STRAlEGY IMPLEMENTATION: A CoNCEYIUAL REvIEw OF PRACTICAL APPllCATIONS James F. Van Houten Mutual Service Insurance S1. Paul, Minnesota V.K Unni Indiana University of Pennsylvania Indiana, Pennsylvania Introduction When systematic strategic planning was first introduced, the initial focus was on di- versification of the firm. But as firms increasingly faced strategic challenges from technological turbulence, changing competition, saturation of growth, and socia-political pressures, it became evident that the problems posed by these challenges could not be resolved simply by adding new areas to the firm [1]. As a result, attention was turned to optimizing the firm's competitive strategies. Corporate executives have continuously sought ever since to achieve such competitive advantage. Most significant business decisions involve substantial commitments with attendant uncertainties. Prominent writings on business strategy for practitioners, such as Michael Porter ([14], [15]), identify certain strategic options for a firm seeking advantage over its competitors. Porter's strategy proposals have been well received in the field of strategic management where they have been analyzed empirically and theoretically. Porter's Model Any business strategy, to be capable of sustained success, must be grounded in com- petitive advantage. Competitive advantage is gained when a company moves into a position where it has an edge in coping with competitive forces. According to Porter the intensity of competition is based on the economic structure of an industry and the state of competition in an industry depends on five basic competitive forces: (I) the threat of new entrants, (2) the threat of substitute products or services, (3) the bargaining power of suppliers, (4) the bargaining power of buyers, and (5) the rivalry among existing firms. The goal of competitive analysis is to find a position in the industry where the company can best defend itself against these competitive forces or can influence them in its favor. In coping with the five competitive forces, Porter has identified three generic strategic approaches: (I) overall cost leadership, (2) differentiation, and (3) focus. Cost leadership emphasizes producing a standardized product at very low per-unit costs for many buyers who are price-sensitive. The impetus for striving to be the industry's low-cost producer can stem from sizable economies of scale and strong learning curve effects. Differentiation refers to outputs which are considered unique industry-wide and are addressed to many buyers who are relatively price-insensitive. Success differentiation creates lines of de- Spring 1991 Van Houten and Unni: Strategy Implementation 37 fense for dealing with competitive forces. Focus strategy adverts to products which ful- fill the needs of particular buyers who are fewer in number in an industry. In this paper an attempt is made to operationalize Porter's model by reviewing the relationship of situ- ational factors to competitive strategy, and by identifying the actions taken to implement the various competitive strategies in the real world. Data and Methodology The data used for analysis were collected from articles in three business periodicals (Business Week Forbes, and Fortune) published during March 1988-89 ([2-13], [16-28]). A convenient sample of twenty-five firms was selected from eighteen different industry categories, with no more than three firms from anyone category. Industry categories were also balanced between ''manufacturing'' and "service-retailing" classification. Since competitive strategy deals with long range sustainable advantages [14], it was important to separate long-term strategic from short-term tactical actions. The fundamental basis of above-average performance in the long run is defined as sustainable competitive advantage. This sorting of the sample size was accomplished by relying on the authors comments, and by selecting only those firms identified in the literature as in "turn-around" or "problem solving" modes. These firms seemed most likely to be taking significant long-term actions as opposed to making tactical adjustments. Table 1 lists the firms and industries selected as sample for the study. Table 1 Firms and Industries Selected for Analysis MaDufaduring: Autos: General MotOlS, Peugeot Motor of America Chemicals: Cabot Drugs: Miles LabslAG. Pharamaceuticals Food Processing: General Mills, Kellog General Mfg: Hillenbrand Shoes: KedslStride Rite Special Machinery: Caterpillar Tires: Bridgestooe Writing Instruments: Parker Services aDd Retailing: Airlines: British Airways Discount and Fashion Retailing: Goldblatt's, Sears Financial SeIVices: Equimark, Jeffries, Solomon JewelIy Retailing: Tiffany Marine Transportation: Sea Container on and Gas: Dresser, Mobil, Occidental Publishing: Knight-Ridder 38 Journal ofBusiness Strategies Vol. 8, No. 1 Each of the twenty-five firms were analyzed, and then classified on the basis of their environmental factors and competitive strategy selection. The environmental factors con- sidered were the five identified by Porter as those which drive industry competition, and therefore, determine the environment in which the competitive strategy will be imple- mented. Since each of these factors is present to some degree for each firm in every industry, one challenge was to identify those which seemed to be the dominant strategic choice factors. When the journal author expressed an opinion, the opinion was accepted as correct and this may be considered as a limitation to the study. In most cases, however, it was necessary to evaluate each author's comments against Porter's mtionale, and subjectively establish the environmental factors which seemed most critical. Using this method it was possible to identify a single environmental factor as dominant for nine firms, and two factors for fifteen firms. All firms were classified on the basis of past competitive strategies using Porter's three categories (differentiation, cost, and focus) whenever possible. This was possible in every case for current competitive strategies. However, the past strategies for eight of the twenty-five firms resisted any classification, and were identified as ''unclear''. Four ad- ditional firms seemed to be moving from unsuccessful strategies best descn"bed as con- glomerate diversification. The past strategies for these four firms were identified as "conglomerate". The fact that twelve of these twenty-five "turn-around" firms were moving from competitive strategies that could not be clearly classified in the Porter model to strategies that could, seems to lend support to Porter's argument that, "the firm failing to develop its strategy in at least one of the three basic directions, is in an extremely poor strategic situation" [14]. Analysis of Environmental Factors and Strategic Selection Table 2, lists the firms and a classification based on environmental factors and strategy selection. The environmental forces, in terms of the five factors in the Porter Model, are noted in column two, along with a narmtive about the specific internal and external situational choice factors which created the environmental forces. The third column in- dicates the past and current competitive strategy pursued by each firm. A narrative of the specific implementation actions taken by the firm to deal with the internal and external situational choice factors is also included in this column. Spring 1991 Van Houten and Unni: Strategy Implementation Table 2 39 Analysis and Classification of Firms Based on Environment Factors and Competitive Strategy Selection Finn Environmental Forces Strategic Choice Industry Sitnational Choice Implementation Factors Actions 1. Bridgestone Boyers, Rivalry From Industry Differentiated to (Tires) (Internal: mfg. Industry Cost leadership facilities inefficient, (Internal: decentralized poor union and decision making, changing distributor relations. culture to get wider input, External: slow industry cost = reduced mgml levels. growth, competitors External: investing in new using new technology.) technology to upgrade mfg. 2. British Airways New Entrants, Rivalry From Unclear to Segment Focus (Airlines) (Internal: low employee (Internal: new CEO, reduced productivity and poor mgml levels, new Board, sold union relations, slow unprofitable assets, cut decision making. employees, changing culture External: outdated to emphasize service. route structure, new External: new advertising entrants in most agency, revised routes, profitable routes, invested in Concorde, acquired service and price British Caledovia AI.., joint based competition.) venture with UL) 3. Cabot New Entrants No Oumge: Industry Cost ladenbip (Chemicals) (Internal: (Internal: invest in new diversified into technology, centralizing some natural gas and functions to reduce cost, open alloys, core bus. new plants in Pacific Rim to mfg. is outdated. reduce transportation costs. External: new External: expand demand for technology in core core product by joint ventures bus., slow growth with tire COS, investment in in core bus. demand, R&D to find new uses.) depressed natural gas prices.) 