, the world and the hereafter, religion and state, individual and society, ideas and reality, old and new, reason and naql (religious texts), religion and science, modernity and tradition, and so on. it is not a recipe for which details are available but a continuous effort to find and apply it (shihab 2020:43-44). religion moderation is different from religious moderation. religion does not need to be moderated because religion itself teaches the principles of moderation, justice, and balance. it is not religion that must be moderated, but the way religious adherents carry out their religious teachings (ministry of religious affairs 2019:15). in this regard, consistency, sincerity, and optimism are needed to continue to inflame moderate character in religious behaviour in people’s daily lives. the current struggle of the nation for the realization of a just and prosperous society requires the presence of a harmonious and peaceful social order. according to hidayat (2019:290), the motto bhinneka tunggal ika and the agreement of pancasila as a guideline for the life of the nation and state are historical evidence and political promises so that indonesia is not controlled and owned by primordial, communal, and tribal ideologies because, if that happens, indonesia will surely be noisy, lose its spirit, and deny being itself at very expensive social, economic, and political costs. it was further stated that fierce religious expressions would grow in prominence and become less enlightening to jointly advance and prosper the indonesian people (hidayat 2019:293). the government must be firm and continue to strive for the presence of a moderate religious atmosphere to achieve national ideals as formulated by the founding fathers in the preamble to the 1945 constitution. the national character that is expected through the religious moderation program is inseparable from the national development program. in this regard, one of the missions formulated to realize the vision of national development for 2005-2025 as stated in law number 17 of 2007 is to 79tatang sudrajat et al. create a society with noble character, morality, ethics, culture, and civility based on the pancasila philosophy. this includes strengthening the identity and character of the nation through education that aims to form people who are devoted to god almighty. the program’s targets include the realization of a strong, competitive, noble, and moral character based on the pancasila philosophy which is characterized by the character and behaviour of indonesian people and people who believe and fear god almighty, have virtue and tolerance, work together, demonstrate a patriotic spirit, develop dynamically, and go science and technology-oriented. the long-term development direction for 2005-2025 is that the development and strengthening of national identity are aimed at realizing the national character and social system that is rooted, unique, modern, and superior. the development of national identity is carried out through transformation, revitalization, and re-actualisation of the nation’s cultural values that have superior potential as well as through the application of constructive modern values. the role of universities regarding the issue of national character and the importance of tolerance and religious moderation programs, according to howlett and ramesh (1995:51), universities play the role as public policy institutions. according to them, policy institutions are structures and organizations of the state, society, and the international system (1995:51). concerning the development of society, nation, and culture, higher education is the centre for the growth and development of national civilization. a civilized nation is indicated by citizens with character. in this regard, one of the functions of higher education, according to article 4 of law number 12 of 2012, is to develop capabilities and shape the character and civilization of a dignified nation to educate the nation’s life. students are the elements of the higher education community that can play a role in supporting this program. therefore, it makes sense when it is stated that one of the goals of higher education as referred to in article 5 is the development of the potential of students to become human beings who believe in and fear god almighty and are noble, healthy, knowledgeable, capable, creative, independent, skilled, competent, and cultured for the benefit of the nation. the obligations of higher education institutions are known as the tridharma of higher education, consisting of education, research, and community service, as referred to in law number 12 of 2012. there is a 80 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 national policy as referred to in article 35 paragraph (4) which stipulates four subjects as general compulsory subjects nationally, including religious education, pancasila education, and citizenship education. the religious moderation program is related to the existence of these three courses. with their organizational resources, universities have a great opportunity to support this program. according to tilaar (1997:167), one of the characteristics that indicate that universities are “partners in progress”, which means that universities must create quality graduates. among other things, universities have given birth to independent and responsible scientists. these scientists are independent in thinking and innovative in commitment to building society as a whole (tilaar 1997:167). the responsibilities of these college graduates include, among many things, taking a real role in everyday life in a pluralistic society. the challenges faced by universities are getting bigger along with the problems faced by the nation, especially in preparing quality human beings. from time to time, the challenges and problems faced by the indonesian nation and state are getting bigger and more complex along with the increasingly globalized human life. according to najmina (2021:53), complex problems require a solution and real action. a commendable national character, excellent citizen intelligence, strong indonesian nationalism, the ability to live in a multicultural society, and culture need to be the focus of the personal development of every citizen of the nation (najmina 2012:53). the role of universities is at stake to provide effective solutions to the nation’s concrete problems regarding the issue of diversity. universities, following the authority they have as stated in article 58 of law number 12 of 2012, have functions and roles including being places for student and community learning and centres for the development of national civilization. with the various organizational resources they have, universities administer the learning of religious education, pancasila education, and citizenship education not only through curricular activities but also through cocurricular and extra-curricular activities. higher education is not an ivory tower that is far from the affairs and problems of the nation but a tower of fire that with its light can illuminate the surrounding space with solutions to these problems. in the religious education course, the assigned lecturers have a great responsibility to ensure that students become adherents of a moderate religion amidst the diversity of religions and beliefs held. according to arifin (2019:75), one of the important and strategic social institutions to 81tatang sudrajat et al. instil a more sympathetic and empathetic construct for the existence of other religions is education. it is time for educational institutions to be used as nurseries to foster an egalitarian attitude toward the existence of other religions. religious learning with plural and multicultural pattern can be understood as a process of awareness of the existence of religious diversity and the willingness to apply every religion in an egalitarian manner (arifin 2019:75). currently, universities seem to be in a race against time due to the ideological infiltration of campus residents, especially students, so if this is left campuses may become perfect nurseries for the seeds of intolerance, radicalism, and terrorism. in the pancasila education course, through the implementation of the values of unity and humanity from the national ideology of pancasila, lecturers can convince students that moderate attitudes and behaviour in religion are a big share for national integration. if this has been internalized in their daily attitudes and behaviour, it will contribute greatly to the realization of the nation’s character. related to this, bartholomew samho (cited in bolo et al. 2012:270) states that one of the orientations of implementing pancasila education is building the character of the nation’s generation toward values such as obedience to rules, devotion to god, honesty, justice, peace, happiness, freedom, simplicity, respect, discipline, tolerance, a sense of unity, cooperation, responsibility, love for the homeland, love, and love for the environment. there must be full awareness from university leaders and lecturers who support pancasila that exclusive and intolerant behaviour in religious life will become the forerunner of social disharmony, which in turn will lead to national disintegration. this is related to the main objective of studying pancasila in universities, as stated by sylvester kanisius laku (cited in bolo et al. 2012:35-36), to invite students to critically study pancasila, both as a moral-juridical discourse and as a humanistic discourse, invite students to understand the dimensions of knowledge in pancasila, and invite students to reflect critically pancasila concerning living together as a nation. through the subject of the rights and obligations of citizens in the citizenship education course, lecturers can conduct intellectual exercises regarding the importance of religious moderation as a tangible manifestation of the obligation to respect religious diversity in society. moderate religion, according to nurdin and naqqiyah (2019:94), has become a characteristic of religious people in indonesia, and basically, it is more suitable to be applied to the pluralistic culture of indonesian society. respectful and tolerant attitudes and behaviour amid differences 82 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 are prerequisites for the realization of social harmony so that religious moderation programs are seen as the right solution. this is in line with what is stated by quraish shihab (cited in fahri and zainuri 2019:97) that moderation contains several pillars, including justice, balance, and tolerance. religious moderation is the key to the realization of tolerance and harmony, be it at the local, national, or global levels (kementerian agama 2019:18). in this regard, it requires a high commitment from the leaders of universities as policy actors to place these three courses fairly and proportionally as the treatment of other courses. the seriousness of this commitment will be seen in the assignments of lecturers to teach this course because it will be related to the sustainability of social harmony in the life of the nation. prudence and careful selectivity are needed to obtain adequate lecturer figures in terms of academic capability and personal integrity. public policy component from the perspective of public policy, the religious moderation program is part of the policy in the field of religious affairs. one way to further identify the program, a policy analyst can analyze it from what gerston (2010:7) puts forward as components of public policy, namely issues, actors, resources, institutions, and the level of government. he states that public policy is the combination of basic decisions, commitments, and actions made by those who hold or influence government positions of authority. furthermore, he mentions five components of the policy as follows: issues that appear on the public agenda; actors who present, interpret, and respond to those issues; resources affected by those issues; institutions that deal with those issues; and the levels of government that addresses those issues (gerston 2010:8). thus, the aspects studied will relate to certain issues, public problems, or policy issues that are controversial. the actors in the community and government circles who are involved have an interest and a stake in the formulation and determination of policies. the resources of government organizations that are prepared and deployed, both human and non-human, are also the focus of a policy analyst’s study. another component that a policy analyst can examine relates to the level of government at which a policy is set. national character, intolerance, exclusivity, and radicalism in religious views as well as religious moderation, are examples of the component of 83tatang sudrajat et al. public policy called issues. regarding issues, gerston (2010:8) mentions that although policy areas include a range of ever-changing public needs, the types of issues can be divided into two broad categories: substantive and symbolic. if policy problems are whole systems of problems, it follows that policy issues must be equally complex. policy issues not only involve disagreements about actual or potential courses of action; they also reflect competing views of the nature of problems themselves (dunn 1981:101). the unit that organizes higher education is the university. the chancellor as the head of the university and lecturers as educators and scientists who are directly related to the support for the religious moderation program are among policy actors. according to howlett and ramesh (1995:51), the term “actors” includes both state and societal actors, some of whom are intimately involved in the policy process while others are only marginally so. actors in the policy process may be either individuals or groups. policy actors may be divided into the following five categories: elected officials, appointed officials, interest groups, research organizations, and mass media (howlett and ramesh 1995:52). the ranks of universities, public and private, which can generally be grouped into appointed officials, research organizations, and interest groups, can be used by the government to stem the threat of radicalism and terrorism. in the view of parawansa (2013:97-98), the involvement of civil society and the intensity of dialogue are very important to eradicate the roots of terrorism, especially due to the radicalization of religious understanding. one aspect that must be considered is ideological because the root of terrorism is a wrong understanding of ideology. this moderation program involves various organizational resources, both human and non-human. human resources consist of state civil apparatus in the ministry of religious affairs following the duties and authorities stipulated in the organizational structure and work procedures. meanwhile, non-human resources include the finances, facilities, and information owned by the ministry of religious affairs. apart from those in the ministry of religious affairs, there are other parties involved, with various organizational resources, from the initial planning to the issuance of the decision on this program. as an integral part of the government structure, the ministry of religious affairs has a network of organizations down to the sub-district level. this is a very important component of public policy because it relates to the authority and legality of a government program. this level of government is related to the existence of public policy institutions. public 84 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 institutions, according to gerston (2019:345), are the vehicles through which public policies are formulated and carried out. the institution rings of formality and organization, but it also suggests the routes for traffic travelling through the policy process (2010:11). this aspect relates to various institutions that are expected to assist in the effective implementation of this program, one of which is an educational institution. according to sutrisno (2019:345), one way to actualize the concept of religious moderation in the context of a multicultural society is to make educational institutions a laboratory basis for religious moderation. from the aspect of government authority, this religious moderation program is part of government affairs as referred to in article 10, paragraph (1), letter f of law number 23 of 2014 concerning regional government, namely religion. this matter is one of the six absolute government affairs, which are fully under the authority of the central government, as regulated in article 9, paragraph 2. the legality of a public policy or program that is set and implemented by the government is certainly related to legitimacy. dye (1978:4) argues that one of the consequences of the institutional model of public policy is legitimacy. in this regard, he states that government lends legitimacy to policies. governmental policies are generally regarded as legal obligations which command the loyalty of citizens. people may regard the policies of other groups and associations in society-corporations, among others, as important and even binding. but only government policies involve legal obligations (dye1987:21). this is also in line with what anderson states that in their positive form, they are based on law and are authoritative (dye 1978:4). public policy category to understand public policy, one should examine what anderson calls “the category of public policy”. he states that the nature of public policy as a course of action can be better understood if it is broken down into several categories, namely policy demands, decisions, statements, output, and outcomes (anderson 1978:3-5). intolerant, radical, exclusive, and extreme attitudes and behaviour in religious life by certain groups are public issues that in the last 20 years have often appeared in public spaces and greatly disturbed other community groups. it is not surprising that there are reactions from various groups who oppose this behaviour which is voiced to the government as the holder of state authority. this is a policy category that anderson calls “policy demand”. this category refers to demands or claims made upon public 85tatang sudrajat et al. officials by the actors, private or official, in the political system for action or action on some perceived problem (anderson 1978:4). the establishment of a religious moderation program by the minister of religious affairs as the top policymaker at the ministry of religious affairs in 2017 is a form of policy decision. currently, the ministry of religious affairs is preparing a draft regulation of the minister of religion regarding this religious moderation program to give it greater juridical strength for its operation. according to anderson (1978:4), decisions are made by public officials that authorize or give direction and content to public policy actions including decisions to enact statutes, issue executive orders or edicts, promulgate administrative rules, or make important judicial interpretations of the law. the existence of a policy decision is a product of the legitimacy of public policy, which is a series of decisions made by a person, a group of policy actors, or an institution. according to anderson (1978:14), several values influence the decision-making process. he states that most of the values that may serve to guide the behaviour of decision-makers may be summarized in four categories. according to him, the behaviour of actors or public policy institutions as decision-makers can be grouped into five types as follow: are political values, organization values, personal values, policy values, and ideological values (anderson 1978:14). policy statements, among others, appear in the form of various official statements from the minister of religious affairs or officials of the ministry of religious affairs n various forums about the importance of religious moderation programs. according to anderson (1978:5), these policy statements are the formal expression or articulation of public policy. included are legislative statutes, executive orders and decrees, administrative rules and regulations, and court opinions, as well as statements and speeches by public officials in dictating the intentions and goals of the government and what will be done to realize them. at the moment, efforts are being made to issue a stipulation in the form of a presidential regulation on this religious moderation program. the implementation of the religious moderation program includes the involvement of various social institutions in helping to encourage the realization of a moderate religious life, which is a form of policy output. according to anderson (1978:5), this policy output is the “tangible manifestation” of public policies, the things done in pursuance of policy decisions and statements. policy output is what a government does, as distinguished from what it says it is going to do (anderson 1978:5). 86 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 another form can also be the number of universities as policy stakeholders that make internal agendas for members of their academic communities as a continuation of the religious moderation program. the realization of a moderate religious life in daily life, which can be seen from the attitudes and behaviour of community members in their social interactions, is a manifestation of policy outcome. according to anderson (1978:5), policy outcomes are the consequences for society, intended or unintended, that flow from action or inaction by the government. of course, the consequences for the community in question are something that is in line with expectations as designed by policymakers. one condition which is the antithesis of what latif (2018:10-11) describes as the spread of religious violence which is an explosion of the tendency to understand, appreciate, and practice divinity that is not cultured does not spark the spirit of rahmatan lil alamin (love for all the worlds). distortions in the practice of the precepts of divinity are exacerbated by distortions in the practice of the precepts of unity. the policy system the religious moderation program from the ministry of religious affairs for the presence of a harmonious and peaceful atmosphere of religious life is a form of public policy. the term “program” in the realm of policy studies is something that is attached to other terminology in the study of public policy. jones (1984:25) explains that the word “policy” is often used interchangeably with goals, programs, decisions, laws, standards, proposals, and grand designs. in other words, referring to jones’s opinion, the religious moderation program is one form of public policy because it is a real state/government’s response to arising public problems and it contains the content of public interest. the birth of this program is not a single phenomenon, but a result of various political processes, both those that take place in the political infrastructure and those that take place in the political superstructure. meanwhile, the condition of commotion in the public sphere regarding intolerant attitudes and behaviour, feeling the most correct in religious beliefs while stating that others are wrong, radical views on religious teachings, disbelief in other people of the same religion, politicization of religion in elections, the intention of the establishment of an islamic state, and even acts of terror in the name of religion can be seen as a policy environment. 87tatang sudrajat et al. according to dunn (1981:47), the policy environment is the specific context in which events surrounding a policy issue occur, which influences and is in turn influenced by policy stakeholders and public policies. in this regard, anderson (1978:27) argues that demands for policy actions are generated in the environment and transmitted to the political system; at the same time, the environment places limits and constraints upon what can be done by policymakers. anderson (1978:27) also mentions that there are three types of the policy environment, namely geographical characteristics, political culture, and socioeconomic variables. dye (1987:6) calls this policy environment a society in the form of social and economic conditions, which consist of wealth, urbanization, economic system, education levels, class structure, racial composition, and religious make-up. within the framework of the policy system, the policy environment greatly determines the existence and success of a public policy or program when it is implemented. this is because this environment can act as a variable or factor that influences (independent variable) the publication of a public policy, or it can also be in the position of an affected variable (dependent variable). this policy environment together with policy stakeholders and public policy in the form of a religious moderation program are the three elements of what dunn calls “the policy system”. he states that the policy system is an overall institutional pattern within which policies are made, which has three elements, namely public policy, policy environment, and policy stakeholders (1981:46). the process of establishing a religious moderation program involves many actors and policy institutions which, according to dunn’s opinion, are part of the policy stakeholders. these policy stakeholders are individuals or groups that have a stake in policies because they affect and are affected by governmental decisions (1981:47). public policy, including public policy in the religious field, is not a single phenomenon that exists in a vacuum. various state or government regulations on religious affairs involve many actors and institutions as policy stakeholders according to the level of government. the issuance of the religious moderation program which then has the power of legality in the form of legislation is a tangible manifestation of the state/government’s response to the demands of a policy environment that requires a cool and harmonious religious life in a pluralistic society. when this religious moderation program has been established through a ministerial regulation or even through a presidential regulation, then as policy content this program will have an authoritative juridical basis 88 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 in the implementation phase. as a first step, the religious moderation working group under the ministry of religious affairs as well as other forms of activity are established as a form of seriousness for the presence of a cool religious life within the framework of nationality. another strategic issue is the inclusion of religious moderation in the 2020-2024 national medium-term development plan (rpjmn) in accordance with presidential regulation number 18 of 2020. in the context of public policy, another important step is the issuance of a circular letter of the directorgeneral of islamic education number b-3663.1/ dj.1/ba.02/10/2019 dated october 29, 2019, for the chancellors of state islamic universities to establish and organize the house of religious moderation. this is a space for nursing, educating, mentoring, and strengthening the religious moderation movement in the campus environment. in other words, the religious moderation program as a public policy contains interdependence between the actors involved in the formulation and determination of the moderation program as policy stakeholders and the policy environment. this will be especially apparent when the program is implemented and has an impact on policy objectives. schematically, by adapting dunn’s policy system, this interdependence can be described in graph 1. graph 1 policy system source: adaptation from dunn (1981:47) 89tatang sudrajat et al. conclusion this article has shown that the character of the nation is very important to support the existence of the state and the sustainability of the government’s efforts to implement national development programs. this is also related to the diverse socio-cultural characteristics. various forms of attitudes and behaviour of some citizens who are intolerant, exclusive, and noisy with religious issues in the public sphere are a threat to social harmony and national integration. it argues that the religious moderation program initiated by the ministry of religious affairs is the state’s response to putting the public interest first. this program is a tangible form of public policy whose implementation requires the support of various parties, including universities. the activities of the tridharma of higher education, especially the learning of religious education, pancasila education, and citizenship education, contribute to the support of the program. references anderson, james e. 1978. public policy making. second edition. new york: holt, rinehart and winston. anwar, syaiful and agus salim. 2019. “pendidikan islam dalam membangun karakter bangsa di era milenial”. .al-tadzkiyyah: jurnal pendidikan islam 9 (2):233-147. akhmadi, agus. 2019. “moderasi beragama dalam keragaman indonesia”. jurnal diklat 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howlett, michael and m. ramesh. 1995. studying public policy: policy cycles and policy subsystems. new york: oxford university press. jones, charles o. 1984. an introduction to the study of public policy. third edition. monterey california: brooks/cole publishing company. kaelan. 2010. pendidikan pancasila. yogyakarta: penerbit paradigma. kementerian agama. 2019. moderasi beragama. jakarta: balitbang dan diklat kementerian agama ri. kementerian agama. 2019. tanya jawab moderasi beragama. jakarta: balitbang dan diklat kementerian agama ri. latif, yudi. 2018. wawasan pancasila: bintang penuntun untuk pembudayaan. jakarta: mizan. lickona, thomas. 1992. educating for character: how our schools can teach respect and responsibility. new york: bantam books. lickona, thomas. 2016. character matters. persoalan karakter: bagaimana membantu anak mengembangkan penilaian yang baik, integritas, dan kebajikan penting lainnya. terjemahan oleh juma abdu wamaungo dan jean antunes rudolf zien. jakarta : pt bumi aksara ma’arif, muhammad anas. 2018. “analisis strategi pendidikan karakter melalui hukuman preventif”. jurnal pendidikan islam.ta’allum 6 (1):31-56. nurdin, ali dan maulidatus syahrotin naqqiyah. 2019. “model moderasi beragama berbasis pesantren salaf”. islamica: jurnal studi keislaman 14 (1):82-102. najmina, nana. 2012. “pendidikan multikultural dalam membentuk karakter bangsa indonesia”. jupiis: jurnal pendidikan ilmu-ilmu sosial 10 (1):52-56. parawansa, khofifah indar. 2013. islam, nu dan keindonesiaan. bandung : nuansa cendekia. shihab, m. quraish. 2018. islam yang saya anut: dasar-dasar ajaran islam. tangerang selatan: lentera hati. shihab, m. quraish. 2020. wasathiyyah: wawasan islam tentang moderasi beragama. tangerang selatan: lentera hati 91tatang sudrajat et al. suseno, franz magnis. 1987. etika dasar: masalah-masalah pokok filsafat moral. jakarta: kanisius. suseno, frans magnis. 2000. kuasa dan moral. jakarta: gramedia pustaka utama. sutrisno, edy. 2019. “aktualisasi moderasi beragama di lembaga pendidikan”. jurnal bimas islam 12 (1):323-348. tilaar, h.a.r. 1997. pengembangan sumber daya manusia dalam era globalisasi. jakarta: rasindo. 92 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 retno sirnopati institut agama islam qomarul huda bagu paringgata lombok tengah, indonesia abdul rasyad* universitas hamzanwadi, indonesia ahmad tohri universitas hamzanwadi, indonesia abstract outsiders have often perceived the wetu telu community in lombok as a variant or a splinter of the predominantly islamic sasak society's religious system. this article aims to understand the existence of the wetu telu community on the island of lombok from the perspective of both outsiders and insiders with a holistic, interdisciplinary approach. this study uses a qualitative method with a phenomenological approach. the research subjects include the wetu telu community in and around lingsar narmada in west lombok, the tanjung area, and several villages in the bayan district of north lombok, such as loloan, anyar, akar-akar, and mumbul sari. the required data were collected through observation, in-depth interviews, documentation, and literature studies. data analysis involved domain, taxonomic, componential, and thematic analysis. the results show that phenomenologically wetu telu is a variant of islamic sasak that believes in some islamic doctrinal values, understands and practices religious rituals that have many similarities with the belief systems before the coming of islam to lombok, and blends with local sasak cultural traditions or customs. wetu telu was born from the historical transition of the development of local belief islamic variant of sasak: transition and dialectics in the wetu telu community in lombok, indonesia journal of asian social science research 2022, vol. 4, no. 2: 165-182 https://cassr.net/jassr/ © the author(s) 2022 article * corresponding author: abdul rasyad universitas hamzanwadi, jalan tgkh muhammad zainuddin abdul madjid, no. 132, pancor selong, lombok timur, nusa tenggara barat, indonesia, 83612. email: rasyad.iis@hamzanwadi.ac.id 166 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 2, 2022 systems that dialectically interacted with the arrival and development of major religions on the island of lombok and were intertwined with the socio-cultural and socio-political dynamics of sasak society. this study significantly contributes to the study on the relationship between “foreign religion” and local culture with a special reference to wetu telu of sasak people in indonesia. key words sasak islam, transition, dialectics, wetu telu community, lombok introduction some scholars classify religions into heavenly (samawi) and earthly (ardhi) religions. the term “heavenly religion” refers to the abrahamic religions; abraham is considered the father of three major religions, namely judaism, christianity, and islam, which were revealed from god. the three religions originated from one religion: the religion of the sky (wahyu) (hidayat 2003). in contrast, the term earthly religions are defined as religions considered to have been born and developed by human civilization. in addition, there is the third term “traditional religion.” traditional religion contains specific values, concepts, views, and practices. weber equates traditional religion with the work of a sorcerer (cited in budiwanti 2013b, 2013a). according to bellah, traditional religion places a lot of emphasis on worldly matters because it creates doctrines that provide limited rational explanations (cited in budiwanti 2014a, 2014b). despite the controversy surrounding these terms, we describe religion from the perspectives of sociologists and anthropologists. according to edward burnett tylor (1832-1917), religion is a belief in spiritual beings. religion is described as a belief in the existence of invisible spirits that think, act, and feel the same as humans, which is called animism. lucien levy-bruhl (1857-1945), a french historian and philosopher, rejected tylor’s theory above because he believed that primitive humans could not think abstractly. primitive people could believe in a person with a particular plant or animal and easily believe in a totem animal. the mystical nature, according to lucien, is that the whole of nature is permeated by supernatural forces (cited in agus 2006). according to james george frazer (1854-1941), the essence of religion is dependence or belief in supernatural powers (cited in fleure 1941). radcliffe-brown (1881-1955) defined religion as an expression in one form or another of consciousness of dependence on forces outside 167retno sirnopati, et al. ourselves, called spiritual or moral powers (cited in niehaus 2021). auguste comte (1798-1858) understood religious thought as a tendency to seek absolute answers about everything, such as returning the cause of all events that happen to the will of god (cited in graham 2012). local religions exist or emerge in various regions of indonesia. the presence of these local religions is a form of a belief system that arises from the local culture. the research conducted by clifford geertz with his monumental work the religion of java resulted in three typologies of islam, namely santri, priyai, and abangan. according to suparlan (2014), this is a study of religion viewed as an acculturative and syncretic social system. based on the notes of the reformists, geertz described some of the practices of abangan and priyai as un-islamic and sometimes referred to as hindu teachings of worship of ancestors and belief in spirits with offerings as rituals, magic, and forms of mysticism (bruinessen 2003). this is also true with the local religion of the sasak tribe who inhabit the island of lombok, which is described in this research as wetu telu. however, islam wetu telu still contains many ambiguous and controversial meanings due to differing perspectives or approaches (cederroth 1975; telle, 2009). therefore, a more comprehensive study with a multidisciplinary approach is needed to gain a more complete and objective perception and understanding of the sasak muslim community’s variant of islam defined by the term wetu telu, which still exists today. interest in local wisdom is growing in cultural and religious studies. there are also studies on customs and religion in west nusa tenggara and lombok’s “local religion,” which has yet to be studied from various perspectives, including law (sharia), sociology, and anthropology. studies on lombok, particularly on wetu telu islam, have been conducted domestically and internationally. erni budiwanti’s (2013b) research on sasak islam studies the sasak bayan community in lombok, focusing on ideological conflicts between two religious and cultural groups, namely wetu telu and waktu lima. wetu telu is sasak people who, despite identifying as muslims, continue to worship ancestral spirits, various spirits, and others in their area. waktu lima is characterized by a high adherence to islamic teachings. m. ahyar fadly’s book on local islam is not different from erni budiwati’s book, both deal with local islam in lombok, namely islam wetu telu. nevertheless, fadly’s book indicates a change in religious attitudes among the followers of islam wetu telu. this change mainly occurred because traditional stakeholders and kyai (muslim leaders) began to look to the future by engaging in previously taboo work (fadly 2008). muhammad harfin zuhdi’s book on traditional parochialism 168 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 2, 2022 towards the religious patterns of the wetu telu islamic community in bayan, which is based on his research at the research institution of uin syarif hidayatullah in 2009, examines the relationship between islam and the traditional parochialism of wetu telu, which influences the religious patterns of the bayan community (zuhdi 2009). in contrast to the relevant previous studies as described above, this study emphasizes the emergence of the sasak islamic variant from the transitional history of the development of the local belief system which dialectically intersects with the coming and development of major religions in the island of lombok that are intertwined with the socio-cultural and socio-political dynamics of the sasak people. therefore, this study aims to understand the existence of the wetu telu community on lombok island from the perspective of outsiders and insiders in the community, with a balanced interdisciplinary approach. to reveal the focus of the research, we used qualitative methods to capture an object with a certain description by following certain ideas and looking for certain thoughts (al-jabiri 2003). based on the purpose and subject of the research, this study used a phenomenological approach, which emphasizes the importance of the equal study of different “religious cultures,” whether in the past or present, the understanding of different traditions that cross the religious spectrum and the construction of a case for the benefit of religious studies in the academic world (erricker 2002). the required data were collected through observation and in-depth interviews with the islam wetu telu community in the lingsar village, narmada district, west lombok, the tanjung area, and several villages in the bayan district, north lombok regency. the collected data were analysed through the techniques of domain, taxonomic, componential, and theme analysis. by doing this, this study contributes a better understanding of the intersection between local religions and foreign, world religions with a reference to the wetu telu community among sasak people in lombok, indonesia, and its dialectics with islam. this study is expected to contributes to the discoure about the relationship between “foreign religion” as represented by islam and local culture with a special reference to wetu telu of sasak people in indonesia. views on the locality of religious practice the term “local religion” becomes problematic when confronted with world religions because it creates a negative paradigm (zaenuddin 2020). in the context of indonesia, there are six accepted or official religions: islam, christianity, catholicism, hinduism, buddhism, and confucianism (mu’ti and burhani 2019). other local or unofficial religions and their adherents 169retno sirnopati, et al. are treated unfairly. local religions should be studied with appropriate approaches and methodologies (maarif 2015). there are at least three approaches used in studying a (local) religion. the first is the “humanistic” approach which demands a perspective that every idea and activity of an individual or community being studied is a form of human creativity. the approach in social science is called the empirical approach (empirical study). the second is the “interdisciplinary” approach that views religion, although already implied as a unique cultural dimension, can be seen as always related to other dimensions. for example, history, anthropology, sociology, philosophy, and psychology have different approaches, focuses, and emphases. the third approach is the “cross-cultural” approach. this approach is not limited to comparing two cultures as the research subject but also demands dialogue between researchers and participants (maarif 2015). the theories used include emile durkheim’s phenomenology theory (d’orsi and dei 2018; gangas 2011). the spiritual life of islam is closely related to the understanding and personal experience of each individual. therefore, this study uses a phenomenological approach. the approach and understanding of the phenomenon of human diversity through the anthropological perspective is a way of approaching and understanding the “object” of religion from various perspectives (abdullah 2000; peek 2005). the phenomenological approach to religion is similar to the approach to pure science. a phenomenological approach is a scientific approach that seeks to find the essence behind all religious manifestations in human life on earth (abdullah 2000). the phenomenological perspective seeks to understand the meaning of events and their relationship to ordinary people in particular situations. phenomenology does not assume that researchers know what something means to the people being studied. what is emphasized by phenomenologists is the subjective aspect of people’s behaviour (desjarlais and throop 2011). they try to enter the conceptual world of the subjects they are studying so that they understand what and why they develop an understanding of events in their everyday lives. the main task of phenomenological analysis is to reconstruct human life’s “real” world in its natural form (cilesiz 2011). there are two ways to examine the nature of religious experience. the first is by using the historical description of religion, sect, or religious thought itself and the second is starting from the potential environment where individual experiences occur (westley 2020). there are four opinions about the nature of religious experience. firstly, denying the existence of such an experience; the religious experience from this first opinion is a mere 170 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 2, 2022 illusion. secondly, acknowledging the existence of a religious experience, but it is separate from common experiences. thirdly, equating historical forms of religion with religious experience. lastly, acknowledging the existence of pure religious experience that can be identified using specific criteria that can be applied to any expression (mulyana 2013). religious beliefs are always held by groups that declare and practice rituals corresponding to those beliefs. these beliefs are not only individually accepted by all group members but also belong to the group, and they unify all members. individuals within the group have a sense of togetherness with others due to the belief that is believed and shared (durkheim 2011). religious phenomena can be divided into two categories: beliefs and rituals. the first is a state of opinion and consists of representations, and the second is a special form of action. all religious beliefs, whether simple or complex, show one common feature: to require the classification of everything, whether real or ideal, that can be known by the class of people, namely, the profane and the sacred. according to durkheim, in any religious society, the world is divided into two separate parts: the “sacred world” and the “profane world,” not natural and the supernatural, in which the sacred has a broad influence, determining the well-being and interests of all members of society (greely 2017). meanwhile, the profane does not have such a significant influence; it only reflects every individual’s daily life, whether related to personal activities or habits that each individual and family always carry out. the important role of religious beliefs and rituals in society is much more significant than that. the sacral function is the main factor that plays a role in society (pals 2011). in this context, sasak islam is an important religious phenomenon that is the subject of study in examining the development and existence of religions in indonesia. the development of religion in the sasak community the sasak ethnic group is one of the indigenous tribes in indonesia, which has its own unique culture and tradition. they inhabit the island of lombok in west nusa tenggara province and have a distinctive language and way of life. the religion of the sasak people has undergone a long and complex development process, influenced by various factors such as historical events, socio-cultural changes, and interactions with other cultures. before the arrival of islam in lombok, the sasak people practised a form of animism and ancestor worship, which involved the veneration of spirits and the use of magic and ritual practices to seek protection and 171retno sirnopati, et al. blessings. the arrival of islam in the 16th century marked a significant turning point in the religious history of the sasak people, as it gradually replaced traditional beliefs and became the dominant religion in the area. the process of islamization in lombok was not a simple or rapid one but rather a gradual and selective adoption of islamic beliefs and practices, which were adapted to the local context and incorporated into the existing cultural traditions of the sasak people. this process was facilitated by the arrival of muslim traders and scholars from various parts of the archipelago, who established mosques and islamic schools in the region and played a crucial role in spreading the religion. over time, islam became deeply ingrained in the social and cultural fabric of the sasak society. a distinct islamic practice and belief emerged, commonly known as “islam sasak.” this form of islam combines elements of traditional sasak beliefs and practices with islamic teachings and reflects the unique cultural identity and worldview of the sasak people. today, most sasak people are muslims, and islam plays a central role in their religious, social, and cultural life. however, traditional beliefs and practices still exist among some segments of the population, particularly in rural areas, where the influence of islam is less pronounced. overall, the development of religion in the sasak ethnic group is a complex and ongoing process shaped by various historical, social, and cultural factors. overall, the early development of islam in lombok is similar to the development of islam in indonesia. two critical themes have been permanent throughout the history of lombok. first, the seemingly dormant and backward islands are a place of various religions that influence the practices and beliefs of the sasak community. second, there is a periodic but consistent call for the purification of faith. the type of islam first practised by the sasak people is a mixture of austronesian beliefs and islam (bartholomew 2001). the original religion of the people of lombok is the boda religion, which is spelt in different ways (bode, bodo, bude) or boda keling, the religion of ancestors, or the religion of majapahit (smith 2021; suprapto 2015; wijono 2009). alfons van der kraan, in his book lombok, conquest and underdevelopment 1870-1940, quoted the opinions of 20th-century sociologists such as j. c. van earde (anteken over de bodha van lombok tbg 43) and g. h. bousquet (recherches sur les deux seces muselmanses (w3 at w5) de lombok, revue des eudes islamique), that there are three groups of sasak communities based on religion, namely budha, wetu telu, and waktu lima (kraan 2009). budha followers are sasak people based 172 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 2, 2022 on ethnicity, culture, and language but fully adhere to the budha belief. meanwhile, wetu telu is sasak people who practice budha and islam to some extent. islam is a religion that greatly influences the sasak people (van eerde 1906). regarding boda religion (considered the original religion of lombok), it is said that outsiders gave the name boda to the boda community, the people of lombok, to refer to the community living in the hills who practice the religion of their ancestors (budiwanti 2014a; wijono 2009). the beginning of the development of islam in lombok, according to one version, came from java brought by the saints using the ancient javanese language and indicated that the hindu javanese tradition was still visible. the arrival of islam in lombok is estimated to be in the 16th century after the fall of majapahit (tohri et al. 2020, 2022). in the 17th century, the majapahit government was replaced by several small muslim kingdoms that established trade relations along the north coast of lombok and from maluku, better known as the "spice island" (bartholomew 2001; telle 2009). meanwhile, according to other records, in the 17th century, lombok had become a "contested object" between the king of bali karangasem and the makassar people who operated from sumbawa (kraan 2009). the spread of islam in lombok is considered to be quickly accepted by the lombok community (jamaluddin 2011b; mutawali and zuhdi 2019). several main factors accelerated the process of spreading islam in lombok. firstly, the teachings of islam emphasize the importance of the principle of tauhid, which gives individuals freedom from any other power except allah swt. secondly, the teachings of islam do not immediately replace the entire value system that had developed in the community before islam came. thirdly, islam is a dominant institution in facing and fighting against the power in front of it (fahrurrozi 2018; zakaria 1998). according to researchers, the spread of islam in lombok is not much different from the pattern of islam’s entry into indonesia (basarudin 2019; jamaluddin 2019a; mutawali 2016). at least, there are three basic arguments about the origin and the entry of islam into indonesia. first, islam originated directly from saudi arabia and egypt. this theory is supported by the discovery of rulers in samudra pasai, followers of the shafi’i mazhab. second, islam in indonesia originated in bangladesh. this theory is based on the assumption that islam first spread to indonesia from the eastern coast of the malay peninsula. the third theory states that islam entered indonesia through traders from gujarat, as evidenced by the fact that the gravestone of malik ibrahim in gresik and several gravestones in the pasai kingdom are believed to have been imported from cambay gujarat (jamaluddin 2019b; marjani 2012). 173retno sirnopati, et al. the dialectic of wetu telu history and its development following geertz’s typology, wetu telu falls under the criteria of islam abangan, which is islam that is mixed with local customs and culture, or more precisely, syncretic islam. wetu telu islam is imbued with local nuances such as animism, hinduism, and islam. historically, there was a dialogue between the muslim and hindu communities, which resulted in a new pattern of religion in the sasak community, known as islam wetu telu (mustain 2013). in the academic context, the term “wetu telu” is generally understood as the belief of the local sasak community that has not fully accepted islamic understanding (fattah et al. 2017). however, until now, several studies do not indicate precisely when the term wetu telu emerged and who coined it. the term wetu telu is often contrasted with islam waktu lima although there is slight contradiction or conflict due to these differences (jamaluddin 2011a, 2011b). the exact meaning of wetu telu, etymologically and terminologically, remains a debate among researchers. some questions need further study such as how are the understanding and experiences of the community of followers, especially the wetu telu figures, and how the religious practices of the wetu telu community continue to experience dynamics in their history. in this study, wetu telu are elaborated based on the views or opinions of insiders and outsiders. in this context, insiders refer to prominent figures in the wetu telu community such as traditional leaders, community figures, and elders (these people are considered to have the legitimacy to explain the term wetu telu). in addition, we view the common people’ opinions also need to be heard to know the comprehensive understanding and beliefs of the wetu telu community. as for outsiders in general, they refer to people or groups outside the wetu telu community that represent the views of the normative islamic community. generally, the normative islamic community or islam waktu lima views wetu telu as thos who worship “three times”, three priority worship performed by its followers: funeral prayer, friday prayer, and eid prayer. all kinds of worship are only performed by the kiyai (religious leader), not the followers (salam 1992). such views can be justified from the perspective of outsiders who compare it with the understanding of the majority of islam. still, it is not entirely acceptable by the wetu telu community if it relates to beliefs that are too simplified regarding profane rituals (halim 2020). the main principles held by followers of islam wetu telu are 1) obedience to allah through the teachings they receive from their teachers; 2) obedience to the government; 3) and obedience to parents in a broad sense (muliadi and komarudin 2020). the religious practices of wetu telu 174 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 2, 2022 are based on the meaning of harian wetu telu, which means three times, by reducing and summarizing almost all rituals into three. compared to formal islamic teachings, wetu telu only practices three pillars of islam: reciting the creed, performing daily prayers, and fasting. generally, wetu telu is seen as an identity attached to the sasak ethnic group, who live in several areas and still hold local customs, such as bayan, tanjung, and narmada. in the village of lingsar, precisely in the narmada district, the religious practices of wetu telu followers are seen to share a temple in celebrating religious holidays, especially in the pujawali celebration, which includes the ritual of perang topat (suprapto 2017). the beliefs and religious practices of wetu telu are classified into five groups as follows: 1) they acknowledge praying five times daily, but the practice is limited to the kyai (islamic teacher) and his followers; 2) they only perform the dhuhr prayer on fridays, pray on eid al-fitr and eid aladha, pray tarawih in ramadan, and pray for the mayit; 3) they perform prayers only on thursday afternoon (asr), fajr prayer on eid al-fitr, and dhuhr on fridays; 4) they perform the fajr prayer only on eid al-fitr, dhuhr prayer on fridays, maghrib and isha prayers in ramadan, tarawih prayer in ramadan, eid al-fitr prayer, and funeral prayer (mayit); and 5) the prayer time is determined as follows; during the kyai’s duty as “marbot” (mosque caretaker), the kyai prays five times a day and continuously for seven nights. however, if no longer assigned, he only prays on fridays, tarawih prayer during the month of fasting, eid al-fitr prayer, and funeral prayer (salam 1992). the start of ramadan fasting in the wetu telu islamic community varies. one group follows a calendar called aboge (rebo wage), which sets the beginning of fasting on the 1st day of ramadan. another group sticks to the thursday pahing calendar, which always sets the beginning of fasting on the second day of ramadan. the last group follows the jumat pon calendar, which always sets the beginning of fasting on the third day of ramadan. the wetu telu islamic followers’ calendar differs from the commonly used islamic lunar calendar (qamariyah). the wetu telu calendar is based on an 8-year cycle, a system not recognized in islam. the years set as follows: alip year (first year), year ehe (second year), jimawal year (third year), dal year (fourth year), be year (fifth year), ce year (sixth year), wau year (seventh year), and jimahir year (eighth year) (budiwanti 2013b). the alip year marks the celebration of the alip festival, which is held every eight years when the bayan community (mainly) collaborates to repair the bamboo walls and roof of the reak tomb. the alip celebration is a renewal of the ancestral burial complex. 175retno sirnopati, et al. meanwhile, for customary leaders, especially in bayan (the majority of the wetu telu community), wetu is often reduced in its meaning to the terminology of time in the sense of tempo or moment. in contrast, wetu comes from the word metu, which means emerge or originate from, while telu means three. erni budiwati further explains in her research: symbolically, this expresses that all living creatures emerge (metu) through three types of reproduction: 1) giving birth (menganak), such as humans and mammals, 2) laying eggs (menteluk), such as birds, 3) developing from seeds and fruits (mentiuk), such as grains, vegetables, and fruits. menganak, menteluk, and mentiuk symbolically represent the literal meaning of wetu or metu telu. however, the focus of the wetu telu belief is not only limited to the reproductive system but also refers to the almighty power of god that allows life to reproduce and develop on its own through the mechanism of reproduction (budiwanti 2013b). the opinions of other figures who support the previous stakeholders’ views that wetu telu as a religious system is also embodied in the belief that all creatures must go through three stages of the cycle, namely menganak (giving birth), urip (life), and jodoh (death). the most crucial element that is embedded in the teachings of wetu telu is faith in god, adam, and hawa as the center of wetu telu beliefs. this belief is derived from the lontar layang ambia, namely 1) secret or asma that manifests in the five senses of the human body; 2) god’s creation manifested in adam and hawa as adam represents the father or male lineage, while hawa represents the mother or female lineage; and 3) god’s nature is a combination of 5 senses (derived from god) and eight organs inherited from adam and hawa (budiwanti 2013b). the views of common members and leaders in the wetu telu community on these religious principles differ from those of islamic followers of waktu lima. wetu telu believe in, first, three types of reproductive systems; second, a balance between the micro and macro world; third, ceremonies that accompany each stage of the transformative process in a person’s life from birth, energy, and death; and fourth, the acknowledgment of god, adam, and hawa. the doctrinal basis of the above wetu telu beliefs, from the normative perspective of the majority of islamic followers in lombok (the perception of outsiders), is not considered to be in conflict with mainstream islamic doctrine but is perceived as a belief or understanding of an incomplete 176 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 2, 2022 and unfinished religious system (jamaluddin 2011). this incompleteness is believed to be caused by historical transition factors that do not fully touch all aspects of teaching, both exoteric and esoteric dimensions. another perspective, according to the scientific nuance of outsiders (socioanthropological studies), regards it a syncretic local religion. the starting point of its syncretism nature is attached by finding similarities in terms of religious understanding and rituals within several pre-islamic belief systems, namely animism-dynamism, boda, hindu, and buddhism (halim 2020). the views or perceptions of outsiders that are recognized by the wetu telu islamic community, although not all entirely accepted in the context of historical transitions that dialectically interact with social, political, and cultural factors, are as follows: 1) the da’wah method of islamic spreaders which are tolerant and committed not to damage local customs. the passive attitude of the preachers towards this local belief system creates a perception among the sasak community that islamic teachings are not different from their ancestral beliefs; 2) in general, the religious and political policies of the hindu-bali rulers in lombok, especially the mataram karangasem kingdom rulers, hindered the processes of nurturing islamic religion, such as hindering muslims who went on the hajj, community and religious figures were pitted against each other through systematic patterns such as sasak women who married hindu men were forced to convert to their husband’s religion or mix their beliefs, and gambling mobilization in every village; this reality often creates confusion and simultaneously nurtures the growth of wetu telu islam; and 3) the active spread of hinduism followed the fading of islam in the sasak community, which was initiated by danhyang nirartha (dangkian niraka), a brahmana caste priest based on the mandate of the gelgel bali king in 1530 (budiwanti 2021); and 4) dutch efforts to create conflict between the muslim communities in lombok were aimed at strengthening their grip on the island since 1894 by applying the divide and conquer policy (divide et imperia) to more easily control the majority sasak waktu lima people, who were predominantly muslim and highly anti-colonialist (depdikbud 1983). the historical debate of wetu telu and its development can be understood through a phenomenological understanding of the lived experiences of the wetu telu community. phenomenology emphasizes the subjective experiences of individuals and how humans perceive the world around them. initially, the wetu telu community followed animism and dynamism beliefs, believing that spirits were present in everything. however, with the introduction of islam to lombok, the wetu telu 177retno sirnopati, et al. community underwent a process of transformation and adaptation in merging their animism and dynamism beliefs with islamic teachings. this transformation process can be understood as the lived experience of individuals in adapting to changes in their environment and socio-political circumstances. the wetu telu community transitioned from animism and dynamism to islamic teachings as reflected in their religious practices such as the five daily prayers and fasting. however, this transformation process also brought significant social and cultural impacts on the wetu telu community. they began to lose their original cultural identity and were influenced by the dominant islamic teachings. this is reflected in the changes in their religious practices, where they began to abandon practices that conflicted with islamic teachings such as traditional ceremonies. these changes can be understood as the lived experience of the wetu telu community in facing the social and cultural differences. the wetu telu community experienced conflicts between their cultural and religious identities, which became part of their lived experiences and shaped the historical development of wetu telu. thus, the historical debate of wetu telu and its effect can be understood through a phenomenological understanding of the lived experiences of the wetu telu community in facing social and cultural changes and how these changes affect their religious practices and cultural identity. conclusion this article has shown that wetu telu as a local belief system of the sasak community in lombok is a variant of islam practiced by the sasak people that is often contrasted or pitted against the mainstream and majority islam that is simplified by the term islam waktu lima. the emergence and existence of the wetu telu community is a logical consequence of the historical transition process of the coming and development of islam in lombok island, which dialectically interacts with social, political, and cultural factors in a long and complex process. therefore, the views of outsiders on the community of wetu telu 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mozaik budaya orang mataram. mataram: sumurmas al-hamidy. zuhdi, muhammad harfin. 2009. parokialitas adat terhadap pola keberagamaan komunitas islam wetu telu di bayan. jakarta: lembaga penelitian uin syarif hidayatullah. 2-cover-jassr-vol.4.no.2.[april.2023]-rev.pdf page 1 are bottom-up approaches in development more effective than topdown approaches? journal of asian social science research 2020, vol. 2, no. 1: 91-109 http://jassr.cassr.web.id © the author(s) 2019 md shahidulla kaiser* university of chittagong, bangladesh abstract this article analyzes both the top-down and bottom-up approaches of development interventions in the global south with reference to historical backgrounds and particular case studies. it is a fact that channeling western financial aid by using the top-down approach has not been successful when compared to the results of poverty reduction programs in poor southern countries over the past decades. as a result, bottomup institutions like ngos and bottom-up development programs like microfinance emerged in the late 80s and have become popular across developing countries. however, recently, the performance of ngos has been questioned and it is perceived that they have lost their roots. moreover, the bottom-up ngos seem unable to flourish further without financial aids although bottom-up development approaches seem to be more effective than top-down development approaches as they ensure people’s participation and right to choose. hence, this article argues that no single development approach is more effective than another. in the globalized world, there are no scopes to justify isolation from each other since countries in the global south still approach south-south cooperation and also receive financial aid from the northern donors. although there are some gross failures of past top-down development approaches, then, not all the bottom-up approaches are fully successful. this article maintains that to ensure cohesive development works, the global world needs both development approaches. key words top-down, bottom-up, development approaches, foreign aid, poverty reduction introduction in today’s globalized world, nations are divided based on geographical locations that determine their economic power and poverty situations. despite having mixed geographical hemispheres of countries, the world *corresponding author: ass. prof. md shahidulla kaiser department of public administration, university of chittagong, chattogram 4331, bangladesh email: mskaiser@cu.ac.bd article 92 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 is sketched as “north – the economic powers” and “south – the poor developing countries” (chisholm 2009). apart from this north-south division, there are still other spheres that differentiate the nations around the globe into developed, underdeveloped, and developing countries. there are also such terms as first world, second world, and third world countries. even though we look and yearn for one globalized world without poverty, the notions of division in terms of economic advancement had been evident in the history of civilization along with the continuation of “development” interventions. the history of development cooperation in the globe denotes northsouth development cooperation in a top-down way. since the end of world war ii, the notion of socio-economic development from the north has enhanced to effect changes in the lives of the millions of poor in the global south. on its own, the northern notion of development has characteristics that derive from its historical evolution —starting with the industrial revolution and colonial expansion. the marshall plan was the initial development cooperation after the second world war to assist in reconstructing the war-devastated economies of the european countries. this plan of development cooperation became successful and created a belief that foreign aid will be effective to reduce poverty and flourish the economies of the global southern countries. there was also a belief that the countries in the global south lacked capital resources and technical skills, which are the vital tools to combat poverty. these lacks created the notion of “underdevelopment” in those countries, and the northern countries, according to the former us president, harry s. truman (as cited in rist 2009), had to effect bold programs in the form of economic, financial and technical assistance to help and lift them from miseries. over the last fifty years, more than us$ 2 trillion of financial aid has been transferred to the poor in the global south. yet, this money has failed to bring “sustainable economic growth” and “poverty reduction” in those countries (moyo 2009:29). such failure of their top-down planning has brought the term “development” under threat. also, it led some post-development thinkers to write the “obituary” of development as it is “outdated” (sachs 1992:1). however, critics of development or post-development thinkers have failed to suggest concrete alternatives to development. this ultimately legitimates the notion of “development” despite having its gross failures over the past several decades. matthews (2004) asserts that “development” is a malfunctioning lighthouse which is yet to be replaced. boldly, the traditional top-down ways of north-south development cooperation have been criticized because of their political motivation 93kaiser, md shahidulla since the end of world war ii. escober (1995) says that the creation of development is nothing but for “making of the third world.” at the same time, national states were used along with support from outside donors as the primary vehicle for the execution of development policies, programs, and projects in a top-down way (uvin and miller 1994). some authors have noted (edwards and hulme 1997; salamon 1994) that the systems of the state were inefficient to deliver the promised services, which led to problems in the top-down ways of development. particularly, the state as an institution was too far from the population of its development programs as they were planned and implemented by the bureaucrats. of course, there are some successes in the top-down approaches of development. the poor in southern developing countries have enjoyed the benefits of financial aid to some extent. easterly (2007) sees reducing mortality rate, vaccination campaigns, and combating of some deadly diseases at the global level as some of the successes of top-down planning of development. again, some countries in east asia like south korea, taiwan, and singapore achieved tremendous economic development with the magic formula from the bretton woods’s institutions along with topdown government market interventions (brett 2003). nevertheless, these top-down approaches to development have been proved unsuccessful and ineffective in most of the developing countries, particularly in africa. in the last three decades, there have been substantial changes in the approaches of development initiatives to the global south. the northernbased donor institutions like world bank and imf are encouraging bottom-up ways of poverty reduction which emphasize participation, empowerment, and more accountability. this is due to bottom-up development initiatives from ngos which are becoming more popular and are used widely in poor southern countries to fight extreme poverty even post-development critics agree on the fact that traditional approaches to poverty reduction have limitations and they have failed mostly at the bottom. now, a new approach has emerged, which is known as “bottomup” development with an emphasis on local initiatives and control in the direction that development should take (parfitt 2002:32; matthews 2008). there are growing debates among scholars, development practitioners, policymakers, government agencies, and ngos to choose the best approach for development interventions in poor countries. whether solely top-down or bottom-up approaches should be used to fight against poverty or a mixture of both top-down and bottom-up approaches is still a debate. while both can bring more effective results, decisions vary from country to country, and project to project. it is perceived that the bottom-up approach 94 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 is the best one as it is directed by the poor themselves and it emerged after the failure of past top-down approaches. however, most bottom-up approaches usually do not thrive without top-down financial aid. this paper examines both top-down and bottom-up approaches to development from different perspectives using particular case studies. it argues that no single development approach is more effective than another. to ensure cohesive development works, the global world needs both development approaches. top-down and bottom-up approaches to development: what do they mean? top-down approaches to development are planned by “experts” or “technocrats” at the top level in any development projects. at the global level, such a situation can occur in projects undertaken by big donor agencies like the world bank, imf, or un agencies located in developed countries. at the local level, such development initiatives can be seen as central to the government of a developing country where the public bureaucrats are the principal decision-makers. in the top-down method of development projects, there are very few opportunities for people’s participation in the formulation process and, as a result, they are marginalized (kothari 2001). the top-down planning to tackle poverty stresses on economic growth, income distribution from the macroeconomic perspectives, and it refers to “everyday development talk” as well as “international institutions” (pieterse 1998). easterly (2007) terms the top-down initiatives and the northern aidagencies as “planners” who seek solutions to poverty through economic development. even in the field of development practitioners and experts, we see academics like paul collier of oxford university and jeffery sachs of columbia university’s earth institute who support top-down ways of providing more financial aids to poor countries to tackle poverty. however, after the failure of past top-down development approaches, new vocabularies of development emerged: bottom-up development, selfreliant development, and development from below. each of them suggested an element of dysfunction in the modern formal economy. bottom-up approaches to development underscore the need for “participation” of the local community for whom the development projects are undertaken. in these approaches to development, the community can select their own goals and the means of achieving them in any development project (kothari 2001). along with participation, bottom-up approaches ensure community ownership, commitment, and accountability to the development project as it seeks development from below (pieterse 1998). 95kaiser, md shahidulla with this approach, local people are considered “searchers” and are given an opportunity to help themselves (easterly 2007). unlike paul collier and jeffery sachs, william easterly of new york university and dambisa moyo, former world bank official, are some of the academics who argue for more bottom-up ways of poverty reduction than top-down solutions. the bottom-up approach seeks micro-level solutions to poverty. at the global level, the cooperation between the developing countries in the south can also be termed a bottom-up development approach as they are seeking the solution to poverty within themselves. for example, the cooperation among china, india, and other developing countries as the effect of power relations is mostly equal in such endeavors in comparison with power relations between developing countries and the developed countries and traditional western donors. now, the bottom-up approaches to development are crucial elements in development projects as there is no scope to undermine the views of poor people for whom the projects are planned. chambers (1994:963) puts the example of bottom-up approaches like participatory rural appraisal (pra) and rapid rural appraisal (rra) where he sees “richness of knowledge” and “creative and analytical ability” of poor villagers. similar to bottomup thinking, sen (1999) sees “development” as freedom where the poor will shape their destiny, and they will not just be “passive recipients of ...cunning development programs.” top-down vs. bottom-up in the development discourses in the history of development, the need for people’s participation has always been undermined. in most development discourses, either the state or the market has been considered more important than the people’s choices and voices. in modernization theory, “local knowledge” is considered as a constraint to development while the dependency theory recognizes that local knowledge is “powerless and sidelined” (sillitoe 2002:3). the failure of top-down development approaches led to concepts such as anti-development, post-development, and alternative development. some scholars like wolfgang sachs even claim that development should be abandoned as it does more harm than good (as cited in parfitt 2002:4). parfitt (2002:9) as a critic of post-development theory admits the faults of top-down approaches that undermine “local societies and cultures” with “development” that is “repressive and disruptive.” parfitt has come forward to salvage the term “development” seeing it as centrally concerned with emancipation. he proposes a solution that endorses the freedom of the community and social groups to determine their own projects thereby 96 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 avoiding harmful “development” such as that sketched out in top-down approaches (parfitt 2002:6). in this light, pieterse (1998:347; 2000:181) sees similarities among “post-development theory,” “dependency theory,” and “alternative development” as they all emphasize bottom-up “self-reliance.” in relation, parfitt endorses the bottom-up approach as a remedy for failure caused by the “traditional top-down” ethnocentric and technocratic approach. parfitt argues that the solutions of development lie within the “development discourse,” and there is no need to go for “post-development” (parfitt 2002:32). still, whether it is “development,” “alternatives to development,” “alternative development,” or “reflexive development,” the need and importance of bottom-up elements have been recognized. escober (1995:215) looks for “local culture, knowledge, grassroots movements” for post-development, and rahnema (1997: xiv) sees the same as “peoplecentered.” meanwhile, parfitt (2002) and pieterse (2000) look for “popular participation” in alternative development. in between “alternatives to development” and “alternative development,” jakimow (2008:314) underscores the “creation and actualization of different approaches at the local level” for “reflexive development.” successes and limitations of top-down development approaches after the second world war, development was perceived as the ideology of the superpowers in the globe. the rise of anticolonial movements in different countries of the global south shaped the ideology of development cooperation. the soviet bloc saw the very notion of development as a form of socialism that leads to ultimate communism. on the other hand, the united states and capitalist movements perceived the development as economic development. the provision and distribution of northern aid were mainly shaped by the political interests of the donors. the pressure of the cold war between the superpowers in the globe created a realization that the withdrawal of aids to autocratic countries means losing clients in the competition of the cold war (dunning 2004: 411). coyne and ryan (2009) put an example that the worst dictators in the world received us$105 billion under the guise of official development assistance. concerning the amount of top-down financial aid that had been channeled to the developing countries over the decades, the successes of such plans are very limited. this is mostly because this type of topdown planning was out of touch with the poor at the bottom. the northern countries and aid agencies always believed that the solution to poverty is in 97kaiser, md shahidulla their hands as they see poverty as an “engineering problem” which can be eradicated with a “big push” of financial aid from the top (easterly 2007). they prescribed solutions without focusing on the problems of poverty at the bottom. all of the projects and programs that were undertaken by the agencies were based on decisions and suggestions of experts and bureaucrats in their offices back in northern areas. meanwhile, the poor masses at the bottom do not participate enthusiastically as they feel these projects are imposed on them because there were no scopes to address their genuine needs in the formulation of those projects (parfitt 2002). also, their apartness from the bottom situation at the global south and failure to respond on time worsened the hiv/aids epidemic in the globe. to this, easterly (2007) argues that the situation could have been controlled better if there were prior attention given by western donors in time. he further argues that the planners at the top were “out of touch” with the tragedy at the bottom. it should be noted that some of the aids are given to the poor developing countries in the form of loans rather than direct grants. there is a possibility that these poor countries may find themselves getting into increasing debts. besides, a major portion of money provided in the form of aid to the development projects in the developing countries is swallowed up in payments of experts on technological issues, salary payment of local staff of donor countries, expatriate staff’s housing, transportation, and other allowances for their dependents. eventually, financial aid which has been channeled in a top-down way to the developing countries tends to be consumed by the urban-centered bureaucrats, policymakers, and politicians on many occasions. the poor people in remote areas hardly benefit from such development efforts. still, easterly (2007) sees the goodwill behind the attempts to combat poverty by the northern countries and their donor agencies. but, the big problem is that they tend to use the same plan to achieve the same objectives repeatedly despite previous failed attempts. they do not go for a new way to accomplish their objectives (easterly 2007; ferguson 1994). again, sometimes the top-down planners try to achieve what is beyond their capacity while they neglect what they can achieve. perhaps, this can be blamed on the common lack of accountability in the top-down traditional development approach. in the past, many goals were set by the big aid agencies to be achieved at a global level. for example, easterly (2007) cites the goal to achieve “universal primary school enrolment” and “universal access to water and sanitation” before the millennium development goals in 2000. unfortunately, due to the absence of accountability, nobody had been held accountable for the failure of meeting those goals. 98 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 furthermore, some global programs initiated by the bretton woods’s institutions failed to bring changes to the lives of the poor of the global southern countries because of their top-down approaches. “structural adjustment programs” (saps) is a good example of such programs that failed to bring the promised economic growth in developing countries by removing barriers to the operation of free markets (parfitt 2002). in some situations, saps even created more critical problems in some countries. easterly puts the example of ivory coast which experienced “one of the worst and longest depressions in its economic history” as a result of a structural adjustment loan which led to anarchy in the country (easterly 2007:58). in the same vein, women in the developing countries where the saps were implemented faced tremendous discrimination in male-dominated market economies in africa and the caribbean (thomasemeagwali 1995; mohan, brown, milward, and zack-williams 2002). apart from aid interventions, there are some successful examples of southern countries that gained tremendous economic growth by using the state machinery in a top-down way. china and india are two examples of the present global economies where states build foundations for the success of liberalization and market forces with a top-down approach apart from the developmental states in south-east asia. measurable economic growth by these countries reinforces the role of the state as a “top-down” institution and brings it back into the development mainstream once again. despite the epidemic of hiv/aids in developing nations, the past top-down development efforts made some remarkable progress in health issues. cosbridge (1999:145) puts the example of an “unprecedented increase in life expectancies for men and women” across the globe because of previous development efforts undertaken by western countries and their donor agencies. also, while we have witnessed numerous occurrences of natural disasters like cyclones, earthquakes, and floods in many poor developing countries, the channeling of western aid saved millions of lives in the aftermath of these natural disasters. the earthquake in haiti, the flood in pakistan, and the cyclones in bangladesh are some examples. in such situations, top-down development efforts are time and cost-effective in relief operations and emergencies (kabusimi 2007). strengths and limitations of bottom-up development approaches development projects must ensure the participation of the poor for whom they are aimed at in the developing countries. it has now been proven that the true success of development projects happen only when the poor drive these projects through their participation. lewis and uphoff (1988) concur 99kaiser, md shahidulla that bottom-up approaches make development projects cost-effective, sustainable, and replicable. unarguably, accountability, feedback, and transparency are also crucial to the success of any development projects. the bottom-up approach to development promotes these components as the people accept and participate enthusiastically in any bottom-up development projects. it should be stated that the formal economy of a developing country cannot provide opportunities that the poor can avail themselves of to change their standard of living. this is because they do not have access to the formal economy due to a lack of capital, formal education, and collateral for securing loans from banks. so, to bring about positive changes and also end the cycle of poverty, they do not have any alternative but to do something about their own livelihoods. given such situations, the state-led top-down approach is not adequate as the macroeconomic development efforts play very little role in the lives of poor people at the bottom. narayan et al. (2009:337) argue that the national economy is good, but because of wider differences among localities, they hardly benefit from the growth. hence, any bottom-up local opportunity creates a great difference for them. following the failure of top-down north-south ways of development cooperation and state as an organization, the emergence of ngos has become remarkable in the global development arena since the 1980s. ngos have become an indispensable part of development paradigms because of their alternative ways of development approaches and acceptability by the poor people in remote areas. although in recent decades the influence of ngos has reduced, no discussion of poverty, inequality, or development is complete without considering their bottom-up roles. in many developing countries, “the resources of ngos, domestic and international, exceed those at the disposal of government” as they have become “major channel of development co-operation” (pieterse 1998:350). brac is such an ngo from bangladesh, which has grown up with the emergence of bangladesh as an independent country. bangladesh is no longer a “hopeless basket” as world-renowned ngos like brac, and grameen bank enabled bangladesh to reach the “first rung of the ladder of development” (sachs 2005:14). white (1999) further argues that success in the development of the field of bangladesh is because of contribution from the ngos, not by the state. remarkably, the bottom-up development approach using “microfinance” has proved successful in eradicating poverty in developing countries. the recognition of microfinance as a tool to combat poverty “from below” was endorsed when the nobel peace prize was given to 100 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 the pioneer of microfinance, dr. muhammad yunus with his brainchild, grameen bank. notably, microfinance, in the form of small loans, is helping millions of poor people in the global south create self-employment opportunities. moreover, faith-based organizations are working to serve humanity with their widespread networks across the globe. amidst secular “development” doctrine, they are combating poverty from the bottom as most of the religions in the world teach the notion of helping those who are in need. ter harr and ellis (2006) put forward the example of poland, south africa, and the philippines as countries where the faith-based organizations contributed significantly to their political development. still, bottom-up faith-based organizations are working in conflict areas in many parts of the world. they are trying to build peace, provide education, and health facilities in many poor countries. however, bottom-up efforts in development projects also have some shortcomings. in an unequal society, there are limitations to implementing bottom-up development projects as the local elite may dominate the whole process. for this reason, mansuri and rao (2004) suggest the need for an “enabling institutional environment” for the sustainability of bottomup community-based initiatives. bottom-up approaches to development cannot be replicated at a large scale as the success of such an approach mostly depends on “local cultures and social systems”. this ultimately fails to generate a “coherent body of theory” in the development field because of such dispersing nature of bottom-up approaches in the form of “alternative development” (pieterse 1998). still, there are fewer negative aspects of bottom-up development than of top-down development. bottom-up development has several unique challenges such as how the programs can receive funding without losing their autonomy and how to make a bottomup project reaches more beneficiaries without becoming less participatory, more bureaucratic, and disconnected from the people it serves. alignment of top-down and bottom-up in the development interventions during the 1990s, there were significant changes in the approaches to development interventions offered by aid agencies. the need for more participation on the part of the poor people and their empowerment had been felt widely amid the failures of traditional top-down ways of development. as a result, the world bank and its presidency began to listen to the voices of the poor in their projects during the tenure of james d. wolfensohn. as part of its participatory approaches to development, “voices of the poor 101kaiser, md shahidulla (2000)” recorded the voices of more than 60,000 poor women and men from 60 countries to understand poverty from the perspective of the poor themselves (narayan, pritchett, and kapoor 2009). hackenberg (2002) reports that the effort of development activities by the world bank was “from the below” and that of incorporating the “bottom-up” development process. however, as pieterse (2000: 180) states, the world bank stories are not the same because there had been “tremendous discontinuities” of the bank’s development approach over time. another is “the paris declaration on aid effectiveness 2005” and “accra agenda for action 2008” by oecd that aim to improve the quality of aid, ensuring increased participation, and accountability (hayman 2009). nowadays, it is very difficult to distinguish bottom-up “alternative development” from the top-down “mainstream development.” a sharp line of boundary between these two approaches to development is difficult to establish because many components of the bottom-up alternative approach have already been incorporated into the mainstream development initiatives by the aid agencies over the years. pieterse (1998:344-350) termed this mixture of the two development approaches as “mainstream alternative development (mad)”. sustainable development goals and the challenges ahead the sustainable development goals (sdgs) were agreed upon in 2015 under the auspices of the united nations and to be achieved by the developing countries in 2030. years after, many developing countries are still lagging behind in the race despite completing a previous cycle of achieving similar global development goals of “millennium development goals” (mdgs). sub-saharan african countries, in particular, are not doing well. there is no doubt that financial aid is needed to achieve the sdgs. it is also important to incorporate other developing countries in the development of developing countries lagging behind. however, global development goals are not free from debates because of the nature of their formulation and implementation process. bond (2006:339) calls to “debate the top-down approach and go for solutions emerging from below” in achieving such goals as he sees one of the topdown characteristics of such goals as its origins within the united nations and other top-down agencies. global cooperation for development is necessary for attaining the sdgs within the deadline. this is particularly important during this unprecedented time of global virus pandemic which has caused negative impacts on the global economy. 