Original Research The impact of moral motives on economic decision-making in relationally different situations Katharina G. Kugler, Julia A. M. Reif, Gesa-Kristina Petersen, and Felix C. Brodbeck Department of Psychology, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Munich, Germany To explore how “salient others” influence economic deci- sions, we tested the impact of moral motives on economic decision-making in three relationally different situations: (a) anonymous social one-shot interactions, where individ- uals should draw on situational cues to infer information about how to interpret their relationship to a salient other due to the absence of other sources of social information, (b) non-anonymous social situations within an ongoing interaction, in which the moral motive established in the relationship should override situational cues about moral motives, and (c) anonymous non-social one-shot interac- tions, in which moral motives should not have an effect given the absence of a salient other. In an experiment (N = 94 participants), we varied these relationally different decision situations and the moral motive framing (unity vs. proportionality). As hypothesized, the two moral motive framings influenced decision behavior, but only in the anonymous social one-shot interaction. By replicating that moral motives matter in economic decision-making and showing that people infer information about morally acceptable behavior in anonymous social situations from moral cues provided by the situation and from prior in- teractions in case of an ongoing relationship, we offer a moral-psychological explanation for why individuals decide differently in economic decision situations depending on the relationality of the situation. Keywords: economic decisions, moral motives, tacit coordination, decision design Consider a call to donate money for a crowdfund-ing initiative. Would you donate money, if the founders of the initiative appealed to your solidarity? Would you donate, if the founders suggested that you would receive something back in proportion to what you give? It probably depends on whether you be- lieve the initiative deserves your solidarity or whether you believe that giving and receiving should be pro- portional. Regardless of how you would decide, sol- idarity or proportionality considerations triggered by cues in the call for donations would influence your de- cision. Such considerations are inherently social and are rooted in the moral motives you apply to the rela- tionship between you and the founders of the initiative (Fiske, 1992; Rai & Fiske, 2011). While economic decisions often seem rationally cal- culable, they are influenced by moral motives as soon as they become social in nature, that is, when other people are involved, affected or influenced by the deci- sion. As situations in general provide opportunities or affordances to express individual preferences (Kelley et al., 2003), social situations provide the context for relationship regulation. In such social contexts, peo- ples’ decision-making processes including the way they think, reason, and ultimately decide vary as a function of how they relate to “the other” person(s) involved in a given situation (Larrick, 2016; Reis, 2008). This reg- ulation of relationships is inherently related to corre- sponding moral motives, which determine the morally required response in a situation (Fiske, 1992; Rai & Fiske, 2011). In our paper, we add to the body of research addressing the question of how salient others influence economic decisions. We address this question from the perspective of moral psychology. More specifically, we draw on re- lationship regulation theory (Rai & Fiske, 2011), and its predecessor, relational models theory (Fiske, 1992). The theory proposes four fundamental moral motives (unity, hierarchy, equality, and proportionality) that are used to regulate relationships and thereby influ- ence individuals’ thinking, feeling, and behavior in so- cial situations (Fiske, 1992; Rai & Fiske, 2011). These four relational models guide all other-related behavior – even when making economic decisions, which was shown by Brodbeck et al. (2013) in a series of experi- ments. With our paper, we replicated Brodbeck et al.’s (2013) work by showing that different moral motives lead to different levels of solidarity shown in economic decision situations. However, we also extended Brod- beck et al.’s (2013) work in the following ways: To show that the effect of moral motives on decision-making behavior is indeed limited to social interactions, we supplemented a new non-social interaction situation in which we expected no effect of moral framing. In contrast to Brodbeck, our non-social situation involved a non-human partner, while Brodbeck et al.’s (2013) non-social condition was an “interaction” with oneself. Moreover, by adding a situation with an ongoing rela- tionship (i.e., prior interaction), we went beyond Brod- beck et al. (2013) to show, which kind of information individuals used to infer morally acceptable behavior. Corresponding author: Julia Reif, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Department of Psychology, Economic and Organisational Psychology, Leopoldstraße 13, 80802 München, Germany. e-mail: ju- lia.reif@psy.lmu.de 10.11588/jddm.2021.1.77559 JDDM | 2021 | Volume 7 | Article 2 | 4 mailto:julia.reif@psy.lmu.de mailto:julia.reif@psy.lmu.de https://doi.org/10.11588/jddm.2021.1.77559 Kugler et al.: The impact of moral motives The influence of social contexts on economic decision-making Standard economic theory, which was long guided by the assumption of rational, self-interested agents, has now also recognized the influence of social contexts on economic decision-making (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999, 2006). For example, scholars have noted that people not only focus on own outcomes but consider others’ outcomes as well when evaluat- ing choices (Fiddick, Cummins, Janicki, Lee, & Erlich, 2013) and are motivated in doing so by other-regarding preferences (Halali, Kogut & Ritov, 2017). In response to findings in experimental economics challenging the “legitimacy of the ‘rational agent’ model as a descriptive model of human behavior” (Fid- dick et al., 2013, p. 319), normative theories includ- ing other-regarding preferences and decision heuris- tics such as altruism, others’ well-being, fairness and reciprocity, the equal division rule (Allison & Mes- sick, 1990) or noblesse oblige (Fiddick et al., 2013) have been proposed (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Levine, 1998; Rabin, 1993, see also Fiddick et al., 2013). Rather than extending the eco- nomic research on other-regarding preferences and de- cision heuristics, we applied a psychological theory on moral motives and relationship regulation to under- stand other-regarding behavior in economic decisions (Fiske, 1992; Rai & Fiske, 2011). In our opinion, the advantage of relationship regulation theory is that it offers a comprehensive, unifying framework concern- ing other-regarding behavior, and thus can be used to predict and explain moral motives in any type of social interaction. Moral motives as mechanisms for relationship regulation in social situations Moral motives represent moral obligations, or motiva- tional forces to pursue acceptable behavior in relation- ships. As such, moral motives are mechanisms for rela- tionship regulation and are thus inherently social. Re- lationship regulation theory (Rai & Fiske, 2011, build- ing on its predecessor, relational models theory, Fiske, 1992; see also Rai, 2020) proposes that in social sit- uations – and only in social situations – individuals universally apply four – and only four – distinct moral motives (also see Brodbeck, et al., 2013) for relation- ship regulation: unity, hierarchy, equality, and propor- tionality. Unity serves as motivation to look