4. Cal Fed Substitntes, SuppUers From Unclear to Segment Focus (Savings (Internal: (Internal: reduce cost by and Loan) diversified into closing unprofitable branches 40 Journal ofBusiness Strategies Vol. B,No.! S. Caterpillar (Special Machinery) 6. Dresser Industries (petroleum services) 7. Equimark (Banking) additional bus. where had low share and limited expertise. External: new competition for same need with new products, new competitors in core business, high interest return demanded by suppliers of funds.) New Entrants, Rivalry (Internal: outdated mfg. plants, poor union relations, high wage costs and restrictive work rules. External: slow down in world wide CODSIrucIion equip. demand, shift in market toward smaller construction firms, dollar value fluctuations vs. other currency, new mfg. technology, new rompetition competition with lower cast.) Rivalry (Internal: diversified broadly into unrelated businesses. External: oil exploration core business demand declined, low shares in new businesses.) Buyers, Rivalry (Internal: poor quality loans decreased earnings, inefficient operations, many unprofitable locations. External: market demand becoming more segmented sold assets not related to core bus., opened branches in profitable markets. External: product-adjustable rate mortgages to reduce risk of rising interest rates.) From Industry DUreI'eDtiated to Industry Cost Leadership (Internal: cut number employees, renegotiated wages and work rules, installed computer inventory control, invested to modernize all plants. External: introduced new products for small coDStruction firms, expanded into U.S. farm machinery and international markets.) From CoogIomerate to Segment Focus (Internal: new CEO, sold all businesses not related to core industry, pared capacity of core business to align with decreased demand, purchased M.W. Kel108& Inc. to strengthen core bus. External: joint ventures to reduce drilling costs.) From Industry DUreI'eDtiated to Segment Focus (Internal: new CEO, cut staff 23%, closed unprofitable locations, upgraded collection staff quality, sold low performing assets. External: focus marketing effort on Spring 1991 Van Houten and Unni: Strategy Implementation 41 8. General Mills (Food Processing) 9. General Motors (Automobiles and Trucks) 10. Goldblatt's Dept. Stores (Discount and Fashion Retailing) and less homogeneous, power of large borrowers to negotiate rates.) Rivalry, Substitutes (Internal: diversified into large number of related businesses. External: new products introduced by competitors in core business, changing customer preferences, slow industry growth.) New Entrants, Rivalry (Internal: production costs higher than competitors, complex structure slowed decision making, culture resisted change. External: slower industry growth, changing customer design and style preferences, new mfg. technology, tluctuating value dollar vs. other currencies.) New Entrants, Suppliers (Internal: expanded into unfamiliar upscale markets, many locations unprofitable. External: new low cost general competitors, many new entrants into upscale markets.) smaller firms, acquiring other banks and thrifts with strengths in small business lending.) From Conglomerate to Industry Differentiated (Internal: sold non-food businesses, expanded Olive Garden restaurants, retired 22% stock. External: introduced 260 new products in last 5 years.) No Change Industry Differentiated (Internal: acquired hi- technology firms, changed culture to emphasize quality, sold Terex and Frigidaire divisions, upgrading mfg. plant technology, closed inefficient plants. External: purchased Lotus to take advantage of styling and design skills, moved more mfg. outside U.S.) From Unclear to Segment Focus (Internal: new CEO, closed stores in upscale markets, added 2 new stores in traditional inner city markets, more aggressive negotiating for low cost merchandise. External: advertising shifted to hand delivered circulars in adjacent target neighbor- hoods.) 42 Journal ofBusiness Strategies Vol. 8, No.1 11. lliIlenbnnd Industries (General Manufacturing) 12. Jelrries and Company (Investment Banking) 13. Keels Division Stride Rite Corp. (Shoes) Rivalry (External: extended life expectancy and excess hospital capacity resulted in non-growth core businesses.) New Entrants, Rivalry (Internal: firm prosecuted for insider trading, many top employees left. External: more financial services firms moving into investment banking, new methods of business financing introduced, traditional large customers market avoid firm because of scandal.) New Entrants, Substitutes (Internal: previous parent-Uniroyal-treated bus. as cash cow, competing on basis of price only, no focused distribution, identity and share declining. External: lifestyle changes