102 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 meanwhile, climate change, global warming, and frequent natural disasters have become threats to the development initiatives in recent years; and the poor communities in the developing countries have become more vulnerable. yodmani (2001: 486) argues that the traditional top-down management was not fully successful in meeting the needs of vulnerable communities. therefore, the bottom-up approach to disaster management has been widely recognized because the communities are involved in what they are the best judges of, dealing with their vulnerability and putting the best solutions on the ground (yodmani 2001:486). corell and betsill (2001) see ngos working in the field of environment as potential partners in implementing projects which are meant to tackle climate change because they can link international and local level with the local popular movement. the momentum of south-south cooperation and triangular development approach for several decades, development assistance in the globe acted as a topdown, one-way street – from north to south. in the 1970s, the countries in the global south formed a new alliance to enhance cooperation within themselves and to strengthen their capacity to negotiate with the north. these countries were neither part of communism led by the former soviet union nor capitalism led by the united states. following the formation of the non-aligned movement and its later manifestation known as the group of 77, the global south began to realize the potential for collaboration within and across developing nations as a way to offset the imbalance created by the north-south divide. this new form of cooperation has been seen as south-south cooperation (ssc). at the initial stage, the cooperation did not speed up so strong and failed to draw the attention of those around the globe. however, the end of the cold war and prolonged debt crisis in the 1980s created a platform for the countries in the global south, which enabled them to deal with their counterpart in the west effectively. since the 1990s, the world scenario has changed significantly. today, there are new winners and losers in the global economy, and surprisingly, most of these winners are from developing nations. particularly, the rise of new economic powers such as china and india from the south has changed the notion of south-south cooperation. their increasing cooperation and investment in other developing countries, particularly in africa, have created a new dimension in the south-south cooperation (un 2010). south-south cooperation (ssc) can happen in the field of technologies, services, trade, infrastructures, and even in the poverty reduction programs. ssc aims to strengthen the notion of “self-sufficiency among southern 103kaiser, md shahidulla nations and promote trade, economic ties among themselves whose marker power is more equally matched than in uneven north-south relationships”. the un is also prioritizing ssc and establishing new innovative programs. ssc is relatively easy among the poor developing countries. it has little or no policy conditions along with procedural conditions (un 2010). much of its disbursement and procurement are simple and fast. the bottom-up ways of development cooperation in the countries of global south believe and see the people as partners in development, respecting them as the primary authors and actors of the work to end poverty; awaking them to the possibility of a better life and self-reliant actions. this bottom-up cooperation is cheap and the learning from one developing country to another is more relevant than traditional top-down ways of learning on poverty reduction. however, there are growing criticisms in such cooperation amongst the developing countries. especially, china’s involvement and development assistance in the african countries are not free from criticism and scrutiny (naím 2007). furthermore, triangular development cooperation is a newly added concept in global development cooperation. it is a kind of development cooperation that connects three development partners. when a donor from northern countries is involved in the development of a developing country with the technical knowledge and expertise from other developing countries, it is called triangular development or north-south-south cooperation -a mixture of both top-down and bottom-up development approaches. triangular cooperation refers to the partnership between traditional donors and southern partners to implement development projects or programs in beneficiary countries (unctad 2010). triangular cooperation often consists of a financial contribution from a “northern donor” together with technical skills from a southern donor, which is then implemented in a partner country. a good example of triangular development cooperation can be the works of a bangladeshi ngo, brac, in african countries. since 2002, brac has been engaged in transforming the lives of millions of poor in many african countries with its successful poverty reduction models from bangladesh and necessary funding support from developed countries (smillie 2009). conclusion in this paper, two different development approaches have been analyzed with reference to historical backgrounds, current development practices, and future goals along with the challenges ahead for the nations. they are, however, not outright solutions to poverty because both of them have their strengths and shortcomings. top-down approaches are not always synonymous with failure, nor are bottom-up approaches always successful. 104 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 top-down efforts of development have failed to bring significant changes in the lives of the poor compared to the time and money spent over the decades. the underlying need for “participation,” “ownership,” “accountability,” and “empowerment” for successful completion of a development project was undermined in the past top-down development efforts. subsequently, these important ingredients were incorporated by the development agencies and state-led development projects. these shifts further prove that solely top-down development efforts are not successful. likewise, bottom-up institutions like ngos and civil society organizations are not successful in all parts of the world like in africa. from this point of view, the state as a top-down institute can facilitate and significantly promote the growth of bottom-up institutions like ngos and civil societies. ngo’s position as “favorite child” to the donor organizations has become narrowed over the years because of disillusionments in their performances and disconnection from their roots. therefore, both types of development approaches are needed to tackle poverty, and it is possible for “coexistence and continuity” of both development efforts as we have seen in earlier years. development is a multidimensional process that has social, political, or economic aspects. hence, development efforts should be carried out in all parts of society for greater benefit. to do this, we need to use both top-down and bottom-up approaches to “promote interaction and dialogue among all levels”. no single development effort, either top-down or bottom-up, is effective in the long run. even in the globalized world, the dependence on the very notion of south-south cooperation cannot be the only means to break the cycle of poverty in the global south. there are needs for both north-south and south-south cooperation or north-south-south cooperation in the globalized world. at the same time, it is important to have a mixture of both top-down and bottom-up approaches to development. this is applicable both in the global development cooperation and in the development projects undertaken by the states in the global south. as a debate on “development” continues, the poor and third world states at the bottom cannot wait for any solidarity or consensus which will bring a unanimous effort. the continuation of both top-down state responsibilities and bottom-up individual capabilities are important for the development of the poor in the global south. attaining sdgs, tackling climate change, and possible financial downturns are major challenges coming ahead for the developing nations where the states are required to bargain and negotiate at the global level for mutual benefits, accountability, risk reduction, and vulnerability. at the same time, the citizens, ngos, and 105kaiser, md shahidulla civil society organizations at the bottom must cooperate with the state in utilizing their potentialities and capabilities. in the new era of development, “state” is back again. it has proved successful in the developmental state economy as well as building foundations for the success of liberalization and market forces in china and india. what is now needed is an “inclusive we” for the development. this “we” includes both “top-down” and “bottom-up” forces and attempts put together in a state. at the global level, both north-south and south-south cooperation or north-south-south triangular cooperation are required. it should be emphasized that given this situation of interdependencies, complex nature of development, and global character, it is not possible to ascertain which particular development approach is more effective than the other. funding the author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/ or publication of this article. acknowledgments a newspaper op-ed was published based on some components of the article in the daily star, leading english daily newspaper in bangladesh. the link to the editorial is https://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-252290. references bond, patrick. 2006. “global governance campaigning and mdgs: from top-down to bottom-up anti-poverty work.” third world quarterly 27(2):339-354. brett, e. a. 2003. “participation 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flinders university, australia abstract this article analyses local elections held in the post-suharto era in indonesia with a special reference to pilkada (pemilihan kepala daerah langsung [direct elections of local leaders]) between 2005 and 2008. using the state-society perspective, it argues that local elections have seen the rise of new political dynamics and rapid growth of electoral activity in regions. pilkada has brought about the emergence of coalitional politics, political ideologies or streams (aliran), the rise of ‘little kings’ (raja kecil), an increasing number of businesspeople entering local politics, the use of gangsters/goons (preman) in local elections, a boom in political consultancy, and the increase of the novote camp. there are grounds for optimism regxarding the intensity of the interaction between the local state and society in the regions. the people in the regions have now had the opportunities to vote for their leaders directly, something which was impossible in the past. there is no doubt that the electoral competition for candidates is going to be very important because the availability of good potential local leaders varies between the regions. political parties themselves have to improve their performance and build a proper recruitment process so that they can find good candidates who can attract voters. key words local elections, local politics, pilkada, indonesia introduction this article examines local elections in post-suharto indonesia with a focus on the direct elections for local heads or pilkada (pemilihan kepala daerah langsung [direct elections of local leaders]) which have been held * priyambudi sulistiyanto, college of humanities, arts and social sciences, flinders university, adelaide, australia. email: priyambudi.sulistiyanto@flinders.edu.au 136 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 2, 2020 throughout indonesia since 2005. unlike the national elections, which since the fall of suharto in 1998 have been held five times, in 1999 (parliamentary elections), 2004, 2009, 2014, and 2019 (parliamentary elections and direct presidential elections), little is known about pilkada. there is no doubt that by successfully holding national elections indonesia has reached a milestone that confirms the country as a new emerging democracy in the region. in this article, i want to argue that the new political phenomenon pilkada deserves serious attention, as the post-suharto indonesia battles to remove the remnants of past authoritarianism while embracing a new democratic path. it suggests here that the intense local contest among political parties and local leaders to assert their control over power and economic resources in the regions occurred during the process of dismantling indonesia’s centralistic political structure. at the same time, it shows that pilkada has facilitated the rapid growth of electoral activity and also enabled local people to vote for their leaders directly which is important in a democracy. pilkada has also brought new trends such as the emergence of coalitional politics which often goes beyond individual political parties’ ideologies or streams (aliran), the rise of ‘little kings’ (raja kecil), an increased number of businesspeople entering local politics, the use of gangsters/goons (preman) in local elections, a boom in political consultancy and the increase of the no-vote camp (golput). widespread money politics, vote-buying, and corruption are also among trends emerging from pilkada in the regions. this article suggests that we need to critically examine pilkada throughout indonesia with a view to learning and comparing it with a similar phenomenon in the southeast asian region. through this examination, we can avoid making simple generalizations because the dynamics of local elections do not necessarily imitate those of the national level. political parties and local leaders who compete in pilkada have their interests which are often shaped by the configuration of local power and by local issues affecting ordinary people. similar trends in local politics including the emergence of corruption, political killings, and the rise of strong leaders in localities also occurred in the philippines and thailand in the 1990s (pasuk and sungsidh 1994; mcvey 2000; and arghiros 2001). the questions i pose in this article are what do we know about pilkada and what have the results of pilkada meant for indonesia’s new democracy? do the results of pilkada in other regions give us some insights into the local elections in java and bali in 2008? what were the results of the local elections in those places that have had implications during the 2009 parliamentary and presidential elections? 137priyambudi sulistiyanto contending perspectives there has lately been an increase in academic interest in decentralization and local politics in the post-suharto era with scholars and observers offering a variety of perspectives to explain the nature and consequences of dismantling the new order’s centralistic political structure. let me examine briefly each perspective. neo-institutional perspective this perspective argues that decentralization is an important step towards making the relationship between government and the people closer, which is achieved through the transfer of responsibilities from the national to local governments. local elections are important because they allow locals to elect their leaders without the intervention of the central government. through decentralization, local governments will have more power or leverage to deliver programs and services for the local people. decentralization will make it easier for political and business actors to reach out to people in the regions. to achieve this, however, there should be capacity building of institutions in the local government. capacity building means that the local government must improve its performance by adopting good governance principles such as accountability, transparency, legal frameworks, and participation (turner and podger 2003:6). consequently, good and proper designs for decentralization policies are required, and the role of non-government organizations or civil society in participating in the local policy-making processes is needed. in the long run, decentralization will encourage the regions to find their resources through raising revenue and bringing investors to the regions. in other words, decentralization will enhance and eventually benefit local markets. the idea of decentralization was discussed among policymakers and international consultants in the 1990s when the global trend of democratization reached out to many nations including indonesia. as is widely known, there has been a great deal of exchange of ideas between the indonesian bureaucrats attached to the ministry of home affairs and those from international donor/aid agencies such as the gtz (deutsche gesellschaft fur technische zusammenarbeit), the world bank, the undp (united nations of development programme), the adb (asian development bank) and usaid (turner and podger 2003:129-30). this nexus provided critical international support for indonesia, especially as the central government had limited resources with which to implement decentralization policies. decentralization was one of the key reform 138 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 2, 2020 agendas that emerged during the habibie government. as the pressure for decentralization gained strength, the new parliament, which came in after the 1999 general election, enacted the law on local government (no. 22/1999) and the law on new financial arrangements between jakarta and the regions (no. 25/1999), enabling the decentralization process to begin. neo-marxist perspective this perspective is a critique of the neo-institutionalist position. it argues that decentralization is about politics and power. it offers the view that decentralization does not always lead to an improvement in the regions because predatory forces at both central and local levels do not hesitate to derail or hijack the policies or programs aimed at improving the wellbeing of local people. these predatory forces comprise key players from the ‘old’ centralistic political system who have survived the change and managed to adjust their role in a new democratic political system. many of them are linked to the old power holders and can forge a coalition with the new power holders in the regions. these predatory forces enter local elections to control political and economic resources in the regions. these see local elections as an arena through which they can achieve their goals to control political and economic resources available in the regions. they may support political parties or local leaders even if this requires the use of bribes or ‘money politics’ (the popular indonesian term for corruption). accordingly, establishing good governance principles at the local level will be difficult because these powerful predatory forces will do their part to ensure those principles do take root. these predatory forces also will organize uncivil society organizations to work against civil society in the regions in the contest for controlling regional political and economic resources. examples of this perspective include robison and hadiz (2004), and hadiz (2004 and 2007). political history perspective proponents of this perspective argue that the idea of a decentralized government is not new in indonesia in that it has historical and constitutional foundations that can be traced back to the post-independence period. the spirit of decentralization is recognized in article 18 of the 1945 constitution, which states that the people of the regions can govern their affairs as long as they operate within the context of a unitary indonesia. this constitutional foundation recognizes the diversity and complexity of the regions —an acknowledgment to the regions whose people were 139priyambudi sulistiyanto anxious and suspicious of a central government governing a large country like indonesia. unfortunately, centralization quickly became the reality as the newly independent indonesia faced regional rebellions and separatist movements in rich regions such as aceh, papua, south sulawesi, west sumatera, east kalimantan, and west java. both sukarno and suharto governed indonesia in a strongly centralist manner that maintained the unity of indonesia at all costs including adopting authoritarian and militaristic governance styles to exploit the rich resources available in the regions. the point here is that the aspiration of the regions to run their affairs has never disappeared and decentralization as an issue became a part of the reformasi movement which spread throughout indonesia in the lead up to the fall of suharto in 1998. the push towards decentralization was a clear rejection of the centralistic nature of suharto’s new order government which suppressed and denied the freedoms of the people in the regions to run their territories with a considerable amount of autonomy. for many indonesians, anxiety and disappointment over the decision of the majority of the people of timor leste to leave indonesia in the united nationssponsored referendum in 1999 created a sense of fear that other troubled regions would break away from indonesia. it was against this backdrop that suharto’s successors (b. j. habibie, abdurrahman wahid, megawati, and susilo bambang yudhoyono) pursued decentralization policies which allowed the regions greater freedom in running their affairs and the right to choose their leaders. this political history perspective can be found in the writings of malley (2003), schulte nordholt and van klinken (2007), and also mietzner (2007). state-society perspective proponents of this perspective argue that the nature of decentralization in the regions depends on the dynamics of state-society relations at the local level. it suggests that decentralization paves the way for local state and society actors in the regions to interact and to negotiate with each other in the context of developing their regions. each region has particular dynamics in its state-society relations. in the regions which have strong and capable local leaders and bureaucracies and better human resources and economic standards, the interactions between state and society actors tend to be better (though not always) compared to those in poorer regions. since decentralization was implemented in 2001, there has been a rise in local civil society actors (encompassing religious organizations, businesspeople, professional associations, journalists, academics, activists, 140 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 2, 2020 and students) who participate in negotiating issues affecting the regions. for example, in the district of jepara in central java, the role of the local nahdlatul ulama branch and non-government organizations is very important, especially in monitoring and scrutinizing the conduct of local government and their leaders to undertake local development projects. the opposition of civil society to the proposed nuclear reactor in jepara shows that local democracy has developed well in this part of indonesia. in bantul district, yogyakarta, a critical role was played by local journalists, artists, and activists from non-government organizations in voicing the concerns of victims of the 2006 earthquake regarding the slowness of the local government in distributing relief assistance and compensation fund. the state-society perspective can be found in the writings of schiller (2007) and erawan (2007). pilkada (2005-2008) pilkada became possible after the parliament enacted the law on local government (no. 32/2004) in the last days of the megawati presidency. the exact numbers of pilkada are not available, but according to the home affairs minister mardiyanto, from 2005 to 2008 there have been 480 pilkada while the data from the people’s voter education network shows less than that number (table 1). the busiest year was in 2005 when more than 200 pilkada were held across indonesia. kutai kertanegara district was the first district to hold pilkada, with the election won convincingly by syaukani hr and samsuri aspar supported by golkar. in the following three years, pilkada was held in many districts and municipalities where the majority of incumbent district heads (bupati) and municipality heads (walikota) were reelected, but others were voted out. the controversial pilkada was the one in depok municipality in the south of the capital city of jakarta where the dispute over the results of the pilkada had to be resolved in the supreme court. overall, however, most pilkada were held without the sort of crisis that could derail pilkada as a mechanism for the direct election of local leaders. this is quite remarkable considering many regions and peoples who were involved in this local political contest, and the magnitude of organizational and logistical capabilities and local resources required to hold many pilkada. there are important principles behind the establishment of pilkada in the regions throughout indonesia. people in the regions can directly elect their leaders as opposed to the indirect election through the votes of local 141priyambudi sulistiyanto parliament members (dprd[dewan perwakilan rakyat daerah]), which was based on the previous law on local governments (no.4/1974 and no. 22/1999). with pilkada, the people in the regions can elect leaders who are known by them and who care about local issues. also, the people in the regions can communicate directly with those who want to contest in elections and exercise their democratic rights through their participation in electing their leaders. as has been discussed widely, the indirect election mechanism was prone to ‘money politics’ as both candidates and members of local parliament were individually and collectively involved in bribing and betting to choose provincial governors or district heads. now, by allowing the people to vote in pilkada, a greater level of public scrutiny is possible. the emergence of independent candidates in the regions is positive in the sense that there is more choice in electing local leaders. the independent candidates are often those who failed to get the endorsement of political parties or those who believe they can mobilize political supports from their community. however, it is too early to know the effectiveness of independent candidates in contesting local elections since the obstacles are not small because they need not just supporters but also other resources. at the end of 2008, the success rate of independent candidates in indonesia was low. nonetheless, we can certainly expect that this trend will continue to gain attention in the years to come. the political developments in aceh during the 2009 election are also worth mentioning such as the emergence of local political parties (partai lokal). i see this will become an issue in the future simply because local people and their leaders may believe they can pursue their political aspirations better through local parties rather than through national political parties. one could argue that if local political parties are permitted in aceh, then why not also in other places in indonesia? historically, local political parties contested local and national elections during the parliamentary democracy period in the 1950s. the role of the regional election commission (kpud [komisi pemilihan umum daerah]) was important for whether the pilkada turned into successes or failures. this all depended on the funding support which in the case of kpud came from the local government. in several places, there were a lot of concerns about the lack of funding and human resources to enable kupd to perform its task well. according to the regulation, the local government is responsible for ensuring that funding is available for the kupd to administer local elections. problems occurred when local 142 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 2, 2020 governments delayed the provision of funding and other resources needed by the kupd to prepare for elections. another concern that often generated legal disputes among political parties claimed that irregularities occurred during the counting of votes. the reality, however, is somewhat different. we can see the use of money (‘money politics’) is still an issue that affects the selection process for candidates in pilkada. candidates need to be endorsed by a political party or a coalition of political parties (holding a minimum of 15 percent seats in local parliament). in the selection process, price tags have been applied for candidates who want to contest the pilkada with amounts in the range of idr 5-10 billion for district head and above idr15 billion for the provincial governor. the rich or popular candidates and candidates who have strong financial backers are most successful at winning the endorsement of political parties. but, this does not necessarily mean that these candidates will win the elections. pilkada has also seen the rise of ‘little kings’ (raja kecil). the role of bupati and governors in the new decentralized indonesia carries much weight in terms of regional power and influence. those who have been elected as governors or district/municipality heads come from diverse backgrounds such as bureaucrats, businesspeople, artists, former military officers, academics, journalists, and activists. sultan hamengku buwono x, who is the governor of the special province of yogyakarta, is one of them. he comes from the yogyakarta royal family and, in a real sense, he is a raja. he has enormous political power and popular appeal which extend beyond his province. he was elected as governor in 1998 and still holds this position but recently he was also seen as a possible contender for the 2009 presidential election, alongside the incumbent president susilo bambang yudhoyono and megawati sukarnoputri. another raja kecil is fadel muhammad who is currently the governor of gorontalo province in north sulawesi. originating from gorontalo, he became a successful business figure in jakarta. he has developed his hometown rapidly over the past years transforming the gorontalo region into an emerging region in the eastern part of indonesia. he is a leading political figure within golkar and he may go into national politics. in blitar, east java, there is djarot saiful hidayat, who was successful in developing blitar with his populist policies favoring small traders and local entrepreneurs. since he became mayor in 1999 he has gained respect and popularity, which positions him as an important local leader in the blitar region (tempo, 28 december 2008). as suggested earlier, there have been new developments in local politics in indonesia where the national and local political and economic 143priyambudi sulistiyanto interests converge and coalesce. pilkada has brought about the emergence of coalitional politics which often goes beyond political parties’ ideologies or ‘streams’ (aliran). these political coalitions are fluid and pragmatic and reflect the local political constellation in the regions. the kinds of political coalitions that are established differ from region to region and there is no guarantee that a local political coalition among members endorsed by the big parties will automatically succeed in local elections. in fact, in several cases of pilkada, a political coalition of small political parties has been able to defeat those of big parties. coalitions of nationalist parties usually comprise pdip (indonesian democratic party-struggle), golkar, pd (democratic party), and other small (nationalist) political parties. nationalist-islamist coalitions comprise pdip, golkar, pd, pan (the national mandate party), pkb (the nation awakening party), pbb (crescent star party), and other small (islamic) political parties. islamist coalition comprises ppp (the united development party), pbb, and other small (islamic) political parties. nationalist-islamist-christian coalitions comprise pdip, golkar, pkb, pks (the prosperous justice party), ppp, pan, pbb, pds (the prosperous and peace party), and other small political parties. the appearance of local gangsters/goons (preman) in pilkada is regarded by some observers as a new phenomenon, but in fact preman have long been established in indonesian society. they appeared in the postindependence period organizing themselves in various militia groupings. during suharto’s new order, the ruling party golkar used preman to mobilize voters and intimidate opponents. now, almost every political party has its militia groups or task force (satgas [satuan tugas]). these appear at many parties’ mass gatherings. among them are the satgas pdip and bmi (banteng muda indonesia [indonesian young bulls]) which belong to pdip. members are recruited from local youth. meanwhile, golkar has the ampg (angkatan muda partai golkar) in areas with a strong golkar’s supporter. the pkb has the garda bangsa or pagar bangsa, the ppp has the amk (angkatan muda ka’bah) which has members coming from various islamic youth organizations. the youth wing of pan is known as bm pan (barisan muda pan) and the pemuda demokrat and satgas pks belong to pd and pks respectively. another trend is the boom in political consultancy aimed at helping political parties and their candidates to win pilkada. this new business activity took off in the past years with a range of political consultancy organizations offering surveys and quick counts for national and local elections, which in many instances causing controversy especially when 144 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 2, 2020 their information is not accurate or differs from official accounts. i would argue that the introduction of surveys and quick counts has been very popular informing and educating voters and the general public about the contending candidates in pilkada. some of the key political consultants are the lsi (lembaga survei indonesia) which pioneered political consultancy in indonesia. it was established in 2003 by yayasan pengembangan demokrasi indonesia by denny january aly and saiful mujani who obtained doctoral degrees from the ohio state university in the us. denny was in charge as its executive director while saiful was one of the researchers. they obtained knowledge on political consultancy in the us and apply survey methodologies similar to those used by political consultancy firms there. in 2005, denny january aly established the lsi (lingkaran survei indonesia) which offers similar services and he has become the executive director. the former is now headed by saiful mujani. this was followed by others such as fox indonesia led by choel mallarangeng, strategic political intelligence (spin) led by hamid basyaib, the cirus surveyors group led by andrinof a. chaniago, and the reform institute led by yudi latif (tempo, 18 january 2009). also, another trend is the increase of the no-vote camp (golput [golongan putih]) in pilkada across indonesia. golput refers to eligible (registered) voters who refuse to go to ballot booths or those who deliberately destroy the ballot papers as a symbol of protest. golput is not a new political phenomenon. it emerged as a protest vote in indonesia in the 1970s and has appeared in every election since then, reminding the public that there is a small number of voters who are not satisfied with the elections or who are disillusioned with how political parties and their leaders conduct their activities. in several pilkadas, there has been an increased percentage of golput votes around 25-30 percent in district or municipality levels and 35-40 percent at provincial level. the local media and local advertising industry in the regions also benefited from pilkada especially when it comes to promoting and advertising the profile of candidates for local elections. the cost of political advertising varies between regions. the most expensive is in jakarta (and java/bali). for example, it costs idr5-10 million to run 1-2 minute radio commercials, idr10-25 million for a section in a newspaper, and idr100200 million for a television advertisement for 1-2 minutes duration. such costs will likely continue to rise in years to come. 145priyambudi sulistiyanto provincial pilkada in indonesia what insights do we get from the results of pilkada about local elections? let me examine the results of pilkada for governors held throughout indonesia from 2005 to 2008 (table 2). from 2005 to 2008, the candidates for governorship supported by the indonesian democratic party-struggle (pdi-p) on its own won in north sulawesi, central kalimantan, west kalimantan, east nusa tenggara, lampung, central java, and bali. however, this success was not repeated in other places. here the pdip was forced to establish a coalition with other parties, including those with different ideologies or aliran such as pbb, pks, and ppp. for golkar, from 2005 to 2008, the results were poor especially for golkar with their candidates winning in only two provinces in 2006: west sulawesi and gorontalo. only golkar has strong supporters in these provinces in sulawesi especially in gorontalo where the local people voted overwhelmingly for fadel muhammad. as a result, golkar decided to form a coalition with other political parties and the results were good in that golkar and its coalition successfully won pilkada in six provinces: jambi, riau islands, banten, jakarta, south sumatera, and riau. the medium and small political parties such as pks, pan, pkb, ppp, pd, pds and pbb also did very well especially by forming several different coalitions and successfully won in bengkulu, south kalimantan, central sulawesi, bangka belitung, north maluku, southeast sulawesi, west java, north sumatera, east kalimantan, and west nusa tenggara. overall, the results tell us that coalitional politics was the best way for political parties to win provincial pilkada in indonesia. what can be said about the recent provincial pilkada held in java and bali? four provinces (west java, central java, bali and east java) held pilkada in 2008. the voters who live in java and bali account for almost two-thirds of total votes in indonesia. it has to be mentioned here that the major political parties golkar and pdip won in java and bali in the 2004 general elections, while parties such as pkb, pks, pan, ppp, and pd also took the remaining votes. therefore, winning provincial pilkada in java and bali was seen as crucial as political parties prepare for the 2009 general elections. in what follows, i examine the results of each of pilkada in java and bali. west java province the results of pilkada in west java province, which was held on 13 april 2008, were big news in indonesia. the candidates supported by major 146 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 2, 2020 political parties such as golkar and pdip lost and suffered a humiliating defeat. a coalition of golkar and pd supported the pair of the incumbent governor, danny setiawan, and iwan sulandjana, while the pdip with the support from ppp, pkb, and other small political parties to endorse agum gumelar and nu’man abdul hakim. the winners were ahmad heryawan and dede yusuf who were supported by a coalition of pks and pan. west java is an important place for major political parties. in the 2004 general election, golkar won 29.4 percent of the vote followed by pdi-p (16.7 percent) with the remaining votes shared equally by parties such as pks, pd, pkb, and pan. the results of the west java pilkada tell us that the supporters of golkar and pdip did not vote for their respective candidates. one theory for this defeat was that the party supporters did not work hard enough to help their candidates at the grassroots level. it is true that the public perception of the incumbent governor, danny setiawan, was not positive as he has been in the job for a long time and more importantly he was implicated in some corruption cases (funds for ambulance and housing project for local parliamentarians) (tempo, 27 april 2008). agum gumelar also suffered image problems, being seen by the supporters of pdip as someone who failed as an attractive candidate because he was seen as a part of the new order period. many voters believed he was not a good candidate as he had also failed in the selection process for pilkada in jakarta in 2007 and before that he was also not successful in the 2004 presidential election. meanwhile, ahmad heryawan and dede yusuf were regarded by many voters as new generation local leaders who were young and fresh. dede yusuf, who is a former movie star, was very popular among young voters and women in west java. the two men were very creative in their support campaigns reaching out not just to the islamic community but also pdip and golkar voters and non-sundanese voters living in west java province. then, this victory was a result of the work of the supporters and party machinery of pks and pan during the campaign period. it is interesting to see whether the rise of pks and pan in west java would continue in the 2009 general elections. central java province the results of pilkada in central java province, which was held on 22 june 2008, was very interesting as the candidates supported by big parties from pdip and golkar fought against the candidates endorsed by small parties from pks, pd, pkb, ppp, and pan. in many ways, it was a tight contest, 147priyambudi sulistiyanto with the candidates supported by the pdip (bibit waluyo and rustriningsih) winning in this pilkada. they were popular and well known. bibit waluyo was a high-profile military general who had occupied several important military positions such as the chief of the regional military command in central java and also the chief of the strategic military command in jakarta. there is a long-standing tradition of governors in central java coming from military ranks. rustiningsih is a successful leader from kebumen district and is among the first women elected as district heads in the post-suharto era. her success in developing kebumen district also brought about the speculation that she would be among potential candidates to reach the pdip at the national level in years to come. in this pilkada, golkar, which supported bambang sadono and muhammad adnan, lacked votes from city and rural areas in central java, which were dominated by pdip voters. candidates who were supported by small islamic parties gained much, sharing the rest of the votes available during the pilkada. for the pdip, this pilkada was very important because it has proven its solid support in central java. the results tell that the pdip’s party supporters worked hard at the grassroots level throughout central java. this augurs well for 2009 when megawati run again in the presidential elections. bali province the result of pilkada in bali province, which was held on 9 july 2008, was to be expected as the candidates supported by the pdip won convincingly against the other candidates. the pdip supported mangku pastika and a.a. puspayoga because they are prominent both internationally and locally. mangku pastika was the chief of police in bali province and was instrumental in dealing with the impacts of the bali terrorist attack in 2002. a.a. puspayoga was familiar to many balinese people as he belongs to the royal family in denpasar. the appointment of these candidates benefited pdip enormously. it sent a strong message to voters that the political stability and security needed by bali could be delivered by the leadership of mangku pastika and a.a. puspayoga. overall, the results demonstrate that support for the pdip in bali remains strong, which was a positive message for megawati in 2009. east java province pilkada in east java province was held in two rounds. in the first round 148 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 2, 2020 (22 july 2008), the results were very close for candidates. the candidates who were supported by pd and pan (soekarwo and syaifullah yusuf) and those who were supported by ppp and other small parties (khofifah indar parawansa and mudjiono) won together and went on to contest the second round (held on 4 november 2008). the results in the first round showed voters were divided along nationalist and islamist lines. the voters from the nationalist camp went to golkar, pdip, and pd while voters from the islamist camp went to pkb, ppp, and pan. this was very interesting because in the end, no one was able to win a majority vote. the results in the second round were even more complicated and again divided equally. this occurred because pdip decided to support khofifah indar parawansa and mudjiono while golkar supported the soekarwo and syaifullah yusuf camp. image 1 pilkada campaign ad on becak photo by sulistiyanto (2008) all these results suggest that none of the candidates were as credible and well known as those in west java, central java, and bali. the voters in east java province were are also diverse and divided along the party lines. it will be also interesting to see whether the voters in east java province would be divided again in the 2009 general elections. in the second round 149priyambudi sulistiyanto held on 4 november 2008, the results were very closed which, according to the kpud, the winner went to the soekarwo-saifullah camp. this decision was protested by the khofifah-mudjiono camp because they argued that they were irregularities occurred in several places in madura island and they brought the case to the constitutional court to solve it. finally, on 2 february 2009, the constitutional court decided that the case brought by the khofifah-mudjiono was not strong and therefore concluded that the results of the second round of pilkada were valid and the soekarwosaifullah camp was the winner. conclusion this article has examined local elections held in the post-suharto era in indonesia between 2005 and 2008. it has been argued that with pilkada we have seen the rise of new political dynamics in the regions. there has been the rapid growth of electoral activity and the possibility of local people directly electing their leaders. pilkada has brought about the emergence of coalitional politics, straddling political ideologies or streams (aliran), the rise of ‘little kings’ (raja kecil), an increasing number of businesspeople entering local politics, the use of gangsters/goons (preman) in local elections, a boom in political consultancy, and the increase of the no-vote camp (golput). in explaining all of this, i suggest that the state-society perspective is useful to examine the emergence of local politics in indonesia. through this perspective, we can see that the success and failures of decentralization depend on the dynamics of state-society relations at the local level. by allowing the regions to run their activities, the local state and society actors can interact and negotiate with each other to develop their regions. each region indeed has different characteristics and political dynamics which sometimes produce different stories. from the above examination of the pilkada held throughout indonesia from 2005 to 2008, it can be suggested here that there are grounds for optimism regarding the intensity of the interaction between the local state and society in the regions. the people in the regions have now had the opportunities to vote for their leaders directly, something which was impossible in the past. there is no doubt that the electoral competition for candidates is going to be very important because the availability of good potential local leaders varies between the regions. political parties themselves have to improve their performance and to build a proper recruitment process so that they can find good candidates who can attract voters. the failure to do all of this would only confirm skepticism that money and power in indonesia are two sides of the same coin. 150 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 2, 2020 acknowledgment the author thanks jim schiller, hadar gumay, sentot setyosiswanto, and rumekso setyadi for their inputs. thanks also to evi nurvidya arifin and bernhard platzdasch for their constructive suggestions to this article. table 1 pilkada in indonesia (2005-2008) year district/municipality province 2005 207 7 2006 70 7 2007 35 6 2008 146 13 total 458 32 source: people’s voter education network (2008) table 2 provincial pilkada in indonesia (2005-2008) province winning candidates political party coalition votes and percentage north sulawesi (2005) sinyo h. sarundajang and freddy harry sualang pdip 447,581 (39%) central kalimantan (2005) agustin teras narang and achmad diran pdip 347,540 (44%) jambi (2005) zulkifli nurdin and antoni zeidra abidin pan, golkar, pks, pbb 995,792 (80%) 151priyambudi sulistiyanto west sumatera (2005) gamawan fauzi and marlis rahman pbb, pdip 757,296 (42%) bengkulu (2005, two rounds) agusrin maryono and syamlan pks, pbr 170,149 (23%) riau archipelago (2005) ismet abdullah and muh. sani golkar, pks, ppp 309,119 (61%) south kalimantan (2005) rudi arifin and nur rosehan pkb, ppp 444,637 (32%) central sulawesi (2006) h. bandjela paliuju and h. ahmad yahya pbb, pan, pkpb, pkb 411,113 (36.15%) papua (2006) barnabas suebu and alex hasegem pdip, pib, pbsd, p pancasila 323,979 (30.75%) west irian jaya (2006) abraham o atururi and rahimin katjong pdip, ppdk, pd, pnim, ppdi, pnbk, pbsd, p pancasila, p pelopor 183,279 (61.3%) west sulawesi (2006) anwar adnan saleh and amri sabusi golkar 220,076 (46.26%) banten (2006) ratu atut chosiyah and m. masduki golkar, pdip, pds, pbb and pbr 1,445,457 (40%) 152 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 2, 2020 gorontalo (2006) fadel muhammad and gusnar ismail golkar 423.335 (81%) nanggroe aceh darussalam (2006) irwandi jusuf and m. nazar independent 768.745 (38.20%) bangka belitung (2007) eko maulana ali and syamsudin basari pbb, pks, pan, pd 180,641 (35.3%) jakarta (2007) fauzi bowo and prijanto golkar, pdip, pd, ppp, pan, pkb, pbb, pbr, pbb and other small parties 2,109,511 (57.87%) west kalimantan (2007) cornelis and christiandy sanjaya pdip 930,679 (43.67%) north maluku (2007) thaib armaiyn and abdul ghani kasuba pd, pks, pbb and pkb 179,020 (37.35%) south sulawesi (2007) syahrul yasin limpo and agus arifin nu’mang pdip, pan, pdk and pds 1,432,572 (39.53%) southeast sulawesi (2007) nur alam and saleh lasata pan and pbr 421,360 (42.78%) west java (2008) ahmad heryawan and dede yusuf pks and pan 7,287,647 (40.5%) 153priyambudi sulistiyanto north sumatera (2008) syamsul arifin and gatot pujo nugroho ppp, pks, pbb, pkpb, pkpi, psi, pdk and other small parties 1,396,892 (28.69%) east kalimantan (2008) awang faroek ishak and farid wadjdy pd, pds, ppp, pan, pkb, pm and pbr 426,325 (28.9%) east nusa tenggara (2008) frans lebu raya and esthon foenay pdip 772,632 (37.34%) central java (2008) bibit waluyo and rustriningsih pdip 6,084.261 (43.43%) bali (2008) mangku pastika and anak agung puspa yoga pdip 1,087,910 (55.04%) west nusa tenggara (2008) gh zainul majdi and badrul munir pbb and pks 847,976 (38.84%) maluku (2008) karel albert ralahalu and said assagaff pdip, pd, pbr, pdk, pkpi, ppnui and pbb 452.711 (62.14%) lampung (2008) sjachroedin and joko umar pdip 1,513.666 (43.27%) south sumatera (2008) alex noerdin and eddy yusuf golkar, pd, pbb, pan, pbr and pnbk 1,866,390 (51.4%) 154 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 2, 2020 riau (2008) rusli zainal and mambang mit golkar, pkb, ppp and pbr 1,069,196 (57.48%) east java (2008, two rounds) soekarwo and saifullah yusuf pd, pan and other small parties 7.729.944 (50.60%) source: centre for electoral reform (2008) and berita indonesia http://beritaindonesia.co.id/politik/catatan-pilkadajatim/print/ (accessed 18 december 2009). notes 1 among these scholars are weatherbee (2001), sulistiyo (2002), king (2003), ananta, arifin and suryadinata (2004), antlov and cederroth (2004), and schwarz (2004). 2 see sulistiyanto (2004) and baswedan (2007). 3 there are a number of studies on pilkada published in indonesian language such as amirudin and a. zaini bisri (2006), joko j. prihatmoko (2005), m. mufti mubarok (2005), and pheni chalid (2005). meanwhile, for a study in english language, see erb and sulistiyanto (2009). 4 for example, see sakai (2002); aspinall and fealy (2003); kingsbury and aveling (2003); erb, faucher and sulistiyanto (2005); and schulte nordholt and van klinken (2007). 5 also the asia foundation and ford foundation, to name a few, supported decentralization programs in several places in indonesia. 6 east kalimantan is among the rich regions and has no traced of local rebellion. 7 thanks to jim schiller for this point. 8 only five pilkada (north maluku, taur bengkulu, southeast aceh, west sulawesi and tuban) encountered legal disputes. two more pilkada (east java and east kalimantan) will be held toward the end of 2008. see, http://www.mediaindonesia.com/print.php?ar_ id=38144, accessed 22 october 2008. 9 the local political parties were allowed to contest in the national elections in the 1950s and therefore the aceh case is without precedent in indonesia. 10 this data was provided by different sources in indonesia (personal communication, 7 november 2008).i 155priyambudi sulistiyanto 11 this data was provided by the centre for electoral reform, a nongovernmental organization based in jakarta. 12 both pks and pan did not done well in the 2009 parliamentary election in west java and surprisingly the yudhoyono’s pd won many votes, capturing the voters from these two parties. 13 pdip did relatively well in central java during the 2009 parliamentary elections but still did help much in giving votes needed for megawati in the presidential election held in july 2009. 14 pdip won the votes in bali in the 2009 parliamentary election as well as in the presidential election. the pd ranked in the second followed by golkar, pkb, pan and other small parties. references amirudin and a. zaini bisri. 2006. pilkada langsung: problem and prospek, sketsa singkat pejalanan pilkada 2005. yogyakarta: pustaka pelajar. ananta, aris, evi nurvidya arifin and leo suryadinata. 2004. indonesian electoral behaviour: a statistical perspective. singapore: institute of southeast asian studies. antlov, hans and sven cederroth, eds. 2004. elections in indonesia: the new order and beyond. london: routledgecurzon. arghiros, daniel. 2001. decentralization in thailand. london: routlegecurzon. aspinall, edward and greg fealy, eds. 2003. local power and politics in indonesia. singapore and canberra: institute of southeast asian studies and research school of pacific and asian studies, australian national university. baswedan, anies r. 2007. “indonesian politics in 2007: the presidency, local elections and the future of democracy”. bulletin of indonesian economic studies 43(3): 323-340. chalid, pheni, ed. 2005. pilkada langsung: demokratisasi daerah dan mitos good governance. jakarta: p.t. mardi mulyo. choi, nankyung. 2007. “local elections and democracy in indonesia: the riau archipelago”. journal of contemporary asia 37 (3): 326345. 156 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 2, 2020 erawan, i ketut putra. 2007. “tracing the progress of local governments since decentralisation”. pp. 55-72 in indonesia, democracy and the promise of good governance, edited by ross h. mcleod and andrww macintyre. singapore and canberra: institute of southeast asian studies and research school of pacific and asian studies, the australian national university. erb, maribeth, carole faucher and priyambudi sulistiyanto, eds. 2005. regionalism in post-suharto indonesia. london and new york: routledgecurzon. erb, maribeth and priyambudi sulistiyanto. 2009. “indonesia and the quest for “democracy”. pp. 1-37 in deepening democracy in indonesia, direct elections for local leaders (pilkada), edited by maribeth erb and priyambudi sulistiyanto. singapore: institute of southeast asian studies. hadiz, vedi r. 2004. “indonesian local party politics: a site of resistance to neoliberal reform”. critical asian studies 36 (4): 615-636. hadiz, vedi r. 2007. “the localization of power in southeast asia”. democratization 14 (5): 873-892. king, dwight y. 2003. half hearted reform: electoral institutions and the struggle for democracy in indonesia. westport and london: praeger. kingsbury, damien and harry aveling, eds. 2003. autonomy and disintegration in indonesia. london and new york: routledgecurzon. malley, michael s. 2003. “new rules, old structures and the limits of democratic decentralisation”. pp. 102-116 in local power and politics in indonesia, edited by edward aspinall and greg fealy. singapore and canberra: institute of southeast asian studies and research school of pacific and international studies, the australian national university. mcvey, ruth. 2000. money and politics in provincial thailand. copenhagen: nias. mietzner, marcus. 2007. “local elections and autonomy in papua and aceh: mitigating or fueling secessionism?” indonesia 84: 1-39. mubarok, m. mufti. 2005. suksesi pilkada: jurus memenangkan pilkada langsung. surabaya: java pustaka media utama. 157priyambudi sulistiyanto phongpaichit, pasuk and sungsidh piriyarangsan. 1994. corruption and democracy in thailand. chiang mai: silkworm books. prihatmoko, joko j. 2005. pemilihan kepala daerah langsung. filosopi, sistem dan problema penerapan di indonesia. yogyakarta: pustaka pelajar. robison, richard and vedi r. hadiz. 2004. reorganising power in indonesia: the politics of oligarchy in an age of markets. london and new york: routledgecurzon. sakai, minako, ed. 2002. beyond jakarta: regional autonomy and local societies in indonesia. adelaide: crawford publishing house. schwarz, adam. 2004. indonesia: the 2004 election and beyond. singapore: institute of southeast asian studies. schiller, jim. 2007. “civil society in jepara; fractious but inclusive”. pp. 327-348 in renegotiating boundaries: local politics in postsuharto indonesia, edited by schulte nordholt, henk and gerry van klinken. leiden: kitlv press. schulte nordholt, henk and gerry van klinken. 2007. “introduction”. pp. 1-30 in renegotiating boundaries: local politics in post-suharto indonesia, edited by schulte nordholt, henk and gerry van klinken leiden: kitlv press. sulistiyanto, priyambudi. 2004. “redefining the indonesian presidentialism in post-suharto indonesia”. kasarinlan 19 (2): 4-24. sulistyo, hermawan. 2002. “electoral politics in indonesia: a hard way to democracy”. in electoral politics in southeast and east asia, edited by aurel croissant, gabriele bruns and marei john. singapore: friedrich ebert stiftung. tempo, 28 december 2008; 18 january 2009. turner, mark and owen podger. 2003. decentralisation in indonesia: redesigning the state, canberra: asia pacific press, the australian national university. weatherbee, donald. e. 2001. “indonesia: electoral politics in a newly emerging democracy”. in how asia votes, edited by john hsieh fu-sheng and david newman. new york: chatham house publishers and seven bridges press. 158 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 2, 2020 abul kalam azad* fakir chand college, india abstract india is regarded as the world’s largest democratic country. the country is well known for its rich cultural diversity, pluralistic society and inclusive secular democracy. however, the recent political scenario has partially damaged the values of the liberal democracy of india. since narendra modi became prime minister in 2014, the bharatiya janata party (bjp) and its parental body rashtriya swayamsevak sangha (rss) have tried to accomplish their goal of hindu rashtra. minorities in the country have been attacked, killed and deprived of their human rights. this article examines this trend by focusing on the growing intolerance during the modi regime and its impact on the country’s democracy. it also discusses how the bjp at the central government and many other states, directly and indirectly, narrow down the space of civil society and media to fuel majoritarian agenda. based on its findings, the article argues that in the narendra modi regime indian political culture has been undergoing a shift from inclusive democracy to a narrow process of democracy. by doing so, it contributes to the studies on the rise of right-wing populism in some countries including india in the contemporary world. key words hindutva, majoritarianism, democracy, intolerance, diversity, minority, mob lynching, modi, bjp, civil society * contact: assistant professor abul kalam azad, department of political science, fakir chand college (affiliated to the university of calcutta), diamond harbour, south 24 parganas, west bengal, india. email: apjkalam90@gmail.com the question of india’s endangered democracy in the light of intolerance debate: some reflections journal of asian social science research 2022, vol. 4, no. 1: 87-104 https://cassr.net/jassr/ © the author(s) 2022 article introduction since its independence, india has taken a democratic path to govern its citizen. it is viewed that india is the largest democratic nation in the world. even in today’s global scenario, indian democracy is a reference point despite having so many highs and lows. as a political philosophy, 88 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1 2022 democracy highly emphasizes individual liberty. the constitution of india comprises all the democratic ethos and values. in the preamble of the indian constitution, india has been described as a ‘sovereign democratic republic’ and these ideas are incorporated in the articles and schedules of the constitution. the constitution and its makers gave their highest effort to consolidate and establish democratic governance which builds more rational institutions and checks the executive branch of the government. india’s democratic governance produces a democratic culture throughout the nation which provides a higher level of tolerance and pluralism as well. however, the recently experienced majoritarian politics, the cry of hindu nationalism, and the rising hooliganism of anti-democratic radical religious groups have been pushing indian democracy to a certain level of authoritarian democracy. a biased discourse of hindu nationalism has been formed in the mind of the indian middle and lower middle class. an anti-democratic political culture is prevailing throughout the nation and the hindu nationalists blame the secular culture of the country as ‘pseudosecularism’ and it is nothing but appeasement of minority communities. this article examines this trend by focusing on the political scenario of the first five years of narendra modi as prime minister (2014-2019), who is a poster boy of hindutva politics in the post-bajpayee-advani era, and how the way he leads bjp’s political culture is affecting the nation’s liberal democracy and political tolerance. the required data for this study were collected through secondary data sources. the process and development of ‘hindutwa’ politics in india and its effect on india’s democracy were analyzed with the help of available secondary data. the data were collected from various books, journals, contemporary magazines, newspapers, websites, etc. the research questions of this article are how does bjp’s ‘hindutwa’politics affect india as the largest democratic country?; what are the issues of recent religious intolerance in india?; and how the oppression of dalits and civil society has increased during the modi regime? india as a pluralistic nation pluralism is a philosophy that supports multicultural values and emphasizes diversity and tolerance. in a plural society, a smaller group within a larger society can maintain their unique cultural identity, value, and practices. pluralism is only possible when the majority section of society accepts the minority communities and agrees to mutual co-existence. the concept of plural society always emphasizes tolerance, mutual respect and peaceful co-existence among the majority and minority communities. india is a diverse and plural nation. many religious, cultural, and linguistic minority groups have been living in this country for years after years. such heterogeneous culture has evolved over the centuries, through 89abul kalam azad a contentious adoption of cultural traits from the invaders like the aryan, the sakas, the huns, the pathans, the mughals, and the europeans. for this composite culture, many sociologists have described india as a “bouquet of flowers” or “vegetables in a salad bowl”. india is the world’s second-largest country in terms of population that consists of diverse social, cultural, and ethnic elements at large. linguistic diversity is a unique feature of india. the country has no ‘national language’; instead, 22 ‘official’ languages have been recognized in the constitution. a lion’s share portion of the indian population, particularly in the northern region of the country, uses ‘hindi’ as their spoken language. there are also more than 19.500 languages and dialects spoken in india. moreover, india is a land of many religions. the world’s six major religions have a presence in india. of these, hinduism (79.8%), sikhism (1.7%), buddhism (0.7%) and jainism (0.4%) took birth in india, while islam (14.2%) and christianity (1.7%) came from outside (iccrindia.net). caste is an important characteristic of indian society. every individual in hinduism is born into a caste and it is the central principle of four-fold hierarchy (varna) stratification in the hindu social order. there are about 2000-3000 castes/sub-castes in india. as per the census of 2011, 16.6% of the total population of india has scheduled castes. tribes are also a crucial part of the national population, popularly known as adivasis (original inhabitants). india has the largest tribal population in the world. there are 550 tribes in india. according to the census of 2011, 8.6% of the total population of india are scheduled tribes (jayal 2016). ‘india’s democracy is in danger’ the economist, a wide circulated magazine with international repute, published in the last week of the january edition in 2020, had its cover page entitled “intolerant india: how modi is endangering the world’s biggest democracy.” in its ‘leaders’ segment, the weekly magazine published an essay entitled “narendra modi stokes divisions in the world’s biggest democracy” and said that millions of indian muslims are frightened about the process of making a hindu state. the magazine criticized that india changed the law (citizenship amendment act 2019) to make it easier to get citizenship for the followers of all the subcontinent’s religions, except islam. at the same time, the ruling party, bjp. wants to compile a register (national population register) of the country’s hundred and thirty crore citizens, so that they can hunt down illegal immigrants (the economist 2020). the economist intelligence unit also stated that india has ranked 90 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1 2022 india 51 among 165 countries on the global democracy index for 2019. the leader of bjp, vijay chauthaiwale, who is a foreign policy expert of the party, gave counter feedback on twitter saying that the magazine is ‘arrogant’ with a colonial mindset. he wrote on twitter, “we thought the brits had left in 1947! but the editors of @theeconomist are still living in the colonial era. they are furious when 600m indians do not follow their explicit instructions of not voting modi” (outlook 2020). the annual democracy report 2020 prepared by v-dem institute (department of political science, university of gothenburg) and entitled “autocratization surges – resistance grows” says that india is being affected by a trend of autocratization along with some other g-20 countries like the usa, brazil, and turkey. according to the report, india’s democracy status is decreasing under modi’s government because of the severely shrinking of space for the opposition, civil society, and media (v-dem institute 2020). the iconic us-based time magazine (asia edition) dated 20 may 2019 put the indian prime minister narendra modi on its cover and cited him as “india’s divider in chief” –a reference to bjp’s hindutva politics. an article in the magazine entitled “can the world’s largest democracy endure another five years of a modi government?” writes that under modi, minorities of every line —liberals, lower castes, muslims, and christians— have been assaulted. the writer also criticized by mentioning “not only has modi’s economic miracle failed to materialize, but he has also helped create an atmosphere of poisonous religious nationalism in india” (taseer 2019a). the article was written by a new york-based journalist aatish taseer, a son of indian mother senior journalist tavleen singh and pakistani father salman taseer, former governor of pakistan’s punjab province. the next day after the article was published, the bjp hit back with their official spokesperson, dr. sambit patra, addressing a press conference and saying that the time story was written by a pakistani and “that nothing better could be expected from pakistan.” furthermore, narendra modi government decided to revoke the writer’s overseas citizenship of india (oci) status —a permanent visa for persons of indian origin (taseer 2019b). a good number of international media organizations raised their voice over the decision taken by the government of india. world’s eminent creative artists and writers including orhan pamuk and j.m. coetzee (both nobel laureates), salman rushdie, margaret atwood, amitav ghosh, and jonathan franzen, wrote to modi to restore aatish taseer’s oci card. many scholars said that the government decided intolerantly as the writer criticized the prime minister (deb 2019). 91abul kalam azad (in) tolerance: a contradicted political culture of ‘new’ india the people of india are always proud of the motto “unity in diversity” which allows the coexistence of types of diverse cultures without giving privileges to a particular group or community. however, in the recent past, india has witnessed issues that flag serious doubt about its cultural heritage. ram temple, the gita, or the cow became the symbols of national identity. as a result of this, a wave of hindu nationalism has been trying to manipulate indian politics. such illiberal attitudes have been pushing the minority section to the margin. prime minister narendra modi uses the term ‘new india’ in his speech very frequently. a changing pattern of political culture has been seen in modi’s “new india”. citizens tend to imagine a strong concept of nationalism, which would be coercive and there is a tendency to connect the nation with religion. in such a texture of new nationalism, people start to believe the state and its military wing are strong enough to strike at enemies (especially pakistan) at any time. a section of the non-muslim majority sees the muslim population as being more violent and less patriotic than others. very often many leaders of bjp and other right-wing nationalist groups publicly say that “muslims should not be living in india; they should go to pakistan” (palshikar 2019). religious intolerance secularism is a crucial component of democracy. however, the concept is under threat after narendra modi-led bjp came to power in the central government in 2014. bjp is a shadow political organization of the rightwing ideological group rashtriya swayamsevak sangha (rss). the leaders and members of rss are very critical of the principles of secularism since its inception in 1925. they have been campaigning continuously for ‘one state, one religion’ (hindu rashtra). after 2014, hate speech and violence against muslims, brutal killings of muslims and dalits in the name of absurd things, issuance of a threat to madrasas (religious schools of islam), withdrawal of subsidies of the hajj pilgrimage, etc. are a few of a long list of violation of the secular values of india (chandoke 2019). fifteen months after modi’s rise to power, the news of mob lynching of beef eaters and cattle traders started to come and got nationwide attention. during his regime so far, the graph of mob killing, rather than say lynching, has been rising to an extent level. these incidents of violence occurred mostly due to cow issues or when someone disagreed to chant ‘jay sree ram’ (victory to lord rama). on 28 september 2015, a fifty-year-old man, mohammad akhlak, was lynched to death and his son danish, 22 92 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1 2022 years old, was brutally tortured for allegedly storing ‘beef’ in their house in uttar pradesh. the mob lynching case of pehlu khan in rajasthan was a unique one. in this case, police filed a charge of cow smuggling against the person who was lynched by some self-appointed gau rakshak (cow vigilante) (alam 2019). tabrej ansari, a twenty-four-year-old muslim man who was being suspected of theft, was attacked by a mob in jharkhand. he was beaten up brutally and forced to recite ‘jay sree ram’ and ‘jay hanuman’. later, he was handed over to the police but after four days he died due to severe injuries he had during the mob attack. since 2014, many people have been killed and hundreds of people have been injured in mob attacks. but no strong actions have been taken at the central government level except a few general statements from ministers in the parliament. the victims of mob lynching are mostly from the muslim community (bbc news 2019). the central government always tried to hide the original data regarding mob lynching incidents around the country. in july 2018, union home minister of state (mos) hans raj ahir told rajyasabha: “the national crime records bureau (ncrb) does not maintain specific data with respect to lynching incidents in the country” (the wire 2019). the upper house was informed that the state governments were competent to deal with such offences under the existing laws. such statements came from home affairs ministry when the supreme court in its judgments condemned the lynching incidents as “horrendous acts of mobocracy” and asked parliament to enact an effective law to deal with mob lynching and cow vigilantism incidents. the three-judge bench headed by the former chief justice of india dipak misra observed with wonder whether the “populace of a great republic like ours has lost the values of tolerance to sustain a diverse culture?”(the hindu 2019). over the last decade, the term “love jihad” has become very popular among many hindu vigilant organizations as they started campaigning against hindu-non hindu marriage. ‘romeo jihad’ or ‘love jihad’ is an alleged attempt by which muslim men pretend to love for hindu women to convert themselves to islam. some radical hindu organizations like hindu mahasabha, biswa hindu parishad, bajrang dal, and r.s.s. have been campaigning boldly that it is a conspiracy by muslim organizations that engaged their youth to feign love non-hindu women and convert them to islam. in january 2018, a few months before the karnataka assembly election, the bajrang dal began distributing pamphlets in the state’s communally sensitive coastal district of dakshina kannada warning hindu girls and families against getting trapped by ‘jihadi muslim’ boys. 93abul kalam azad the pamphlets were distributed in colleges, door to door, and wherever the bajrang dal cadres see hindu girls, they warned them to “keep distance” from muslim boys in schools, colleges, workplaces, and during travelling. bajrang dal state president sharan pumpwell told the media that the objective of the activity is to warn hindu mothers and girls of the organized conspiracy to convert hindu girls to islam through ‘love jihad’ (the economic times 2018). even before yogi adityanath became chief minister in uttar pradesh (u.p.), he started a strong protest against the ‘love jihad’ issue. during the state assembly election campaign in february 2017, he said in a news channel-organized event that the issues of the upcoming election would be ‘love jihad’ and women’s safety, hindu exodus from kairana, etc (the economic times 2017). the murder of mohammad afrajul in a protest of ‘love jihad’ shocked the nation in no time. afrajul, a fifty-year-old migrant labourer from west bengal, was hacked to death and burnt by a local goon sambhulal regar in rajasthan on december 6, 2017. the footage of the murder was uploaded on social media where regar stated that he had burnt the man to protect a “hindu sister” from the socalled ‘love jihad’. but the real shock came again during the u.p. assembly election when uttar pradesh nabanirman seena declared that sambhulal regar would contest from the rampur constituency against samajwadi party general secretary azam khan (dey 2018). according to annual reports of the ministry of home affairs, more than 10,362 communal incidents were reported between 2004 and 2017, of these incidents (28% or 2,920 cases) were recorded during the nda government between 2014 and 2017 (fact checker 2019). the new delhi riot in 2020 was the worst incident of this decade. between 23 february 23 and 1 march 2020, india’s capital city witnessed a spate of inter-racial and religious riots between hindus and muslims, resulting in dozens of casualties, while vehicles, shops, and houses were massively destroyed. in all, 53 people were killed and they were mostly muslims. the clash broke out when bjp leader kapil mishra gave an “ultimatum” to the police to remove anti-citizenship amendment act (caa) protests that blocked roads in jaffrabad metro station in northeast delhi. he called his followers to assemble at maujpur chowk in support of the newly passed citizenship law to counter the roadblock by the anti-caa protestors. after a few hours, the police started lathi-charge and, many armed with weapons and donning hindu symbols, attacked the protesters (singh 2020). the mob attacked a local mosque, fired on it, and placed a ‘hanuman flag’ on the minaret of the mosque. in many areas, police have been accused of siding with hindutva groups in attacking muslims (barton 2020). 94 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1 2022 the nda government led by modi in their second term passed a few legislations that challenge the status of muslims as equal indian citizens. passing the muslim women (protection of rights on marriage) bill in july 2019 was one of the few which created nationwide controversy. the law says there shall be three years imprisonment for the pronouncement of instant ‘talaq, talaq, talaq’. the opposition political parties remarked critically that the law could be misused to attack muslim identity and citizenship as the law is much closer to the long-time agenda of r.s.s. to implement a uniform civil code with an intentional hindu majoritarian colour. many political analysts said that the law is discriminatory as there is no law to protect women of other religions who are abandoned by their husbands (mahaprashasta 2020). indian parliament passed the citizenship amendment act (caa) in 2019 to provide a fast-track route to indian citizenship for illegal migrants of hindu, sikh, buddhist, jain, parsi, and christian religious minorities, who had fled persecution before december 2014 from pakistan, bangladesh, and afghanistan. however, the law does not mention muslim members of neighbouring countries. the law is antimuslim and unconstitutional as religions are used as a criterion for getting indian citizenship. the caa created a huge hue and cry among the indian muslims as they are scared of being snatched their citizenship with the help of the process of national register of citizens (nrc). the religious basis of caa violates the idea of secular india as the preamble of the indian constitution says: “we the people of india have solemnly resolved to constitute india into a sovereign, socialist, secular and democratic republic” (changoiwala 2020). universities have been playing an important role in democratic protest in india. on the occasion of caa, many higher education institutions like iit, iim, central and state universities, and colleges agitated against such a discriminatory law. jamia milia islamia university (jmiu) and jawaharlal nehru university (jnu) are the frontrunners in this case. in the middle of december 2019, the students of jmiu started a rally to march toward parliament to protest the exclusion of muslims from the citizenship law. the police blocked and beat them up. even delhi police controlled by the central home ministry entered the campus forcefully without taking permission from the authority and charged batons at the students and staff of the university (aljazeera 2019). in march 2020, safura jargar, a m.phil. student of jmiu, was arrested by delhi police under uapa sections in connection with the delhi riot. she was a member of the jamia co-ordination committee that led protest 95abul kalam azad rallies in delhi against caa. according to her family, she was three months pregnant and was not allowed to meet with her lawyer and her husband as well. she was rejected for getting bail many times for her continued detention under uapa (khan 2020). the police repression of the students of aligarh muslim university (amu) in uttar pradesh was quite similar to jmiu. when the students started protesting against the caa in solidarity with the students of jmiu, they were baton-charged by police. the police of the bjp that ruled u.p. fired tear gas directly at students, broke the main gate and entered the campus (ahmed 2019). such news came earlier in 2018 when jagaran mancha, a hindu, entered the campus demanding the removal of muhammad ali jinnah’s portrait from the students’ union room. the students protested heavily. to control the situation, police lobbed tear gas shells and a good number of students were injured (indian express 2018). this kind of incident is very common in nature and the way these two muslim-based higher education institutions are tortured is a tendency toward the decline of democratic culture. the students of jnu, particularly the left-wing student organizations attack the modi-led bjp government as a ‘fascist government’. as a response, bjp and its leaders always claim jnu as a den of antinationals. last few years, this central university came to news headlines so many times for its unique student movement. but, in january 2020, the university witnessed a severe attack by some masked goons on students including the university’s students’ union president aishe ghosh and a well-known teacher sucharita sen. students’ union of jnu alleged that the attack was perpetrated by akhil bharatiya vidyarthi parishad (abvp), a student organization affiliated by rss. the goons pelted stones, vandalized the property, and physically assaulted the members of left-wing student organizations (india today 2020). dalit repression the word ‘dalit’ is primarily used to identify a lower caste of socioreligious groups in india. they are beyond of four-fold varna (social classes according to hindu texts) system in hinduism. historically, they were marked as ‘untouchables’ and they were forbidden to celebrate hindu religious and social life. the term ‘dalit’ was popularized by a great indian intellectual dr. b.r. ambedkar, an ‘untouchable’. he fought for the rights of the community throughout his life and believed that only by destroying the caste system could ‘untouchability’ be destroyed. in present india, dalits have got the legal nomenclature of schedule caste (minorityright. 96 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1 2022 org). ideologically, bjp and dalits have a very opposite stance on nationmaking as the former is a campaigner of ‘hindu rashtra’ and the latter is very critical of such thoughts. in modi’s regime, ambedkar, a hero for the dalits, has been given tribute many times, but at the same time atrocities against dalits have become the news for the nation. 2014 onwards, some negative developments, such as suppression of dalit voice, assault of dalit youth, and curb down of funding for development of dalit sections, have signalized the hollowness of the indian democracy. the news of lynching operations against dalits and beating of dalits in different parts of the country have been coming regularly. the incident of una in u.p. was the worst among all. in may 2015, ambedkar periyar study circle (apsc), a student body in the indian institute of technology (iit), madras, was suspended for ‘misuse of privileges’. the decision was taken by the ministry of human resource development (mhrd), government of india, following an anonymous complaint that the apsc was instigating protests against the bjp government policies and spreading “hatred” against prime minister narendra modi and hindus. after this decision came into effect, a huge protest was organized across the country, and finally, a few days later, the recognition of apsc was reinstated by the iit, madras, authority (teltumbde 2019). the suicide case of rohit vemula, a 26-year-old dalit ph.d. student at hyderabad university, in 2016 stirred the whole nation. rohit was a key leader of the ambedkar students association (asa). the incident started with a clash between asa and abvp. after that, bjp and abvp gathered at the university campus demanding punishment against asa. meanwhile, bandaru dattatreya, a cabinet minister of the modi government sent a letter to mhrd saying the university of hyderabad is a ‘den of antinationals’ and appropriate action had to be taken. the mhrd sent an email referring the letter to the university. based on abvp’s complaint, rohit and five others were suspended and expelled from the university hostel in august 2015. the students pitched a tent outside the university premise, stayed there, and agitated peacefully. on 18 december 2016, rohit wrote a letter to the vice chancellor saying such discrimination might lead them to commit suicide, but the authority ignored it. rohit committed suicide on 17 january 2017. it can be said that such systemic oppression and institutionalized discrimination pushed him to commit suicide. these are the incidents that proved the growing intolerant attitude of the government and ruling party to any kind of criticism (shanta 2019). chandrasekhar azad, a young leader of the dalit community from saharanpur, uttar pradesh, was arrested a couple of times. he is a cofounder of the bhim army, an organization to fight for the development of 97abul kalam azad dalits and other marginalized sections. he was first arrested under national security act allegedly in connection with a clash between rajput and dalit in saharanpur that left one dead and many injured in june 2017 and he was released after one year in jail. then, he was arrested for the second time during the anti-caa protest in new delhi (the indian express 2018). the saga of injustices against dalit people continued in the bhima koregaon incident, where some radical hindu organizations attacked the annual dalit congregation on 1 january 2018 which left one dead and several others injured. in connection with violence at bhima koregaon, the then bjp-led maharashtra government arrested five renowned activists under uapa — writer p. varavara rao, lawyers sudha bhardwaj, arun ferreira and vernon gonzalves, and gautam navalakha in august 2018— by labelling them “maoist links”. even the police stated that the activists had a conspiracy plan to murder prime minister modi. such a vindictive attitude of the government is an obvious attempt to stifle democracy (dutta 2018). distorting history after coming into power at the central government and other states in india, the bjp-ruled government took an unscientific approach to indian history. the decision of renaming streets, railway stations, towns, and cities are a part of the ideological politics of rashtriya swayamsevak sangh (rss), which aims to impose a majoritarian cultural assertion. uttar pradesh’s government led by chief minister yogi adityanath, a hindu priest and founder of a militant hindu youth-wing group, recently changed the name of allahabad to prayagraj, mughalsarai station to pandit dindayal upadhyay junction, an early ideologue of rss, and faizabad to ayodhya. aurangzeb road in new delhi has taken its new name as a.p.j. abdul kalam road. the wish list of bjp and other hindu organizations for renaming a place is quite huge. they proposed agra to be agravan, muzaffarnagar to be laxminagar, ahmedabad to be karnavati after hindu king karan dev, hyderabad to be bhagyanagar after goddess bhagyalakshmi and aurangabad to be sambhaji nagar after sambhaji, elder son of king shivaji. many bjp leaders opined that these efforts are nothing but a process to restore indian culture particularly ‘hindutva’ which was destroyed by mughals (mukhopadhyay 2018). before the bjp regime, the names of the cities were also changed to emphasize their independence from the british ruler and to pay respect to their linguistic autonomy. for example, the names of bombay, madras, and calcutta were changed to mumbai, chennai, and kolkata. but in the present regime, the intention is to erase the heritage of the medieval muslim era and establish majoritarian authority to promote sectarian politics (ahmad 2018). 