after in-group members by avoiding threats and providing aid and protection when needed due to a sense of collective responsibility. Decisions are made by consensus, and goods are divided according to needs. Hierarchy serves as motivation to respect rank, where deference and obedience towards superiors is exchanged for leader- ship and guidance as well as protection of subordi- nates. Decisions are made by the authority, and goods are divided depending on status. Equality serves as moral motivation for balanced, in-kind reciprocity and equal treatment in the sense of “scratch my back and I will scratch yours” as well as “eye-for-an-eye forms of revenge” (Rai & Fiske, 2011, p. 63). Decisions are made by majority, with everyone having the same vote, and goods are divided equally. Proportionality serves as motivation for calculations and behavior based on ratios and making judgments according to a utilitar- ian calculus of costs and benefits. Decisions are made by following market principles, and goods are divided in proportion to contributions. In asocial situations or in situations with null relationship, interactions are not coordinated with reference to a specific relational model or moral motive which leads to moral indiffer- ence (see Fiske, 1992; Rai & Fiske, 2011). In general, humans use the four moral motives to develop, coordinate, evaluate and sustain social rela- tionships. Specific moral motives dominate specific re- lationships, and specific individuals prefer to regulate relationships with a specific moral motive (Forsyth, 1995; Haslam, 2004). However, all humans use and “understand” all four moral motives. In short, the four moral motives apply to all humans in all cul- tures. Note, however, that the way moral motives are expressed varies cross-culturally (Fiske, 1992; Rai & Fiske, 2011). In any specific social situation, an in- dividual’s behavior can be attributed to one of the four moral motives. Thus, any economic decision that involves others can be attributed to one of the four moral motives as well (individuals’ behaviors might vary across situations). Cues eliciting moral motives in social situations Moral motives guide (economic decision-making) be- havior in social situations. But from where do individ- uals infer information about “morally correct” behav- ior? In an ongoing relationship within a context that provides culturally formed prescriptions about accept- able behavior, norms are established and guide indi- viduals’ behaviors. At work, for example, managers and subordinates usually establish a relationship of hierarchy in which the managers’ instructions are fol- lowed. Or when two friends always take turns pay- ing for a round of drinks, they establish and express the moral motive of equality. Within the boundaries of such ongoing interactions, people recognize rules and prohibitions and develop consensus about accept- able moral motives to be applied in interactions (Rai & Fiske, 2011). Established relationships, being rel- atively stable, should thus be the most salient cue guiding behavior compared to specific situational in- fluences which should be less influential. However, economic decisions are often made in a so- cial context where individuals do not share a common history and cultural norms might not exist. Coordina- tion in such situations – where explicit communication is also often limited or impossible – can be termed tacit coordination (e.g., Abele, Stasser, & Chartier, 2014; De Kwaadsteniet & Van Dijk, 2010; Van Dijk, De Kwaadsteniet, & De Cremer, 2009). In the absence of other information, people base their assumptions 10.11588/jddm.2021.1.77559 JDDM | 2021 | Volume 7 | Article 2 | 5 https://doi.org/10.11588/jddm.2021.1.77559 Kugler et al.: The impact of moral motives about the relationship on the most salient cues (cf. De Kwaadsteniet & Van Dijk, 2010). In anonymous one-shot social interactions, that is, in situations in which people who cannot identify each other interact only one time, moral motives cannot stem from the re- lationship between individuals, and individuals do not share a history or potential future. In such situations, individuals should be particularly susceptible to ex- ternally provided cues regarding moral considerations. Cues such as situational framings should evoke moral motives, leading to tacit coordination and indicating “what to do”. Moral motives eliciting different economic decisions The four moral motives unity, hierarchy, equality, and proportionality differently direct people’s actions in so- cial situations (Rai & Fiske, 2011), including in eco- nomic decision-making in social situations. According to Brodbeck et al. (2013), unity moral motives should lead to higher levels of solidarity than proportionality moral motives, as unity moral motives serve as motiva- tion to look after in-group members, while proportion- ality moral motives serve as motivation to calibrate costs and benefits (Rai & Fiske, 2011). The authors contrasted these two moral motives (unity versus pro- portionality) because their effects were expected to be particularly large in the context of their paradigm. In a series of studies, Brodbeck et al. (2013) showed that situational framings and even subtle subliminal primes in economic decision games involving an anonymous other did indeed evoke moral motives, such as soli- darity or proportionality, that distinctively guided in- dividuals’ decision behavior: While a unity frame in- duced more solidarity behavior with more money being saved for an anonymous other, even though this be- havior decreased the decision-maker’s expected total utility, a proportionality frame made participants con- sider costs and benefits with less money being saved for the anonymous other, increasing the decision-maker’s total expected utility. Relationally different situations Within our goal of exploring how salient others in- fluence economic decisions, we focused on subtle sit- uational cues providing information on the relation- ship to the salient other. To explore the effective- ness of the subtle situational cues, we contrasted (a) an anonymous social one-shot interaction with two other conditions: (b) a non-anonymous social situation with an ongoing interaction, and (c) an anonymous non-social one-shot interaction. Decision-making was thus dynamic as we investigated interlinked social and non-social interactions in differently framed contexts with short-term and ongoing relationships and chang- ing moral motives, implying short-term and long-term considerations of decision-makers. Thereby, we built on research by Brodbeck et al. (2013), using their paradigm, the Dyadic Solidarity Game (DSG), to replicate and extend their findings on the influence of situational cues regarding moral motives on social economic decision-making. The Dyadic Solidarity Game In the DSG, two individuals make an economic deci- sion in a one-shot interaction. Even though the de- cision is made by each individual independently, the revenue is dependent on a probabilistic risk as well as the other person’s decision: Two participants are matched to form one dyad. Both participants in the dyad have EUR 10 at their disposal. Participants can freely divide the EUR 10 into two amounts, Amount A and Amount B (without knowing how the other par- ticipant decides). Then a die is rolled: If the die lands on a 1, 2, 3, or 4 (i. e., probability of 2/3) the par- ticipants receive their own Amount A, and Amount B is not disbursed. However, if the die lands on a 5 or 6 (i. e., probability of 1/3), each participant receives the Amount B of the other person in the dyad and Amount A is not disbursed. In other words, the par- ticipants in a dyad can choose to put money aside for each other, which is disbursed in the case of a loss, that is, when the die lands on a 5 or 6. The DSG is a static game where players choose their actions simultaneously and