created From Segment Focus to Industry Cost Leadership (Internal: used eainings from core bus. to purchase additional firms in related bus., invested in technology to reduce mfg. costs, cut core bus. expenses, created 59 warehouse distr. system to improve service. External: introduced new products in core and related bus., increased core bus. advt. to hold share, purchased Medeco Locks and American Tourlster to take advantage of new low cost mfg. technology and expertise.) From Segment Focus to Industry Ditfereutiated (Internal: new CEO, rebuild culture, more decentralized decision making. External: advertise to rebuild firm image, more emphasis on small as well as large customers, and broader services to all size customers.) From Industry Cost Leadership to Segment Focus (Internal: Uniroyal sold division to Stride Rite in 1982. External: introduced new products and colors for women's and children's "canvas shoe" segment, heavy advertising support, distribution strategy Spring 1991 Van Houten and Unni: Strategy Implementation 43 numerous new segments, concentrate on dept. stores segments, each targeted and fashion retailers.) by new competitors, generic type product no growth.) 14. Kellogg Rivalry, Substitutes From Unclear to Industry DiJfa'entiated (Food Processing) (Internal: mgmt lost (Internal: increased R&D touch with markets, spending, invested in new culture resistant to mfg. technology. External: change, outdated. mfg. increased advertising of facilities. External: brand, introduced new products demographic and life- emphasizing nutritional value, style changes reduced attacked niches controlled by demand for sweet competitors with me-too tasting children's products, expanded into cereal, new mfg. foreign markets, launched technology.) twice as many new products as competitors.) 15. Knight-Ridder New Entrants, Rivalry From Unclear to Segment Focus (Publishing) (Internal: diversified (Internal: new CEO, new into TV stations, poor publishers at 1/3 of papers, relations with unions, sold unprofitable-unfocused poor printing plant TV stations, acquired specific efficiency. External: market cable stations. changing population in External: seeking newspaper key markets-Hispanics, acquisitions, introduced suburbs-new printing Spanish language supplements, technology, new cut ad rates, introduced zone competitors in Latin editions for larger papers.) language papers and stations.) 16. Miles Laboratory Rivalry No Change: Industry DiII'erentiated Division, AG (External: lifestyle (Internal: reorganized 178 Pharmaceuticals change toward over person sales force into (Drugs) eating and drinking separate divisions for reduced industry doctors, food stores, and Rx. demand for stomach External: new advt. agency, upset and hangover increase advL expenditures, remedies including product line extensions, Atka-Seltzer key joint advL with H&R Block.) product, many new 44 Journal ofBusiness Strategies Vol. 8,No.l products for same purpose introduced.) 17. Mobil Corp. Rivalry From Conglomerate to (Oil and Gas) (Internal: expanded Industry Cost Leadership into unrelated (Internal: sold non-oil and industries, expanded gas businesses, sold stations service stations into too distant from refineries new regional markets, for low cost distribution, many unprofitable, shut down least efficient refinery technology refineries, purchased high outdated, unsuccessful tech. refinery from Tenneco, at finding new oil renovated service stations, reserves. External: reduced corp. staff by 33%, gas use decline, new acquired Superior Oil to refinery technology.) increase reserves, investing in new exploration. External: opening new type of service station with fast food facilities in selected regional markets, marketing higher profit margin refinery products more aggressively.) 18. Occidental Rivalry From Conglomerate to Petroleum (Internal: heavy debt Industry Differentiated (Oil and Gas) incurred to expand into (Internal new COO taking unrelated businesses, over more of leadership from heavy demand for cash CEO, changing culture to flow, autocratic encourage broader mgmt. leadership of 90 year participation in decision old CEO and founder. making, sold non-eore External: gas use industry assets to pay down decline, new refinery debt, increase investment in tedmology.) oil exploration, forward integration into distribution, acquired chemical businesses.) 