98 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1 2022 attacks on civil society and media the ‘intolerance’ wave hit the bollywood film industry in a bad way in recent times so that many film personalities started questioning the freedom of expression in india. in 2017, national award-winning film director sanjay leela bhansali received a life threat including his castings regarding the film making about the 14th century rajput queen padmavati. the radical rajput caste group, karni sena, started an extreme movement in northern india claiming that movie did a ‘history distortion’. few state governments run by bjp decided not to release the film until necessary changes were made. finally, in january 2018, the supreme court gave a judgment that the film could be released nationwide and four states — haryana, rajasthan, gujarat, and madhya pradesh— which banned the film, were told to maintain law and order during the film’s release (tilak 2018). a few months before this incident, another eminent film director karan johar faced a similar problem with a threat to stall the release of his film ae dil hai muskil for working with pakistani actor fawad khan. maharashtra navanirman sena (mns) started a strong protest and threatened the owners of the movie theatre not to release the film. after a huge agitation against the film, the director-producer had to sit with mns chief raj thackeray in the presence of the chief minister of maharashtra. the whole issue was resolved with a decision that the owner of the film gave five crore rupees to army welfare fund and the director promised that he would never work with a pakistani artist (dikshit 2016). two bollywood superstars, shahrukh khan and aamir khan, were attacked by hindu nationalists as they remarked on intolerant india. in 2015, when shahrukh khan opined about growing intolerance in the country, yogi adityanath compared him to pakistani terrorist hafiz saeed and threatened to mass boycott his films. a senior bjp leader, kailash vijayvargiya, remarked that shahrukh’s comment was anti-national (hindustan times 2015). a few days later, aamir khan expressed his view over “rising intolerance” in india, stating his wife had inquired if they should leave the country. aamir also said that his wife was scared for the safety of their children in a climate of insecurity (the hindu 2015). the decision of the modi government to cancel the licenses of nearly 20,000 ngos that receive foreign funds under the foreign contribution regulation act (fcra) was also an attempt at the systematic stifling of the voices of civil society groups. in india, about 3.4 million ngos work as independent and voluntary for disadvantaged communities. the process started in 2015 based on a leaked intelligence bureau report stating that the ngos with the help of the foreign fund tried to create an atmosphere 99abul kalam azad that might stall the country’s development project. in 2018, many ngo activists were arrested including sudha bhardwaj, general secretary of the chhattisgarh people’s union for the charge of maoists connection (kumar 2019). the murder of 55-year-old journalist gouri lankesh in front of her house in bengaluru in september 2017 triggered a nationwide outrage. sujith kumar, one of the masterminds of this killing and a member of the hindu yuva sena, confessed before the police that gouri lankesh was murdered for her “anti-hindu views” (the indian express 2018). the bjp government, its members and supporters closely observe news channels that show ‘anti-government’ programs and try to control the channels. a few months ago, two very popular anchors of abp news channel, punya prasun bajpai and abhisar sharma along with the channel’s managing editor milind khandekar, were forced to resign. the anchors were very outspoken about recent intolerant issues and anti-people government policies. ravish kumar, an anchor of the ndtv news channel was very critical of modi government and tried to deliver unbiased news. according to him, in 2018 whenever he aired his show discussing the unemployment issues in prime time, the signal would disappear. to him, to disturb the signal was a new weapon of control. in 2019, the founders of ndtv prannoy roy and radhika roy were stopped from travelling abroad by the immigration officials at the mumbai international airport for allegedly a corruption case initiated by the central bureau of investigation. however, few channels have a pro-government stance as they are owned by either bjp leaders or their supporters. for example, zee news is owned by subhash chandra who became an independent rajya sabha mp nominated by bjp legislators, republic tv is owned by rajeev chandrasekhar (resigned from the board of directors in 2018) and news 18 network is owned by ambani group (kumar 2019). every country’s democratic health largely rests in the hands of its civil society and media. but these two pillars of democracy in india are crumbling due to frequent attempts to control these institutions by the government and its supporters. conclusion this article has tried to argue that in the narendra modi regime indian political culture has been undergoing a shift from inclusive democracy to a narrow process of democracy. the values of diversity, openness and mutual coexistence have been languishing as the bjp is trying to accomplish its goal to make india a ‘hindu rashtra’, an ultra-fascist attitude in the twenty-first century. in the first five years of the modi-led bjp government, 100 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1 2022 the people of india witnessed right-wing populism at the national level and a clear tendency for majoritarian politics. this transformation is largely damaging the country’s very own consensual social fabric. in this short span, the idea of secularism has been attacked regularly in the name of hindutva which violates the core values of constitutional democracy. an atmosphere of rising intolerance has been affecting civil society rights and freedom and the ‘idea of india’. however, the people of india have seen a ray of hope as the nation has 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july 2020 (https://minorityrights.org/minorities/dalits/). md akbor ali* acharya prafulla chandra college, west bengal, india abstract because of their distinct histories, india and bangladesh have unique neighbourly relations. india and bangladesh have completed 51 years of bilateral ties in 2022, beginning in december 1971 with india's recognition of the newly independent people's republic of bangladesh. india played a significant role in the formation of bangladesh during a liberation conflict with pakistan. many things tie the two nations together, such as a shared history and legacy, linguistic and social ties, and a love of art that reflects the diversity of human expression in music, literature, and other forms. bangladesh is a geopolitically and strategically important country in india's neighbourhood policy. bangladesh is especially important to india because of its connectivity with the country's seven landlocked northern sister states. bangladesh's foreign policy discourse is dominated by the words "indian factor" and "blocked by india." as a result, india is a top priority for bangladeshi policymakers. the india-bangladesh partnership affects millions of people in both countries, as well as in south asia and beyond. the two nations are presently setting an example in south asian politics in terms of security cooperation, connectivity, collaboration in the energy and power sectors, social and cultural integration, and bilateral trade. during the covid-19 period, cooperation between the two nations was crucial. india made a humanitarian gesture at the time by assisting bangladesh in developing its vaccine. for more than 51 years, india and bangladesh have had a more or less friendly relationship. there have been a few tense moments in the relationship's half-century history, most notably during the military regime and the bnp's rule. the golden jubilee year of the bilateral relationship was completed in 2021. the 51 years of india-bangladesh bilateral relations: opportunities and challenges journal of asian social science research 2023, vol. 5, no. 1: 79-98 https://cassr.net/jassr/ © the author(s) 2023 article * corresponding author: md akbor ali department of political science, acharya prafulla chandra college, west bengal, india email: mdakborali992@gmail.com 80 journal of asian social science research vol. 5, no. 1, 2023 current research aims to provide a beneficial road map for the future by evaluating the history of the bilateral relationship and commenting on the problems and barriers experienced. contributes key words bilateral relations, landlocked, india factor, neighbourhood, border introduction in 2022, india and bangladesh completed 51 years of bilateral relations, which began in december 1971 through india’s recognition of the newly independent people’s republic of bangladesh. bangladesh’s geographical location made it crucial for india and other extra-regional powers. india’s longest border (about 4096 km) with bangladesh runs across five states: west bengal, assam, meghalaya, tripura, and mizoram. india-bangladesh relations have become important from a political, economic, strategic, and socio-cultural perspective. the india-bangladesh partnership affects millions of people in both countries, as well as in south asia and beyond. bangladesh is one of the most important countries in india’s neighbourhood policy from a geopolitical and geostrategic perspective. bangladesh is an essential partner in india’s act east policy. it is particularly crucial for india because of its connectivity with the seven sister states’ landlocked northeastern region. transit rights through bangladesh to reduce the distance between the country’s northeastern area have a special strategic significance. it also relieves strain on the siliguri corridor and provides an alternate route, which is especially important given china’s presence in doklam. bangladesh is frequently referred to as “india-locked,” referring to the fact that 90% of its international border is shared with india. it has maritime access to the bay of bengal, where india has a strong presence. india and bangladesh have numerous similarities, including language, culture, food, music, sports, and literature, particularly in the border area, especially in west bengal. given these facts, a friendly relationship between the two countries is important for both. friendly ties between the two neighbours influenced their economies, security, and development, leading to improved welfare and well-being for their people. the former union minister and president of india, pranab mukherjee, said that “you can change your friends, but you cannot change your neighbours, so it is better to live in peace”. in the foreign policy discourse of bangladesh, the terms “india factor” or “india locked” are dominant keywords. as a result, india is a top priority for bangladesh’s foreign 81md akbor ali policymakers. from the indian side, bangladesh is not just another neighbour. bangladesh will always remain special for several reasons. during a visit to bangladesh in 2015, indian prime minister narendra modi stated that bangladesh is “not merely a neighbour,” but rather “a nation with which india shares enduring links,” indicating the importance of bangladesh to india and vice versa. bangladesh is also india’s key south asian strategic partner in promoting growth and combating terrorism. rabindranath tagore, the nobel laureate, had a dream of bangladesh as “sonar bangla,” which is found in the composition of the bangladesh national anthem. bangabandhu sheikh mujibur rahman also wanted to make bangladesh “sonar bangla”. a friendly relationship is very important for both countries to make bangladesh “sonar bangla” and india “a responsible and reliable international power”. nevertheless, india-bangladesh ties have been more or less friendly throughout the last half-century. there have been a few tense periods in the relationship’s half-century history, mainly under the military regime and the rule of the bangladesh national party (bnp). both countries worked to improve bilateral relations after the emergence of the people’s republic of bangladesh. nowadays, india regards bangladesh as a close neighbour, and bangladesh is a key partner in india’s neighbourhood first policy. friendly relations between india and bangladesh have become a sensitive issue in domestic politics in both countries. in 2021, the golden jubilee year of the bilateral relationship has been completed. in this article, i explain the journey of the bilateral relationship and introspect its struggles and the challenges faced by india and bangladesh to ascertain a productive road map for the future. there have been many studies on the india-bangladesh bilateral relations. these include a study by majumdar (2014), for example, in his research paper entitled “making sense of india-bangladesh relations” which analyzes various aspects of india-bangladesh relations from the geo-political context. chaudhury (2020) in her research paper entitled “re-connecting neighbours” focuses on how strong connectivity plays an important role in india-bangladesh bilateral ties and how both countries are coming closer to improving their connectivity. kashem and islam (2016) in their article entitled “narendra modi’s bangladesh policy and india-bangladesh relations: challenges and possible policy responses” investigate narendra modi’s bangladesh policy and india-bangladesh relations under his regime. kumar (2020) in his research article entitled “india-bangladesh relations: some issues need deft handling” talks about some of the issues that have adversely affected the relationship 82 journal of asian social science research vol. 5, no. 1, 2023 between the two countries and the need for an immediate and permanent solution. chowdhury (2013) in his research article entitled “asymmetry in indo-bangladesh relations” focuses on the recent issues that have created problems and the possible areas of cooperation and development in the relations between the two neighbours. lastly, ranjan (2018) in his famous book entitled india-bangladesh border disputes: history and post-lba dynamics” assesses whether the implementation of lba will have impacts on border-related problems like mobility, migration, and tensions. the majority of the relevant existing studies concentrate on a specific aspect of india-bangladesh bilateral relations. there is, however, no research article that covers every aspect of the india-bangladesh bilateral relationship. to fill this gap, this study attempts to discuss all aspects of india-bangladesh relations and sheds light on the problems facing these two neighbouring countries. it aims to answer the following three basic questions: what are the major areas of india-bangladesh bilateral cooperation? what are the major problems in india-bangladesh bilateral relations? and what steps should be taken to improve the relationship between the two countries? this study is based mainly on the content analysis method. it was conducted based on primary data in consonance with the secondary one. it is descriptive, deductive, and explanatory. the required data were collected from books, book chapters, journal articles, internet sources, newspapers, and other sources concerned with the topic of this study. there were thematic arrangements for the collection of data. data collected from various sources were checked through triangulation. this study revolves around the concept of india-bangladesh bilateral relations. it takes different components of india-bangladesh ties. these components are land boundary agreement, security cooperation, cooperation over connectivity, economic cooperation, and socio-cultural cooperation. major areas of cooperation land border agreement the border between india and bangladesh is one of the most complicated in the world. historically, india and bangladesh have a land boundary of roughly 4096 km, and the disputed area is around 6.1 km. on may 16, 1974, indian prime minister indira gandhi and bangladeshi prime minister sheikh mujibur rahman signed a land border agreement for their respective countries that was aimed at setting things right. even though bangladesh’s parliament ratified the lba treaty within a month, india did 83md akbor ali not ratify it for some reasons. to ratify the lba in india, a constitutional amendment was necessary, which remained a major challenge. both countries continued to talk about how to solve this situation. in january 2010, during bangladeshi prime minister sheikh hasina’s visit to india, both countries expressed a willingness to look for a final solution to the long-standing matter and agreed to comprehensively resolve all outstanding border issues under the principles of the 1974 lba. in september 2011, during the visit of indian prime minister manmohan singh, india and bangladesh signed a protocol to the land boundary agreement, though it was not ratified. the indian parliament (rajya sabha) declined to approve the constitutional amendment bill to ratify the lba because of strong opposition from trinamool congress leader mamata banerjee and asom gana parishad leaders. mamata banerjee opposed the lba ratification bill because while west bengal would get only 7000 acres, it would have to concede nearly 17,000 acres. later, she agreed to exchange the enclaves. finally, after 41 years of the indira gandhi-sheikh mujibur rahman pact, the historic ratification came in 2015 when the 100th constitution amendment act was passed by the indian parliament. due to the implementation of lba, primarily three complex and sensitive issues were resolved in india-bangladesh relations: (1) the exchange of 162 enclaves between the countries; (2) the exchange of adverse possessions of each other’s territories; and (3) the demarcation of a 6.5 km boundary. the ratification and implementation of the lba will take india-bangladesh ties to new heights. as it was noted in one of the editorials of the indian express, “lba is, above all, a primary instrument of consolidating india’s ties with bangladesh” (2015, 6th may). the prime minister of bangladesh, sheikh hasina, said india’s lba ratification is “a new milestone” in the long-standing bangladesh-india relations. after ratification of the lba, india will be able to advance its trade and security ties with bangladesh. it is also expected that the lba implementation will have a favourable impact on border management, counter-terrorism, and other border-centric crimes. there might be a chance to improve connection, economic collaboration, and energy cooperation. security cooperation woodrow wilson viewed security cooperation at the international level as necessary to avert war. global terrorism, marine piracy, cyber insecurity, and other non-traditional security threats have all become common in the twenty-first century, and no one state can address the problems of the twenty-first century alone. security collaboration at the bilateral, regional, 84 journal of asian social science research vol. 5, no. 1, 2023 and global levels is required for this. security cooperation is now one of the most important aspects of bilateral cooperation. both india and bangladesh face numerous security issues, such as cross-border terrorism, maritime challenges, cyber insecurity, and other non-traditional security concerns, which may be addressed by strengthening security cooperation. it is also argued that strong india-bangladesh security cooperation benefits not just these two nations but also others in this region. after bangladesh’s independence, the two nations have taken a variety of steps to improve security cooperation. during the visit of bangladeshi prime minister sheikh hasina to india in 2010, she ensured that “bangladesh will not allow its territory to be used for terrorist activity against any country in the neighbourhood or around the world. i can assure you that bangladesh is committed to eliminating all forms of terrorism within its borders”. to address cross-border terrorism, india and bangladesh signed some agreements and mous. during sheikh hasina’s visit to india in january 2010, india and bangladesh signed three anti-terrorism agreements as follows: a) criminal mutual legal assistance; b) terrorism, organized crime, and illicit drug trafficking; and c) sentenced persons’ transfer. narendra modi and sheikh hasina expressed their firm commitment to extending anti-terror cooperation. in november 2016, indian defense minister manohar parrikar paid his first visit to bangladesh as the country’s defence minister. during his visit, parrikar met with prime minister sheikh hasina, bangladesh’s president, the prime minister’s security adviser, and the chiefs of the navy, army, air force, and coast guard. during this visit, both countries emphasized the importance of their security ties. india’s proposed defence agreement would cover “greater militarymilitary cooperation, the sale and supply of military hardware from india to bangladesh, and coordinated operations against mutually perceived threats”. india offered a 500 million usd line of credit to bangladesh for the purchase of military hardware from india. in 2019, during sheikh hasina’s visit, india urged bangladesh to expedite the implementation of the line of credit that was offered in the field of defence cooperation, which was strengthened by the army-to-army and navy-to-navy talks between india and bangladesh. both india and bangladesh heavily depend on the sea for international trade and energy supply from the middle east. so, india and bangladesh come closer and take the necessary steps to protect the sea jointly. in 2017, india and bangladesh signed an mou on cyber security. as far as the mou is concerned, new delhi and dhaka will focus on establishing a framework for dialogue, information exchange, and mutual response related to cyber85md akbor ali attacks, as well as cooperation on technology; and capacity building. cooperation in connectivity connectivity matters and directly impacts the lives of people. connectivity is becoming a global phenomenon. it is also crucial to the process of globalisation, which is frequently regarded as a prerequisite for progress, wealth, and development. the recent developments in india-bangladesh connectivity have established an example for many in the region and beyond. as “the 3c mantra”, i.e., commerce, culture, and connectivity, are the primary objectives of narendra modi’s foreign policy, the issue of connectivity remains a priority area in india-bangladesh relations. after the emergence of bangladesh as an independent country, both countries have taken various initiatives to improve connectivity. on july 12, 2001, an agreement was concluded to facilitate passenger rail service between india and bangladesh. nevertheless, it was delayed due to political tensions between india and bangladesh. in july 2007, these countries initiated a trial run of passenger train service between kolkata and dhaka. on 14th april, the kolkata-dhaka passenger train service, the ‘maitree’ express, was started after 43 years of bilateral ties. this was one of the key milestones for india-bangladesh people-to-people contacts. in february 2016, the banglabandha-phulbari immigration check post was inaugurated to facilitate the cross-border movement of people and goods. transhipment of goods to the northeastern states of india through the ashuganj river port and agartala-akhaura by road commenced in june 2016 under the piwtt. the ‘bandhan’ express between khulna and kolkata was inaugurated in november 2017. during the visit of the bangladeshi rail minister in august 2019, both countries agreed to increase railway connectivity following the demand for passengers. at the two countries’ virtual summit in december 2020, narendra modi and sheikh hasina launched the haldibari-chilahati rail link, which would improve railway connectivity between india and bangladesh. apart from railway connectivity, the operationalization of buses is also emphasised. the bus service between kolkata and khulna-dhaka began in april 2017. agartala is around 1600 kilometres from kolkata via assam and roughly 500 kilometres from kolkata via dhaka. india bangladesh and myanmar have a marine boundary of 1116 kilometres, hence maritime linkages have significant economic and socio-cultural development potential. inland water transport (iwt) links prevailed only between india and bangladesh. inland water transport connectivity has great potential for development since it is the cheapest mode of transportation. the india86 journal of asian social science research vol. 5, no. 1, 2023 bangladesh protocol on inland water transit and trade, which was signed in 1972, has been a pioneering initiative in this context. initially, the protocol was renewable every two years. in april 2015, india-bangladesh decided to automatically renew the protocol every five years. under the protocol, bangladesh and india agreed to use designated inland waterways for the passage of goods between two places in the country through the territory of the other. the protocol provides for 50:50 ratio sharing on a tonnage basis for inter-country and transit cargo by indian and bangladeshi vessels. according to the 1980 trade agreement, the two governments agreed to make mutually beneficial arrangements for the use of their waterways, railways, and roadways for commerce between the two countries. in 2015, india and bangladesh signed the coastal shipping agreement to facilitate inland water connectivity. the signing of the coastal shipping agreement was a landmark step. the shipping industry plays a key role in establishing and sustaining commerce and growth. on october 25, 2018, india and bangladesh signed another agreement on the use of chattogram and mongla ports for the movement of goods to the north-eastern states from mainland india. in may 2020, india and bangladesh signed the second addendum to the protocol on inland water transit trade to facilitate more trade. in the addendum, the number of india-bangladesh protocol routes has been increased from 8 to 10. in august 2020, the first export consignment from daudkandi, bangladesh, reached tripura, india through a waterway. it was another milestone in connectivity between the two countries. notably, the bangladesh vessel mb primer carried 50 metric tons of cement and arrived at sonamura, tripura, after a 93 km journey on the gumit river. this initiative was vital in the case of india-bangladesh connectivity. according to the national waterway act of india, 106 such waterways were declared national waterways, of which 19 are in the northeast. the main protocol routes between bangladesh and india are kolkata-sundarban-chalna-khulnamongla and kaukhali-barisal-narayanganj-aricha-dhubri-pandu-silghat. economic cooperation trade is seen as a catalyst for peace and stability in bilateral and multilateral relations. beginning their diplomatic relations, trade constitutes a crucial component in india-bangladesh ties. a detailed discussion on economic cooperation was held in january 1972, during bangladeshi foreign minister abdus samad azad’s visit to new delhi. on march 28, 1972, india and bangladesh signed a trade agreement. according to the agreement, both sides expressed an interest in strengthening “economic 87md akbor ali relations between the two countries based on equality and mutual benefits.” as far as possible, state-to-state trade was identified as the organizing trade between india and bangladesh. on july 5, india and bangladesh signed another trade agreement, which came into force on september 28, 1973, for three years. again, on october 4, 1980, india and bangladesh signed a trade agreement for three years, with the possibility of extension for a further period of three years. on june 6, 2015, india and bangladesh signed a trade agreement for five years. the agreement was supposed to automatically be extended for successive terms of five years unless either government gave written notice of its intention to terminate the agreement to the other government at least six months before the end of such term. the india-bangladesh chambers of commerce and industries (ibcci) was formed in 2007 to promote bilateral trade, reduce the trade imbalance, resolve bilateral business-related issues, increase bangladesh’s exports to india, and encourage india’s investors to invest in bangladesh. during the 14th saarc summit in new delhi, india announced duty-free access to exports from least developed countries in the saarc region, including bangladesh, from january 1, 2008, and reduced the sensitive lists. the introduction of border haats also introduces a new dimension in india-bangladesh economic relations. bangladeshi patients’ favourite destination is india, considering the proximity of the neighbouring asian and european countries. on average, 1,000 bangladeshis come to india daily to take treatment. according to the indian ministry of tourism, the number of medical tourists coming from bangladesh is increasing day by day. there is a strong political economy involved in this medical tourism. in 1980, bangladesh’s exports were worth us$ 12.35 million, while imports amounted to us$ 105 million. according to the indian department of commerce, as per 2016-2017 data, bangladesh was the largest trading partner of india in south asia. of the 83 per cent of total indian exports in south asia, bangladesh alone accounts for 35 per cent. due to several special advantages, bangladesh has emerged as an investment bonanza for interested countries. bangladesh has identified 13 possible investment areas, including agro-processing, ceramics, automobiles, gems and jewellery, chemicals, light engineering, itc, hospitals, medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, and textiles, where the country is seeking india’s investment in a joint venture basic. in february 2009, india and bangladesh signed an agreement for the promotion and protection of investment for ten years, and thereafter it shall be deemed to have been automatically extended unless there is any opposition. economic, trade, and investment are the three main dimensions of india-bangladesh relations. 88 journal of asian social science research vol. 5, no. 1, 2023 during the modi regime, indian investment in bangladesh’s gas has increased a lot. two indian companies, namely reliance power limited and adani power limited, have signed an mou with the bangladesh government to invest us$ 5 billion to generate 4,600 mw of electricity during modi’s visit to bangladesh. according to the mou, reliance power limited will invest us$ 3 billion to generate a 3,000 mw power plant based on imported liquefied natural gas, while adani power limited will invest us$ 2.5 billion to build a 1600 mw coal-fired power plant. bangladesh has become india’s leading south asian trading partner and the world’s fourth-largest market for indian exports in the years 2021–2022. exports to bangladesh increased by more than 66% during fy 2020-21 and fy 202122, from $9.69 billion to $16.15 billion. india is bangladesh’s secondlargest trading partner and asia’s top market destination for exports. bilateral trade between both countries increased at an unprecedented rate of approximately 44% from $10.78 billion in 2020-2021 to $18.13 billion in 2021-2022, despite covid-19-related difficulties. raw cotton, non-retail pure cotton yarn, and electricity are india’s key exports to bangladesh, whereas pure vegetable oils, non-knit men’s suits, and textile waste are its main imports from bangladesh. energy and power cooperation on january 4, 1973, india and bangladesh signed an mou regarding the joint power coordination board that aimed primarily to “maintain liaison between the participating countries to ensure the most effective joint efforts in maximizing the benefits from the power systems and energy resources to their mutual benefit.” but it took almost four decades for electricity to be exchanged between india and bangladesh. regarding energy cooperation, the second meeting of the joint working group on cooperation in the power sector was held in dhaka and delhi in may and june 2010 respectively. the notable development was the signing of a 35-year power transmission agreement between the power grid corporation of india (pgcil) and the bangladesh power development board (bpdb). in addition, in august of the same year, an mou was signed between the national thermal power corporation (ntpc) and bangladesh power development board (bpdb) for the setting up of two coal-fired power plants of 1320 megawatts each in chattogram and khulna under a joint venture. three agreements were signed in april 2013 during the visit of india’s power secretary, uma shankar, to bangladesh for the joint venture 1320 mw power plant in rampal, khulna. in february 2014, india’s ongc videsh ltd (ovl) and bangladesh’s petrobangla signed two production-sharing contracts for the 89md akbor ali exploration and production of oil and gas in two shallow-water blocks in the bay of bengal. in 2017, adani power india inked a long-term pact with bangladesh power development board to supply electricity from its upcoming 1600 mw coal-based power plant at godda in jharkhand for 25 years. in september 2018, narendra modi and sheik hasina jointly inaugurated three major india-bangladesh joint venture projects, including the supply of 500 mw of electricity from india to bangladesh. socio-cultural relations since india has had strong cultural ties with bangladesh for a long time, there is greater scope for enhanced collaboration in new avenues of cooperation. socio-cultural similarities are always one of the key strengths of bilateral relations. during modi’s visit to bangladesh, “cultural exchange programs” for the years 2015–2017” have been adopted. the promotion of socio-cultural relations is noticeable between india and bangladesh during modi’s regime. cultural exchange promotes people-to-people contact between neighbouring countries, which increases belief in each other and has a positive impact on bilateral relations. the opening of border haats on the india-bangladesh border is a new initiative taken by both countries to deepen their bilateral relations through promoting people-topeople contacts. the first border haats were set up in 2012 at kalaichar in the west garo hills of meghalaya. now india and bangladesh have five border haats. it is expected that these border haats will play a vital role in the future in improving people-to-people contact between india and bangladesh. cooperation during covid-19 pandemic the covid-19 pandemic shook the world with broader implications on a domestic, regional, and global scale in the domain of the economy, security, foreign policy, and diplomacy. the coronavirus crisis affects normal bilateral relations, whether through bilateral visits, trade, investment, or people-to-people contacts, severely. the covid-19 global pandemic had some direct impact on india-bangladesh bilateral relations; that is, bilateral trade decreased massively and regular bangladeshi patients were not able to visit indian doctors and hospitals, which hampered their medical treatment. india-bangladesh cooperation is manifested at the regional level in addressing the covid-19 global pandemic impacts. in august 2020, during the covid-19 pandemic, indian foreign secretary harsh vardhan shringla visited bangladesh to discuss the progress and prospects 90 journal of asian social science research vol. 5, no. 1, 2023 of india-bangladesh relations, which demonstrate the importance that new delhi attaches to dhaka. on this visit, both sides discussed ways to address issues arising out of the covid-19 situation. during his visit, harsh vardhan shringla also assured that bangladesh would get priority in getting the covid-19 vaccine once it is produced in india. consequently, an mou was signed in november 2020 between the serum institute of india and beximco pharma in bangladesh for the priority delivery of 30 million covid-19 vaccines to bangladesh. bangladesh got the first supply on january 21, 2021. during the pandemic period, india also continued to work on developing connectivity projects. the first trial container ship from kolkata to agartala through the chattogram port was flagged off during this period. visit of sheikh hasina to india, september 2022 on september 5-8, 2022, bangladeshi prime minister sheikh hasina visited india at prime minister narendra modi’s invitation. during the visit, both countries took steps to improve their bilateral relations. during this visit, prime minister sheikh hasina announced the “bangabandhu sheikh mujibur rahman student scholarship” for 200 descendants of indian armed forces personnel martyred and critically injured during the liberation war of bangladesh in 1971. the two leaders also discussed a variety of bilateral issues, including political and security cooperation, defence, border management, trade and connectivity, water resources, power and energy, development cooperation, and cultural and people-topeople ties. additionally, they decided to work together in three new areas of cooperation: those related to the environment, climate change, cyber security, ict, space technology, green energy, and the blue economy. they also discussed the implementation of bilateral and sub-regional rail, road, and other connectivity initiatives, such as the conversion of the tongiakhaura line to dual-gauge, the supply of railway rolling stock, capacity building for bangladesh railway staff, and the sharing of it solutions for improved services at bangladesh railway. both sides also welcomed the new initiative, namely, the kaunia-lalmonirhat-mogulghat-new gitaldah link; the construction of a link between hili and birampur; the upgrade of the track and signalling systems; and railway stations along the benapole-jesore line; and the restoration of the link between burimari and changrabandha were also welcomed by the parties. e.g., the construction of a container depot at sirajganj, etc., and both sides have agreed to finance these projects through various financial instruments under bilateral development cooperation. recognizing the peaceful management of the 91md akbor ali indo-bangladesh border as a shared priority, the two leaders directed the officials to expedite work to complete all pending developmental works within 150 yards of the zero line. the two leaders reaffirmed their commitment to eradicating terrorism and strengthening their cooperation in combating and countering the spread of radicalization. they agreed to accelerate efforts to improve bilateral and sub-regional connectivity by launching the bbin motor vehicle agreement and the comprehensive economic partnership agreement (cepa). they also praised the recent completion of a joint feasibility study and the strengthening of bilateral defence ties. they emphasized the importance of strengthening people-to-people ties and the resumption of rail, road, air, and water communications. they also agreed to work towards other initiatives, such as the operationalization of “shadhinota shorok” and the production of a documentary on the liberation war of bangladesh in 1971. the following memorandum of understanding and agreements were signed and exchanged during the sheikh hasina’s visit to india: 1) an mou between the ministry of water resources, government of bangladesh, and the ministry of jal shakti, government of india, on the withdrawal of water by india and bangladesh from the common border river kushiyara; 2) an mou between the ministry of railways, government of india, and the ministry of railways, government of bangladesh on the training of bangladesh railway personnel in india; 3) an mou between the ministry of railways, government of india, and the ministry of railways, government of bangladesh on collaboration in it systems such as fois and other it applications for the bangladesh railway; 4) an mou on scientific and technological cooperation between the council for scientific and industrial research (csir), india, and the bangladesh council of scientific and industrial research (bcsir), bangladesh; 5) an mou on cooperation in the areas of space technology between newspace india limited and bangladesh satellite company limited; 6) an mou between bangladesh television (btv) and prasar bharti on cooperation in broadcasting; and 7) an mou between the national judicial academy, india, and the supreme court of bangladesh on a training and capacitybuilding program for bangladesh judicial officers in india. during the visit, the following were unveiled, announced, or released: 1) the unveiling of unit-i of maitree super thermal power plant, rampal, bangladesh; 2) inauguration of the rupsha railway bridge; 3) announcement of the signing of project management consultancy contracts for the khulna–darshana railway line and the parbotipur–kaunia railway line; 4) presentation of the book containing the translation of the 92 journal of asian social science research vol. 5, no. 1, 2023 historic “7th march speech” of bangabandhu sheikh mujibur rahman in 23 indian languages and 5 languages of other south asian countries by prime minister sheikh hasina to prime minister narendra modi; 5) announcement regarding the offer of 20 broad gauge locomotives to bangladesh railway on a grant basis; and 6) announcement regarding the supply of road construction equipment and machinery to the road and highways department, government of bangladesh. major challenges nevertheless, there are some challenges in indo-bangladesh relations as will be described below. water sharing of the common rivers india and bangladesh share 54 common rivers. the sharing of the water of these common rivers forms a crucial part of the bilateral relationship. in june 1972, india and bangladesh established the joint river commission (jrc) to resolve the waste-sharing issue peacefully. but this substantial progress is not manifested under the jrc. only two water-sharing agreements have been signed between india and bangladesh. these are the ganga water agreement of 1996 and the feni water agreement treaty of 2019. the ganga water agreement was signed for 30 years, so this is one of the important questions: what is going to happen in 2026 when the 30-year agreement ends? since india is the upstream state, the flow of the river water into bangladesh is susceptible to indian activities, including the building of barrages and dams, linking and digging canals, or abandoned use of water. bangladesh has situated on the lower side of these rivers and suspects that the absence of just river water-sharing agreements makes it vulnerable to indian designs. river water sharing has become not only a means of communication between india and bangladesh but also a sensitive issue in both countries’ domestic politics. the teesta is the fourth largest transboundary river in bangladesh. around 21 million bangladeshi people directly depend on the teesta, which is crucial for the agricultural and irrigation needs of the northern parts of bangladesh. in 2011, during the visit of the indian prime minister to bangladesh, the teesta water-sharing treaty was supposed to be signed. but west bengal chief minister mamata banerjee opposed the deal, which led to the failure of any agreement. challenges at the border the killing continues to be a major issue in border management and bilateral relations between india and bangladesh. it creates a climate of 93md akbor ali fear and mutual mistrust. notably, those who are at the border are primarily cattle, drugs, and arms smugglers. but it is a matter of concern that many civilians have been killed by the border force. smuggling has been a common border crime on india’s and bangladesh’s borders for a long time. the smuggling of cattle, drugs, and arms has been a common phenomenon over the decades. illegal migration and human trafficking the issue of illegal migration from bangladesh is considered a major weakness in the bilateral relationship. migration from bangladesh is perceived to have caused a major demographic shift in the bordering states and has been a cause of ethnic and social tension in states like assam. in india, hindu migration has become a sensitive issue. even after bangladesh became independent and adopted a secular policy, hindu people continued to migrate to india for many reasons. it is widely assumed that all religious people from bangladesh are illegally migrating to india for reasons such as employment, education, and health. india has again and again urged bangladesh to take steps to control cross-border migration, but bangladesh has consistently declined india’s claims of unchecked migration from that country. in a recent study, nandy and roy(2022) show that illegal bangladeshi migrants have paid and manipulated touts and local politicians to manage their ration cards and voter cards. also, india doesn’t have any authentic data on the number of illegal migrants, and india cannot provide authentic data to bangladesh. this is one of the ways that affect the illegal migration problem which is constantly hampering bilateral relations between the two countries. china factor the policy community in bangladesh defines an “all-weather friend”. similarly, china sees bangladesh as a “good neighbour and a good partner”. the growing china-bangladesh partnership in the economic, security, strategic, and development realms has created concerns for india. in 1975, the china-bangladesh bilateral trade volume was only us$ 3.6 million, but it reached us$ 18.33 billion in 2019. approximately 200 large chinese companies and 200 chinese smes are operational in bangladesh. in 2019, bangladesh replaced the usa as the top source of foreign direct investment in bangladesh, amounting to us$ 1.6 billion. according to the bangladesh government, there is the possibility that china might invest around us$ 50 billion in the next 15 years in bangladesh. in 2019, china-bangladesh trade volume was us$28 billion, while india-bangladesh trade volume 94 journal of asian social science research vol. 5, no. 1, 2023 amounted to us$ 10 billion. besides these, china-bangladesh defence cooperation has also reached a new height. china is targeting all of india’s friendly neighbours, such as nepal, sri lanka, and now bangladesh. the expansion of india-bangladesh bilateral relations in the south asian region has caused anxiety among indians, which has harmed india-bangladesh bilateral relations. domestic politics domestic politics is a crucial factor in india-bangladesh relations. some argue that “foreign policy is the extension of domestic politics,” which is reflected in bangladesh and indian foreign policy toward each other. the origin of religious radicalism is a threat to the south asian region as well as bilateral relations between india and bangladesh. moreover, the ideological difference between the awami league and the bangladesh nationalist party about india also impacts bilateral relations between india and bangladesh. the teesta water sharing treaty was not signed because of mamata banerjee’s opposition. the national register of citizens (nrc) and citizenship amendment act (caa) in india also hampered bilateral relations between india and bangladesh. conclusion this article has shown that both india and bangladesh have recognised the importance of collaboration for their growth in the context of politicosecurity constructions and socioeconomic restraints. as a result, in the last two decades, both governments intended to work proactively under a cooperative framework. in 2021, india and bangladesh completed 50 years of diplomatic relations. now, bangladesh is india’s biggest trading partner in the south asian region. they share a liberal democracy, secularism, and inclusive socio-cultural nationalism attitude. from important partners in the liberation war to periods of indifference, and eventually emerging as cooperative neighbours, the two countries have set out on a course previously uncharted in this region with their mosaic of connection projects and various other cooperation efforts. the spirit of bilateral interaction between india and bangladesh is also propelling the eastern south asian area into sub-regional alliances. the two friendly neighbours have often cooperated in addressing some common challenges and some genuine concerns about each other. this requires the two countries to emphasize their cooperation further and address whatever potential irritants are left. 95md akbor ali beyond the rhetoric of the golden period in bilateral relations, the crucial question for india today is: how far will bangladesh align itself with china? recent steps to normalise relations with pakistan, as well as china’s expanding ability to invest in infrastructure projects, may eventually put political pressure on bangladesh to embrace policies that are compatible with china’s anti-indian strategic interests in south asia. yet, india has significant influence to offset chinese activities in bangladesh, and this balancing act will decide the future trajectory of bilateral relations. based on the above-concluding remarks, i propose policy recommendations that a sustainable and warm political relationship between india and bangladesh has become necessary for the long-term interests of the two countries. for this, the political regimes in both countries need to play a crucial role. the role of civil society needs to be protective and constructive in deepening india-bangladesh relations. there is an increased need for concrete academic and media cooperation between india and bangladesh. there is also a greater need to promote students, teachers, researchers, and intellectuals exchange programs. all disputes between the two countries should be resolved through mutual discussion, especially the river water sharing dispute. to increase bilateral trade, both countries should work together. to stop informal trade, india and bangladesh should take necessary measures. increased and extensive cooperation in the health sector has become a priority in the wake of the covid-19 period and post-covid-19 period. to prevent coronavirus, india and bangladesh should take the necessary steps to increase their cooperation in the health sector. both countries should take the necessary measures to stop smuggling at the border. people-to-people contact is the most important aspect of bilateral relations. both countries should take the necessary steps for this, like establishing border haats. track-ii diplomacy can be an effective alternative channel in india-bangladesh relations. references ali, syed muazzem. 2018. “the 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jayanta kumar and muntassir mamoon. 2011. india-bangladesh relations: current perspectives. new delhi: kw publishers. shringla, harsh vardhan. 2018. “india–bangladesh relations: an indian perspective.” strategic analysis 42(5):524-528. sikri, veena. 2009. “india–bangladesh relations: the way ahead.” india quarterly 65(2):153-165. sufian, abu. 2020. “geopolitics of the nrc-caa in assam: impact on bangladesh–india relations.” asian ethnicity 1-31. 2-cover-jassr-vol.5.no.1.blkng [rev-2023-08-15].pdf page 1 against the tarbiyah’s symbolism of hijab: feminism, islamic conservatism and reconstruction of hijab symbolism in indonesia journal of asian social science research 2021, vol. 3, no. 1: 15-38 https://cassr.net/jassr/ © the author(s) 2021 article ayu regina yolandasari* ewha womans university, south korea abstract although indonesia is the largest muslim country in the world, the way of how muslims dress had never been a major focus of islamic practice until the 1980s. the promotion of a particular islamic dress code, especially hijab (veil), started in the early 1980s on indonesian campuses. since the reformasi in 1998, the wearing of hijab has grown significantly along with the spread of the tarbiyah movement, a transnational islamist movement affiliated with the muslim brotherhood from egypt. the rise of islamic conservatism has targeted women to be controlled through their dress and caused indonesian women to lose their freedom to decide whether they want to wear hijab or not. to fully understand this controlling mechanism, this article explores how the tarbiyah movement has constructed and utilized the symbolization of hijab, and the weakness of the movement in enforcing its conservative values to its muslim women members. such exploration may direct us to a counter-strategy against the values. based on in-depth interviews with four former tarbiyah activists who have been active in feminism, this article examines the way the tarbiyah controls its female activists through the hijab symbolization and how feminism has helped these activists to detach themselves from the movement. thus, this article will make an important point on how feminism contributes to the battle against islamic conservatism in indonesia. key words the tarbiyah movement, feminism, veil, hijab, islamist groups * corresponding author: ayu regina yolandasari address: jalan pala no. 5a, komplek pasir indah, kaligandu, serang, banten province, indonesia 42116. email: aryolandasari1312@gmail.com 16 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 introduction “i really want to die. there’s no point i live my life,” a friend of mine texted me after being severely bullied by her friends due to her decision to remove her hijab.1 “no wonder that you’re poor! it’s all because you are getting away from god by removing your hijab,” one of the texts she got says. she had been removing her hijab for 4 days and verbally abused since the first day she went out in public without her hijab. other than her, there was also rina nose, a celebrity who had been intensely attacked on social media for no longer veiling. in her first instagram picture without her hijab, she had received hundreds of thousands of comments in a few days. people not only kept asking why she made the decision but also aggressively expressing their sadness, disappointment, even rage. she had been severely accused of toying with islam and changing her religion. although she took down the picture and turned off the comment section of her social media, the insult continued through other media platforms. the unveiling has been a difficult decision for indonesian muslim women in indonesia nowadays. in an interview, rina nose asserted that she had been wearing a hijab for only about one year and prepared herself for six months before she finally took off her hijab. this decision made her receive a lot of social pressure on social media. however, committing to wearing the hijab is not easy for indonesian muslim women. another friend of mine texted me and said that she wanted to wear a wide-loose hijab, the so-called syar’i hijab, but she was not sure about it. she said: “… since i work in sport, i’m afraid that i will not be able to maintain my hijab and it will give a sort of impression that i’m just playing with my religion.” those examples show that indonesian muslim women are no longer free to wear what they want to wear or not to wear what they do not want to wear. indonesia is not an islamic state although it is the largest muslim country in the world. indonesian muslims are regarded as the representatives of moderate islam in the world (hakim 2016). however, lipi (lembaga ilmu pengetahuan indonesia [the indonesian institute of science]), reported that radicalism and fundamentalism in indonesia have been spread and strengthened among indonesian muslims since the era of reformasi in 1998 (lestari 2016). it has caused an increasing number of intolerance acts such as attacks on non-muslims’ worship places. it also leads to the ruling of certain kinds of dress codes for women (wieringa 2015). hijab was not a major focus of the islamic practice before 1980 (salim 2015). the promotion of hijab-wearing or veiling in indonesia was initiated by state university students who had an affiliation with the muslim brotherhood (ikhwanul muslimin), an islamist group from egypt. since after, through 17ayu regina yolandasari the tarbiyah movement in campuses in indonesia, the promotion of hijab wearing continues and the symbolism of hijab has been changing over time, from a symbol of islamic identity, resistance to western domination, freedom of expression, to a symbol of piety. later on, the changes then affected people’s attitudes toward hijab and indonesian moslem women. as someone who had committed to wearing a hijab for 12 years until 2016, i personally had been experiencing the dynamic changes of hijab symbolism and its impact on me as a woman. when i decided to wear hijab, people were quite resistant to my decision since hijab was stigmatized as a symbol of women’s involvement in a certain islamic extremist group. i had also experienced a short period when women could freely wear and take off their hijab anytime they want. later on, along with the promotion of hijab as the symbol of moslem women’s identity and piety, i also experienced the growing pressure for women to wear a hijab. indonesian moslem women kept losing their freedom to veil or unveil due to the institutionalization of hijab-wearing in certain areas or institutions in indonesia and the possibility to get bullied when a woman decided to unveil. despite the symbolism, there are various reasons why a woman decides to wear a hijab such as religious reasons, local or institutional regulation, psychological/conformity, political, fashion (juneman 2010), and advocacy strategy (suryakusuma 2007). as for the reason to unveil, a study by juneman (2010), shows that two out of four informants of his study decided to not wear hijab anymore after their encounter with non-islamic activism. moreover, one of them testified that her involvement in women’s activism has changed the way she perceived her hijab and decided to take it off. nevertheless, less is known the correlation between the decision to veil or unveil and women’s activism, especially in the tarbiyah movement as the one that initially promoted the hijab-wearing and in feminism as the movement which is known in indonesia as a western product so that is against the veiling. therefore, this article aims to give an understanding of the intersecting issues of veiling, feminism, and islamist activism in the context of jakarta as the capital city of indonesia, the major target of hijab-wearing promotion by the tarbiyah movement. the research for this article was conducted through the exploration of women’s activists’ subjectivity, focusing on women who had been involved in the tarbiyah movement and moved to feminism. therefore, this article mainly aims to explore how women’s activism in the previously tarbiyah movement and currently feminism 18 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 affects the way women’s activists construct, deconstruct, and reconstruct the hijab symbolism and whether it also affects the decision to veil or unveil? this article attempts to answer the following three main questions: how was the symbolism of hijab constructed by the tarbiyah movement and functioned as the means to discipline its female members’ bodies?; how did the ex-female member of the tarbiyah movement question and realize the negative ideology embodied in the symbolism of hijab constructed by the tarbiyah movement? (3); and how did the involvement in feminism affect the ex-female members of the tarbiyah movement to reconstruct the symbolism of hijab and (un)veil themselves? qualitative research was conducted to answer the above-mentioned research questions by using a literature review and in-depth interviews as data collection techniques. the literature review focused on the issues of hijab, the tarbiyah movement, and feminism in the context of indonesia. using a snowball sampling technique, the in-depth interviews were conducted with four subjects of research who did their activism in jakarta. they are former activists of the tarbiyah movement who have moved to the feminist movement. some still wear hijab and others do not (tabel 1). table 1 the subjects of study subject age marital status education occupation veil/unveil af 32 married bachelor degree in social and political science researcher and writer on gender issues and islam veil ds 24 single bachelor degree in law gender analyst for a legal aid institution veil (considering to unveil) rn 31 married master degree in gender studies founder of a feminist community of the sexual harassment issue veil cu 26 single bachelor degree in social science an employee of an ngo for gender and sexual diversity issues unveil 19ayu regina yolandasari there were three sets of questions for the interview. the first set asks the subjects’ involvement in the tarbiyah movement, from the first exposure until they finally left the movement. the second set explores how they initially veiled themselves and made changes to their hijab. it also questions their motivation and feeling regarding the initial decision to veil and the changes they have made. lastly, the third set of questions asks about their activism in the feminist movement, starting from their first exposure until the recent one. the interview was conducted in person from october until september 2017. there was also a further inquiry process conducted by email until december 2017 to make sure that my understanding of the experience they have told was correct and to have their confirmation that the information i would put on the report was safe enough for their confidentiality. the issues of hijab, tarbiyah, and feminism in indonesia historically, according to salim (2015), dress had never been a major focus of islamic practice in indonesia before 1980. kerudung or selendang which partially covered women’s hair was considered sufficient to fulfil the islamic advice to cover female bodies. it was the 1979 iranian revolution that led to an increase in the promotion and the wearing of middle easternstyle veils and other forms of islamic dress in indonesia. hijab in indonesia was initially promoted by state university male students affiliated with a transnational islamist group ikhwanul muslimin (im[muslim brotherhood]) whose dakwah aimed to counter western cultural and political hegemony. the term “islamist” refers to a fundamental or radical islamic group that has a literal understanding of the quran and hadith (albana 2017). the indonesian tarbiyah movement also emphasizes the concept of ikhwanul muslimin’s dakwah (rinaldo 2013). therefore, veiling becomes not only a marker of islamic identity but also a form of opposition to perceived western cultural domination in indonesia. in response to the promotion, the new order government intermittently took actions against the practice. effendy (2003) explained that in 1982, the government formulated the policy to prohibit students from wearing hijab in public and non-islamic schools. in 1991, the policy was taken down. according to machmudi (2008), the tarbiyah movement through its campus activist of dakwah (adk) started to spread its ideology in secular and best campuses in indonesia such as the university of indonesia (ui), bogor agricultural institute (ipb), and bandung institute of technology (itb). besides, in indonesia, prosperous justice party (partai keadilan sejahtera [pks]) has been well-known as part of im (burdah 2017). according to rinaldo (2013), most pks women 20 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 began their involvement in the group through their initial involvement in moslem study group, moslem student activism or tarbiyah networks, and some also joined with their husbands. pks women’s views on marriage, family, and gender are more conservative than other islamic groups since they are part of the textualist milieu. pious practices such as ruling the moslem clothing for women help to instil in party members a sense of the essential difference between man and women, one that is respected through bodily separation. a study conducted by turmudi (2016 in ramadhini 2017) shows that the spread of hijab wearing on the campus was more effective if the students organized it because it could strengthen religiosity in terms of the implementation of hijab as a daily outfit. however, according to suryakusuma (2013), muslims in indonesia are becoming increasingly concerned with formalism such as clothing and rules, rather than spirituality and faith after the reformasi 1998. as quoted in fujita (2015), dewi candraningrum, the lecturer at muhammadiyah university surakarta and the author of the book negotiating women’s veiling, stated that after suharto was toppled in late 1998, the headscarf became a symbol of freedom for women. but, conservative activists pushed to make veiling mandatory afterwards. a feminist anthropologist saskia e. wieringa (2015) also mentioned that the growing influence of conservative islamic teachings has led not only to the increasing numbers of intolerance towards other islamic groups and sexual minority, but also the ruling of a certain kind of dress code for women. due to the significant escalation of the process of islamization after suharto, the changes in the interpretation of the quran occurred. therefore, at the national level, dress and modesty have been a major focus for change following the lead of the saudi arabian government’s translation. the new indonesian version of the quran interpretation released by the ministry of religion in 2007 mandated more covering of women’s bodies than the older version one, which was released in 1970 and was more flexible (salim 2015). in no longer a choice, eve warburton (2007) also explained that since the fall of the new order regime, there has been a serious shift in indonesian society concerning the hijab. in the past, most indonesians considered islamic dress as a matter of private interpretation. in contrast, since reformasi, local governments and islamic institutions have begun to force women to cover and, at the national level, the proposed antipornography laws place restrictions on women’s dress and emphasize control of the female body as a tool for social reform. the supporters of these new regulations argue that this is a necessary step for addressing 21ayu regina yolandasari what they see as ‘moral crises’ of indonesian society, claiming that the veiling of women will create a moral and stable community. islamic universities have begun enforcing muslim dress for female students on campus. the proponents of tighter regulations argue that veiling displays a strong religious public image and improves the moral quality of the student community. meanwhile, in non-religious universities, even where there are no legally enforceable rules, there is growing pressure for women to dress modestly and wear hijab. warburton also explained that the control of the female body and the promotion of personal morals have become part of a mainstream political approach for addressing indonesia’s complex social and economic problems. the veil is a powerful symbol of muslim identity and moral control so that enforcing hijab became an easy way for institutions to show their adherence to islamic principles and commitment to moral reform. in early 2000, the hijab started to be well-marketized in the fashion industry. thereafter, the fashion industry of moslem wear keeps growing significantly as more “young” and attracting urban women to wear hijab as their fashion style. the representative of the ministry of cooperatives and smes, euis saidah, mentioned that there are 20 million people in indonesia wearing hijab in 2012 and the development of moslem-wear fashion rose 7% per year (noorastuti and abbdinnah 2012). therefore, indonesia has set a target to become a centre for global muslim fashion by 2020. the government is quite optimistic with the target since indonesia has become the third country with the highest moslem wear consumption after turkey and iran based on a report by thomson reuters and dinar standard in the global islamic economy report in 2012. besides, within the organization of islamic cooperation, indonesia is one of the biggest moslem wear producers and exporters. despite the above historical journey of hijab promotion in indonesia, there are various reasons why indonesian muslim women veil themselves. siti musdah mulia (in juneman 2010) explains that some women wear hijab for theological reasons as they believe that wearing a hijab is an islamic obligation. others wear hijab because of local and institutional regulations. another reason is psychological one in that some attempt to conform with their surrounding in which many women wear hijab. there is also a political reason as some fulfil the demand of certain islamic groups which utilize islamic symbols as their political strategy. lastly, fashion has been the most significant reason for the wearing of hijab in indonesia, especially after the 2000s. in addition, the massive spread and formality of hijab wearing seem to influence women’s activism. for instance, neng dara affiah, an indonesian 22 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 muslim feminist, wears a hijab because she comes from a strong pesantren (traditional islamic learning institution) tradition. she said that wearing a hijab makes it easy for her to be accepted in muslim communities when she carries out grassroots gender training, gives seminars, or attends qur’anic recitals and other religious meetings (suryakusuma 2013). due to the dynamic changes in the representation of hijab in indonesia, lies marcoes (in wahid institute 2007), an indonesian muslim feminist, stated that hijab cannot be interpreted monolithically. “hijab can be a business field or class identity. it can also become the mean of women’s subordination and struggle”, she said. in the discussion on the freedom to veil held on may 23rd, 2017, two indonesian muslim feminists spoke about hijab in the context of indonesia. nong darol mahmada, based on her study on fatima mernissi’s interpretation of the quran and hadith regarding veil, firmly stated that wearing hijab is not an obligation in islam and indonesia is socially and culturally different from arab or middle eastern countries. according to her, indonesian women have more freedom than middle eastern women to some extent. lailatul fitriyah explained that hijab can be considered as an obligation in one context and not so in another one, and it represents the symbol of oppression in one context and the symbol of women’s empowerment in another one in indonesia. this is in line with fadwa el-guindi (1999), a muslim feminist who conducted the feminist study on veiling, who said that veiling must be viewed in its historical, socio-cultural, and situational/spatial context to ascertain its meaning and significance. juneman (2010) researched the decision of four women who decided to take off their hijab from a psychological and sociological perspective. through interviews, he found that their decision to veil and unveil is significantly caused by their existential beliefs, a continuous process of muslim women to formulate and reformulate their way to view a hijab. the belief would be affected by the subject’s chronological age as well as their life crisis, challenges, and any form of disturbance cognitively, affectively, or socially. the result of his research shows that the experience of veiling and unveiling is particularly related to the aspect of the symbolic function of hijab itself. however, that aspect could not be separated from other aspects such as logic, social perspective internalization, moral consideration, the limits of social awareness, authority locus, and the coherence of the subject. thus, the way of valuing oneself as a muslim woman who wears or no longer wear a hijab has a close relationship with her way to value her own religious and not religious life. besides, too much emphasis on the concept of sin versus reward and hell versus heaven 23ayu regina yolandasari as something they should always be aware of has become the significant factor that affects the aspect of moral consideration. it is also related to the subject’s interactions with her family, friends, and her other circumstances. interestingly, two of his respondents decided to unveil after their encounter directly and non-directly with non-islamic activism, namely feminist activism. unfortunately, this aspect was not further explored in the study. thus, in this article, i will explore more about women’s activism concerning the (un)veiling by focusing on the subjectivity of women’s activists who had been involved in the islamist movement but then moved to feminism. more specifically, i will examine the symbolism construction and reconstruction of hijab by the subjects. the tarbiyah movement’s construction and utilization of the symbolism of hijab the construction of hijab symbolism most of the subjects of this study wore hijab for the first time in their senior high school. it is only om who started to wear it at the end of her junior high school, right after she finished the school national examination. however, all of them had worn hijab before they were involved in the tarbiyah movement which was started by their involvement in liqo. later, their involvement in tarbiyah affected the way they perceive what the hijab is and the way they wore their hijab. the interviews show that each of the subjects had their initial reason and motivation to wear hijab for the first time, which is different from one to another. unlike the others, ds did not want to wear hijab, but she then wore it because her high school had obliged her to wear one. af, who had been exposed to the social and political issues in the islamic world since very young, was motivated to wear hijab to show her islamic identity as the manifestation of her solidarity with muslims who had been killed and tortured in the bosnian war. besides, like rn, the experience of sexual harassment in public places had also contributed to the decision to veil. af said: i feel like it was a form of religious and solidarity statement. the religious statement itself is not in the sense that i can be more pious, but become more secure, and protected. from the identity aspect, this is also part of my islamic spirit that just found its manifestation. and at the pragmatic aspect, it might protect me from sexual harassment. 24 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 rn also stated the same reason to wear hijab as she said: now, i have been in a point that women who wear hijab have the same potency as women who do not wear hijab in terms of becoming the victim of sexual harassment. however, in indonesia and according to my experience, by wearing hijab, i could have more bargaining positions to fight back. it is like i am bringing my fence everywhere, so if someone keeps violating me i could fight. thus, both af and rn thought that the hijab made them more secure from sexual violence that they had experienced before. while om, although she was unsure about why she decided to wear hijab, she was motivated to wear one since she was in her second grade of junior high school. it was when she was involved in after-school mentoring in her school’s mushola in which she attended discussions on hijab. despite the different motivations of why they decided and started to wear hijab, all the subjects admitted that gradually they covered their bodies further by wearing a longer and wider hijab, long skirt, and socks, and covering their arms. besides, the change in how they covered their body happened when they were involved in the tarbiyah. the feeling that they were supposed to conform to the group in terms of veiling was one of the reasons why they covered more parts of their bodies (juneman 2010). as rn explained, the way women in tarbiyah interacted made her uncomfortable if she did not conform to their veiling “template”, by which members had to wear a long hijab that covers her bottom, a long skirt, arm covering, and socks. ds started to wear hijab due to the school rule as her school is affiliated with pks (an islamist party) or tarbiyah. she also admitted that she started to wear a wide and loose hijab as she wanted to conform to her surrounding. om said: i am thinking that maybe at that time i wore a loose and long hijab because my friends in that group wore that kind of hijab and people valued others based on their hijab”. this is confirmed by af who stressed that: “besides, they also fixed me…, fixed the way i wore my hijab, the way i do jamaah prayers”. another reason they covered more parts of their body is related to the symbolism of hijab in the tarbiyah movement they followed. they realized that in the group, hijab was a symbol of muslim women’s piety. as om said before, in the group members valued others based on their hijab; the looser and longer hijab one wore, the more pious she was regarded. af said: 25ayu regina yolandasari so, the bigger hijab you wear, the better you are. we measure our piety from the size of hijab. if one wears a short hijab, she will be considered as futur. it is a term in the tarbiyah movement, which means breaking rope or breaking liqo. the movement members may think that she is losing her faith in islam. this is confirmed by rn who said that “so, physical code is so much important for them although it was not visibly written. it has become the indicator of the level of islamic piety”. this is also in line with ds explanation that in her high school, she learned from her surroundings that hijab was a representation of piety, and a wide hijab meant that the wearer was a pious woman. so, there was pressure from her surroundings that made her wear a loose and long hijab. thus, based on the explanation above, the early reason and motivation of subjects to wear hijab are theological, but they then developed into nontheological ones due to the subjects’ experiences. the experience of sexual violence led the subjects to wear hijab to feeling more secure. following school’s rules is another reason why they decided to wear hijab. then, their involvement in the tarbiyah movement made them cover more parts of their bodies. this is due to the indirect pressure to conform to the “template” showed by their fellows in the tarbiyah movement as well as the constructed symbolism of hijab as the sign of muslim women’s piety. then, how the tarbiyah movement utilized this symbolism? the utilization of hijab symbolism at the end of her first grade in high school, rn decided to wear hijab for the first time. since after, she started to come to mentoring sessions (liqo) more often in the tarbiyah movement. she was excited to see her mentor. “at that time, i just started to wear hijab and i became excited to find more information about islam. i read islamic books, i came to mentoring sessions more often, and tried to find more places to have discussions on islam,” she explained. she admitted that it was just after she wore hijab for the first time she was interested to have a deeper understanding of islam. she felt that because she wore hijab, she had to understand islam more than before. she found the mentoring sessions in the tarbiyyah movement a way to understand islam. as seen from rn’s experience, hijab wearing affected women’s attitude towards religion. in her case, it improved her interest in learning more about islam and led her to attend actively the mentoring sessions. 26 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 in the other cases, the wearing of hijab interested the senior members of tarbiyah movement to approach the subjects and get them involved in tarbiyah activism. as ds explained: during religious activities in the campus orientation program, they will assess students to be recruited by their appearance first. it will be easy for women to be targeted. they will personally approach those who wear loose and long hijab and long skirt. furthermore, once the subjects of my study were involved more actively in the tarbiyyah movement, they looked similar to other members of the movement in appearance. for instance, like the senior members of the movement, they covered more parts of their bodies. the similarity in appearance then affected their relationship with those outside of the group. as om said, after she wore her hijab for the first time, her friends identified her as a member of rohis (islamic activism at high schools) because of the sim1ilarity of her appearance with the tarbiyah members. her friends who were not from rohis felt awkward to her. in the other words, wearing hijab in line with the tarbiyah’s way of wearing hijab created exclusivity. this also affected the level of their militancy, the most important criteria in the further recruitment of tarbiyah members. according to kholis fuad (in rahmat 2008), a pks male activist, the selection system in the tarbiyah movement prioritize militancy so that the activists’ commitment to the vision and mission of the group would not easily fade away. this is proved by the experience of om. om was more militant than her friends in her senior high school. she obliged herself to not come late to the liqo and be never absent. but, she became more judgmental toward those of different groups as well those of the same movement. om said: oh, so sad… i was horrible. at that time, i felt like i was the most righteous one. i became so much judgmental to the other different groups also to my own. i could not accept even if someone needed to accompany her mother. i would say that the liqo is more important. i believe so much in a verse of the quran, surah attaubah verse 41, that said, “go forth whether light or heavy and strive with your wealth and your lives in the cause of allah. that is better for you if you knew”. my group often repeated that verse to motivate us to involve in liqo and any other activities. i absorbed it too well. i did not care about my body condition. even if i got dizzy, i would come to the liqo. 27ayu regina yolandasari this is similar to af who admitted that she would confront women who removed their hijab. her militancy made her act “just like a sharia police officer.” thus, it is why physical code become so much important for the tarbiyah movement. it is an indicator of members’ militancy. according to kokom (in rahmat 2008), an activist of the tarbiyah movement, the moderation of the outfit ruling affected the women activists’ level of militancy. it decreased their commitment to islamic dakwah, their willingness to struggle and sacrifice, and the intensity of their participation in the tarbiyah activities. she also mentioned that moderation caused them fragile, easily affected by other groups, and withdraw from the tarbiyah movement. questioning the tarbiyah’s hijab symbolism the life crisis experienced by the subjects of this study was momentum for them to question the tarbiyah movement. it triggered them to realize patriarchal and heteronormative values embedded in the movement. the following is the detail of the life crisis experienced by the subjects of this study. falling victim to an abusive relationship falling victim to an abusive relationship was a moment in which af realized to leave the tarbiyah activism. it was not the direct cause of why she detached herself from the movement. instead, she left the movement after she realized what had made her fall into the unfortunate situation and the lack of support given by the movement. af admitted that she was the victim of the early marriage doctrine socialized by the tarbiyah movement. one day, she read a book entitled indahnya pernikahan dini (the beauty of early marriage). then she hoped to meet a nice guy who would bring her out of the house. thus, when she met this guy, she thought that by marrying him, she could leave the house soon. even though he had that commitment, the guy still approached her aggressively and it seemed that he used the commitment to touch and harass her sexually. she was also pressured by her fellows in the tarbiyah movement. af said: they said:”you know, you’ve become part of our core team, you must know the rules, but why you are still being close to him? did you get married already?’ i was frustrated and because of that pressure, i decided to get married. 28 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 since the marriage and because of the abusive relationship, af became less active in the tarbiyah and was no longer involved in the movement. she could not develop herself because of being busy with her personal struggle. af tried to tell her seniors in the movement about her plan to divorce. but, they told her to rethink her decision and discouraged her. af was disappointed. she said: i kept silent for so long. i wanted to leave the relationship but i was too scared. i was terrorized. i needed someone to tell me that i am not alone. i already had two kids at that time. he said: “who will be interested in you if we get a divorce?! you will just be a widow with two kids”. i couldn’t stand it anymore. the tarbiyah didn’t support me. it didn’t give any spirit of resistance against personal oppression. we supported palestine even did the demonstration for palestine. but, when we faced a personal problem, we had to fight alone. amidst abusive marriage and was no longer involved in the tarbiyah, af was introduced to feminism when she took two classes on politics and women. in the classes, she started to be empowered. moreover, the lecturer was empowering and supportive. when she told the lecturer about her family condition, her lecturer supported her plan to divorce. she found her spirit of resistance again and was triggered to question herself: “we (women) are interested in politics of violence and resistance, but why do we allow ourselves to be oppressed? we (women) have a high political will when we see the injustice here and there, but when it happened in our domestic sphere, why can we just be silent?”. falling victim to sexual violence all the subjects of this study experienced sexual violence. the occurrence of sexual violence itself was not enough to empower and trigger them to question the values that were cultivated by the tarbiyah. to empower them and change their attitude towards tarbiyah and hijab, it needed to be mediated with another event that could raise the subjects’ consciousness of becoming the victim and that they were not the cause of the sexual violence. in the case of ds, sexual violence that happened to her after she was involved in the tarbiyyah movement did not immediately trigger her to question the negative values that had been cultivated by the movement. instead, she tended to blame herself. she said: 29ayu regina yolandasari it was in 2012. i experienced sexual violence from my male friend who is a member of the tarbiyah as well. no one knows this. i just told my high school friend who doesn’t know how to react to that. she just asked me to learn from my mistake. so, i blamed myself. why did i allow myself to be with him by myself, just two of us? we were not supposed to have an intimate relationship, but i was a rebel. i was not his girlfriend, but we were close. one day he kissed me forcefully. but then he repeated kissing me three or four times. i kept coming back to him because i thought that he was a responsible one. i didn’t know that it was sexual violence. it took two years for ds to find out that it was sexual violence and she became a victim. in 2014, she attended a seminar on sexual violence at the university of indonesia. the speaker shocked her and she felt empowered. ds said: at that time, i remembered what had happened to me in 2012. oh my god! it (sexual violence happened to her) was not my fault! i felt empowered!”. this consciousness of being the victim empowered ds. she realized that there was something wrong with the value she had internalized from the tarbiyah movement. she said: i felt like, this was supposed to be able to be prevented. not the sexual violence itself, but how i was supposed to deal with that. to whom should i report it and for sure not blame myself. and i think one of the problems that caused this was how i was educated and the circumstances where i live. how islam teaches about women is not empowering at all. not empowering at all. this make the cases like this (sexual violence) will never be exposed because people will just keep silent and women will just blame themselves. this enraged me, but i did not know to whom because my culture and religion talk like this (blaming the victim). i did nothing bad to anybody. how come this horrible thing happened to me? they said if we are good, we will receive the good. in fact, it is not like that. being lesbian in 2011, om started to question her sexuality. this led her to learn about female sexuality and explore more about her own. it was not easy for her because she was still involved in liqo. she stopped her activities in tarbiyyah including the daurah due to an accident and her leave of absence. so, at that time, her interaction with the movement had been lessened. 