interdependently. The ac- tual profit in the game depends on one’s own and the other’s decisions as well as the roll of a die. How- ever, participants are not able to influence the other person’s decision, and can only actively influence their profit through their own decision. Under the assump- tions of rationality and von Neumann–Morgenstern utility (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1953; Schoe- maker, 1982), the only variable influencing utility is the payoff. In the DSG, payoff is maximized when each person in the dyad choses a maximum amount for themselves (i. e., Amount A = EUR 10) and con- tributes nothing to the other (Amount B = EUR 0). Thus, this distribution, Amount A = EUR 10 and Amount B = EUR 0, represents maximum cost-benefit considerations. Cost-benefit considerations decrease as participants allocate less money to Amount A and more to Amount B. Conversely, solidarity is shown when individuals decide to put money aside for the other, at the cost of potentially receiving less payoff, in order to prevent the other person from getting noth- ing if the die lands on a 5 or 6. The lower Amount A and the higher Amount B, the higher the solidarity. Research overview and hypotheses Building on our theoretical argumentation, we as- sumed that whenever an economic decision involves others which makes the situation a social situation, individuals’ behavior is shaped by the moral motives that are salient and assumed to be acceptable in the given situation; non-social situations, i.e., situations that do not involve other persons, should not be sus- ceptible to moral motives. Moreover, we assumed that when individuals interact, that is, when a situation is social, they infer an acceptable moral motive from the 10.11588/jddm.2021.1.77559 JDDM | 2021 | Volume 7 | Article 2 | 6 https://doi.org/10.11588/jddm.2021.1.77559 Kugler et al.: The impact of moral motives most salient cues. In anonymous social one-shot inter- actions, individuals use situational cues, for example, content-related information from situational framing, such as written descriptions, to determine an accept- able moral motive. In non-anonymous social ongoing interactions, cues from the interaction should be more salient than situational framing, and moral motives should mainly depend on the quality of prior interac- tion with one’s counterpart and not on the situational framing of moral motives. Building on research by Brodbeck et al. (2013) and applying their experimen- tal approach, we also assumed that in social situations, a unity moral motive leads to more solidarity behav- ior than a proportionality moral motive, while a pro- portionality moral motive leads to more cost-benefit analyses than a unity moral motive. We conducted a laboratory experiment in which participants engaged in the Dyadic Solidarity Game (DSG; Brodbeck et al. 2013). The experiment had a 3 x 2 study design in which we intended to replicate and extend the series of studies conducted by Brod- beck et al. (2013). The first independent variable constituted the decision situation. We created three relationally different situations: (a) anonymous social one-shot interactions where two anonymous individu- als interacted in the DSG, (b) non-anonymous social ongoing interactions where two individuals had a short personal interaction before engaging in the DSG and (c) anonymous non-social one-shot interactions where one individual interacted with a computer “deciding” on the basis of a fixed algorithm. The second inde- pendent variable constituted the framing of the situ- ation with respect to a moral motive. Analogous to Brodbeck et al. (2013), we compared unity moral mo- tives and proportionality moral motives (Rai & Fiske, 2011). Based on our theoretical argumentation and exper- imental design, we tested the following hypotheses: Hypothesis 1a: In anonymous social one-shot inter- actions, the situational moral motive framing (unity vs. proportionality) influences participants’ decisions in the DSG: Participants receiving a unity moral frame show more solidarity than participants receiving a pro- portionality moral frame. Hypothesis 1b: In non-anonymous social ongoing in- teractions, the situational moral motive framing (unity vs. proportionality) has no effect on participants’ de- cisions in the DSG. Hypothesis 1c: In anonymous non-social one-shot interactions (i. e., interacting with a computer which is not social), the situational moral motive framing (unity vs. proportionality) has no effect on partici- pants’ decisions in the DSG1. (Given that comput- ers are not social, social cues regarding moral motives should not matter.) Taking Hypotheses 1a–c together, we expected an interaction effect between the decision situation and the situational moral motive framing: Hypothesis 1d: There is an interaction effect be- tween the decision situation (anonymous social one- shot vs. non-anonymous social ongoing vs. anony- mous non-social one-shot) and the situational moral motive framing (unity vs. proportionality). The moral motive frame influences the economic decision in the DSG in anonymous social one-shot interactions (high solidarity in the unity condition, low solidarity in the proportionality condition) but not in non-anonymous social ongoing interactions or in anonymous non-social one-shot interactions. Whereas the hypotheses specify a level of solidarity in the anonymous social one-shot interaction, that is, high solidarity in the unity condition and low solidarity in the proportionality condition, they do not specify a certain level of solidarity in the other two conditions (i. e., non-anonymous social ongoing interaction, anony- mous non-social one-shot interaction). We will now close this gap. First, in the non-anonymous social ongoing interac- tion, participants engage in a cooperative task with another person prior to the DSG. Due to the coopera- tive nature of the task, participants were expected to form an in-group (Billig & Tajfel, 1973) and strengthen their team spirit (Deutsch, 1973). They further had to touch each other by shaking hands and holding a pen together2. According to Fiske (1992), the feeling of belonging to an in-group and touching should elicit a unity moral motive. We assumed that the unity motive established in the cooperative task would be maintained for the subsequent interaction in the DSG. Second, in the anonymous non-social one-shot in- teraction, no social moral motive should apply. We assumed that in this situation, individuals solely draw on rational cost-benefit analysis to make their deci- sions and decide as would be predicted by subjective expected utility theories. In the DSG, this implies that individuals show no/little solidarity. Combining these considerations and the hypotheses above, we hypoth- esize: Hypothesis 2: While participants in non-anonymous social ongoing interactions and participants in anony- mous social one-shot interactions with a unity frame show high levels of solidarity, participants in anony- mous non-social one-shot interactions and participants in anonymous social one-shot interactions with a pro- portionality frame show low levels of solidarity. Experimental conditions and Hypotheses are sum- marized in Figure 1. Method Design In order to test our hypotheses, we employed a 3 (de- cision situation: anonymous social one-shot interac- tion vs. non-anonymous social ongoing interaction vs. 1Please note that Brodbeck and colleagues (2013) also investi- gated non-social situations: Participants interacted with them- selves in the Self-Insurance Game (SIG). However, interacting with oneself implies non-interdependency and the absence of risk due to either another person (like in the DSG) or a computer (like in the non-social DSG, which we employed). 2Data were collected before the COVID–19 pandemic. 