19. Parker Pen Rivalry From Unclear to Segment Focus (Writing (Internal: diversified (Internal: IBO of pen Instruments) into temporary division from parent in 1985, employment business with new CEO, cut production Manpower acquisition. capacity. External: new External: slow growth advt. to emphasize premium pen of premium pen market, markets, increased advt. aggressive competition expenditures 60%, introduced Spring 1991 VanHouten and Unni: Strategy Implementation 45 New Entrants, Substitutes, From Segment Focus to 20. Peugeot Motors of America, Di'risiou of Peugeot Corp. (Automobiles) 21. Salomon, Inc. (Financial Services) 22. Sea Coutainer Corp. (Ferry and Marine Freight Transport) among top 3 firms for low price pen market. new technology in mfg. low price pens.) New Entrants, Rivalry (Internal: low parent understanding of U.S. market. poor dealer relations, limited dealer representation and service facilities in some locations. External: slower industry growth, changing customer design and style preferences, new mfg. technology, fluctuation in value of dollar vs. other currencies.) Rivalry (Internal: autocratic CEO, culture resisted change. External: rely heavily on largest aIStomers, needs of larger customers becoming more diverse, new business financing methods and services being introduced by both old and new competitors.) Substitutes (Internal: expanded to mfg. and supply all types of oontainers, acquired numerous ferries-many new luxury pens, raised prices.) From Unclear to Segment Focus (Internal: new CEO, improved parts delivery, closer relations with dealers, and more participation by them in decisions. External: parent won "car of the year" award in Europe, introduced it with inaeased advt.in U.S., narrow target mkt. advertising~ mail to aJStomers near dealer locations, cash awards for test drives. seeking new dealer outlets in target markets.) Industry Differentiated (Internal: reshuffled top mgmt., provided incentives and internal partnership to reduce turnover, reauited experienced mgrs to run new institutional investment and banking depts, alt employees 10% to reduce costs, purchased a S & L. External: reposition firm as provider of broad services with larger customers, i.naease advt. of broader services to all, expand stock trading to Asia.) From Industry Differm.tiated to Segment Focus (Internal: alt payroll, closed unprofitable ferries, sold HQ bldg and excess container capacity, shifted 46 Journal ofBusiness Strategies Vol. 8, No.1 23. Sears, Roebuck and Co. (Discount and Fashion Retailing) 24. TIffany and Co. (Jewelry) 25. Union Pacific (Railroad) unprofitable, excess mfg. and transport capacity. External: shipping industry losing share to other transporters. Overall no growth. helicopters and airlines competing with ferries.) New Entrants, Suppliers (Internal: culture resistant to change, many unprofitable locations, productivity per square foot and employee is low. External: homogeneous market splitting into price and specialty store segments, many new competitors for each, customers less willing to buy store brands.) New Entrants, Rivalry (Internal: purchased by Avon in 1979 and changed emphasis to mid- price premium items from unique-exclusive items, name recognition is primary asset-but losing awareness. External: gold price fluctuations, style changes, dept. stores and other entrants into premium jewelry, slow growth in market.) Substitutes (Internal: 74 year old CEO unwilling to change, poor union relations, mig to specialty containers. External: acquired Hoverspeed, acquired additional European ferries with strong mkt positions, refurbished remaining ferries.) From Industry Differentiated to Industry Cost Leadership (Internal: selling HQ bldg, closing unprofitable stores, reducing number models carried to control inv. costs, cut promotional expenses. External: redesign stores, discount all items, discontinue annual sales promotions, opening new specialty children's stores, testing superstore concept.) From Industry Differentiated to Segment Focus (Internal: leveraged buyout from Avon in 1984, sold existing merchandise and replaced with unique-high priced items. External: new advt agency and ads, increased advt budget, started prestige catalogue business. added luxury fragrances, purses and silk scarves to branded category, made stores avail for high prestige charity events.) From Unclear to Industry Cost Leadership (Internal: new CEO, sold HQ in NY and moved to Bethlehem, Spring 1991 Van Houten and Unni: Strategy Implementation 47 high wage costs and restrictive work rules. External: deregulation increased price competition for traditional R.R. dominated commodity transport, airline fares declined, market demanding more comfort and more dependable service. new scheduling and communications technology.) PA, reduced layers of mgmt., cut jobs, closed outdated repair yards, tied Sr. mgmt. compensation