30 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 in her exploration of her sexuality, she tried to find the quranic verses, hadith, and ulama’s jurisprudence on homosexuality. she found that there is nothing that talks about same-sex attraction, but same-sex sexual activities or behaviour. at that time, she did not think that she would do the sexual activities either. however, she was also exposed to a narration that said that homosexuals deserve to be killed. this kind of narration made her upset as she felt that her feeling about a woman was given by god. then she could not understand why she was supposed to be punished for something that she never asked for. in her liqo and her circle of friends, she tried to bring up the issues of lgbt to be discussed. but, these were not positively responded to. in her liqo, she shared that she wanted to be a counsellor. but, her murrobiyah (a feminine form of murrobi or mentor) warned her not to become a counsellor for lgbt. in her circle of best friends, she asked what they would do if they had a family member who is lgbt. her friends told her that they were unsure, but probably they could not accept him or her. thus, om realized that her sexuality was something that she could not talk to them although she had tried to give some hints. being feminist rn had been interested in women’s issues before she was involved in tarbiyah. it was when her identity as a feminist was bothered by the tarbiyah movement that she no more tolerated different values between her and the group. during the 2014 presidential election, the liqo became a medium for spreading hatred against chinese communities, communists, and feminists. while rn identified herself as a feminist, she decided to leave the tarbiyah in 2015 because she could not stand it anymore. she told her friends that she could not involve anymore in the movement and would find her spiritual journey. she said: i decided not to involve [in the tarbiyah movement] anymore even until now. before, i thought that if i was no more there, i wouldn’t be able to reach them out anymore. i tried to survive there, in the system, because i wanted to disseminate my thought about gender and give them a different perspective. but then i realized, whom i was trying to save? i thought that i needed to save myself, so i left and decided to continue the struggle through another way. the life crisis that had happened to the subjects of this study triggered them to question the negative values, such as misogynist, patriarchal and 31ayu regina yolandasari heteronormativity, embedded in the tarbiyah movement (shaiks and maguire 2007). it refers to the violence they experienced, such as falling victim to an abusive relationship and sexual violence, as well as an indirect attack on their sexual and feminist identity. moreover, the lack of support from the tarbiyah members led the subjects to find another source of support. this led to their detachment from their tarbiyah group and the movement. the exposure to feminism when they had to deal with their life crisis empowered and triggered them to question the values that had been internalized by the tarbiyah and later led to the change in their attitude toward the movement. as a result, this change affected their attitude toward their hijab. the wearing of hijab is caused by the commitment to a group which is manifested through the hijab symbolism according to the group’s construction of it which is socially legitimized (ramadhini 2017). the involvement in feminism and the reconstruction of personal hijab symbolism the violent reality facing the subjects of this study triggered them to question the negative patriarchal and heteronormative values which had disempowered them. the lack of support they got from their fellow members and the exposure to feminism helped them to detach from the movement. besides, it helped them to reconstruct the symbolization of hijab which then led them to take their hijab off or not. thus, in this part, each of the subjects’ reconstruction of the hijab symbolization will be explained. then, it will show how they internalized the meaning of being (un)veiled. re-veiling as the means to negotiate and be socially accepted sexual and domestic violence experience made af realized that the tarbiyah movement would not support her and other women who experienced crises. she wore hijab when she was 17 years old and since then it became a statement of her islamic identity, struggling, and personal convictions. but, in 2016, af decided to remove her hijab. she said: “i’ve always tried to be a good muslim woman, but i kept falling into traumatic experiences and was disappointed with my convictions”. af admitted that when she removed her hijab for the first time, she felt free. for her, it felt like she released the burden and horrible experiences in the past. but at the same time, af also questioned if it was really her. she had unveiled for 8 months when i met her. for her, it was also a battle. her mom was furious about her decision to unveil. after eight months 32 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 she had unveiled and had struggled on it, she managed to negotiate with her circumstances by changing her perspective regarding hijab. wearing hijab was no longer a burden afterwards. she did not consider hijab as the symbol of a certain islamic identity which bothered her life. rather, it became her way to negotiate to be accepted by her family, her people in aceh, and the islamic community. af realized that freedom could not be attached and symbolized by a piece of cloth. she found that by doing all this she got a kind of freedom, but she lost other things when she veiled and unveiled. unveiling as the way to gain the freedom of expression the consciousness of being a victim of sexual violence led ds to realize that her islamic circumstances, namely the tarbiyah movement, did not enable her to be empowered. not only did she detach from the movement, but also managed to find her space in her workplace. besides, it led her to the point in which she was no longer comfortable with the hijab that she wore. hijab lost its significance for ds. she said: because i’ve learned feminism, i felt like it is not anybody business how long my hijab is. so, now i feel that the hijab is only an accessory like a hat or jacket. moreover, feminism also has taught me that there is a lot of different interpretation regarding hijab, even there’s also an interpretation that says it is okay to not wear it. […] i wanted to express myself through what i wear, and it cannot be done if i wear hijab. by expressing ourselves it means that we have power over our own body, right? i envy my feminist friends. they can wear any kind of clothes, any colour of lipstick. they seem to have their freedom. in march 2017, ds tried to unveil for a few days when she came to coldplay’s concert. when she removed her hijab for the first time, she thought that she would feel guilty or uncomfortable. in fact, she was fine with it. moreover, she was finally able to wear an outfit she wanted to wear. when she informed me on december 12th, 2017, ds had removed her hijab in her office for two or three months. she felt happy and tried to wear anything that she had not been able to wear when she was still veiling. veiling to own her body regardless of the heated debates on hijab, rn felt that wearing hijab made her own her own body. this is related to her relationship with her mother who always controls her body. rn said: 33ayu regina yolandasari even when i was 30 years old, my mom still protested the way i dressed and asked me to wear her chosen dress. she always complained about my things, my hair, anything. but now i don’t care anymore. when i wear hijab, my family support me, including my mom. previously, when i wore a long and wide hijab until my bottom, she didn’t like it. for her, i was too conservative. but now when i am more stylish, she wants me to wear my hijab like before. she becomes more religious according to her definition. rn no longer wore hijab until her bottom and opted to wear pants rather than a long skirt. but, her hijab was wide enough to cover her chest. she explained that it was related to her multiple experiences of sexual violence. she perceived her breast as the source of sexual harassment. she was and is still uncomfortable with her breast. she does not want to look at them and when she has sexual activities she did not want to talk about her breast. she felt that her breast was the source of what had happened to her all this long. so, she kept wearing hijab that covers her breast. unveiling as the symbol of rebellion removing her hijab became om’s way to distinguish herself from the members of the tarbiyah movement. she said: i don’t want to look like that group anymore, i don’t want to be identified as part of them. so, i kept removing the things that made me look similar to them. i removed my arms covering. i remove my under-veil. i folded my sleeves. i am not comfortable even just with wearing a thin hijab. and after i told you this, i am thinking that maybe at that time i wore a wide hijab because my friends in that group wore that kind of hijab and they valued others according to their hijab. now, i don’t want to be part of that group. it is very uncomfortable. moreover, removing hijab was an expression of om’s rebellion against the ideas on sexual violence and hijab promoted by the islamist groups. she thought that she disagreed with the idea that hijab protects women from sexual violence. she could not accept the idea that she needs to do something, in this case wearing hijab, to prevent men from doing sexual harassment to her. this made her rethink and question why she wore hijab if she didn’t believe in it anymore. despite her willingness to fully unveil, om wore hijab on certain occasions and circumstances where her friends from the tarbiyah 34 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 movement lived and did their activities. this was her way to respect her friends who still held the conservative values of hijab. moreover, she needed to keep veiling to support her work to infiltrate into the islamist groups’ discussion on lgbt. she wore hijab more flexibly. she did not wear hijab whenever she wanted and she wouldn’t mind wearing it in a condition that she needed to wear it like when she needed to negotiate with conservative islamic groups on certain issues. she believed that hijab was only a piece of cloth or accessory, but she also regarded it as having power that she could exercise in certain occasions and contexts. conclusion this article has shown that women’s activism in their former tarbiyah movement and current feminism affected the way they constructed, deconstructed, and reconstructed the hijab symbolism and influenced their decision to wear or not to wear hijab. despite different motivations on why the subjects of this study decided and started to wear hijab, the involvement in the tarbiyah movement affected the way they covered themselves. they gradually covered more parts of their bodies just like their fellow members in the movement in conformity with the hijab symbolism constructed by the tarbiyah movement. hijab was regarded as a symbol of muslim women’s piety as the members of the movement valued others by the kind of their hijab. the wider hijab a woman wore, the more pious she was regarded. hijab and dress code were indicators to measure the militancy of tarbiyah female activists. the life crisis experienced by the subjects of this study such as falling victim to gender-based violence and the realization that they were feminists and lesbians was the momentum for them to question the teachings and values enforced by the tarbiyah movement. this led them to realize patriarchal and heteronormative values promoted by the movement, which in turn disempowered them. the disappointing attitude of fellow members also brought the subjects of this study to detach themselves from the tarbiyah movement. the exposure to feminism, when they had to deal with their life crisis, empowered them and changed their attitude toward the tarbiyah movement. moreover, this change in attitude towards the movement affected their attitude toward hijab. their disappointment with the tarbiyah movement did not necessarily bring them to remove their hijab. the subjects of this study changed their way of veiling their bodies and reconstructing new values of (un)veiling. thus, veiling and its symbolism constructed by tarbiyah had no longer the power to determine 35ayu regina yolandasari the subjects’ behaviour. their reconstruction of hijab symbolism enabled them to regain control of their bodies and determine whether they would go veiled or unveiled according to certain contexts and situations. funding the author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. acknowledgments this article was written based on my master’s thesis in the department of women’s studies at ewha womans university, south korea. i would like to thank prof. kim eunshil for supervising and giving me valuable advice and support for this research and my overall master’s education. i also would like to thank all informants for their willingness to be involved in this research and share their valuable experiences. this research was presented in some feminist groups in korea and indonesia and at some conferences such as the empowerment of women in indonesia conference organized by ucla center for southeast asian studies, la, united states, in 2019, and the 1st bandung international conference in social science (bicoss), 6-8 july 2021 in bandung (online) where i received some supportive feedback to the improvement of this article. endnotes 1 hijab is a term that has cultural and linguistic roots that are integral to islamic (and arab) culture as a whole (el-guindi 1999) and has the meaning “to cover or separate things”. in relation to clothing in islamic teaching, hijab could be defined as muslim women’s modest wear or the islamic tradition of veiling. in this article, the terms hijab and veil is used interchangeably. references albana, u. a. 2017. kaffe 6: online lecture on women and religious radicalism. jakarta: yayasan jurnal perempuan. burdah, ibnu. 2017. “adakah hubungan pks dengan ikhwanul muslimin?”. jawa pos, 1 may. effendy, bahtiar. 2003. islam and the state in indonesia. singapore: institute of southeast asian studies. 36 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 el-guindi, fadwa. 1999. veil: modesty, privacy, and resistance. new york: berg. fujita, akiko. 2015. “hijab fashion is so popular in indonesia. non-muslim designers are getting in on it”. the world, october 7. retrieved 1 september 2017 (http://www.pri.org/ stories/2015-10-07/hijab-fashion-so-popular-indonesia-nonmuslim-designers-are-getting-it). hakim, rakhmat nur. 2016. “survey wahid foundation: indonesia masih rawan intoleransi dan radikalisme”. kompas.com, august 1. retrieved 1 september 2017 (http://nasional.kompas.com/ read/2016/08/01/13363111/survei.wahid.foundation.indonesia. masih.rawan.intoleransi.dan.radikalisme?page=all). juneman. 2010. psychology of fashion: fenomena perempuan [melepas] hijab. yogyakarta: lkis. lestari, sri. 2016. “sikap intoleran ‘kian meluas’ di masyarakat indonesia”. bbc, february 16. retrieved 1 september 2017 (http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/berita_ indonesia/2016/02/160222_indonesia_intoleransi). machmudi, yon. 2008. islamizing indonesia: the rise of jamaah tarbiyah and the prosperous justice party (pks). canberra: anu press. retrieved 1 september 2017 (http://www.jstor.org/ stable/j.ctt24hddh) mernissi, fatima. 1987. beyond the veil: male-female dynamics in modern muslim society (revised edition). indiana: indiana university press. rahmat, m. imdadun. 2008. ideologi politik pks: dari masjid kampus ke gedung parlemen. yogyakarta: lkis. ramadhini, eveline. 2017. “fenomena merebaknya jilbab di universitas indonesia” (the spread of hijab at the university of indonesia). wartapilihan.com, february 23. retrieved 1 september 2017 (http:/www.wartapilihan.com/fenomena-merebaknya-jilbab-diuniversitas-indonesia/) rinaldo, rachel. 2013. mobilizing piety: islam and feminism in indonesia. new york: oxford university press. salim, delmus puneri. 2015. the transnational and the local in the politics of islam: the case of west sumatra, indonesia. switzerland: springer international publishing. 37ayu regina yolandasari shaik, s. and maguire, d. c. 2007. violence against women in contemporary world religions: roots and cures. cleveland, ohio: pilgrim press. suryakusumah, julia. 2013. “sexypants and headscarf: when minds and spirits meet”. in julia’s jihad: tales of the politically, sexually, and religiously incorrect: living in the chaos of the biggest muslim democracy. depok: komunitas bambu. wahid institute. 2007. “peta dan isu gerakan perempuan islam di indonesia”. the wahid institute, june 12. retrieved 1 september 2017 (http://www.wahidinstitute.org/v1/programs/ detail/?id=126/hl=id/peta_dan_isu_gerakan_perempuan_islam_ di_indonesia). warburton, eve. 2007. “no longer a choice”. inside indonesia, july 14. retrieved 1 september 2017 (http://www.insideindonesia.org/nolonger-a-choice). wieringa, saskia e. 2015. “gender harmony and the happy family: islam, gender, and sexuality in post-reformasi indonesia”. south east asia research 23(1): 1-18. doi: 10.5367/sear.2015.0244. 38 journal of asian social science research vol. 3, no. 1, 2021 ahmad ali nurdin1 uin sunan gunung djati, bandung, indonesia ahmad tholabi kharlie uin syarif hidayatullah, jakarta, indonesia abstract this paper discusses how the indonesian sunni muslim leader abdurrahman wahid and the iranian shiite muslim leader ayatollah khomeini responded to the debate about the relationship between islam and the state. their responses impacted on the struggle of indonesian and iranian muslims in considering the ideological basis of indonesian and iranian states. on the one hand, wahid with his educational and social background and indonesian political context rejected the concept of an islamic state. he did not agree with the formalization of islamic sharia. to implement his idea, he promoted the idea of pribumisasi islam. for wahid, islamization was not arabization. khomeini, on the other hand, believed that islam is a religion that has complete laws and way of life including social rules. according to khomeini, to effectively implement these rules, muslims need to have executive power. in khomeini’s view, when the quran calls for muslims to obey allah, the messenger, and ulil amri, this means that allah instructs muslims to create an islamic state. to realise his views, khomeini proposed the doctrine of velayat-e al faqeeh. thus, different religious-political contexts of these two leaders contributed to their different responses to the relationship between islam and the state. keywords islamic state, sunni, shi’ite, pribumisasi, velayat-e al faqeeh intisari artikel ini membahas bagaimana pemimpin muslim sunni dari indonesia, abdurrahman wahid, dan pemimpin muslim syiah dari iran, ayatollah khomeini, merespon perdebatan tentang hubungan sunni and shiite political thought of islamstate relationship: a comparison between abdurrahman wahid of indonesia and ayatollah khomeini of iran journal of asian social science research 2019, vol. i, no. 1: 27-45 http://jassr.cassr.web.id © the author(s) 2019 article 1 corresponding author: ahmad ali nurdin faculty of social and political science, uin sunan gunung djati, bandung jalan a.h. nasution 105, cipadung, cibiru, bandung, indonesia 40614 email: nurdinster@gmail.com 28 journal of asian social science research vol. 1, no. 1, 2019 antara islam dan negara. respon keduanya mempengaruhi upaya muslim indonesian dan iran dalam membentuk basis ideologi negara indonesia dan iran. pada satu sisi, wahid dengan latar belakang pendidikannya dan konteks politik indonesia menolak konsep negara islam. ia tidak setuju dengan formalisasi syariah. untuk mewujudkan idenya, wahid mempromosikan gagasan pribumisasi islam. bagi wahid, islamisasi bukalah arabisasi. khomeini, pada sisi lain, percaya bahwa islam adalah agama yang yang memiliki hukum dan jalan hidup yang lengkap termasuk aturan sosial. ia berpendapat bahwa untuk melaksanakan aturan-aturan islam ini secara efektif, muslim harus memiliki kekuasaan eksekutif. ketika quran menyeru muslim untuk taat kepada allah, nabi-nya dan ulil amr, ini berarti perintah allah kepada muslim untuk menciptakan negara islam. untuk mewujudkan ini, khomeini mengajukan gagasan institusi velayat-e al faqeeh. jadi, konteks keagamaan dan politik yang berbeda membuat wahid dan khomeini memberikan respon yang berbeda terhadap persoalan hubungan antara islam dan negara. katakunci negara islam, sunni, syi’ah, pribumisasi, velayat-e al faqeeh introduction the relationship between state and religion has frequently been discussed by muslim scholars. the roots of this debate relate to myriad interpretations of the main sources of islam: the quran and hadith. as commonly known, differences among muslim scholars which lead to different schools of thought have appeared not only in their responses to the relationship between and the state but also in several fields of islamic teaching such as fiqh (islamic law). in the field of fiqh, muslims are familiar with schools of thought (madhhab) such as malikites, hambalites, hanafites, and shafiites. regarding the relationship between state and religion, muslim scholars’ views are divided into three categories of political thought. first, those who believe that religion and state cannot be separated. second, those who argue that state and religion are related to each other and both have a mutual relationship. the last group who believes that relations between state and religion should be separated. these three different views have impacted on the extent to which islamic law (sharia) should be implemented in muslim countries. according to mudzhar (1990:5), there are at least three types of countries as far as the role of sharia is concerned. first, countries that still regard the sharia as the fundamental law and apply it more or less in its entirety. saudi arabia is a case in point. second, countries where sharia law has been abandoned completely and substituted by a wholly secular one. turkey fits into this category. third, countries that try to reach a compromise between the two domains of law by adopting secular law and 29nurdin and kharlie preserving the sharia at the same time. these include such countries as egypt, tunisia, iraq, indonesia, and malaysia. it is against the above background this paper tries to deal with questions about how sunni and shi’ites muslim leaders respond to such debates. in doing so, it focused its analysis on the views of abdurrahman of sunni indonesia and ayatollah khomeini of shiite iran. the paper describes how their different views occurred and impacted upon the struggle of indonesian and iranian muslims in determining how the indonesian and iranian states should be based ideologically. indonesian and iranian contexts before comparing the thoughts of wahid and khomeini on the islam-state relationship, it is necessary to look at the context of their countries, indonesia and iran, where these two leaders promoted their ideas. besides the fact that both indonesia and iran were countries where islam is the dominant religion and a growing factor in mainstream political life, several additional reasons can be put forward to justify this comparison. firstly, indonesia and iran are two examples where religious discourse has occurred that aims at the reconciliation of democratic and liberal values. leading religious intellectuals and ulama in both countries have generated arguments that islamic activities can be better applied in democratic environments that guard the freedom of speech, the freedom of association and the freedom of religion. however, when compared to the rest of the muslim world including iran, it is only in indonesia that large sections of the public could be mobilized based on these arguments. islamic civil society groups including nahdhatul ulama (wahid was the former chairman of this organization) and muhammadiyah, the two large islamic organizations of the country, have been at the forefront of pro-democratic mobilization in indonesia since their establishment until the present. the second reason, the role of islam in indonesia and iran is a result of the historically and socially constructed circumstances made and produced by the fundamental interaction with the state. islam in both countries has been shaped in two different ways. it should be similar if there were something inherent about islam, but in reality, however, they are extremely different. this difference demonstrates “that islam cannot automatically produce a single cultural outcome” (winter 2010:256). on the one hand, islamization in indonesia has been prompted by different actors and, according to ufen (2009), the state apparatus only controlled and directed its dynamics with growing intensity from the mid1980s until the fall of suharto. since the reformation era that started in 1998, there has been a blossoming of a diverse, yet mostly conservative, islam across the society. however, in the party system, the islamization of politics has been moderate. indonesia is not an islamic state because the 1945 constitution stipulates a ‘state philosophy’, the pancasila (five pillars), that recognizes religions lived and adhered to by indonesian people. on the other hand, iran has a long tradition of clerical involvement in common freedom movements, dating back to the constitutional revolution of 30 journal of asian social science research vol. 1, no. 1, 2019 1906. since the revolution, political reform has been supported by members of the clergy in iran. this reached its peak when the ayatullah khomeini led the movement that toppled and ended iran’s monarchy under the shah in 1979. kar (2010) argues that the contemporary debates on the role of islam in iranian politics are informed by five major historical episodes: the constitutional revolution in 1906, the white revolution in 1963, the islamic revolution in 1979, the reform movement in 1997, and the green movement that emerged in 2009. kar (2010) further argues that much of the contemporary history of iran is “a story” of clashes between aspirations for and obstacles to political participation. two revolutions (the change from an autocratic system to a constitutional monarchy in 1906 and the islamic revolution of 1979) were the result of “conflict” between those who supported modernity and those who struggled to keep the tradition. the third reason is that indonesia and iran represent two different kinds of islam: sunni and shiite. the sunni muslim world consists of countries where the religious leaders (ulama) by and large oppose the establishment of a formal islamic state. in contrast, shii islam is dominant in countries like iran where clerical groups promote politicization of religion and take on leadership roles in movements and governments. as a sunni state, indonesia has struggled for decades over the place of islam in its political systems. indonesia has experienced authoritarianism with secular tendencies for significant portions of its recent history. mainstream and non-violent islamist movements have played influential roles in the country, and, by their political success, have effectively marginalized violent fringe groups. in contrast, the leader of the 1979 revolution in iran, khomeini denounced monarchy and proposed an unprecedented theory, velayat-i faqeeh, the governance of supreme jurist. the regime has established institutions to assure the compliance of all legislation with islamic laws, even though there is no precedent in islamic law for the iranian constitution, which combines elements of the western parliamentary system with khomeini’s theory of velayat-i faqeeh (ayoob 2007:24-25). another striking difference between indonesia and iran is concerned with the extent of the politicization of religious issues within the party systems. in indonesia during its under authoritarian rule, political parties simply did not have the opportunity to radically politicize islam and mobilize supporters. in iran, in contrast, political islam is not as fragmented as in indonesia. the fourth reason is that a comparison of islam in indonesia, which is represented by wahid’s thought, and in iran, which is represented by khomeini, could challenge the common image of islam as portrayed by the western media. the media commonly offers a single version of islam in place of an extremely diverse and pluralistic tradition. redrawing the coverage of islam to cover other aspects of the muslim world other than the middle east like indonesia would help to decrease the cultural bias that has been created in the west by expanding the world understanding of islam. understanding the pluralistic and diverse nature of the muslim world, such as comparing indonesian and iranian islam, challenges the idea that islam is monolithic. it also helps to show that religion generally, or 31nurdin and kharlie islam in particular, is not the only source of identity for muslim people. instead, other social divisions often have a much greater influence on the decisions people make and the way they chose to live their lives as muslims (winter 2010:258). finally, the study of wahid and khomeini’s thoughts on the islam-state relationship is still suffering from a lack of scholarly attention. although some attention has been given to wahid and khomeini by scholars who study indonesian and iranian politics, none have studied them in comparative ways. abdurrahman wahid’s views of islam-state relationship wahid’s social and educational background abdurrahman wahid, popularly known as wahid, was born in jombang on 7 september 1940 (yahya 2004:2). gus is a short name taken from bagus (good) and it is an honorific title given to a son of the leader of pesantren (islamic boarding school) and dur is a short name for abdurrahman (thorchia 2007:34). his father, k.h. wahid hasyim, was the chairman of the biggest muslim organization in indonesia, nahdhatul ulama (nu), and his grandfather, hasyim ashari, was the founder of nu. as a son of a kyai, wahid studied islamic studies in several pesantrens in east java before he went to egypt in 1962 to study at alazhar university. he did not finish his bachelor’s degree in al-azhar because he felt bored of studying islamic teachings that he had already learned in pesantren. thus, during his stay in cairo, he spent most of his time in the american university library, instead of attending lectures on campus (barton 2002:5-10). he moved to bagdhad university in 1965. wahid was a fast language learner. he was fluent in several languages such as arabic, english, dutch, and read french and germany (harjanto 2003:15). his ability to read arabic and other foreign languages led him to read both classical and modern sources and influenced intellectual development, and shaped his progressive and liberal thinkings. wahid’s views of islam and his intellectual journey are represented by his book entitled islamku, islam anda, islam kita (my islam, your islam and our islam) (wahid 2006). he admitted that when he was young, around the 1950s, he followed the idea of ikhwan al-muslimun and was actively involved in its activities in jombang. meanwhile during the 1960s, when he was a student at al-azhar university, egypt and baghdad university, iraq,wahid learned about and was interested in arabian nationalism and socialism. but when he returned to indonesia in the 1970s, he saw the development and dynamism of islam in indonesia which was different from that of the middle eastern islam. he said that his intellectual journey resulted in two things: on the one hand, his personal experience would never be experienced by others, but on the other hand, his experience could be similar to other experiences. thus, wahid concluded that islam that was thought and experienced by him was a unique and special islam,which he called “my islam” (islamku). for wahid, his islam should be seen as personal experiences that are important to be known by others but cannot be enforced on others. 32 journal of asian social science research vol. 1, no. 1, 2019 islam anda (your islam) is wahid’s appreciation and reflection on traditionalism and religious rituals that are “living” and existing in community. in this context, he appreciates religious tradition practiced by the people. islam kita (our islam) is wahid’s concern for the future of islam which represents all muslims. however, he admitted that it is difficult to formulate “our islam” because the experiences that formed “my islam” were different from experiences that formed “your islam”. it is hard to form “our islam” because sometimes there is a group who enforces the concept only according to their interpretation of islam, but repudiates others’ interpretation. formalization of islam and islamic state based on his intellectual journey and his views on islam, wahid rejected the idea of formalization and ideologization of islam in the form of making islam a state ideology). he believed that the greatness of islam is seen in its ability to develop culturally. he did not agree with the formalization of islamic sharia. this can be seen in his interpretation of quranic verse udkhulu fi al silmi kaffah. wahid interprets the word al-silm as “peacefulness”, which is different from that of formalist-textualist scholars who interpret the word as “an islamic system”. these two diverse interpretations have wide implications. those who believe in the formalization of islamic sharia always struggle to create an islamic system and neglect the reality of the plurality of indonesian people (wahid 2006:xvxvii). as a result, those people would consider non-muslim citizens to be secondclass members of society in indonesia. thus, for wahid, to become a committed practicing muslim does not require creating an islamic system or an islamic state as long as a muslim accepts the islamic tenet, has faith in islam, and spreads peace among people. as a consequence, to create an islamic system or formalization of islamic sharia is not a requirement for an indonesian muslim to be called a pious muslim. in the context of the formalization of islamic sharia, wahid also rejected the idea of the ideologization of islam. to make islam a state ideology is not compatible with the development of indonesian muslim society, which is known as “a home for moderate muslims.” for wahid, the ideologization of islam could pave the way for indonesian muslims to politicize religion and encourage muslims to interpret religious texts textually and literally, which could lead to islamic radicalism. as a result, wahid rejected the idea of an islamic state. he did not agree with some indonesian muslims who proposed the idea of an indonesian islamic state. for wahid, islam as a way of life does not have a clear concept of an islamic state. he claimed that during his life he had looked for makhluk (a creature) named “islamic state”, but he could not find any. wahid (2006:81-82) said: during my life, i have searched futilely for a creation named islamic state. up to today, i could not find one yet. thus i have to conclude that islam does not have a concept on how a state should be built and defended. 33nurdin and kharlie wahid had two reasons why he rejected the idea of an islamic state. first, according to wahid (2006:84), islam does not have a clear view of leadership succession. during the period of the first four caliphs, different methods were adopted for the appointment of the caliphs, and in all four cases, the appointment was confirmed by the muslim community’s oath of allegiance which was formally obtained. abu bakar was elected without planning or preparation because the prophet, according to sunni, did not leave any message or testament to guide the succession of the leader of the muslim community. umar bin khattab was elected by the former caliph directly. furthermore, uthman bin affan was chosen by a six-member election committee and ali was elected only by three persons. however, according to iqbal (1983:225), generally speaking, the methods adopted during this period had a common feature namely the selection of the best man followed by the oath of the muslim community. this means that there is neither any standard procedure for electing a caliph in islam nor any standard form of islamic government. according to ayubi (1991:6), the quran does not stipulate a specific form of the state or the government, and the prophet muhammad did not appoint a successor for himself even though he knew his demise was imminent. thus, some ulama argue that the caliphs can be elected, generally, in two ways: by an election committee or by the former caliph. since the quran and hadith do not stipulate a specific form of the state or the islamic government, muslim scholars try to respond to questions such as what constitutes an islamic government and to what extent an islamic government is dependent upon the virtuous character of the caliph or the manner of his selection. this resulted in diverse views of ‘an islamic state’ and no single one is universally adopted. for some, the true caliphate is restricted to the first four rightly guided caliphs. but, for others like ibnu khaldun pragmatically accept the possible compatibility of caliphs with a kingdom as it is said that “government and kingship are a caliphate of god amongst men, for the execution of his ordinance amongst them” (gibb 1982:46). the jurist al-mawardi, in his treatise al-ahkam al-sultaniyah (the ordinances of government), which became a classic exposition on islamic government, presented a theoretical, idealized view of the caliphate (esposito 1998:20). second, wahid rejected the idea of islamic state because the extent to how big an islamic state should be is not clear. when the prophet muhammad migrated to madinah, wahid, argued, that it was not clear what form of “islamic government” he built – a nation-state or only a city-state. according to anwar (2006:4-5), wahid belonged to the group of substantiveinclusive muslims. there are two perspectives of islamic political thought: legalexclusive perspective and substantive-inclusive one. the first perspective refers to the idea that islam is not only a religion but also a complete legal system, universal ideology, and a perfect system of guidance. the second perspective, in contrast, refers to the notion that islam as a religion does not stipulate any theoretical concepts related to politics and the quran only contains information about aspects of ethical or moral guidance for human life. 34 journal of asian social science research vol. 1, no. 1, 2019 hosen (2005) called these two groups as formal and substantive sharia groups respectively. there are at least four characteristics of a substantiveinclusive group. the first characteristic of this group believes that the quran consists of ethical and general moral concepts for muslims to follow but does not stipulate detailed explanations of how muslims should solve all life’s problems. thus, according to this group, there was no single verse of the quran which instructs muslims to establish an islamic state. instead, the followers of this paradigm argue that the quran consists of ethical and moral guidance on how political leaders should behave such as upholding justice, equality, democratic and other good characteristics. second, the followers of the substantive-inclusive paradigm believe that the main mission of prophet muhammad was not creating a kingdom or a state but, like other prophets, muhammad was sent by god to promote and spread islamic values and wisdom. the third characteristic of this paradigm believes that sharia was not bounded to establishing an islamic state. last, the substantive-inclusive muslim group believes that the struggle should be for the implementation of substantial islamic values in their political activities rather than a struggle for symbolic islam. esposito (1998:140) describes wahid’s political thoughts as follows: wahid believes that contemporary muslims are at a critical crossroads. two choices or paths confront them: to pursue a traditional, static legal-formalistic islam or to reclaim and refashion a more dynamic cosmopolitan, universal, pluralistic worldview. in contrast to many “fundamentalists” today, he rejects the notion that islam should form the basis for the nation-state’s political or legal system, a nation he characterizes as a middle eastern tradition, alien to indonesia. indonesian muslims should apply a moderate, tolerant brand of islam to their daily lives in a society where “a muslim and a non-muslim are the same”, a state in which religion and politics are separate. rejecting legal-formalism or fundamentalism as an aberration and a major obstacle to islamic reform and to islam’s response to global change, wahid has spent his life promoting the development of a multifaceted muslim identity and a dynamic islamic tradition capable of responding to the realities of modern life. its cornerstones are free will and the right of all muslims, both laity and religious scholars (ulama) to “perpetual reinterpretation” (ijtihad) of the quran and tradition of the prophet in light of “ever-changing human stations”. pribumisasi islam wahid popularised the term pribumisasi islam in the 1980s. the idea of pribumisasi islam seems to be part of his agenda of “pembaharuan” (renewal) of islamic thought. the spirit of his renewal was against the idea of islamic universalization (abdullah 2014:68-69). pribumisasi islam gives a room for an islamic “particularization” or local islam. it is an unavoidable process when islam meets a local culture. islam is believed to be originated by god, while 35nurdin and kharlie culture is a product of human thinkings that continues to change. pribumisasi is a transformation process of islamic elements into local cultures. this means that pribumisasi is a continuous process of acculturation. if pribumisasi is placed in the context of javanese culture, it can be understood as a process of an encounter between two cultures in which these two entities do not negate, but instead, enrich each other. to implement his pribumisasi idea, wahid argued that muslims should not make arabic language or arabic culture a superior entity. he did not agree with replacing several local languages with arabic. for example, he did not agree to replace the indonesian term ulang tahun (birthday) with the arabic milad, sekolah with madrasah), minggu (sunday) with ahad, etc. for wahid (1989:96), the most important thing is the meaning, not the symbol. however, his pribumisasi idea is different from sinkretisasi (syncretism). thus, his pribumisasi idea should be implemented carefully to avoid a mixture of local culture and originality of fundamental islamic teaching. for example, in the name of implementing the ideas of pribumisasi islam, one should avoid replacing praying activities which are spoken in arabic with indonesian words. in the context of wahid’s pribumisasi islam, effendy (2003:76) notes that: wahid advocates the notions of (1) islam as a complementary factor in indonesia’s socio-cultural and political life; (2) the need to accommodate the indonesian-local and cultural context in implementing islam in the archipelago; and (3) the need to struggle for democratic indonesia in which muslims should cooperate with other groups in its process. regarding the need to struggle for democratization in indonesia, wahid encourages indonesian muslims to be actively involved in struggling for a democratic indonesia with fellow indonesians from other religious beliefs. the discourse of democracy can integrate social-political groups in indonesia which have previously been divided. by struggling for a democratic indonesia, all sociopolitical groups in indonesia will feel connected and it will lead to “communal maturity” to reach a common objective under the name democratic indonesia. wahid (1999:191) writes: this issue of democratization can integrate all diverse powers of a state. this issue could change every scattered groups to the same directions that are maturity, development, and integrity of the state. if the islamic movement could struggle for this process, this could contribute to a precious future of the state. wahid believed that indonesian muslims should have been actively involved and participated in struggling for a democratic indonesia with other groups. by participating in the process for a democratic indonesia, muslims would have passed and departed from “the political imagination” in putting religion as an alternative ideology for the state. wahid (1999:192) said: 36 journal of asian social science research vol. 1, no. 1, 2019 thus, the process of democratization could become a foothold of hope for those who reject a religious state. and at the same time, the process gave a place for religion, meaning that if a society was democratized, islam got a guarantee to live. from his statement above, it is clear that for wahid, the discourse of democratization could become the place for the muslims who rejected the ideas of integration between religion and state to play their role. and at the same time, in its democratic discourse, islam would still have a public arena to develop dynamically in the name of the indonesian democratization process. besides actively involved in disseminating pribumisasi islam agenda, wahid was also known as a political activist in indonesia. shortly after coming home in the early 1970s, he began to develop his political career. first, he established a reputation as a promising intellectual and a man of culture. he could talk on various subjects, from religion, philosophy, music, movies, sports, history, and literature to popular jokes. he was a prolific writer. he could write quickly about those subjects in every situation without losing the stylish quality of his writing. he spoke in different arenas, from village meetings to international conferences. he also began to involve himself in many non-governmental organizations as a supervisor, consultant or functionary. he was elected in 1983 and served from 1983 to 1986 as the chairman of the jakarta institute of culture. since the late 1970s, he had held the position of khatib syuriah (secretary of the central advisory board) in nu. when nu was in danger of schism as rivalry between two camps heightened in the early 1980s, wahid with several young nu scholars came to be a mediating force. at the historic nu congress at situbondo in east java in 1984, he was elected chairman of nu, after he advocated that nu as an organization should return to its initial commitment as a social-religious movement to prevent nu from becoming a supporting or opposing force of the authoritarian regime of soeharto. his leadership in nu was deeply rooted and respected, as many influential figures at that time felt that wahid was a ‘reincarnation’ of his grandfather, the founder of nu. during soeharto’s authoritarian periods, wahid moved back and forth from proximity with the regime to criticism of it, making him a controversial and unpredictable figure. besides abandoning an overtly political role for nu in 1984 with a “back to initial function” policy (kembali ke khittah); he endorsed the government when it moved to force all political parties and social organizations to adopt the state ideology pancasila in the mid-1980s. but later, he stood against the suharto’s efforts to harness islam for the regime’s advantage, and he declined membership in the government-backed association of indonesian muslim intellectuals (icmi) that was established in 1990. rather, he set up the alternative organization called forum demokrasi (democracy forum) with many prominent nationalist figures in march 1992 to counter sectarian and primordial tendencies in indonesian politics (ramage 1997:58). despite his islamic credentials, wahid opposed the idea of making indonesia an islamic state, consistently arguing that if islam is institutionalized in the state, 37nurdin and kharlie it will go against the plurality of indonesian society and will marginalize many minorities which would lead inevitably to national disintegration. wahid was also one of the few prominent muslim leaders to speak up for indonesia’s economically influential, but politically weak chinese community. in a gesture of reconciliation, he even claimed chinese ancestry. after a lengthy discussion of wahid’s idea about the relationship between islam and state which clearly shows that he rejected the idea of an indonesian islamic state, it is important to look at the following paragraphs to determine how imam khomeini responded to the idea. did khomeini have the same response as wahid? ayatollah khomeini and his view of islamic state a brief biography ayatollah khomeini was born in a small town called khomein in 1902. khomeini is a town in the south-east of the central province of iran. it is an old town, with some ninety surrounding villages (qadiri 2008:61). his original name was mustafa musawi. he adopted the name khomeini, for which he was popularly known, after his home town of khomein. khomeini came from a clerical family. he was the child of a family with a long tradition of religious scholarship. his ancestors, descendants of imam musa al-kazim, the seventh imam of the ahl albayt, had migrated towards the end of the eighteenth century from their original home in nishapur to the lucknow region of northern india and began devoting themselves to the religious instruction and guidance of the region’s predominantly shi’i population. from his early childhood, khomeini learned islamic studies, as his family had. when he was twenty years old, khomeini went to the iranian city of qum. the city of qum was, along with the iraqi city of najaf, the spiritual capital of shia islam and served as the primary educational center of islamic jurisprudence at that time (jonas 2009:25). when he was thirty-four years old, khomeini obtained the prestigious title as a hujjatul islam. he received this title after khomeini completed his seminary education. because of this title, khomeini could officially conduct his classes and begin to have followers. although a young khomeini was popularly known for his admiration for the clergy who were brave enough to stand up to unjust rulers, he as a young cleric tried to avoid expressing publicly his opinion on political issues. according to lewis (2010:29), there are two main reasons why khomeini maintained a quietist stance on political issues. first, khomeini’s position as a junior in the clerical hierarchy made it difficult for him to adopt a politically activist stance out of step with those above him, both because it would marginalize him within the clerical establishment but also because he had great respect for those senior to him, particularly the sole marja-e taqlid at the time, ayatollah borujerdi. secondly, khomeini was still developing as a political thinker and, although confident that his voice and the voice of another clergy should be heard in the public sphere, he was not yet sure exactly what he wanted to say. 38 journal of asian social science research vol. 1, no. 1, 2019 in the 1950s when he was in qum, khomeini was appointed ayatullah. however, his initial step toward politics was the same as other mainstream ulama’s approach, a quiet stance toward political issues. this meant that khomeini seemed to still support the legality of the monarchy saying that a bad government is still being better than no government. despite several explosive critiques against perceived anti-islamic policies of the then-ruling monarch, khomeini adhered to the ulama’s reactionary yet accepting role towards the monarchy and non-islamic governments. after khomeini received his title of grand ayatollah as well as marja-e taqlid at the beginning of the 1960s, he then changed his approach toward politics. khomeini did not stand quietly as before but he becomes the most vocal clerical opposition towards the shah, attacking him for being what khomeini perceived as the “tool of the imperialist-jewish conspiracy” or nothing more than an american puppet allowing western influences to dominate the public sphere in iran. khomeini continued to criticize the authoritarian shah during the 1963 uprising when he severely censured the shah’s regime for being secular and having anti-nationalist policies. khomeini’s confrontation with the pahlavi regime paves the way for the regime to arrest and exile the imam for fifteen years. khomeini had by the time of his exile become a symbol of the resistance against the authoritarian shah, which played a key role in the iranian revolution and the consequential toppling of the monarch fifteen years later. although initially khomeini was extradited to turkey, he only stayed there for a short period and then moved to najaf, spiritual capital of iraq. according to keddie (2003:192), khomeini’s decision to move to najaf could be understood because he was reluctant to refrain from political activities. thus, from this city of najaf, khomeini kept his oppositional campaign against the dominion of the shah. his time in najaf was one of fourteen years of teaching and agitation which had a significant impact on many iranian students as well as iranian people at large. during his period of residence in iraq, khomeini developed his concept of the islamic state. in the early 1970s, he initiated a series of lectures attacking clerics, the shah, and various political actors on the iranian scene for being out of touch with the political realities of the time. in his critique, khomeini says that the regime was “fundamentally opposed to islam” and therefore to refuse to oppose it was essentially to accept the inevitable destruction of the clerical establishment and the decay of iranian society (khomeini 1981:181). necessity for islamic government khomeini’s document or blueprint for the islamic government was originally a collection of his lectures in the 1970s which was printed and published as a book entitled governance of the jurist (velayat-e faqeeh). like other books written by khomeini, this book had been considered to be top of the list of prohibited books for publication during the shah’s regime. the main idea of an islamic state according to khomeini should be government led by the jurist. according to 39nurdin and kharlie andersson, at the essence of khomeini’s doctrine stands the belief in an islamic government as the best temporary solution in the post-occultation era. khomeini insisted that the shia muslims cannot wait for the return of their imam; instead, they have to establish a just islamic state under the banner of the guardianship of the jurist (jonas 2009:27). khomeini (2002) divides his book of the jurist (velayat-e faqeeh) into four sections: introduction, the necessity for islamic government, the form of islamic government, and program for establishment of an islamic government. for the rest of this paper, we will base our explanation on khomeini’s political thoughts on this translated book. the first two sections of the book discuss iranian political context and evidence from the muslim tradition that suggests why muslims should establish an islamic government. khomeini believed that the islamic government would be a means of solving iran’s social problems at that time by ridding the country of corrupting foreign influence. to support this, he pointed out the example of the prophet muhammad who not only established government but also designated a ruler to succeed him. khomeini believed that when the prophet muhammad passed away, he had appointed a successor. he then posed the question of whether the role of successor was designed to expound the religious teachings or doctrines. he answered himself: of course not. expounding religious precepts, according to khomeini, does not have to be done by the prophet’s successor. therefore the appointment had been for rulership and enforcement of laws and regulations. for khomeini, it was logically necessary for the successor to be appointed for the sake of exercising the government. law requires a person to execute it. if a system of law and government lacks executive power, it is deficient. thus islam, just as it established laws, also brought into being an executive power. however, for khomeini, there was still a further question on who was to hold the executive power. if the prophet had not appointed a successor to assume the executive power, he would have failed to complete his mission. it is for this reason, according to khomeini, that the formation of a government and the establishment of the executive organs are necessary. belief in the necessity of these is part of general belief in the imamate. khomeini (2002:16) said: whereas hostility toward you has led them to misrepresent islam, it is necessary for you to present islam and the doctrine of the imamate correctly. you must tell people: we believe in the imamate; we believe that the prophet appointed a successor to assume responsibility for the affairs of the muslims, and that he did so in conformity with the divine will. therefore, we must also believe in the necessity for the establishment of government, and we must strive to establish organs for the execution of law and the administration of affairs…knows that it is your duty to establish an islamic government. in addition, khomeini provided three reasons why muslims should struggle to establish an islamic government. first, the action taken by the prophet to 40 journal of asian social science research vol. 1, no. 1, 2019 establish the government was a reason why muslims should follow the same step. the prophet himself, according to khomeini, established a government. he engaged in the implementation of laws, the establishment of the ordinances of islam, and the administration of society. the prophet also sent out governors to different regions. he playe a role as a judge, appointed judges and dispatched emissaries to foreign states and kings. second, the prophet designated a ruler to succeed him, in accordance with divine command. if god through the prophet designated a man who was to rule over muslim society after him, this is in itself an indication that the government remained a necessity after the prophet passed away. third, the nature and character of islamic law and the divine ordinance of sharia furnish additional proof of the necessity for establishing a government, for they indicate that the laws were laid down to create a state and administer the political, economic and cultural affairs of society (khomeini 2002:18-20). islamic government and leadership the third section of khomeini’s lectures, which were translated and compiled by hamid algar, is the form of islamic government. khomeini’s vision of the islamic government is based on the sole sovereignty of god – the legislative power and competence to establish laws belong exclusively to god almighty. khomeini understood sharia as a comprehensive set of laws designed to create a society in line with divine will. thus, the highest goal of an islamic government in his mind was to effectively implement sharia. khomeini (2002:29) said: the fundamental differences between islamic government, on the one hand, and constitutional monarchies and republics, on the other is whereas the representatives of the people or the monarch in such regimes engage in legislation, in islam the legislative power and competence to establish laws belongs exclusively to god almighty. the sacred legislator of islam is the sole legislative power. in laying claim to imamate, khomeini quoted imam ali who said that the most qualified among men for the caliphate is he who is most capable and knowledgeable of allah’s commands. thus, the ruler must be the most learned person of the rest. in addition to the requirement for the ruler who is knowledgable, khomeini also proposed the idea of a special kind of islamic state leadership called the guardianship or the governance of the jurist (velayat-e faqeeh). according to zubaida, as quoted by jonas (2009:29), “the clerical elite of the grand ayatollahs would have the duty to appoint this ruling jurist, or primary guardian, who was supposed to fulfil the qualifications of total knowledge of the law and total justice in its execution.” jonas further states that khomeini believed that because the prophet and the imams had cared for the functions of government throughout history, so would the ruling jurist. however, khomeini argued that, of course, it is not necessary for all officials, provincial governors, and administrators to know all the laws of islam and be fuqoha; it is enough that they should know the laws about their role’s duties. such was the case in the time of the prophet. the highest 41nurdin and kharlie authority must possess these two qualities: comprehensive knowledge and justice, but his assistants, officials and those sent to the provinces need know only the laws relevant to their tasks; on other matters they must consult the ruler (khomeini 2002:32). the two qualities of knowledge of the law and justice are present in countless fuqoha of the present age. if they come together, according to khomeini, they could establish a government of universal justice in the world. if the worthy individual possessing these two qualities arises and establishes a government, he will possess the same authority as the prophet in the administration of society, and it will be the duty of all people to obey him. because the clergy are naturally the most learned and knowledgeable of divine law, khomeini argued, it is only logical that the right to rule belongs to them. khomeini (2002:33) said: if the ruler adheres to islam, he must necessarily submit to the faqih, asking him about the laws and ordinances of islam in order to implement them. this being the case, the true rulers are the fuqaha themselves, and rulership ought officially to be theirs, to apply to them, not to those who are obliged to follow the guidance of the fuqaha on account of their own ignorance of law. the fourth section of khomeini’s lectures on the government of the jurist deals with programs for establishment of an islamic state. in this section, khomeini called for the clerical establishment to renounce quietism and assume its rightful position of political leadership in the muslim community. drawing on primarily shi’i traditions, he regarded those clerics who practice taqiyya to be more worried about their well-being than that of islam and asserted that without clerical leadership any movement for an islamic government is doomed to fail. khomeini further pointed out the importance of propagation and instructions. in his preface to khomeini’s translated book, algar (2002) says that the necessity for the proper attention to instructions and propagations, moral and cultural reformation of seminaries, annihilation of the moral and cultural effects of imperialism, correction of pseudo-saints, purging the seminaries of the court ulama, and finally taking effective measures to overthrow the oppressive and tyrannical governments, are among the concluding discussions of the book. struggle for implementing the vision of an islamic state after the shah was removed from office and spent fifteen years in exile, khomeini returned to iran. the people of iran at that time gave respect and had hope that khomeini would lead them to a better future for iran. thus, it was reasonable that in the referendum held on april 1, 1979, almost 100% iranian people voted for the establishment of the islamic republic of iran led by khomeini. of course, after the result of the referendum were officially announced, khomeini could, at last, be convinced that he was the leading figure to form a new iranian government. unfortunately, the realization of khomeini’s vision of an iranian government based on velayat-e faqeeh, was not easy to complete. before that vision could become a reality, khomeini had to successfully respond to critiques and concerns about his government offered by various segments of 42 journal of asian social science research vol. 1, no. 1, 2019 iran’s population. the people of iran at that time sharply criticized the khomeini government. lewis (2010:46-47) described: firstly, khomeni was criticized that the constitution enshrined clerical rule in such a way that it rendered elected officials in the government potentially irrelevant. secondly, khomeini was criticized that the system of velayat-e faqeeh he proposed would lead to authoritarianism. and the last major critique leveled against the new khomeini-inspired iranian constitution was that it created a state that was doomed to be deemed “backward” by the rest of the world. nevertheless, due to his charisma and leadership capabilities, khomeini answered this criticism successfully. according to viorst (1995), although not without criticism, khomeini was quite successful in implementing his vision. it can be seen from the fact that the larger clerical class inside iran had originally been rather indifferent toward khomeini’s proposal and propagandizing of an islamic state in iran. wimelius (2003:13) applauded khomeini’s effort saying that khomeini ensured an islamic intellectual awakening among the iranian population as he saw it, and he was thus able to turn around a revolution against the shah into a revolution to establish an islamic government. from the above discussion, it is clear that khomeini’s version of the theory of the guardianship of the jurist became the steering principle of the islamic republic, as the clergy was to safeguard the iranian nation and its population. khomeini entered into the powerful clerical elite of iran, which generated for him an outstanding and powerful position, as the clerics played a key role in the iranian public sphere. under the title of marja-e taqlid, ayatollah khomeini managed greater authority than ever before, which gave him a strong base of popular support in his campaign against the monarchy. being among the highest religious authorities in iran, his paradigmatic politicization of velayat-e faqeeh thus remained largely unchallenged by the public. his struggle to combine religion and politics and the call for clerical assumption of power was new in islamic history, but the selective emphasis on the aspects of authoritative leadership and guidance of the people was relevant in iran. by applying islamic rhetoric, emphasizing the importance of martyrdom, revolution and the importance of an islamic state, khomeini was able to unify the dispersed revolutionary movements. finally, as a consequence, the revolution due to khomeini’s powerful position brought about a major political transition. finally, as viorst (1995:67) said, “because it was khomeini’s revolution, it became khomeini’s government”. conclusion there are contrasting opinions and implementations between abdurrahman wahid and imam khomeini on islam and state relationship. while wahid rejected the idea of an indonesian islamic state, khomeini, on the other hand, believed that islam is a way of life. for khomeini, there is no separation between religion and politics. khomeini pointed out that the misgivings suggested by the enemies of 43nurdin and kharlie islam paved the way for the faulty notion of separation of religion from politics. khomeini, on the one hand, believed the establishment of an islamic state is a must and obligatory for every muslim. wahid, on the other hand, believed that to become a practicing muslim with a deep understanding of islam does not require the creation of an islamic system or an islamic state as long as this muslim accepts the islamic tenet, the faith tenet, becomes proficient and spreads peace to people. as a consequence, for wahid, to create an islamic system or formalization of islamic sharia is not a requirement for an indonesian muslim to be called a pious muslim. but, according to khomeini, the only way to prevent the emergence of anarchy and disorder and to protect society from corruption is to form a government and thus impart order into all the affairs of the country. this means that the different political and historical contexts of iran and indonesia were influential factors that contributed to the different khomeini and wahid’s views of islam-state relationship. another reason why khomeini and wahid had different views of the establishment of an islamic state was due to their difference in the idea of succession or imamate. on the one hand, wahid argued that islam does not have a clear view of leadership succession. according to wahid, during the period of the first four caliphs, different methods were adopted for the appointment of the caliphs, and in all four cases, the appointment was confirmed by the muslim community’s oath of allegiance which was formally obtained. khomeini, on the other hand, believed that before the prophet passed away he designated the ruler to succeed him and this is an indication that establishing an islamic state remains a necessity after the death of the prophet. wahid admitted this difference as well as the similarity between his nahdlatul ulama and shiism. he said: “nu is shi’ite minus imamate or shi’ite is nu plus imamate.” references abdullah, mudhofir. 2014. “pribumisasi islam dalam konteks budaya jawa dan integrasi bangsa.” indo-islamika, vol. 4, no. 1:68-69. anwar, m. syafi’i. 2006. “shari’a, pluralism and the prospect of democracy in post soeharto indonesia.” in eu-indonesia day conference on pluralism and democracy: indonesian perspective, organized by the european commission in collaboration with the european institute for asian studies brussels: belgium. ayoob, mohammed. 2007. the many faces of political islam: religion and 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tuttle publishing. 45nurdin and kharlie ufen, andreas. 2009. “mobilizing political islam: indonesia and malaysia compared”. commonwealth & comparative politics, vol. 47, no. 3: 308-333. viorst, milton. 1995. “the limits of the revolution”. foreign affairs, vol. 74, no. 6. wahid, abdurrahman. 1989. “pribumisasi islam”. in islam indonesia menatap masa depan, edited by mutaha azhar and abdul mun’im saleh. jakarta: p3em. wahid, abdurrahman. 1999. mengurai hubungan antara agama dan negara. jakarta: gramedia widiasarana indonesia. wahid, abdurrahman. 2006. islamku, islam anda, dan islam kita: agama masyarakat negara demokrasi. jakarta: the wahid institute. wimelius, malin. 2003. on islamism and modernity: analysing islamist ideas on and visions of the islamic state. statvetenskapliga institutionen: umeå universitet. winter, lily. 2010. “the myth of the clash of civilization: political islam in indonesia and iran.” annual review of undergraduate research, vol. 9: 255-280. yahya, iif. d. 2004. wahid: berbeda itu asyik. yogyakarta: penerbit kanisius. zubaida, sami. 1993. islam, the people and the state: essays on political ideas and movements in the middle east. london: i. b. tauris publishers. new grounded feminist approach to islam in indonesia: a textual analysis of rahima and fahmina’s publications journal of asian social science research 2020, vol. 2, no. 1: 25-52 http://jassr.cassr.web.id © the author(s) 2019 nina nurmila* state islamic university (uin) sunan gunung djati bandung, indonesia abstract this article aims to offer a textual analysis of rahima and fahmina’s publications. rahima and fahmina are two non-government organizations founded in 2000 by a young generation of nahdlatul ulama (nu), one of the largest moderate muslim organizations in indonesia. there are more similarities than differences between rahima and fahmina because the persons involved in the organizations are close friends and, in fact, the same persons even though both are based in two different cities. since their foundation, both rahima and fahmina have published many books and magazines. this article argues that both rahima dan fahmina publications offer a new grounded feminist approach to islam, which counterbalance the dominant male-biased normative approach to islam in most muslim societies. these publications are based on their feminist activism and community engagement with the grass-root level of many nahdlatul ulama pesantrens (islamic boarding schools). the topics of their publication cover many current issues such as fiqh of women’s reproductive rights and empowerment, fiqh of the daily life of migrant workers, fiqh of anti-trafficking, prevention of child marriage, violent extremism and religious pluralism. as a result, the progressive nature of their publications negates the existing label of nu as the traditionalist organization. key words rahima, fahmina, women’s rights, islam, pesantren, feminist approach introduction rahima, the center for education and information on islam and women’s rights, and fahmina, a non-government organization that promotes pluralism, were founded soon after the end of the suharto-led new order regime in indonesia (1966-1998). the new order is well-known for its *corresponding author: prof. nina nurmila faculty of education, state islamic university (uin) sunan gunung djati, bandung, indonesia. email: ninanurmila@yahoo.com article 26 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 repressive, militaristic, and authoritarian regime, in which women were constructed to fulfill the expectation of the patriarchal system: to be a good housewife and mother. the regime did not give much room for women’s organizations which did not support this state construction of femininity. this has led to the flourishing formation of many organizations that are against the new order unification of ideology soon after this regime ended in 1998, including the foundation of rahima and fahmina, which argue for women’s rights in islam. this article analyzes rahima and fahmina’s publications since their foundation until 2014 in supporting women’s rights within islam. it argues that both rahima dan fahmina publications offer a new grounded feminist approach to islam, which counterbalance the dominant male-biased normative approach to islam in most muslim societies. in what follows, the article, first, starts with the brief “herstory” of rahima and fahmina, and then provides a textual analysis of their publications. herstory of rahima the seed of rahima was initially planted in p3m (perhimpunan pengembangan pesantren dan masyarakat [the association for the development of pesantren and society]). p3m was an ngo founded on 18 may 1983 which aimed to be a forum for communication, consultation, and cooperation for pesantren and other national ngos to develop pesantren and its surrounding communities (yafie 2010:10). in the 1990s, p3m turned its direction from community development into the strengthening political civil rights by having critical and massive social movement. being interested in p3m’s engagement with critical studies that problematize injustice and domination of the elite over the pesantren community, lies marcoes joined p3m. her presence at p3m filled in the gap of the absence of gender analysis in the p3m’s critical study of fiqh (islamic jurisprudence), which led p3m to have a division of fiqh al-nisa’ (islamic jurisprudence on women’s issues, which was initially part of fiqh al-siyasah [islamic jurisprudence on political issues]), and helped p3m to survive financially because lies marcos could connect p3m with the new funding source from ford foundation after p3m lost its earlier funding source (yafie 2010:18-19). the fiqh al-nisa’ division educated pesantren communities by providing training and workshop to critically read gender-biased religious texts, mainly kitab kuning (“the yellow books”: classical islamic books in arabic, which are usually printed on yellow paper) studied in many pesantrens and reconstruct the texts into new fiqh that is pro-women. these 27nurmila, nina training sessions resulted in the publication of new fiqh which empowers women, written by the director of p3m at that time, masdar f mas`udi, under the title islam dan hak-hak reproduksi perempuan: dialog fiqih pemberdayaan (yafie 2010:20).27 the fiqh al-nisa’ division promoted women’s reproductive rights within islam to pesantren communities such as kyai (pesantren leaders) and nyai (female pesantren leaders or the wives of kyai) to counter the new order family planning which tends to control and take away women’s reproductive rights. due to the shortage expertise on gender, the promotion of gender perspective in reading classical fiqh text was assisted by gender activists at kalyanamitra, the second feminist ngo in indonesia (the first was yasanti in yogyakarta), which was founded in 1985. during the promotion process, they were resisted by the pesantren communities who saw gender as western imported ideas which contradict islam and they saw that the concept of gender tried to deconstruct the whole structure of islamic teachings, especially because those who introduce gender perspective were secular feminists who had never been engaged with pesantren communities and did not wear a veil. however, slowly but surely, this fiqh al-nisa’ division could build gender awareness among pesantren communities, which previously had patriarchal culture. this program has given birth to the progressive pesantren leaders who become active in promoting gender equality in islam such as kiayi husein muhammad and kh muhyiddin abdusshomad, nyai djudju zubaidah, ruqoyyah ma`shum, syafiq hasyim, hamdanah halim and ema marhumah (yafie 2010:22). in its peak period of success, however, the fiqh al-nisa’ division was struck by the fact that the director of p3m practiced polygamy. this practice is considered contradictory with their struggle for equality between men and women and therefore has led the fiqh al-nisa’ division to separate from p3m and founded a new institution named rahima, which continued to educate pesantren communities with women’s reproductive rights (yafie 2010:22). the name rahima is derived from the word rahim, which means “womb”, or rahiim, which means “the most compassionate”. it is also taken from the rahim forum, a discussion forum of fiqh al-nisa’ division. rahima was founded on 5 august 2000 and started to have activities at the end of february 2001. rahima has two main activities: 1) education; and 2) information dissemination about islam and women’s rights through public forums such as regular discussion, dialogue, seminar, and the publication of books, the arham brochure, and the swara rahima magazine. rahima initially focused its activities on pesantren communities, but then it expanded its activities into broader audiences such as university 28 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 students, religious teachers, local religious figures, local religious gathering members, and muslim women’s organizations (yafie 2010:vi). besides, rahima expanded its focus, not only on women’s reproductive rights but also on other general issues such as incest, domestic violence, women’s poverty, and political issues (yafie 2010:33). this is in response to the strong patriarchal culture which subordinates women and sees women only as domestic persons; to global capitalists which tend to exploit women; and to the state ambiguity, which produces women’s friendly policies but did not show any serious effort in implementing these policies (yafie 2010:43-44). furthermore, rahima expanded its network nationally such as with jkp3 (jaringan kerja prolegnas pro perempuan [working networks of pro-women’s national legislation program]), women’s health forum, cedaw working group initiative (cwgi), alimat (women scholars), and internationally such as with coalition on sexuality and bodily rights in muslim communities (csbr) (yafie 2010: vii). in education, rahima undertook women scholar education (pendidikan ulama perempuan [pup]). this was suggested by kiayi husein muhammad, who was inspired by a woman who spoke eloquently and argumentatively about women’s issues in musyawarah alim ulama nu (nahdlatul ulama scholars’ assembly) in lombok, nusa tenggara barat, in 1997, in which she showed her understanding of the classical religious knowledge and women’s issues. based on this observation, husein muhammad believed that women could express better their own issues than men and therefore women should be equipped with the required knowledge and be given an opportunity to speak in the legitimated forums like mui (indonesian ulama consultative body), bahtsul masa’il nu (nahdlatul ulama consultative assembly) and majlis tarjih muhammadiyah (muhammadiyah consultative assembly). to prepare female scholars to do so, rahima selected pup candidates with the criteria that the women can read classical arabic texts written in the yellow books, are aware of the current reality and are pro-women. the selected candidates were trained to increase their gender sensitivity and social organization. it is expected that these female scholars can be the main agents who spread their ideas about justice and equality between men and women from the islamic perspective. furthermore, they are expected to change the culture which does not allow women to express and actualize their interest and to support state policy that is pro to women’s interests (yafie 2010:48-50). moreover, rahima organizes gender sensitivity training for local religious figures, either male or female, and activists in certain organizations 29nurmila, nina started in 2004. knowing how important the role of islamic education teachers is at school in spreading an equal gender perspective, rahima facilitated gender training for teachers, most of them also religious figures in their residence. rahima has also trained university students (students of uin jakarta) just like they trained female scholars, but it was regarded to be less successful because students were busy with their university schedule and they did not have a community to be engaged with. thus, rahima has female scholars, local religious figures, activists, and islamic education teachers to help achieve rahima’s aims for women’s rights in islam to counter radical and fundamentalist islam which tends to marginalize women (yafie 2010:50-53). [his]story of fahmina fahmina was founded in cirebon, west java, in november 2000, but only started to be known to the public in february 2001. it was founded by a group of young pesantren graduates to empower marginalized groups such as the poor, migrant workers, petty traders, and farmers, in which many of them are women. the founders of fahmina are kiayi husein muhammad, affandi mukhtar, marzuki wahid, and faqihuddin abdul kodir. fahmina was initially based in the house of husein muhammad, the leader of pondok pesantren dar al-tauhid, cirebon, but it then moved to the city of cirebon after its promotion to the public. fahmina is derived from the arabic word “fahmina” which means “our understanding”. in fahmina’s understanding, islam aims for social justice. to implement this islamic value of social justice, fahmina founders combine their intellectual engagement with social activism (praxis). as pesantren graduates, they re-read the classical islamic texts (kitab kuning) contextually to produce new islamic knowledge, which empowers the marginalized groups (the poor and the women) and to stand for social justice. they see that within patriarchy, women have been regarded as powerless objects, and therefore are vulnerable to all forms of violence such as domestic violence and human trafficking. they promote islam which is friendly to women and stand for gender justice, enlighten the community by having religious study group fortnightly, advocate for the conservation of cultural sites and heritages as well as for the rights of the poor to access education and health services, encourage public participation to ensure good and clean governance, and conducted community empowerment for political victims of 1965-1966 (the “cleansing” of people being labeled or associated with communist party). they also publish newsletters to educate the mosque community, religious study group, and pesantren community 30 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 so that they have collective awareness and ability to see social injustice resulted from social, economic, and political interests (fahmina 2008). since many women are part of the marginalized group, fahmina aims to achieve gender justice. this is implemented not only through their publication but also by conducting islam and gender training for two different groups: (1) women’s activists who do not know much about islam to enlighten them about islamic religious arguments for gender justice; and (2) pesantren-based communities who have rich knowledge about classical intellectual tradition to enlighten them about re-reading this classical intellectual tradition from an equal gender perspective. as a result of this training, fahmina published modul kursus islam dan gender: dawrah fiqh perempuan (2006), which has been re-published in 2007 and 2011 and translated into english. this module is used to train many more muslim women activists, not only throughout indonesia but also abroad such as sisters in islam (sis), malaysia, and nisa’ul haq fi bangsa moro, the philippines (fahmina 2008). through islam and gender training, fahmina has successfully arranged ‘difficult’ marriage between secular feminists who previously believed that islam subordinates women and pesantren communities as the important agents in perpetuating a patriarchal system which tends to subordinate women. the result of this ‘marriage’ is the excitement of secular feminists who were surprised that islam can be used to promote gender justice (personal communication with abdul kodir in 2007) and the increasing number of pesantren communities who can re-read classical texts from an equal gender perspective. fahmina has had a close connection with indonesian famous feminists such as saparinah sadli, kamala chandra kirana, and debra yatim, who were involved in its first islam and gender training in 2004. husein muhammad even continued his activism nationally by being one of the commissioners of the national commission on violence against women (komnas perempuan [kp]) for two terms (2005-2009 and 2010-2014). the inclusion of husein muhammad in this state institution seems to be encouraged or invited by saparinah sadli, the first leader of kp, and kamala chandra kirana, the leader of kp after saparinah sadli. fahmina also promotes religious pluralism in which people from various religious and ethnic backgrounds can sit together, communicate, and respect each other. this is not an easy task for fahmina because, in reality, they face many serious challenges especially in defending the rights of ethnic and religious minorities such as chinese, dayak, and christian as well as muslim groups who have been labeled as deviant muslims such as ahmadiyah. 