10.11588/jddm.2021.1.77559 JDDM | 2021 | Volume 7 | Article 2 | 7 https://doi.org/10.11588/jddm.2021.1.77559 Kugler et al.: The impact of moral motives Figure 1. Experimental conditions and hypotheses. IV = independent variable; H = hypothesis. anonymous non-social one-shot interaction) x 2 (sit- uational moral motive frame: unity vs. proportional- ity) between-subjects experimental design. The exper- iment was conducted in a laboratory of a large German university. Each session with up to 24 individuals was randomly assigned to one of the three experimental situations: anonymous social one-shot interaction vs. non-anonymous social ongoing interaction vs. anony- mous non-social one-shot interaction. Within each ses- sion, we randomly assigned 50% of participants to a proportionality moral motive framing and 50% to a unity moral motive framing. Participants An a priori power analysis with G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) for an ANOVA with six cells, a targeted power of .80, an alpha level of .05 and an estimated medium to large effect (f = .30, df = 1) of moral motive framing (cf. the effects found by Brodbeck et al., 2013) resulted in a total sample of 90 persons and thus a cell size of at least 15 participants. For the main effect of deci- sion situation (f = .30, df = 2) a total sample of 111 persons was estimated. Thus, we recruited 112 stu- dents from a large German University. Out of the 112 initial participants, we excluded 18 individuals, who indicated in an open-ended question at the end of the study that they had not understood the experimental game (i.e., DSG), even though we provided a detailed explanation of the game followed by an opportunity to ask comprehension questions. The exclusion of partic- ipants was determined by two blind coders who were familiar with the DSG. The coders rated all qualita- tive responses. The inter-rater reliability was Cohen’s κ = .80; discrepancies were discussed and could be resolved in all cases. Thus, N = 94 participants remained in the sample. Those participants varied in sex (59% women) and age (M = 24.16 years, SD = 4.78 years). On average, par- ticipants earned EUR 10.74 (SD = 2.58) for their par- ticipation. The payoff included a EUR 4 show-up fee plus the individual’s profit from the DSG (Brodbeck et al., 2013). Material Dependent variable: Level of solidarity in the DSG. All participants engaged in the DSG (Brodbeck et al., 2013). We measured “Level of solidarity in the DSG” with the Amount B participants chose in the DSG. Amount B varied on a continuum from “high cost- benefit considerations and low solidarity” to “low cost- benefit considerations and high solidarity”. For ease of reading, we refer to low and high solidarity, which simultaneously implies high and low cost-benefit con- siderations. Independent variable 1: Decision situation. The DSG was played in three different decision situa- tions using the computer program z-tree 3.3.11 (Fisch- bacher, 2007): • In the anonymous social one-shot interaction, par- ticipants played the DSG with one person who sat in the same room. Min = 12 to Max = 24 partici- pants engaged in the DSG simultaneously and were randomly matched by the experimental computer. However, participants did not know who the other person was. • In the non-anonymous social ongoing interaction, participants were seated next to their game part- ners. First, they greeted each other and then en- gaged jointly and silently in the following cooper- ative task (Antons, 1992): Participants drew three 10.11588/jddm.2021.1.77559 JDDM | 2021 | Volume 7 | Article 2 | 8 https://doi.org/10.11588/jddm.2021.1.77559 Kugler et al.: The impact of moral motives pictures (a house, a tree, and a dog) together by si- multaneously holding the same pen. Having drawn the three pictures, participants signed their draw- ings. Thus, participants had a common goal and had to touch each other, two mechanisms that should establish a unity moral motive for the re- lationship. Then, participants played the DSG us- ing the computer in a cubical but knowing that the other player was the person next to them they had just met and with whom they had completed the cooperative task. • In the non-social one-shot interaction the other player was the computer. Participants were told in the introduction to the game. Thus, participants had the option to put money aside for the computer they “played” with. Participants were further told that the computer randomly divided “its” EUR 10 into Amount A and Amount B. Independent variable 2: Moral motive framing. The entire experiment was either framed as a unity sit- uation or a proportionality situation. Depending on the moral motive frame, participants were either told that the experiment was about “common welfare in groups or in society” (i.e., unity moral motive frame) or that the experiment was about “cost-benefit opti- mization in free markets” (i.e., proportionality moral motive frame). The frames were developed and pub- lished by Brodbeck et al., 2013 and are available in full length there. Control variables. After the DSG, participants an- swered a short questionnaire. The questionnaire in- cluded a short version of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Thompson, 2007). In addi- tion, the questionnaire included an open-ended ques- tion about the game and the participants’ decision. We used the latter question to disqualify some of the participants who had not understood the game (see “Participants”). Procedure Each session was conducted by the same experimenter. At the beginning of each session, participants were greeted by the experimenter, who explained the ex- perimental procedure and the tasks. Then, partici- pants read a general introduction to the experiment, which included either a unity frame or a proportional- ity frame (i.e., independent variable 2). Following this introduction, participants engaged in the DSG (Brod- beck et al., 2013) in one of the three decision situ- ations: anonymous social one-shot interaction, non- anonymous social ongoing interaction, or anonymous non-social one-shot interaction (i.e., independent vari- able 1). At the end of the session, participants an- swered a questionnaire including demographic ques- tions and control variables. Results Preliminary Analyses Because previous research has shown that sex influ- ences economic behavior (e.g., Ortmann, & Tichy, 1999; Van den Assem, Van Dolder, & Thaler 2012; Whitaker, Bokemeiner, & Loveridge, 2013), we wanted to test whether sex had an effect in our data as well. Preliminary analyses showed that participants’ sex had no significant effect, t(92) = 0.70, p = .488, d = 0.15, on the level of solidarity (i.e., Amount B). A t–test further confirmed that the frame (proportional- ity vs. unity) evoked neither positive, t(92) = 1.73, p = .088, d = 0.36, nor negative affect, t(92) = -1.55, p = .125, d = 0.32, which could have influenced partici- pants’ decisions. In the non-anonymous social ongoing interaction condition, we ruled out that the sex con- stellation of the dyad had an effect. Note that in the anonymous social one-shot interaction the sex of the other person remained unknown. Sex constellation did not have a significant effect on negative affect, F(1, 22) = 4.11, p = .055, h2 = 0.16, positive affect, F(1, 22) = 1.82, p = .191, h2 = .08, or on the level of solidarity, F(1, 22) = 0.21, p = .649, h2 = 0.01. Test of Hypotheses Main effects of moral motives in the three relation- ally different decision situations. To test Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c, we calculated the main effects of moral motive framing (unity vs. proportionality) in the three decision situations (anonymous social one-shot inter- action vs. non-anonymous social ongoing interaction Table 1. Descriptive results by decision situation and moral motive framing. Means (M) represent level of solidarity (Amount B in the DSG in Euro). The effect size Cohen’s d quantifies the differences