to performance, created customer service culture. External: est. a new natl. account sales staff for large customers, replaced distr. system of freight forwarding agents with national service center using computer technology.) Discussion and Conclusions The relationships between the specific environmental forces and selected competitive strategy are shown in Table 3. Table 3 Environment f!!m No. Firms AlJ'ectecJ Selected Competitive Strategy Cost J pdership Differentiation Sejpnent FOCUS Buyers New Entrants Rivalry Substitutes Suppliers 2 12 18 7 3 1 3 4 I I o 3 7 3 o I 6 7 3 2 The data does not suggest any dominance of certain Environment Forces, in-and-of themselves that may lead to specific competitive strategy choice. This is not in conflict with the Porter model, which states, "the best strategy for a given firm is ultimately a unique construction" [14]. The common requirements to effectively implement each strategy, as described by Porter, and the number of firms in this study that possess each of these requirements are summarized in Table 4. 48 Journal ofBusiness Strategies Table 4 Portion of Firms in Study that Possess the Most Common Requirements for the Selected Strategy Vol. 8,No.1 Strat.e2Y Skills or Resources Common Qmnization RegpiRmen1s Cost Leadership (Total: 7) Access to Capital (7) Engineering Skills (4) I.abor Supervision (2) Easy to Mfg. Prods (4) Tight Cost Control Detailed Reports Structured Organization Special Mgmt. Incentives (7) (0) (5) (1) At least one of above At least two of above Three or more of above 7 7 4 7 5 1 Industry Differentiation (Total: 7) Marketing Skill (5) Engineering Skill (3) Creative (4) Skilled Employees (4) Unique Skill (7) Strong Internal Coord. (5) Subjective Perf. Measure (2) Amenities to Attract Strong R&D (4) Reputation (4) Channel Cooper (4) At least one of above At least two of above At least three of above Four or more of above 7 7 5 5 6 3 2 NA Segment Focus (Total: 11) Some Combination of the Above Cost or Differentiation Strengths Aimed at a Particular Segment At least one of above At least two of above At least three of above Four or more of above 11 11 8 3 It should be noted that the data in Table 4 are the minimum number of satisfied cri- teria, because not all of the criteria could be verified for each firm from the articles re- viewed. For example, the common requirement for ''Detailed Reports" for the "Cost leadership Strategy" was mentioned in none of the articles, but seems likely to exist in at least some of the firms. Only five of the twenty-five firms reviewed seemed to have situational factors that were in opposition to the selected strategy. Despite these five possible conflicts, the model seems to do a good job reflecting the real world in the overall. All firms have at least some of the strengths needed to imple- ment their selected competitive strategies. and the majority of the firms have all but one or two. Spring 1991 Van Houten and Unni: Strategy Implementation 49 Table 5 summarizes the percentage of firms in each competitive strategy category tak- ing each of the general actions identified in the literature review. Table 5 Portions of Firms Taking Each Management Action Competitive Strategy Cate&oa nurerentiatjon Cost Leadership Eggg Organization Decentralize Dec. Making 29% 14% 9% Change Culture 57 29 18 Replace CEO 14 14 64 Redesign Mgml Incentives 14 14 0 Cost/Expense Reduce Mgml 14 71 9 Sell Unprofitable Assets 29 57 18 OIt /I Employees 14 43 27 Cose Unprofit Locations 14 29 18 Sell Non-Core Businesses 14 14 36 Renegotiate Wages/Rules 0 29 0 Marketing Change Advt. Agency 14 0 18 Change Advt. Strategy 43 0 36 Increase Advt. $ 57 14 36 Change Distr. System 43 29 18 R&D/Product Dev. Invest in R&D 29 29 0 Add New Products 71 43 45 Cut No. Products 0 14 18 Core Business Expansion Acquisition 29 43 54 Joint Venture 14 14 27 Invest New Tech. 29 86 9 Add Facilities 14 14 27 New Geog. Mkts. 43 29 18 UDRlated Bus. Expansion Acquisition 43 0 0 Core and Unrelated Bus. Acquisition 72 43 54 50 JoumalofBusiness Strategies' Vol. 8, No.1 Firms implementing a Product Differentiation strategy were most likely to take actions to acquire additional businesses and add new products. They were least likely to cut their product portfolios or make it a high priority to renegotiate wage rates or work rules. Firms implementing a Cost Leadership strategy were most likely to take actions to invest in new technology, reduce management levels, and sell unprofitable assets. Th((y were least likely to acquire businesses unrelated to their core industry or to change advertising. 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