31nurmila, nina furthermore, fahmina expands its network not only with individuals and institutions within cirebon such as gerbang informasi dan dewan kesenian cirebon, but also with institutions outside cirebon which have been previously engaged in intellectual and social activism such as pp lakpesdam nu, rahima, lkis, and desantara. as an independent nongovernment institution, fahmina opens its membership to any community regardless of their ethnicity, gender, and religion. rahima and fahmina publications as a result of their intellectual engagement and social activism, fahmina and rahima have published many books, magazines, and newsletters. tables 1 and 2 below enlist rahima publications (rahima 2014; 2019) and fahmina publications (fahmina 2014; 2019), which i will describe some of their contents and analyze their approach to islam. these publications are fahmina and rahima responses to the challenges of fundamentalist and radical islam, and violence experienced by the marginalized groups such as women, migrant workers, petty traders, becak driver, and religious minority groups. these works were published based on rahima and fahmina’s experiences of promoting gender equality within the pesantren communities and women’s activists. table 1 rahima’s publications no title author(s) date of publication 1 fiqh perempuan k.h. hussein muhammad 2001 2 tubuh, seksualitas dan kedaulatan perempuan abdul muqsit ghozali, badriyah fayumi, marzuki wahid, syafiq hasyim 2002 3 bergerak menuju keadilan ust. faqihuddin abdul kadir, m.a. 2006 4 umat bertanya, ulama menjawab k.h. muhyidin abdussomad, dra. badriya fayumi, ust. faqihuddin abdul kadir, m.a., nyai hj. siti ruqoyyah ma’shum, marzuki wahid, alai nadjib, ma., dra. afwa mumtazah, luluk farida muchtar, m. pd. i. 2008 32 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 5 keluarga sakinah k.h. husein muhammad, ust. faqihuddin abdul kadir, ma., dra. badriyah fayumi, nur achmad, m.a., daan dini kharunida, s.ag., a.d. kusumaningtyas, m. si., farha ciciek, m. si., leli nurrohmah, m. hum. 2008 6 pelajaran agama islam kelas i slta suparman, s.ag., abdussama, s.pd., moh. faisol, s.si., m.hi., drs. mahrus usman, misbahul munir, dhiya’ul fuad, nurul imam, aryudi a razak 2008 7 pelajaran agama islam kelas ii slta suparman, s. ag., abdussama, s.pd., moh. faisol, s.si., m.hi. drs. mahrus usman, misbahul munir, dhiya’ul fuad, nurul imam, aryudi a razak 2008 8 pelajaran agama islam kls iii slta suparman, s. ag., abdussama, s.pd., moh. faisol, s.si., m.hi., drs. mahrus usman, misbahul munir, dhiya’ul fuad, nurul imam, aryudi a razak 2008 9 perawan: kumpulan fiksi pembela perempuan a.d. eridani, s.h. 2009 10 modul keluarga sakinah a. dicky sofyan, a.d. eridani, a.d. kusumaningtyas, leli nurrohmah, maman a. rahman, nur achmad 2009 33nurmila, nina 11 rahima dalam pandangan para mitra abd. rahman, mas’ud, ahmad suaedy, afwah mumtazah, anwar hidayat, cecep jayakarama, evi sofia inayati, firliana purwanti, imam tholkha, iswanti, kamala chandrakirana, maria ulfa anshor, m. ikhsanudin, mohammad syarifuddin, najmatul milla, neng hannah, nihayatul wafiroh, ninuk mardiana pambudy, norhayati kaprawi, nur hidayah, pinky saptandari, rena herdiyani, saparinah sadli, yuniyanti chuzaifah 2010 12 the rahima story hilmy ali yafie 2010 13 modul panduan pendidikan hak & kesehatan reproduksi a.d. eridani, s.h., dinah muhidin, s.s., farha ciciek, m.si., dr. nur rofiah, leli nurrohmah, m. hum. 2010 14 vcd shalawat kesetaraan rahima 2010 15 kesetaraan, kemajemukan & ham leli nurohmah, a.d. kusumaningtyas, nur achmand 2011 16 ijtihad kyai husein k.h. husein muhammad 2011 17 modul pengkaderan ulama perempuan ust. imam nakhai, dr. nur rofiah, a.d. kusumaningtyas, maman abdurrahman 2011 18 modul pendidikan guru agama islam ust. imam nakhai, dr. nur rofiah, a.d. kusumaningtyas, maman abdurrahman oktober, 2011 34 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 19 panduan konseling untuk konselor bp4 perspektif kesetaraan drs. h. tulus, dra. hj. fadilah ahmad, m.m., drs. h. najib anwar, m.h., dr. hj. nurhayati djamas, m.a., prof. dr. hj. aliyah hamka, m.m., dra. hj. zubaidah muchtar, dra. radhiya bustan, m. psi., drs. h. kadi sastrowirjono 2012 20 peran bp4 dalam mewujudkan keluarga sakinah: hasil penelitian di 6 wilayah. a.d. eridani, a.d. kusumaningtyas, anis fuadah, fadilah ahmad, fatimah, maman a. rahman, noor rohman, nurhayati aida, pera sopharianti, rahmat supena, riri khariroh, titin kurniawati 2013 21 merintis keulamaan untuk kemanusiaan: profil kader ulama perempuan rahima rahima 2014 22 profil kader ulama perempuan rahima tim rahima (a.d. eridani, a.d. kusumaningtyas, mawardi, maman abdurahman) 2014 23 pendidikan kesehatan reproduksi penguatan guru kelas x tim rahima 2014 24 profil kader ulama perempuan rahima tim rahima (a.d. eridani, a.d. kusumaningtyas, mawardi, maman abdurahman) 2014 25 majalah swara rahima edisi 1-55 rahima 2001-2019 35nurmila, nina table 2 fahmina’s publications no title publisher author(s) date of publication 1 modul kursus islam dan gender: dawrah fiqh perempuan fahmina institute k.h. husein muhammad, faqihuddin abdul kodir, lies marcoes natsir, marzuki wahid 2006, 2007, 2011 2 spiritualitas kemanusiaan: perspektif islam pesantren pustaka rihlah dan fahmina institute k.h. husein muhammad march 2006 3 post tradisionalisme islam: wacana intelektualisme dalam komunitas nu fahmina institute rumadi march 2006 4 bukan kota wali: relasi rakyatnegara dalam kebijakan pemerintah kota kutub fahmina dewi laily purnamasari, faqihuddin abdul kodir, ipah jahrotunnasipah, obeng nur rosyid march 2006 5 fiqh anti trafficking: jawaban atas berbagai kasus kejahatan perdagangan manusia dalam perspektif hukum islam fahmina institute faqihuddin abdul kodir, abd. moqsith ghazali, imam nakha`i, k.h. husein muhammad, marzuki wahid nov 2006 36 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 6 nalar politik perempuan pesantren fahmina institute maria ulfah anshor december 2006 7 hadith and gender justice: understanding the prophetic traditions fahmina institute faqihuddin abdul kodir. translators: fikri sulaiman ismail and ted thomton february 2007 8 nalar islam nusantara: studi islam ala muhammadiyah, al-irsyad, persis dan nu fahmina institute m. mukhsin jamil, musahadi, choirul anwar, abdul kholiq march 2008 9 islam pesantren dan pesan kemanusiaan fahmina institute k.h. syarief utsman yahya january 2008 10 bertahan dalam ketidakpastian fahmina institute lies marcoes natsir august 2008 11 kajian islam dalam ragam pendekatan fahmina institute marzuki wahid, adnan, faqihuddin abdul kodir, naqiyah mukhtar, septi gumiandari 2010 12 reformasi peradilan pascaorde baru: pengadilan agama di indonesia dan keadilan bagi masyarakat miskin (terjemahan) institut studi islam fahmina (isif) cate sumner dan tim lindsey. penerjemah: mia hapsari kusumawardani february 2011 37nurmila, nina 13 peta gerakan perempuan islam pasca-orde baru fahmina institute lies marcoes natsir, marzuki wahid, mahrus el mawa, nur rofi’ah, ida rosyidah, khariroh ali, testriyono, nunung sulastri, nurul huda s.a., alimah, nurun nisa, ali mursyid january 2012 14 islam dan jurnalisme kemanusiaan: membangun gerakan masyarakat sipil berbasis radio komunitas fahmina institute ade duryawan, ali mursyid, nur khalik ridwan, obeng nur rosyid, vera sovaryanti january 2012 15 fiqh keseharian buruh migran: jawaban atas pelbagai masalah keagamaan yang dihadapi buruh migran institut studi islam fahmina (isif) imam nakha’i, marzuki wahid january 2012 16 ragam kajian kekerasan dalam rumah tangga institut studi islam fahmina (isif) afwah mumtazah, faqihuddin abdul kodir, lia aliyah, mimin mu’minah, nina mariani noor, rosidin, sadari, sahiron syamsuddin, tatik hartati, tohir laila sholeh january 2012 38 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 17 kurikulum dan silabi ahwal syakhshiyyah institut studi islam fahmina (isif) dan fahmina institute nur khalik ridwan, nurrohman, marzuki wahid, nurul huda sa january 2012 18 manba’ al-sa’āda fī usus husn al-mu’āshara fī hayāt al-zawjiyah isif dan fahmina insitute faqihuddin abdul kodir 2012 19 panduan hak asasi manusia bagi satuan polisi pamong praja fahmina institute dan institut studi islam fahmina (isif) mufti makaarim a dan papang hidayat january 2012 20 toleransi islam: hidup damai dalam masyarakat plural fahmina institute k.h. husein muhammad 2015 21 menangkal siaran kebencian: perspektif islam fahmina institute k.h. husein muhammad dan siti aminah 2017 22 liputa media: kongres ulama perempuan indonesia fahmina institute satori, et al. penyunting: tim kupi 2017 23 diskursus keulamaan perempuan indonesia fahmina institute satori, et al., penyunting: tim kupi 2017 39nurmila, nina 24 proyeksi masa depan ulama perempuan indonesia: kumpulan tulisan refleksi tentang kongres ulama perempuan fahmina institute satori, et al., penyunting: tim kupi 2017 25 anak muda memaknai perbedaan: pengalaman mengelola sekolah cinta perdamaian fahmina institute alifatul arifiati. editor: abdul rosyadi 2017 26 menggagas fiqh ikhtilaf: potret dan prakarsa cirebon fahmina institute alifatul arifiati. editor: marzuki wahid 2017 27 sunnah monogami: mengaji alqur’an dan hadits (reprinted edition of memilih monogami with additional information on the interpretation of divorce after polygamous marriage) umah sinau mubadalah (usm) faqihuddin abdul kodir 2017 28 pendar-pendar kebijaksanaan fahmina institute k.h. husein muhammad. editor: wawan kurniawan 2018 40 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 29 manual mubadalah: ringkasan konsep untuk pelatihan perspektif kesalingan dalam isu gender dan islam umah sinau m u b a d a l a h (usm) faqihuddin abdul kodir 2019 textual analysis of rahima publications each rahima’s publication has its own background and was in response to certain circumstances. for example, three books of pelajaran agama islam (2008) for senior high school grades i-iii were published after rahima engaged with school religious teachers who saw their needs for teaching materials that support their struggle for gender equality. also, to facilitate its educational process for various audiences, rahima published several training modules such as modul keluarga sakinah (2009), modul panduan pendidikan hak dan kesehatan reproduksi (2010), modul pengkaderan ulama perempuan (2011), and modul pendidikan guru agama islam (2011). furthermore, as a result of rahima’s cooperation with indonesia’s ministry of religious affairs (mora) in their effort to create a happy family, rahima researched the role of marriage counselors to create a happy family resulting in the publication of peran bp4 dalam mewujudkan keluarga sakinah: hasil penelitian di 6 wilayah (2013). rahima also undertook the training of gender sensitivity for the marriage counselors of mora which resulted in the publication of buku panduan konseling untuk konselor bp4:perspektif kesetaraan for them to refer to in the counseling process. the rahima story (yafie 2010) was published in response to rahima staff’s ideas to celebrate the 10th anniversary of rahima. i mainly relied on this book in writing herstory of rahima since its birth from p3m, development, and programs. similarly, rahima dalam pandangan para mitra (rahima 2010), a compilation of the views of rahima partners about rahima, was published at the same time with the rahima story to celebrate the 10th anniversary of rahima. vcd shalawat kesetaraan was the product of rahima’s creativity which was initially inspired by rahima partners who mostly come from nu background and like to sing arabic songs before any events. it contains arabic songs that promote gender equality. rahima has a quarterly magazine, swara rahima, which is published since 2001. up until june 2019, rahima has published 55 editions of swara 41nurmila, nina rahima. each edition consists of about 40 pages with similar content of various contemporary issues such as women’s poverty, education, formalization of shari`a, domestic violence, sexuality, prevention of child marriage, rural development, prevention of violent extremism, face veiling, reciprocal reading of the qur’an (qira’ah mubadalah) and women’s political rights, not merely on women’s reproductive rights. each edition has sections of “tafsir al-qur’an” (qur’anic interpretation), “dirasah hadis” (the prophet’s tradition studies), “cerpen” (short story) and “tanya-jawab” (question and answer), in addition to other sections such as reflection, information, opinion, and interviews with certain figures of gender activists. this magazine looks like a simple magazine decorated with comic types conversation to simplify the content of the magazine. however, the content of the magazine is packed with progressive ideas which can raise consciousness to the existing gender inequality, critically deconstruct patriarchal knowledge and reconstruct it with new knowledge which is friendly to women, empowering and in accordance with the spirit of islam as the religion of kindness to all humans and environment. even though the topics of the magazine are not simple, its content can be easily understood by general readers. rahima also has four books published as a compilation of writings taken from certain sections of swara rahima magazine. these are bergerak menuju keadilan (2006), a compilation of faqihuddin abdul kodir’s writings previously published in “dirasah hadis” section; umat bertanya, ulama menjawab (2008), a compilation of “tanya jawab” section; perawan: kumpulan cerpen (2009), a compilation of short stories written by various writers; and ijtihad kyai husein, a compilation of husein muhammad’s writings published in “tafsir al-qur’an” section. these publications are beneficial especially for general readers who do not have access to swara rahima. bergerak menuju keadilan contains various topics covered by each edition of swara rahima such as women’s rights for education, their participation in politics, the right of a woman to marry off herself, domestic violence, reproductive issues, women as aurat (things need to be covered) and the empowerment of hiv/aids victims. like husein muhammad, faqihuddin abdul kodir shows his expertise on classical islamic knowledge, especially hadith (the prophet muhammad’s sayings). by using content analysis of the hadith (the study of matan), rather than its chain of narration (the study of sanad), abdul kodir counters the use of hadith to justify women’s subordination such as the hadith that states that women are created from the male’s rib; that women are aurat and 42 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 fitnah (source of social destruction); that women cannot marry off herself and others; that women cannot travel unless accompanied by her mahram (male relatives that she cannot marry); and that women should obey her husband and stay at home. in contrast to the patriarchal and literal understanding of hadith, abdul kodir understands the hadith contextually. for example, he explains that women in the prophet muhammad’s era expressed their anxiety about social injustice and asked the prophet to spare his time to teach the women, and then the prophet responded positively to their anxiety and provided his time to teach the women. the lesson learned from this hadith for indonesian current context, according to abdul kodir, is that everybody, including the women, has the rights for education and therefore, the state should facilitate the fulfillment of this right. affirmative action should be provided to marginalized groups such as women to ensure the fulfillment of this right. abdul kodir also argues that the intended message of the hadith which requires a woman who travels to be accompanied by her mahram is not to prohibit women to travel but to require the state and its society to provide a security system which allows women to travel safely and free from violence. unlike other muslim feminists such as amina wadud (1999) and asma barlas (2002), who tend not to use hadith in their struggle for gender justice due to the questionable validity of the hadith, abdul kodir sees the importance of using hadith to counter the existing use of hadith to support women’s subordination. in doing this, he critically looks at the problematic nature of the chain of narration to show readers that many of the hadiths which are used to justify women’s subordination are problematic in their chain of narration. in addition, he dismisses these hadiths by showing that the content of the hadith is contradictory to hadith with better quality or the content of the qur’anic verses. for instance, in response to the hadith narrated by abu hurairah compiled in the shahih bukhari which states that “there are three things which cause bad luck: horse, women and house”, abdul kodir refers to syarh shahih bukhari which tells that aishah, the wife of the prophet, rejected the above hadith because she considered its content to be contradictory with the qur’an chapter al-hadid (57), verse 22 (abdul kodir 2006: 29-30). in response to the literal reading of the hadith that women are aurat, abdul kodir looks at the context when the hadith was narrated. he explains that at that time, women were vulnerable to being raped or kidnapped by the enemy of the women’s group. this act of rape and kidnapping could humiliate the clan or group the women belong to and therefore women 43nurmila, nina should be protected. abdul kodir disagrees with the use of this hadith to domesticate women because the qur’an gives equal mandates for men and women to instruct the good deed and to forbid wrongdoing. he offers a new interpretation that the hadith “the women are aurat” in the current era means that women still easily become the target of physical abuse and violence in the domestic and public sphere and therefore they should be protected by the state such as by creating security system or law to protect women. or aurat of women in the current context, according to abdul kodir (2006: 226), can be in the form of women’s backwardness, poverty, and low level of education and this should be “protected” (solved and alleviated) by providing education and empowerment for women. the methodology of abdul kodir’s ijtihad (the use of reason to distill the intended message of the qur’an or hadith) is similar to the hermeneutical approach of fazlur rahman’s double movement (1982). abdul kodir has moved from the current era to the time when the qur’an was revealed or when a hadith was narrated to distill the intended message of the qur’an or a hadith, then he moves back to the current era to apply the spirit or the intended message of the qur’an or hadith in the current indonesian context. umat bertanya, ulama menjawab (2008) is the second easiest book to understand after the compilation of short stories below. it contains short questions from rahima’s partners and rahima scholars’ answers to the questions on issues of women’s career, marriage, and family. the main difference between this book and other mainstream books is that the answers use an equal gender perspective and, therefore, the answers tend to be pro-women and not victimizing the victims. this book not only shows rahima’s engagement with the grass-root level of the society but also its approach to knowledge is grounded, based on the reality of the everyday life of women. even though it is a fiction, perawan: kumpulan fiksi pembela perempuan (2009) is a rahima publication that is inspired by the current realities and issues being discussed in each edition of swara rahima. it raises consciousness and builds empathy for the current issues facing women such as the situation of women who became victims of the formalization of shari`a, the high maternal mortality during childbirth, and women’s poverty. besides, the stories not only raise consciousness but also motivate readers to do something in dealing with injustice toward women, a powerful tool for social change. perhaps, ijtihad kyai husein (2011) is the “heaviest” book to understand in comparison to the three other books published as a 44 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 compilation of swara rahima section. abdul kodir’s book on hadith is easier to understand than husein muhammad’s book on tafsir (qur’anic exegesis). however, both are similar in their approach to the interpretation of islamic texts: a substantive, contextual, and feminist approach to islam resulted in pro-women knowledge to counter the mainstream misogynistic and male-biased knowledge. both husein muhammad and abdul kodir show expertise on classical islamic knowledge that they often refer to in their struggle for gender justice and in dealing with the current problems facing many women. for example, in response to the current situation in which marriage can be the source of disaster for some women, especially those who become victims of domestic violence and polygamy, husein muhammad emphasizes the reciprocal relationship in marriage by semantically explains the meaning of mawaddah wa rahmah (love and mercy). quoting muqatil bin sulaiman (d. 150h), one of the earliest qur’anic exegetes, husein muhammad points out that mawaddah has three meanings: love, advice, and strong relationship. based on this, he argues that the qur’anic concept of marriage is the tie that can produce a relationship in which the couple love, advise, and respect each other. such a strong relationship should be free from abusive words and treatment. also, quoting al-raghib al-ishfahani, husein muhammad explains the meaning of rahmah as the delicate nature of heart which requires the person to treat his/her spouse well (muhammad 2011:8-9). this shows husein muhammad’s rich knowledge of the classical islamic knowledge that he can take advantage of in promoting gender equality among nu pesantren communities, who prefer classical islamic knowledge instead of the word “gender”, which some of them consider it to be western imported knowledge they should resist. this also shows that even though much classical islamic knowledge is misogynistic and male-biased, some of them are pro-women, which husein muhammad and abdul kodir often use to promote gender equality. on polygamy, husein muhammad argues that islam does not invent or initiate polygamy. rather, it is a pre-islamic patriarchal tradition. using a gradual and accommodative approach, husein muhammad argues that islam transformed the practice of polygamy from an unlimited number of women that men could marry without any regulation into the condition in which men could treat their wives justly. this transformation, according to husein muhammad, is an islamic criticism and disagreement with the existing practice of polygamy. it is an islamic response to the existing injustice toward powerless women at the time of revelation (muhammad 2011:27-28). in contrast with the mainstream interpretation which tends 45nurmila, nina to use qur’an 4: 3 as justification to allow polygamy, husein muhammad argues that as the efforts to gradually abolish slavery, mentioned in the qur’an, a necessary step to gradually abolish polygamy should be taken. husein muhammad quotes some ulama who argue that reducing the number of wives done by islam should be continued from a long time ago, from four to three, to two and then one (muhammad 2011:46-47). there are many other issues dealt with in this book such as female-led family, women’s human rights, and female scholars which i cannot discuss further here. in the early stage of its development, rahima in cooperation with lkis and ford foundation published fiqh perempuan: refleksi kiai atas wacana agama dan gender (2001). in 2007, this book was reprinted four times. there is still a demand for this book today, but there is none in the market. the book argues that the context or social, economic, and political reality should be the main basis and consideration in producing fiqh or understanding religious texts in order religious teachings can be contextual, not ahistorical (shalih likulli zaman wa makan). like other books by husein muhammad, this book offers grounded, contextual and feminist approaches in reading islamic texts (qur’an and hadith). it calls for a reinterpretation of the texts which tend to be unjust to women because, he argues, that religion including islam cannot tolerate any injustice or bad treatment against women. religion must always bring kindness and justice. based on this belief, husein muhammad offers new fiqh which is friendly to women such as the fiqh which allows women to lead prayer for both male and female, reveals various opinions on the variety of limits of female aurat, argues against under-aged marriage, allows women to exercise their rights to choose their prospective husband, emphasizes the importance of protecting women’s reproductive rights, suggests to treat women with kindness, argues for women’s leadership in domestic and public spheres, condemns the perpetrator of rape, and criticizes nawawi’s uqud al-lujain, a manual book of marriage, which is popular among indonesia muslims, that tends to subordinate women. the strength of fiqh perempuan lies in its revelation of many classical “hidden” knowledge that can be used to support gender equality. husein muhammad’s rich knowledge of classical islamic heritage allows him to present various opinions of classical ulama, criticize their patriarchal opinions that are no longer relevant to indonesian current context, and use the classical opinions that are pro-women and still relevant with contemporary indonesia. for example, on women’s political leadership, he quotes several male-biased tafsir such as from tafsir al-razi, al46 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 zamakhshari, al-thabathaba`i, al-qurthubi, ibn kathir, muhammad abduh and muhammad thahir bin asyur that tend to undermine women’s leadership ability due to their belief of the natural superiority of men over women physically and intellectually. this kind of tafsir, husein muhammad argues, is no longer relevant to the current context, where the reality shows that many women can do the tasks that were previously dominated by men. besides, according to him, there have been female governors and executive leaders in their profession. this reality shows that male superiority is not biologically given, but socially constructed. this world, in his view, is not stagnant but is changing into a more civilized, rational, and open society (muhammad 2001:197-198). textual analysis of fahmina publications fahmina’s publications reflect fahmina’s vision “to create critical, open, dignified and just social structure and societies” (fahmina 2013). fahmina adopts critical thinking by not taking for granted what is written in the classical fiqh to be applicable in the current indonesian context, but by critically looking at the context where this fiqh was produced before it is applied in the current indonesian context. like rahima publications, almost all fahmina publications are based on their social activism and are in response to the existing contexts before its publication. for example, islam, pesantren dan pesan kemanusiaan (2008) by k.h. syarief utsman yahya, a senior pesantren leader of khatulistiwa in kempek, cirebon, was written in response to several public acts of violence to religious and ethnic minority committed by radical muslim organizations such as front pembela islam (the front of islamic defender). the book argues for the fundamental teaching of islam that islam is a religion of kindness to all humans and the environment (islam rahmat li al-`alamin) and, therefore, no violence or environmental destruction can be justified by islam. if there is any violence or destruction by using any justification, according to yahya, islam should move and act appropriately in response to them. the book uses a substantive approach to islam, which allows flexibility to adopt indonesian local culture. this might be in response to a certain political party that tends to arabise indonesian muslims such as by adopting pakistani or arabian clothes. similarly, unlike hizbut tahrir indonesia that adopts khilafah as a state political system, this book argues for negara kesatuan republik indonesia (nkri; the republic of indonesia as one nation state), claiming that “we are indonesians who are muslims” (yahya 2008:85). the book also acknowledges and respects plurality and shows its partiality to the marginalized group. as a 47nurmila, nina nu leading figure, yahya expects young nu generation to rejuvenate its organization to function well in dealing with social and political problems such as violence, corruption, human trafficking, and social injustice. yahya disagrees with the formalization of shari`a and criticizes the phenomenon of the increasing number of indonesians who frequently go to pilgrimage to mecca (hajj), but at the same time, the incidence of social crimes also increase. similarly, husein muhammad in his book spiritualitas kemanusiaan: perspektif islam pesantren (2006) uses the esoteric approach that emphasizes human spirituality. this book is a compilation of short reflective views of husein muhammad about the current realities and lessons learned from the past stories, which show his rich knowledge about the classical islamic tradition and his engagement with current realities. this book not only supports progressive thinking, which encourages ijtihad (the use of reason to understand god’s intended message of the qur’an) but also respects religious differences, encourages social solidarity, cares for the environment, and support gender equality. unlike male-biased writings which tend to blame and subordinate women, this book believes that islam respects women; that men and women are equal in their ability and potential; that women who lived during the prophet era participated freely in public and were intellectually active. however, the patriarchal system, according to husein muhammad, has subordinated and domesticated women. in response to domestic violence against women and rape, he does not blame women as those who are inviting men to rape them by not covering their bodies as many people believe, but rather he blames the perpetrators for their destructive mentality, poverty, and low educational level. husein muhammad is a male writer who is pro-women and a strong advocate of treating women in respected ways. like other books written by husein muhammad and abdul kodir, modul kursus islam dan gender: dawrah fiqh perempuan (2006) offers grounded feminist contextual approach in understanding the qur’an and hadith, critically reads patriarchal fiqh and offers a feminist reconstruction of pro-women fiqh. for example, in response to the absence of valid hadith on female circumcision, the book highlights the possible influence of pre-islamic tradition and argues that islam cannot allow the practice that is harmful to the body. it emphasizes women’s rights to choose their prospective husband in response to the practice of forced marriage. it quotes many hadiths that are friendly to women such as the hadith that says“the best of you are those who treat their wive well” in response to the misogynistic hadith like the one that narrates that “never prosper the 48 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 society who entrust their affairs to women”. this discourse is empowering and enlightening for many women who previously believe that islam supports women’s subordination. similar to husein muhammad’s fiqh perempuan, abdul kodir also wrote hadith and gender justice: understanding the prophetic traditions (2007) based on his expertise on hadith. this book calls for a critical and contextual reading of hadith with justice as the principle of understanding the text because abdul kodir believes that the prophetic mission is to call for justice and equality. with this principle in mind, someone cannot just take for granted a hadith which tends to subordinate women. moreover, abdul kodir counters the discourse that hadith has often been used to justify women’s subordination by publishing 60 hadits tentang hakhak perempuan dalam islam: teks dan interpretasi (abdul kodir 2017). this book is beneficial for many readers to support the argument that the prophet muhammad was a feminist who supported women’s rights. recently, abdul kodir published his new approach to reading the qur’an called mubadalah approach (reciprocal reading), to produce a progressive interpretation of the qur’an for gender justice (2019). this book helps readers to see gender justice brought in the qur’anic verses. in 2017, fahmina published three books on (1) media coverage of kongress ulama perempuan indonesia (indonesian female ulama congress) conducted in april 2017 at pesantren kebon jambu cirebon, which had international media coverage as it was the first female ulama congress in the world attended by about a thousand attendants from all over indonesia and international speakers and observers; (2) the issues discussed at the congress; and (3) the compilation of opinions on the congress. overall, fahmina’s publications promote gender justice and religious pluralism to make indonesia a peaceful country. conclusion the article has shown that rahima and fahmina are two islamic institutions established in 2000 that are concerned with the development and empowerment of pesantren communities. both rahima and fahmina started to be concerned with general issues of social injustice and pesantren development. but, then rahima focused on women’s reproductive rights and other rights in islam after its independence from p3m. in contrast, fahmina continued its concern with general issues of social justice including gender justice. although both rahima and fahmina claim that they are not nu-affiliated organizations and open to non-nu membership, they mainly consist of young nu members and their concern is also 49nurmila, nina with nu-based pesantren communities. the progressive nature of both rahima and fahmina’s publications negates the existing label of nu as the traditionalist organization. both rahima and fahmina combined their social activism with intellectual engagement (praxis). they have contributed to the advancement of women’s rights within islam in indonesia and in countering the increasing influence of radical, literalist, and formalist islam that tend to subordinate women and pro-patriarchal system. in contrast to the dominant normative patriarchal discourse of women, derived mostly from the classical fiqh, rahima and fahmina have offered a grounded, substantive and contextual approach to islam. they have provided space for critical thinking of the tradition, deconstruct the existing patriarchal interpretations of the qur’an and hadith, and reconstruct new knowledge that is pro-women by using an equal gender perspective. interestingly, the main actors for this intellectual engagement are kiayi husein muhammad and faqihuddin abdul kodir, both of them are male. this shows that biology is not determinant of patriarchal attitudes. either male or female, without critical engagement with patriarchal injustice, can unconsciously perpetuate and support this patriarchal system. in contrast, with critical engagement and equal gender perspective, either male or female can support the struggles for gender justice. funding the author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/ or publication of this article. notes 1 see saskia wierienga (2002) for the new order eradication of indonesian women’s movement, gerakan wanita indonesia (gerwani), for its affiliation with communist party and for its radical and political movement for women’s rights. see also suryakusuma (2011) for the new order construction of women to be good mother and housewife, which she calls “state ibuism”. kalyanamitra was one exception for the non-government organization (ngo) which was founded on 28 march 1985 and survived during the new order period. this ngo could exist within the new order period might be because kalyanamitra focus more on providing information or academic (research and publication) engagement, rather than social activism (kalyanamitra 2014). 2 this book was published by mizan, bandung, in 1997 and then re-printed several times. 50 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 references abdush-shomad, muhyiddin et al. 2008. umat bertanya, ulama menjawab: seputar karir, pernikahan dan keluarga. jakarta: rahima. barlas, asma. 2002. ‘believing women’ in islam: unreading patriarchal interpretations of the quran. austin, tx: university of texas press. fahmina. 2008. “sejarah fahmina.” retrieved july 24, 2014 (http://www. fahmina.or.id/profil/sejarah.pdf). fahmina. 2014. “daftar publikasi fahmina.” email communication with alifatul arifiati, alifatul@fahmina.or.id, 14 july 2014. fahmina. 2019. “daftar publikasi fahmina.” whatsapp communication with alifatul arifiati, 4 december 2019. fahmina. 2013. “profil yayasan fahmina”. retrieved july 31, 2014 (http:// www.fahmina.or.id/profil.html). kalyanamitra. 2014. “sejarah.” retrieved august 1, 2014 (http://www. kalyanamitra.or.id/tentang-kami/sejarah/). kodir, faqihuddin abdul. 2006. bergerak menuju keadilan: pembelaan nabi terhadap perempuan. jakarta: rahima. kodir, faqihuddin abdul. 2007. hadith and gender justice: understanding the prophetic traditions. cirebon: fahmina institute. kodir, faqihuddin abdul. 2017. 60 hadits tentang hak-hak perempuan dalam islam: teks dan interpretasi. yogyakarta: graha cendekia. kodir, faqihuddin abdul. 2019. qira’ah mubadalah: tafsir progresif untuk keadilan gender dalam islam. yogyakarta: ircisod. muhammad, k.h. husein. 2001. fiqh perempuan: refleksi kiai atas wacana agama dan gender. yogyakarta: lkis. muhammad, k.h. husein. 2006. spiritualitas kemanusiaan; perspektif islam pesantren. cirebon: fahmina institute. muhammad, husein, faqihuddin abdul kodir, lies marcoes-natsir and marzuki wahid. 2006. modul kursus islam dan gender: dawrah fiqh perempuan. cirebon: fahmina institute. muhammad, husein. 2011. ijtihad kyai husein: upaya membangun keadilan gender. jakarta: rahima. rahman, fazlur. 1982. islam & modernity: transformation of an intellectual tradition. chicago: university of chicago press. rahima. 2014. “mohon list judul publikasi rahima dan tahun terbitnya.” email communication with binta from rahima, rahima2000@cbn. net.id, 11 march 2014. rahima. 2019. “mohon list judul publikasi rahima dan tahun terbitnya.” 51nurmila, nina whatsapp communication with binta from rahima, 4 december 2019. suryakusuma, julia i. 2011. state ibuism: the social construction of womanhood in new order indonesia. depok: komunitas bambu. yafie, helmi ali. 2010. the rahima story. jakarta: rahima. yahya, syarief utsman. 2008. islam, pesantren dan pesan kemanusiaan. cirebon: fahmina institute. wadud, amina. 1999. qur’an and woman: rereading the sacred text from a woman’s perspective. new york: oxford university press. wieringa, saskia e. 2002. sexual politics in indonesia. new york and london: palgrave. 52 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 didin nurul rosidin* iain syekh nurjati cirebon, indonesia mila amalia iain syekh nurjati cirebon, indonesia ihsan sa'dudin iain syekh nurjati cirebon, indonesia eka safitri jenderal soedirman university, indonesia abstract the early twentieth century saw the emergence of muslim social movements as a new model of resistance against the dutch colonial rule in indonesia. this model of the resistance movement was a response to various changes in politics, social and religious culture in the early decades of the 20th century due to dynamics within the muslim community as well as the new policy of the colonial government. this article studies the emergence of muslim social movements in cirebon, west java, and its impacts on the development of the muslims’ resistance movement against the dutch colonial rule in indonesia. there have not been many studies of cirebon's role in islamic social movements in the early 20th century. therefore, this article, using a historical method, attempts to contribute to this literature by examining social movements carried out by muslims in cirebon and their impacts on the emergence of resistance against dutch colonial rule in indonesia. the findings show that cirebon, which was one of the main centres of early islamic civilization in the indonesian archipelago, played a *contact: didin nurul rosidin, ph.d., institut agama islam negeri (iain) syekh nurjati jalan perjuangan, sunyaragi, kec. kesambi, kota cirebon, jawa barat 45132 indonesia e-mail: didinnurulrosidin@syekhnurjati.ac.id muslim social movements in cirebon and the emergence of national resistance movements against the dutch colonial government in the early 20th century indonesia journal of asian social science research 2022, vol. 4, no. 1: 63-86 https://cassr.net/jassr/ © the author(s) 2022 article 64 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1, 2022 prominent role in the emergence of muslim social movements in early 20th century indonesia. various muslim social organizations emerged in the area such as sarekat islam, persarekatan ulama, nahdhatul ulama, and muhammadiyah. although these social-religious organisations had differences or were in tension on various issues, their emergence succeeded in convincing the native people of the importance of a new strategy in their resistance against the long and hegemonic rule of the dutch colonial government which had ruled the cirebon region since the late 17th century. key words muslim social movements, cirebon, resistance, dutch colonialism, indonesian islam introduction resistance and rebellion fill the pages of the history of european colonialism in the world. history records that only with resistance did the colonized finally gain independence. the same feature happened in the dutch east indies which later changed its name to indonesia after independence. many studies have been carried out on the resistance movements that occurred in this archipelago, such as the resistance of the king and the people of badung in bali (mirawati 2013), the aceh war led by cut nya dien (kirana and wiharyanto 2022), sawitto’s resistance in sulawesi (amir 2018), the prince diponegoro war (ariwibowo 2021), wangi-wangi people’s rebellion (lina, hadara, and hayari 2020), and the resistance of sultan thaha saifuddin in jambi (sianipar 2022). one of the important points is the change in the strategy of resistance from partially, physically and regionally restricted to non-physical, well organized and massive with a much wider scope. this change in strategy cannot be separated from the emergence of a new awareness among indigenous leaders about the importance of the intellectual side in resistance. at the same time, thanks to political pressure within the netherlands, the colonial government made a policy change toward the native people, which was known as ethical politics, in 1901. these two factors played a major role in the emergence of muslim social movements such as jami’atul khair (sari 2020), sarekat (dagang) islam (mustakif and mulyati 2019), hayatul qulub (permanasari 2019), muhammadiyah (nashir 2010), nahdlatul ulama (farih 2016) and others. through these mass-based socio-religious organizations, the indigenous 65didin nurul rosidin, et al. people carried out resistance with a new “face and look”. the social movements of muslims mentioned above are generally a manifestation of the ultimate mission of islam to transform the social life of muslims to become better and able to uphold islamic values (jurdi 2013). the birth of these muslim social movements became one of the driving forces for indigenous people, especially muslims, not only in the context of resistance to the colonial ruler but also in developing a new awareness of independence. regarding the history of islamic social movements in indonesia, izudin divided it into several phases that were adjusted according to the period, one of which was the colonial period. this period is regarded as the initial phase of the occurrence of islamic social movements in indonesia, known as the traditional movements, which were characterised as partial movements. apart from having limitations in their nature, the ideas used as manifestations of social protest were still coloured with myths so that the emerging movements were not based on collective awareness as a response to the inequality they faced (izudin 2017). in their development, islamic social movements in indonesia began to be influenced by the emergence of islamic thoughts and reform movements in the world before the 20th century. these movements were carried out by islamic figures, including jamaluddin al-afghani (18391897), muhammad abduh (1849-1905), and rashid ridho (1865-1935) (rosidin 2018a). although geographically islam in the archipelago is on the periphery of the islamic world, its development cannot be separated from the influence of islam in the middle east as the centre of islamic civilization (fadhly 2018), including the publication of magazines and the formation of social, economic, religious, and even political organizations (padmo 2007). as a result, various islamic-based organizations emerged such as the sarekat dagang islam (sdi), jam’iyyat khair (1905), alirsyad (1915), persyarikatan ulama (1911), and muhammadiyah (1912) (sulistiono 2001). these mass-based organizations became the forerunner of strengthening national awareness that crossed regional, ethnic or racial boundaries, and spread to various regions in the dutch east indies including cirebon, in now west java province. cirebon is not only known as one of the centres of the islamization of west java but also an important part of the islamic social movement carried out by islamic organizations in indonesia. this can be seen when cirebon hosted the al-islam congress in 1922. cirebon also became one of the centres of the nahdlatul ulama (nu) movement because of the large number of nu-based pesantren, a kind of traditional islamic boarding 66 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1, 2022 school. other mass organizations established either at the centre or at branches were persyarikatan ulama and muhammadiyah. however, in this case, there have not been many studies of cirebon’s role in islamic social movements in the early 20th century. therefore, in this article, using the historical method, we examine social movements carried out by muslims in cirebon and their impacts on the emergence of resistance against dutch colonial rule in indonesia. cirebon in the early 20th century toward the twentieth century, criticism of the colonial system of centralized government strengthened and prompted changes to a decentralized direction. finally, in 1903, the desentralisatiewet (decentralization law), which implemented a decentralized system was officially issued (kartodirjo 2015). based on that, the colonial government gave wider autonomy to the residency leadership. apart from that, in terms of structure, a special government for urban areas was also formed under the residency, namely the gemeente led by the burgemeester (mayor) (hardjasaputra 2011). at both the residency and gemeente levels, semi-parliamentary political organizations were also formed with the number of members regulated by the colonial government with a composition of dutch, natives and other foreigners, namely the city council (gemeente raad) for gemeente and the residency council for residency. this is the first local political institution provided for the people to voice their aspirations, albeit with various restrictions and limitations (hestiliani 2019). in 1819, cirebon was designated as one of the twenty residencies on the island of java. cirebon residency oversaw several areas in the southern part of the now west java province, from cirebon to galuh. meanwhile, cirebon city as the capital of the residency was established by gemeente (kotapraja or city town) in 1906. three factors were taken into consideration by the colonial government in determining the establishment of gemeente in the cirebon residency (masduqi 2010). the first was the number and composition of the population. the main focus was the presence of white people in cirebon who were not only dutch people but also other europeans and other nationalities, including ethnic chinese, making up a minimum of 10% of the total population. the second was local conditions related to the potentials that could support the sustainability of gemeente. the last one was finance related to taxation matters in the local area which could be obtained from various sources. along with the development of gemeente, the rise of new awareness among the native people was expected to contribute to the political dynamics at that time. some native leading figures started loudly to voice the need to 67didin nurul rosidin, et al. involve natives in the process of political policies used by the government, which they believed gave an impact on the fates of their fellow natives. as a direct response to this pressing notion, the colonial government established a newly semi-parliamentary council named the volksraad (people’s council) on 18 may 1918, in which native representatives were involved in governmental affairs. meanwhile, the socio-economic conditions of cirebon in the early 20th century were very dynamic and complex. after the enactment of the culturestelsel in 1830, there was a significant increase in the population of cirebon. the change in the mode of agricultural production from traditional to modern industrialism become a magnet for migration from surrounding areas, such as tegal and pekalongan (taufik and husin 2014). the shift in production mode gave birth to a variety of new occupations. another economic phenomenon was an increase in trade which invited foreign traders from other ethnicities such as europe, china and the middle east (hartatik 2014). cirebon was supported by a wealth of agricultural products and plantations from the surrounding areas. in addition, economic growth in cirebon was strengthened by a city modernization policy that included the construction of ports, roads, factories, government and private offices, irrigation, waterways, markets, hospitals, and other health institutions (hendro 2014). the sharp increase in population and the modernization of cirebon city impacted the environmental and health conditions in cirebon. at the beginning of the 20th century, various epidemics hit the people in the cirebon region such as cholera, typhus, bubonic plague, malaria, and influenza (emalia 2020; 2021). as a result, thousands of people died and socio-economic conditions deteriorated (masduqi 2011). in terms of education, the educational system in cirebon in the early 20th century was marked by the development of two educational models, religious and secular ones. referring to points outlined in the ethical policy, the dutch colonial government introduced modern schools such as els (europeesche lagere school), elm (europeesche lagere meisjeschool), his (hollandsch inlandsche school), hcs (holladsch chineesche school), twede klaase inlandsche school (indigenous second grade school) and, for advanced levels, mulo (meer uitgebreid lagere onderwijs). at the same time, muslim leaders took a quick response by establishing modern yet religiously-based educational institutions such as madrasah ta’lim al-aulad al-islam (darul hikam) and madrasah al-irsyad (hadi 2014). gemeente cirebon’s lack of attention to education and teaching for the natives encouraged people to take the initiatives to establish private schools that had similarities with the primary schools owned by the dutch 68 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1, 2022 colonial government (masduqi 2011) such as christian els, hollandsch chineesche zendingschool, kartini schools, taman siswa schools, his pbg, his sarekat islam, and his de volharding (persistence) (as hardjasaputra and tawalinudin 2011). the existence of cirebon as one of the centres of islamic civilization cannot be separated from the various developments that have occurred in indonesia, especially on the island of java. a study of the history of islamic social movements in cirebon in the 20th century shows the great influence of developments that occurred in the city on muslims in the dutch east indies (now indonesia after its independence in 1945). interestingly, what happened to the muslims in cirebon was also inseparable from the developments that were happening to the muslims in the world. this is not surprising for muslims in this archipelago had been connected to the islamic world with various channels since the beginning of islamization in the archipelago and this connection continued to strengthen into the 20th century (duriana 2018). the islamization process that took place in cirebon could not be separated from the role of international muslim preachers such as syekh hasanudin, syekh nurjati, and in particular sunan gunung djati. they come from the middle east. under their leadership, islam spread not only in cirebon but also in almost all of the western parts of the island of java and southern sumatra (wildan 2003). the same role was also played by charismatic figures of cirebon in the late 19th and 20th centuries such as syekh tolhah kalisapu and kiyai abbas from buntet. they were alumni of middle eastern education. syekh tolhah developed the qadariyah naqsabandiyah order and is known as a pioneer of the tarekat movement in west java. kiai abbas not only introduced the tijaniyah tarekat in the pesantren, but also played a major role in the birth of a jihad resolution in the indonesian war of independence. the influence of islam on the cirebon people is reflected in their social and cultural lives. their traditions, customs, arts and beliefs are heavily influenced by islamic teachings like the tradition of the coastal community of cirebon in telling the stories of the prophets and apostles, which are usually conveyed at a circumcision ceremony by a cleric or parents to their children. therefore, the presence of islam in cirebon is inseparable from the life of its people (as hardjasaputra and tawalinudin 2011). the rise of muslim-based mass organizations in cirebon as stated above, the early 20th century saw a change in the pattern and strategy of the resistance movement carried out by muslims in the dutch 69didin nurul rosidin, et al. east indies, including cirebon. before the 20th century, the resistance movements in cirebon were mostly physical in nature such as the ones that were carried out by mbah muqoyyim in buntet, kiai jatira in ciwaringin, kiai romli in balerante, and the kedondong war. the failure of physical resistance and the arrival of new ideas from abroad prompted awareness of the need for a more organized resistance strategy in the form of socioreligious organizations in cirebon. sarekat islam sarekat islam (si) was officially established by hos tjokroaminoto on 10 september 1912. previously, this organization was called sarekat dagang islam (sdi), which was founded on 16 october 1905 in surakarta, central java, by haji samanhudi(djaelani 2017). one year later, si leaders officially established their local partners in surakarta. then, in 1913 some branches of si were established in west java, including the one in the residency of cirebon. in the first year of its establishment in cirebon residency, si attracted the people of cirebon to join. the number of members of si in cirebon residency was recorded at 23,000 people, which constitutes 60.96% of the total number of si members in west java (lubis 2011). viewing the number of members, si in cirebon residency ranked first in west java and second at the national level leaving only si in surakarta at the top. however, in the following year, their numbers decreased. for instance, in 1914, si of cirebon residency became the third largest in java with 40 thousand members, compared to batavia which had around 77 thousand members and surakata which had 60 thousand members (emalia 2008). the rapid increase of members of si was due to its propaganda capabilities. it was claimed that si was the only mass-based organization that was actively engaged in religious affairs with an attitude in line with upholding the orthodox streams of islam. this also owed to the propagated notion that si was a movement that would save the native people from the threat of colonialism and take a side with the disadvantageous communities (jayusman and shavab 2021). in the early days of its development, si got support from local ulama who were influential among people. in cirebon residency, the support that si received did not only come from the ulama figures but also from people who were convinced to join. the fact that the early founder of sdi was haji samanhudi (1868-1956) was a decisive factor in gaining endorsement from those leading figures of palaces in cirebon. it was a circulated report that stated that haji samanhudi was a former student of kiyai abdul jamil (1842-1919), the supreme leader of pesantren buntet and a senior adviser 70 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1, 2022 in religious affairs at palaces in cirebon. this showed a close relationship between si leaders with cirebon. thus, it was plausible to see the arrival of si to cirebon got strong support from kiai abdul jamil, who then became the leader of the syuriah council of the sarekat islam of cirebon. therefore, kiai abdul jamil was known as a palace adviser as well as a popular religious leader who had an anti-colonial attitude (emalia 2006). it is noteworthy to mention that si also enjoyed support from the tarekat groups that were flourishing in the cirebon residency (anri 2014). having been persuaded by the pivotal roles of the ulama such as kiyai abdul jamil at the top level of si leadership in cirebon, the reigning sultans of the traditional local palaces as a part of the indigenous elite showed open support to si. sultans of both the kasepuhan and kanoman palaces saw si as the most possible vehicle for them to express their grievances resulting from the penetrative intervention of the dutch colonial government over their affairs. under the strict control of the colonial government for a long time, sultans of both palaces were being cut off from their subordinates. hence, both local palaces showed their support for all activities carried out by si such as protesting and criticizing the policies of the dutch colonial government. for example, the palaces supported the establishment of qur’an-based islamic schools. since the inception of si, the leaders of si of cirebon were active in organizing many grassroots protests, including the protest of a merchant group. they voiced their dissatisfaction with the economic deprivation of muslims under the dutch colonial government (gemeente of cirebon). for instance, bratanata, a deputy chairman, in a meeting criticised the lack of opportunity for the natives to take part in government affairs. his critique was not aimed at bringing si of cirebon to join the colonial government but as a protest against the injustice of the gemeente cirebon that burdened the natives with tax (emalia 2008). so, it was not surprising that the chinese people in cirebon who at that time controlled the economy of cirebon became the main target of attacks. for instance, in 1913, there was a riot in the celeng village, lohbener, indramayu. the riot rose from an open conflict between mohammad yasin, an activist of the local si, and the wedana (sub-district) assistant of pemajahan. many chinese were persecuted and robbed, and their homes were burned. another case was the gebangilir riot between the chinese and members of si on 23 september 1914. this incident was not much different from that in lohbener. in the aftermath, 25 rioters were arrested and jailed, and 14 people were stamped as sympathizers of the riot who were then released without further charge. reports said among the victims were five chinese people of whom three were badly injured (taufik and husin 2014). 71didin nurul rosidin, et al. in its later development, si paid attention to other aspects, including education as well as politics. this is evidenced by the struggle of the si of cirebon to establish an islamic educational institution for native people. to do so, led by m. djaid, si organized a special meeting that was initially to prepare for the 10th anniversary of the foundation of si of the cirebon branch. a number of representatives from such districts as majalengka, indramayu, kuningan, sumber, clancang, jamblang, losari, sindanglaut, and kedawung attended the meeting. interestingly, representatives of other associations and media were also present such as the paguyuban pasundan, sin po, kong po, utusan hindia, neraca, fadjar and others. there were also representatives from the central board of si, namely h. agus salim dan h. djuanda. during the meeting, all participants discussed the need for islamic education through which all activities were designed in accordance with the basic principles of si, which were purely based on the teachings of the quran and hadith. as a result of the meeting, the sarekat islam of cirebon set up the igama school or school met de al-quran, but it was still similar to that of his intended for javanese aristocrats. in the school, dutch was the language of instruction. likewise, islamic lessons were included. the strong attention of si of cirebon over improving the quality of the education system was reinstated at a conference held on 16 july 16 1922 at societeit paroekoenan (emalia 2008). muhammadiyah muhammadiyah was founded by k.h. ahmad dahlan on 18 november 18 1912 in kauman, yogyakarta. this organization was mainly engaged in socio-religious affairs and was focused on opposing all forms of worship practices believed to be mixed with superstitions and heresies, and reviving the tradition of ijtihad (independent way of thinking) among muslims in carrying out religious practices (nashir 2010). in 1929, muhammadiyah began to attract the people in west java. the establishment of muhammadiyah branches in west java referred to the 18th muhammadiyah congress in 1929 in surakarta. the first branch of muhammadiyah was in garut from which muhammadiyah spread its influence to other areas in west java by sending missionaries to several areas such as sukabumi, bandung, tasikmalaya and kuningan. the muhammadiyah branch of kuningan was founded in 1929. interestingly, its foundation was not possible without the close supervision of the board of the muhammadiyah branch in batavia (purnama, lubis, and widyonugrahanto 2017). the foundation of the muhammadiyah branch in kuningan was the first step in developing muhammadiyah in the cirebon residency. according 72 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1, 2022 to sidik sadali, three years after the establishment of the muhammadiyah branch in kuningan, the people of cirebon began to receive information about the organization. in 1933, a preacher from kuningan named kiai toyib was invited to give a religious lecture in which he explained muhammadiyah to the public including its aims and objectives. since then, cirebon regularly held religious gatherings once a month by inviting kiai toyib as a lecturer. this regular religious gathering took place at haji wasiaatmadja’s house at gang syekh magelung, kebun baru. those who attended that program included r. soejat and haji hoed (farihin and rosidin 2019). it is noteworthy to mention that this religious gathering was believed to be the forerunner of the establishment of muhammadiyah educational institutions in cirebon when it transformed into a non-formal educational institution known as al-wustho, which was led by kiai toyib. in 1947, the first formal educational institution was founded through the conversion of the al-wustho into an islamic high school (sekolah menengah islam or smi) (noer 1982), which is now the place of sekolah dasar (elementary school or sd) 3 muhammadiyah cirebon. at first, efforts to spread muhammadiyah in the cirebon residency were carried out clandestinely. it was only in 1935 that muhammadiyah was publicly introduced to the wider community after other reformist organizations such as al-irsyad and persis rose to surpace in cirebon residency, although cirebon as a name of the place had been in a close contact with muhammadiyah since 1922. as being stated elsewhere, cirebon hosted the first al-islam congress, in which delegates of a variety of muslim based mass organizations gathered including those of muhammadiyah. it was kh ahmad dahlan, the founder as well as supreme leader of muhammadiyah attended the congress (hadi 2014). it seems that kh ahmad dahlan was more focused on matters related to congress instead of expanding muhammadiyah’s influence in cirebon. haji basoeki took the leadership of the cirebon branch of muhammadiyah in the first two years of its development in the city. haji bazar ma’ruf, a special envoy of the central board of muhammadiyah assisted the new chairman in handling the organization. from 1939 to 1942 the cirebon branch of muhammadiyah succeeded in expanding its influence, due to a new structure it introduced. then, a teaching division was set up and led by kamil kartapradja. after completing his duties in cirebon, haji ma’ruf bazaar returned to yogyakarta in 1939. after serving for five years, haji basoeki gave up the leadership of the cirebon branch to haji hoed who took the office from 1942 to 1947 (farihin and rosidin 2019). 73didin nurul rosidin, et al. persarekatan ulama hayatul qulub was the initial name of the persarekatan ulama, which was founded in 1911 in majalengka. its founder was kiyai haji (k.h.) abdul halim, who was born in 1887 in ciberelang, majalengka (noer 1982). he came from religiously devout family background. his father was k.h. muhammad iskandar, a religious court official (penghulu) in the area of majalengka and his mother was hj. siti mutmainah. both were still close relatives. abdul halim was the youngest of seven children. in his childhood, he was called mohammad sjatari, who was later better known as otong syatori (falah 2008). after completing his religious studies in some islamic boarding schools (pesantren), in 1908 he went to mecca like other charismatic and notorious religious figures such as k.h. ahmad dahlan, k.h. hasyim asy’ary, and k.h. mas abdurrahman. abdul halim was a man with a mission. during his study in the holy city of mecca, he was impressed by the two educational institutions that applied a modern teaching system, which applied a teaching curriculum and provided students with benches and tables. the halaqah system was gradually abandoned. both institutions were located in bab al-salam near mecca and jeddah. impressed by this fact, abdul halim had a strong ambition to modernize traditional education institutions in his homeland (noer 1982). upon his return in 1911, abdul halim started to introduce new ideas of the modern education system in his home village in majalengka. yet, unlike what he discovered in mecca that focused on education, he not only gave special efforts in the fields of education (tarbiyah), but also in economic enterprises (iqtiṣādiyah). it was not surprising for he was a trader of the batik cloth, perfume and religious books. in his educational curriculum, he set up a variety of technical skills, carpentry, and textiles. thus, abdul halim combined educational modernization and economic empowerment for the betterment of his fellow muslim natives (saefullah 2017). to support his above-mentioned goals, only six months after his homeland return, he founded an organization engaged in education and economics called hayatul qulub. the hayatul qulub, within a short time, succeeded in attracting 60 farmers and traders. in the following years, the hayatul qulub was more known in the economic fields as abdul halim founded s study club named madrasah i’anat al-muta’allimin in 1912. since then, the hayatul qulub focused on empowering fellow muslim traders, especially when they faced chinese traders who had almost full control of economic enterprises in the country including in the cirebon residency (noer 1982). to do so, 74 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1, 2022 abdul halim initiated building a weaving company to produce cloth needed for native batik traders (falah 2008). as a result, he faced direct trading conflicts with the chinese businessmen who were more in favour before the colonial government. this trading conflict brought about severe treatment from the colonial government and forced abdul halim to close down the hayatul qulub in 1914. as mentioned above, abdul halim in the field of education founded the madrasah i’anat al-muta’allimin in 1912 before he changed its name into the jam’iyat i’anat al-muta’allimin in 1916. however, this new name was short-lived as abdul halim then changed it into the persjarikatan oelama (muslim scholar association) following the submission of legal approval to the colonial government. under the auspices of hos tjokroaminoto, a supreme leader of the sarekat islam, the persjarikatan oelama succeeded in obtaining legal status from the dutch colonial government in 1917. since then, the persjarikatan oelama was officially legalized and free to hold its activities, which for its first decade, were restricted around majalengka and its surrounding areas. after 1934, it was able to expand its influence throughout java and madura (falah 2008). abdul halim’s dreams to modernize islamic traditional boarding schools came to reality when he founded santi asromo in 1932. since its inception, the school was similar to that of the existing pesantren type. yet, it applied a modern system in which schooling was divided into three levels, namely elementary, middle and advanced. the curriculum was composed following this level-based design. not only were religious subjects taught, but also some secular ones. furthermore, students were equipped with various kinds of skills such as farming, making handicrafts from iron and wood, weaving, and processing various materials such as soap making (choirunniswah 2013). despite failures encountered by the hayatul qulub, abdul halim, who was so-called an ulama entrepreneur, continued his tireless efforts to improve the economic conditions of fellow natives. this was the banner of persjarikatan oelama. he strongly believed that only through being independent of the economic ties of the colonial government, the economic conditions of the natives could be improved. he then in 1927 started purchasing two and a half hectares of land for agricultural purposes. in the 1930s, he bought a printing company and in 1939 established a weaving company (noer 1982). in addition to educational and economic programs, abdul halim through the persjarikatan oelama provided social services and was then also active in politics. he established an orphanage special section which was managed by the women’s division called fathimiyah. in politics, under 75didin nurul rosidin, et al. the tutelage of abdul halim, the persjarikatan oelama used its printing company to publish a magazine called soeara persjarikatan oelama (the voice of ulama association or spo). the persjarikatan oelama explored other means of voicing its grievances such as organizing a direct audience with the colonial government officials as seen in the case of the demand for the inclusion of religious subjects in public schools’ curriculum. another case was its objection to the implementation of the inheritance regulation that was based on customary law (hukum adat) instead of islamic law. the persjarikatan oelama directly presented both demands to the office of the adviseur voor inlandsch zaken (advisor of native affairs) at batavia in 1940 (noer 1982). nahdlatul ulama nahdatul ulama (the resurgence of muslim scholars or nu) was founded on 31 january 1926 as an indonesian islamic organization spearheaded by the ulama (usman 2018). in its development, nu becomes the largest muslim mass-based organization spreading in almost all parts of the country, even abroad, with tens of millions of members. according to nina h. lubis, two factors drove nu into west java, namely the kinship networks among kyai and their intellectual networks in pesantren. many young muslims from areas in west java headed to many pesantren in east java to master religious subjects before setting up pesantren in their villages. these pesantren include pesantren tremas (pacitan), pesantren bangkalan (madura), and pesantren tebuireng (jombang) (purnama, lubis, and widyonugrahanto 2017). as for nu, which was founded in east java by kyai who were closely attached to pesantren, it was not surprising that the spread of nu in west java has been very efficiently carried out by kyai and santri through the pesantren-based network. the rise of nu in west java cannot be separated from the religious features of the people (sujati 2019a). generally, muslim communities in west java paid high respect to kyai along with their affiliation. the spread of nu in west java would not happen without the central role of the kyai. in its 3rd national congress in 1928, nu was determined to spread its influence over all parts of java and madura. in particular, for the mission of establishing nu’s branches in west java, the nu central board sent a special envoy led by k.h. wahab hasbullah, k.h. bishri syansuri and k.h. abdul halim, all of them were members of the lajhnah nashihin (propaganda commission). in just two years, nu’s branches were established in cirebon, tasikmalaya and ciamis (purnama, lubis, and widyonugrahanto, 2017). 76 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1, 2022 the establishment of nu in west java also owes to the great figures of nu in cirebon namely k.h. abbas and k.h. anas, both are the leaders of pesantren buntet (sujati 2019a). although no data are indicating the exact time of the establishment of nu in cirebon, it is safe to assume that nu in cirebon was established at the same time as the foundation of nu in surabaya in 1926. it is mainly because many nu’s founders were cirebonbased kyai such as k.h. abdul halim of leuwimunding (majalengka), who was later appointed as the khatib tsani (the second secretary) to accompany k.h. abdul wahhab hasbullah. in the following years, more cirebon-based kyai came to the top leadership of nu at national, regional or local levels. such big names should be mentioned here such as k.h. abdullah syatori of pesantren arjawinangun, k.h. amin sepuh of pesantren babakan ciwaringin, k.h. abbas of pesantren buntet, and k.h. abdul halim baribis of leuwimunding, majalengka (sujati 2019a). they played pivotal roles in expanding nu through the pesantren-based networks and their intellectual chains. k.h. abbas of pesantren buntet was a former pupil of k.h. hasyim asy’ari of pesantren tebuireng as well as rois akbar (supreme leaders) of nu. he used the pesantren buntet-based pesantren networks and its alumni chains to set up tens of nu branches in areas of the former cirebon residency. in its development, nu cirebon showed its persistence in defending its religious views against reformist circles. for instance, k.h. abdul khair of nu came to the stage in a religious debate versus k.h. ahmad sanusi of persatuan islam (persis). this debate was held on 19 june 1932 in ciledug, cirebon. the main topics of the debate were the necessity of returning to the qur’an and hadith, the obligatory ijtihad and the prohibition of taqlid and some religious rituals considered to be heretical. the debate itself was led by h. agus salim of the central board of psii and h. alimoen as a note taker of the psii of the cirebon branch (purnama, lubis, and widyonugrahanto 2017). another religious debate took place in gebang, cirebon, on 31 may 31 1936 between the same two mass-based organizations along with al-irsyad. on this occasion, there were three debaters of nu, namely k.h. masduqi, h. abdul khair and awad basit. from the opposing sides, there were a. hasan and h. moehsin of persis, and h. aliman of al-irsyad (purnama, lubis, and widyonugrahanto 2017). despite facing challenges and opposition, nu succeeded in cementing its influence in the areas of cirebon residency, particularly through pesantren and its alumni networks. 77didin nurul rosidin, et al. it is noted that, in the early 20th century, muslim social movements emerged and flourished in indonesia through various mass-based organizations. they were characterized by different and even conflicting notions in a variety of fields, mainly religious ones, among their leaders and supporters. yet, attempts to unify those notions were not absent. in fact, at the end of the 1930s, a dream to see the unity of muslims came to reality when different organizations agreed to set up a sort of federative organization named majelis islam ‘ala indonesia (miai) on 29 september 1937. this took place in surabaya with some prominent figures being the main actors behind the scene such as k.h. mas mansur of muhammadiyah, k.h. muhammad dahlan and kiai wahab hasbullah of nu, and wondoamiseno of sarekat islam. the establishment of miai was aimed at bringing together all muslim-based organizations so that they could openly discuss important issues for the ultimate benefit of islam and muslims (noer 1982). the unity spirit was soon widespread among muslim society including those in cirebon. however, this favourable circumstance was short-lived following the arrival of the japanese occupation that forced muslim leaders to dismantle miai in 1942. factors contributed to the emergence of the cirebon islamic social movements some factors contributed to the emergence of muslim social movements in cirebon in the form of social organizations as described above and their impacts on the development of muslim resistance in cirebon and then indonesia. table 1 shows factors and triggers that contributed to the emergence of muslim social movements in cirebon and the impacts of these movements on the rise of the resistance movement against the dutch colonial rule. 78 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1, 2022 table 1 factors, triggers, and impacts of the cirebon islamic social movements no factors triggers impacts 1 the ethical policy the formation of the cheribon gemeente on 1 april 1906 based on staadsblad van nederlandsche indie no. 150/1906(majid 2021) • government bureaucracy was under the full control of europeans • the economy and trade were controlled and dominated by foreign europeans and easterners • cheribon gemeente focused on improving the city’s infrastructure • indigenous people’s welfare was neglected • education and teaching for indigenous people were not a priority • the birth of landform in 1918 2 disputes between reformist and traditionalist groups in religious ideas the emergence of a group of muslim reformers in cirebon in the early 20th century (feillard 1999) • the spread of the ideas of returning to the quran and hadith as the only valid sources and disregarding other sources by the ulama of the past • frictions between reformist and traditionalist groups • the strengthening of traditional islamic teachings in the inner circle of the cirebonbased sultanate families 79didin nurul rosidin, et al. 3 the emergence of a new awareness of the need for political independence among native elites the social, political, economic, and educational conditions of the cirebon people were in danger following several economic and health outbreaks • the emergence of various social resistance movements • the awakening of awareness among native traders • the awakening of intellectual consciousness among natives • the awakening of consciousness among scholars (rosidin 2017) • kedondong war 1810-1812 led by bagus rangin (farhan, widya wardani, and saptodewo 2020) 4 the strengthening of the pesantrenbased networks the continuing development of pesantren and the rise of modern islamic schools in cirebon and its surroundings • the strengthening of solidarity between pesantren, kyai, and santri • the emergence of young muslim intellectuals as future leaders with pesantren background • the strengthening of islam as the ideology of resistance against the colonial government as seen in table 1, point 4 seems to be appropriately underlined, as it shows the continuity of the various developments of muslims in cirebon. since the beginning of islamisation in the indonesian archipelago, cirebon has been one of the centres of islamic intellectual networks and islamisation with leading figures such as syekh hasanudin, syekh 80 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1, 2022 nurjati and syekh bayanullah (sujati 2019b; rosidin 2018b). these three muslim preachers had arrived at the shore of cirebon before the rise of those so-called walisongo in java. in the following periods, the prominence of cirebon in the context of the ulama network continued with the rise of the palace as its centre until the end of the 17th century (el-mawa 2012). the fall of the palaces under the hand of the colonial government had insignificant impacts on the development of the ulama networks. this could be discerned in the rise of pesantren-based scholars such as kiyai muqoyyim of buntet, kiyai jatira of ciwaringin, kiyai romli of balerante and kiai sholeh zamzami of benda kerep (rosidin 2014). this pesantren-based ulama network later played as the backbone of various physical resistance movements in cirebon throughout the 19th century. following the changing mode of muslim resistance movements in the early 20th century, the pesantren-based ulama network in cirebon continued to be limelight through such great figures as kiyai abbas, kiyai abdul halim, and kiai toyyib. therefore, it is not surprising that with all this background including its role as a centre of islamisation, cirebon is considered to have played a pivotal role in the emergence and development of muslim resistance movements against the dutch colonial rule in java and even the indonesian archipelago. conclusion this article has shown that historically cirebon played a pivotal role in the development of muslims in the dutch east indies. after its transformation into the status of the gemeente on 1 april 1906, cirebon experienced a variety of developments in different sectors of society such as economic, political, social, religious, environmental, and health. the transformation of cirebon from an agricultural to an industrial city made it a magnet for employment in the surrounding areas. in addition, the construction of infrastructure to support the development of cirebon, which became the main focus of the government at that time, contributed to this development. historically, cirebon was a centre of islamic civilization in java, especially the western part of the island, particularly from the early periods of islamization in the indonesian archipelago to the early 20th century. thus, cirebon has played an important role in the dynamics of muslim social movements in indonesia. the city was impossible to avoid being embarked by the ongoing dynamics of muslim movements, both at the national and international levels. the dynamics of muslim social movements in cirebon were driven by the ethical policy made by the dutch east indies colonial government, tensions between reformist and traditionalist groups, the emergence of awareness among native elites, and 81didin nurul rosidin, et al. the strengthening of the pesantren-based network. what characterizes the social movements of muslims in 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sejak berdiri hingga pemilu 2009.” asyahid journal of islamic and quranic studies (ajiqs) 1 (1). 84 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1, 2022 purnama, agung, nina herlina lubis, and widyonugrahanto. 2017. “pergulatan pemikiran kiai nahdlatul ulama dengan kaum modernis islam di jawa barat (1930-1937).” patanjala 9 (2):291743. rosidin, didin nurul. 2014. “ulama paska sunan gunung jati: studi atas sejarah dan jaringan intelektual cirebon pada abad ke 16 hingga abad ke 18.” cirebon. rosidin, didin nurul. 2017. “ulama pasca sunan gunung jati: jaringan intelektual islam cirebon abad ke-16 sampai dengan abad ke18.” jsw (jurnal sosiologi walisongo) 1 (2). rosidin, didin nurul. 2018a. “membela islam mathla’ul anwar di arus tengah perubahan agama sosial, budaya, dan politik di indonesia.” cv elsi pro. rosidin, didin nurul. 2018b. “syekh nurjati sang peletak dasar islam awal di cirebon.” bandung: rajawali press. saefullah, asep. 2017. “kh abdul halim dan gagasan pendidikan 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nationstate indonesia.” jurnal al adyaan jurnal sosial dan agama 5 (02):167–92. wildan, dadan. 2003. sunan gunung jati antara fiksi dan fakta: pembumian islam dengan pendekatan struktural dan kultural. bandung: humaniora utama press. 85didin nurul rosidin, et al. author biography didin nurul rosidin, ph.d. is vice director of the postgraduate program of iain syekh nurjati cirebon, indonesia. he finished his phd at leiden university, the netherlands. he has published numerous publications on history and islamic movements in indonesia. among his notable works are “the rise of the at-taqwa as the grand mosque and authority contested in cirebon indonesia”, journal of islamic architecture 7(1), 2022; “muslim fundamentalism in education institutions: a case study of rohani islam in high schools in cirebon, ” in islam in indonesia: contrasting images and interpretations, edited by jajat burhanudin and kees van dijk, amsterdam university, 2013; “in search of true religiosity: the conversion experience of two jemaat ahmadiyah,” international journal of multicultural and multireligious understanding 9(1), 2022; “islam, ahmadiyah and the government: unresolved religious conflicts in manis lor kuningan, west java,” teologia: jurnal ilmu-ilmu ushuluddin 21(1), 2010; and “pesantren and modernity in indonesia: ma’had aly of kuningan,” hunafa: jurnal studia islamika 9(2), 2012. 86 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1, 2022 alternative imaginations: confronting and challenging the persistent centrism in social media-society research journal of asian social science research 2022, vol. 4, no. 1: 1-22 https://cassr.net/jassr/ © the author(s) 2022 article merlyna lim* carleton university, canada abstract this article attempts to intervene the current trend in social media research that, to a certain degree, reflects the centrality of technology. beyond the broad trend of technocentrism, i identify and outline four other major oversights or challenges in researching the social media/ society relationship, namely online data centrism, moment centrism, novelty centrism, and success centrism. stemmed from these four types of centrism, i offer an alternative imagination, namely a set of alternative pathways in social media research that value histories and historical context, interdisciplinarity, longue durée, and complexity. by revealing these oversights, this article aims to contribute to our collective attempt to interrogate the relationship between social media and society (and technology/society) critically. this alternative imagination might help animate, reveal, and make transparent various societal dynamics that otherwise would be invisible and, thus, might contribute to a better, deeper, and more comprehensive understanding of the technology/ society relationship. key words technocentrism, social media research, technology and society, alternative imaginations * contact: professor merlyna lim, canada research chair in digital media and global network society, school of journalism and communication, carleton university, ottawa, on, canada. e-mail: merlyna.lim@carleton.ca introduction: technocentrism in social media research it was the month of march 2022. i wrote this article under the shadow of a long covid-19 pandemic that has just entered its third year and another global event that took the world by storm, the russian invasion of ukraine. for these two events, media commentaries about social media platforms, written both by journalists and academic writers, have primarily focused on how the platform facilitated misinformation and conspiracy theories around covid-19 and the invasion of ukraine (e.g., falcon 2022; ling 2 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1, 2022 2022; schreiber 2022). this trend seems to be a continuation of earlier conversations that we had seen several years before the pandemic, albeit on different events. indeed, in the last several years, notably since the 2016 u.s. presidential elections and the cambridge analytica scandal, media commentaries on social media’s negative impacts and implications have surged. media pundits have blamed social media for emboldening rightwing, populist, and authoritarian narratives in various political events, including the victory of trump in the united states (grassegger and krogerus 2017; rosenberg et al. 2017), the brexit campaign in the united kingdom (scott 2018), the reigns of duterte in the philippines (bbc trending 2016) and modi in india (ayed and jenser 2019), and the success of bolsonaro’s presidential campaign in brazil (the economist 2019). media commentaries are meant to provide quick, immediate insights into social phenomena. in media, reductionist, singularity, and deterministic tendencies are not exceptions to the rule. academic publications, which are naturally much slower than media, expectedly reveal more nuanced analysis. yet, they, too, reflect a similar trend. since the mid-2010s, academic insights on social media in socio-political areas have been primarily focused on the adverse implications of the technologies. social media are implicated in spreading misinformation, disinformation, fake news, and conspiracy theories; proliferating racist and discriminatory messages; facilitating populism and extremism; exacerbating sociopolitical polarisation and divides; and undermining democracy (e.g., cesarino 2020; castaño-pulgarín et al. 2021; tucker et al. 2017; shu et al. 2021; vaidhyanathan 2018). this tendency stands in contrast to the trend of scholarly analysis of social media in the early 2010s. following the mena (the middle east and north africa) uprisings, academic discourse primarily focused on the role of social media with analyses that “overestimate the role of technology” (fuchs 2012:387) and were criticised as being technologically deterministic (aouragh and alexander 2011; fuchs 2012; alrasheed 2017). alrasheed’s (2017) systematic research on journal articles published on the mena and iranian uprisings, notably in political science, sociology, and communication and media studies, reveals that the majority of these writings reproduced technological utopianism. they collectively viewed what unravelled in the arab countries through the “progressive notion of revolution”, namely “the belief a revolution is relatively short and should generate conditions superior to previous ones” in conjunction “with the belief that technology is part of progress” (alrasheed 2017:231). such a lens, alrasheed (2017:231) further argues, has energised “the notion that new communication technologies revolutionise, make, enhance, or replace 3merlyna lim the path to democracy in the region of mena”. i concur with alrasheed (2017) that by exploring the complex phenomena through the technological utopian lens, such a discourse “hinders the production of the production of exegetic frameworks that informatively evaluate the mena movements and their interactions with technology” and “generates stories with less human action and less history” (alrasheed 2017:237). in response to what has unravelled globally in the last decade, some scholars take a longer view arguing that social media has transitioned from a platform for progressive activism and a force for democracy to one of facilitating regressive actions and proliferation of disand misinformation (e.g., sinpeng and tapsell 2020). it is crucial to point out that much of these debates echo much earlier scholarly discourse following the proliferation of the internet throughout the 1990s and each debate concerning the introduction of new media in media history. discourses on earlier technologies, from telegraph to telephone, radio, and television, underwent similar paths with the amnesiac and ahistorical shift from utopian to dystopian tones. however, on closer and more longitudinal empirical examination, it becomes apparent that the relationship between any technology, including social media, and society is always complex and essentially does not fit the progressive-to-regressive scenario discussed above. on the contrary, early works on the internet in various empirical contexts, including my own, demonstrated that even in the late 1990s, uncivil and regressive practices were already embedded in digital media usage (lim 2002, 2005; bräuchler 2013). for example, in the 1990s, the early static internet was not only appropriated by progressive movements such as the zapatista in chiapasmexico (froehling 1997) and the battle of seattle protests (eagletonpierce 2001), but also by far-right groups such as the stormfront, a neonazi internet forum focused on propagating white nationalism (back et al. 1996). there has been an exponential growth of scholars researching the impact of facebook, twitter, youtube, instagram, tiktok, and any other social media platforms. as a result, publications in information studies, communication and media studies, and relevant fields now comprise a swollen bibliography of research about trending topics on social media in various empirical contexts. many of these studies focus on social media’s roles, impacts, and effects and make a direct/indirect causality or strong correlation to its impact on society, whether utopian or dystopian, positive or negative. observably, the research focus—which largely determines the selection of the case, the phenomena, and/or the context—to a certain 4 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1, 2022 degree, has encoded the possible direction of the research outcomes. for example, studies that focus on the role and impact of social media in progressive phenomena or for progressive usage or movements eventually end up formulating a positive association between technological uses and a set of progressive values and/or characteristics such as civic participation, freedom of speech, social awareness, and citizen empowerment. similarly, studies focusing on regressive phenomena/usage, too, tend to find a positive correlation/association between the usage of technology and negative outcomes such as deepening polarisation, aiding the proliferation of hate and discriminatory speeches, and facilitating disinformation and misinformation. further, scholars who study progressive usages and movements, in general, rarely look at the other side, namely, the regressive ones. likewise, scholars who dedicated themselves to studying antidemocratic events, groups, and phenomena, such as those who called themselves scholars of terrorist studies, also primarily focus merely on the dark side of politics. as such, their studies tend to perpetuate a dystopian view of technology. at the heart of both sides is the centrality of technology. by focusing on the “impact”, “roles”, and “effect” of the technology, these studies tend to privilege the position of technology in social explanations. the extreme form of this technological determinism views technological platforms such as social media as the decisive force, the prime actors that shape social relations and cause social change (matthewman 2011:15). while not taking social media as the prime cause, the more moderate ones still formulate their frameworks around the active roles of technology in society, community, and individuals. as succinctly pointed out by rodriguez et al. (2014), many of these studies reduce the richly contextual human relations surrounding media use into flat, unrevealing technological determinism. in other words, they privilege the technological features and constructs and subsequently render human agency invisible. and by so doing, the technological determinism in research push for the anti-human conceptualisation of technology. however, i do not necessarily argue for the opposite approach, namely humanist theories that privilege the absolute role of society/ people. in the humanist approach, which is sometimes referred to as social constructionism or (socio)cultural determinism, humans take a central role as the main actors (matthewman 2011:15). in this approach, technology is simply an extension of human users. therefore, a technological system such as social media is viewed as merely a neutral artefact that is malleable, ready to be moulded by the hands of its users. this view simplifies the relationship between society and technology into a popular but partial catchphrase “guns don’t kill people; people kill people”. 