between the unity moral motive framing and the proportionality moral motive framing. Decision Situation Moral motive framing Anonymous socialone-shot interaction Non-anonymous social ongoing interaction Anonymous non-social one-shot interaction N M SD N M SD N M SD Total 37 2.20 1.78 28 3.75 1.35 29 0.48 1.12 Unity 18 3.06 1.59 16 3.75 1.34 10 0.60 1.35 Proportionality 19 1.40 1.60 12 3.75 1.42 19 0.42 1.02 Cohen’s d 1.04 0.00 0.15 10.11588/jddm.2021.1.77559 JDDM | 2021 | Volume 7 | Article 2 | 9 https://doi.org/10.11588/jddm.2021.1.77559 Kugler et al.: The impact of moral motives vs. anonymous non-social one-shot interaction). All results are summarized in Table 1. Participants in an anonymous social one-shot inter- action showed significantly different levels of solidar- ity (i.e., Amount B) depending on their moral motive framing, t(35) = -3.16, p = .003, d = 1.04, with partic- ipants in the proportionality frame (M = 1.40, SD = 1.60) showing less solidarity than participants in unity frame (M = 3.06, SD = 1.59). Thus, Hypothesis 1a was supported. In non-anonymous social ongoing interactions, the level of solidarity did not vary depending on the moral motive framing, t(26) = 0.00, p > .999, d = 0.00, M proportionality = 3.75, SDproportionality = 1.42, M unity = 3.75, SDunity = 1.34. Because non-significance does not confirm equivalence, further analyses were conducted using the procedure suggested by Rogers, Howard, and Vessey (1993). Equivalence was tested against an assumed large effect size of d = 0.80 (Co- hen, 1988) based on the results reported by Brodbeck and colleagues (2013). A large effect (d = 0.80) trans- lated into a difference of EUR 1.10 in Amount B, which did not fall within the 90% CI [-0.86, 0.86]. Hence, for non-anonymous social ongoing interactions, the levels of solidarity between participants with a unity frame and a proportionality frame were equivalent, support- ing Hypothesis 1b. In anonymous non-social one-shot interactions, par- ticipants in the two framing conditions (unity vs. pro- portionality) showed no significant difference with re- spect to their level of solidarity, that is, Amount B, t(27) = -0.40, p = .691, d = 0.15, M proportionality = 0.42, SDproportionality = 1.02, M unity = 0.60, SDunity = 1.35. Again, further analyses testing the equiva- lence of the two framings were conducted. Following the same assumptions and procedure (Rogers et al., 1993) as for the non-anonymous social ongoing inter- actions, the assumption of equivalence could be sup- ported. Based on the sample’s SD, a large difference would amount to EUR 0.96, which was outside the 90% CI [-0.55, 0.91]. Hence, Hypothesis 1c regard- ing the equivalence of the two framing groups (unity vs. proportionality) in anonymous non-social one-shot interactions was supported. Interaction effect between decision situation and sit- uational moral motive framing. To test Hypothesis 1d, we conducted a 2 x 3 between-subjects ANOVA, which revealed a significant interaction, F(2, 88) = 3.46, p = .036, h2 = 0.07. The pattern of the interaction sup- ported Hypothesis 1d: The moral motive frame (unity vs. proportionality) influenced the level of solidarity in the economic decision only in the anonymous social one-shot interaction but not in the non-anonymous so- cial ongoing interaction or the anonymous non-social one-shot interaction. The results are summarized in Figure 2. Differences in levels of solidarity. Hypothesis 2 predicted that participants in non-anonymous social ongoing interactions, regardless of the moral motive framing, and participants in anonymous social one- shot interactions with a unity frame would show high levels of solidarity, while participants in anony- mous non-social one-shot interactions, regardless of the moral motive framing, and participants in anony- mous social one-shot interactions with a proportion- ality frame would show low levels of solidarity. The descriptive results visualized in Figure 2 support the predicted pattern. To statistically test this result, we combined the anonymous social one-shot interaction with unity framing and non-anonymous social ongo- ing interaction with both framings conditions into a “high solidarity” condition and the anonymous social one-shot interaction with proportionality framing and anonymous non-social one-shot interaction with both framings into a “low solidarity” condition. Support- ing Hypothesis 2, the high solidarity condition and the low solidarity condition differed significantly in the predicted direction, t(92) = -8.92, p < .001, d = 1.81, M high solidarity = 3.48, SDhigh solidarity = 1.47, M low solidarity = 0.84, SDlow solidarity = 1.39. Exploratory Analyses Proportionality versus self-interest. The outcome in the DSG paradigm (i.e., Amount A and Amount B) is suited to differentiate between unity and proportion- ality moral motives. However, is not equally suited to rule out all alternative explanations for the behav- ior shown. Most apparent, low levels of solidarity or rather high levels of cost-benefit considerations could potentially also stem from pure self-interest besides proportionality moral motives. Presumably, both, in- dividuals with self-interest and individuals with pro- portionality moral motives, consider costs and benefits and conclude that their payoff is maximized by show- ing no solidarity. From a theoretical point of view the distinction between self-interest and proportional- ity moral motive is of interest, because self-interest is explicitly not a defining or necessary feature of propor- tionality. Different from self-interest a proportionality moral motive is relational and other-regarding (Fiske, 1992; see also Brodbeck et al., 2013). To provide some evidence that the effects of our proportionality framing are different from self-interest (which indeed should be shown in the case when in- teracting with a computer), we compared Amount B in the anonymous social one-shot interaction with pro- portionality framing and Amount B in the anonymous non-social one-shot interaction (across both framings). Both amounts differed significantly, with Amount B in the anonymous social one-shot interaction with pro- portionality framing (M = 1.40, SD = 1.60) being significantly higher than in the anonymous non-social one-shot interaction across both framings (M = 0.48, SD = 1.12), t(46) = 2.35, p = .023, d = 0.69. Post- hoc, we assume that besides cost-benefit considera- tions, participants with a proportionality moral mo- tive might have considered on average EUR 1.40 (+ show up fee) the least payoff a participant should get proportional to the effort for participating in the study (i.e., “at least a cappuccino on their way home”). The ‘Golden Rule’. The Golden Rule tells us to 10.11588/jddm.2021.1.77559 JDDM | 2021 | Volume 7 | Article 2 | 10 https://doi.org/10.11588/jddm.2021.1.77559 Kugler et al.: The impact of moral motives Figure 2. Interaction effect of decision situation and moral motive framing on solidarity. Brodbeck et al.’s (2013) results (Self-Insurance Game) are included as a reference value. treat others as we would like to be treated. In our experiment, we demonstrated that participants with a unity motive showed high levels of solidarity towards the other person in the DSG. Therefore, one might ask whether individuals with a unity moral motive applied the golden rule and showed solidarity to the extent they would want to be treated themselves. The ques- tion’s theoretical foundation refers to the fact that a unity motive entails that everyone should be treated the same – oneself and all others (Rai & Fiske, 2011; Fiske, 1992). To answer the question, we combined our findings with those of Brodbeck et al. (2013). Brodbeck et al., 2013 included a condition in which individu- als played the DSG with themselves (i.e., the Self- Insurance Game, SIG; Brodbeck et al. (2013)). In the SIG, moral motives