5merlyna lim it is essential to clarify that most social studies of social media do not fall into the crudest and simplest form of either anti-humanist or humanist approach. some, however, revolve around these approaches and thus are at risk of being reductionist and partial. in dealing with the binary, i am positioning myself with a stream of scholars who see the relationship between technology and society as an integrated sociotechnical system. we do not need to choose between privileging the role of society/ humans or the role of technology. instead, we can adopt a posthumanist approach that advocates “distributed agency”, namely “the idea that humans and technologies (and a host of others) have agency and create their effects” (matthewman 2011:19). echoing matthewman (2011), here we can transgress the technology/society binary and, instead, turn into a dialectical relationship between the two that can be conceived as “coagency, collective production and interaction” (matthewman 2011:19), “co-shaping” (verbeek 2005), or “mutual shaping” (boczkowski 1999).1 my aim here is not to propose a new theoretical framework or approach to challenge the technology/society binary. instead, i ground my intervention in this debate pragmatically by discussing how such a binary is rendered legible in the current trend of social research on social media. beyond the broad trend of technocentrism, i identify and outline four other major oversights or challenges in researching the relationship between social media (and communication technologies in general) and society, namely online data centrism, moment centrism, novelty centrism, and success centrism. when needed, they are illustrated by empirical snapshots from various places in the world, including indonesia. my inclusion of the indonesian context is a conscious choice as i consider that the journal’s reader comprises primarily indonesian scholars and social sciences students. beyond identifying the oversights, i also attempt to chart alternative pathways in researching the relationship between digital media, particularly social media, and society by offering an alternative imagination that might help animate, reveal, and make transparent various societal dynamics that otherwise would be invisible. finally, on the ontological level, i wish to engage with and contribute to the broader conversation that challenges and transgresses the technology-society binary. online data centrism: data mining and big data analytics trends in social media research a study on 1632 papers in the web of science database from 1990 to 2013 by zhang et al. (2015) found that social media studies had developed rapidly, especially after 2008. their analysis reveals that the pre-2008 study was related to journalism and social problems such as social capital, anti-war 6 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1, 2022 movements, people’s relationships, and health (zhang et al. 2015:1145). since 2008, however, they have predominantly concentrated on studying users’ connections and networks. their analysis of citation and reference practices shows that most references were introduced in frequency and burst. further, they argue that “most researchers are still focusing on fundamental works on social media instead of studying deeply on branches of this field … social media knowledge has not been transferred enough” (zhang et al. 2015:1146). meanwhile, an earlier and much more extensive study of 27,349 internet studies articles between 2000 and 2009 in the social sciences and the arts and humanities citation indexes by peng et al. (2013) found that the field has primarily focused on the internet usage patterns (and their relationship to specific behaviours/attitudes/effects) and networks. this study also found that only 21% cited theoretical works and 59% of the conducted research used quantitative methods (peng et al. 2013). these studies do not capture the more recent evolution in social media research. observably, however, this early trend has influenced the subsequent development of social media research. my limited scan of selected 100 articles studying social media and society in the indonesian context published between 2018 and 2021 demonstrates that the earlier trend is not only confirmed but also amplified. utilising data mining as the primary method, the majority of the publications rely on the ‘reading’ and ‘mapping’ of patterns and connections among social media messages and users as their methodological framework to explain the social phenomenon. hence, data mining takes a central stage as the most popular method. social media data-driven research has become popular and even mainstream in academia, mainly due to the public availability and ease of access to such data. advances in big data and deep learning have paved the way for the developing methods of information extraction and data analytics on social media platforms. large-scale computational analysis of online data has unsurprisingly become the foundational approach to studying social media dynamics in computer science, information science, and cognate fields such as human-computer interactions. however, beyond these fields, “the obsession with quantification, the use of computation in the social sciences and big data have also manifested itself as a preoccupation with attempts to develop new digital methods in both the humanities and social sciences” (fuchs 2017:39). some research grant institutes, such as those in the united kingdom, associate social media research with big data analytics (fuchs 2017:39). from data journalism to digital humanities, big data and open data have become buzzwords for many funding initiatives on social science and humanities not only in europe and north america, 7merlyna lim but also in developing countries such as brazil, india, and indonesia. thus, in the last decade, large repositories of online users’ data, particularly traces of users’ interactions, have become a gold mine for social science and humanities researchers studying social media. big data-based research is seductive that it construes mythology; there is the “widespread belief that large data sets offer a higher form of intelligence and knowledge that can generate insights that were previously impossible, with the aura of truth, objectivity and accuracy” (boyd and crawford 2012:663). as such, big data analytics reinforce the “illusion of informational comprehensiveness, representativeness, and trustworthiness”, which, in turn, “tend to be held as ontological foundation, guiding, and shaping scientific knowledge and its public diffusion” (soares 2018:170). social media data-driven studies are helpful in that they allow us to document patterns, nodes, and connections among messages and users and, thus, can provide us with insights into the formation of networks. however, these insights do necessarily yield accurate, meaningful, or comprehensive explanations. kitchin (2014:5) argues that “data are examined through a particular lens that influences how they are interpreted” and that “correlations between variables within a data set can be random in nature and have no or little causal association.” further, big data analytics is problematic in the way that “it often does not connect statistical and computational research results to a broader analysis of human meanings, interpretations, experiences, attitudes, moral values, ethical dilemmas, uses, contradictions and macro-sociological implications of social media” (fuchs 2017: 40). hence, i do not advocate dismissing data mining, especially big data analytics, from our research repertoire. rather, i call for decentring its place and repositioning it as one of many possible methods in social media research. more importantly, i insist that we need to understand the limitation of this method and recognise that these types of data are inadequate for answering complex questions that deal with cultural and social dynamics, power and resistance, and other societal processes that shape and influence how we utilise social media. moment centrism: preoccupation with the moment, neglecting historical context social media data-driven studies, both quantitatively and qualitatively, are particularly valuable in capturing a moment and/or an event whose data are made visible in a specific time and space, notably through the emergence of associated keywords and #hashtags. facebook and twitter have become the most popular research sites. further, hashtag-driven 8 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1, 2022 studies, especially on twitter, have become one of the most popular types of social and humanities studies on social media. in addition to big data analytics, qualitative methods employing content and discourse analysis of tweets collected within a specific timeframe on a particular event have been customarily utilised. terms such as tweet-activism, hashtag activism, hashtag feminism, hashtag feminist-activism, and hashtag discourse/discursive activism emerge as keywords of such studies. this type of research has its currency and values. the concern here is not about the method itself but the prevalence and homogeneity of this research framework in the field. regardless of the method chosen, whether quantitative or qualitative, big data or small data analysis, there is a broad tendency to focus on a single phenomenon, narrowly examined from the capture of data originated in a certain moment, and thus miss society’s big picture. such a trend in social media research perpetuates moment centrism, which reads a complex phenomenon from what transpires during a brief period rather than interrogates it as an outcome of longitudinal and historical societal dynamics. every moment has a history. a robust explanation of how and why a particular moment is created cannot be found in the moment itself but originated in the past. what is notably missing from a moment centrism is a historical context. specific to the field of communication for social change, rodriguez et al. (2014) highlight the “need for research that takes seriously the idea” that media and communication technologies “are used within historical conditions” (p. 153). by taking historical context into account, we can potentially “explore how media technologies are bent in specific ways according to local power dynamics, level of expertise, cultural negotiations, and social interactions” (rodriguez et al. 2014:153) —all of these contribute to a deeper and robust understanding of the relationship between social media and society. moment centrism, in addition to techno centrism, has prompted to dominant but misleading views i discussed earlier, such as one that saw the mena uprisings in 2010-2011 as spontaneous and driven mainly by social media and the other that cast social media as the main instrument for the global rise of right-wing populism in the more recent years. the tunisian uprising, for example, was not a spontaneous movement and was not fuelled by facebook. it was years in the making and went through many smaller-scale and even failed mobilisations (lim 2013). similarly, the recent public visibility of far-right groups, through online and inperson collective actions, in the united states, canada, and europe, was 9merlyna lim not spontaneous but a culmination of years of networking and propaganda works (lim and rigato 2022). to further illustrate the practice of moment centrism, let us look at an indonesian example, namely the transparency of the voting system in the 2014 (and 2019) presidential elections in indonesia. the 2014 election was the first election subjected to a high level of openness where the public was very much involved in the process. many academic and media commentaries too quickly credited this to the spontaneous outburst of citizen participation, notably the outsized role of kawal pemilu. translated as “guard the election”, kawal pemilu was a close voluntarybased crowdsourcing initiative that attempted to document vote tally manually and release the count result on its website in real-time. calling kawal pemilu members “election tech fighters” and “keyboard warriors” and framing their actions within an “electronic democracy” or “digital democracy” framework, media and scholarly discussions on social media and the 2014 election tended to idealise online citizen participation (lukman 2014; bland 2019; grigg 2019; febriansyah et al. 2020; sukartini 2020). this tendency elevates citizen initiatives such as kawal pemilu into an ideal, heroic, and even mythical entity that spontaneously emerged mainly due to the “power” of social media. these discussions reflect not only technocentrism but also the preoccupation with the moment itself. there is no doubt that online monitoring initiatives such as kawal pemilu have their currency in one of the most important political events in the country, the presidential election. as a researcher who was among the most active volunteers of the kawal pemilu, i can attest that the dedication of some volunteers in this initiative was indeed impressive. the initiative itself, along with some other citizen initiatives, contributed to making the election more transparent and accountable. however, it is misleading to view the public availability and transparency of electoral data resulting merely from a spontaneous upsurge of social media-driven citizen engagement. it is important to point out that the citizen monitoring of voting data was only made possible due to the online availability of the official data released by the general elections commission. further, it is significant to understand that the high level of transparency of the 2014 (and 2019) presidential election cannot be separated from years of open data activism involving tremendous hard work, struggles, and many failed negotiations, errors, and conflicts that can be traced back to at least the mid-1990s. the persistent activism eventually pushed the government to issue the 2008 public information disclosure act (undang-undang keterbukaan informasi publik no.14/2008), which gives the public the 10 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1, 2022 right to request information and access government documents. specific to the election, open data activists from the open-source movements had been trying to push the government to make the election data available since the 2004 election. while the 2008 law has not been exercised to its fullest extent, the online publication of the electoral voting data was one of some attempts to observe this law. momentous social media events are worth researching. social media research focusing on a single phenomenon, if robust, may yield some understanding of the relationship between technology and society. however, researchers need to be aware of the limitation of such a study, especially if the explanation solely originated in the capture of data collected from a particular moment in space and time, such as in hashtag-driven or facebook group-driven studies. to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between social media and society, the study needs to be anchored in larger social contexts and historical conditions. further, it may also necessitate shifting focus from the moment or the phenomenon itself to the processes that contribute to associated (societal) changes. novelty centrism: preoccupation with the “new” and “newness” i concur with menke and schwarzenegger’s (2019) statement that “it is an old, yet, accurate observation that the ‘newness’ of media is and most probably will continue to be a catalyst for research in media and communication studies” (p. 657). specific to studies of social and political implications of social media, research publicised “new politics of food” (phillipov 2017), “new politics in the middle east” (katz 2019), “new politics of party organisation” (dommett et al. 2021), “new politics of extremism” (mann and ornstein 2016), “new forms of rioting” (baker 2011), and many other “new politics”. i neither oppose nor disagree with using the term “new politics” in these studies. some of these authors indeed reveal social, cultural, or political dynamics and arrangements that challenge or alter the “old” ones and therefore appropriately employ the term “new politics”. beyond these studies, in this section, i question, problematise, and caution our tendency to be novelty centrism, focusing on and being preoccupied with the “newness” of the so-called “new” technology. it is understandable that the emergence of something new, especially if it is a new technology for the mass, as reflected in the global ubiquitous of social media platforms, would scratch our inquisitiveness and prompt us to seek something new. however, such a curiosity typically comes with an assumption that the new thing would challenge the existing practices, norms, or even values. and thus, this conjecture may lead us to ask the same 11merlyna lim old same old question. for every new technology, we have been asking whether this technology makes us more social or not. does it promote democracy or not? does it deepen inequality or not? and other questions that represent binary thinking. to a certain degree, these questions, too, may trap us in similarly broad and polarised answers between the positive and the negative, the optimists and the pessimists, the utopian and the dystopian. however, while critical of novelty centrism, i am not advocating for anti-newness views. it is important to remember that newness is relative to place, time, and societal context. every technology was once new. as we cannot recognise something as new without defining it in comparison with “the old”, therefore, it is easy to be preoccupied with the newness itself rather than interrogating an associated artefact as a more complex entity that may offer a mix of old, new, and everything in between. arguably, old and new media continually intertwine and remediate each other (bolter and grusin 1999), leaving a shifting and sometimes arbitrary picture of novelty and oldness in the process (acland 2007). therefore, old and new should be considered in a relational framework, which is not about the characteristic of media as such but rather the way people perceive and imagine them (natale 2016). in line with this framework is the notion of “remediation” coined by bolter and grusin (1999). they argue that each new medium undergoes a process of refashioning old media or at least one older medium, retaining some of its features while discarding others. here, remediation is “the way which one medium is seen by our culture as reforming or involving upon another” (bolter and grusin 2016:59). research on the digital media/society relationship is neither the domain of media scholars nor social scientists and humanities scholars specialising in media. nearly all disciplines in social sciences and humanities have incorporated the new media, notably social media. further, other fields—information science, education, human-computer interaction, and economics—have become interested in tapping into this relatively new area of research. over twenty years ago, when i started researching and publishing on the relationship between the internet and politics in indonesia, scholarly writings on the topic were a rarity.2 at that moment, digital technology was seen as external to socio-political dynamics. scholars in indonesian studies, or the so-called indonesianists, had not included this technology in their existing studies. however, scholars in communication and media studies, especially those examining the empirical context of the united states and western european countries, have written extensively on the socio-political implications of the internet. as scholars in areas where such a media was previously absent started tapping into “digital research”, 12 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1, 2022 there had been successive waves of excitement about the “newness” of digital media from the static internet to social media, largely driven by the fact that such a focus was new in their associated discipline. research of “new media” in varied disciplines in social science and humanities and beyond has been valuable in enriching our understanding of the relationship between such media and society. however, as sonia livingstone (2004) had already warned us nearly two decades ago, it is crucial to not fall “into the hyperbolic discourse of ‘the new’ and, thus, neglecting historical continuities and reinventing the wheel of media and communication research” (livingstone 2004:75). instead, it is essential to continuously reflect on historical and ideological dimensions of “newness” and “media” in studying social media platforms and any “new” media that will come along in the future. beyond that, it is also imperative to “ask what the new media are in their variety and plurality” (livingstone and lievrouw 2006:12). in this context, i find a set of questions formulated by livingstone and lievrouw (2006) particularly useful in our attempt to frame the “newness” of media better. instead of being preoccupied with the new technical features of social media and how these may challenge old sociopolitical arrangements, we may ask: new textual experiences, new ways of representing the world, new relationships between subjects (users and consumers) and media technologies, new experiences of the relationship between embodiment, identity, and community, new conceptions of the biological body’s relationship to technological media; and new pattern of organisation and production (livingstone and lievrouw 2006:12-13). success centrism: preoccupation with visible, prominent, and successful events evidently, social media research tends to focus on successful cases, visible moments, and events. scholars and media observers are seduced by how fast people unite under a certain symbolic act and perform collective actions online—mass tweeting under a particular hashtag, communally changing their profile, or collectively tiktok-ing a specific issue. while successful3 and visible events are in themselves important subjects for research, the tendency to privilege them fails to address complex and multiple realities of social media/society relationships. for example, in the case of social media activism in indonesia, journalists, scholars, and observers have generally focused on prominent cases deemed successful such as the coin for prita4 and save kpk movements5, the #shameonyousby campaign6, kawal pemilu, aksi bela islam 2127, among others. these are exemplary cases of social media 13merlyna lim activism that are worth researching. typically, these cases have been explored to shed light on the relationship between social media affordances and democracy. it is important to note that “exemplary cases are known, used, and reused because the case itself stands out as unique in some ways, regardless of the quality of the accounts about them” (morgan 2019:6). to clarify, i am not dismissive of using a single case/phenomenon in research. while being mindful of its non or limited contribution to the formal generalisation of knowledge, context-dependent knowledge gathered from a robust exploration of such a case is highly valuable. the knowledge that cannot be formally generalised, such as in the case of a purely descriptive phenomenological case study, can certainly be part of the collective process of knowledge accumulation in a given field or society. however, as success centrism prevails, we may be at risk of being partial in our understanding of technology/society relationships. going back to the case of indonesia, studies of successful social media activism cases typically come up with positive conclusions on the role of social media in mobilisation, activism, social change, and even democracy. however, the success centrism, which is typically accompanied by or overlapped with techno, moment, and online data centrism, may hinder researchers from seeing a broader context. in this milieu, we, the researchers, would be at risk of being trapped in a technologically deterministic framework and thus, do not gain a deep understanding of how, why, and under what conditions social media can be effectively used in mobilising issues. instead of focusing on exemplary cases, i advocate for doing exemplary accounts of a wider range of cases by exploring not only successful and prominent ones, but also obscure and mundane ones, and those that fail. what do we learn about the “thingness” of technologies when they fail to function? what would we reveal about the relationship between people and “things” from the story of failure? and, more poignantly, what might we learn about our misunderstandings and misperceptions about “things” when they cannot or will not fulfil our expectations? in my work (lim 2013), by looking not only at prominent cases such as coin for prita and save kpk movements but also at the cases that failed to generate mass support such as the lapindo and ahmadiyah cases, i gained a broader and deeper understanding about the complexity and dynamics of social media/society relationship. notably, i found that social media activism generates “many clicks, little sticks” phenomenon, pointing to the reality that the majority of social media activism failed to achieve critical mobilisation. further, the social media environment 14 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1, 2022 is not neutral but is bound to disparity and is subjected to domination. conversations and information that dominate social media reflect its users’ interests, choices, and preferences; issues propagated by mainstream media that engage urban middle-class interest receive the most coverage. despite the propensity of social media to promote radical transparency and to diffuse issues in multiple networks, activism around cases that represent the interests of the poor and marginalised communities tends to fail to reach critical mass. additionally, comparing both failed and successful activisms, i also learned that successful activisms were typically framed in a populist8 binary framework of people against the corrupt elites as in the battle of david versus goliath. the ascendancy of the populist binary framework is one of the main characteristics of prominent social media activism. the success of kawal pemilu, for example, was not replicated by kawal pilkada despite the involvement of the same group of leaders and volunteers and the utilisation of the same technological application. the differing outcomes of these two initiatives cannot be simply explained by differences in scales, scopes, and contexts of the two elections (pemilu is national while pilkada is regional/ local). the strong narrative of crisis that framed the 2014 presidential election in a binary framework of jokowi versus prabowo or, in many indonesians’ minds, the battle between the good versus the bad (or even the evil) was not entrenched in regional and local elections. as most jokowi supporters can attest, any voluntary project to support jokowi at that moment was indeed framed within the absolute fight for democracy, for “the good” and “good people” (orang baik). while its “volunteers demonstrated their impartial stance in words and deeds”, virtually nearly all kawal pemilu volunteers were pro-jokowi who, to a certain degree, saw their voluntarism in the same light, in the fight for good against evil. this fact certainly does not lessen the vital contribution kawal pemilu made in increasing the quality of the procedural democracy in indonesia in 2014. however, this small but essential detail might help us understand the differing realities of two similar voluntary projects, kawal pemilu and kawal pilkada, and can serve as a focal point to further research and reveal the complexities of both initiatives. “success” label that we attach to technology, i argue, involves a complex and contingent tangle of social, cultural, political, economic, and material factors. studies of unsuccessful cases and the cases of failure and breakage open an opportunity to tease out various factors that might and might not contribute to the success scenario. so, here i argue that we need to consider the significance of failure in recognising how societal 15merlyna lim arrangements around the materiality of technology as well as the content (uses and appropriations) might contribute differently to the outcomes. beyond the success or failure, ultimately, we need studies of the everyday, the mundane, and the insignificant, as the notion of everyday life is key to our understanding of power relations, resistance, and socio-political arrangements and dynamics in our contemporary society (lefebvre 1961; de certeau 1984). alternative imagination: embracing the interdisciplinarity, the longue durée, and the complexity to reiterate what i have stated in the introduction, it is not my intention to propose a new theory or approach to challenge the technology/society binary in studying the relationship between social media and society. instead, i have identified challenges or, in other words, several notable and persistent centrism, namely technocentrism, online data centrism, moment centrism, novelty centrism, and success centrism, that have obscured the complexity of social media/society relationship. hence, inspired and informed by other scholars who have been tirelessly generating critical discourse against technological determinism9, i offer an alternative imagination that may be useful in moving research away from the binary technological/social determinism. stemmed from the five types of centrism i have outlined, such an alternative imagination, first, locates the technology not at the centre as in technocentrism, but in its right place, in its dialectical relationship with users, people, community, and society. hence, it is crucial to shift the focus from the role or impact of the technological artefact to the process instead. the shifting focus to process affords us two adjoining routes. first, it will hinder us from inaccurately assigning an active role to technology (while treating society/ people as a passive entity). and second, it will help us start seeing both technology and society as co-shapers of their relationship; neither is inferior nor superior to the other. second, in response to online data (and big data) centrism, it considers alternative methodological pathways that may not always be popular, visible, or entrenched in our discipline or area studies. here, i see the value of an interdisciplinary methodological framework or methodological pluralism (topper 2005), namely alternative approaches for drawing productively on multiple methodological traditions, which include but are not limited to creative mixes of quantitative and qualitative methods, online and in-person observations, big and small data approaches. third, instead of focusing on moments such as in moment centrism, the alternative imagination calls for the reading of a moment 16 journal of asian social science research vol. 4, no. 1, 2022 within the time continuum, where a visible moment is read as part of a series of moments, visible and invisible ones, across time and space. here, we see the need to contextualise moments and events within a historical context. to put it bluntly, here i call for privileging the longue durée over the moment-centric approach and, further, for bravely bringing tedious and unpopular longitudinal research into the rapidly growing studies of social media. fourth, i caution the social media research’s preoccupation with the “newness” of the “new” technology or novelty centrism. echoing livingstone (2004), i invite research in any discipline to value historical continuities in media and communication research, to continuously quest historical and ideological dimensions of “newness” and “media”, and to inquire “newness” in varied and plural forms and shapes. lastly, rather than being seduced by successful cases, as in success centrism, i call for the investigation of the unsuccessful, the failure, the breakage, and, beyond that, the every day, the mundane, and the insignificant. conclusion studies of social media and society are a vibrant and evolving field that confronts critiques. in this milieu, neither the critique nor the area of research itself is static. scholarly activities in this field are rapidly growing, with new research being published and new projects being launched every day. some of my criticism in this article has indeed been confronted and tackled by scholars in the past and present. in this context, i understand that the five types of centrism i have discussed are not all-encompassing. further, i also recognise that none of these calls is easy or straightforward, and applying any alternative pathways in research is even more challenging. having said that, by revealing these oversights, i hope to contribute to our collective attempt to interrogate the relationship between social media and society (and technology/society) critically. the alternative imagination might help animate, reveal, and make transparent various societal dynamics and layers of complexity that are otherwise invisible. a better, deeper, and more comprehensive understanding of the technology/society relationship, i believe, cannot be achieved by simplifying the complexity but by revealing the complexity itself. notes 1 these three concepts are comparable but not interchangeable. unquestionably, they all challenge the technology/society binary and can potentially provide an avenue to position technology and society in an integrated, dialectical relationship. 17merlyna lim 2 prior to 2002, there were only a handful scholarly writings on the internet in indonesia. notable ones were authored by krishna sen and david hill (1997; 2000). 3 here, “successful” refers to more than just positive events; successful mobilisation by regressive or uncivil groups are also included. 4 this refers to a story of prita mulyasari, a nursing mother of two, who complained about the poor service she received at the international hospital in a private email and was found guilty of defaming the hospital, fined, and sentenced to 6 months in prison. her complain prompted to the movement to collect coins to pay prita mulyasari’s fine. the activism, however, did not challenge the root of the problem; a draconian internet law (ite) was used to frame mulyasari. see lim (2013) for a complete account on the case. 5 this refers to social media driven activism to defend the national corruption eradication committee (kpk) that began in 2007 where thousands of indonesians joined ‘one million facebookers’ to protest the arrest of two senior members of kpk (see lim 2013). in 2015, the movement re-emerged on facebook and twitter using the hashtag #savekpk. 6 #shameonyousby was a worldwide trending hashtag used by indonesians on social media to publicly force president susilo bambang yudhoyono to reverse a controversial law which scrap the direct election of local leaders (took place in september 2014). 7 also called aksi 2 desember, aksi 212 or aksi bela islam iii (translated as the action to defend islam) refers to a mass gathering held on december 2, 2016, in jakarta, involving at least 2 million protesters who demanded of the resignation of the governor of jakarta, basuki tjahaja purnama (ahok), due to the blasphemy case charged to ahok. see lim (2017) for an account of this specific case and its larger political and social media dynamics. 8 here, i use the term populist or populism as the idea that the society is divided into two antagonistic camps between “we the people” as a morally good force versus “they the elite” who are framed as corrupt and self-serving (mudde 2016:25). hence, populism is not an ideology but rather a way of thinking and expressing politics that appeals to the entire public against a common enemy, especially corrupt political elites (laclau 2005). 9 see alrasheed (2017), fuchs (2012), jordan (2008), lievrouw and livingstone (2006), livingstone (2004), matthewman (2011), rodriguez et al. 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behavior 51:1142-1153. author biography professor merlyna lim is canada research chair in digital media and global network society with the school of journalism and communication at carleton university. an align media lab founder/director, merlyna lim’s research interests revolve around the mutual shaping of technology and society, and political culture of technology, especially digital media and information technology, in relation to issues of justice, democracy and civic/participatory engagement. among her notable publications are “the politics and perils of dis/connection in the global south (crosscurrent: the limits and boundaries of digital disconnection), media, culture & society 42(4), 2020; “roots, routes, routers: communication and media of contemporary social movements”, journalism and communication monograph 20(2), 2018; and online collective action: dynamics of the crowds in social media (springer, 2014). jajang a. rohmana* uin sunan gunung djati bandung, indonesia abstract this article examines how the dutch colonial government in the netherland east indies attempted to civilize its colony through the work on etiquette. it focuses its analysis on the malay manuscript of haji hasan mustapa on the code of polite behavior for acehnese in dealing with the dutch people, kehormatan kepada orang belanda (cod. or. 18.097 s9). hasan mustapa wrote his work when he served as chief-penghulu of kutaraja, aceh (1893-1895) and sent it to c. snouck hurgronje in batavia. he wrote the book at the request of teuku umar, an acehnese patriot who used to collaborate with the dutch authorities. using a philological analysis, this study suggests that the dutch authority utilized the native officials to write the etiquette guidebook on speaking and behavior to civilize acehnese people. hasan mustapa’s work on etiquette shows that he played an important role in maintaining the dutch honor and bridging the interests of the dutch colonial government in its colony, the netherland east indies. key words colonializing mission, etiquette, dutch colonial government, aceh, hasan mustapa, teuku umar introduction since its arrival in the malay-indonesian archipelago at the end of the 16th century, the dutch colonizers could not solve the problems facing them simply by confronting the natives of the archipelago. they had to learn the customs of the native people to facilitate colonial policy. they did not only employ the dutch officials but also used the native authorities and learned * jajang a. rohmana faculty of social and political sciences, uin sunan gunung djati bandung, indonesia email: jajangarohmana@uinsgd.ac.id the politics of civilizing the colony: haji hasan mustapa’s malay guidebook on the etiquette for acehnese people towards the dutch in the netherland east indies journal of asian social science research 2020, vol. 2, no. 2: 191-218 http://jassr.cassr.web.id © the author(s) 2020 article 192 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 their laws and customs (rangers 1947:40). one of their efforts was setting ethics rules, which were based on the ethics of the colonizers, targeted at the people of their colony. the dutch colonizers generally considered themselves more civilized than their colony. this is related to the colonial mission in civilizing colonies by using values adapted to the environment of the colonial state (fischer-tiné and mann 2004). this article focuses on the philological study of malay manuscript on etiquette guidebook for acehnese people in facing the dutch colonial authorities. the manuscript was written by haji hasan mustapa on december 3, 1894. he served as chief penghulu (the government official for islamic affairs in a district) of kutaraja, aceh, from 1893 to 1895 (jahroni 1999; kartini et al 1985). this work was written as one of the ways of the dutch colonial government’s mission to civilize acehnese people. this mission was conducted, among other ways, by using the hands of the local authorities in aceh. there are many studies of hasan mustapa’s works such as kartini et al. (1985), rosidi (1989), jahroni (1999), ali (2004), millie, ed. (2017), and rohmana (2018). however, mustapa’s work on etiquette is rarely studied. one of the reasons is the work was inserted into his letters when he lived in aceh (cod. or. 18.097 s9). mustapa attached his etiquette work in his letters. we would never know mustapa’s etiquette work if we did not read his letters. he sent the letters to c. snouck hurgronje, the dutch colonial adviser who lived in batavia (moestapa, december 3, 1894). mustapa was an informant for snouck hurgronje providing him with information on various situations in aceh. he met snouck hurgronje in mecca and both continued their relationship in the dutch east indies. he then became chief-penghulu of kutaraja aceh with the suggestion of snouck hurgronje to the dutch colonial government for three years (18931895) (rohmana 2018). this etiquette guidebook of hasan mustapa was originally a request of teuku umar (1854-1899) when he collaborated with the dutch colonial authorities. teuku umar as a prominent figure required hasan mustapa and other native officials to write an etiquette guidebook for the acehnese in facing the dutch officials. teuku umar officially declared his loyalty to the dutch in september 1893. he then received various privileges such as the title of teuku johan pahlawan, the commander-in-chief of the aceh war, the right to his soldiers, weapons, office fees, and houses (alfian 1987:82-83). he previously fought alongside the acehnese troops against the dutch colonial power. it was no coincidence that five months after hasan mustapa arrived in aceh and served as chief-penghulu of kutaraja, 193jajang a. rohmana teuku umar chose to collaborate with the dutch in september 1893. he then turned to attack the dutch on march 30, 1896, or a few months after hasan mustapa left kutaraja and returned to bandung on september 1895 (said 1981:199; bakker 1993:57). the work of hasan mustapa is not the only one etiquette guidebook in the dutch colonial period. there are some etiquette guidebooks written by other native officials like sayyid ‘uthman (1822-1913) and his son, yahya. sayyid ‘uthman was the colonial adviser on arab affairs who had also written an etiquette guidebook entitled adab al-insān (the etiquette for humans) on august 1885 or about eight years before the work of hasan mustapa (kaptein 2014:98). the work of sayyid ‘uthman discusses broad knowledge on the etiquette for humans such as the relationship between humans and god, children and parents, young people and parents, students and teachers, the etiquette of visiting sick people, attending friday prayers, burying a human corpse, welcoming ramadan month, carrying out marriages, and the rights of husband and wife in the marriage. another work of etiquette guidebook was written by yahya, the son of sayyid ‘uthman. he wrote the mosque entrance etiquette, dalā’il al-nāshid ’an aḥkām al-walā’im fī al-masājid in 1938 (wieringa 2014:1-15). both the works of sayyid ‘uthman and his son, yahya, differed from hasan mustapa’s etiquette guidebook, which specifically explained the behavioral and speaking etiquette for the acehnese when facing the dutch officials. all these etiquette guidebooks were written to be guidelines for the people in the dutch east indies peoples during the colonial period. the significance of this study lies in showing the involvement of local authorities as informants in strengthening the power of the dutch colonial government in the dutch east indies. the dutch colonial government’s effort to strengthen its power in aceh was not only carried out by the military strategies but also the cultural approaches. the study of the acehnese culture involved a well-known scholar c. snouck hurgronje (1857-1936) showing serious dutch efforts in facing the resistance of the acehnese people. the dutch colonial government’s attitudes towards the acehnese people were shaped by a lack of adequate knowledge about aceh. in addition to possessing adequate knowledge of indonesian islam, snouck’s understanding of the culture of the acehnese was invaluable in steering the dutch islamic policies in aceh. his principal achievement was no doubt the part he played in the political reorientation which, together with improved military tactics, finally led to the conclusion of the aceh war (benda 1958:340-341; wertheim 1972:320-328; missbach 2010; kitzen 2012; and mcfate 2018). 194 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 besides, there were some efforts of the dutch colonial government to conquer, educate, and civilize the acehnese including the writing of an etiquette guidebook that had to be obeyed by the acehnese. every ritual and symbol of etiquette demonstrates the dutch hegemony over aceh (locherscholten 2004:167). in postcolonial terms, the dutch colonial government justified social hierarchy and exclusion in the relation to civilized white race versus the uncivilized non-white race (gordon 2017; young 2003:23). they assume that civilization can contribute to difficulties to control, indiscipline and chaos. hasan mustapa’s etiquette guidebook cannot be separated from the context of strengthening the dutch hegemony over its colonies, the white over non-white, at the end of the nineteenth century. hasan mustapa as a chief-penghulu of kutaraja hasan mustapa was appointed as chief-penghulu of kutaraja for about three years (1893-1895) in the third phase of the acehnese-dutch war (1884-1896), especially during a period of constant decline (18841896) after the dutch government applied the enforcement of the civil administration (1881-1884) in aceh. the dutch colonial authorities previously decided to place aceh-groot or aceh besar under a civilian government in the staatsblad 1881 no. 79. meanwhile, the other regions headed by the uleebalang (traditional leaders) were permitted to have their authorities (swapraja). pruys van der hoeven, the civil and military governor in aceh, divided aceh into three regions (afdeling): aceh besar in kutaraja, north and east aceh in lhok seumawe, and west aceh in meulaboh. all regions were headed by the resident and assistant resident who lived in kutaraja. they were assisted by ten controllers or the assistant regional heads in the districts (alfian 1987:23). colonel deijkerhoff was appointed as the military and civil governor in aceh (1892-1896), while the dutch governor-general in batavia was by c.h.a. van der wijck since 1893. the dutch colonial government changed the relationship with the acehnese, from the war to the situation where the acehnese were regarded as “rebels,” because they refused the sovereignty of the ‘legitimate’ sultan of aceh, tuanku muhammad daud syah (1874-1904). the appointment of hasan mustapa as chief-penghulu of kutaraja was decided by the dutch authorities shortly after he returned from mecca in 1885. he had become a religious teacher (kiai) at the great mosque of garut and participated in accompanying snouck hurgronje on a journey around java for about two years (july 1889-february 1891). hasan mustapa then returned to garut to continue his activities as the religious teacher. the appointment of a penghulu before the period of 1882 was 195jajang a. rohmana entirely decided by the colonial rulers based on their appraisals. anyone who was considered to have expertise in the field of islamic law could be chosen as a penghulu. the main consideration was the expertise in the field of islamic law, the experience in the field of administration, and the loyalty to the dutch authorities. after 1882, when the office of penghulu was incorporated into the colonial administration, the recruitment of penghulu and the members of the religious council (raad agama) began to be controlled by the dutch administration. the office of advisory for native affairs, where snouck hurgronje became the first official, played an important role in the recruitment of penghulu (hisyam 2001:42-44). hasan mustapa was appointed as the chief-penghulu of kutaraja on february 22, 1893, based on the recommendation of snouck hurgronje. the appointment letter (besluit) of his appointment dated january 13, 1893, no. 23 (jahroni 1999:24). the appointment of the sundanese to serve as an official in the outer java region was unusual. some scholars even think that the position of chief-penghulu in aceh never existed. his appointment was a colonial effort to improve peace in a region known to be problematic like aceh. it was reasonable that before peace was realized, the most essential condition was to get an understanding of the socio-cultural aspects of the acehnese people (hisyam 2001:95). the position as a penghulu opened a new world for hasan mustapa. he was fully involved in the religious affairs in the dutch administration. he was responsible for islamic religious affairs in kutaraja such as marriage, alms, waqf, and others. his involvement in the dutch colonial bureaucracy was directly related to his close relationship with snouck hurgronje. he recommended hasan mustapa to the governor of civil and military in aceh for the position of chief-penghulu in his letter dated october 26, 1892. it was a letter that was considered by van koningsveld as significant in the study of aceh and about snouck hurgronje (van koningsveld 1990:xvii and l). hasan mustapa was the right person for the position because he was considered capable of handling several important issues in aceh. he would be able to be a good mediator between the dutch authorities and the acehnese people, as he had proven while accompanying snouck hurgronje on his journey around java several years before. hasan mustapa’s position as chief-penghulu of kutaraja had political implications. this can be seen from the letter of snouck hurgronje dated may 22, 1894, to the secretary of governor-general in buitenzorg. he believed that hasan mustapa would be able to develop a close relationship with the acehnese people. he could understand the situation in the local areas of aceh. the letters of hasan mustapa to snouck hurgronje (cod. 196 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 or. 18.097) which were used as the object of studies proved the truth of snouck hurgronje’s belief. hasan mustapa reported a lot of information related to the political situation in aceh. hasan mustapa initially refused some positions that were offered to him, including that of the chief-penghulu of kutaraja. however, he finally decided to accept the position based on the instigation of snouck hurgronje. according to snouck hurgronje, it was easier to propose the name of hasan mustapa to the dutch authorities in batavia than to persuade him to leave his independent life to be replaced by a difficult environment in aceh. hasan mustapa’s decision to accept the position as chief-penghulu of kutaraja was related to his close relationship with snouck hurgronje. snouck hurgronje as his close friend had been well known by hasan mustapa since his first meeting in mecca in 1885. he accepted the position, although the salary as penghulu was lower than his salary as a manuscript copyist (van koningsvel 1990:li; jahroni 1999:25). by proposing hasan mustapa as chief-penghulu of kutaraja, snouck hurgronje expected him to be his assistant and informant in acehnese affairs. it reminds us of the appointment of raden aboe bakar djajadiningrat (1854-1914) as a drogman at the dutch consulate in jeddah based on the proposal of snouck hurgronje to the dutch authorities. snouck hurgronje succeeded in employing aboe bakar as an informant on the daily activities of the muslims and the nusantara ‘ulamā’ in mecca (van koningsveld 1990: xiv-xv). snouck hurgronje’s book, mekka, was derived from the manuscript of tarājim ‘ulamā’ al-jāwā, the biography of the nusantara ‘ulamā,’ which sent by aboe bakar to snouck hurgronje after his return to the netherlands (laffan 2003:61; hurgronje 2007). this is also true for snouck hurgronje’s proposal on the position of hasan mustapa as the chief-penghulu of kutaraja. he employed hasan mustapa to access the information about the situation in aceh. the required information was passed through the letters of hasan mustapa to snouck hurgronje and became the important source of the official recommendation of snouck hurgronje to the dutch colonial government. although snouck hurgronje previously came to aceh two years earlier (july 16, 1891-february 4, 1892) before hasan mustapa arrived in aceh, it was too short for him to collect adequate information about aceh. understandably, he expected hasan mustapa to continuously inform him about the situation in aceh. since his meeting with snouck hurgronje in mecca 1885 and then in the dutch east indies (1889-1906), hasan mustapa continued to make contact with snouck hurgronje who was believed to be a muslim (algadri 1996:134). snouck hurgronje succeeded to utilize hasan mustapa to work 197jajang a. rohmana his mission in gaining the knowledge of islam and the muslim community in the indonesia archipelago (benda 1958:340-341). this success marked his reputation as the father of islamic studies in southeast asia who was considered the most influential in colonial history and constituted an important period of the colonization of knowledge in the dutch east indies (steenbrink 1995; benda 1980:44; suminto 1996:115-125). therefore, the letters of hasan mustapa play an important contribution to snouck hurgronje’s reputation as a scholar and adviser to the dutch colonial government. the information mustapa provided covers a wide range of current situations of aceh including politics, religious, social, and personal matters. this reflects more than just an ordinary friendship that was far from suspicious and prejudice. this relationship is related to the position of snouck hurgronje as an adviseur voor inlandsche zaken who advised the minister of the colonies as illustrated in the works of gobée and andrianse. on one hand, their relationship was open, but on the other hand, it was colored by an opportunistic attitude and can be said to be a collaboration in a negative sense (jahroni 1999:27). all this is illustrated in a letter written by hasan mustapa for snouck hurgronje on the etiquette that prescribes how the acehnese people were expected to behave before the dutch colonial officials. on the manuscript of kehormatan kepada orang belanda there is no title in this unpublished malay manuscript by hasan mustapa. for the purpose of this study, i entitle it kehormatan kepada orang belanda as hasan mustapa started with these words in the first paragraph of his work (see figure 1). in addition to the malay language, hasan mustapa used sundanese vocabularies such as atawa (atau [or]), misti (mesti [must]), ati-ati (hati-hati [be careful]). one sentence is influenced by arabic style: minum rokok, which is similar to shurb al-dukhān (to drink the cigarette [to smoke]). this malay manuscript is inserted into the arabic letter collection of hasan mustapa cod. or. 18.097 s9.1. dated december 3, 1894, which was held by the leiden university library. there is a short explanation of the curator or librarian on the cover of the manuscript: “letters from hasan moestapa (et al) and documents regarding ‘sjair prang’ and ‘keumala’” and aantekenboekje hasan moestapa, 4 laatste dejoemada 1312 (hasan mustapa’s notebook dated the last 4 jumadil ula 1312). if we read the contents of the letters of hasan mustapa, it should be inserted into cod. or. 18.097 s9.2.006-007 dated december 4, 1894, not cod. or. 18.097 s9.1. 198 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 the manuscript was written in a notebook that was brownish colored. there is an image of decorated floral motifs on its front cover entitled “memorandum in account with a book.” there is also a calendar at the back of the cover in the form of tables entitle “almanac for 1891” and “almanac for 1892.” the title of the table calendar of “almanac for 1893” and “almanac for 1894” can be found on the back part cover. the manuscript is 30 pages long, including the front and back cover. hasan mustapa used lined papers. there are 19 lines on every page of the manuscript. from the number of pages, hasan mustapa wrote on the right side of the page (recto) in round numbers 12 pages. he left blank on the left side of the page (verso). both pages 1 and 2 are left blank. he also left blank the page of even number from page 4 to page 26. this manuscript was written by hasan mustapa after he completed another unpublished malay work on the acehnese entitled kashful sarā’ir fī haqīqati aceh wa fidir (cod. or. 7636 dated july 25, 1894), revealing the reality of aceh and pidie. it is a book of questions and answers that contains hasan mustapa’s reflection on political, social, cultural, and religious subject matters. the kehormatan kepada orang belanda, in the same manner as kashful sarā’ir, was presented in classical malay with hard-to-understand sentences: the punctuation is not clear; it contains complicated subject-object-predicate relations and long sentences, and some paragraphs contain only one sentence which takes more than one page. he indeed acknowledged that in writing this book he just followed his mind and practiced the etiquette (ali 2004:70). i found out at the end of the manuscript that hasan mustapa wrote the etiquette guidebook to serve teuku umar’s request when umar collaborated with the dutch authorities (1893-1896). hasan mustapa mentioned the titles johan pahlawan and panglima besar government, the great commander of the dutch government, that refer to teuku umar, in the colophon after the place and date koetaradja 4 jumadilakhir 1312 (december 3, 1894). 199jajang a. rohmana figure 1 the guidebook of kehormatan kepada orang belanda source: haji hasan moestapa, arabic letters from kutaraja (correspondence with snouck hurgronje), 1893-1895, december 3, 1894, cod or. 18.097 s.9.1, the university of leiden library. summary of hasan mustapa’s etiquette guidebook hasan mustapa said in his first sentence that the book describes the etiquette before the dutch people. he wrote: “adapun kehormatan kepada orang belanda itu ada dua bagian. pertama di dalam tingka laku, kedua di dalam perkataan” (the etiquette towards the dutch people was two parts. first, in the behavior, and second, in the words). furthermore, hasan mustapa divided the etiquette of behavior into eighteen commands and prohibitions. he then described the etiquette in a series of numbers. he said, for instance: “no. 1, do not face someone before being permitted. we have to choose a time. do not (face) when he is eating or sleeping, unless we come because we are called by him; no. 5 do not spit, to throw phlegm or belch, but it does not matter during blow nose; no. 9, we must be careful, do not button your shirt or adjust your head coverings in front of him; no. 10, do not smoke our cigarettes; no. 13, when we stand, we must strongly face. keep our feet fixed. do not stand with arms akimbo or put your hand in your pocket; and no. 18, if 200 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 another dutch person wants to come, it is better to you to ask him, “can i sit down or go home?” likewise, in his etiquette of words, hasan mustapa explained eighteen things, for instance: “1. do not dare to promise someone that you cannot fulfill it; 6. do not interrupt someone when he is speaking to others, especially in secret; 11. do not show your thought or intelligence if you do not ask; and no. 18, do not dare to praise someone, do not disapprove of his goodness, and do not pan someone. he certainly has the mistakes, but he still has a mind.” after making a list of 36 etiquette behaviors and words, hasan mustapa explained that the work was written based on the request of someone. he said, “inilah saja menoelis sepandjang sobat poenja permintaan tetapi saja ambil pendek sadja jang boleh di pake sehari2…” (this is what i wrote for my friend’s request. i wrote a concise work (on the etiquette) that can be practiced every day”). hasan mustapa suggested that the etiquette guidebook could be used as a daily guideline and published by the dutch government in the form of a printed book to help the acehnese behave appropriately before the dutch people. but, he at the same time stated that the book was written based on his knowledge. if someone wanted to have a better understanding of the etiquette, hasan mustapa suggested them to come to a teacher who could teach them the etiquette. he said: “akan tetapi djikalau sobat maoe taoe terang betoel hal kehoermatan satoe2 toewan besar dan ketjil baroe ketemoe kenalan atawa soedah biasa, itoe lebih baik sobat tidak koerang boeat goeroe pengadjaran jang goena dia poenja pertoendjukan sebab saja sendiri belom sebegitoe tjoekoep kerana beloem sebegitoe lama” (however, if you want to know the etiquette towards the high or low rank [dutch] officials and when to meet your friends, you should study with a teacher who knows the etiquette. i do not have enough knowledge about it because i am new in aceh). hasan mustapa’s kehormatan kepada orang belanda the following section is the transcription of the manuscript of hasan mustapa’s kehormatan kepada orang belanda. the transcription was written following the spelling in the source text by using a philological approach. i then will translate the text into english. 201jajang a. rohmana /1r/ (flower motif on the front cover of the book) 1 memorandum/ 2 in account with/ 3 book/ /1v/ (kalender) 1 almanac for 1891/ 2 almanac for 1892/ /2r/ (blank page) /2v/ (blank page) /3r/ 1 adapoen kehormatan kepada orang/ 2 belanda itu ada doea bagian./ 3 pertama di di dalam tingkah lakoe./ 4 kedua di dalam perkataan. ma/ 5 ka jang di dalam tingkah lakoe/ 6 jang perloe diketahoewi 18 perkara./ 7 no. 1 djangan mengadab1 sebelom/ 8 nja ditirima, misti kita pilih wa/ 9 ktoe, minta permisi, djangan tem/ 10 po makan dan tidoer melain/ 11 kan kalau kita datang sebab/ 12 dipanggil. no. 2 djangan kita ma/ 13 soek sebelumnja disoeroeh ma/ 14 soek dan djangan teroes doedoek’’/ 15 sebeloemnja disoeroeh dengan per/ 16 toendjoekannja2 dimana kita’’/ 17 doedoek. no. 3 selama kita doedoek/ 18 djangan melihat kekanan kiri/ /3v/ 1 jang paling tidak baik/ /4r/ 1 jang paling tidak baik melihat/ 2 apa2 toelisan diatas medjanya/ 3 biar kita tidak mengerti. no. 4/ 4 djangan angkat kaki atawa3 toe/ 202 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 5 mpang loetoet atawa kaki madjoe/ 6 kemoeka. no. 5 djangan meloedah/ 7 atawa bedahak atawa sandao/ 8 tetapi tidak apa selemo mengeloe/ 9 arkan ingoes. no. 6 tempo poelang/ 10 djangan poetar belakang sebelom/ 11 nja tabek dan minta idjin. no. 7/ 12 djangan datang sebelomnja sa/ 13 mpei waktoe djandji dan dja/ 14 ngan lat4 dari djandji. no. 8 djan/ 15 ngan bawa teman kapan kita tidak/ 16 kasih taoe doeloe biar anak2/ 17 sendiri. no. 9 misti kita ati2 djangan/ 18 sampei bikin betoel kantjing bajoe/ /4v/ (blank page) /5r/ 1 atawa atau tengkoeloek5 dimoekanja dia/ 2 sepoeloeh, djangan berani minoem/ 3 roko dari kita poenja. no. 11 djangan/ 4 berani ambil roko lebih dari/ 5 satoe bidji. no. 12 tempo dikasih’’/ 6 tangan djangan kita pegang roko/ 7 no. 13 tempo kita berdiri misti me/ 8 ngadab betoel kaki tetap, djang/ 9 an menolak pinggang atawa/ 10 masoekkan tangan didalam/ 11 sak.6 no. 14 misti kita berdiri kapan/ 12 datang lagi lain toean yang patoet/ 13 no. 15 djangan bawa tongkat ata/ 14 wa pajoeng masoek kemana/ 15 tempat doedoek. no. 16 kalau kete/ 16 moe di djalan2 kita melimat/ 17 ka samping kanannja. no. 17 dja/ 203jajang a. rohmana 18 ngan berani melihat moekanja/ /5v/ (blank page) 1 melainkan selama dia bitjara/ 2 sama kita. no. 18 kalau ada/ 3 toean lain maoe datang lebih/ 4 baik kita tanjak apa hamba/ 5 boleh doedoek atawa poelang/ 6 sadja. adapoen kehormatan/ 7 didalam perkataan’’ itoe ada/ 8 no. 18 perkara jang misti diketahoe/ 9 wi/ 10 1 11 djangan berani djandji sekira2/ 12 itoe perdjandjian tidak bisa djadi./ 13 no. 2 kalau kita datang dipanggil/ 14 djangan moelain tjerita bitjara/ 15 sebelomnya terbit dia poenja maksoed./ 16 3 djangan mengoempat orang/ 17 melainkan kalau dipinta kete/ 18 rangan djoega djangan lebih dari/ 19 tjerita orang atawa lihat sendiri/ /6v/ (blank page) 1 4. djangan bitjara sebeloemnja dia/ 2 poenja tjerita habis./ 3 5 djangan mengeloewarkan per/ 4 kataan jang tidak patoet dip/ 5 ertjaja melainkan dengan tanda/ 6 betoel./ 7 6 djangan tjampoer moeloet/ 8 tempo dia bitjara sama orang/ 9 lain apalagi di dalam rahsiha./ 10 7 djangan bitjara sama kita poe/ 204 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 11 nja teman apa lagi diseroepa/ 12 kan rahasia”./ 13 8 djangan kita loepa mengerti di/ 14 dalam bitjara jang kita tidak tjam/ 15 poer./ 16 9. djangan ada permintaan lebih/ 17 dari satoe kali di dalam satoe/ 18 perkara biar dia belom menjahoet./ /7v/ (blank page) /8r/ 1 10 djangan tjirita jang bersalakan/ 2 sama tjirita jang soedah ditjiri/ 3 takan di dalam lain tempat/ 4 jang sama patoetnya dan kepa/ 5 da lain toean apa lagi toean/ 6 satoe tjirita satoe diboeka doewa/ 7 tiga kali./ 8 11 djangan menimboelkan pi/ 9 kiran atawa kepintaran kalau/ 10 tidak ditanja betoel2./ 11 12 djangan manjilak pikiran/ 12 orang2 atawa toewan2 apalagi/ 13 manjilak bangsa sendiri sebab/ 14 satoe2 orang melihara dia poe/ 15 nja diri./ 16 13 djangan pindah tjerita jang/ 17 lebih djaoeh dari jang ditjeritakan/ 18 ketika itu seperti tempo kita/ /8v/ (blank page) /9r/ 1 tjerita atoeran negeri teroes pin/ 2 dah tjirita perkara beniaga/ 3 melainkan kalau dia jang/ 4 molai pinda./ 205jajang a. rohmana 5 14 apa2 jang dia tanja atawa/ 6 hiroh djangan kita teroes/ 7 menjaoet sebelomnja menger/ 8 ti lebih baik kita tanjak min/ 9 ta mengerti lebih dahoeloe./ 10 15 sekali2 tidak patoet menentoe/ 11 kan kedjadiannja satoe per/ 12 kara dibelakang hari melain/ 13 kan pake sepandjang taksi/ 14 ran atawa agah2./ 15 16 sekali2 tidak patoet boeka/ 16 tjirita hal igama apa lagi/ 17 kalau kita boekan ahlinja/ 18 17 djangan sekali2 menetapkan/ /9v/ (blank page) /10r/ 1 satoe kesenangan atawa kebentji/ 2 an pada satoe perkara diseboe/ 3 t menoeroet sepandjang igama/ 4 melainkan setelah kita ten/ 5 toe itoe perkara tidak bersala/ 6 an dengan kita poenja bitjara/ 7 di dalam satoe tempo di belakang/ 8 hari./ 9 no. 18 djangan berani memudji orang sebe/ 10 lumnja tentoe tidak bersalaan kaba/ 11 ikannja dan menjila orang sebelom/ 12 nja tentoe dia poenja kesalaan’’/ 13 melainkan dengan pake sepandja/ 14 ng pikiran./ /10v/ (blank page) /11r/ 1 inilah saja menoelis sepandjang sobat/ 2 poenja permintaan tetapi saja am/ 206 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 3 bil pendek sadja jang boleh di/ 4 pake sehari2 djoega saja boekan/ 5 ambil sengadja dari pengadjaran/ 6 tjoema itoelah jang saja soedah/ 7 pake. maka hal diterimanja/ 8 atawa ditjilanja sama orang/ 9 orang besar saja tidak taoe./ 10 akan tetapi djikalau sobat ma/ 11 oe taoe terang betoel hal kehoer/ 12 matan satoe2 toewan besar/ 13 dan ketjil baroe ketemoe kena/ 14 lan atawa soedah biasa, itoe/ 15 lebih baik sobat tidak koerang/ 16 boeat goeroe pengadjaran jang/ 17 goena dia poenja pertoendjukan/ /11v/ (blank page) /12r/ 1 sebab saja sendiri belom sebegitoe/ 2 tjoekoep kerana beloem sebegitoe/ 3 lama./ 4 dan lagi itoe jang saja toelis 36/ 5 perkara barang tentoe ada koerang/ 6 nja atawa lebihnja sebab tentoe/ 7 koerang dari sebab itu toean soed/ 8 ah lama kenalnja dan itoe/ 9 kedoedoekan antara jang perloe/ 10 dan tidak perloe tentoe ada be/ 11 danja./ 12 dan antara kita datang handa/ 13 mengadap sendiri dan kita/ 14 datang dipanggil tentoe ada/ 15 bedanya./ 16 dan antara perkara rahsia dan/ 207jajang a. rohmana 17 bukan perkara rahsia tentoe/ 18 ada bedanja./ /12v/ (blank page) /13r/ 1 dan antara kita doedoek di roema/ 2 hnja dan di dalam katornja/ 3 tentoe ada bidanja./ 4 dan antara kita koempoelan/ 5 bitjara pekerdjaan’’ dan koempoe/ 6 lan di dalam pelesiran seperti/ 7 pesta atawa rizepsi tjampoer/ 8 adoek toewan2 banjak tentoe ada/ 9 bedanja./ 10 dan lagi antara toewan2 sivil/ 11 dan militter dan pereman2 jang/ 12 kenal jang tidak tentoe ada beda/ 13 nja, maka dari itoe tidak bisah/ 14 tentoe kehormatan misti pa/ 15 ke sepandjang timbangan/ 16 jang kita niat merendahkan/ 17 diri dan boedi dan/ 18 djangan harap kabaikannja sebelom/ 19 nya kita punya pekerdjaan goena adanja./ /13v/ (blank page) /14r/ 1 kotaradja 4 djomadilakir/ 2 h 1312/ 3 tanda saja jang bikin boekoe/ 4 ini dengan permintaan/ 5 joehan pahlawan dan penglima/ 6 perang besar governement./ 7 h. hasan moetapa/ /14v/ (blank page) /15r/ almanac for 1893/ almanac for 1894/ /15v/ (flower motif on the back cover) 208 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 translation “there are two parts of etiquette towards the dutch people. first, the courtesy of behavior; second, the etiquette of words. the etiquette of behavior has 18 rules: 1. do not face a duch official until you are permitted to do so. we have to choose a time. do not (face) when he is eating and sleeping except we come because we are called by him. 2. do not enter before we are ordered to enter. do not sit before we are ordered to do so with the instructions where we should sit. 3. while sitting, do not look into left and right. the worst is to see or read anything on his table, although we do not understand. 4. do not sit with your legs crossed or put your knees or legs forward. 5. do not spit, throw phlegm, or belch, but it does not matter during blowing nose. 6. when you will go back, do not turn back before you say a greeting and ask permission. 7. do not come before the appointment time and do not be late at the appointed time and condition. 8. do not bring friends and even our children when we do not tell first. 9. we must be careful, do not adjust the shirt button or tengkuluk (veil) in front of him. 10. do not smoke from our cigarettes. 11. do not take more than one cigarette. 12. when we were given the cigarettes, we must not hold the cigarettes at the same time. 13. when standing, we must properly face. we keep our feet fixed. do not stand with akimbo arms or put your hand in your pocket. 14. we must stand up when another dutch official comes. 15. do not bring a cane or umbrella into your sitting place. 16. if you meet the official in the streets, you must look to the right side. 17. do not dare to look at his face except he talks to us. 18. if any other dutch people want to come, you should ask him, “can i sit down or go home?” meanwhile, the etiquette of words towards the dutch people contains 18 rules: 209jajang a. rohmana 1. do not dare to promise a dutch official that you cannot fulfill it. 2. if we are called by a dutch official, do not start to talk, before he tells his purpose. 3. do not curse anyone, except if you are asked for the information. do not tell the story that more than said by the people or that you see directly. 4. do not talk before he finishes telling his story. 5. do not talk the untrustworthy words, only the truth. 6. do not interfere with the dutch official when he is speaking to others, especially in secret. 7. do not talk to our friends only, especially in secret. 8. do not forget to understand that we do not talk to him. 9. do not have more than one request in one question as long as he does not answer. 10. do not tell the story that is similar to another story that has been told on another occasion, do not tell that to your lord. one story is told two or three times. 11. do not show your thought or intelligence if you are not asked. 12. do not criticize the opinion of the people or the lord. do not criticize your nation, because everyone has to save himself. 13. do not tell the story told by other people at that time. when we tell the story of the state rules, for instance, we move into the story of the business, except if he starts moving into the story. 14. whatever he asks or cares about something, do not respond to him before we understand his talk. it is better to ask him to understand first. 15. it is not appropriate to determine the occurrence of the future but use your estimate. 16. it is not appropriate to tell about religious matters especially if we are not experts. 17. do not determine one pleasure or hatred in one case decided by the religious rule, except after we believe that the case will not disapprove with our opinion in the future. 18. do not dare to praise someone, do not disapprove of his goodness, and do not pan someone. he certainly has the mistakes, but he still has a mind. 210 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 this is what i am writing to fulfill the request of my friend. however, i write a short work that can be used by him every day. i write this work that does not refer to my previous learning but it is just what i have practiced every day. hence, i do not know whether this work will be received or rejected by him. however, if my friend wants to know the etiquette towards a dutch lord or when you meet your acquaintances or your familiar friend, it would be better for my friend to learn from the teacher who knows. i do not have enough knowledge because i have not been living long in aceh. it is what i am writing about 36 etiquettes of behavior and words, of course, there is less or more useful because you have known before. you know more than me that there are some differences between usefulness and unusefulness. there are differences between the two conditions. if we come directly or we come when called by a dutch lord; between the secret and not secret; when sitting in the house and the office; when talking about the jobs together and making a tour like a party; between civilian or military people and the private agency. therefore, there is no doubt that etiquette must be used to humble ourselves. do not expect his goodness before we have a good job for him. kotaraja, 4 jumadil akhir 1312 h. my signature was added to know that i wrote this book with the request of johan pahlawan and the commander of the great war in the government. haji hasan mustapa hasan mustapa and the politics of civilizing the colony hasan mustapa sent various information about the people and culture of aceh to snouck hurgronje during his position as hoofd-penghulu of kutaraja (1893-1895). it can be seen in hasan mustapa’s kashful sarā’ir fī haqīqati aceh wa fidir (boekoe rahayat aceh dan pidir) which was written in kotaraja on july 25, 1894. some of the transcripts of this manuscript were published in ajip rosidi (1989) and studied by mufti ali (2004). according to mufti ali, kashful sarā’ir contains hasan mustapa’s reflection on the political, social, cultural, and religious situations in aceh. mustapa used a question-answer method that spent 190 pages. one of his viewpoints in kashful sarā’ir is that he looked down at the acehnese people (ali 2004:70). according to him, the acehnese people always deceive each other. they were stubborn and firm. they easily forgot the 211jajang a. rohmana kindness of other people and reject their advice. once they are disturbed by others, they will be angry (questions 31 and 32). these characters of acehnese people are related to low awareness, illiteracy, and rejections to be obedient to the ruler and faithful to the dutch colonial power (questions 51 and 53). hasan mustapa then concluded that the reasons why the dutch colonial government had difficulty conquering aceh were the refractory of the aceh kings and the folly of their people (question 53). in the context of civilizing the acehnese people, hasan mustapa wrote a manuscript on the etiquette guidebook for acehnese people in facing the dutch people. he agreed that the dutch government was a powerful ruler so that the acehnese people had to be ruled by the powerful rulers (the dutch) to prosper and achieve their glories. for mustapa, therefore, all muslims had to be loyal to the dutch colonial government. as noted above, the etiquette guidebook was written by hasan mustapa at the request of teuku umar (1854-1899) when umar collaborated with the dutch authorities in aceh from 1893 to 1896. teuku umar as a respected figure had an interest in civilizing the acehnese people. he meant it to civilize them and to be regarded as loyal to the dutch authorities. hence, teuku umar then asked hasan mustapa to write the etiquette guidebook. hasan mustapa was regarded as a worthy figure because of his position as chief-penghulu of kutaraja who understood both the customs of the dutch and the culture of the acehnese people. the request of teuku umar to the dutch colonial government to write the etiquette guidebook was submitted in june 1894. it can be seen from the information of hasan mustapa in his letter on june 24, 1894 (cod or, 18.097 s16.2.036-39) to his colonial friend, snouck hurgronje. hasan mustapa informed that he gained the information from muhammad mubarak, his friend in the office of penghulu of kutaraja who said that teuku umar came to the office. teuku umar asked for advice from the penghulu on three requests to the dutch officials: to write the rules and law of the country to civilize the acehnese people regarding the etiquette towards the dutch authorities, to order the masses of acehnese people to stop doing the robbery, and to issue rules regarding local dignitaries and ordinary people. hasan mustapa wrote: 212 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 ومن فرصة تكو عمر اليت قد اخربان هبا حممد مبارك انه يف هذا الدور دخل كنتور وطلب قبول نصيحته ابلسرعة يف ٣ امور االول يلزم لكل كرباء اچيه الذي حصل املشاهرة من الدولة شغل مرتب له وهو ترتيب العزل فعليه ومثله للجهل االشغال يعرف ما فان اهلينة املسائل يف عليهم واحلكم رعيته وأتديب البلد واالبدال مبن يصلح. there is an activity of teuku umar that is informed by muhammad mubarak (hasan mustapa’s friend) to me. he said that teuku umar came and went around the office (of penghulu). teuku umar asked for advice immediately in three matters. first, every acehnese dignitary who got a monthly salary from the dutch government must work and write the etiquette guidebook on the order and law of the country to civilize their people. if they do not know the work for their follies, they must step down and be replaced by the right person (moestapa, june 24, 1894). hasan mustapa said in his letter that teuku umar insisted that the dutch officials had to write an etiquette guidebook to regulate the country and educate the acehnese people. according to mustapa, teuku umar affirmed that if the acehnese dignitaries who received the monthly salary from the colonial government were unable to write the etiquette guidebook for their follies, they had to resign and be replaced by others. it was a pressure of teuku umar to hasan mustapa as a chief-penghulu of kutaraja. this demonstrates the assertiveness of teuku umar as a respective acehnese leader in educating and civilizing the acehnese people. he put a bold face on his concern to increase the knowledge of the acehnese people who were regarded as stupid and hick, especially in facing the dutch officials. the acehnese people in the war situation were generally uneducated, poor, and got no chance for school. teuku umar’s aspiration in civilizing the acehnese people was in line with snouck hurgronje who wished aceh to be a civilized country and less threatening to the dutch authorities. aceh was known for bad images by the european colonizers. the acehnese people were regarded as devout muslims, fanatic, superstitious, insincere, deceiver, dishonest, riotous, and war lovers (hurgronje 1985:xx-xxii). the request of teuku umar as a great commander of aceh (johan pahlawan) was also affirmed by hasan mustapa when umar came to mustapa’s home six months later on december 1894. mustapa told the reason why he wrote the etiquette guidebook in his letter dated december 4, 1894 (cod. or. 18.097 s9.2.006-007): ويوم ٢ دمسرب جوهن جائنا يف البيت قصد اجاب مسرية البلد ابن الدولة ال حتصل هلم الراحة ما دام ال يشتغل امرين االول حرب مجيع اچيه مرة واحدة واحراق بيوهتا لكن ال ليجلس فيها الدولة بل للتأديب فقط والثايت احاطة فر بسر على مجيع الليين وجاب سرية امساكم ))واسم توان فومفا(( ومدح تدبريكم على موجب 213jajang a. rohmana اخلرب و اشتاق ابالتفاق معكم ومقصوده االعظم مننا ان نكتب له رسالة صغرية ملعرفة اداب ملصاحبة الدولة كانه احس عرضه به النه دائما ما يتعرفين وال يتكلم لنا خصوصا يف امور البلد مث الفنا له هذه منقولته. johan (teuku umar) came to me at my home on december 2, (1894). he intended to describe the development of the country (aceh). he said that the dutch government cannot establish peacefulness for the acehnese people as long as they do not do two things. first, the war against aceh regions entirely and burn their houses. however, it is not to occupy by the dutch government but to give them the lesson. second, make the large fence bar over the surrounding area of the concentration line. teuku umar also mentioned and praised your name (and the name of mr. pomp). he commended your judgment based on the information. he wanted to compromise with you. his biggest purpose, in my opinion, was that i write for him a small essay on the knowledge of etiquette to be friendly with the dutch government. he made it as if to show me because he does not know me forever. he also did not speak specifically about the country with me. i then wrote for him this copy (of the etiquette guidebook)” (december 4, 1894). hasan mustapa informed snouck hurgronje in his letter dated december 2, 1894, that teuku umar came to his home. his purpose was to tell about the aceh situation. according to teuku umar, the dutch government could not establish peacefulness to the acehnese people as long as they did not do two things. first, serious action had to be taken to the acehnese residents as a lesson for them. second, the government had to create a large fence to protect the concentration line area. teuku umar also praised snouck hurgronje and wanted to meet him. however, his main purpose was to ask hasan mustapa to write a small book on the etiquette for anyone friendly to the dutch government. this work would a guidebook for teuku umar and his troops who were on the dutch colonial side. hasan mustapa then wrote the etiquette guidebook for this reason which was then copied and sent to snouck hurgronje. hasan mustapa also informed the dutch civil and military governer in aceh, deijkerhoff, about his work in his letter (cod. or. 18.097 s.16.3.026-029 dated december 18, 1894). deijkerhoof praised hasan mustapa for his work. he said, “hopefully, teuku umar will realize that he is a bit stupid in terms of etiquette (qāl, ṭayyib, ḥatta yaḥass anna nafsah qalīl al-jinān).” this shows that teuku umar had an aspiration to civilize both himself and his acehnese people who were friendly to the dutch authorities concerning the etiquette. his main goal was not only that aceh would be 214 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 orderly and peaceful for the acehnese people, but also he aimed to get trust for himself from the dutch government. he even rather threatened hasan mustapa to write the etiquette guidebook. “if you could not write, it should be better to step down”, he said. deijkerhoff, the civil and military governor in aceh, supported hasan mustapa to write the book so that teuku umar and the acehnese people realize that they were stupid in terms of etiquette in facing the dutch officials. sociologically, hasan mustapa’s etiquette guidebook was a moral education through discipline and attachment to a social group as suggested by durkheim. it is a morality that is not only related to the external obligations and authorities that work primarily through prohibition and oppression, but also through some elements of control that attach social groups through warmth, volunteerism, and commitment (bellah 1973:xxxix; durkheim 1961). without morality, society will lose solidarity leading to the disconnection of individuals and society. it is understood that george washington, the first president of america, wrote the rules of civility and decent behavior, the rules of etiquette and ethics in the 18th century to civilize americans to bridge class differences in american society (hemphill 2006:345-72). however, in the perspective of the history of colonialism, the etiquette guidebook marks what edward said calls a relationship between culture and imperialism, between western modern metropolitan and national boundaries in the colonies (said 1994:xi-xiii). the dutch colonial government justified social hierarchy and exclusion that were legitimized by race theory in anthropology. they portrayed it colonies as inferior in the framework of white versus non-white. therefore, white culture was regarded as the basis of the legitimacy of colonial government, law, economics, science, language, art, literature (gordon 2017). one of the forms of white culture is the aesthetic that is believed to improve, refine and elevate the knowledge and mind of people. the west is generally known to write the mysterious eastern world with primitive and barbarous nations. hasan mustapa’s etiquette guidebook illustrates the colonial west’s effort to civilize its eastern colony by using the hands of the colonized people. conclusion this article has demonstrated that the colonial informants and collaborators played an important role in strengthening the honor of colonizers. the dutch colonial government not only strengthened its power through 215jajang a. rohmana military action but also disciplined its colony in the netherland east indies through some guidelines on behavior and speaking etiquette as seen in the case of aceh. the people in aceh were expected to obey the etiquette to be civilized persons. hasan mustapa who served as chiefpenghulu of kutaraja had an important role in this civilizing mission of the acehnese people. his malay guidebook on etiquette, kehormatan kepada orang belanda (cod. or. 18.097) which was sent to his colonial friend, snouck hurgronje, shows that the native officials had an important role in maintaining the honor of the dutch colonial authorities in their colony. the native officials bridged the interests of colonizers and their colonies in the netherland east indies. notes mengadab, that means “menghadap” (to face) 2 pertoendjoekannja, that means “petunjuknya” (his instruction) 3 atawa, originally from sundanese language that means “atau” (or). 4 lat, a terlambat; kasip; (to late), see tim penyusum (2008:886). 5 tengkoeloek, n 1 kain kepala; kerudungl destar; 2 kain penutup kepala atau muka; cadar; (veil), see tim penyusun (2008:1680). 6 sak, n 1 saku; kantong (baju dsb), (pocket), see tim penyusun (2008:1342). references alfian, ibrahim. 1987. perang di jalan allah (going war in the way of allah). jakarta: sinar harapan. algadri, hamid. 1996. islam dan keturunan arab dalam pemberontakan melawan belanda (islam and arab descendants in the rebellion against the dutch). bandung: mizan. ali, mufti. 2004. “a study of hasan mustafa’s fatwa: it is incumbent upon the indonesian muslims to be loyal to the dutch east indies government.” journal of the pakistan historical society 52 (2): 6784. bakker, hans j. i. 1993. “the acehnese war and the creation of the netherlands east indies state”. pp. 53-82 in great powers and little wars: the limits of power, edited by a. hamish ion and elizabeth jane errington. westport. connecticut: praeger. bellah, robert n. ed. 1973. emile durkheim on morality and society: selected writings. chicago and london: the university of chicago press. 216 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 benda, harry j. 1958. “christiaan snouck hurgronje and the foundations of dutch islamic policy in indonesia.” the journal of modern history 30 (4): 338-47. benda, harry j. 1980. bulan sabit dan matahari terbit (the crescent and the rising sun). translated by daniel dhakidae. jakarta: pustaka jaya. durkheim, emile. 1961. moral education. new york: free press. fischer-tiné, harald and michael maan, eds. 2004. colonialism as civilizing mission: cultural ideology in british india. london: anthem. gobée, e. and c. adriaanse. 1990. nasihat-nasihat c. snouck hurgronje semasa kepegawaiannya kepada pemerintahan hindia belanda 1889-1936 (the advice of c. snouck hurgronje as an official of the dutch east indies government). vol. i, translated by sukarsi. jakarta: inis. gordon, daniel. 2017. “‘civilization’ and the self-critical tradition.” society 54:106-123. doi 10.1007/s12115-017-0110-4. hemphill, c. dallett. 2006. “manners and class in the revolutionary era: a transatlantic comparison.” the william and mary quarterly. third series 63 (2): 345-372. hisyam, muhamad. 2001. caught between three fires: the javanese pangulu under the dutch colonial administration 1882-1942. jakarta: inis. 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power-holders in colonial warfare.” small wars & insurgencies 23(1): 93-116. van koningsveld, p. sj. 1990. “pengantar: nasihat-nasihat snouck sebagai sumber sejarah zaman penjajahan” (introduction: the advice of snouck as a source of history in colonial time). in nasihatnasihat c. snouck hurgronje semasa kepegawaiannya kepada pemerintahan hindia belanda 1889-1936, edited by e. gobée and c. adriaanse, vol. i. translated by sukarsi. jakarta: inis. laffan, michael francis. 2003. islamic nationhood and colonial indonesia, the umma below the winds. london-new york: routledge curzon. locher-scholten, elsbeth. 2004. sumatran sultanate and colonial state: jambi and the rise of dutch imperialism, 1830-1907. cornell: southeast asia program. mcfate, montgomery. 2018. “military anthropologist looks at islamic insurgency in aceh.” orbis 985:1-23. doi: 10.1016/j. orbis.2018.08.007. millie, julian. ed., 2017. hasan mustapa: ethnicity and islam in indonesia. clayton: monash university press. missbach, antje. 2010. “the aceh war (1873-1913) and the influence of christiaan snouck hurgronje”. pp. 39-62 in aceh: history, politics, and culture, edited by arndt graf, susanne schroter, and edwin wieringa. singapore: institute of southeast asian studies. 39-62. moestapa, haji hasan. 1894. arabic letters from kutaraja (correspondence with snouck hurgronje), 1893-1895, cod or. 18.097 s.16.2.036-39, ub leiden university. moestapa, haji hasan. 1894. arabic letters from kutaraja (correspondence with snouck hurgronje), 1893-1895, cod or. 18.097 s.9.2.006-007, ub leiden university. moestapa, haji hasan. 1894. arabic letters from kutaraja (correspondence with snouck hurgronje), 1893-1895, cod or. 18.097 s.16.3.026029, ub leiden university. rengers, d. w. van welderen. 1947. the failure of a liberal colonial policy netherlands east indies, 1816-1830. springer-science business media. rohmana, jajang a. 2018. informan sunda masa kolonial: surat-surat haji hasan mustapa untuk c. snouck hurgronje dalam kurun 218 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 1894-1923 (sundanese informant in the colonial time: the letters of haji hasan mustapa to c. snouck hurgronje in the period of 1894-1923). yogyakarta: octopus publishing. rosidi, ajip. 1989. haji hasan mustapa jeung karya-karyana [haji hasan mustapa and his works]. bandung: pustaka. said, edward. 1994. culture and imperialism. new york: vintage book. said, mohammad. 1981. aceh sepanjang abad (aceh in the century). 2 volumes. medan: percetakan dan penerbitan waspada. steenbrink, karel. 1995. kawan dalam pertikaian (friend in conflict). bandung: mizan. suminto, aqib. 1996. politik islam hindia belanda (islamic politics in the dutch east indies). jakarta: lp3es. tim penyusun. 2008. kamus besar bahasa indonesia (indonesian dictionary). jakarta: pusat bahasa departemen pendidikan nasional. wertheim, w. f. 1972. “counter-insurgency research at the turn of the century: snouck hurgronje and the acheh war.” sosiologische gidz. 19: 320-328. wieringa, edwin p. 2014. “following the faith of the father: sayyid ‘uthman’s son yahya on mosque etiquette.” wacana 15 (2): 1-15. young, robert j. c. 2003. post-colonialism: a very short introduction. oxford: oxford university press. the roma in post-communist bulgaria: growing social marginalization and state policies journal of asian social science research 2020, vol. 2, no. 1: 1-24 http://jassr.cassr.web.id © the author(s) 2019 yorgos christidis* university of macedonia, greece abstract this article analyzes the growing impoverishment and marginalization of the roma in bulgarian society and the evolution of bulgaria’s post-1989 policies towards the roma. it examines the results of the policies so far and the reasons behind the “poor performance” of the policies implemented. it is believed that post-communist bulgaria has successfully re-integrated the ethnic turkish minority given both the assimilation campaign carried out against it in the 1980s and the tragic events that took place in ex-yugoslavia in the 1990s. this bulgaria’s successful “ethnic model”, however, has failed to include the roma. the “roma issue” has emerged as one of the most serious and intractable ones facing bulgaria since 1990. a growing part of its population has been living in circumstances of poverty and marginalization that seem only to deteriorate as years go by. state policies that have been introduced since 1999 have failed at large to produce tangible results and to reverse the socio-economic marginalization of the roma: discrimination, poverty, and social exclusion continue to be the norm. ngos point out to the fact that many of the measures that have been announced have not been properly implemented, and that legislation existing to tackle discrimination, hate crime, and hate speech is not implemented. bulgaria’s political parties are averse in dealing with the roma issue. policies addressing the socio-economic problems of the roma, including hate speech and crime, do not enjoy popular support and are seen as politically damaging. key words roma, post-communism, bulgaria, marginalization, state policies introduction *corresponding author: assoc. prof. yorgos christidis department of balkan, slavonic and eastern studies, university of macedonia, greece email: gxristidis@uom.edu.gr article 2 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 post-communist bulgaria has had an admittedly difficult post-communist transition. much of the 1990s were politically turbulent, while the economy suffered from a recession until 1996. after 1997, bulgaria enjoyed, at large, stable political governments, and economic growth that, coupled with its pro-western foreign policy orientation, allowed the country to join the north atlantic alliance (nato) in 2004, and the european union (eu) in 2007. still, bulgaria remains the poorest eu member-state, facing an array of difficult issues, like fighting corruption and stopping the brain drain that is undermining its future. one of the biggest challenges that the country faces is the demographic crisis: bulgaria has experienced a steady reduction of its population since 1989: from 8,487,317 people in 1992 to 7,364,570 in 2011 according to the 2011 census (national statistical institute 2011). in 2000, bulgaria had a negative natural growth rate of –0.7 percent and a total fertility rate of 1.1 children per woman. with replacement fertility being 2.1 children per woman, bulgaria was characterized by what demographers call “lowest-low fertility”, and had the lowest fertility rate of any european country between 1995 and 1997. according to united nations projections, bulgaria’s population, which stood at around 7.9 million in 2001, would shrink by 31 percent in 2050, the second steepest decline in all europe (ghodsee 2002). almost twenty years later, the future projections remain dramatic: if the current trend continues, by 2050, bulgaria will have 38.6 percent fewer people than it did in 1990 (judah 2019). in that bleak demographic reality, there is, however, one group of people that demographically seem to be stable if not growing: the roma. according to official statistics their numbers increased from 313,396 (or 3.7 % of the total) in 1992 (national statistical institute 2004 in pamporov 2009) to 325,343 (or 4.9%) in 2011 (national statistical institute 2011). according to unofficial estimates, there is a much higher number of roma living in bulgaria. thus, according to the council of europe, the number of roma living in bulgaria in 2012 was approximately 750,000 or 9.94% of the total (european commission 2014), which in practice meant that bulgaria had one of the largest roma populations in the eu.1 nevertheless, the demographic dynamism of the roma has not been welcomed in bulgaria. the roma population in the country has experienced, since 1990, growing impoverishment, social marginalization, and public hostility. in post-1989 bulgaria, there have been many surveys revealing widespread negative stereotypes and hostility towards the roma.2 a survey, for example, conducted in 2005 revealed extensive antiroma stereotypes: some 86% of the respondents defined roma as “lazy 3christidis, yorgos and irresponsible”, while 92% said that they had “criminal tendencies” (petar-emil mitev in shkodrova 2005). in another nationwide survey also conducted in 2005 among 1,112 people, there were similar findings: to the question “would you agree (would you or would you not accept) to live in the same country with roma people (gypsies)?”, more than a quarter of bulgarian respondents (27%) answered negatively; three-quarters of those interviewed responded negatively to the question of whether they would vote for a candidate nominated by their party if the candidate was roma; and 82%, 74% and 76% of those questioned would not accept a roma as a local police chief, an army officer, and a government minister respectively (bbss gallup in cohen 2005). anti-roma behavior is deemed “socially acceptable, tolerated and normalized” (zahariev 2017), with bulgarian political leaders, particularly in the far-right, stimulating “in practice negative attitudes towards the roma by using populist, anti-roma rhetoric in order to win votes” (angel ivanov in kyuchukov 2012:51). the systematic way the roma community has been targeted by the political party ataka and its leader, volen siderov, is well documented.3 less-well known is the anti-roma rhetoric of valeri simeonov, leader of the national front for the salvation of bulgaria and deputy prime minister in the government of boyko borisov (from march 2017 until november 2018), and krasimir karakachanov, leader of the party vmro, who following the march 2017 elections became minister of defense, in the same government. simeonov has described roma as: “… arrogant, insolent, and ferocious pongids”, and roma women as “stray bitches” (roma civil monitor 2018). during the 2016 presidential election, karakachanov claimed that “gypsy families have turned giving birth into a business. they live on social assistance, do not pay their electricity and water, and harass people in small towns”, stressing that he would, “stop gypsy raids and every day [gypsy] crime” (cited in zahariev 2017:91). based on the above background, this article analyzes the growing impoverishment and marginalization of the roma in bulgarian society and the evolution of bulgaria’s post-1989 policies towards the roma. it examines the results of the policies so far and the reasons behind the “poor performance” of the policies implemented. the article argues that bulgaria’s successful “ethnic model” has failed to include the roma. state policies that have been introduced since 1999 have failed at large to produce tangible results and to reverse the socio-economic marginalization of the roma such as discrimination, poverty, and social exclusion. 4 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 who are the roma in bulgaria? according to the census in 2011, 325,343 roma live in bulgaria. however, most unofficial data estimate a much higher number of roma, around 10% of the total population or between 700,000 to 750,000 people. the geographic distribution of the roma population within the territory of bulgaria is relatively even, with half of the roma living in towns (todorov 2011). as most anthropologists who have studied the roma argue, the roma groups “are not static with unchangeable social and cultural units” and generally it can be said that they form a specific type of community, “the intergroup ethnic community which is divided into several separate (and sometimes even opposed) endogamic groups, subgroups and metagroup units with their own ethnic and cultural features” (marushiakova and popov n.d.). in bulgaria, there are five main roma groups (the daskane, the horahane, the calderashya, the kalaydzhes, and the ludari or rudari) (pamporov 2009:8-29), that lack a common language and religion. there are four romany languages spoken, as well as bulgarian, turkish and romanian (pamporov 2009:8-29),4 while religiously the majority of the roma identify either with orthodox christianity or with islam.5 there is also a growing number of roma who have converted to protestantism since 1990 (slavkova 2007:206). there is little “sense of solidarity between the linguistic and religionbased roma subgroups… the different roma communities are endogamous and in general, they live segregated from each other in the frame of the neighborhoods (a kind of ghettoes in the ghetto) or in a given settlement” (pamporov 2009:27). another striking characteristic of the roma in bulgaria is the lack of political mobilization, despite their numeric strength. although some roma mps had been elected on the lists of mainstream parties since 1990, as a non-governmental organization’ (ngo) report underlined in 2001, “the roma community is not represented in proportion to its share of the bulgarian population, and roma mps seldom dare to push for roma political interests” (minority protection in bulgaria 2001:109). it has been mainly roma ngos that have been striving to represent roma interests.6 in 1999, roma organizations succeeded in their efforts to develop a common platform, “a rare success story in the roma political participation”, while in april 2002, 11 roma ngos established a “roma parliament” (parliament roma 2003:34-35). however, the roma have remained politically disempowered as a 2011 report succinctly underlined: 5christidis, yorgos despite the existence of a great number of romany political parties and non-government organizations, the political representation of roma in the parliament, the institutions of the executive power and even in the local authorities is insufficient. a serious indicator for this is the inability of romany representatives in the legislative or executive power or even in the local authorities to raise a serious public debate on the problems of roma economic and social exclusion and to substantially contribute to the implementation of consistent programs for solving those problems. at present, the pressure for the integration of roma ethnic minority in the bulgarian society comes mainly from the european union rather than from the political structures in the country or the civil organizations of romany people (todorov 2011:17). the growing impoverishment and social marginalization of roma it is well-known that the position of the roma communities in postcommunist europe has been drawing growing attention due to their deteriorating living conditions and their growing social marginalization. a report commissioned by the world bank in 2003 noticed that “while roma have historically been among the poorest people in europe, the extend of the collapse of their living conditions in the former socialist countries is unprecedented” (ringold et al. 2003). in bulgaria itself, it had become pretty obvious by the end of the 1990s that roma’s standards of living had sharply deteriorated. some bulgarian and international analyses were underlining the dramatic drop in the roma’s standards of living that took place during the 1990s in all spheres of social life. with a soar in unemployment and long-term unemployment rates among the roma, according to a representative regional survey in nine roma neighborhoods in 1999-2000, unemployment levels were as high as 80%; 26% of the adult roma had never been employed; 21% had been unemployed for more than ten years; 34% had been unemployed from five to nine years; 11% for two to four years (tomova 2002:134). according to world bank data, in 2001, the unemployed among the roma had reached 70% (information about 2003:26). an increasingly large number of roma live in illegally constructed houses, in poor conditions, that had limited access to public services. based on a countrywide survey conducted in 2000, “approximately 70% of the houses in roma neighborhoods countrywide were built “illegally”, i.e. either outside of the municipal borders or without appropriate authorization papers”.7 in big urban neighborhoods, the share of illegal construction 6 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 reached 80% (information about 2003:6). the tendency of roma to gather in isolated, segregated neighborhoods since the socialist times8 was further accentuated. the anyway low educational attainment of roma would get even worse. the proportion of children who dropped out of school at an early age or who had never enrolled in school rose from 11.2 % in 1992 to 14.9% in 2000. at the same time, the number of roma with higher education that was particularly small anyway declined even further, from 0.3% in 1992 to 0.16% in 2000 (tomova 2002:138). according to a survey in august 2000, of the, at least, 100,000 bulgarian children of school age who did not attend school, 30% were roma (minority protection in bulgaria 2001:86). another survey, in october 2000, put the share of the roma children who drop out between grades one and seven at 80%. the high drop out rate is a direct cause of high rates of illiteracy among roma: according to estimates in april 1998, as much as 25% of the roma population was illiterate”(minority protection in bulgaria 2001:87). roma children who lived in segregated roma neighborhoods attended schools that were poorly equipped and offered pedagogical programs of inferior quality, compared to schools in non-roma neighborhoods. moreover, there was an overrepresentation of roma children into “special schools”: in october 2000, there were approximately 130 such special schools in bulgaria, with more than 19,000 students attended primarily by roma (minority protection in bulgaria 2001:88). poverty rates in segregated roma neighborhoods would rise dramatically. according to world bank data for 2001, poverty among the roma was ten times as frequent as among the bulgarians (tomova 2002:136). as it was aptly described: “a sizeable part of the roma now live in extreme poverty – in shanties with no access to electricity, drinking water, sewage and heating in winter” (tomova 2002:135). the general health of a growing part of the roma population was deteriorating fast. according to a survey conducted in 1994, 44% of roma families included at least one chronically ill member and 13% included a disabled member (minority protection in bulgaria 2001:91). furthermore, “bulgarian roma not only suffered from generally poorer health than the population as a whole but also did not enjoy equal access to either health care or social assistance” (minority protection in bulgaria 2001:90). according to a fact agency survey, 17% of the roma households did not have a personal doctor (gp) and 46% did not have a personal dentist (tomova 2002:139). in addition, reforms introduced in the bulgarian health system in mid-1999, concerning compulsory health insurance, 7christidis, yorgos made things even worse for the roma, as the new system required every employed bulgarian citizen to contribute six percent of his/her income and register with a “personal physician”, as roma were already suffering from widespread unemployment. a growing number of roma were not present on official social welfare lists, either because they had moved without registering or because they had dropped out of the welfare system altogether. as a result, they are ineligible for any kind of social support, including health insurance” (minority protection in bulgaria 2001:92). the roma also faced many other socio-economic problems such as growing dependency on social assistance: a 2000 survey revealed that 63.5% of the romani households surveyed depended on social assistance to survive (minority protection in bulgaria 2001:92); disruption of family ties: surveys show that more and more young bulgarian roma fathers were leaving their families (tomova 2002:139); growing isolation of the residents of segregated neighbourhoods: “excluded from the labour market, with no access to health care, education and social assistance, the roma are having less and less opportunities for contacts with the members of “the other” communities. often a significant part of the women and children do not leave the ghetto for years” (tomova 2002:139); and deterioration of the social organization in roma neighborhoods: “the possibilities of the residents of segregated neighbourhoods to cultivate in the young generation strong motivation for education and success, to exercise effective control over the behaviour of their members and especially over youths, and to form positive social attitudes in them, are declining. conversely, the manifestations of the culture of poverty, with its typical orientation towards survival and neglect of possibilities for development are increasing” (tomova 2002:139). there was little doubt, then, that by the end of the 1990s the bulgarian roma were suffering from large-scale poverty and social exclusion. social exclusion “refers to a process of social separation between individuals and society” and can have multiple dimensions: economic, political, sociocultural and geographic (ringold et al. 2003:18). “in economic exclusion, individuals cannot participate in market activity, including employment, access to credit, and land. political exclusion refers to limitations on participation in democratic processes, such as voting, participation in political parties and other associations within civil society. sociocultural exclusion encompasses separation based upon linguistic, religious, and ethnic grounds. geographic exclusion involves various types of spatial differentiation” (ringold et al. 2003:18). 8 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 bulgaria’s policy responses towards the roma predicament: the first 20 years the first government initiative concerning the roma was undertaken in 1994 when the council of ministers (i.e. the bulgarian government) decided to establish an advisory body dealing with issues and concerns of ethnic minorities. thus, in 1994, the interdepartmental council on ethnic affairs was established by the council of ministers (minority protection in bulgaria 2001:113). one year later, in 1995, the new bulgarian socialist party’ (bsp) government under zan videnov, established the national council on social and demographic issues (ncsdi) as an advisory body representing not only ethnic communities but also organizations of the disabled, the pensioners and women. the way ncsdi dealt with problems of the ethnic minorities was criticized as reflecting “the traditional approach of pre-1989 governments to ethnic minority issues in bulgaria: problems faced by minorities were regarded as primarily social problems rather than as problems caused by ethnic discrimination” (minority protection in bulgaria 2001:113). on 30 january 1997, the council published a “programme for the resolution of the problems of roma” in bulgaria as an integral part of the “national programme for social development”.9 the program, however, was never implemented as a few days after its adoption, the bsp’ government resigned (minority protection in bulgaria 2001:113). during the same period and particularly during zhelyu zhelev’s presidency (august 1990-november 1996), a special advisor to the president on national-ethnic issues and religious denominations had been appointed.10 judging from the results, his practical significance in advancing solutions for the roma community must be regarded as doubtful. thus, until 1999, bulgaria had failed to develop any kind of policy for dealing with the deteriorating position and living conditions of the roma community. any measures that were introduced failed because, among others, “they were not harmonized with the roma community, who therefore remained indifferent to them” (yaneva 1999:57). in december 1997, the new government of ivan kostov established the national council on ethnic and demographic issues (ncedi) designed to operate as “a body for consultations, co-operation and coordination between government bodies and ngos, designed to formulate and implement national policy on ethnic and demographic issues and migration”.11 the members of ncedi included representatives of ten government ministries at the level of deputy minister and of four state institutions represented by their directors. thirty-two ngos were also participating in ncedi, twenty-one of which were roma.12 in 1999, ncedi initiated the formation 9christidis, yorgos of regional councils on ethnic and demographic issues as consultative bodies to the regional governors.13 an important problem, however, that emerged with the regional councils was that as of october 2001, there was “no law or other regulation providing for their function and powers” (minority protection in bulgaria 2003:114). besides, by 2003, almost half of bulgaria’s 263 municipalities had appointed municipal experts on ethnic and demographic issues (“national council on ethnic and demographic issues” 2003:6). the most important initiative undertaken by the ncedi concerned the adoption on 22 april 1999, of the framework programme for equal integration of roma in bulgarian society. the program explicitly recognized the existence of discrimination against the roma14 and set as a “strategic goal” the eradication of the unequal treatment of roma: “elimination of discrimination against the roma should become one of the main political priorities of the bulgarian state” (“national council on ethnic and demographic issues”:19). the program included some recommendations in various spheres of public life that had to be adopted during a period of ten years (“national council on ethnic and demographic issues”:19-24) as follow: 1) on discrimination: a) the introduction of effective legislation on protection against discrimination and b) the establishment of a public authority for the prevention of discrimination; 2) on economic development: the introduction of measures on employment, social assistance and land allocation to improve their standard of living; 3) on health care: a) tightening sanitary controls and b) intensifying health education programmes; 4) on the spatial development of roma neighbourhoods: the legalization of housing; 5) on education: a) desegregation of roma schools, b) elimination of the practice of sending healthy children of roma origin to special schools, c) counteracting against forms of racism in the classroom, d) providing opportunities for the study of the romani language at schools, e) facilitating the enrollment of roma students in universities, and f) introducing literacy and training programs for adult roma; 6) on the protection of the ethnic specificity and culture of roma: the development of roma culture as a specific ethnic culture and, at the same time, as part of bulgarian national culture; 7) on roma presence in the national media: the participation of both broadcasting of roma programs and inclusion of roma journalists in bulgarian national television and radio; and 10 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 8) on the roma women: the promotion of culture for their fullfledged individual, social and economic participation in public life. the framework programme undoubtedly represented a positive step forward in terms of government policy. however, as of october 2001, very few legislative measures had been taken to ensure its implementation. specifically, it was claimed that “there is no corresponding plan for implementation of the programme and no mechanism for requiring the necessary commitment of staff or resources on the part of different government ministries” (minority protection in bulgaria 2001:115). following the formation of the new bulgarian government of simeon saxcoburgotski, in june 2001, a new impetus was given to the policy dealing with the roma. the fact that bulgaria had entered into accession negotiations with the eu and that the latter was urging it to alleviate the roma’ predicament was additional pressure on the bulgarian government. in its 2002 regular report on bulgaria, the eu commission was openly critical on the issue of the roma: as reported in previous years, bulgaria has a good framework programme on integration of minorities targeted at the roma. regrettably, however, this has not been put into practice. there has been very little change in the situation of the roma minority since the last regular report, and there are no significant developments in their socio-economic situation and living conditions to report. roma continue to suffer from social inequalities due to the accumulation over time of factors that have worsened living conditions… discrimination, and cases of violence against members of the roma community continue to be reported. this situation needs to be addressed urgently (commission of the european communities 2002:32). the report was highlighting the absence of any significant progress made in areas such as employment, legalization of roma’ housing, health care, and desegregation of roma education and was urging for the adoption of “comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation” (commission of the european communities 2002:32-33). in addition to the need to adopt an effective anti-discrimination piece of legislation, it was also becoming clear that a specific action plan had to be adopted to implement the framework programme of 1999. as the new chairwoman on ncedi, filiz husmenova, appointed on 17 july 2003, pointed out: the problems of minorities are grave and they are not problems of today or of yesterday but of many years. unfortunately, the efforts 11christidis, yorgos made so far for their overcoming, though significant, have not led to very encouraging results… there are quite serious problems in the regions where roma population is predominating… the framework programme for equal integration of roma into the bulgarian society adopted in 1999 is a good document but it is of general character…(“national council on ethnic and demographic issues”:7) on 16 september 2003, the bulgarian parliament adopted the protection from discrimination act, elaborated under ncedi’s supervision. it was an important step forward in the development of the national legal framework for the protection from discrimination on an ethnic basis by establishing an independent body with sufficient powers to investigate cases of alleged discrimination and to impose sanctions.15 furthermore, on 6 october 2003, the bulgarian government with its decision no. 693 adopted the action plan for the implementation of the framework programme for roma integration. the action plan was elaborated by the government with the participation of the roma parliament, an association of roma organizations established in april 2002. it included some specific measures in several different fields to effectively implement the framework programme.16 in 2004, the government adopted some specific measures in the field of education, which -although were not announced specifically for the roma school childrenwere expected to have a beneficial effect also on them.17 furthermore, in july 2004, the minister of education and science approved a strategy for the educational integration of minority children and students while it was also decided to set up a special fund for the implementation of the strategy.18 ngos, however, remained skeptical of government policy.19 on the eve of the ceremony on the international decade of roma inclusion 2005-2015, which was organized in sofia on 2 february 2005, sixty-three roma leaders published a declaration criticizing “the government’s formal attitude towards its own promises with regard to helping the roma minority to overcome discrimination and isolation” (human rights in bulgaria in 2004:15-16). during the following day, there was a roma demonstration in front of the national assembly against discrimination, the first mass roma anti-discrimination demonstration held since 1989 (human rights in bulgaria in 2004:17). on 13 and 14 may 2005, at a conference organized by the roma ngo, human rights project, 142 roma experts from the regional and municipal administrations signed an open letter to prime minister simeon saxcoburgotski, claiming that the framework programme for equal integration of the roma “was not being fulfilled”, 12 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 calling upon the government “to undertake the genuine fulfillment – rather than just on paper – of this program document, to take steps toward multilateral consultations with the roma community on roma integration issues, and to extend real, rather than just consultative, powers to roma representatives… on ethnic and demographic matters” (human rights in bulgaria in 2004:17). just before the national elections in june 2005, saxcoburgotski’s government announced action plan for achieving the goals of the decade of roma inclusion, adopted in the context of the decade on roma inclusion. although the plan was greeted as containing “many laudable measures… which could significantly ease, if not resolve completely, problems related to healthcare, employment, education, and the hygiene and infrastructure in the roma neighbourhoods… the great majority of these measures are only good wishes, because the bulgarian budget’s funding for them is minimal” (human rights in bulgaria in 2004:16). a total of 37,622,000 euros was envisioned for the entire ten-year period (human rights in bulgaria in 2004:16). some additional documents were adopted between 2005 and until 2010: the strategy for educational integration of children and pupils from ethnic minorities (adopted 2004, updated 2010), the health strategy for disadvantaged persons belonging to ethnic minorities (adopted 2005), the national programme for improvement of roma housing conditions for the period 2005-2015 (adopted 2006), and national programs included in the national employment strategy for the period 2008-2015 and the employment national action plan (todorov 2011:23). assessing the effect of the policies introduced during the first 20 years ten years after the adoption of the framework programme for equal integration of roma in bulgarian society (april 1999) and with all the other programs announced until 2010, a question naturally arises of their effect upon roma standards of living: had the processes of impoverishment and social marginalization of the roma being reversed or at least stopped? the answer is negative. as pointed out, among others, by todor todorov in his detailed report on bulgaria entitled measures to promote the situation of roma citizens in the eu: country reports, commissioned by the directorate-general for internal policies of the european parliament and published in 2011, the situation concerning roma hadn’t improved but had deteriorated. specifically, todorov (2011:13-16) underlined as follows. on employment: “the employment decrease with romany people is incomparable with that of the rest of the population. from the beginning 13christidis, yorgos of the transition in 1989 until now between 37 and 61% of the roma in active working age were permanently excluded from the legal labor market in the country… (the roma) are the group, where the employed usually work under a temporary or even no contract and short-time working arrangements. for this reason, roma are much more vulnerable to the risk of not receiving remuneration for their labor… as a rule, the share of the romany employed who do not participate in the social insurance system or are insured for a small part of their actual incomes is high”; on housing conditions: “almost half of roma live in dwellings with no water supply, while 75% of the romany households do not have sewerage in the villages or urban neighborhoods, which they occupy. waste in romany neighborhoods is not regularly collected by waste collection companies while the partially built infrastructure and bag hygiene favor the spread of different stomach infections. over 33% of the roma population permanently lives in frame-built houses which threatens the health and lives of their inhabitants... an acute problem is the lack of control over illegal construction in romany neighborhoods – during recent years the illegal building of dwelling extensions, garages, workshops and sheds for firewood on the pavements and part of the streets, which together with the unwarranted fencing makes parts of the neighborhoods inaccessible for ambulances or fire brigades”; on education: “during the last two decades bulgaria witnesses an alarming trend of deterioration of the educational status of the young members of the roma community which further reduces their chances to find a job and will eventually lead to replicating poverty in the following generations… in bulgaria one in every four romany adults is illiterate, while the functional illiteracy practically covers about half of the adult roma population… another distinctive feature of the roma community is that it is the only ethnic group in the country where the educational level of women is much lower than that of men. and since women are those who are usually responsible for raising children, their illiteracy and low educational level are of key importance for the educational aspirations and school achievements of children… the quality of education in the romany schools is very poor, while the level of hidden and open dropping out of the educational system among romany children continues to be very high”; on poverty: “poverty in bulgaria has been a common phenomenon among roma since the beginning of the transition period. within the roma community poverty is characterized by its widest spread as well as with its greatest depth and duration… on one side of the gap is the predominant part of the community who face misery and poverty, while on the other – 5-10% who are very rich”; 14 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 on health: “despite the relative improvement in their living conditions in the last decade, the number of those roma community members who define their own health as bad or very bad increases. based on estimations of medical specialists, the health problems of roma are particularly acute despite the fact that they are the youngest community in bulgaria… in the last years, drug abuse has increased in some of the big romany ghettos as have related infections… roma are the ethnic group in bulgaria with the highest share of premature deaths and lowest levels of life expectancy… the infant mortality reaches its highest levels with the roma community – 25 per 1000 live-born children or 2.6 times higher than with ethnic bulgarians. the main reasons include the widespread and deep poverty, low hygiene, and frequent child-birth of mothers... the highest levels of premature child-birth are registered with romany women – 10-12 times higher than with bulgarian women”; lastly, on the continuing ghettoization of the roma: “the concentration of roma in isolated neighborhoods has increased during the last ten years in the urban as well as rural regions. at present more than 75% of romany people live in segregated communities, compared to only 49% in 1980” (todorov 2011:13-16). the deepening impoverishment and social marginalization of the roma in bulgaria during the 1990-2010 period had been accompanied by growing public hostility against them. in bulgaria as elsewhere in europe, roma “fall into the category of people that ‘everyone loves to hate’ (avara and mascitelli 2014:132), where what has been termed as “antigypsyism” had to a large extent become socially acceptable (zahariev 2017:89). it is illustrating that even “the poverty of many roma communities contributes to resentment” as roma were perceived “as dependent on welfare benefits and burdens on the state” (ringold et al. 2003). the events in katunitsa, a village near the city of plovdiv, in september 2011 graphically underlined the extent of public hostility against the roma. on 22 september 2011, a 19-year-old ethnic bulgarian boy was run over by a local roma working for a notorious roma figure, kiril rashkov, known also as “tsar kiro”. anti-roma, mob riots broke out in the village, with the participation of football hooligans, and spread throughout the region of plovdiv. while in the capital sofia, ataka and vmro organized anti-roma protests at the centre of the city (bulgarian helsinki committee 2011). “most people in bulgaria saw the case of katunitsa as a “collective crime of the roma”, not as a crime committed by an individual. therefore, the majority of bulgarian society supported the riots against the roma” (ivanov 2012:50). thus, it came as little surprise that anti-roma attitudes played a significant 15christidis, yorgos role in the october 2011 presidential and local elections, when “politicians competed to win the votes of those who were against roma” (ivanov 2012:51). state policies since 2010: more of the same approach and same results on 12 may 2010, bulgaria adopted the framework programme for integration of roma in the bulgarian society (2010-2020) “extending the strategic areas and guidelines, laid down in 1999, and establishing the framework for the next steps of bulgaria in the new eu membership context” (todorov 2011:22). following the adoption of an eu framework for national roma integration strategies up to 2020 by the european commission in april 2011, which required all member-states to produce national strategies to guide roma integration (eu framework for national roma integration strategies up to 2020:2011), the framework programme was updated as the national integration strategy of the republic of bulgaria (2012-2020)20, adopted by the borishov government in december 2011 and also by parliament in march 2012 – the first such document on roma integration approved by parliament (civil society monitoring report:9). the bulgarian national strategy explicitly recognized the predicament facing roma in various areas,21 setting as its “strategic goal… creating conditions for equitable integration of the roma and the bulgarian citizens in a vulnerable situation… in the social and economic life by ensuring equal opportunities and equal access to rights, goods and services, by involving them in all public spheres and improving their quality of life, while observing the principles of equality and non-discrimination”, enumerating a variety of measures in education, healthcare, housing conditions, employment, rule of law and non-discrimination, culture and media (the national integration strategy of the republic of bulgaria [2012-2020]). soon after, and following a research project that was conducted in the period november-december 2012 in all neighborhoods with predominantly roma populations in bulgaria, the civil society monitoring report was published in 2013 that was highly critical of the bulgarian national strategy. dimitrov et al. (2013:9) underlined: the main conclusion of the present report is that the national roma integration strategy (nris) lacks synergy, coherence and equal distribution in its envisaged activities, measures and financial allocations. it overlooks major areas such as housing conditions, health care and educational integration… regardless of the large 16 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 number of strategic documents and operational programs that have appeared, it is clear that strong political will to improve the situation of roma does not exist. the implementation and application of politically stated intentions have not become reality. one of the main obstacles to more significant results in the field of roma inclusion is the inadequate financial provision of activities for integration. a european commission report that was published in april 2014 recognized the “positive steps” that had been taken in the direction of roma integration in bulgaria since 2011 in education,22 employment,23 health,24 housing25, and anti-discrimination,26 setting the following priorities for the future: further reforms are needed in education, employment, health and housing policy to support roma inclusion; political leadership of the inter-ministerial working group on the use of eu funds for roma integration should be reinforced; the overall mandate and resources allocated to the national roma contact point should be reinforced; anti-discrimination campaigns and communication activities on roma integration should be developed targeting the entire population (the european union and the roma factsheet bulgaria). four years later, in 2018, a report by ngos on the implementation of the national integration strategy noticed that: …the period of 2016-2017 does not mark any significant advances in the implementation of the nris. improvements have been observed in the usage of eu funds for roma inclusion… and for education (especially in reducing early school leaving and increasing participation in different levels of education, although segregation remains a problem). deterioration is obvious in the fields of governance… and the consultative process with civil society and antigypsyism (with a significant rise in anti-roma rhetoric, publications and even actions) … the period of 20162017 marked the full collapse of the legitimacy of both the nrcp and the national council for cooperation on ethnic and integration issues (ncceii), which have been fully abandoned by the roma ngos and cannot implement their consultative and coordination roles… the added value of the action plan was limited by a lack of financial backup for most of its activities (roma civil monitor 2018:7, 9). 17christidis, yorgos conclusion this article has shown that post-communist bulgaria’s successful “ethnic model” policy has failed to include the roma. the “roma issue” has emerged as one of the most serious and intractable ones facing bulgaria since 1990. a negligible growing part of its population has been living in circumstances of poverty and marginalization that seem only to deteriorate as years go by. the marginalization of the roma population has been feeding the agenda of political demagogues and populists, particularly on the right-wing, that are constantly targeting the roma. the roma have gained the “distinction” of having become a permanent object of hate speech and hate crime. there can be little doubt that negative stereotypes and widespread discrimination practices have played an important role in roma’s social marginalization in bulgarian society. ngos have been particularly vocal in stressing discrimination as a problem for the roma, something that has also been officially recognized. since 1999, successive bulgarian governments have introduced many policy measures, seeking not only to fight discrimination but also to improve the roma’s socio-economic status, taking advantage of the available, since 2007, eu funding mechanisms such as the european social fund (esf), and the european regional development fund (erdf). however, state policies that have been introduced since 1999 have failed at large to produce tangible results and to reverse the socio-economic marginalization of the roma: discrimination, poverty, and social exclusion continue to be the norm. as to the question of why all this arises, ngos point out to the fact that many of the measures that have been announced have not been properly implemented, and that legislation existing to tackle discrimination, hate crime and hate speech is not implemented. bulgaria’s political parties, including gerb (citizens for the european development of bulgaria) that has practically dominated bulgarian politics since 2009, winning each successive election, are averse in dealing with the roma issue. policies addressing the socio-economic problems of the roma, including hate speech and crime, do not enjoy popular support and are seen as politically damaging. however, the roma’s predicament could be seen also in relation to the post-1989 dominance of the neo-liberal discourse in former eastern europe and its economic and social ramifications. neo-liberalism dominated transition politics from communism in ex-eastern europe, including bulgaria. the state lost its central role for the modernization and development of society in favor of the market. the so-called “washington 18 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 consensus”, with its “holy trinity” of rapid stabilization, liberalization, and privatization became the essence of the reform policies that all former eastern european states were called to implement. yet, reform policies proved particularly controversial in terms of delivering a better standard of living and deep economic changes took place that produced a deep socio-economic crisis. while whole social groups like the roma found themselves impoverished and unable to cope with their predicament, the state was drastically weakened. the state’s weakening has been particularly harmful to the most vulnerable groups in society like the pensioners or the roma community. then, it is not incidental that ngos and others dealing with roma issues in bulgaria have been arguing for a more interventionist state. such a policy can be exercised primarily by the state. the market cannot substitute the state in its social functions and obligations. notes 1 bulgaria, romania, spain and hungary are the 4 countries with the largest roma populations in the eu. 2 see, for example, the survey conducted among bulgarians on “attitudes towards people from different nations”. the attitude towards the roma is the most negative among different social categories (pupils, students and the employed) (cited in petar-emil 1999:14-15). also illustrating are the results of three surveys conducted respectively in 1992, 1994 and 1997 that registered a high level of prejudice against the roma (krassimir 1999). 3 ataka conducted its first pre-election campaign in 2005, soon after it was established, under the motto “no to turkification! no to gypsification”. its leader volen siderov, produced a series of seven programmes on the roma in the private television channel skat tv, claiming that “bulgarians were the object of criminal “gypsy terror” – that they were being murdered, robbed, beaten and raped daily by an alien minority in their own country and were not getting any protection from the law enforcement authorities, who had united with the roma against the bulgarians because they are the employees of a corrupt anti-bulgarian ruling class”(krassimir 2005). 4 according to a 2007 study by the open society institute, 60.7% of roma population in the country declare romany language as their mother tongue, while 25.3% and 5.4% are self-identified as having bulgarian and turkish respectively as their mother tongue (open society institute 2007; todorov 2011:13). 5 according to the 2001 census, 48.6 % of the roma identified as orthodox christians and 27.9% as muslims (pamporov 2009:30). 6 at the end of the 1990s, two main roma ngos stood out in representing roma’ interests: the kupate roma public council (krpc) and the euroroma association. krpc was established in 1997 and held its first congress on 19christidis, yorgos 16 september 1998. its priority was on social policy and employment, and during the tenure of the union of democratic forces’ (udf) government of ivan kostov, associated itself closely with the ruling party. the euroroma association was founded on december 12, 1998. it gave priority to the protection of civil rights and settlement of the problems of the roma and has associated itself with the euroleft (christidis 2008). 7 in some of the biggest urban neighbourhoods, the proportion is even greater: in the roma neighbourhoods of sliven, between 90 and 100 percent of roma houses are illegal; the figure is 80 percent in stara zagora and in shumen; 85% in blagoevgrad; 90% in kurdzhali; and over 80% in lovech (minority protection in bulgaria 2001: 94). 8 “according to data from a survey in 1980, “49% of the urban roma population still inhabited isolated neighborhoods, which were falling short of even minimum standard living conditions” (panchev 2015:18). 9 “this programme focused mainly on the social problems faced by the community, such as poverty, poor education, bad hygiene, and inadequate housing, without touching on either racial discrimination or deficiencies in the protection of minority rights” (minority protection in bulgaria 2001:114). 10 it was mihai ivanov, who in 2003 became the secretary of the national council on ethnic and demographic issues. 11 article 1 of the rules of organization and procedure (“national council on ethnic and demographic issues: structure and functions”: 2). 12 all major ethnic groups living in bulgaria were represented in the council. thus, apart from ngos representing roma, turks, armenians and jews, one could find ngos representing vlahs, aromanis, karakachans, crimean tatars and greeks living in bulgaria (“national council on ethnic and demographic issues”: 3). 13 as of 2003 there were 22 such regional councils. the councils included regional administration experts, municipal mayors, representatives of territorial units of central government, regional providers of communal services, representatives of non-profit associations and minority nongovernmental organizations employed in the respective sphere, as well as municipal experts on ethnic and demographic issues (“national council on ethnic and demographic issues”:6). 14 “in a socioeconomic aspect, the status of roma is on the whole drastically lower than the average in bulgaria: high rate of unemployment, poor housing conditions, high-rate of illiteracy. those permanent characteristics of the state of the roma community are external manifestations and direct results of, inter alia, discriminatory treatment” (“framework programme for equal integration of roma in bulgarian society”:19). 15 in addition, the protection from discrimination act was “providing a broad definition of the scope of protection” and was “reversing the burden of proof from the victim to the perpetrator” (human rights in bulgaria in 2003:12). 20 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 1, 2020 16 the action plan included 27 specific measures on protection against discrimination, five on social services and protection, five on employment, 8 on health care and sport, three on housing, and eight on institutional strengthening (“action plan for the implementation of the framework programme for roma integration”:35-40). 17 it was decided to provide breakfasts, warm milk and free textbooks to about 300,000 children from the first grade to fourth grade as well as to invest 10 million levs towards improving the level of bulgarian language skills, providing transportation to the secondary schools and lowering the drop-out rate (human rights in bulgaria in 2004:16). 18 a fund that was established by government decree in january 2005, as a majority of mps had rejected the draft law for the establishment of the fund, on october 6, 2004, “citing populist and even racist arguments” (human rights in bulgaria in 2004:16). 19 according to the bulgarian helsinki committee, “only cosmetic changes were undertaken in 2004 to overcome the discrimination and isolation suffered by the roma community, mostly geared toward making a show of action for the benefit of international organizations. no legislatives changes were made for promoting the roma integration into bulgarian society. as in previous years, there was practically a lack of any state policy aimed at roma integration. this minority group’s exclusion from societal processes, discrimination, educational segregation, lack of adequate access to justice, poverty and poor hygiene conditions continued to characterize the position of roma in bulgaria in 2004”. furthermore, the government decree in december 2004 to transform ncedi into a national council for inter-ethnic co-operation although welcomed in principle it was being criticized as limiting “the opportunities for roma ngos to influence policies affecting the roma community, since ngo representation was sharply reduced on the new council”(human rights in bulgaria in 2004:15-16). 20 for the document, see https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/roma_bulgaria_ strategy_en.pdf, accessed 8/2/2020). 21 “a serious problem facing the roma is the increasing spatial isolation of their community. the concentration of roma in isolated neighborhoods has increased during the last fifteen years both in the urban and rural areas…”; “the roma people are in a disadvantaged position at the labour market as a result of the structural changes that have taken places in bulgaria. the changes of the macroeconomic situation in the country have resulted in their exclusion from the labour market and in constantly persisting very high unemployment levels in their community, or employment in only very low-income jobs”; “observations show that the improvement of the educational status of the roma community has slowed down during the last 20 years. another specificity of the group is that functional illiteracy is three times more frequent among roma women than men…”; “the survey shows that 12.6% of the entire roma population in the country, including children, has some kind of disabilities 21christidis, yorgos or suffer from a heavy chronic disease. what is specific for the roma people is the very early onset of disability and the widespread chronic diseases on a mass scale as early as the middle age. one third of the male roma population and two fifths of the female population in the age bracket 45-60 have already lost partially or in full their work capacity due to poor health status” (the national integration strategy of the republic of bulgaria [2012-2020]). 22 “in three years, a bulgarian education project has brought down the number of children who drop out of school by almost 80%” (the european union and the roma factsheet bulgaria). 23 “80-95 roma mediators appointed in local employment offices; community development centers (cdc) promoting the employment of young people and women in marginalized roma communities were set up in 11 municipalities; job fairs targeted at the most disadvantaged including roma” (the european union and the roma factsheet bulgaria). 24 “mobile medical units and mediators in areas where the majority lacks health insurance; x-ray, immunization of children, medical and gynaecological exams, screenings and prevention of hiv and tib; health education and awareness raising campaigns” (the european union and the romafactsheet bulgaria). 25 “launch of an eu co-financed housing initiative to provide quality homes within an integrated approach (addressing also employment, education, and health challenges simultaneously) for roma people in 4 municipalities (burgas, dupnitsa, vidin, dnevnya)” (the european union and the roma factsheet bulgaria). 26 “training for police forces on human rights and minority issues; local actions include: legal support and information of rights; encouraging roma women to participate in public life and the protection of the rights of roma children through improvement of parental capacity and car” (the european union and the roma factsheet bulgaria). references “action plan for the implementation of the framework programme for roma integration”. newsletter 2003: 35-40. avara, hayriye and bruno mascitelli. 2014. “do as we say, not as we do”: eu to turkey on roma/gypsy integration”. european review, volume 22 (1), february. retrieved february 4, 2020 (http://journals. cambridge.org/abstract_s1062798713000690) bakalova, maria. 1999. “the bulgarian ethnic model. legal ffamework and policy aspects”. in bulgaria: facing cultural diversity, edited by goedele de keersmaeker and plamev makariev. sofia: ipis in cooperation with access. cohen, emil. 2005. “the 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youth, balkan crisis report, institute for war and peace reporting, no. 555, 11 may. retrieved february 4, 2020 (www. iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/bcr3/bcr3_200505_555_6_eng.txt) sigona, nando and nihditrehan. 2010. the (re)criminalization of roma communities in a neoliberal europe”. retrieved february 4, 2020 (https://www.academia.edu/36599837/_the_re_criminalisation_ of_roma_communities_in_a_neoliberal_europe_in_racial_ criminalization_of_migrants_in_the_21st_century_ed._s._ palidda_london_ashgate_press_2010) slavkova, magdalena. 2007. “evangelical gypsies in bulgaria: way of life and performance of identity”, romani studies 5, 17(2): 205–246. retrieved february 4, 2020 (https://www.academia. edu/2133446/evangelical_gypsies_in_bulgaria_way_of_life_ and_performance_of_identity) the national integration strategy of the republic of bulgaria (20122020). council of ministers. retrieved january 22, 2020 (https:// ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/roma_bulgaria_strategy_en.pdf) todorov, todor. 2011. “country report – bulgaria”. in measures to promote the situation of roma citizens in the eu: country reports, directorate-general for internal policies, european parliament. retrieved january 22, 2020 (http://www.europarl. europa.eu/regdata/etudes/etudes/join/2011/432747/ipol-libe_ et(2011)432747_en.pdf) tomova, ilona. 2002. “problems of the roma in bulgaria”. in bulgariayugoslavia: journalism in intercultural dialogue, sofia: access. yaneva, maria. 1999. “system of central and local government: political participation and civil participation of minorities in bulgaria”. in bulgaria facing cultural diversity. zahariev, atanas. 2017. “hate crime and hate speech against roma in bulgaria, the czech republic and hungary”. in countering antigypsyism in europe, edited by guillermo ruiz torres.the greens/efa in the european parliament. retrieved february 4, 2020 (https://www.academia.edu/35814965/countering_antigypsyism_ in_europe_ed.) in search of the imagined ummah: explaining the political crossover of islamic conservatism in indonesia’s 2019 presidential election journal of asian social science research 2020, vol. 2, no. 2: 109-134 http://jassr.cassr.web.id © the author(s) 2020 article andar nubowo* ecole normale supérieure (ens) lyon, france abstract it has been admitted that the 212 movements constituted not only a socio-religious driving force but also a political one in contemporary indonesia. in the 2019 presidential election, conservative islamic camps that had anger and resentments toward president joko widodo (jokowi) as he was regarded incapable of solving crises and keen on discriminating against islam and ulama came up together to win prabowo subianto-sandiaga uno. based on qualitative field research in some areas of indonesia, this article analyses the diffusion of some islamic groups with their grand narratives and discourses, and their involvement in prabowo-sandiaga’s campaign, considered as a fast track of establishing a utopia of the imagined ummah (united muslim community). in the light of an islamic activism and social movement theory, it concludes that such a political crossover is a kind of new islamic activism and social movement. it has not been merely rooted in a conservative outlook of islam, but also in their dissatisfaction and contention over jokowi’s social and economic policies. this kind of new islamic social movement would affect contemporary indonesian religious and political realms. key words indonesian presidential election, political crossover, conservative muslims, moderate islam, islamic solidarity, islamic da’wa, constitutional jihad introduction in the post-suharto era, islamism emerged in various islamic social and political movements brandishing the enactment of sharia or caliphate (effendi 2004: 401; osman 2018; hasan 2006). various and different islamic conservative groups have been exploiting the elections to posit * andar nubowo, address: 15 parvis rene descartes 69007 lyon, france emails: andar.nubowo@gmail.com; andar.nubowo@ens-lyon.fr 110 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 2, 2020 their “ideal muslim leaders” (ipac 2018). in this vein, they have zealously been promoting mayor and governor candidates taking benefits of the electoral democracy system after reformasi in 1998. seeing their victory in the 2017 jakarta gubernatorial election, they become more convinced that such spirit of islam would also matter in the 2019 presidential election. in so doing, they supported voluntarily and militantly prabowo subianto and sandiaga salahudin uno (prabowo-sandi), likely their total vote for anies baswedan and sandiaga uno in the 2017 jakarta gubernatorial election, in expecting the fast-track fulfillment of their islamic utopia in the country. facing his old rival in indonesia’s 2019 presidential election, joko widodo, well known as jokowi, nominated nahdlatul ulama (nu)’s supreme leader (rais ‘am) and majelis ulama indonesia (mui; indonesian council of ulama)’s general chairman, ma’ruf amin, as his running mate. it was eventually a masterstroke for prabowo’s camp as well as conservatives. in the election, jokowi-ma’ruf then gained 85, 6 million votes (55, 5%). they won in some javanese and non-muslim strongholds like jakarta, central java, yogyakarta, east java, west kalimantan, central kalimantan, east kalimantan, north sumatra, lampung, central sulawesi and north sulawesi, maluku, papua, bali, and east nusa tenggara. meanwhile, in contrast, prabowo-sandi accumulated only 69,6 million votes (44,5%) (“hitung hasil suara pemilu presiden & wakil presiden ri 2019”) by conquering some muslim strongholds such as banten, west java, aceh, west sumatera, riau, jambi, bengkulu, south kalimantan, west nusa tenggara, south sulawesi, southeast sulawesi, and north maluku. this electoral result reflected the return of ethnic cleavages and identity (pepinsky 2019), regional polarization, and politics of aliran in contemporary indonesian politics (dinarto and nubowo 2020:128-144; hasyim 2020:75-89). it also attested to a pressing “conservative turn” phenomenon within indonesian islam (bruinessen 2013). this rising tendency also gained traction in indonesian urban muslims, specifically the young generation, even those of moderate islam muhammadiyah and nahdlatul ulama organizations, especially after the 212 movements and the 2017 gubernatorial election with two pair candidates, basuki tjahaya purnama-saiful djarot and anies baswedan-sandiaga uno (sebastian and nubowo 2019). furthermore, the two moderate organizations were said to be supposedly ‘contingent democrats’, supporting both democratic liberalism and non-democratic values (menchik 2019:415-433). moderate muslim student organizations (hmi, imm, and pmii) were less attractive than islamist student organizations (kammi and gema hti)1 in 111andar nubowo universities (arifianto 2019: 415-433). some scholars revealed then that the return of ideological competition, rising islamism, and executive illiberalism in most recently organized elections provoked and led to a democratic decline (aspinall 2019). nevertheless, little scholarship has been done in understanding the phenomenon of a political crossover between multiple islamic groups in the 2019 elections. therefore, this article aims to fill this gap in the literature by asking the following questions: why did political convergence happen among various conservative islamic groups in indonesia’s 2019 presidential election? how did they mobilize their resources to support their candidate? what is its effect on contemporary indonesian politics and islam? to answer these questions, i conducted qualitative field research in some areas of indonesia (west sumatra, north sumatera, central java, yogyakarta, surakarta, south sulawesi, and north sulawesi). to sharpen some related issues, many in-depth interviews and focus group discussions were also conducted with muslim activists of muhammadiyah, nahdlatul ulama, of islamic defenders front (front pembela islam [fpi]), wahdah islamiyah (wi), salafi movement networks, and tarbiyah movements in those areas.2 in the light of islamic activism and social movement theory approach, this article, firstly, will focus on “the mobilization of contention to support muslim causes”. secondly, it will describe “how resources are mobilized for such activism”. thirdly, it will have a look at the cultural, religious, and ideological structure and disposition in presenting opportunities for activism (wictorowicz 2004). in this sense, by analytically describing the collected data, this article will figure out islamic factors (islamic credentials) which became very decisive and pertinent for both candidates in the elections. it will also unearth some common-shared islamic grand narratives and discourses diffused by conservative camps in the presidential election’s campaign. then, it will slightly reveal some actors, institutionally and individually, who make such political convergence possibly happens. finally, the article will map out some implications of this new emerging trend of a conservative political crossover to the future of indonesian islam and political realms. islamic credentials indonesia’s 2019 presidential election was an old rival face-off whereby some electoral issues were a reproduction of that of the 2014 presidential election such as the economy, nationalism, social, and political identity 112 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 2, 2020 (fealy 2019). however, the situation was not the same, as the “conservative turn” indicated by the massive organization of the aksi bela islam on 2 december 2016 might be a game-changer. the 212 movements were seen as the rise of religious and political conservatism which aims at islamising indonesian life. indeed, it was not just merely a religious and political movement against the incumbent governor of jakarta basuki tjahaja purnama (ahok) but also became a standpoint for the rise of religious and political conservatism within indonesian muslim society (mietzner and muhtadi 2018:479). interestingly, the 212 movements became much more pivotal in shaping indonesian politics. it not only encouraged muslims to express their political opinion and behaviors, but also prompted elite politicians, political parties, and presidential candidates to be more accommodative toward islamic causes and factors. in this regard, both joko widodo (jokowi) and prabowo subianto’s camps had to consider the new rising islamic conservatism within indonesian socio-political contexts. it has been argued that it was prabowo’s camp and his conservative supporters who manipulated islam to pursue their political gains. nevertheless, jokowi performed also such parallel politicization of islam. to some extent, he managed better this issue than his rival. considering islam as a dominant political driving force in the election, jokowi made a series of political “triangulation” maneuvers by approaching conservative muslims and ulama (tornquist 2019:459-474). he nominated ali mochtar ngabalin, a conservative muslim politician and former prabowo’s spokesperson in the 2014 election, to join the office of the presidential staff (ksp). his task was to communicate jokowi’s policies to the public, especially muslim audiences. ngabalin became then a blatant spokesperson of ksp who defended jokowi’s policies and confronted the oppositions, especially that of his conservative fellows. it was reported that jokowi approached two moderate islam organizations, nahdlatul ulama (nu) and muhammadiyah. he frequently met nu’s ulama and structural leaders, notably its supreme leader (rais ‘am), ma’ruf amin, on several occasions. he also visited many traditional islamic boarding schools (pesantren) that belong to this traditionalist organization, especially in java. during his safari visit to pesantrens, his photos wearing a sarong and black peci got published and became viral through every social media platform. it is interesting to observe that since those frequent rendez-vous, the nu’s supreme leader reportedly conveyed some compliments overtly to jokowi. on many occasions, ma’ruf amin encouraged ulama and muslims not to hesitate to support the former jakarta governor. “i invite ulama to support jokowi,” said 113andar nubowo ma’ruf amin. to secure his card within modernist islam, jokowi also made political rapprochement maneuvers toward muhammadiyah, the biggest modernist islamic organization in indonesia. he reshuffled anies baswedan from his ministry by appointing muhajir effendy, one of the chairmen at the muhammadiyah national board, to lead the ministry of national education. he also invited din syamsudin to his administration as a special envoy for dialogue on religion and civilization civilization who then resigned later from his office in september 2019. to raise his islamic credentials among majelis ulama indonesia (mui), jokowi supported sharia economic programs. having a central position among indonesian muslims, mui constituted a strategic partner for the government. mui delivered jokowi’s sharia economic programs such as the construction of the mui tower in jakarta and minimart networks owned by lembaga ekonomi umat (leu) affiliated to mui (“presiden luncurkan ritel modern leu umat”). it is effortlessly discernable when maruf amin stated overtly that jokowi was a nice person and that he had long been familiar with the president. he appreciated jokowi’s insatiable work ethos to develop indonesia by constructing infrastructures throughout indonesia. at the commemoration of partai persatuan pembangunan (ppp; union and development party) in semarang, amin narrated his conversation with the president: to speak frankly, i get interested in pak jokowi’s personality as a president. he is a humble man. what did i say? pak jokowi is chosen by allah to become a president. i said to pak jokowi: “if allah determines someone become whatsoever, he just says “kun faya kun” (creatio, ex nihilo). and then you get such kun faya kun, not anyone else. why did allah choose you? on your personality, there is something which is not in anyone. hence, allah lets you lead this country, to develop prosperity and welfare for this nation and state” (“ma’ruf amin puji kepribadian jokowi sebagai pemimpin”). ultimately, in this logical background, jokowi would say clearly that he had been close to islam and moderate islam in indonesia, represented by muhammadiyah, nu, and mui. his cunning strategies and maneuvers toward these influential two moderate organizations and the ulama council were intended to streamline them into his political status quo and considerations. furthermore, the nomination of ma’ruf amin was aimed at, particularly, consolidating moderate muslim voters and, on the other side, breaking down the conservative ones. 114 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 2, 2020 nevertheless, this nomination sparked controversies. within jokowi’s die-hard supporters themselves, ma’ruf amin was very unpopular. he had been long considered as the notorious intellectual actor behind the blasphemous allegation over ahok and his two-year imprisonment. his opinion on religious diversity and pluralism had been considerably criticized and questioned (burhani and simanjuntak 2018). some islamists concomitantly accused him of having betrayed the islamic struggle and ummah when he turned to jokowi’s camp by accepting his nomination as a vice presidential candidate (schaffer 2019: 235-255). however, as we might know, ultimately, jokowi’s unpopular strategy was effective in discouraging prabowo’s islamic credentials among his conservative muslim supporters. in this context, by nominating ma’ruf, jokowi himself needed to appease conservative muslim’s contention and resentments as well as to consolidate and secure nahdliyin’s (nu followers) votes. nevertheless, it is worth noting, through his state apparatus, jokowi also allegedly repressed conservative leaders. a chairman of fpi and a most notorious leader of the 212 aksi bela islam, rizieq shihab, had to flee to saudi arabia. he was allegedly accused of having a sex chat scandal and other “subversive” statements on pancasila and some ethnic and religious groups. a salafi network prominent figure and coordinator of the national movement for guarding fatwa (gnpf-mui), bahtiar nasir, was also accused of supplying illegal weapons to palestine fighters through his aql charity funds (ipac 2018). those allegations sparked further controversies among the indonesian muslim population. in the meantime, we witnessed rizieq and nasir became the symbol of socioreligious and political contention toward jokowi. for their supporters, they were “martyrs” for their struggle and jihad against the political repression and the outlawing of ulama. this contention against jokowi has triggered further the newly emerging political crossover of religious conservatism in nowadays indonesian politics. prabowo enjoyed a wide range of muslim (islamist) networks since he was active in the indonesian national military (hefner 2000). he also enjoyed his father sumitro djojohadikusumo’s political legacy. sumitro’s affiliation to the indonesian socialist party (psi), to some extent, facilitated him to have these wide-ranging conservative networks which inherited masyumi’s political legacy. historically, the masyumi and psi were banned undemocratically by sukarno in 1960 as they converged in a point to confront sukarno’s politics. in west sumatera, for instance, as a biological son of sumitro djoyohadikusumo, prabowo was quite popular among the muslim population, due to the historical alignment between 115andar nubowo masyumi and psi in the period of the local rebellion of prri (adriwanto and sebastian 2020:108-127). in this socio-political context, it is easy to understand why prabowo became a magnetic political leader among muslim supporters in 2014 and 2019. his long historical proximity to islamist and conservative groups permitted him to get easily backed up by wide-ranging and diverse muslim leaders and population. thus, for the prabowo-sandi’s camp, such muslim image and credentials were indeed pivotal for political mobilization. through a series of campaigns, prabowo was idealized and romanticized as the best muslim candidate who was friendly to islam and not hostile to islamic causes and muslims’ aspirations. despite his father’s socialist and abangan (nominal) muslim and his non-muslim mother, prabowo was known for having established widespread relations with muslim intellectuals and activists who occasionally named him “umar ibn khattab”, the second caliph in the early islam, for his bravery and sincerity toward islamic causes. in this regard, it is easy to understand, prabowo and his political team made the islamic (modernist) and conservative support as the basis for his support of the presidential elections in the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections. prabowo’s credentials and his proximity to islam, denoted by his black peci and specific islamic terms and word such as allahu akbar, alhamdulillah, and insha allah, were regarded as a symbolic attempt to polish his islamic credentials among the muslims’ eyes. prabowo was seen as competent in taking and winning conservative islamic groups’ hearts and minds. unlike his contender supposedly hostile to islam, the former commander of the elite military kopassus, on the contrary, promised to protect ulama and other religious leaders from any criminalization or persecution. he then condemned, further, growing persecution against several ulama in his camps such as rizieq shihab, bachtiar nasir, and alfian tanjung. in front of his thousands of supporters in jakarta convention center in january 2019, prabowo said: it is essential that, in our national history, the role of ulama is of enormous significance in our struggle. indeed, indonesian independence was proclaimed in jakarta on 17 august 1945. nevertheless, such independence was examined and challenged (by the aggressors) in surabaya, east jawa. the battle that happened in surabaya had been supported by a jihad revolution by the great ulama (“prabowo: kami akan pastikan pemuka agama-ulama bebas kriminalisasi”). 116 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 2, 2020 prabowo seemed to understand that his most prominent supporters came from modernist, conservative, and islamist muslims. it is easy to understand why prabowo tended to use islamic populism such as hajj issues, financial and economic issues, and foreign debts (“janji prabowo di depan ulama”). to attract more supporters and polish his democratic profile and credentials, he also promised to defend any religious groups following the constitution and the ideology of pancasila. this statement was likely intended to answer the accusations that he protected fpi and hti, regarded as anti the constitution of 1945 and pancasila. on the other hand, it was also aimed at attacking jokowi’s policy that was leaning toward democratic decline due to allegedly persecution and criminalization against his opposing voices. to polish his tolerant image, prabowo was not reluctant to show publicly his religiously plural background of his own family. on gerindra’s facebook page (24 december 2011), he stated that his family consisted of religiously plural backgrounds. his father was a javanese muslim, while his mother was a christian. according to him, the principle of pluralism and multiculturalism has been highly respected in his family. therefore, he claimed to be accustomed to religious differences and pluralism and to be close to other religious groups such as christianity, catholicism, and even jews. once again, in his facebook, prabowo conveyed further that he grew up with muslim colleagues and activists, including traditionalist ulama that belong to nu. strategy patterns of using islamic identity politics were also performed by prabowo’s running mate sandiaga uno. sandiaga is well known as a young businessman, instead of being a muslim santri or coming from a santri family. however, after running for jakarta pilkada with anies baswedan, suddenly his ‘santri’ image was politically well polished. to polish sandiaga’s islamic credential, it was pks who called him “a new santri of post islamism” (“pks jelaskan definisi santri postislamisme sandiaga uno”). his soft discourse and rhetoric full of islamic phrases such as insha allah, alhamdulillah, and subhanallah made his muslim militants effortlessly idealize him as a young santri post-islamist leader. initially, sandiaga felt uncomfortable with such a new identity, as he has never been to any pesantren. however, he finally enjoyed his new nickname (“sandiaga sempat bingung dengan julukan santri di era postislamisme”). ultimately, in the lead of the election, conservative ulama issued a fatwa through the ijtimak ulama (ulama consensus) supporting prabowo-sandi in the 2019 election (“ini alasan ijtimak ulama capreskan prabowo subianto”). they believed that by supporting prabowo-sandi, the 117andar nubowo project of deep islamization in nusantara would be in fast-track fulfillment. in this regard, they were engaged voluntarily and militantly in the long campaign to win this ‘ideal’ and ‘best muslim presidential candidate’. grand islamic narratives during the 2019 election, there were unimpeded and massive circulations of grand political narratives through social media platforms (facebook, youtube, instagram, twitter, and whatsapp). both jokowi and prabowo’s camps generated concomitantly political discourses and narratives to win the fierce electoral battle. in this sense, they created coherent narratives out of the complicated reality of political and human life. these narratives had an impact on the political agency and ultimately constructed social and political orders by drawing on limited narrative resources. the process of narration was necessarily selective because there was always more than one story to tell. narratives are thus tools to understand, negotiate, and make sense of situations they encounter (graef et al. 2018:2-3). in the case of the election, narratives are “equipment for conquering and winning.” within prabowo’s militant supporters, there were grand islamic narratives and discourses which were widely distributed throughout the country. these include “prabowo and sandiaga are good muslims”, “prabowo-sandi pair is an ideal muslim candidate”, “prabowo is competent to tackle social-economic agonies”, “prabowo-sandi’s victory is for an islamisation of the country”, “jokowi is hostile to islam”, “jokowi outlaws, criminalizes, and persecutes ulama”, “ma’ruf is less convincing”, “jokowi is incompetent”, “jokowi is close to the chinese-non muslim tycoons, “alukhuwah al-islamiyah”, “islamic da’wah”, “constitutional and political jihad against jokowi-ma’ruf, enabling an islamic khayru ummah”. these narratives and discourses were readily accepted by prabowo’s political agents and then were exploited as political instruments and weapons to obstruct the rival camp. in some areas of west sumatera, north sumatera, central java, south sulawesi, and north sulawesi, some conservative islamic groups accepted and distributed those narratives and discourses. they portrayed both candidates jokowi-ma’ruf and prabowo-sandi differently. jokowi was considered too late to accommodate muslim aspirations. he was also seen as having criminalized some ulama and persecuted political opposition in the name of political stability and order. also, ma’ruf amin was not enough for convincing them to burnish jokowi’s image as a good muslim. some traditional kyai in a very influential local pesantren as’adiyah sengkang, wajo, south sulawesi, interestingly asserted: 118 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 2, 2020 we would prefer to have a cup of kopi pahit (black coffee) with a little sugar than that of kopi susu dengan teh (milk coffee blended with tea). kyai ma’ruf amin insufficiently convinces us to polish and burnish jokowi’s islamic credential. we then prefer to vote a humbler and more honest sandiaga, even though he was born a nominal muslim, than kyai ma’ruf”.3 surprisingly, the traditionalist kyai culturally affiliated to nu also said that ma’ruf selection as jokowi’s running mate would endanger and tarnish ulama and mui’s credibility. they stated further their preference: “we want to vote for prabowo-sandi. albeit not good santri, they are close to islam and muslim aspirations. he is a kopi pahit with a little sugar (little islamic credentials)”. furthermore, amid the conservative muslim groups, there were massively circulated narratives that president joko widodo was hopeless in terms of economic grievances. jokowi’s projects ignited economic grievances and resentments among conservative muslim groups. they then looked at jokowi’s economic policies as hostile and detrimental to muslims’ economic welfare and prosperity. jokowi’s economic policy which was seen as pro-liberalist and capitalist during his first mandate was considered proof of jokowi’s incompetency to tackle the problem. some religious leaders in makassar south sulawesi revealed their discontent to jokowi-ma’ruf.4 the common-shared resentment toward jokowi also came up within conservative muslim groups in medan, north sumatra. accordingly, jokowi was regarded to have caused indonesia’s economy to slump and regress by hiring chinese workers in indonesia on many infrastructure projects. they said further that jokowi, in place of muslims’ interests, was so close to the “nine dragons” (non-muslim and chinese conglomerates).5 the imbalance in economic growths and property, most of which are in the hands of non-muslim tycoons, was a useful tool to bolster the tragedy of injustice and economic depression among the muslim community. in this sense, the ijtimak ulama which was held by conservative politicians and ulama in jakarta issued a fatwa for obliging all muslims to vote without any reserve prabowo-sandi in the 2019 election (“ijtimak ulama ii sepakat dukung prabowo di pilpres 2019”). the fatwa was based on the perception that the pair was no atrocity toward islam and muslims’ interest. the conservative ulama believed that the prabowo-sandi pair was highly competent to tackle such pressing issues and closer to islamic causes 119andar nubowo than jokowi-ma’ruf. they crafted and diffused islamic discourses and narratives such as al-ukhuwah al-islamiyah (islamic solidarity), islamic da’wah, and constitutional jihad. these discourses served to motivate all muslims to pursue the title of khayru ummah, the best community, by voting for prabowo-sandi in the election. for conservatives, the three tenets were inherently embodied in their thought and action in pursuing their ultimate objective of islamizing the country. based on the fatwa above, the conservative groups struggled for defeating jokowi-ma’ruf. they called this duty of constitutional jihad for every muslim. rahmat surya, a local ustadz and businessman in medan, said: why is it a jihad? ahok is already finished. right now, we do jihad for stopping jokowi. he is the enemy of islam as he has been criminalizing our ulama. constitutional jihad is our obligation. to defeat jokowi-ma’ruf and to win prabowo-sandi is an obligation for all muslims. i believe that voting for prabowo’s victory is part of spiritual and religious obligation. it is following the ulama’s political fatwa. if i wrongly choose prabowo-sandi, at least my sin belongs to ulama’s responsibility. however, on the contrary, if i wrongly choose jokowi-ma’ruf, then no one bears my sin, because the ulama do not support them. by the spirit of jihad, we must conduct campaigns for prabowo militantly and voluntarily.6 it is interesting to note that religiously political narratives generated volunteerism. in the name of jihad and for the sake of the glorious islam and muslim community (‘izz al-islam wa al-muslimin), diverse muslim groups got engaged militantly in campaigning prabowo-sandi’s victory. they principally consisted of muslim activists and supporters of the 212 movements who were famous in their jihad’s spirit in islamic causes and interests. such volunteerism also was found in all provinces of indonesia. in north sulawesi, muhammad as’ad, an islamic teacher at the pesantren darul istiqamah manado, was voluntarily called to the rank of local prabowo-sandi’s camp. he then created a volunteer group for prabowosandi in manado. acknowledging that he never received any financial support from the party coalition or prabowo-sandi’s team, they raised funds by themselves to run the campaign. they hoped that what they did for prabowo’s victory become part of jihad for islam.7 120 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 2, 2020 interestingly, in south sulawesi, some politicians from jokowi’s coalition parties differed from the official party’s policy and decision in that they blatantly supported prabowo-sandi. they argued that prabowosandi represented their local values leadership which was in line with the sulawesi muslim’s indigenous islamic history.8 moreover, in central java, prabowo-sandi volunteers never lost their militancy. their spirit and energy of jihad did not make them recede to winning their best candidate although they admitted that it was so difficult to convince nu and abangan people. in west java, it was reported that having been ignited by the spirit of jihad, some hijabi female activists conducted campaigns for prabowo militantly and voluntarily. by conducting a door-to-door campaign, they were firmly convinced it was inherently part of their jihad for enacting their utopia. according to them, this islamic utopia would be hindered to exist by jokowi-ma’ruf’s victory. in contrast to prabowo’s muslim supporters, jokowi’s camp volunteerism was relatively low. their supporters were not as militant as it was in the 2014 presidential election. in south sulawesi, a member of jokowi’s coalition party would not be engaged in any campaign, if there was not any campaign fund.9 an indonesian film director indra gunawan testified: “i was involved in the campaign for jokowi in the 2014 [presidential election]. but in the 2019 [presidential election], i was no longer active, although i chose him finally”.10 however, among nu’s elites, clerics, and members, another jihad and political militancy for the jokowi-mar’uf’s total victory was astonishing. different from the jokowi’s party coalition, nu volunteers were vehemently militant campaigners. this could be understood because for them, as the most prominent traditionalist muslim scholar, ma’ruf amin is their highly respected rais am (supreme leader). for a young nu cleric in pesantren ma’hadut thalabah, babakan madang, brebes in central jawa, the 2019 election constituted a real battle for nu between victory or glory (kemenangan dan kejayaan) and loss and shame (kekalahan dan hal memalukan). he said enthusiastically: “if the pair of pak jokowi and kyai ma’ruf lose the election, all nu followers will bear a big shame”.11 the nature of conservative convergence it is stimulating to observe how the grand political narratives were widely distributed and readily accepted by islamist and conservative camps in the 2019 presidential election. we might analyze the phenomenon of “deep islamization” through insatiable campaigns of “syariat islam, 121andar nubowo nkri bersyariat and khilafah islamiyyah” (islamic sharia, the unitary state of indonesia with sharia and islamic caliphates).12 despite their different objectives, those islamist and conservative groups came up with a common cause to establish sharia in indonesia. the great victory of the 212 movements in putting ahok in jail and winning anies baswedan in the 2017 jakarta gubernatorial elections motivated them to nominate muslim candidates who are supportive of their exclusive islamist agenda and utopia. interestingly, this phenomenon was not detached from the role significantly played by mui, muhammadiyah, and nu’s conservative elements. those elements were involved in rallies for some islamic issues and cause with other conservative elements of salafi-wahabism, tarbiyah, and caliphate movements. some elements of conservatism within mui, muhammadiyah, and nu always stand for the nkri and pancasila. meanwhile, wahdah islamiyah and fpi are of a utopia for establishing the “nkri with sharia”. in contrast, the council of indonesian jihadist (majelis mujahidin indonesia, mmi) and hti idealize an enactment of an islamic state or caliphate in place of pancasila and nkri. despite their differences, those conservative elements are united by islamic doctrines of islamic solidarity, islamic propagation, and constitutional jihad to construct the “imagined” islamic community in indonesia. the mui has facilitated the fast-spreading of islamic conservatism in indonesia. it accommodates all variants of islamic organizations, moderate or conservative groups, except the shiite organizations such as the indonesian association of ahlul bait congregation (ijabi) and indonesian ahlul bait (abi). although muhammadiyah and nu dominated the mui, some smaller conservative organizations were vocal minorities that were undoubtedly able to influence mui’s islamic edicts (fatwa). since the reformasi, the conservative elements have been successful, little by little, in transforming the mui to be more conservative. in 2005, the mui issued a fatwa condemning western ideologies of secularism, liberalism, and pluralism. mui was reportedly friendly to pluralism during its inception in 1980 until 1998. however, after the reformasi, the organization turned to conservatism by condemning pluralism which is recognized culturally and constitutionally in the indonesian realm (hasyim 2015:487-495). the ahok’s blasphemy case and the emergence of the national safeguard of mui’s fatwa (gnpf-mui) are the best examples of such conservative influence and tendency within the mui’s direction. furthermore, the conservative islamist groups were nimbler than muhammadiyah and nu. in urban areas and cities, muhammadiyah 122 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 2, 2020 and nu have been challenged by new emerging conservative islamic organizations and groups that more adept at exploiting their weakness. being preoccupied with large organizational affairs and business charities, the two organizations pay greater attention to elite concerns and politics. consequently, they are not well-equipped to cope with fastmoving religious and social change at the grassroots level. in this regard, it is not hard to discern that religious conservatism becomes visible and gains traction among the members of the moderate organizations. in several muhammadiyah’s pesantrens and universities in central java and yogyakarta, there have been women teachers (ustadzah) and students who wear a burqa.13 in this regard, a fully veiled female activist and secretary of sukoharjo branch of muhammadiyah student association (imm) shared her story: i have been wearing a burqa since i was in the second semester of study at my university. it does not impede my social activism. i wear it not because it is an islamic obligation, found in al-quran or hadith, but mainly in the interests of my safety. i do not subscribe to any radical ideology. it is uncomfortable if someone stares at me. i have the freedom to wear a burqa. i am still active at imm as i think that donning a full burqa is a private matter and there is no rule disallowing it. i am wonderfully comfortable and will remain active in muhammadiyah.14 moreover, at the regional level of muhammadiyah, there has been a rapprochement of conservatism. regional or local activists of muhammadiyah have been keen to invite some conservative religious preachers such as bachtiar nasir, adi hidayat, and activists of the banned islamic organizations like sobri lubis of front pembela islam (fpi) and felix siauw of hizbut tahrir indonesia (hti). in other words, “they prefer inviting bachtiar nasir to haedar nashir, muhammadiyah’s general chairman”. in february 2018, the muhammadiyah branch (pimpinan cabang muhammadiyah [pcm]) of mantrijeron yogyakarta invited the chairman of fpi, sobri lubis, to deliver a religious sermon. the pcm kauman yogyakarta invited an infamous activist of hti, felix shiauw, to give his religious reflection at the great mosque of yogyakarta at the end of the year 2017. the catchphrase “back to the quran and sunnah” is a standard rallying call of such conservative ideology. it is not hard for islamist groups to find a convergent point with the conservative strain 123andar nubowo of muhammadiyah. this convergence is happening in many religious events or even politics. buya risman muchtar from the muhammadiyah department of tabligh (islamic predication) stated that muhammadiyah could collaborate with any other islamic organizations, including conservative ones (nubowo 2018). it is quite common to say that compared to muhammadiyah, nu’s structural body of the organization is more immune to conservatism. it is not easy to imagine that someone without a genealogical lineage of a kyai and pesantren educational background could obtain an influential position in the nu organization. nu has been fortunate thanks to the progressive role and ideas of the late kyai abdurrahman wahid (gus dur). during his long tenure in the chairmanship post, he successfully fostered culturally and intellectually the ideas of tolerance and moderation among nu members. nevertheless, there has been a rallying phenomenon of rapprochement between nu’s ulama and conservative religious ideas and movements. in the 1999 nu congress, the bahtsul masail committee issued a fatwa prohibiting inter-religious prayer meetings, frequently practiced by gus dur. such events arguably contradicted with shari’a, and therefore haram (religiously forbidden). the committee also declared that it was haram for a non-muslim to be a political leader in indonesia (bush 2000:80-81). this fatwa is similar to the conservative groups’ argument which was used to reject ahok, a chinese-christian candidate, in the 2017 jakarta gubernatorial election. furthermore, at regional or local levels, nu’s kyais and followers were strongly associated with more symbolic expressions of islam and conservative discourses. in 2011, east java governor, soekarwo, issued a provincial decree no. 188/94/kpts/013/2011 banning the existence of jamaah ahmadiyah indonesia. this decree was supported by nu clerics stating that ahmadiyah’s doctrine on the prophecy of mirza ghulam ahmad was not in line with nu’s teachings and the aswaja doctrines. hasyim muzadi, former nu chairman, enunciated that all ahmadiyah activities had to be banned in indonesia following the ministerial decree (skb) of religious affairs, home affairs, and the attorney general office (kejagung). said aqil siraj, the current nu chairman, and the east java provincial nu (pwnu) also supported the ban of ahmadiyah. however, they constated that ahmadis should be respected as muslim fellows and be reconverted to the correct line of islam (“nu, ahmadiyah, dan fpi”). in the case of tajul muluk and the shiite community in sampang, madura, nu’s local branch (pcnu) of sampang condemned muluk’s shiite teachings as heresy and a deviation of islam. he then was forced 124 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 2, 2020 to sign a statement that he would refrain from teaching shiite doctrines and movement in madura. the expulsion of shi’a islam has been a humanitarian tragedy (kontras surabaya 2012: 5). nu’s stance and opposition against ahmadiyah and shi’a islam may constitute a significant setback for enlightened, tolerant, and moderate islamic discourses and narratives within this largest islamic organization in indonesia. moreover, in fact, in many local areas of east java such as bangkalan, pamekasan, and bojonenegoro, there has been an alliance and cooperation between conservative elements of nu with the conservative groups, especially with fpi. being close to the aswaja and nu, fpi has received support from nu local conservative clerics. in bangkalan, madura, again, to put an example, nu local kyais supported or even became leaders of a local branch of fpi (hamdi 2013:71-95). this habib rizieq-led organization has been seen as a brother of islam that wants to do “compelling the good deed and forbidding the bad one”. this da’wah has no contradiction with nu’s aswaja ideology and doctrines. they also have common cultural traditions of respecting habib (plural: habaib) and of honoring sheik muhammad alawi al-maliki. many nu members and students study and seek the blessings of this most prominent traditionalist ulama in saudi arabia. former maliki students, luthfi bashori and habib abdurrahman bin husain bahlega assegaf, are dubbed as an advisor of fpi-east java and an imam of fpi respectively. in this context, al-maliki and nu garis lurus networks led them to have mutual understandings leading to convergence and alliance (iqbal 2020:107-108). other nu conservative figures in east java serve as the rallying factor of such conservative convergence: idrus romli (majelis intelektual ulama muda indonesia [miumi]), jurjiz muzammil (head of fpi sumenep), and syarifuddin surur (leader of fpi pamekasan) (ipac 2018: 9-11). the rising political crossover conservatism is also characterized by the emergence of young ustadzs who gain popularity thanks to social media platforms. through their easy-to-understand lectures uploaded on youtube and other social media platforms, these young conservative preachers became famous as a new role model of islamic preachers among muslims, such as bachtiar nashir, abdul shomad,15 adi hidayat, 16 khalid bassalamah, buya yahya,17 and teuku zulkarnain.18 these smart urban muslim preachers and teachers are indeed brilliant in benefiting the growing importance of social media and technology. their religious sermons and activities had become viral and viewed by hundreds of thousands of viewers. the conservative ustadzs also gain a broader public audience through television channels. they create islamic content for 125andar nubowo islamic soap operas and islamic ftv compelling to a broader islamisation among muslims. also, they are of numerous broadcasting channels that belong to conservative groups such as rodja tv and radio, fpitv, tvalakhyar, and radio rasil (radio silaturahmi). radio rasil, for instance, has been admitted to having 3 million active listeners in greater jakarta and other major cities in indonesia. in this case, the deep islamization project undertaken by conservative religious agencies in indonesia is of a wide range of networks within the public and private sectors. such networks shape considerably muslim voting behaviors in the elections by disseminating political and islamic messages and narratives. in urban areas, mosques and congregational lectures (majelis taklim) have been controlled by these smart and savvy social media ustadzs. they run regular friday sermons and ramadan meetings and activities to attract the muslim middle class and young generations. at the lower social class, the network of fpi has been effective in rallying muslim electoral. in this context, a few weeks before the presidential election, shomad and hidayat, zulkarnain, and other ustadzs called all muslims to vote for the prabowo-sandi pair. these new ustadzs represent different ideologies from salafi-wahabi to traditionalist and modernist islam. nevertheless, they have been converging on a shared and common call for supporting the prabowo-sandi pair militantly in search of their imagined ummah. polarisation and division among moderates amidst the emerging political convergence within the conservative and islamist element of indonesian islam, it is interesting to evoke the 2019 presidential election impacts on the two moderate muhammadiyah and nu. divisions or sub-divisions have been occurring within muhammadiyah and nu. surveys indicate that muhammadiyah members favored voting for prabowo-sandi and nu members favored for jokowi-mar’ruf. as has been revealed by some credible surveys, more than 50 percent of muhammadiyah members preferred prabowo-sandi to jokowi-ma’ruf. inversely, more than 50 percent of nu members were solid to back jokowima’ruf (“nu condong ke jokowi, muhammadiyah pilih prabowo”). this general configuration underpins a long-existing polarisation between the two mainstream indonesian islam. it reignites a fierce political division within indonesian islam in the 1950s. however, there were subdivisions within the two organizations (nubowo 2019:218-222). if we look further, there was an inter-polarisation 126 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 2, 2020 within muhammadiyah and nu members. muhammadiyah activists were sub-divided into two groups of supporters. some groups created jokowi’s volunteer networks such as relawan indonesia berkemajuan (rib), balad jokowi, and kaum milennial muhammadiyah (kammu). they supported jokowi-ma’ruf pairing militantly. besides, some muhammadiyah politicians with different party affiliations supported jokowi-ma’ruf such as raja juli antoni (psi), hajriyanto y. thohari (golkar party), ahmad rofiq (perindo party), and sutrisno bahir (pan party). but, other groups of volunteers within muhammadiyah in many regions supported prabowosandi such as aliansi pencerah indonesia (api). although muhammadiyah is a non-partisan organization, the polarisation within muhammadiyah members became more apparent than before. the polarisation also took place within nu both among structural and cultural nu clerics.19 in some areas in central and east java, some prominent clerics of “nu kultural” were very critical of said aqil siraj’s leadership who supported jokowima’ruf. for them, kyai said put the future of nu in danger. salahuddin wahid, a grandchild of the nu’s founding father, kyai hasyim asy’ari, criticized said aqil siraj’s nu leadership for being too deeply politicized in the 2019 presidential election. these ideological and political cleavages between nu and muhammadiyah occurred during the campaign period in some areas in central java, north sumatera, west sumatera, south sulawesi, and other provinces. for example, in jepara, tegal, purwokerto, wonosobo, solo, pare-pare, makassar, manado, padang, and medan, the majority of muhammadiyah members and activists were firmly convinced with prabowo-sandi’s presidential campaign projects (hasyim 2020:7689: dinarto and nubowo 2020:128-144). conversely, within the nu’s congregation and community, there was a firm conviction that the presidential battle belonged to them. for example, the political stance of the nu’s structural leaders in demak, jepara, kudus, and tegal in central java to win jokowi-ma’ruf was unquestionable. a nu leader in tegal said: it is not about only how to win pak jokowi and pak ma’ruf. rather, i is about our value to defend the foundations of pancasila and nkri. hti and other conservative groups will replace them with the islamic state and the global caliphate.20 in solo, nu local leaders accused muhammadiyah of being supportive of islamism and the islamic caliphate. to them, muhammadiyah did not 127andar nubowo love pancasila and the nkri as it was silent toward the rising phenomenon of radicalism and religious conservatism propounded by hti and other local islamist and neo-fundamentalist groups such as luis (laskar umat islam solo).21 for nu members, defending jokowi-ma’ruf’s victory was framed as defending the nkri and pancasila. such a narrative of defense was distributed in the name of jihad among nu followers. it is worth noting that the grand narratives circulated among nu elites and members seemed to counter the grand islamic narratives of conservative groups. this situation eventually reproduced religious and ideological frictions and divisions of the 1950s between modernist and traditionalist islam. in this vein, such tacit conflict within moderate islam has become more visible. this unfortunate situation is detrimental to cohesive solidarity within indonesian networks of moderates. as nu leaders in solo said: this is our critical time to win jokowi-ma’ruf. if the pair loses the battle, nu’s tradition will be threatened by another islamic ideology that tends to dispel nkri and pancasila and replace both with sharia. if the time comes, nu will ally with nationalist, abangan people, and even non-muslims to thwart them, including muhammadiyah people.”22 so, if the division and sub-division within moderate islam are unstoppable, it would be dangerous for indonesia. the rising and growing islamic conservatism could replace a tolerant and open-minded indonesian islam of muhammadiyah and nu. conclusion this article has shown that the scramble of islamic credentials among the elite power of indonesia indicates that indonesia’s 2019 presidential election constituted a new come back of 1950’s geertzian identity politics of aliran: santri, abangan, priyayi (geetz 1976). it has since created polarisation and sub-division among the indonesian population, including among moderate muslims. the weight of islam on the national (local) political stages also reflected the dynamic of the ongoing islamization and shariatization of the country. the rising phenomenon of political crossover of various islamic conservative groups and movements in indonesia’s 2019 presidential election -spanning from salafi-wahabi to traditionalist conservative onesseems to be not a run-off phenomenon 128 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 2, 2020 in the current indonesian political and religious landscape. in the light of islamic activism and social movement theory, this phenomenon becomes plausible as they share common muslim causes to mobilize their islamic and political activism and movements. their discontent, dissatisfaction, and resentment toward the current government’s social, political, and economic policies would be a tough perennial raison d’etre for their islamic activism and social movements. furthermore, they are of vast and widerange muslim networks and actors to deploy and circulate religious and political messages, narratives, and discourses among muslim fellows. by controlling off-line (mosques, schools, universities, and majelis ta’lim) and online realms (social media, internet tv and radio), they could effortlessly “win and conquer” muslim’s religious and political orientations and attitudes. finally, they also considered that the electoral democracy system and structure could be the best opportunity or momentum for electing pro-sharia muslim leaders. in this frame of mind, their volunteerism and political engagement in elections could be understood as being part of the constitutional jihad and islamic activism. indonesian islam is a contested realm of the established islam (muhammadiyah, nu, mui) with a moderate and progressive vision of islam. there are also new emerging islam (fpi, salafi-wahabi networks, hti, and tarbiyah movement-pks). they embrace a more conservative and rigorous strand of islam and are ready to siege the religious and political momentum. in this case, indeed, the moderate power of islam, such as muhammadiyah and nu, must be consistently consolidated. the weaker the moderate strength of islam, the more the conservative group allows appearing on the national stage. therefore, a moderate islamic group needs to re-establish its religious and social authority among muslims. they should retake over indonesian islamic discourses and narratives, enlightening the young muslim generation, and getting more engaged in addressing social, cultural, political, and economic grievances. moderate islam must also reinforce cohesiveness and solidity to build together a sustainable global peaceful effort and to curb the growing worldwide tendency leading to conservatism and exclusivism. funding the author(s) received financial support from indonesia programme, institute of defence and strategic studies, s rajaratnam school of international studies (rsis), the nanyang technological university of singapore to conduct field trip research in many areas of indonesia. 