likewise did not matter given the absence of a relationship to someone else. Instead, participants’ economic decisions in the SIG provide an answer to how participants treated themselves in the specific economic situation, that is, how much “soli- darity” they showed towards themselves. Thus, we tested the equivalence of the following two groups: (a) the level of solidarity of participants with a unity motive engaging in the DSG in our experi- ment, that is, the average level of solidarity among participants in the anonymous social one-shot inter- action with a unity frame and participants in the non-anonymous social ongoing interaction and (b) the amount people put aside for themselves in the SIG in the experiment by Brodbeck et al. (2013). The de- scriptive results are visualized in Figure 2. Conducting the test of equivalence described above (Rogers et al., 1993), we found that participants with a unity frame in our experiment put aside the same amount of money for their partner in the DSG as participants put aside for themselves in the SIG conducted by Brodbeck et al. (2013). Assuming a large effect (Cohen’s d = .80) based on our and Brodbeck et al.’s (2013) findings, the respective difference of 1.31 EUR was outside the 90% CI [-0.62, 0.51]. Discussion Our study sheds light on the question of how “salient others” in social situations influence economic deci- sions. Based on the theory of relationship regulation (Rai & Fiske, 2011; Fiske, 1992), we proposed that in social situations – and only in social situations – moral motives influence behaviors, including economic decision-making. In our study, we showed that, on the one hand, moral motives had no effect in non-social situations, that is, when individuals interacted with a computer in the DSG. Conversely, in anonymous so- cial situations, different moral motives led to different economic decisions: (a) the moral motive of unity, un- derlying relationships with in-group members in which everything is shared according to needs, led to more solidarity and less cost-benefit considerations towards one’s partner in the DSG (and the application of the “Golden Rule”), (b) the moral motive of proportional- ity, underlying relationships that function on the basis of market principles, where costs, benefits, gains, and contributions are divided proportionally, led to less sol- idarity and more cost-benefit considerations towards one’s partner in the DSG. Differentiating post-hoc between a proportionality moral motive (an other-regarding motive) and self- interest (a self-regarding motive), we could show that participants in anonymous social situations with a pro- portionality frame donated more to the other than people in the non-social situation (which should be guided by self-interest). Showing solidarity in our paradigm (i.e., the Dyadic Solidarity Game, DSG; 10.11588/jddm.2021.1.77559 JDDM | 2021 | Volume 7 | Article 2 | 11 https://doi.org/10.11588/jddm.2021.1.77559 Kugler et al.: The impact of moral motives Brodbeck et al., 2013) clearly deviated from what ra- tionality, von Neumann–Morgenstern utility (von Neu- mann & Morgenstern, 1953; Schoemaker, 1982) and pure self-interest would predict. However, this post- hoc exploration is preliminary and requires further in- vestigation. In addition to showing that moral motives mat- ter in economic decisions involving others, we also shed light on how specific moral motives are activated. In anonymous social one-shot interactions, individu- als were susceptible to cues provided by the framing of the situation. Individuals implied the appropriate moral motive for the relationship in the DSG from the most salient cue in the situation (cf. De Kwaadste- niet & Van Dijk, 2010). Thus, the cues tacitly coordi- nated the participants’ decision behavior (e.g., Abele, Stasser, & Chartier, 2014). In non-anonymous social ongoing interactions, such situational cues were inef- fective. Instead, individuals “applied” the moral mo- tive in the DSG that had been established in a pre- vious interaction. In our experiment, we established a unity motive, which subsequently led to high levels of solidarity in the DSG and to an application of the “Golden Rule” in economic decisions. From an evo- lutionary perspective, this contingency between situ- ational cues and respective moral motives can be ex- plained by systematic relationships between informa- tion and behavior. Behavior per se cannot be inter- preted without considering the informational context upon which it is contingent. In this vein, relationship regulation based on moral motives could be interpreted as “evolved neural architectures [which] are specifica- tions of richly contingent systems for generating re- sponses to informational inputs” (Tooby & Cosmides, 2005, p. 13). In sum, the findings show that individuals deviate from rational decisions in social situations as a result of moral motives underlying their relationship to the other person. Moreover, individuals’ actual economic decisions can be predicted by the specific moral mo- tive active in the specific interaction. Whereas in on- going relationships, the moral motive stems from the relational history, in anonymous one-shot interactions, individuals’ decision-making can be influenced by sit- uational frames or peripheral cues. This finding is especially interesting given that individuals nowadays often interact anonymously and only once when mak- ing economic decisions. Nowak (2006) refers to such asymmetric kinds of cooperative behaviors as indirect reciprocity. From an evolutionary perspective, helping strangers or donating money helps to establish a good reputation, which then will be rewarded by others in the long run. According to Rai and Fiske (2011, p. 59) “our sense of morality functions to facilitate the gener- ation and maintenance of long-term social cooperative relationships with others”. From this evolutionary per- spective, cooperation and the evolution of morality go hand in hand and are mutually conditional. Our results replicate and extend previous work by Brodbeck et al. (2013). Brodbeck et al. (2013) also showed that moral motives affect economic decisions when interacting with an anonymous person in the DSG. First, we extend their research by including an anonymous non-social interaction. In doing so, we showed that moral motives only matter in social, not in non-social situations. Note that Brodbeck et al. (2013) compared anonymous social one-shot interac- tions in the DSG to a structurally equivalent “inter- action” with oneself in the Self-Insurance Game. Sec- ond, we extended their research by including a non- anonymous social ongoing interaction. In doing so, we shed light on the question of what individuals base their decisions about the appropriate moral motive on and when individuals are especially susceptible to sit- uational cues. Our findings also provide an alternative explanation for the identifiability effect. In social decision situ- ations, this effect refers to the fact that “willingness to share or give resources to another person is often greater when the recipient is identified rather than anonymous” (Halali, Kogut, & Ritov, 2017, p. 474, see also Small & Loewenstein, 2003). The identifiabil- ity effect is often explained with reference to emotions or “ethical motivations” (Halali et al., 2017, p. 481) that are evoked by an identifiable counterpart and sub- sequently influence decision-making (e.g., Kogut & Ri- tov, 2005, 2015). According to relationship regulation theory (Rai & Fiske, 2011), these ‘ethical motivations’ could reflect a unity motive activated by the identifia- bility of the other which then regulates social behavior. This assumption should be tested in future research contrasting ongoing, identifiable relationships in which unity motives are prevalent with ongoing, identifiable relationships in which other motives, such as propor- tionality