129andar nubowo 1 kesatuan aksi mahasiswa islam, kammi, has been oftenly described as an underbow organisation of the prosperous and justice party (pks), meanwhile gema pembebasan hizbut tahrir indonesia (gema hti) is a pro caliphate student organisation movement. kammi and gema hti have been in harsh competition in recruiting new students and members in some universities. indonesian islamic student movement (pergerakan mahasiswa islam indonesia [pmii]) is affiliated to nu and muhammadiyah student association (ikatan mahasiswa muhammadiyah [imm]) belongs to muhammadiyah, and islamic student association (himpunan mahasiswa islam [hmi]) is the oldest islamic student movement after indonesian independence of 1945. 2 i conducted field trips on the 2019 presidential election in several cities and provinces in indonesia: padang, padang panjang, bukittinggi, padang pariaman (west sumatera) and medan and karo (north sumatera), on 23-30 november 2018, makassar, wajo, pare-pare, south sulawesi and manado north sulawesi on 16-24 december 2018, semarang, demak, kudus, jepara, rembang, tegal, purwokerto, wonosobo, solo (central java) and yogyakarta, on 6-15 march 2019. 3 fgd’s with some traditionalist ulama of pesantren as’adiyah wajo south sulawesi on 25 november 2018. 4 interviews with dr. mostari basra (muhammadiyah) on 22 july 2018, ustadz saharudin (wahdah islamiyah) on 27 july 2018, and ustadz fahrudin ahmad (pesantren darul istiqamah), 1 august 2018 in makassar, south sulawesi. 5 ustadz slamet pohan, 28 november 2018 in medan north sumatera 6 interview with rahmat surya, a young islamic teacher and local muslim businessman, 28 november 2018 in medan, north sumatera. 7 interview with ustadz muhammad asad from pesantren darul istiqamah manado north sulawesi, 23 december 2018. 8 interview with erna taufan pawe, golkar‘s national legislative candidate, 20 december 2018 in pare-pare, south sulawesi. 9 interview with a legislative candidate of pan, mukhtar tompo, 18 december 2018 in makassar, south sulawesi. acknowledgments the authors would like to thank leonard c sebastian (rsis, nanyang technological university of singapore) and the anonymous reviewers for their comments. end notes 130 journal of asian social science research vol. 2, no. 2, 2020 10 interview with indra gunawan, 27 december 2019 in lyon, france. 11 interview with kyai aqib malik in pesantren ma’hadut thalabah, babakan slawi, tegal, central jawa, 11 march 2019. 12 a prominent historian m.c. ricklefs (2013) who studied the long process of the islamization in jawa says that the deep islamization has been still ongoing development in all around indonesia, especially in java. he enunciates that it is important to understand the islamization of jawa in three contexts: the history of religion, contemporary muslim worlds, and of the struggle to the better life (pursuing freedom and justice). 13 interview with ustadzah ninin karlina from pesantren muhammadiyah imam suhodo sukoharjo, 2 july 2018 and azaki khoiruddin from muhammadiyah university of surakarta on 11 july 2018 in surakarta, central java. 14 interview with a veiled student activist of muhammadiyah, lailatul husna, in solo, december 2017. 15 ustadz abdul shomad is a graduate of al azhar university which got suddenly his popularity thanks to hundreds of his video lectures posted on youtube. shomad started his career as an islamic preacher in pekanbaru riau. recently, he is invited by various muslim communities and congregational organisations to addresse his religious lectures from aceh to papua. one of his videos entitled “mr. limbad asked to abdul shomad” has been viewed by as much as 4,775,786 people. the fan page of facebook “pecinta ustaz abdul shomad lc, ma” is followed by as many as 46,517 people. 16 adi hidayat is an alumnus of islamic muhammadiyah boarding school darul arqam garut, west jawa. after that, he pursued his licence (lc) in tripoly university libya and his master in state islamic university sunan gunung jati bandung. he has 632,399 followers on twitter and 82,930 people on facebook 17 buya yahya is a savvy social media ustadz who achieved his popularity among muslim society through his widely spread religious interactive sermons on youtube. he runs al-bahjah foundation and an islamic boarding school (pesantren) al-bahjah in cirebon, west jawa. he culturally belongs to nu’s islamic tradition despite he is not active in the board of nu. within the conservative strand of nu, he and habib rizieq syihab were supported to be the next chairman of nu. his official al bahjah tv channel on youtube has 167,369 subscribers. 18 teuku zulkarnain was a deputy secretary of the council of indonesian ulama. he is a jamaah tabligh preacher who gets its popularity among 131andar nubowo muslims and raises up as one of prominent leaders of the action 212 through his religious predications and sermons on youtube. on youtube, his religious (provocative) sermon “2019 ganti presiden, ini alasan cerdas kh tengku zulkarnain” is viewed by 336,675 viewers. 19 “nu struktural” refers to nu clerics and members who hold the structural body of the organisation led by chairman said aqil siraj from the national to sub-district levels, and “nu kultural” constitutes clerics and members who are traditionally and culturally affiliated to nu’s traditions and are not involved in running the organisation. 20 interview with nu’s leaders of the city of 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saharudin, 27 july 2018 in makassar south sulawesi. fahrudin ahmad, 1 august 2018 in makassar, south sulawesi. slamet pohan, 28 november 2018 in medan, north sumatera. rahmat surya, 28 november 2018 in medan, north sumatera. mukhtar tompo, 18 december 2018 in makassar, south sulawesi. erna taufan pawe, 20 december 2018 in pare-pare, south sulawesi. muhammad asad, 23 december 2018 in manado, north sulawesi. indra gunawan, 27 december 2019 in lyon, france. aqib malik, 11 march 2019. focus group discussions pesantren as’adiyah, 25 november 2018 in wajo, south sulawesi. nu’s local leaders solo, 13 march 2019 in surakarta, central jawa. the threat no more? indonesian atheists, pancasila, and the search for a common moral ground journal of asian social science research 2023, vol. 5, no. 1: 1-32 https://cassr.net/jassr/ © the author(s) 2023 article muhamad ali* university of california, riverside, usa abstract the fall of soeharto's rule in 1998 marked the beginning of a new era in indonesian democratization, allowing old and new voices in the public realm, including atheists who defined themselves as no less indonesian and, more crucially, no less moral than the rest. globalization and increasing access to information and communication technology facilitated this. this article analyses how and why indonesian atheists have become more outspoken in recent years about their lack of religious belief and defence of their denial of the existence of any deity or gods in response to their upbringing, education, news about religious radicalism, liberalism, and scientific advancement. these atheists provide context for atheism in indonesia. they also redefine indonesia as a non-religious nation-state, despite the country's muslim population and efforts and aspirations to bring it closer to an islamic state or culture. in numerous official declarations and textbooks, indonesia has historically been referred to as neither a theocracy nor a secular state. it is a pancasila state. indonesian atheists redefine the country as a whole by reinventing pancasila and bhineka tunggal ika. they are not opposed to collaboration and unity. instead of sacred or religious principles, they emphasize humanity and morality as common values. key words atheists, indonesia, pancasila, common moral ground * corresponding author: associate professor muhamad ali, department for the study of religion, university of california, riverside, usa. email: muhamad.ali@ucr.edu 2 journal of asian social science research vol. 5, no. 1, 2023 introduction in june 2012, alexander aan, a 31-year-old civil servant in west sumatera province, was taken into custody by the police, and charged with “blasphemy” when he declared on facebook in february 2012 that “god doesn’t exist” and called himself the atheist of minang (“ateis minang”). after receiving reports by the indonesian council of islamic scholars (majelis ulama indonesia [mui]), who charged him with “disseminating information aimed at inciting religious hatred or hostility”, with “religious blasphemy”, and with an act of “calling for others to embrace atheism”, the court decided that his words incited hatred and animosity against religious groups, but charged aan under the 2008 cyber crime law, (rather than the “blasphemy law”), to two-and-half year in jail and a fine of 100 million rupiah ($us 10,600). aan later issued an apology for his facebook posts and converted to islam, praying “for god’s mercy.” this arrest caused a mixture of international and domestic reactions in various forms: petitions, op-eds, news stories, and comments on social media. new public discourses were created. some say “the arrest is a violation of the international covenant on civil and political rights”; “it is a serious setback for freedom of expression in indonesia”; “atheism does not pose a threat to public order”; “the arrest is a violation of freedom of expression and conscience”. others say “aan’s blasphemous words cannot be tolerated”; “aan deserves more than that: beheading”; and “if you are an atheist, indonesia is not for you”. why did the issue become controversial in indonesia and attract much international attention? why do many indonesians see atheism as a threat to public order? what are we to make of hatred and discrimination by the state and religious groups and leaders? because pancasila has been regarded by many as the ideology of compromise and tolerance, to what extent does it serve as a viable public ethical foundation across divisions of faith (and conscience, which would include the non-believers)? how and why do indonesian atheists emerge? how do the atheists (including agnostics, freethinkers, the nones) negotiate their atheist identity and moral conscience in both national and international contexts? how are they trying to search for a new common ground for coexistence? in this paper, i explore some philosophical, legal, and ethical aspects of the contemporary debate concerning atheism, using primarily online sources, including email interviews with two indonesian atheists, as a way of exploring the meanings of tolerance and public ethics in both global and national context, in both predominantly religious and marginally nonreligious indonesia. 3muhamad ali indonesia is home to more muslims than any other country in the world, but also to several million hindus, buddhists, christians and others. under former president suharto’s ‘new order’ regime (1966-1998) interreligious ‘tolerance’ was fostered through a combination of education and the brutal suppression of dissent. with the collapse of the regime in 1998 limitations on public expression were relaxed, giving rise to a vibrant debate around the relationship between religion and the appropriate use of state power. theist and atheist participants in this debate have drawn inspiration from an often eclectic range of traditions, variously linking and opposing the ideals of enlightenment with religion and nationalism rooted in the history of the indonesian struggle for independence and the diverse yet unitary state. in the following section, i will review the mainstream, theistic views of pancasila and bhineka tunggal ika before i discuss the rise of indonesian atheists and their views of these philosophies and then discuss the atheists’ hopes for tolerance and common ground in indonesia. there have been studies on the rise of atheism in indonesia. pioneering studies on indonesia’s atheism include works atack (2014), hasani (2016), and duile (2018, 2020). these were followed by other studies such as those by himawan et al. (2022), peranginangin (2022), and adithia et al. (2023). nevertheless, in general, literature on indonesia’s atheism is relatively new and scant so it still needs further exploration on understanding atheism in indonesia. in response, this paper attempts to contribute to this literature by examining how and why indonesian atheists have become more outspoken in recent years about their lack of religious belief and defence of their denial of the existence of any deity or gods and providing contexts for the rise of atheism in indonesia. theistic views of the state’s philosophy of pancasila pancasila in particular has been regarded as uniquely indonesian from its formation in 1945 to the present day. it has incorporated world ideologies – notably world religions (belief in one god), humanism (humanity that is just and civilized), nationalism (unity of indonesia), democracy (democracy guided by the wisdom of representative deliberation), and socialism (social justice for all indonesians), as penetrating the newly built, nation, and yet it has made them national. pancasila itself is a sanskrit phrase meaning five principles, which were stated in the preamble of the new indonesian constitution (undang-undang dasar) in 1945 (thus called the 1945 constitution). yet, although it is a unifying ideology for many, its meanings and interpretations have become contested throughout indonesian history. 4 journal of asian social science research vol. 5, no. 1, 2023 criticisms have been directed not only toward the interpretations of others or manipulation of particular regimes such as the one under soeharto (1966-1998) but also toward its very existence and status as the state’s philosophy, as the basis for political parties and organizations in indonesia. it is a complex history in itself, but for the purpose of this paper, some references to pancasila (particularly the first pillar “belief in one god) as defined and interpreted concerning theism (or lack of attention to atheism) by some well-known leaders are in order. there were three formulators of pancasila: muhammad yamin, supomo, and soekarno. muhammad yamin said that there were several possible names: pancasila, trisila, or ekasila, and he asked a linguist who suggested he used “pancasila”, supported by others on the committee of nine leaders. soekarno, one of the formulators of pancasila, defined it as “the philosophical basis for free indonesia”: “the fundamental, the philosophy, the underlying reason, the spirit, or the deepest desire, on which to build the structuring of a free indonesia, enduring and age-long.” (soekarno 1947). “belief in god the almighty” came the fifth in one of soekarno’s formulations: indonesian nationalism, internationalism or humanism, consent, or democracy, social prosperity, and faith in god the almighty. soekarno said, the principle of belief in god! not only should the people of indonesia have a belief in god, but every indonesian should believe in his own particular god. christians should worship god according to the teachings of jesus christ, moslems according to the teachings of the prophet muhammad, and buddhists should discharge their religious rites according to their books. but let us all have belief in god…. (soekarno 1947:28). for soekarno, “indonesians have always lived their life, worshipping something into which they have put all their wishes and belief.” soekarno himself believed in god and said in one of his speeches: “is god changeable? no! god does not change. the essence of god does not change. what is changeable is the perception of human beings” (notosusanto 1981:13-24). in the early time, there emerged two major political factions: islamist nationalists and secular nationalists. in the preamble of the constitution, in “belief in god”, a phrase was added to it: “with the obligation for adherents of islam to practice islamic law” (ketuhanan, dengan kewajiban menjalankan syari’at islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya” (later called “the jakarta’s charter”) to resolve the tension between the islamist and secular nationalists (notosusanto 1981). another compromise was made: the 5muhamad ali belief in god became the first instead of the fifth principle as in soekarno’s original formulation. however, this compromise with an additional phrase was ambiguous and problematic. due to some perceived and real resistance voiced by christian committee members who demanded the omission of the phrase (of the jakarta’s chapter), on august 17, 1945, the first principle became: “belief in the one and only god” (ketuhanan yang maha esa). a hindu delegate proposed to delete the islamic word “allah” in the preamble and to replace it with tuhan yang maha kuasa (god the almighty), but without success (kim 1998:359). the 1945 constitution stipulated in article 29: verse 1: the state is based on belief in one god; verse 2: the state guarantees the freedom of each citizen to have their own religion and to observe their religious duties according to their own religion and belief. in this article, there was no specific formulation as to what each of the concepts of god (tuhan), religion (agama), and belief (kepercayaan) means, leaving ambiguity and multiple interpretations. in 1945 and throughout his tenure, soekarno tried to offer a compromise among the existing religions but didn’t say in any explicit way about atheism or those without religions. he was concerned about how the believers of god could be equal in the new state and how they could practice their own ways of worshipping god in a “civilized way”: “the way of mutual respect… a belief in god which has respect for one another” (soekarno 1947:28). in 1965, a presidential decree (signed by soekarno) listed religions followed by indonesians: islam, protestantism, catholicism, buddhism, and confucianism. but it also stated that this doesn’t mean that other religions such as judaism, zoroastrianism, shintoism, and taoism are prohibited in indonesia. these religions are fully guaranteed in so far as they do not violate the stipulations in this presidential decree or other acts and regulations (budiyono 1983:106). pancasila was regarded as being too strict on the one hand or too inclusive on the other side. communist leaders also offered their views of the pancasila. d.n. aidit, one of the leaders of partai komunis indonesia approved pancasila as the state philosophy, commenting in 1964 that the five pillars “reflected an objective reality, encompassing the interests of all factions among the people of indonesia and constituted a unifying mechanism in revolutionary struggle….” (notosusanto 1981:31). more specifically, aidit saw pancasila as the tool of unifying the ideologies in indonesia: nationalism, religion, and communism (notosusanto 1981:32). the kepercayaan (spirituality) groups sought to be recognized as well under the pancasila (notosusanto 1981:31). some of the islamists wanted more than “belief in one god”, thus reviving the phrase of the jakarta 6 journal of asian social science research vol. 5, no. 1, 2023 chapter’s that was removed. some of them promoted the banning of the beliefs (aliran kepercayaan, kebatinan). ministers of religious affairs and other muslim leaders defined religion as a revelation coming from god, having prophets, and holy books, thus excluding indigenous religions and beliefs (djojodigoeno 1982:126129). as one of the responses to the debate, the kebatinan groups had to define their belief: a congress defined it as the basic source of the principle of belief in one god, the aim of which is to achieve a noble character and perfection of life (subagyo 1973:76). confucians who were included in the official religions category under soekarno (1945-1965) and then were excluded under soeharto (166-1998), had to discuss whether confucianism was a philosophy or a religion (abalahin 2005:119-142). there was no explicit reference to atheism. agus salim (1884-1954), one of the leaders of the union of islam (sarekat islam) and one of the members of the committee nine mentioned above was among the first in making an explicit reference to atheism, albeit in passing, in his writing about the functions of the ministry of religion in indonesia. he wrote: how should we interpret religious freedom in our state, which is based on the belief in one god? can the basis of the state recognize the freedom of conscience of those who deny the existence of god? or the belief that admits many gods? indeed and surely! (this is) because our constitution, like other constitutions of the civilized states, recognizes and guarantees freedom of religion, in so far as they do not violate the rights of others, public morality, security and peace (salim 1951/1952:124-125). but atheism remains taken for granted, even among progressive muslim scholars. abdurrahman wahid, nurcholish madjid, and many others have promoted religious tolerance and pluralism within the framework of multiple religions, although they have talked about religious freedom in general and have become influential figures for some atheists who were learning from their liberal interpretations of religion. nurcholish madjid, for example, elaborated and promoted “a common platform”, among the peoples of the book, jews, christians, and muslims, a phrase derived from a qur’anic phrase “kalima sawa”, based on the unity of god, tawhid. for madjid, universal humanism is framed within the oneness of god. the unity of truth is manifested in the plurality of religion. another contribution is that madjid promoted inclusiveness, mutual respect, and tolerance, drawing from the qur’anic texts, classical and medieval thoughts, as well as modern sources (madjid 2008:173-194). madjid’s contribution 7muhamad ali was his promotion of common ground that goes beyond historical islam as practised by muhammad, but also all religions, including judaism, christianity, buddhism, hinduism, zoroastrianism, confucianism, and other moral teachers (madjid 2008:173-194). however, while attempting to describe atheism as broader than communism and saying that not all communists were atheists and not all atheists were communists, madjid concludes that atheism was a failure, and has no future for indonesia. madjid says: “politically and legally, our state shall not recognize atheism. the new order has regarded it as the enemy of the state, because of bitter experience in the recent past with the indonesian communist party”. madjid divides atheism into “philosophical atheism”, “polemical atheism” or “confessional atheism”, “hidden atheism” (the latter being formally religious but the heart denies god). madjid then discusses atheism from an islamic perspective of “la ilaha illallah” meaning “no god (negation, al-nafy) and but god (affirmation, al-itsbat)”. for madjid, atheism is a form of human arrogance, that is, “a reliance on one’s self alone and only from the material side, in understanding “god”. from an islamic view, he says, atheism, as described by bertrand russel, is a product of failing to understand god using one’s reason and science. madjid says that muslims should not fear atheists because islam was freed from mythology, islam was for science and civilization that atheists promote. islam should not be blocked (mahjub) by muslims (madjid 1995:143-68). reading his views about “no compulsion in religion”, based on an interpretation of a quranic verse, one could argue however that madjid would have supported the freedom of atheists as well as theists in indonesia, although he didn’t mention in his 1995 article referred above, the existence of indonesian atheists beyond those associated with the indonesian communist party in the recent history of indonesia. his contemporary scholar, djohan effendy, however, was more explicit in suggesting that atheism is a belief and a religion that must be respected (effendi 2002:13538). effendy didn’t elaborate on how and why he used the terms “belief” and “religion” for atheism. the point he was making is that atheism had the equal right to exist in indonesia (assyaukani 2009). many religious scholars (ulama) have tended to focus on the debates within the framework of religious tolerance. when they talk about secularism, they talk more about the separation of religion and the public domain. atheism has received minor attention. there were several fatwas about kafir, generally defined as “disbelief”. in response to a question on the different kinds of kafir, the nahdlatul lama, the largest muslim 8 journal of asian social science research vol. 5, no. 1, 2023 organization in indonesia, established in 1926, issued the following fatwa as follows: there are different kinds of kafir; first, the one who does not believe in god (called kafir inkar); second, the one who believes in god in his heart, but does not proclaim this verbally, such as satan and some jews (called kafir juhud); third, the one who says he believes in god verbally but does not believe it in his heart (kafir nifaq); and lastly, the one who knows god in his heart, and says it verbally, but does not obey him in practice, such as abu thalib (called kafir ‘inad) (masyhuri 1997:61-62). here, the term atheism is not mentioned. the indonesian council of islamic religious scholars (majelis ‘ulama indonesia [mui]), which was established in 1975 and consists of islamic scholars from different organizations, issued no fatwa about atheism or agnosticism. they have issued fatwas concerning muslim groups considered controversial or problematic in their views, such as ahmadiyya, syiah, dar al-arqam, al-qiyadah al-islamiyyah, religious liberalism, religious pluralism and religions secularism, but not atheism (majelis ulama indonesia 2011: 35-114). even the promoters of pancasila rarely talked about atheism. more recently, political leaders and activists have promoted to revitalize pancasila as one of the four pillars of the nation (4 pilar kebangsaan) – the other three being the 1945 constitution, the unitary state of republics of indonesia, and bhineka tunggal ika (kansil and kansil 2011: 9, 31-32). atheism is mentioned in relation to communism. one of the books about the four pillars of the nation states that communism is atheist. communism is based on materialism and disbelief in god. communism says religion is the opium of the people. therefore, the authors of the book say, it is incompatible with pancasila (kansil and kansil 2011:47). a member of house representative, dani anwar, affirmed the incompatibility of pancasila and atheism, although he noted indonesian religious diversity and called for tolerance between religious communities.1 religious freedom is formulated in terms of freedom of religion, which doesn’t state “freedom from religion”. tolerance (toleransi) and harmony (kerukunan) are discussed and promoted in terms of tolerance and harmony between religious groups. in light of the historical and philosophical debates reviewed above, the question of being atheist and being indonesian offers us a variety of issues about law and ethics as well as indonesian nationalism and globalization. because they are indonesian first before they turn to be atheists, and in many cases, they were religious first before they turned away, indonesian atheists refer to pancasila and bhineka tunggal ika in 1 http://www.mpr.go.id/berita/read/2013/05/31/12125/dani-anwar-ateis-tak-sesuai-dengan-pancasila. 9muhamad ali positioning themselves among mainstream indonesians. they emerge in the contemporary time as a response to multiple phenomena: access to information and science, human rights activism, the rise of new atheist versus religious radicals, and religious liberalism versus fundamentalism in both local and global contexts. in indonesia, atheism has become one of the public discourses primarily online, although atheists also hold offline gatherings among themselves. the rise of indonesian atheists scholars have tended to analyze indonesian history as religious history, global and local or indigenous (see stohr and zoetmulder 1968). it was after the fall of soeharto’s authoritarian regime in 1998 that atheists emerged in the public sphere, along with new religious movements, islamic and otherwise. democratization allows new voices as well as a reassertion of old voices. atheists, agnostics, or doubters of religion or belief in god or the supernatural, must have existed long before 1998, but self-identification seemed to be recent. they were born and raised in families with the mainstream religions: islam or christianity. most atheists have not disclosed their names or identities in public areas: many used aliases in their facebook and twitter accounts. some of them have become open, vocal, and articulate. karn karnadi, now on his 30, was the founder of a facebook group called “indonesian atheists” in october 2008. he was open to disclosing his identity because he studied and stayed abroad, in germany, since 2006. others, who live in indonesia, who joined the group have decided to be anonymous: some are increasingly open to friends or colleagues. others remain not, for security reasons as they study or work in an indonesian environment. they all have been expressing their ideas freely online: facebook, twitter, blogs, and emails. when asked why they become atheists, they responded in different ways. in an email interview with the author of this paper on october 27, 2013, karl karnadi said that he became an atheist through a personal search. he was not content with religious explanations about various mysteries that he encountered about the origin of the universe, the origin of humans, the origin of religion, and so forth. he watched documentary films (such as on discovery channel) which increased his curiosity and motivated him to read books about science and history. he encountered books by liberal thinkers and priests (such as anglican bishop spong in the u.s.) and ex-nun karel amstrong whom he viewed as promoting “love” (kasih), rather than hatred (benci). he realized there were many religious streams. it took about two years for him before he decided to have a view 10 journal of asian social science research vol. 5, no. 1, 2023 radically different from his family and community. he came to believe that it was no longer necessary to read religious interpretations and his religion, christianity. he then sent an email to his family in indonesia and openly declared he no longer belonged to a religion (tidak beragama). he expressed his gratefulness that his “very religious” christian parents eventually accepted him although they were worried about his safety due to interviews in the media such as the jakarta globe and others in english.2 karnadi felt “freer” by expressing his views without fear and hesitation by turning away from any religious affiliation. another self-declared atheist did not want to disclose her identity. let us call her wati. wati became an atheist because of “simple logic and rational thinking”. she became sceptical about many things and was keen to know the scientific proof. a religious person, she wrote to me in an interview, would think that something has to be created and this universe has to be created but he would stop there. wati said that she too kept thinking about things as being created, but this made her think that god has to be also created, as a scientific rule called occam’s razor states (she gave me the link: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/occam’s%20razor). therefore, she said, it would make more sense to think that the universe was not created so that god was not absent as he too was not created. the world is easier to be understood as being not created by a being, but it exists naturally on its own. wati said that she began to see the irrationality of religion when reading the translation of the qur’an and reading science and science documentaries. she recalled no specific books that made her an atheist. she became one because of an accumulation of knowledge, simple logic, and humanitarian reason. wati learned islam from her grandmother, who was an activist in the nahdlatul ulama organization. her grandmother offered her a more humanist perspective on islam. she also met some religious activists who were concerned about equality, humanitarian causes and justice. but she realized that everybody can have different interpretations. she found islamic laws such as the death penalty, the cutting off of the hands, discrimination against women, hell punishments for other religious peoples, and so forth, no longer relevant in today’s era. these laws, for her, were discriminatory and cruel. she had become sceptical since her junior high school years. wati felt that she didn’t need a religion to become a good person. she didn’t need the threat of hell for her not to harm others, nor did she need the reward of paradise to act good. 2 http://xwisnuajix.wordpress.com/2011/08/11/wawancara-dengan-atheis/. 11muhamad ali wati decides not to be open that she is an atheist. only her close family, close friends, and colleagues know that. she has a foundation working on science development. she doesn’t want people to assume that science is a window to being an atheist and fear learning science. she doesn’t want people to look at human beings on their beliefs or lack of belief. she wants to see what people do and produce. religious identification could lead to discrimination. her adoptive parent accepted her and she later realized that her father was also a sceptic after she informed him about her being a sceptic. her blood parents didn’t know she is an agnostic but they accept islam as the religion of peaceful, rather than violent propagation (da’wa). she becomes open to others whom she thinks are open to accepting differences, such as activists of the liberal islam network, researchers, ahmadi, and human rights activists. another atheist discloses her reasons why he or she becomes an atheist by writing and posting an article on the internet, in kompasiana, a website provided by kompas daily newspapers for anybody to post their views on any kind of topic. her posted name is rainny drupadi.3 she became an atheist not because of her family, her friends, or of marriage (in indonesia, couples have to be in the same religion to get a marriage license, she noted). like the other two atheists above, rainny said that she became an atheist because of her long search for god, but she could not find hard evidence to support god’s existence. she admitted that she was raised by a muslim parent, heard the call to prayer when she was first born, read the qur’an since childhood, attended islamic religious studies and gatherings in mosques, fasted, prayed, and paid the zakat alms as any other muslim. her father and mother were devout muslims, very tolerant, and encouraged freedom of expression. they motivated her to love reading and science. when she reached junior high school age, she still prayed diligently but began to question god. rainny said that she was taught pancasila in school, but was more an indoctrination than a discussion of ideology and philosophy as she did with her parent. she started to be curious about pancasila’s principle of “belief in god” and indonesia’s slogan bhineka tunggal ika. she asked a question: why are there many gods? if there were one, the same god, why had there been many, different laws and regulations, she pondered. from then on, she learned about all religions that exist in indonesia and met different religious leaders (romo, pedanda, biksu, pendeta, and kiyai). she found that her beautiful journey led her to meet romo mangun, a 3 http://filsafat.kompasiana.com/2010/06/12/mengapa-saya-memutuskan-menjadi-atheis-164721.html. 12 journal of asian social science research vol. 5, no. 1, 2023 well-known catholic priest, and abdurrahman wahid (gus dur), a wellknown islamic scholar, who happened to be a friend of her parent. but she didn’t find the answer to her question: which religion would bring her to god? she realized that the question was false because the answer to the question was a notion that all religions were equally good and following common sense. her search through encounters with open-minded religious scholars led her to wise words: “religions are like food, spiritual food, and choose what tastes good to you. if the food were nutritious, it should not be consumed forcefully. forcing makes the food harmful to you.” so she had become sceptical since her high school years. and at 20, she declared to be an atheist. her encounters with atheists didn’t make her an atheist. no atheist encouraged her to be an atheist. an atheist would tell her:” follow your reason, seek knowledge, and study the history of human civilization.” in the three cases above, there is an emphasis on individual autonomy vis-à-vis family and a wider, generally religious community to which they belong. their search for the truth and constant curiosity about what was taught to them, what they saw on tv or read in books and the internet, and no less importantly, about what they experienced in everyday life. however, as individuals, they need group support. they felt better to belong to a wider community of like-minded individuals otherwise being in their own private spaces. the three atheists above then became affiliated with a wider network. some of them administered websites and wrote blogs, and collected materials related to atheism in indonesia and around the world. one of the websites is called you ask atheist answers (“anda bertanya ateis menjawab” [abam], http://fb.ateismenjawab.com), created by virgi albiant. this has become the main medium for reaching out to the public. the administrators aim to introduce atheists and debunk false and negative stereotypes about atheists, and ensure moderation by avoiding insults and unhealthy interactions. in addition, they have a facebook group called “indonesian atheists” that karl karnadi created in 2008, as a support group to accommodate atheists, who need help, including those who suffer from difficulty and discrimination in indonesia. they coordinate their activities offline and online. offline, they hold gatherings to know each other, to eat and chat among themselves.4 wati, the co-founder of indonesian atheists referred to above, assisted karnadi in mapping atheists, agnostics, deists, and others who support the right of atheists. according to her, some atheists were expelled from their homes, beaten by their husbands, and lost their jobs. 4 currently the coordinator for jakarta is karina and for yogyakarta is arimbi dewinggani. 13muhamad ali wati personally attends and participates in interfaith meetings such as the interfaith network (jakatarub) in bandung, west java. she finds that interaction between faith communities and atheists important because “to know the thoughts and views of different people lead to mutual respect of differences”. apart from that, they have more recently created a facebook group called “ia parents” which has members of atheist parents who discuss the bearing and education of their children. the group’s 70-plus members discuss topics ranging from specifically atheist issues, such as “what schools are secular?”; “what do you do when a relative asks the children about their religious studies?”; “how do you survive religious holiday gatherings?”, to more general ones about sex education, home-schooling and holiday destinations.5 support groups are not sufficient for them. karnadi and others created a website about atheists in southeast asia (http://www.sea-atheists.org/ indonesia/) and create connections to international atheists around the world. one of the tweets by an atheist tweep reads: “humanism. meeting in cebu, philippines, june 21-23, 2013. asia humanism conference: breaking barriers” (karin-isme). the indonesian atheists were affiliated with an international organization atheist alliance international (aai) which assists them in introducing indonesian atheism into the world. many indonesian atheists post tweets actively. they make references to a variety of thinkers and groups whom they support and whom they criticized. some cited christopher hitchen’s “ mortality”, and salman rushdie’s words, “the moment you declare a set of ideas to be immune from criticism, satire, derision, or contempt, freedom of thought becomes impossible” (posted by karin_isme). your body is free but your mind is prisoned. “ others criticized the indonesian ministry of religious affairs: “department of religion’s budget is much more than department of health” (5/16/13). they cited tweets about science news: “evidence for evolution. evidence against evolution” (karin_isme. 5/4/13). some are critical of the qur’anic verses, such as this picture tweet: “surat almaidah: 5:33: indeed the penalty for those who wage war against allah and his messenger and strive upon the earth (to cause) corruption is none but they be killed or crucified or that their hands and feet be cut off from opposite sides or that they are exiled from the land. that is from a disgrace in this world; and for them in the hereafter is a great punishment.” another picture post looks the following: “we want to kill myanmar’s budhis!!! : 5 “raising kids without god: atheist parents in indonesia”, the jakarta globe, july 15, 2013, http://www. thejakartaglobe.com/features/raising-kids-without-god-atheist-parents-in-indonesia/ 14 journal of asian social science research vol. 5, no. 1, 2023 “bad spelling, bad costume, bad attitude, being proud of wanting to kill people. is that your religion of peace? “ (karin_isme 5/3/13). the atheists under study do not want to be dichotomous in seeing whether atheism is foreign or indigenous, western or eastern. they would not agree with the binary opposition of the west and the east. the labelling of thoughts as western or eastern, to them, would bring people to narrowminded thinking and even group conflicts. rationalism and scepticism, karl karnadi argued, exist in various forms in the west and the east, such as in hinduism and buddhism (as in the kalama sutta), among christian majority and islamic majority kingdoms. science, such as math and astronomy, flourished in islamic empires before european enlightenment, karnadi said. karnadi was concerned about people often charging new ideas of “deviant” or “foreign”, an act that could lead them to inter-group tribalism. an anonymous writer posted his or her reconstruction of a brief history of atheism in the world and then in indonesia.6 the writer begins with an illustration that up to the seventeenth century, and even until today, belief in god has been taken for granted, although, in our century, there are between 500 and 750 million people who do not believe in god, positioning them the fourth after christianity, islam, and hinduism. citing books, such as at the origins of modern atheism and atheism: a very short introduction, the writer associates atheism and deism with european enlightenment and the advancement of modern science and philosophy. marxism and communism helped spread atheism, and in contemporary times, new atheists emerge in part as a vocal response to “islamic terrorism.” the writer then discusses the rise and fall of atheists in a religious indonesia with her belief in one god, pointing to the difficulty of exploring atheists before colonialism. atheists emerged with communism, but soeharto’s regime (beginning in 1966) marked the demise of atheism conflated with communism. the writer mentions haji misbach, a muslim trader who turned communist, and achdiat k. mihardja who wrote about atheists among marxist groups in his novel atheis (1943). the clash between the indonesian party of communist and islam and the military strengthened the perception of atheism as the enemy of the nation. books, such as bahaja atheisme terhadap sila ketuhanan j.m.e. (the danger of atheism to the principle belief in god) by muchammad iljas (1967) and aliran-aliran besar ateisme (main streams of atheism) by louis leahy (1985), were produced in indonesian to refute atheism. only after the fall of soeharto, atheistic works have come to the surface in indonesia. sigmund 6 http://garrybrumadyadisty.wordpress.com/2012/04/01/sejarah-singkat-ateisme-modern-termasuk-indonesiaanonim/. 15muhamad ali freud’s books including totem and taboo were translated into indonesian. translated were also the works of nietzsche, sam harris, and richard dawkins. more recently, the internet plays a major role in increasing the spread of atheist voices, especially among the youth generation, in the big cities of indonesia, such as jakarta, yogyakarta, surabaya, and bandung. the writer ends the overview with a remark: ”countries with a high percentage of atheists such as sweden have a low rate of population’s birth, whereas countries with marginalization and discrimination of atheists such as indonesia, the rate is high...” indonesian atheist views of pancasila and bhineka tunggal ika generally, these indonesian atheists are not concerned about whether or not atheism is recognized in the pancasila state. however, some of them talked about this, given the circumstances and implications for their very existence in the country. when asked about pancasila as the state’s philosophy and in particular the first principle, karl karnadi attempted to contextualize it. he said that the principles were created as a unifying tool in the early years of the birth of the republic when different factions with ideologies competed for influence: soldiers who were not yet organized, nationalist students, islamist scholars, christians, and others. pancasila was a hybrid ideology deliberately created from various ideologies that existed at the time for them to be united in the new state. it was in that context that the principles, including the belief in god, were formulated. the first principle unified the aspirations of the islamist groups without alienating christians and others, whereas other principles accommodate other factions. the belief in god principle was deliberately stated as “ketuhanan yang maha esa” (the one god), rather than “kepercayaan pada tuhan” (belief in god), or “kepercayaan enam agama” (the beliefs of six religions) to accommodate the existing religions. karnadi said that he would not criticize or blame pancasila’s five principles, including the first one. it was by design to unify not to divide people. part of it was suitable for some factions, and another part for other factions. so, karnadi continued to say, someone who doesn’t believe in god or someone who has a different definition of religion such as minorities cannot be regarded as deviant from pancasila. for him, deviants are those people who make pancasila the tool of disunity and conflict. likewise, wati sees pancasila as a combination of the existing ideologies in indonesia. the ideology of “divinity” is in the first principle, the ideology of humanism in the second, and so forth. she said that if one holds the view that the first principle means to oblige every citizen 16 journal of asian social science research vol. 5, no. 1, 2023 of indonesia to have a religion or to believe in god, then one should also hold that the second principle obliges you to be humanitarian, the third to be nationalist, the fourth to be democratic, and the fifth to be socialist. pancasila, she continues to say, can be interpreted according to social development in indonesia. if an indonesian society is tolerant toward differences, pancasila serves as a philosophical basis (philosopische grundlagen) for accommodating all views. if society is intolerant toward differences, then pancasila is a form of enforcement of one particular view. the first principle has to be understood alongside the other principles of humanism and justice. another atheist posted an article to argue that an atheist can be a nationalist. atheists do not contravene pancasila. pancasila does not require citizens to believe in one god because hindus and buddhists believe not in one god but they are legal in indonesia. pancasila doesn’t demand indonesian citizens to have a religion. indonesian atheists do not find it problematic to have a pancasila that makes its principal belief in one god or many gods, as long as it makes the state better and progress.7 being an atheist in indonesia remains a stigma. even a progressive vice-governor of jakarta, basuki tjahaja purnama or ahok, has to refute a rumour by disassociating himself from being not a believer: “it is not true that if you believe in pancasila you do not follow the sacred book. many charge me of being “nonbeliever, atheist”. no? i still need god.”8 another atheist, named alex zulkarnain noerdars, posted a blog in the form of dialogue among atheists about pancasila. one suggests erasing the first principle of belief in god because it was a historical accident (soekarno should have not made it part of the pancasila in the first place: where are muhammad yamin, syahrir and others who were more secular?) and because different people interpret god in different ways and the state should not interfere in people’s belief or disbelief. another person argues that pancasila was meant to be a foundation for the state, and it has been broad enough to include even the non-religious as long as its interpretation is not monopolized by certain groups, let alone islamic radicals. alex contends that he accepts the first principle of pancasila in the broad sense, including spirituality.9 another wants to redefine the term “esa” in the principle of ketuhanan yang maha esa. esa doesn’t mean one. one in sanskrit or pali is eka, 7 http://laboratoriumreaksi.wordpress.com/2013/02/16/pancasilaateis/; http://hirethetruth.blogspot.com/2012/12/ ateisme-melanggar-pancasila-sila-1.html. 8 http://news.liputan6.com/read/699697/ahok-banyak-yang-cap-saya-tidak-beriman-ateis. 9 http://alexznoerdars.wordpress.com/2011/05/15/ateis-menerima-pancasila-dialog-tentang-pancasila/. 17muhamad ali not esa. instead of one, esa means un-identified, beyond number, beyond form. our founding fathers were very accommodating!10 for the atheists we have discussed so far, pancasila should be open to multiple interpretations.11 but the national slogan that atheists appropriate and reinterpret alongside pancasila (and in some cases instead of pancasila) to support their place in indonesian civil society is the slogan bhineka tunggal ika, a sanskrit phrase for unity in diversity. bhineka tunggal ika means to them a principle that does not homogenize ideas and perspectives. the state was born in diversities, not in homogenization. bhineka tunggal ika offers them a sense of being recognized and desires not to be discriminated against as minorities.12 karnadi tends to turn to bhineka tunggal ika, rather than pancasila, in the context of the common good in an increasingly diverse indonesia. it is crucial, he said, to maintain diversity in indonesia because it is unique and enriches the national life. diversity creates innovation and unique ideas and offers lessons to everyone in seeing the world not in the white/black fashion or friends versus enemies. diversity at the same time can create clashes and conflict. the only way to live in diversity for common wellbeing is through healthy debates in the public arena, exchanging ideas in all kinds of forums which function as introducing each other and debunking misconceptions about each other, which tend to lead to enmity. although this is still far away at this point, karnadi is optimistic. bhineka does not mean pretending to agree. it means to be honest in expressing opinions. karnadi said: “we should respect diversity, support the exchange of ideas openly and resist discriminatory policies that contravene diversity.”13 for wati, bhinneka tunggal ika unifies all differences. if indonesians remember it and pancasila as the unifying tool, not the forcing ideology, then collective good becomes possible. she believes that individual rights are fundamental. as far as an individual does not harm others physically or directly, then his or her rights should be protected. wati maintains that the collective good should not deny individual rights. collective good comes from public interaction to find social order and benefit. but private rights and public rights should be differentiated. private rights should be protected and applied to every citizen so that conflicts do not harm the public interest. collective good comes from the altruism circuit in the mind of every human being and a social strategy to survive in society. the 10 http://forum.detik.com/berdasar-sila-kesatu-pancasila-layakkah-atheis-me-berada-di-indonesia-t602390.html. 11 http://andabertanyaateismenjawab.wordpress.com/2012/10/14/apakah-ateisme-dilarang-di-indonesia-kaitannyadengan-sila-pertama-pancasila/. 12 http://indonesianatheists.wordpress.com/2013/05/22/suratrakyat-mitos-dan-pertanyaan-mengenaiateisme/#more-244. 13 http://xwisnuajix.wordpress.com/2011/08/11/wawancara-dengan-atheis/. 18 journal of asian social science research vol. 5, no. 1, 2023 concept of collective good has developed according to human knowledge and understanding of human rights. when asked about tolerance, karl karnadi replied that tolerance is to accept the reality that difference always exists and not to pretend that the difference does not exist. tolerance does not prevent one from having healthy and polite debates and dialogues with good intentions. it is a misconception that to be tolerant people should be silent and should avoid all forms of conflict and controversial issues. karnadi contends that avoiding differences would create negative stereotypes, which could lead to hatred and enmity. in the context of religion, karnadi said, the emergence of diverse groups such as the conservative, the radical, and the liberal, has its causes. religion has the natural feature of a mechanism to avoid conflict or violation such as blasphemy law and the paradise and hell as reward and punishment. this feature is guided by the scriptures, triggering hate against other religions or religious sects, he said. in ancient and medieval times, this recipe was successful in motivating a great number of people to support wars against other nations with different religious ideologies, but in modern times, this recipe is unhealthy. suffering and murder occur. in this modern time, to be successful, he said, people should not establish a state based on a religious ideology but should base the state on tolerance toward diversity so that they could use all the resources to the maximum. today, he said, christians, muslims, hindus, buddhists, and others should work together to be successful. for wati, tolerance is a human attitude or behaviour in which a person respects an act of another person so far as the act does not do any harm to him or her directly. taking the right of another person is intolerant. in her view, to be radical or to be conservative is the right of each individual. to be intolerant is also a right. however, people should stop intolerance, which jeopardizes the right of others, and violent acts. in terms of thinking, every thought, radical or liberal, is subject to critical views. violence has to be prevented or stopped, but the right of these groups, including the radicals, should be protected. they had the equal right to express their views, but they should not act violently. wati argues that there are various reasons why people turn violent. in her study of terrorism in indonesia, different individuals turn to be terrorists for different reasons: some were influenced by religious interpretation; some needed to actualize themselves in groups (the more radical, the more they become heroes); some become terrorists because of lack of education 19muhamad ali so they become intolerant toward other thoughts; others lack interaction with different people with different ideas; some others are mentally ill. wati said that she knows liberal muslim and christian thinkers and activists and interacts with them in a discussion about science. she agrees with their view that religious interpretation has to be free and progressive. the religious interpretation could be tyranny if it is imposed to be the same or serves as a political tool, rather than a humanitarian factor. however, for her, religion is needed for part of people, not for individuals like herself. addressing “blasphemy law” and communist-atheist conflation with the arrest of alexander aan mentioned in the introduction, the debate about atheism enters the legal sphere. another atheist, the administrator of abam mentioned above, contends that no single principle of the pancasila forbids an indonesian citizen to be an atheist. one of the interpretations of the first principle states that there shall be no compulsion in entering a religion or belief in god toward others. these “others” should include atheists. it is admitted that atheism is not formally recognized in the state, like other recognized religions and beliefs. however, the absence of formal recognition does not mean a contradiction against the law. pancasila is one of the sources of all laws in indonesia (law no.10/2004 on the creation of laws, article 2) and no such laws prohibit indonesians to be atheists. the 1945 constitution, article 29 verse 2, stipulates that “the state guarantees freedom of every citizen to adhere to their religion and to worship according to their religions and beliefs”.14 pancasila, according to karnadi, is a hybrid ideology that serves to inspire law, but not the law itself. the existing laws, he believes, have not fully guaranteed the rights of minorities, including atheists. there has not been a law that formally and explicitly protects the rights of atheists to the present day. politically, during the administration of susilo bambang yudhoyono, no real actions were done to prevent and address violent attacks against minorities such as the ahmadiya, shi’a, and atheists. for wati, pancasila cannot guarantee any rights. it is the law which offers guarantees. however, positive laws in indonesia prioritise the interests of the majority rather than minorities nationally and locally. but no prevailing law punishes atheists, she argues. but minorities like atheists may be subject to article 156a of the criminal code, (kitab undang-undang hukum pidana, kuhp) concerning “religious insult” 14 http://andabertanyaateismenjawab.wordpress.com/2012/10/14/apakah-ateisme-dilarang-di-indonesia-kaitannyadengan-sila-pertama-pancasila/. 20 journal of asian social science research vol. 5, no. 1, 2023 or “blasphemy” (penodaan agama). this law is discriminatory as she argues: “i think every religion is blasphemous to other religions. in every religion, other religions are false and will go to hell. isn’t this a blasphemy? unfortunately, minorities suffer from the law”. blasphemy law is defined under the indonesian criminal code as “publicly expressing feelings or doing something that spreads hatred, abuse, or taints certain religions in a way that could cause someone to disbelieve religion.”15 the cyber crime law, chapter vii on “the forbidden actions”, articles 27 and 28, used to charge alexander aan mentioned above, stipulate legal charges against everyone who deliberately distributes and/ or transmits and/or makes access to the content that contravenes “proper conduct” (kesusilaan), that contains gambling (perjudian), insult of one’s name or reputation, threats, false and misleading accusations, which aims at creating hatred or enmity toward an individual or group based on ethnicity, religion, race, and factions (suku, agama, ras, dan antar-golongan, sara). but the interpretations have been contextual, shaped by socio-religious and political contexts. apostasy is often charged against those who differ. religious people are worried that their children could have been misguided and turned apostates. “he has hurt the feelings of the people in minang society and damaged the religious structure by his posting,” said the local head of the indonesian council of ulama (mui) syamsul bahri khatib. another said: “he has violated pancasila because atheism has no place in indonesia” (osman 2012). for the padang clan chief, zainuddin datuk rajo lenggang, religious minorities like aan pose a serious threat to indonesia’s national identity and atheists are particularly risky. he said: “if you are not a religious person, you might be dangerous to others, behaving without control and doing anything you like. religion brings order. you cannot be an individualist.”16 zubaidi, a spokesperson for the ministry of religious affairs, said:” we welcome every religion here, six recognized religions”. when asked if religions not covered under these categories were also legally protected, he said: “of course. but, if you are an atheist then it’s different. perhaps indonesia is not the right country for you” (aiyar 2013). some legal scholars see the first pillar as a compromise between secular nationalists, muslims, and non-muslim founding fathers. indonesian law 15 on cyber crime bill, see http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/archive/indonesian-cyber-crime-bill-to-sparkdebate/349320/; undang-undang republik indomnesia no.11 2008 informasi dan transaksi elektrorik. http:// id.wikisource.org/wiki/undang-undang_republik_indonesia_nomor_11_tahun_2008. 16 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/may/03/indonesia-atheists-religious-freedom-aan. 21muhamad ali scholar yordan nugroho said the first pancasila principle was not intended to ban atheism. “it was meant to bring together the different religions of indonesia in a fair-minded, compromising manner,” he wrote in the jakarta globe. he addressed the issue of identity cards. “if atheism were to be banned, similar questions could be raised as to why three religions with no monotheistic belief – hinduism, buddhism, and confucianism –are recognized in indonesia. atheists are charged with blasphemy for defiling a religion, and not because of atheism” (nugraha 2012). the former chairman of the constitutional court, mahfud md, incited controversy. he was first quoted to have supported the legalization of atheism and communism in indonesia. he then refuted that he had said that or that was what he meant. mahfud md maintained that no law unambiguously punishes a communist or an atheist. what the state prohibits is “spreading the teachings of communism and atheism through organizations (such as reviving the indonesian communist party) because these are in contradiction with pancasila.” “if a person says he is a communist or an atheist he is not subject to the law. this is different from murder and corruption that have clear laws. pancasila doesn’t judge. law does”.17 the congress decree (consultative assembly decree [tap mpr] no. xxv of 1966) prohibits the spreading of communism, leninism, and marxism. president abdurrahman wahid proposed the decree be annulled but many resistances prevented that to happen. there are three reasons put forward by many muslim leaders for resisting the annulation of the mpr decree: communism and atheism are identical; communism is not appropriate in religious indonesian people; and communism in its struggle allows all means to reach its goal.18 thus, for many indonesian scholars and activists, atheism is subject to an obvious legal judgment in indonesia.19 for atheists, there is still a “constitutional dilemma” and philosophical dynamics. the first principle of pancasila, as also stated in the preamble to the constitution, is “belief in the one supreme god” as stated in the 1945 constitution, article 29 of the constitution, and the mpr decree. “freedom of religion” in the 1945 constitution is interpreted as the freedom to be religious (anyone), but to exclude the freedom not to believe in any religion or even in the existence of god. 17 http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2012/07/12/173416582/mahfud-md-bantah-legalkan-ateisme-dankomunisme. 18 http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2012/07/16/06344493/ketua.mk.penganut.ateis.dan.komunis.tidak.dapat. dihukum. 19 “bolehkah menjadi ateis di indonesia?” : pancasila, kependudukan, perkawinan, kuhp. http://www. hukumonline.com/klinik/detail/lt4f4545a9b77df/bolehkah-menjadi-ateis-di-indonesia. 22 journal of asian social science research vol. 5, no. 1, 2023 another difficult situation faced by atheists in indonesia is the common association of atheists with communists. pancasila has been held to be the guard of communism. the notion that atheism is illegal has its origin during former president suharto’s new order regime, which treated atheism as an enemy of the state, because, deemed like communism, it rejects religion. communism was and is still considered an enemy of the state because of an alleged coup attempt by the indonesian communist party in september 1965. the aftermath saw the bloody killings of thousands of communists and their sympathizers. atheists, fearing that they would be targeted, had to declare themselves muslims or christians to escape death. since then, atheists eschew disclosing their rejection of god and all religions, for fear of being branded communists or accused of breaching the constitution and the state ideology. the contemporary indonesian atheists under study attempt to debunk the misconception. when asked about whether atheists are also fascist and communist, they replied they are not. atheists disbelieve in god or gods whereas communism is an ideology for proletariat liberation. in indonesia, an atheist argues, communism emerged earlier through the islamic trade union (serikat dagang islam [sdi]) which later became “the red faction” and then the indonesian communist party (pki). however, there were a few communists who were religious such as tan malaka (d.1949), one of the marxist figures and indonesian founding fathers. tan malaka gave a speech at the global communist meeting in russia in 1922: i have been asked in public meetings: are you muslim? yes or no? do you believe in god? yes or no? how can we answer these? yes, i answer. when i stand before god, i am a muslim, but when i stand before people, i am not a muslim, because god says many satans (iblis) among the people!” this statement, for these atheists in contemporary indonesia, means that atheism and communism are not identical, and communism and religion could coexist. 20 wati is aware that the problem in indonesia is that many people think atheists are communists. she said that she is not a communist, but a libertarian. people become antipathetic toward atheists because they regard them as being immoral. they think that if a human being does not believe in god, and does not believe in paradise and hell, he or she must not have 20 http://indonesianatheists.wordpress.com/2013/05/22/suratrakyat-mitos-dan-pertanyaan-mengenaiateisme/#more-244. 23muhamad ali moral guidelines. wati maintains that moral consciousness is based on altruism which is found in every human being. there is awareness of not harming others. morality changes according to the development of society and science. she maintains that the basis for morality is only one: harming none. from legal uncertainty to a search for a common ethics learning from legal uncertainty, atheists in indonesia have begun to pay more attention to “polite”, ethical ways of discussing religion, atheism, and all related topics in indonesia. they define and address what “offending” god or religion means in a time and place where theists set the definition religiously, socially, and in a legal way. karl karnadi said that because he had studied in germany since 2006, he did not receive comments of hatred and enmity or discrimination. he received harsh comments regarding atheists, including those by what he termed as radical islamists such as hidayah.com, arrahmah.com and voaislam.com. however, he found that his publicly declared atheism receives support not only from other atheists whom he didn’t know previously but also from muslims, christians, and other theists who showed their respect and tolerance. karnadi came to realize that the more open he became the more open others became. the more atheists become open to the public, the more they get supportive views toward their existence from indonesian society. in this spirit, karnadi wanted to formulate their views and debates as politely and positively as possible to show that they have good intentions. they want to make friends, not enemies. karnadi quotes local, javanese words “witing trisno jalaran soko kulino”, meaning “love grows out of mutual understanding and meeting and then interaction becomes normal”. through indonesian atheists, karnadi and friends introduced many aspects of atheism and give positive impressions to the public. thus, through the facebook group and webpages, such as www. facebook.com/ateis.menjawab2, which currently has 23,074 likes, karnadi seeks to create a medium for members, atheists and theists, to ask and comment cleanly and politely. the facebook account also sends greetings on religious holidays as follows: we, the abam administration, send you happy galungan and kuningan to those who celebrate them, “ happy fasting” and “happy idul fitri” to muslims, “happy vesak day 2557”, or “happy indonesian anniversary, may the future be more tolerant” to the atheist or theist friends. 24 journal of asian social science research vol. 5, no. 1, 2023 these facebook statuses and comments suggest healthy conversations that karnadi hopes to see. hatalla langit posts his status: “thank you for having been critical of my religion. i don’t agree with some of the criticisms, but i agree with some others. all are interesting, as long as we are not attacking each other. “ another writes: “i can be more open to being religious.” another one writes: “hopefully you become more accommodative, and respect and enjoy each other’s faith. theist.” introducing and shuttering the myth about atheism in predominantly religious communities in indonesia and the world remains a challenge for karnadi and his friends. when karnadi was asked if atheists are interested to spread atheism like missionary religions, he replied in the following way: atheism is not a doctrine, not a religion, not an ideology. atheism is not an ism. it is not athe + ism, but it is a + theism. so there is nothing to proselytize. what we spread to the public is not atheism, but religious freedom, science, care for humanity, bhineka tunggal ika, critical and mature attitude toward difference, and readiness for defending discriminated groups. i think many religious individuals agree with all of these. i’m ready to cooperate with anybody who agrees with these dreams, atheist or theist. for wati, only vocal minority in society shows their resistance against atheism. she understands if they show antipathy against new ideas. therefore, she invites others to know an atheist. if they knew an atheist they would realize atheists were humans too, only that they have different views. wati hopes for the protection of the rights of all thoughts in indonesia, not only atheism but also other minorities. she hopes for interaction between faith communities and theist and atheist communities in indonesia. she wants interaction between everyone, including ahmadiyya, shi’a, traditional beliefs (kepercayaan), atheists, agnostics, deists, and all others. pluralism comes from tolerance, and tolerance comes from healthy interaction, she affirms. for rainny, it is not her desire to call religious people to give up their beliefs. she just wants that atheists can live without pressure and fear in indonesia. she still cannot erase the word “islam” from her identity card. it is an official thing for everyone to state their religion (among the officially recognized ones) on their identity cards. also when getting married, one has to follow the existing regulation. but to other atheists, she wants to say: “don’t be afraid, you are not alone.” 25muhamad ali the public discourse also concerns what constitutes politeness, insulting, or offensive when it comes to faith, religion, and god (as well as ethnicity and race called sara). karnadi is aware that many on the internet demonstrate false accusations, insults, and hatred against each other. he attempts not to be trapped in that attitude. at the same time, religions and ideologies should not be immune from critical views. differences of views should be discussed, rather than banned or punished. attacks or provocative comments are different from criticisms. a good criticism in his view leads people to ask questions and discuss the topics: “although i am honest and assertive in giving criticisms, i don’t agree with insults or personal attacks.” 21 considering the legal case against alexander aan mentioned above, karnadi calls his atheist friends not to say things arbitrarily.22 the jakarta globe’s editor suggests that “atheism is a fundamental right of citizens who choose not to have god in their belief systems. but atheists who want to proclaim their beliefs outside their circles might want to think carefully before zealously taking on established religions or worse, denigrating religious faiths” (osman 2012). apart from journalists, people have expressed diverse comments on the internet regarding the legal status of atheists in indonesia. in response to a survey question regarding “when an indonesian becomes an atheist”, a reader from aceh writes:” the issue is not about atheism, but it is about offending religion in either direct or indirect way. if an atheist is silent there should be no problem, but now in reality they deliberately show themselves by insulting religion arbitrarily.” another one, fatimah, from depok, gives her comment: “the article 156 kuhp is right. indonesia holds pancasila. in civic education during my high school years, i learnt the law has to be in accordance with pancasila. being an atheist is subject to the law. do not make our eastern culture the same as the western culture from europe. we are not the same, and we are more civilized.” another reader says: ”which religion is insulted? he is free to believe or not to believe in god.” another supportive comment from yogyakarta read as follows: regardless of article 156 kuhp and pancasila, i think religious freedom is a fundamental human right, a muslim, catholic, buddhist, or even non-believer. by being religious, we cannot serve as god and judge others who do not believe in god. with kuhp, the state is too interventionist in the people’s beliefs. the state should focus on eradicating poverty and corruption rather than intervening in people’s 21 http://xwisnuajix.wordpress.com/2011/08/11/wawancara-dengan-atheis/. 22 http://www.merdeka.com/khas/kumpulan-penolak-tuhan-komunitas-ateis-2.html. 26 journal of asian social science research vol. 5, no. 1, 2023 faith. i am a muslim and i have never been taught by my parent and my religious teacher to bother others who do not believe in god or act criminally against them.23 some indonesian islamist organizations in their websites offer their responses. for example, hidayatullah.com begins its story with the following: “this is a warning for all parents who always trust that their kids are all alright, even the kids who study in a religion-based university. this group who do not believe in god has found their safe place on the internet, in social media such as facebook, friendster, multiple, and twitter, thanks to the advancement of information technology.” the story reads: “the atheists could pretend as if they are religious but they, in fact, hate religion.” it concludes with this: ”so, if you think that the haters of god and religion are just quiet, then you are wrong!” 24 a facebook group named “dialog ateis indonesia”, which currently has 12, 558 members, has active postings by self-declared atheists and theists. 25 the front page reads as follows: “all people become religious or believe in god because of tradition. 99% of them are born to a religion. this means there is no reasoning before belonging to one religion. what they have is a mere justification for their identity. everybody knows this tradition that has lasted for more than 2,75 million years is wrong.” in responding to a question about why atheists often attack (menyerang) religion, the atheists replied as follows: before making any conclusion that atheists often attack religion, we must define what “attacking” means: personal, physical, argumentative in the form of argumentum ad hominem, or dialectic of thinking. we have to understand that nothing is immune to criticism, including ideas about religion and divinity. atheism is not a doctrine, and what atheists do is not monolithic or the same. many atheists support the existence of religion but resist violence based on religion. criticisms or attacks toward religion come also from the religious communities against each other and other interpretations of the same religion. a religion attacks other religions. many religious people attack others violently. are these not deemed an attack too? the question is: who actually attacks religions most frequently?26 23 http://www.bbc.co.uk/indonesia/forum/2012/01/120120_forum_atheis.shtml. 24 http://www.voa-islam.com/lintasberita/hidayatullah/2010/12/14/12300/kaum-atheis-indonesia-subur-di-duniamaya/. 25 www.facebook.com/groups/ai.dai/permalink/301217470023738/. 26 http://indonesianatheists.wordpress.com/2013/05/22/suratrakyat-mitos-dan-pertanyaan-mengenaiateisme/#more-244 27muhamad ali the atheists recognize that, unlike the official religions, their future in indonesia is still uncertain, but the course of research is very wide open and promising. recent legal cases and debates suggest more atheist individuals will likely come to the public and social media thus creating even more vibrant, dynamic debates about public morality and religiosity. pancasila, bhineka tunggal ika, indonesia, and more broadly humanity, continue to be redefined and reinterpreted within changing circumstances. conclusion this article has shown that combined with globalization and greater access to information and communication technology, the fall of soeharto’s regime in 1998 marked a new phase in indonesian’s democratization, allowing old and new voices in the public sphere, including atheists defining themselves as no less indonesian and more importantly no less moral than the rest. the well-read and young educated individuals emerge as a response to their upbringing, education, and news about religious radicalism on the one hand and liberalism and science development on the other hand. in recent years, atheists have been more assertive in proclaiming their absence or lack of religious faith and defending disbelief in god or gods. in their discourses, pancasila and bhineka tunggal ika have to be addressed. some have felt indoctrination, but others want to redefine and reinterpret the indonesian state philosophy and national slogan. for them, pancasila should serve as a unifying tool for every citizen and should not mean compulsion of a belief in god, or of belonging to any religion. bhineka tunggal ika, unity in diversity, should mean tolerance of diverse ideas, not to exclude, let alone discriminate against non-believers. indonesian atheists are aware of their minority status like the ahmadiyya, shi’a, christians, and other religious groups, but they know that being an atheist has been more difficult for them than the other religious minorities. toward this public ethic, they have tried to refute misconceptions about the conflation between communism and atheism, about immoral or inhumane atheism, and about the common manipulation of pancasila to reject dissent. they were also critical of the blasphemy law for they considered it to have contravened the fundamental human rights and the international laws on political and civil rights. focusing on individual human rights, they need support groups both in their localities and internationally, both online and offline. they have demonstrated that being an atheist and being an indonesian are not incompatible. they wanted to demonstrate to other indonesians that they are no longer a threat as in 28 journal of asian social science research vol. 5, no. 1, 2023 the past as perceived and reconstructed by the state and the mainstream organizations and leaders. these atheists are not only redefining indonesia but also contextualizing atheism in indonesia. they redefine indonesia as not a religious nationstate despite the muslim majority and attempts at making the country more toward an islamic state or society. in many official statements and textbooks, indonesia has been regarded as neither a theocracy nor a secular state. it is a pancasila state. this allows atheists to redefine indonesia by redefining pancasila and bhineka tunggal ika. they are not against common ground and unity. they support these but they emphasize humanity and morality as the common ground: not the sacred common ground, not the religious common ground. pancasila has been analyzed as an ideology of tolerance, a political compromise, a civil religion, or a common platform for all indonesians. as an open ideology, pancasila has been praised by many for its inclusiveness and tolerance, but has been criticized by others: some islamists want to limit its role as they make islam their political basis. secular indonesians define pancasila as a common platform against islamization, arabization, and neo-liberalization, but atheists, even the liberals have not been inclusive enough when the latter promote religious liberalism or religious pluralism. pancasila is both liberating and constraining. indonesian atheists envisage moral pluralism and common ground. further research should be conducted on the different dimensions of indonesian atheism: philosophical, theological, anthropological, sociological, legal, and political. in other countries, there has been research on america’s civil religion, sacred ground, common ground, french laicité, turkish secularism, and others. this paper has considered atheism in terms of philosophical, legal, and ethical questions in indonesia and offers preliminary data that can be analyzed further to offer sound theoretical arguments. references abalahin, andrew j. 2005. “a sixth religion? confucianism and the negotiation of indonesian-chinese identity under the pancasila state”. pp. 119-142 in spirited politics: religion and public life in contemporary southeast asia, edited by andrew c. willford and kenneth m. george. ithaca, new 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