motives, are prevalent. Economic theories and individual preferences Economic theory suggests that when making economic decisions, people are “strongly motivated by other- regarding preferences” (Halali, Kogut & Ritov, 2017, p. 473). Individual other-regarding preferences are susceptible to “slight changes in the social context” (Fehr & Hoff, 2011, p. 7) within which an inter- action takes place and can be influenced by culture, situational framings, anchors, or priming of individ- uals’ identities. For example, the economic environ- ment determines “the preference type that is decisive for the prevailing behavior in equilibrium”: either the fair type or the selfish type (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999, p. 2). Below, we discuss our findings in the light of the economic framing literature and a theory that explic- itly models fairness as a decision rationale, the theory of reciprocity (Falk & Fischbacher, 2006). The economic framing literature explains how changes in the experimental context affect behavior in the short run; for example, individuals contribute more in a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma if it is called a “com- munity game” than if it is called a “Wall Street game” (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999, p. 27; Liberman, Samuels, & Ross, 2004). We could easily explain the framing effect in our anonymous social one-shot interaction based on 10.11588/jddm.2021.1.77559 JDDM | 2021 | Volume 7 | Article 2 | 12 https://doi.org/10.11588/jddm.2021.1.77559 Kugler et al.: The impact of moral motives the framing literature. However, the framing literature cannot explain the differential effects of moral motive framings in the anonymous social versus anonymous non-social interactions. To explain those differential effects, a theory is needed that highlights the distinct nature of social interactions, which the framing liter- ature does not do, but relationship regulation theory does (Rai & Fiske, 2011), as does the theory of reci- procity (Falk & Fischbacher, 2006). The theory of reciprocity (Falk & Fischbacher, 2006) explains why people behave differently when interact- ing with real persons compared to “interacting” with random devices, drawing on the intentionality of real people’s behavior and non-intentionality of random de- vices’ “actions”. A random mechanism does not “sig- nal any intentions” (Falk & Fischbacher, 2006, p. 304) which could be intentionally reciprocated. As such, the theory of reciprocity offers an alternative explana- tion for why participants in our study did not show solidarity towards an algorithm in the non-social sit- uation but did show solidarity towards other humans in the social situations. Moreover, the theory of reciprocity proposes that when acting in a competitive market, people will ac- cept unfair distributions because they know that “in a competitive market [they have] no chance to achieve a ‘fair’ outcome” (Falk & Fischbacher, 2006, p. 307). By contrast, in cooperative games such as public goods games, people contribute more, the more they expect the others to contribute. Moreover, in bilateral in- teractions, the theory of reciprocity predicts outcomes tending to be ‘fair’. As such, the theory of reciprocity seems to offer alternative explanations for the effects of our unity and proportionality frames as well as for the higher levels of solidarity in situations with prior bilateral interaction. However, the theory of reciprocity defines reci- procity as a “behavioral response to perceived kind- ness or unkindness” (Falk & Fischbacher, 2006, 2006, p. 294), and accordingly builds on multi-shot games. Thus, the theory of reciprocity cannot explain the ori- gin of non-selfish behavior in one-shot games, as we have demonstrated and theoretically explained in our study. Instead, the theory of reciprocity assumes that “unconditional cooperation is practically inexistent” (Falk & Fischbacher, 2006, p. 308), an assumption which we can reject based on relationship regulation theory (Rai & Fiske, 2011). Taken together, neither the framing literature nor the theory of reciprocity can fully explain the behav- ioral patterns we identified in our experiment. Thus, economic theory and research on individual prefer- ences (e.g., Falk & Fischbacher, 2006; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) offer alternative explanations for some of our re- sults but not for the overall pattern. Thus, we en- courage the scientific discourse on economic decision- making to more systematically take theories of moral motives into account and further explore the nature of moral motives as a component of utility functions. Although the discourse on individual preferences and their susceptibility to situational changes has been go- ing on for several decades, more discussion and theo- retical integration between economics and psychology would be even better. Limitations and future research The generalizability of our results, which stemmed from a sample of 94 people with two out of six cells falling below a cell size of 15 persons, might be ques- tionable. However, we were able to replicate Brodbeck et al.’s (2013) findings, which underlines the robust- ness of the effect of moral motive frames on economic decision-making behavior. Moreover, our proposi- tions and hypotheses were derived from and embedded within a strong theoretical rationale, relationship reg- ulation theory (Rai & Fiske, 2011), which makes our results comparable to other empirical findings in the field of moral psychology and strengthens our results’ interpretability and theoretical relevance. Regarding our sample, many drop-outs occurred in the anonymous non-social one-shot interaction with unity framing, that is, when solidarity towards a non- social entity was suggested by the situation, and in the non-anonymous social ongoing interaction with pro- portionality framing, that is, when low solidarity to- wards a person, with whom a prior cooperative rela- tionship was built, was suggested. In these cases, the experimentally induced moral motive might have con- tradicted human intuition and thus have caused con- fusion for some participants. Thus, drop-outs might have been confounded with our experimental condi- tions. These systematic drop-out effects might be subject to future research investigating the power of human moral intuition and consequences of intuition- situation-incontingencies when interacting with tech- nical or artificial devices. From a broader perspec- tive, insights into such experimental “errors” could also point at general misconceptions of human think- ing and reasoning, which can also lead to misconcep- tions when creating artificial general intelligence (cf. Deutsch, 2019). In our study design, we included a non-anonymous, social ongoing interaction to test the assumption that moral motives formed by a prior interaction were stronger than a situational framing provided in the ex- perimental task. By instructing participants to com- plete a cooperative task, they were expected to estab- lish a unity moral motive for the relationship. Future research should also include an experimental condi- tion with a non-anonymous, social ongoing interaction based on proportionality motives, in order to probe whether the overriding effect supported by our data also holds for ongoing relationships based on propor- tionality motives. In our research rationale, we did not check for the effectiveness of our manipulations, because a manipu- lation check would have meant to check the presence of moral motives as mental states and to test the me- diating function of these mental states between the in- duced motive and the subsequent behavior. However, a test of this mediation effect was not the focus of this 10.11588/jddm.2021.1.77559 JDDM | 2021 | Volume 7 | Article 2 | 13 https://doi.org/10.11588/jddm.2021.1.77559 Kugler et al.: The impact of moral motives study, in which we focused on proofing that moral mo- tives were (or were not) present in relationally differ- ent types of situations. We inferred on the existence of moral motives based on different behavioral reac- tions, which were also identified in prior research (see Brodbeck et al., 2013). Nevertheless, future research could dedicate to the examination of the role of mental states as mediators in morally-loaded social situations. Regarding the experimental setting, the manipula- tion of decision situations was randomized at the ex- perimental session level. Thus, the effects of the de- cision situation on the level of solidarity might have been confounded with potential session effects. How- ever, we tried to keep the experimental setting con- stant (the same experimenter conducted all sessions) and controlled for effects of positive affect and negative affect, which might have been triggered within specific sessions. With our paradigm, we demonstrated the moral ba- sis of our experimentally induced motives by showing that the respective motives were active in social situ- ations but not in non-social situations. However, with our paradigm, we cannot entirely rule out that our pro- portionality framing was confounded with pure self- interest or egoistic behavior. Although self-interest is not a distinctive, defining or necessary feature of proportionality, both can be linked and may co-occur (Fiske, 1992). Future research should contrast situ- ations, in which the moral motive of proportionality leads to decisions which would also be triggered by egoism and situations, in which both lead to distin- guishable decisions patterns. Economists have begun to recognize the influence of other-regarding preferences, norms or decision heuris- tics on individuals’ economic decisions, which cause individuals to deviate from self-interest as the primary source of motivated behavior. These other-regarding preferences, norms or decision heuristics show paral- lels to the four moral motives suggested by relation- ship regulation theory, which is not astonishing, be- cause the four moral motives claim universal valid- ity. Future research should investigate whether other- regarding preferences, norms or decision heuristics as investigated in economic studies can be traced back to the moral motives suggested by relationship regulation theory. For example, noblesse oblige, “a social norm that obligates those of higher rank to be honorable and generous in their dealings with those of lower rank” (Fiddick et al., 2013, p. 320), might be an expression of hierarchy; altruism, a “form of unconditional kind- ness” (Fehr & Schmidt, 2006, p. 619) might be an expression of unity; reciprocity, which is characterized by being “willing to incur costs with the expectation of immediate or future benefits” (Fiddick et al., 2013, p. 319) and the equal division rule (“whatever is being allocated should be divided equally among the partic- ipants”; Allison & Messick, 1990, p. 195) might be ex- pressions of equality; rational cost-benefit calculations might co-occur with proportionality. This endeavor might help to bridge the gap between economics and psychology and advance interdisciplinary theorizing. We also want to offer a normative, ethical perspec- tive on our experimental design and results. Two ma- jor views have dominated philosophical approaches to morality: utilitarianism (or consequentialism) and de- ontology. A utilitarian or consequentialist ethic as- sumes that the rightness of an action can be deter- mined by its consequences (Holyoak & Powell, 2016). To “bring about the greatest good for the greatest number” (Bartels et al., 2015, p. 488) would be such a utilitarian logic. By contrast, a deontological ap- proach assumes that “the right does not necessarily maximize the good” (Holyoak & Powell, 2016, p. 1180) and that acts are wrong if they violate rules or obli- gations (Bartels et al., 2015). From this perspective, our proportionality framing might have provided the ground for a utilitarian interpretation. As the ex- pected utility for both persons in the DSG was maxi- mized when each person chose a maximum for them- selves, the “greatest good for the greatest number” was reached by contributing nothing to the other. By contrast, our unity framing might have provided the ground for a deontological interpretation, as deontic rules might be “driven by concern for the well-being of others” (Holyoak & Powell, 2016, p. 1181) which is also in the center of a unity moral motive. Future research should disentangle (or reconcile) normative ethical theories, moral principles of relationship regu- lation and economic theories based on “expected util- ity”. Practical implications Our results suggest that how people interact in anony- mous social settings, such as online settings, is influ- enced by the moral motive framing provided in the setting itself. A growing body of research in finance examines textual influences on investor behavior in large-sample real-world data sets (for a review, see Loughran & McDonald, 2016). We demonstrated a possible mechanism for why textual characteristics in- fluence investors in an anonymous social situation: Textual characteristics might serve as a frame shaping investors’ moral motives and behavior. Moreover, we examined economic decision situations in which partic- ipants had had a short prior interaction. Such short personal interactions can also be found in interactive online tools. Live chats and helplines, for example, support people in search of information while opening an online broker account, deciding on a new energy provider or buying new electric appliances, for exam- ple. These short interactions can be powerful sources of moral motives, overruling moral motives provided by a situation’s framing. Our results also shed light on moral behavior in non-social situations: People were not receptive to moral cues in a non-social situation. This result might be interesting for the design of in- teraction situations with non-human devices, such as autonomous vehicles, robo-counselling, or smart home systems. 10.11588/jddm.2021.1.77559 JDDM | 2021 | Volume 7 | Article 2 | 14 https://doi.org/10.11588/jddm.2021.1.77559 Kugler et al.: The impact of moral motives Declaration of conflicting interests: The authors de- clare no conflicts of interest. Author contributions: All authors contributed sub- stantially to the conception and design of the study, to the acquisition, analysis, and interpretation of data for the study; they also contributed to drafting the study or revising it critically for important intellectual content. Katharina G. Kugler and Julia A. M. Reif equally con- tributed to the development of the manuscript. Author note: Gesa-Kristina Petersen is now at Way- fair. Julia Reif was funded by a postdoctoral research fellow- ship of the “Bayerische Gleichstellungsfoerderung” while writing the manuscript. This research was conducted at the “Munich Experimental Laboratory for Economic and Social Sciences” of the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Munich, Germany, funded by the German Re- search Foundation (DFG) in the context of the Excellence Initiative “LMUexcellent”. Data was collected within the context of a diploma the- sis completed by Gesa-Kristina Petersen at the Ludwig- Maximilians-Universität München. We thank Keri Hart- man for proofreading our manuscript and the Reviewers and the Editor for their helpful comments. Handling editor: Wolfgang Schoppek Copyright: This work is licensed under a Creative Com- mons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 In- ternational License. Citation: Kugler, K. G., Reif, J. A. M., Petersen, G.- K., & Brodbeck, F. C. (2021). The impact of moral motives on economic decision-making in relationally dif- ferent situations. 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